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How Migrations to Lagos State in Nigeria Influence Social Borders of Lagosian Society. The example of the migration typology and the spatial structure of a city

The aim of the paper is migrations to Lagos State in Nigeria and their influence on social borders of Lagosian society. I would like to propose the thesis which assumes that the type of migration influences the internal structure of a city and this structure shows the borders in space - divided society.

Federal Republic of Nigeria is one of the most populated African countries in the south of the Sahara and the internal as well as external processes of migration are very dynamic. They are related to the population placement and geographical condition. Until the end of the 19th century, Sokoto was the most populated Nigerian city, but the end of the slavery trade placed on the south-west coast, caused the rapid migratory wave from the interior to the current Lagos State area. Lagos had been growing up in a rapid pace. Many important institutions placed in Lagos and the industry development was the reason of foundation of Lagos as a capital of Nigeria until 1991. Whereas on the north of the country, there were the old well developed cities in the Muslim area and it caused non-proportional demographical placement. Population used to settle down mainly on the north and on the south of the country. The Middle Belt area stayed weakly populated, so there were no ethnic conflicts, because the land was neither Yoruba land nor Hausa land nor Ibo land, it was more neutral. The consequence of that fact was the decision to move the capital city from Lagos to Abuja.

"Pre-colonial Lagos originated as fishing and farming settlement in the 17th century"[1] is related to the colonialism period in sub-Saharan Africa. In 15th century (about 1472) the Portuguese got into in those days the Benin Kingdom coast. The British, the French and the Dutch fleets had followed after them and on the one hand they opened the trade relations with local kings and on the other hand they started the slavery trade. Lagos Island was placed on

[1] Josephine Olu Abiodun, *The challenges of growth and development in metropolitan Lagos*, in: *The Urban challenge in Africa: Growth and management of its large cities*, (ed.) Carole Rakodi, United Nations University Press, New York 1997, p. 58.

The Gulf of Guinea, called at that time Slavery Coast. Lagos Island has got its own *oba* (king), but he was removed because of the British attack in 1851. His successor was forced to sign the treaty which determined the British domination on Lagos Island, its port, with all rights and profits. It was the beginning of the foundation of the first official British colony in Nigeria in 1861. In spite of the fact that Lagos was the area of lagoons and it has got sandy, wet terrains, British colonizers decided to invest there. They had built many industrial centers along the coast or with easy access by water to the coast. It is the example of the fact that "south of the Sahara, the primate cities were all founded as trading centers and located near the coasts."[2] That caused new workplaces for migrants who had been coming from the internal to current Lagos area. They were employed in fabrics and ports. This place-arrangement around important and strategic coast had been the effect of the fact that the city started to grow up further down on land. The illustration No. 1 shows this effect in three periods in 1900, 1963 and 1984.[3]



Fig. 6.2 **Growth of the built-up area of metropolitan Lagos, 1900–1984 (Source: Town Planning Services, Ministry of the Environment and Physical Planning)**

Illustration No. 1.



Figure 22 Three generalizations of the internal structure of cities

Illustration No. 2.

[2] M. Gottdiener, R. Hutchison, *The New Urban Sociology*, 3rd ed. Westview Press 2006, p. 309.
[3] Josephine Olu Abiodun, *The challenges of growth and development in metropolitan Lagos*…, p. 62.

The urban studies literature identifies three models of the spatial structure of a city. The first type was termed a centric one as it is based on the plan of a circle, the second one was termed sectoral and the third one - called "multiple nuclei" type – is a multicentre structure.[4] Present-day Lagos represents the third type, what illustrates picture number 2.[5] Lagos contains 16 mean quarters - *Local Government Area* (LGA) and they are: Agege, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Alimosho, Amuwo – Odofin, Apapa, Eti-Osa (Victoria Island i Ikoyi), Ifake-Ijaiye, Ikeja, Kosofe, Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland (Yaba), Mushin, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo, Shomolu, Surulere.

The city plan with several centers confirms the thesis that the spatial structure of a city is determined by its geographical location (in this case it is related to its location on the sea-coast and to its access to the sea) and by migration processes. In the evolution of the Lagos quarters layout three types of quarters, established as separate centers/nuclei, can be differentiated. The first group of such centers is trade quarters where markets are located. The second one includes rich quarters, business centers situated in the south of the metropolis. The third type is determined by industrial development and rapid spread of the slums.

We can point out 6 main nuclei - centers: Apapa, Ebute Meta, Mushin and Ikeja, Victoria Island and Lagos Island. In the 60s of the 20th century this situation established internal structure of the metropolis and defined circular migration processes which also functions nowadays. It confirms the 3rd type of the spatial structure of a city.[6]

In the migration literature there are defined three main Word migration phases. The first one was related with migration to uninhabited places in order to acquire new terrains.

[4] Chauncy D. Harris & Edward L. Ullman, *The Nature of Cities*, in: *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.*1945; 242: 7-17.
[5]Akin L. Mabogunje, *Theory of urban growth and development*, in: *Urbanization in Nigeria*, University of London Press, London 1968, s. 178.
[6] See: Akin L. Mabogunje, "The internal structure of Lagos", in: *Urbanization in Nigeria*, University of London Press, London 1968, p. 289.

Subsequently migratory movements were focused on the big industrial center. And finally migratory movements in the third phase are concentrated on the big metropolis. The history of Lagos is the example of each kind of the mentioned phases and it shows the factors of Lagos attractiveness for migrants. Thus, analogical history of Lagos population has been progressing. The oral records explained that Yoruba people came from Ife city (the cradle of Yorubaland[7]) into the present-day Lagos terrains. It is important to mention that in this way the first migrants based Lagos metropolis. It was a small Lagos Island, which is now one of the quarters with *oba* (king) palace, remaining about the roots of the place.

After few centuries, during the colonial times, when the British developed the city, Lagos became an industrial center, there were created new workplaces for people from other Nigerian states as well as for Yoruba people. Since two decades, even though the capital has been moved from Lagos to Abuja, Lagos is still the financial, industrial and economic center in the country. Important Nigerian and other African banks are located there, also lots of corporations with national and foreign capital have got their own place of residence here. It brings about the rise of the external migration effects. Besides, there are many higher schools and universities in Lagos, hence external and internal migrations are related to the inflow of students, who very often used to stay there looking for a job. The metropolis is also the center of contemporary Nigerian culture and entertainment.

It shows the big contrast between the poorest people from one of the 42 slums of the city and the rich people, who can afford to go to the modern cinema like Silver Bird, gallery like Terra Kulture, theatre like Muson Centre, etc.

> "The occurrence of slums alongside rich urban neighborhoods is seething pot of unrest and a glaring proof of disharmony in our cities."[8]

This kind of the opinion presented by the Minister of State for Environment, Housing and Urban Development, emphasizes the social borders in Lagos metropolis in the common city space.

Lagos became a big metropolis from a small fishing village and now its population is about 8-14 million. It is important to note that it is very difficult to give unambiguous number of Lagos inhabitants, because the amount depends on the data source. "There are many problems in getting accurate population statistics in Nigeria, because numbers are the key to power."[9] Nigeria's role in Africa is compared with Russia's position in Europe, because both

[7] Yorubaland is placed on the South-West of Nigeria, on the West of Niger River.
[8] http://knuws.blogspot.com/2008/10/lagos-nigerian-upcoming-mega-city-with.html
[9] Margaret Peil, *Lagos. The City is the People*, Belhaven Press, London 1991, p. 18.

of them want to be hegemony, that is why Nigerian government informs about the higher number of its cities' populations.[10]

Lagos is unusual metropolis due to the fact that it includes two different theoretical models according to city development theory. One of the models describes a development in rich, wealthy countries, where the expansion process results from the consumerism behaviors (banks, shopping and entertainment centers) and the second model characterizes development process in developing countries (unemployment, homelessness, social conflicts, crimes, sanitation problems and transport problems).[11] Both of these phenomenons exist simultaneously in Lagos. On the one hand Lagos has got very exclusive area on Victoria Island, Ikoyi, Lekki and Ikeja and the living standards in these quarters are similar like in well-developed European countries. On the other hand migrations of the poorest populations from inside Nigeria as well as immigrants from less rich West African countries are rising up. These groups form the high number of homeless people, which hope to survive in the big city. So Lagos is the place, where the slums and the expensive districts are so close to each other that we can observe in the public area borders between the very rich and the very poor. It leads to a low level public security and is the reason why Lagos is listed among the most dangerous cities in the world. Another interesting issue relates to the fact that these borders are quite flexible. It is significant that in that agglomeration it is difficult to identify one settled position in the social stratification category. Besides, many new quarters are growing into the metropolis, one quarters used to change and develop from the poor areas into the place of middle-income like Yaba or working-class districts became housing estates, like Mushin. There are consequences and they are related to migrations types which can be observed in Lagos.

Therefore, we can point out the internal migrations which are including: swinging migration as a daily travels to work (commutes), mainly to Victoria Island direction (Lagos administration - business center), they are temporary tendency. There are also internal migrations between the Lagos districts, where mainly families (generations born in Lagos) move from the worst quarters to the better one, for example from old slums on Lagos Island to Sabo Yaba (where *sabo* means "the new one"), from Surulere to Ikeja or Victoria Island. These migrations movements are constant tendency and they forced the state government to

[10] Thus statistic data are hypothetical. For instance in the comparison of the biggest metropolis on the Word in *The New Urban Sociology* [Gottdiener, Hutchison, 2006], Lagos from the year of 2000 was on the 17th position, when according to UN broadcastings for a year of 2030, Lagos supposed to be on the 14th position. Hence in Nigerian publications, Lagos metropolis is seemed in 2015 as the 7th the biggest World city, even sometimes on the 4th position in ranking after Tokyo, New York and Bombay.

[11] See: Tom Martison, *American Dreamscape*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York 2000.

build new bridges and roads. New illegal housing estates of homeless have started to spread out along them. Homeless people and beggars hope to survive along a bustling street and it caused another social border in the same city space.

The internal migrations are also migration movements from other Nigerian states to the metropolis and they are characterized by circulation tendency with regular returns to the hometown. On these kind of migrations we can observe an example of infrastructure border, because new residential citizens have to exist between their home place, the new place in Lagos and more of that when they want to get to the main domestic bus station Ojota placed on the top north of the metropolis, they have to regularly spend 2–2,5 hours traveling through Lagos to get to the bus station, because of the bad infrastructure and traffics. This kind of protruding junction provokes new citizens to settle down on Lagos suburbs created by these new economic borders between local inhabitants from the old Lagos districts and the new areas.

The second type of migrations movement is external migration. It is due to them that Lagos is overpopulated, overcrowded and the borders between citizens are growing up simultaneously with industry development of the city in some part of Lagos and with industry underdevelopment with most places of the metropolis. It builds borders which raise aggression and the culture of area-boys and crime resulting from the economic inequality.

Lagos has got lots of unfinished, empty buildings because of the lack of investors' money. These buildings are without neither electricity nor sewerage systems, but they are good places to live for the poorest migrants from Nigeria and neighboring countries like Niger or Benin as well as from Ghana and Togo[12]. Most of them transform into slums. But at the same time, well-off migrants but non-educated ones from the same countries start to invest in street business. "Immigrants from Togo, Benin, Ghana have been attracted by Lagos prosperity, especially during the oil boom of the 1970s, when there were many low-paid jobs which Nigerians were unwilling to do".[13] Some of them do open small kiosks with pieces of products like in all Africa (for example single cigarettes or the single bags of tea instead of the one box of tea). External African female migrants used to open also street cantinas when male migrants looping for a job as a night guards in the residential districts of Lagos metropolis.

[12] See: Oka Obono, "A Lagos Thing. Rules and Realities in the Nigerian Megacity", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Autumn 2007, s. 36.

[13] Margaret Peil, *Lagos. The City is the People*, Belhaven Press, London 1991, p. 40.

External migrations are also legal and illegal emigration movements of Lagosians to two main directions – Europe and the USA (also to Canada). These have mostly permanent tendency, due to fact that every Nigerian (and generally African) family wants to have own member abroad in Europe or the USA, because of the financial reason and the possibility of join to him. It provokes another economic and life style border between the citizens of the same housing estate, between those families who has got the relative abroad and those who do not.

Within the framework of external migrations it counts immigrants from Europe (mainly these are British, German and Irish) as well as Canadian and Asian expatriates which are sent by the international companies. They treat Lagos as a place of economic investment and oil trade. Expats are holding management position and as a rule they live in separate and armed districts. Usually they hate Lagos and they treat its habitants and their workers with contempt. It creates stereotypes and builds other borders, the borders between the cultures. It also deepens the extremely economic situation in the society because due to these rich immigrants from abroad (sometimes also some experts from other African countries) there are built new expensive hotels, bars, restaurants, shopping centers and night clubs.

In Lagos there are many educational centers like: Queen's College, the Nigerian Institute of Medical Research, the Yaba College of Technology, the Igbobi College, the University of Lagos, the Federal School Science and Technical College, and the Federal College of Education. These situations caused that well educated young people live among the poorest one which often have not graduated even primary school. Usually in the metropolis this difference is not so big, but because Lagos is the hope for these worst-off people from slums as well as is the hope for career we can observe the next border in education level.

Assuming, Lagos is a city with plenty of borders: social, economical, related to lifestyles, infrastructure, and architecture. According to mentioned above migration consequences, Lagos is seemed as an emigration city on the one hand and as an immigration city on the other hand. Both tendencies contribute to creation contradictions in the framework of a one city like exclusive districts and slums. My field participatory observation in 2008 leads me to conclude that borders between religions and ethnicities are less dangerous than we could suppose. Metropolis is a melting pot where citizens are used to live among different temples, shrines, mosques and churches and respect their ethnic background. The fact of moving the capital from Lagos to Abuja was a good decision in establishing this kind of ethnic relations on Lagos area.

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Environmental discourses and mobility control in borderland spaces: a case study of Mtabila refugee camp, Kasulu District, Tanzania

Introduction

Borderlands have often been at the heart of refugee crises, as asylum seekers cross their national borders to seek refuge in another country. Following instability in the Great Lakes region of Africa in the 1990s, over one million refugees entered neighbouring Tanzania, leading to the creation of new refugee camps to accommodate these refugees as the situation became protracted. New smaller and transient borderlands, identified as 'refugee-hosting areas' by the international community, emerged all along North-western Tanzania as a result. My research examines the ways in which environmental discourses have contributed to security regimes and controls over mobility in these refugee-hosting areas. While there have been studies related to border security and 'environmental scares,' such as issues of environmental health and the spread of diseases across borders (Nugent & Asiwaju 1996), as well as cross-border conflicts over natural resources (Okumu 2010), the relationship between border security and environmental issues has largely been ignored in borderland studies, especially in the context of forced migration. In this paper, I argue that environmental discourses have had effects on policy interventions in the refugee-hosting areas, hence shaping the livelihoods of the refugee populations living in the camps, and their interactions with local Tanzanian communities. A case-study approach is taken, based on fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2009 in Mtabila refugee camp and neighbouring Mugombe village.

Mtabila refugee camp is located in Kasulu District, in the remote Kigoma region, which is more than 1,500 km away from Dar es Salaam, the economic capital. Mtabila camp was created in April 1994 to provide shelter for Burundian refugees and grew to accommodate 33,000 refugees by April 1997, occupying most of the Mtabila valley, between Shunga and Mugombe villages, with the adjacent Muyovosi camp[1] (UN-OCHA, IRIN 1997; UNEP & UNHCR 2005). The camp is less than 50 kilometres from the Burundian border. Several villages are located nearby, and most natural resources are shared with the local communities. Upon arrival, each family was given a plot of land to build a home, and schools, market areas, churches, and distribution areas were developed through international aid assistance in the following years. In recent years, however, Burundian refugees have repatriated to their home country, and there are currently

[1] Muyovosi camp was created in 1996 to accommodate the growing numbers of Burundian refugees, and had a population of 40,000 in April 1997. It was decommissioned in May 2008 after many of its residents had repatriated to Burundi, and the remaining refugees were moved to Mtabila camp.

around 35,000 registered refugees residing in Mtabila camp, some of whom have been resettled there from other camps in the region. Neighbouring Mugombe village, created as a result of the villagisation scheme in 1972, is located three kilometres away from Mtabila camp, and has just over 10,000 residents, the majority of whom are engaged in subsistence agriculture.

History of borderland interactions and environmental change in Kasulu District

When refugees are blamed for environmental degradation, there is a tendency to assume that they have settled in a pristine landscape, untouched by humans before their arrival. The reality, however, is usually different: places of refugee settlement are areas with a history that predates their influx. It is thus important to study refugee camps within the longer history of population resettlement and environmental change in the borderlands. In the case of Mtabila camp, the interactions between the Burundian refugees and the Tanzanians from the local host communities have been shaped by a long history of cross-border migration in the study area. During the pre-colonial period, the area covering what is now Kasulu District was located in the Buha territory of Tanganyika, which integrated parts of Rwanda and Burundi (formerly Ruanda-Urundi) and most of Kigoma region. The Buha population was divided into two groups which spoke the same language and shared cultural ties: the agriculturalist Waha majority (also known as Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi), and the pastoralist Watutsi (Tusi or Tutsi) minority, which constituted the ruling class, similarly to neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi (Grant, 1925). The Waha group was indigenous to the area, living in dispersed settlements, subsisting from slash-and-burn agriculture, and moving to new areas once natural resources had been exhausted (Fergus, 1983). Migration within Buha territory was frequent, depending on environmental conditions, as migrants moved in search of pastures and land. There were also cross-border interactions between people living in Buha and those living in the Barundi kingdoms, facilitated by language similarities on either side of the border. Nsanze (1994) describes a pattern of cross-border relationships in his investigation of trade in the area in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the Waha travelled to Burundi for short periods of time, for trading and hunting, while long-term migration was more frequent in the other direction, from Urundi to Buha, with emigration from Urundi increasing in times of food shortages (Gahama & Thibon 1994).

These cross-border exchanges persisted when colonial boundaries were drawn in 1885, separating Burundi and Tanganyika into two administrative units of German East Africa, and migration was relatively unaffected by the transition of colonial power from German to Belgian rule and the subsequent transfer to British rule in the early 1920s (Shipton, 1984, Waters, 1997). When the borders currently dividing the territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi were

defined, they generally followed the boundaries of the original kingdoms, with each area representing a local administrative entity (Lovett 1994; Office of the US Geographer 1966). People living in the Tanzania-Burundi borderland shared cultural and historical ties, as well as similarities in language, so they could easily travel across borders without being noticed by the colonial administrators (Chaulia, 2003). Labour migration for government work and agricultural estates from Ruanda-Urundi to Tanganyika was encouraged by the colonial powers during the 1920s (Daley, 1993). These decisions were driven by a disparity in access to land and population density in the two countries. Buha territory in western Tanganyika was sparsely populated and large expanses of land were under-utilised, in contrast to the Ruanda-Urundi which had little available land for agricultural development, with a population density nine times higher than across the border in Tanzania according to 1957 population estimates, so people from Burundi could easily to move into the area (Daley, 1993, Chaulia, 2003). People in the borderland also travelled further inland, as the colonial administration massively recruited migrant workers from Burundi and Kigoma region to work in sisal estates located to the east of the country. These estates continued to be the principal employer of migrant labour in the post independence period (Daley, 1993). These labour flows from the Tanganyika-Ruanda-Urundi borderland during the colonial era had an impact on the way future refugees from Rwanda and Burundi would be treated after Tanganyika gained independence in 1961.

The potential role of refugees as agents of economic development through agricultural work in under-populated areas of Tanzania was recognised by Julius Nyerere, the first post-independence president. This was reflected in the choices made by the Tanzanian government in 1972, when Burundian refugees fled to Kigoma region in order to escape conflict in their country. The strong social ties between Tanzanians and Burundians living in the study area allowed these asylum-seekers to integrate themselves among local Tanzanians and compatriots who had previously settled on the Tanzanian side of the border for economic reasons (Christensen, 1985). As the numbers of refugees entering Kigoma region increased, some remained in villages near the border, while others were receptioned in holding centres and later sent to live on agricultural settlement sites in Rukwa and Tabora regions (Christensen 1985; Malkki 1995). The creation of agricultural settlements for refugees was just an extension of Nyerere's villagisation policies that were being implemented in several regions of the country. Until then, the residents of Kasulu district lived in a similar way to their ancestors, living in small groups, practicing shifting agriculture and opening new land when agricultural output decreased. Through these policies, Tanzanians residents were expected to move to centralised villages and partake in communal labour, while having improved access to services. In the case of the refugees who spontaneously

settled in Kigoma region, many were also moved to these new villages, sometimes along with the local population, or alongside them in sub-villages. The refugees who stayed in the borderlands benefited from the bonds they had established with those living in the area and quickly integrated into the border communities (Ayok-Chol & Mbago 1990). In contrast, the refugees who were sent to live in the agricultural settlements were given grants of up to 5-10 hectares per head to bring into cultivation, and were settled in villages within the defined settlement zone, and the area was developed through 'self-help' projects, similar to the ones practiced elsewhere in Tanzania, although the refugee population was separated from the local Tanzanian communities. Over time, the presence of these agricultural settlements had a long-term positive effect on the economy of the region: "Thanks to refugees, tobacco, beans, cassava, maize, cotton etc. of exportable quality and quantity appeared in parts of the country where there used to be an acute shortage of staple foods and zero production of cash crops" (Chaulia, 2003). In 1985, the agricultural settlements were 'handed over' by the international organisations to the Government of Tanzania, and by then, refugees had become self-sufficient and produced a surplus of crops[2]. Around the same time, however, there was a change in government, and the subsequent refugee policies were no longer based on Nyerere's policies.

Shifts in refugee policies – creation of refugee camps and control of the borderlands

Between 1993 and 1998, nearly 1.5 million refugees fled Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to seek refuge in western Tanzania, resulting in an increase in the populations of Kigoma and Kagera regions of more that 50 percent (Whitaker, 2002). These mass population movements into North-western Tanzania were one of the main reasons for the securitisation of the borderlands and the creation of refugee camps in the area. In October 1993, following the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the country's first democratically elected president, about 345,000 Burundian refugees fled to Tanzania, mainly women and children (Malkki, 1995). The Tanzanian government decided to accommodate them in temporary camps close to the border, as it was believed the crisis would be short-lived. However, continued conflicts in the Great Lakes region and instability in Burundi led to the creation and expansion of several settlements for Burundian refugees. In April 1994, Tanzania experienced one of the largest and most rapid refugee arrivals in the world, with approximately 250,000 asylum-seekers from Rwanda crossing the border in a 24-hour period to escape genocide (Rutinwa, 1996).

[2] A number of researchers have studied the 1972 Burundian refugees and these agricultural settlements (Ayok-Chol & Mbago 1990; Chaulia 2003; Malkki 1995), although academic attention was diverted to research on more 'traditional' camps hosting refugees fleeing conflict in the Great Lakes region in the mid-1990s (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010; Armstrong 1988; Black 1998; Landau 2001; Turner 1999; Jacobsen 2001).

Within several weeks, the population of Rwandan refugees in the largest camp hosting them was estimated to be between 500,000 and 700,000; this was the second largest 'settlement' in Tanzania, after Dar es Salaam, and by mid-March 1995, the Tanzanian government hosted over 1,400,000 refugees (Rutinwa, 1996). This put tremendous pressure on the Tanzanians living in the borderlands, and there were reports of increased insecurity, environmental damage and strains on local infrastructure in Kigoma and Kagera regions (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010; Berry 2008; UNEP & UNHCR 2005). As a result, Tanzania closed its border with Burundi in March 1995 to prevent further refugees from coming in. This decision was reversed due to international pressures, but the border remained militarised (Whitaker, B. E. 1999). Overall, the open-door policy of previous decades was no longer seen as beneficial, and the main objective was to contain the new influx of refugees in camps until they could repatriate; the policy changed from one oriented towards finding permanent solutions, to one of providing relief in isolated camps, managed and sustained by international humanitarian assistance.

Upon the establishment of the camps, restrictive measures were introduced to ensure that refugees would not remain in Tanzania indefinitely and the resulting refugee policy, embodied in the Refugees Act of 1998 made Tanzania less attractive for asylum seekers. One of the underlying strategies of the 1998 Refugees Act was to actively discourage self-sufficiency, by limiting opportunities for the development of economic activities on Tanzanian territory by refugees, and to restrict their movements, while promoting their dependence on international aid for their survival. This was a significant departure from the refugee policy of earlier years, when asylum-seekers were settled in agricultural communities and encouraged to be productive actors in Tanzanian society. Aside from issues of insecurity caused by refugees, one of the main justifications for these policies was based on environmental grounds, with the underlying assumption that refugees were at the heart of environmental degradation in the refugee-hosting areas (Rutinwa & Kamanga 2003). The initial environmental pressures generated by a rapid increase in population in Kigoma and Kagera regions were substantial, due to the sheer number of refugees coming into the area. Trees were cut to provide shelter and energy to cook food, and there were high demands on water resources (UNEP & UNHCR 2005). Environmental interventions in the camps were quickly introduced by the United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR, to mitigate these impacts and promote sustainable resource use. Despite the success of these interventions, the depiction of refugees as resource degraders was recently echoed in a government policy paper, the National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (better known as *MKUKUTA* – it's Swahili acronym), where refugees are presented as a burden on Tanzania and are amalgamated with environmental disasters: "The common hazards in Tanzania include

epidemics, pest infestation, droughts, floods, major transport and industrial accidents, refugees and fires" (The United Republic of Tanzania 2005). It is important to note that the view of refugees presented in the Poverty Reduction Strategy has been implicitly accepted by the United Nations and other international agencies, which use the document as a framework towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Claims that refugees were responsible for massive environmental degradation were embraced by district, regional, and national authorities, as well as by the policy discourse of international aid organisations, and still persist today (Keeble 2001; Rutinwa & Kamanga 2003; UNEP & UNHCR 2005). In light of the fact that there are very few detailed empirical studies to substantiate the environmental impacts of refugees in the area, especially in the long-term, one wonders why this negative view of refugees has been so widely adopted at all levels.

Focus on the Mtabila-Mugombe borderland – social bonds and access to resources

Mtabila camp, similarly to the other refugee camps in North-western Tanzania, was a political space within the Tanzanian territory, defined by the Government of Tanzania and recognised by international organisations and donor governments. The laws and rights which applied to the Burundians living in Mtabila camp were different from those governing the Tanzanian villagers living on the other side of the camp borders, and refugees were governed by Tanzanian refugee law, as well as international refugee law. The UNHCR, in collaboration with the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs, took over a coordinating role for the provision of emergency and post-emergency assistance to the refugees, with the help of various national and international implementing partners. To define rights of access to the land and to identify the area within which the Ministry of Home Affairs had authority, the camp limits were formally surveyed and demarcated, and since Mtabila camp had a common border with three villages, this had a direct impact on the local population, restricting their movements into the camp. Life in the borderland was influenced by decisions made the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as the various local, district and national authorities, and the international aid agencies funded by donor governments. These decisions encompassed all facets of life in the camp, including access to environmental resources and to agricultural land.

One of the objectives of the Ministry of Home Affairs was to prevent refugees from accessing Tanzanian land outside the camp limits, and the branding of refugees as environmental degraders was an easy way to justify restrictions on movement and livelihood opportunities. In practice, self-sufficiency was prevented by allocating small plots of land to refugee families in Mtabila camp, on which they could only build a house and engage in small-scale garden agriculture, but

the bulk of their consumption had to be based on food assistance from the World Food Programme (WFP), distributed every two weeks. The rations provided by the WFP, however, were often insufficient to provide adequate nourishment, so refugees had to search for other options to feed their families. Refugees relied heavily on local land resources for household food production and consumption, and farming was the main active strategy adopted to address food vulnerability. Since refugee movements were restricted to a four kilometre radius around the camp, for the lucky few who managed to obtain permits, the majority of Burundians living in Mtabila camp had no choice but to engage in intensive agricultural practices on their home plots, leading to considerable pressure on the land around refugee homes. Aside from small plot sizes, soil fertility and soil erosion due to over-exploitation of land were identified by respondents as the major factors limiting agricultural production in the camp and preventing them from supplementing their food rations sustainably.

The anti-refugee discourse of the Tanzanian authorities and the reports of insecurity and environmental destruction widely publicised by the media, compounded with the new policy of encampment, initially influenced the perception of Burundians refugees by the Tanzanians living in Kasulu district. Refugees were not perceived in the same way as Burundian economic migrants had been in the past, and local people were mistrustful and often blamed them for a range of problems. During my fieldwork in Mugombe village, several informants accused refugees of taking land away from local villagers during the establishment of the camp, although the refugee camp site had actually been selected by the Tanzanian government. The area in which the camp was located did not have much ecological or economic importance: local Tanzanians had been practicing shifting cultivation and had clear-felled most of the area prior to the refugee influx, and the land was mainly used for grazing livestock by local villagers (Grimsich & Owen 1998). Nevertheless, the land uses of local people were disregarded during site selection: both private and communal land was taken away from nearby villages without consultation or compensation, yet the refugees, not the government authorities, were blamed for this. As the camp moved from an emergency phase to a protracted situation, new economic and social bonds were created between the two groups, in spite of the official restrictions put in place by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the suspicions of the local Tanzanians, echoing Nugent and Asiwaju's claims about the purpose of a border, "...the reality is frequently that it sets up a zone of interaction rather than representing a genuine partition" (Nugent & Asiwaju 1996). This was facilitated by the fact that the Burundians and local Tanzanians spoke a similar language, and that Burundians had a reputation of being good farmers, unlike some of the other refugee communities. The proximity of Mtabila camp to Tanzanian villages and the lack of a physical separation preventing

movements across the camp limits also helped; the borders were permeable and there were several paths to leave the camp, which were unmanned for the majority of the time. The connections between those living inside and outside the camp were recognised by the UNHCR and other international aid organisations: their programmes encompassed the 'refugee-hosting areas,' shifting away from an initial camp-centred approach to one that included the neighbouring communities.

A significant number of refugees left the camps illegally to practice agriculture and find employment in neighbouring villages, leading to new dynamics in the refugee-hosting areas. The Mtabila-Mugombe borderland became a social and institutional construction, and the Burundian refugees and local Tanzanians became interdependent over time. The change in perception of refugees was described by an informant in Mugombe village: "I had never seen a refugee before; I had just heard about them on the news. After hearing about them, I was told that they would come to live here, and I was able to see what they were like. I expected them to be different, because there was so much talk about them on the radio, but they were just like other Burundians... The difference between us Tanzanians and these refugees is that they have an affected mind and were forced to leave their country because of war, so they came to Tanzania to seek security and a new place to settle in. They are happy to work for us, and we benefit from their labour..." The refugees in Mtabila camp had access to plots in Tanzanian villages through different mechanisms – they could either provide labour to local villagers in exchange for food or cash, or rent land from them. Refugees relied on local markets to sell their products, and to obtain cash or other goods. There were several market areas in the camps, and there was also a common market within the Mtabila borderland where refugees were able to trade with Tanzanians from neighbouring communities. This common market day took place every other week, once food distribution had taken place. Trade was not limited to agricultural products harvested by the refugees; goods from the food rations were also sold to Tanzanians. Due to political instability, Tanzanians were forbidden to travel to Burundi starting in 2000, so the continued presence of the refugees in Mtabila camp allowed Mugombe residents to continue engaging in trade activities at the village level. The presence of a cheap and readily available labour force encouraged some of the residents to open up new fields, usually in woodlands, and increase the amount of land they could cultivate. A by-product of this was deforestation of the new plots, but this allowed them to profit economically due to an increase in agricultural production. The land use changes in the area can thus be partly attributed to the presence of the Burundian refugees, but they should also be seen as a consequence of a long-standing lack of interest in the region by the Government of Tanzania, due to its remote location and limited

connections to other parts of the country (Landau 2001). The cash-flow generated by the presence of the refugees and the humanitarian agencies had a positive impact on the development of a district that had often been ignored by the central government.

Deforestation was one of the key issues of contention used by the Tanzanian government to justify the restriction on refugee movements. During my fieldwork, I often saw men, women and children walking along the paths connecting Mtabila camp to the surrounding villages, and most of them carried bundles of wood into Mtabila camp. They told me that they were refugees returning from collecting wood, sometimes having walked for over eight hours to do so. Tanzanians also came into the camp to sell bigger pieces of wood and coal at the camp markets. This corresponds to Jacobsen's argument that interactions between refugees and local populations can create pressures on forested areas, due to the commoditisation of forest resources (Jacobsen 1994). The search for wood resources was a central issue that emerged during my investigations of access to natural resources and land use changes within the Mtabila borderland. Wood was mainly used for cooking and for construction, and the area in which the camp was located had been used as a grazing area by local communities, mostly consisting of grasslands and scattered trees. Refugees and Tanzanians alike relied heavily on fuel wood for their daily energy requirements, since it was the most important source of energy in the area. While refugees initially cut down trees in the camp, cutting trees inside the camp became illegal, so they soon moved out of the camp, into adjacent village forests to meet their needs. Although there were risks involved in leaving the camp illegally, including rape and assault by local villagers, the lack of options provided by the Tanzanian government and the international aid community, forced the refugees to take their chances in order to obtain enough wood to cook their meals. This was a recurrent source of disputes with the local communities. Although many Tanzanians living in the refugee hosting areas benefited economically from the pool of available labour provided by refugees, the latter were often accused of environmental degradation, and of stealing crops and properties. To address this, and especially since the aid agencies were not able to provide a durable solution for wood distribution, regular trainings and conflict-resolution meetings were established by UNHCR to promote cooperation between refugees and local community members.

The depiction of refugees as 'exceptional resource degraders[3]' has been repeated at different junctures over time, and is a recurrent thesis in situations of refugee encampment (Black 1998;

[3] The concept of 'exceptional resource degraders' was introduced by Leach and its central argument is that due to the temporary status of refugees and lack of land tenure rights, refugees have no long-term stake in the sustainability of the natural environment, leading to environmental degradation (Leach 1992).

Hoerz; Kibreab 1997; Jacobsen 1997; Mubali 2010). The anti-refugee discourse of the Tanzanian authorities and the media relied heavily on allegations of environmental destruction by refugees (see Mubali, 2010), although it was not always a reflection of actual environmental degradation. For instance, claims of environmental degradation in Tanzania's refugee camps have been put forward in many reports, but the evidence is often based on inaccurate findings generated by the environmental NGO working in the refugee-hosting area. The situation in Kasulu District and around Mtabila camp in particular, did not seem so dire when I conducted my fieldwork there in 2008-09. From personal field observations and discussions and interviews with different refugee and Tanzanian stakeholders, I was not able to identify severe environmental degradation directly associated with the refugee presence. It was even recognised that the Burundian refugees had better land management techniques than the local Tanzanians, and that the afforestation programmes initiated by UNHCR in the refugee-hosting areas had been quite successful: there were more trees in these areas than in villages further away from the camp. While the mass influx of refugees into Kasulu district undoubtedly brought about new pressures, especially on woodlands and forested areas, I agree with Berry's claims that the long-term impacts on the environment due to the presence of the Burundian refugees are not clear, due to the lack of accurate data to separate potential refugee impacts from the agricultural and land use practices of local communities in the borderland (Berry 2008). I do not want to suggest that there were no adverse impacts on environmental resources in the area, but visual evidence of environmental regeneration following the closure of Muyovosi camp, and discussions about historical land use changes with elders from Mugombe village, confirmed that environmental changes in the Mtabila-Mugombe borderland were not irreversible, and highlighted the fact that these changes need to be evaluated over a long time frame.

Conclusion

While the mass influx of refugees into Kasulu district did bring about new pressures on the environment, especially driven by the need for fuel wood and food security, the historic and social bonds between Burundian refugees and local Tanzanian communities in Kasulu enabled the refugees to evade some of the restrictive policies and improve their livelihood options. In this case, social ties had an unexpected impact on the control of refugees and their access to natural resources in the area. The environmental impacts associated with refugee camps thus need to be examined in terms of a wider history of population movements and environmental change in the borderlands. Furthermore, environmental changes in the refugee-hosting areas should also be examined as consequences of policy choices and discourse. Issues of

environmental sustainability and climate change have become buzzwords in international development and relief discourses over the past decades, and it seems that the Tanzanian government has sought to capitalise on this within the context of hosting refugees. The environmental discourses adopted by the Tanzanian government and international organisations have contributed to rationalise the decision to control the mobility of refugees in the borderlands and justify policy interventions, regardless of the actual situation on the ground. It would be interesting to further investigate the reasons driving these choices, as well as their consequences on future refugee policy.

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Aborne Summer School: Paper Draft

Ana Bracic

July 2, 2010

Cover Letter

Dear Aborne readers,

Here I briefly present two projects on the topic of human rights diffusion. I decided to present both because they are a part of a larger whole and because I am looking for as much feedback as I can possibly get. Both projects are very much in progress and are somewhat flexible going forward. The first is further along because the main analysis has been completed, while the second is in its early stages and therefore in particular need of a critical eye.

The first project aims to establish whether or not a state's rights practices are affected by the practices of its neighbors. The substantive contribution is in the focus on practices instead of policies. Despite the clear divide between promises and actions in the field of rights, scholars who study their diffusion examine the former. I address the latter. The empirical contribution of the project is in the spatial human rights lag, constructed to, as precisely as possible, reflect every yearly geographical or territorial change.

The second project aspires, through a focused study of the rights of Romanies (the Roma) in Eastern Europe, to explore some of the top-down mechanisms that may be responsible for the diffusion of rights practices. It endeavors to increase our understanding of the repression of Romanies in Eastern Europe, to venture beyond correlations and towards causality, and to produce a more nuanced set of rights measurements. As this project is in its early stages, my writing on it reads like a proposal and for that I apologize. I plan to begin fieldwork to collect data on Romani rights in July, and will, by the time of the summer school, have a better grasp of what I can and cannot accomplish.

I look forward to hearing your comments and advice.

Thank you,

Ana

1 Diffusion of actions, not promises

Diffusion, as understood by political scientists, takes place when a country does not adopt policies in isolation, but at least partly in response to the policies that governments in other countries are choosing (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008). Policies generally lead to tangible change, but in human rights they may not. The divide between promises and actions in human rights is clear and observed: to promise improvement is often relatively costless, while actual change can result in risks that many non-democratic governments are unwilling to take. They therefore promise, but do not deliver. Most scholars that study diffusion in the context of rights examine policies. In my second paper, I would like to focus instead on practices.

Since repression is a strategically domestic concern, with almost no spillover effects, the diffusion of practices seems unlikely. Nonetheless, practices do diffuse - women's suffrage spread from state to state in a manner that defies the idea of changes in isolation (Przeworski 2008), as did Brazilian torture techniques (Dassin 1986). An empirical examination of rights practices might resolve this puzzle and reveal either that practices diffuse only under special circumstances or that, counter-intuitively, diffusion is a common occurrence. The findings could have profound implications for both local and international human rights efforts - if practices themselves diffuse, we may move beyond expecting nations to sign onto agreements and start promoting the diffusion of rights directly; if they do not, we may choose to focus on finding the mechanisms that do work.

Here I present the results of first part of the inquiry, which tests for the presence of rights practices diffusion in a geographical context. I then discuss alternate types of diffusion, and the ways in which I could explore the mechanisms behind diffusion.

Main conceptions of diffusion in political science

Challenging the notion that governments make decisions independently of each other, scholars have so far convincingly shown that diverse political and economic policies diffuse, ranging from tariff reductions and privatizations to changes that lead to democratization (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008). Most of these findings can be placed in one of the four theories of diffusion: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008). *Coercion* is generally exercised by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental actors, either through physical force or manipulation of

economic costs and benefits, information, and expertise. Though the name suggests otherwise, the shift in incentives is generally voluntary; in exchange for preferred trade conditions, for example, governments can sign Preferential Trade Agreements with hard human rights clauses and so subject themselves to stricter human rights standards (Hafner-Burton 2005).

Competition between governments offers a more decentralized explanation for diffusion; this mechanism is generally applied to states' efforts to remain competitive in product markets and attractive to global investors. As an explanation for diffusion, competition has been predominantly applied to changes in economic policies. Its diffusive effects are easily evident through changes in short term economic policies like capital account liberalization and tax breaks (Rodrik 1997; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008), though they also apply to governmental change since investors generally prefer transparency, and some political systems over others (Jensen 2003). *Learning* contends that shifts in policy require a cognitive process that results in a change in beliefs about cause and effect, concerning either the proper means of achieving a goal or the goal itself (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008). Policy diffusion through learning therefore takes place when governments draw lessons from the experiences of other countries and incorporate the new information when they form their own policies. Finally, *emulation* proposes that policy makers will adopt a new policy when they believe that it is the most appropriate (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008), whether or not they understand why or how it may be superior to alternatives. To understand why policies diffuse, write emulation scholars, we must understand how they become socially accepted.

Why human rights practices could diffuse

Several works suggest that diffusion of human rights practices is possible. The first explores the spatial clustering in democracy and transitions, and finds that international factors can strongly influence a state's prospects for democratic transition (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). The diffusion of democratization implies, at the minimum, that policies not directly tied to economic liberalization can diffuse; that policies that are challenging, and in the short term perhaps less profitable, can diffuse; and, finally, that rights practices may in fact diffuse within the larger framework of democratic diffusion.

The next, and perhaps most relevant, group of works examines human rights agreements. The suggestion here is twofold: human rights practices could diffuse because, first, human rights treaties diffuse, and second, because those treaties have an effect, though limited, on human rights. In support of the first

suggestion, scholars have found that leaders emulate those around them and more often ratify when states in their region have done so, purportedly to avoid being criticized as outliers (Simmons 2009). They have also found that international rights conferences are a powerful mechanism and spur ratification of agreements like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). The support for the second idea is slightly weaker; while a group of scholars found that governments do not improve their human rights practices after they ratify agreements (Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), Simmons (2009) claims that treaties do have a positive effect, but that it is limited to states with unstable or transitional governments. Even though human rights agreements appear to be ineffectual in the most oppressive environments, the fact that they do diffuse and, in a particular political context, inspire change suggests that states may be receptive to other influences as well.

Finally, the collection of works on the spread of conflict suggests that human rights practices might diffuse in the negative direction. Gleditsch and Salehyan (2006) and Salehyan (2008) find that refugee flows are an important mechanism of conflict diffusion, while Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) find that countries with ethnic ties to groups in a neighboring conflict zone are at a higher risk of civil conflict onset. Since conflict clearly diffuses, it is possible that rights practices, in this context likely repressive, diffuse as well. Governments may react to a conflict next door by repressing more, regardless of refugee presence, in order to prevent a domestic outburst of conflict. Abuses of refugees are likely, as is repression of the host population, if it becomes violent in response to the increased social and economic pressures originating from refugees.

How human rights practices could diffuse

There are several pathways along which human rights practices could diffuse; I would like to focus on top-down mechanisms. Mobility of individuals is a strong possibility. According to Tiebout (1956), the individual will move to the community where the local government most suits the set of his or her preferences. Tiebout's domestic analogy of local governments has limited implications in the international context because mobility is likely much easier between districts than between countries, but there is no doubt that people can move across nations as well (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Immigration is one main mechanism of mobility; refugee flight is another. As noted, refugee flight may spur rights diffusion in the negative direction; in addition, rights may improve or worsen as a result of intense migration because a leader may want to prevent further "brain drain."

Coercion by entities that offer aid or membership is another possible pathway of rights practices

diffusion. As mentioned above, the benefit of a preferential trade agreement may outweigh the costs of agreeing to comply with a hard human rights clause (Hafner-Burton 2005). Aid agencies may also demand a decrease in repression in exchange for help. Finally, membership in the European Union, for example, is impossible without satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, which require a candidate state to have stable institutions that guarantee human rights[1]. A clear benefit could provide a strong incentive to improve rights practices. In limited circumstances, transitional states may even welcome the pressure of compliance, perhaps to signal the righteousness of their intent.

Competition can be closely related to coercion through the final benefit, be it aid, a trade agreement, or membership. States may not only improve rights because of the coercive element. If resources are limited, and only the deserving few are rewarded, they may directly compete with other states that hope to receive the benefit. Competing for a trade agreement seems the clearest example - if two states produce similar goods they may compete for the same agreements; should the agreement include a hard human rights clause, they may have to compete on that front as well. In competition for aid or membership the situation resembles a collective action problem where a defection by one may cause all competitors to strive for better rights.

Mobility of people and competition for or coercion by aid agencies or entities like the EU seem the most likely and obvious top down pathways for rights practices diffusion. So far, I have tested for the presence of rights practices diffusion in a geographical context, and these are the results presented below.

Methods and data

To determine whether or not rights practices diffuse, I ran an ordered logistic regression with physical integrity rights as a dependent and a rights spatial lag as a main independent variable. The dataset spans 149 to 179 countries (data vary by year) and covers the period between 1976 and 2008.

The dependent variable is the indicator of physical integrity rights reported as the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2007). The measure captures state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment and is computed annually using reports on human rights practices by Amnesty International and by the U.S. State Department. The version used in this analysis is based on an average of scores from Amnesty International reports and U.S. State Department reports; since the two sources are not in complete agreement with regards to particular scores, the scale is expanded to nine

[1]http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/ conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm, accessed on May 10 2010.

points. The score of 1 stands for the lowest levels of human rights and 5 for the highest.

The physical integrity rights variable is also used to calculate the spatial lag[2], along with the geographical component that contains information on distances between countries, by year, which is taken from Weidmann et al.'s Cshapes project (Wiedmann et al. 2010). The spatial lag for each state is the mean physical integrity rights score of all its neighbors. To avoid isolating islands, I recognize as neighbors states within 1000 km of the state in question. The 1000 km cutoff is based on the minimum distance between the states. The lags were calculated separately for every year, so that any changes in borders, integrations, or disintegrations of states were taken into account. Finally, the spatial lag variable is lagged for a year, with the intent of capturing a spatial influence instead of a regional homogeneity.

The main controls included in the analysis are a one-year temporal lag of physical integrity rights, regime type (polity2 by Marshall and Jaggers 2006; regime by Cheibub and Gandhi from Norris 2008), natural log of GDP per capita (Heston et al. 2009), civil conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002), population density (Heston et al. 2009), and a set of regional variables (United Nations Statistics Division). Some iterations of the regression include further controls: growth of GDP per capita (Heston et al. 2009), the log of cumulative conflict fatalities (coded based on Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), ratification of treaties (ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT) and optional protocols (Hathaway 2007), and the number of human rights NGOs (Hathaway 2007).

[2]The physical integrity rights index suffers from non-random missing data. In order to preserve as much information as possible, the missing values were converted to 0 prior to calculating the spatial lag. This was preferable to losing a country's spatial lag altogether, on the account of one of its neighbors having an 'unmeasurable' level of rights. To partly account for this problem, the spatial lags were recoded into high (1) and low (0) in an alternative measure; the results remain the same. The entire lag construction can be repeated with only the countries for which we have the data; the preferred interpretation should include results from both analyses, however, because it is quite unrealistic to assume that the countries for which it was impossible to collect reliable rights data have no effect. On the contrary, the difficult situations in such states may have a disproportionate effect on their surroundings and while it is incorrect to assume that those states should receive the lowest scores it is equally incorrect to assume that they have no effect at all.

Preliminary results and discussion

Table 2: Results of ordered logistic regression with a spatial lag

Variables	Model with subregion variable	Model with region dummies	Model with subregion dummies
Physical integrity rights lag (t-1)	3.02*** (0.06)	3.00*** (0.06)	2.91*** (0.06)
Spatial lag (t-1)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.15* (0.08)
Polity (before interregnum)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
GDP per capita (ln)	.00003*** (0.000004)	.00003*** (0.000004)	0.00002*** (0.000004)
Conflict	-1.25*** (0.09)	-1.25*** (0.10)	-1.29*** (0.10)
Population density	-0.0000004* (0.0000002)	-0.0000005* (0.0000002)	-0.0000009** 0.0000003
UN subregion	0.0006 (0.0006)		
Europe		-0.79*** (0.22)	
Asia		-1.12*** (0.23)	
Africa		-1.06*** (0.22)	
Americas		-1.22*** (0.23)	
Western Europe			0.03 (0.39)
Eastern Europe			-0.58 (0.37)
Southern Europe			-0.38 (0.37)
Northern Europe			0.79* (0.40)
Western Africa			-0.49 (0.36)
Eastern Africa			-0.57 (0.36)
Southern Africa			-0.29 (0.38)
Northern Africa			-1.11** (0.38)
Middle Africa			-0.86* (0.38)
Northern America			0.55 (0.50)
Southern America			-0.99* (0.36)
Central America			-0.67 (0.37)
Caribbean			-0.79* (0.38)
Western Asia			-0.84* (0.36)
Eastern Asia			-0.20 (0.41)
Southern Asia			-0.84* (0.38)
South-East Asia			-0.51 (0.37)
Central Asia			-0.68 (0.41)
Melanasia			0.33 (0.43)
Australia New Zealand			1.69* (0.64)

Variables	Model with subregion variable	Model with region dummies	Model with subregion dummies
cut 1	3.65	2.04	1.79
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.46)
cut 2	5.31	3.69	3.43
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.46)
cut 3	7.37	5.74	5.46
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.46)
cut 4	8.81	7.18	6.87
	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.46)
cut 5	11.22	9.58	9.26
	(0.26)	(0.39)	(0.47)
cut 6	12.70	11.06	10.74
	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.48)
cut 7	15.13	13.52	13.25
	(0.30)	(0.41)	(0.49)
cut 8	16.34	14.76	14.55
	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.50)
Number of observations	4280	4310	4310
Pseudo R squared	0.3948	0.3968	0.4024

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standard errors in parentheses.

The results consistently show a positive and significant relationship between a country's physical integrity rights score and the average of those that its neighbors had a year before. Since the relationship persists even when various regional controls are included, it is unlikely that the spatial lag coefficient is only capturing a regional effect. To the extent that the yearly lag of the spatial lag variable captures diffusion, the results suggest that rights practices indeed do diffuse. The lag is limited, however, and may merely show that neighbors adopt similar rights practices at similar points in time. Whether neighbors move together because the practices adopted by one or more of the states among them diffuse, or because they respond to an outside factor remains to be tested.

What to do next

The analysis so far is promising - it appears that the behavior of neighbors does, on average, affect the way states treat their own citizens. I next aim to test the coercive, competitive and mobility mechanisms presented above. I have not yet determined the exact way of showing that diffusion happens along a particular path and am currently considering the following options.

The effect of mobility, particularly as it pertains to refugee flight, might be captured by examining states that have at a point in time received refugees, and comparing the magnitude of the spatial lag's effect from the periods with and without refugees. Since the samples would not be the same (a state can at a point in time either receive refugees or not, never both), it would not be possible to compare the coefficients themselves. It is possible, however, that the effect may be more significant in one situation, suggesting that the presence/absence of refugees may increase the likelihood that the spatial effect occurs

by chance. An alternative way of testing whether the presence of refugees, or an increase in emigrants, affects the strength of the spatial lag might be with an interaction term between a logged number of people arriving or leaving and the spatial variable.

Mobility is a mechanism quite closely related to the geographical nature of diffusion. It is almost certain, however, that the diffusive effects of rights practices are not completely dependent on geography. Practices may diffuse through links between countries that disperse aid and those that receive, or entities that accept new members and states that want to join. The competitive and coercive options may be tested through a comparison of states that compete or strive for a benefit with a set of similar states that do not. A method of matching alone seems inadequate; one would have to match on the presence of competitive ambition or a coercive relationship first, and then compare how the treated and untreated groups react to spatial lags. Again, a comparison of coefficients would be impossible because such samples are not identical; nonetheless, the results may provide a general sense of a stronger or weaker effect in the presence of competition or coercion.

Finally, we could explore the coercive and competitive mechanisms independently of their relationships to geography. A competitive lag for a country would, for example, capture rights practices in the states with which the country competes and perhaps weigh those rights in proportion to the degree of competition. A coercive relationship could, in turn, be tested with measures of the benefits promised and the strength of the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to receive the benefit.

2 Finding the diffusion mechanism: a focused study of Romani rights in Eastern Europe

In the global test of rights practices diffusion, I was able to establish that rights practices appear to diffuse, or that, at the least, neighboring countries appear to adopt similar rights practices at similar points in time. To uncover the mechanism behind the apparent diffusion, I propose a focused study of Romani rights in Eastern Europe around the turn of the millennium. Romanies (or the Roma) are a particularly good target population because they live, in various numbers, in almost all European states and suffer repression and discrimination in most, if not all. In the time period I propose - the years that led up to the eastern enlargement of the European Union, - the mechanisms of 'coercion' and competition were undoubtedly present among the states that aspired to become members, while mobility existed at least as a threat if not a reality. At the same time, not all states in which Romanies reside were striving for membership in the EU; some, like England, Austria, and Italy were already members, while others, like Croatia, Macedonia, and Ukraine were not yet far enough along to attempt membership in the first two rounds of the enlargement. Those states provide a controlled set that should allow for a meaningful comparison.

Romanies and current violations of their rights

Eastern European Romanies hail from India, but have been living in Europe for centuries (Hancock 2002). They have maintained both their cultural identity and their diversity (there are many subgroups of Romanies, and some speak entirely different versions of Romani), and are not particularly open to parting with their way of life. They have been widely repressed and discriminated ever since they had arrived in Europe, surviving slavery in Romania and the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. According to official estimates, there are possibly over ten million Romanies in Europe as a whole today, though precise figures are unavailable, partly because many do not own personal documents and partly because many governments refuse to include Romani as a legitimate category for census purposes (ERRC[3] 2004). Around one and a half million Romanies joined the EU with the first eastern enlargement in 2004 (ERRC 2004).

Current violations of Romani rights are expansive. In many states[4] Romani children are schooled in

[3]'The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union', a report by the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)

[4]Those states include but may not be limited to Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France (ERRC 2004).

remedial special schools for mentally disabled, even though they in fact have no disabilities (ERRC 2004). Romanies face significant barriers in accessing employment; they frequently live in substandard housing in unsuitable locations, often without electricity, waste removal, sewerage, or heat; they are more likely to suffer from asthma, tuberculosis, and hepatitis A and B, and generally receive substandard health care. Women are far more likely to suffer from most of these iniquities. Despite these realities, Romanies are sometimes deemed undeserving of social welfare[5]. Due partly to personal choice and to a greater extent bureaucratic barriers, many do not have personal documents and are effectively stateless, which contributes to several of the problems just described. Romanies are also significantly more likely than non-Romanies to be abused by the police in general, while in detention, and in prison (Profession: Prisoner 1997). Anti-Romani sentiment is present in most, if not all, European states. According to a survey conducted in 1994, 64 percent of Germans had an unfavorable opinion of Romanies; similarly, a recent survey showed that 79 percent of Czechs would not want them as neighbors (ERRC 2004).

Diffusion mechanisms

The mechanisms of coercion and competition are quite closely connected in the context of the eastern enlargement because the final benefit is the same for both - membership in the EU, along with monetary aid. The coercive path is clear. To qualify for membership, candidate states must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, of which the first requires "stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities"[6]. The EU does not merely require the ratification of all necessary human rights agreements. As the state prepares for membership, the European Commission guides it, assesses it, and reports its progress to the council and the Parliament in the form of yearly Progress Reports[7]. The reports detail the candidate's human rights situation and focus especially on its shortcomings. Only when the problem areas have sufficiently improved, and the requirements are satisfied, can a state become a member of the EU[8]. The coercive mechanism appears efficient - a state does not receive the benefit until the conditions are fulfilled to a sufficient degree, and so typical retroactive sanctions are not necessary. Instead of taking a benefit away, the EU need not grant it in the first place.

[5]Romania, France (ERRC 2004)

[6]http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm, accessed on May 19 2010.

[7]Europa - Gateway to the European Union, "How does a country join the EU", in European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/index_en.htm (cited 1 May 2007)

[8]Europa - Gateway to the European Union, "Accession Criteria", in European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl (cited 1 May 2007)

The competitive mechanism could be at work within the greater framework of coercion. Instead of competing for membership in the EU in isolation, candidate states may adjust the pace of their reforms based on the progress of their neighbors. If, for example, Slovenia makes great strides in improving its treatment of Romanies, the states competing alongside may look less capable, in comparison, if they do little. In turn, if none of the candidates improve their practices, the overall standard of rights might be perceived as lower than desirable, but perhaps more resistant to change than anticipated. This stagnation appears unlikely, however. It seems reasonable to expect at least a minimum level of competitiveness among the candidates, and given the EUs strict requirements for rights standards, it appears less likely that even the smallest change would not be attempted. It seems that candidate states would be facing a collective action problem, and that once the first state starts improving, others would have to follow.

Finally[9], in most states the mechanism of mobility was present at least as a threat, if not an immediate reality. Contrary to their popular image, Romanies are not itinerant (Matras 2000). If they migrate, they generally do so to seek better economic opportunities or to escape discrimination, in particular violence and harassment by both non-Romani civilians and the police. Since Romanies are overwhelmingly seen as unequal members of society, states are not likely to see their migration as brain drain; correspondingly, the receiving states are most likely to perceive the incoming population as a burden. Indeed, this is precisely how Romanies from Slovakia were treated when they left for the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2000 (Guy 2003) and Finland between 1999 and 2000 (Nordberg 2004). In both intended destinations, the press did not welcome the newcomers, and both governments responded by tightening asylum procedures and imposing visa restrictions on Slovak citizens. Many Romanies returned to Slovakia, voluntarily or forcibly (Vasecka and Vasecka 2003).

There is evidence of Romani migrations, or their attempts, to Western European states in the time period I propose to examine. The timing of some attempts, notably the Slovak migration to Finland, suggests that they might have been strategic. Since Slovakia had hoped to become upgraded to the first group of EU candidate states during the December 1999 summit, for example, a human rights scandal occurring six months prior to that might have produced a quick response (Vasecka and Vasecka 2003). Whether or not all attempts of migration were strategic, they have likely played some role in the improvements (or lack thereof) of Romani rights in the candidate states. The evidence for mobility of Romanies among the

[9]There could be numerous other mechanisms at work - grassroots mobilization through NGOs is foremost among them. I have left them out because I wish to focus on the top-down decision making processes.

candidate states is less easily available. If Romanies increased migrations among the candidate states as well, the interplay between the benefits of improving rights (as they may affect accession) and the costs of an increase in the Romani population would in itself provide a fascinating study of balancing costs and benefits.

Possible variables and data gathering

I aim, if possible, to perform an empirical examination of these three mechanisms. I would ideally like to run a cross-time cross-country analysis of Romani rights, with various mechanisms as main independent variables. This summer, I plan first to determine whether or not sufficient data exist to reliably test all components and second, to begin collecting the information that is available. I am likely to face limitations with the numbers of observations available; I will therefore strive to collect semi annual data.

Coercion

The most straightforward indicators of the coercion mechanism are (1) the dates when various agreements were signed, (2) the dates of the inspections (if available) conducted for the purposes of the progress reports, (3) the dates when the progress reports were published, and (4) any instances where a candidate country was publicly criticized by the EU for its problematic treatment of Romanies. Any aid given to a candidate by the EU should also be noted, especially if it is intended for the development of institutions that could improve Romani rights, and particularly if aid is allocated with that purpose.

A slightly less direct measure of coercion, but one that may provide a unique comparison of the coercive and competitive mechanisms, would be a content analysis of the minutes of parliamentary sessions in each of the states. Searching the minutes for key phrases that associate Romani rights with the accession process or the EU, and comparing the incidence of those phrases to the likelihood that the phrase Romani rights alone appears, would provide quite a reliable sense of the strength of the coercive mechanism at the top level decision making. My ability to construct this variable depends on the availability of parliamentary minutes of the states in question. Since minutes of the Slovene Parliament are available online from 1996 onward, and minutes of the Czech and Slovak Parliaments are available from 1994 onward, this option appears promising. I would use Gary King et al,'s ReadMe software to construct the measure.

Competition

Although the candidate states may appear equal competitors because they are all competing for entry, some may fiercely compete with only a few other states. A measure of competition should identify which states compete with one another, and perhaps capture the intensity of the competition. There may be several focal points of competition; among them, all that could get a state closer to an EU membership could be considered. States may compete in achieving institutional change, for example, or in adopting trade liberalization policies. Perhaps states that specialize in similar export products may compete more fiercely with one another. Variables noting these factors would measure the level of dyadic competition between countries, and could probably be integrated into a time-series cross-section measure as well.

A direct measure of diffusion based on competition may be a spatial human rights lag, similar to that employed in the second project. Instead of a geographical measure, the distance component of the lag would identify distances between countries based on the strength of their mutual competition. The final spatial lag would then be calculated by weighting a neighboring country's rights score by its competitive indicator. This, too, could either exist as a dyadic measure or a time-series cross-section variable.

Finally, as with the coercive mechanism, a content analysis of the parliamentary minutes would be a fascinating alternative measure of the strength of the competitive mechanism. The minutes would here be surveyed for the likelihood that the phrase Romani rights is associated with the names of the competitors. Should competitors often appear in parliamentary debates on rights, the data would suggest that diffusion at the top level is happening through competition. Such a measure of the competitive mechanism could be directly compared to the coercive mechanism, to test the relative strength of one and the other. This is perhaps a superior comparison to the one available using alternative suggested variables.

Mobilization

Mobilization would most ideally be measured by the number or the estimate of Romanies crossing borders. For events like the Slovak Romani migrations to the UK and Finland, the estimates would likely not be as challenging to obtain; for migrations on a smaller scale, however, the data may not be as readily available. I plan to determine whether or not that is the case this summer. Should the data not be available, a rough instrument for migrations may be the number of newspaper articles in major national newspapers that discuss them.

Romani Rights

There are several possibilities for measuring Romani rights. As measures of rights frequently tend to be, they are imperfect and quite possibly limited. The first measure is most similar to the measures human rights scholars now use in empirical analyses. It would be based on the annual human rights reports by Amnesty International and the State Department, the Progress Reports published by the European Commission (where available), and various reports on Romani rights by local or international NGOs like the European Roma Rights Center and the Open Society. The reports by Amnesty International and State Department are necessary as a baseline because the detailed reports do not exist for all states for all time periods. I believe, however, that with a baseline and the detailed information from reports I may be able to interpolate the observations for which detailed information is missing.

The second measure is based on discrimination in education. In many states, Romani children are put into schools for disabled children whether or not they are disabled. It is reasonable to suppose that the proportion of disabled children in a population is relatively constant; disabilities generally do not come in spurts, and are neither contagious nor curable. If Romani children are indeed sent to schools for disabled children, and if a push to decrease that particular discriminatory practice is effective, we should observe a decrease in the number of children enrolled in schools for disabled children. This would only hold in regions/districts where Romanies live. Collecting the total number of children enrolled in schools for disabled is the only feasible way of estimating whether the numbers of Romanies in those schools fluctuate. A survey of Romani enrollment in regular primary schools is not possible because classifying students based on their ethnicity is illegal in several European countries.

The third measure would be a strict measure of labor discrimination. Labor offices in several countries have reported that potential employers attempted to submit listings stating "Roma need not apply" (ERRC 2004). While those statements were not printed by the labor offices themselves, there is a possibility that newspapers are not as sensitive. If successful, a search for that phrase within the listings pages of newspapers would provide a very strict, clean measure of discrimination in employment. It is quite likely that those phrases will not appear; such blatant discrimination seems too outrageous to be true, especially since an employer can dismiss a Romani candidate upon an interview. Indeed, some of the labor offices that refuse to publish the discriminatory listings provide potential employers with listings of job seekers that identify the applicants as Romani or non-Romani. Nonetheless, given that employers have an interest in discriminating

so openly, I am not yet inclined to dismiss the possibility of this measure.

Conclusion

In July and August 2010 I plan to first, explore the possibility of constructing these measures and second, begin constructing the indicators that are feasible. In addition, I hope to gain, through fieldwork, a deeper understanding of Romani repression.

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Beyond 'hidden resistance' against colonial boundaries: Bundu dia Kongo and their philosophy of colonial boundaries in Bas-Congo region of the Democratic Republic of Congo

By Clara Devlieger

1. Introduction

This essay addresses the case of the African borders between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, and between DRC and the Republic of Congo (RC) in the Bas-Congo region of DRC, a region inhabited by adepts of 'Bundu dia Kongo' (BDK), a cultural movement made up of members of the Bakongo ethnic group which combines politics and religion. In the following, we attempt to investigate BDK adepts' visions on the boundaries in their region and the role that their political-religious movement plays in their reaction towards the problems associated with these borders. Doing so, we'll discuss their reaction from two perspectives. First, from a functional day-to-day perspective; secondly and most importantly, on a larger level of how they translate these day-to-day experiences into a cultural philosophy and a religious doctrine. On both levels, BDK combines religion and politics in order to explicitly denounce the situation caused by the imposition of colonial boundaries in the territory of their lost Kingdom of Kongo. BDK's reaction to their border situation thus goes further than the "hidden resistance," a concealed creative manipulation of the border for example by illicit cross-border trade, that many researchers on African boundaries refer to. As we will see, the Bundu dia Kongo movement handles the problems associated with the border through this cultural philosophy in two ways. On the one hand, they react spiritually: through religious practices and the reinforcement of a shared "Kongo" identity, the movement offers psychological support. On the other hand, at the same time the movement functions as a political tool: while denouncing the artificiality of colonial boundaries which separates "blood brothers", BDK also denounces "injustices" against and domination of the Bakongo people and of BDK in the region by government officials and by the presence of other ethnic groups. Using the problems they encounter as arguments, BDK thus advocates the installation of a system of federalism in DRC. Finally, through the movement and these reactions, the movement seems to create an overall "Kongo" identity for its adepts. Doing so, the choice of an overall "Kongo" identity that BDK offers seems to help overcome the difficulty of

choosing between several dimensions of identity, like national identities, in this relatively small region divided by several boundaries.

2. The Bas-Congo region in the Democratic Republic of Congo and "Bundu dia Kongo"

Boundaries in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Bas-Congo region

Like elsewhere on the African continent, the political boundaries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were installed by colonial authorities. In particular, King Leopold II of Belgium took advantage of the Conference of Berlin in 1885, at which point European colonial powers officially divided the African continent amongst themselves, to have his colony recognized internationally and so to establish internationally recognized boundaries. However, the European powers concerned refrained from taking the indigenous population into account when setting the political boundaries. On the contrary, as Simon Katzenellenbogen makes clear,

> In reality, setting Africa's colonial boundaries reflected a range of political/strategic and economic considerations and hopes which, along with ignorance, misconceptions, sheer uninformed greed and ineptitude, were of much greater practical significance than legal niceties.[1]

This neglect of the original population is particularly apparent in the Bas-Congo region, where the movement of Bundu dia Kongo is based today. Indeed, if one takes a look at a map of the Bas-Congo region in the whole of DRC and in central Africa as in annex 1 (p. 16), we see that the region protrudes from the rest of the country. This, because the colonial powers concerned in the division of the area, namely Belgium, France, and Portugal, all necessitated an entrance to the ocean. Doing so, they thus divided the existing Kingdom of Kongo and the Bakongo people over three new countries, DRC, RC, and Angola. Since the time of Leopold II, the political boundaries of the DRC have remained largely unaltered, which create several trans-boundary communities and a great ethnic diversity in the country itself. Another result of this is that in the past, it has been difficult to create a sense of nationalism or even an ethnic majority fit to govern the country.

In general however, in the entirety of the immense country that is the DRC, the Bas-Congo region proves to be exceptionally marked by colonialism and the imposition of its boundaries, which has influenced the appearance of political-religious movements throughout history like

[1] Katzenellenbogen, S. (1996). It Didn't Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa's Colonial Boundaries. In P. Nugent, & A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.), *African Boundaries. Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities* (pp. 21-35). London: Pinter, pp. 21-22.

the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) movement today. That is to say, the region was colonized and Christianized particularly early in the history of colonization: already in 1485, the Portuguese explorer Diego Cao and his following landed on the banks of the Congo River in the present Bas-Congo region and baptized the *Mani Kongo*, the head of the Kingdom of Kongo.[2] Consequently, by the time that the country officially became a Belgian colony, the Bas-Congo region especially had thus already been in contact with Western civilization for centuries because of its strategic location in central Africa and at the Congo River, an essential point of entrance to the whole of the continent.

This early contact with Western civilization and with Christianity, in combination with particularly harsh colonial rule under Leopold II, provoked a reaction that came to be typical of the region concerned: the creation of political-religious cultural movements, the most famous and influential of which is the church of Simon Kimbangu, still active at present. These influential movements later often prepared the way for nationalist movements like the ABAKO, the "Alliance of Bakongo", the first influential political party that demanded independence from Belgium, and whose leader, Joseph Kasavubu, was elected president after independence. Typical of these movements is that they combine politics and religion as a way of reacting against the perception of the loss of their culture, religion, and political power in their own territory in favor of western versions. Thus, these messianic movements assert ethnic identity as a way of redeeming culture and political power; at the same time also, the affirmation of their ethnic "Kongo" identity was a way of coming to terms with the imposition of European models. Namely, by asserting a strong ethnic identity, on the one hand, "Kongo" culture and identity became more fixed and less susceptible to change. On the other hand, this fixed, clear identity made the region and the people more open to western influences and the few advantages of colonialism. Psychologically stronger through a clear identity, the Kongo people thus creatively "borrowed" positive traits of western influences and came to be known for example as accomplished traders and skillful administrators in the colonial administration. Another example often referred to is the fact that their religion became a combination of tradition practices and Christianity.[3] Doing so, "Kongo" identity thus came to be a mixture of traits associated with the ancient Kingdom of Kongo and traits associated with Western civilization.

All in all, the first of these political-religious movements originated as a reaction against colonial rule and the division of the Kingdom of Kongo by asserting ethnic "Kongo" identity, by taking advantage of positive aspects of colonialism, and thus by creating a kind of

[2] Banda Banda-Mwaka, J. (1971). Le kimbanguisme en tant que mouvement prépolitique chez les Kongo. *Problèmes Sociaux Congolaise*, pp. 12-15.
[3] See for example Kabwita, K. I. (2004). *Le royaume Kongo et la mission catholique 1750-1838. Du déclin à l'extinction* (Mémoire d'Eglises ed.). Paris: Editions Karthala.

hybrid identity. Today, we will see that Bundu dia Kongo reacts in similar way against the successors of the European colonists, namely the Congolese government and the colonial boundaries they continue to uphold and that continue to divide the homogenous cultural zone of the ancient Kingdom of Kongo.

Bundu dia Kongo

As mentioned, the Bundu dia Kongo movement is made up of members of the Bakongo ethnic group and is thus a successor of the messianic political-religious movements that originated as a reaction against colonial rule. The movement was founded in 1986, 17 years after the religious leader, Ne Muanda Nsemi, claims to have been awakened by the supervising spirit of the Kongo people, who told him that he had been chosen by their god, Akongo, to enlighten Africa and the entire world. His task would thus be to create the "Temple of Bukongo," the religion of Bundu dia Kongo. Starting from this date, the movement organized itself and spread out throughout the Bas-Congo region, spreading its message already by using pamphlets explaining their religious and political visions. Three years into its existence, the movement became officially recognized as a religion by the government and given the right to practice. Throughout the years however, BDK became more and more influential, until in 1990, when the movement publicly began to manifest itself in the political realm. In 1990 already, they rejected the new political order installed by the president Mobutu; starting from this year they started advocating the installation of a system of federalism. However, as the leader Ne Muanda Nsemi says himself, the political influence of the movement came to be a thorn in the flesh of the Kinshasa government. According to Nsemi, from 2002 up to 2008, governmental authorities thus tried to diminish the influence of the movement at the same time that the movement continued to gain in influence and to openly criticize the government.

Over the past years, conflicts between the movement and the Kinshasa government in the Bas-Congo region have escalated, leading to conflicts between adepts of BDK and local police in the Bas-Congo region. The result, being at least 200 deaths and the destruction of more than six hundred houses and temples in the region, prompted the National Assembly to request that Ne Muanda Nsemi restructure his movement according to the law of the country. Thus, he was requested to clarify the position and future existence of the movement either as a religion or as a political party organized in the same manner as the other parties of the country. Accordingly, the leader Ne Muanda Nsemi decided to split the movement into two autonomous entities: on the one hand, "Bundu dia Kongo", the religious wing, which unofficially continues its practices while officially being banned, on the other, "Bundu dia

Mayala", an official political party open to all Congolese citizens. At present, the movement is organized from Kinshasa, and most of the adepts live in the Bas-Congo region; many also live in the Kongolese diaspora throughout the world, like in Liberia, Brazil and several European countries. According to the religious leader, there are about 500.000 adepts and sympathizers of the movement across the world.

As a political-religious movement, BDK claims that its most important objective is to encourage the emergence in Central African of a modern civilization especially adapted to an African mentality. In order to arrive at this point, they argue that there are three conditions that must be fulfilled: forlorn African wisdom must be rehabilitated, modern technology must be welcomed, and the combination between the two must be provoked. In developing a country, they argue that a civilization and its technology must be adapted to the mentality of the originals. They refer for example to their perception of Chinese medicine: in China, they see a combination of traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine, which, in China, is creating modern medical practices particularly adapted to a Chinese mentality.

This general background information taken into account, that which proves to be most interesting concerning BDK and the subject of African boundaries is the fact that the movement explicitly denounces the continual existence of colonially imposed political boundaries, which divide their ancient Kingdom of Kongo. Indeed, as we will see throughout the remainder of this essay, BDK adepts translate problematic day-to-day experiences at border regions into a political-religious philosophy against colonial boundaries. In this way, they explicitly denounce these boundaries in a way that goes beyond hidden resistance of the boundary. In the subsequent pages, we will briefly examine their perception of day-to-day experiences at the boundary in relation to their philosophy of colonial boundaries. Doing so, we do not claim to give an objective view of the situation; we focus on the subjective perspective and the philosophy of the adepts concerned.

3. Boundaries in the Bas-Congo region in day-to-day experiences of BDK adepts and the translation of these experiences into a cultural philosophy

Boundaries as experienced on a day-to-day basis

In everyday life, the adepts criticize practical problems caused by national boundaries while underlining the fact that they perceive their existence as artificial. On the one hand, they emphasize thus that in significance, the political boundaries dividing the ancient Kingdom of Kongo do not exist for them: the same population lives across the multiple political

boundaries in the Bas-Congo region. On the other hand however, the boundaries impose their existence when they offer opportunities and/or problems.

On the one hand, BDK adepts underline the fact that, in their eyes, what they call "cultural boundaries" prevail over "political boundaries" in significance. Indeed, since they live in a region in which a homogenous social group is divided by several boundaries, in cultural significance, the political boundaries have little meaning. For example, many adepts have family and friends who officially live in a different country than they. Thus, in the vast country of DRC, they feel closer to kin who are for example Angolan than to fellow Congolese who live thousands of miles away in the east of the country. Like one man asserted during the time of our research, the movement says that "Brothers of the same blood are destined to live together and community life exists for centuries … but the colonial boundaries with all their harassments make the indigenous people suffer."

On the other hand however, the political boundaries dividing their region become quiet tangible when they offer opportunities or create problems. In this way, adepts admit that having family in other political countries can have its advantages. One man for example asserted that in case of war in one country, the Bakongo can easily move across the boundary, where they can most often rely on family to receive them. Other examples concern education and health care: in this case adepts give the example that Bakongo from RC come to DRC because there are more hospitals and schools in DRC than in RC. The example which was given the most often however concerns trade. An adept who lived at the boundary between DRC and RC explained that those who live in DRC sell their goods at markets in RC because the Franc in the Republic of Congo is more favorable than the Franc in DRC. In general, once they cross the boundary, Bakongo from Angola or RC are relatively indistinguishable from Bakongo from RDC, were it not for certain dialects spoken in one or other countries. Thus, once the boundary has been crossed, the opportunities of another country can be open for members of this same ethnic group.

However, adepts mainly underline that the act of crossing the boundaries itself is problematic: the passage of BDK adepts into other countries is obstructed among other things by the corruption of immigration officers who don't speak their language and who block their passage into neighboring countries by demanding excessive taxes. On the other hand however, in their own region, they feel dominated by other ethnic groups, who hold high functions in the region while the original population has difficulties of finding employment. As Englebert formulates it, BDK adepts thus feel on the one hand, "dismembered" from their fellow kinsmen, and on the other hand "suffocated" by the presence of other, dominating,

ethnic groups in their territory.[4] A practical reaction to the obstruction of their passage into other countries and the presence of other ethnic groups in their territory is thus among other things to utilize informal strategies in order to pass the boundary, like avoiding boundary posts by taking small routes less known to immigration officers or by presenting counterfeit official documents of the other country.

All in all, BDK adepts vigorously emphasize that the "cultural boundaries" of the past Kingdom of Kongo prevail over the more recent political "colonial" boundaries installed during colonialism. In their eyes, it is morally wrong to separate "blood brothers" who speak the same language and to group them together with other ethnic groups who have a "different mentality". In this situation, they often contend that colonial boundaries are there "to make us suffer" and that they denounce the situation. These experiences and thoughts, they translate into a cultural philosophy of boundaries, as we will see in the following section.

Boundaries translated into a cultural philosophy

That which is especially interesting for the subject of this essay however, is the fact that BDK adepts translate these concrete experiences into a cultural philosophy, thus going further than the "hidden resistance" often remarked in literature on African boundaries, or in the words of Timothy Raeymaekers, "silent encroachment".[5] Thus, they contend with the problems associated with the political boundaries that divide their ancient territory by nostalgically glorifying their ethnic history, their culture, and their language before the advent of colonialism and reinforcing a shared ethnic identity. Doing so, they advocate the installation of a system of federalism in DRC, which would give them more freedom to govern their region according to their preferences and thus also to ease the restrictions on boundary crossing. At the same time however, in this way they challenge state attempts to create a sense of nationalism, which stigmatizes the movement in a negative way.

In their cultural philosophy of boundaries, the BDK movement creates an ideology and a discourse that explicitly denounces the existence of the present political boundaries in DRC and in Africa in general while glorifying their pre-colonial history and ancient Kingdom of Kongo. As we can see for example in annex 2 (p. 17), by way of pamphlets for example the movement explicitly condemns the artificiality and absurdity of what they call "colonial boundaries". This, they link to a philosophy of boundaries at which their "sacred law" is the origin. In this "sacred law", given to them by their god Akongo, is written for example that it

[4] Englebert, P., Tarango, S., & Carter, M. (2002). Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries. *Comparative Political Studies , 35*, 1093-1118.
[5] Raeymaekers, T. (2009). The silent encroachment of the frontier: A politics of transborder trade in the Semliki Valley (Congo-Uganda). *Political Geography , 28*, 55-65.

is forbidden to “balkanize” the Kingdom of Kongo, which was founded by their god Akongo and which has to stay whole as a stone that should not be broken into smaller pieces.

Further, they distinguish for example between a “nation” and a “state”. For the adepts, a “nation” is defined as “a land which is made up of all the land which belongs to a same tribe, a homogeneous ethnic group of people brought together and created by God”; a “state” on the other hand, is “an artificial political entity created by men.” Thus, they contend that the political states that exist today like DRC, RC, Angola, are artificial entities and that ideally, they should be disbanded in the future in order to turn the existing pre-colonial natural “nations” into corresponding political internationally recognized entities. These ideas they link also to notions of “land” and “ancestors.” Thus, they romantically refer to their history and to their ancient territory, the great pre-colonial Kingdom of Kongo which occupied territory from the south of Gabon to the north of Angola. The movement clearly displays a characteristic pride in this myth of origins, which they link also to the fact that their ancestors are buried in this ancient territory.

While accentuating their history, they also compare themselves with other ethnic groups in DRC as well as with other “dominated” ethnic groups over the world. Compared with other groups in DRC; they differentiate themselves by giving themselves certain positive traits while attributing other groups more negative traits. For example, like mentioned above, the adepts of the movement assert that the Bakongo people are good traders and good administrators, but also trustworthy, noble, welcoming to strangers, peaceful, honest etc. By contrast, other ethnic groups in DRC they denote as having a “different mentality”; they designate as “fighters”, “dishonest”, “unwelcoming” to strangers etc. At the same time, they compare themselves to other ethnic minorities in similar situations over the world, like the Catalans between Spain and France, or the groups in the former Yugoslavia. In this respect, they also compare the situation of colonial boundaries particularly often to the situation created by the Berlin Wall after World War II in Europe, saying that “The Wall of Berlin separated the German people, so what did they do? They broke it down.”

Finally, throughout this logic that it is their god Akongo’s will that the people of one “nation” with the same ancestors and ancient territory be together, and by differentiating themselves with other ethnic groups in DRC while comparing themselves to other ethnic minorities over the world, they assert that the present “artificial” political situation in which the Kongo people are divided over several countries whilst they have to live with other ethnic groups who have a “different mentality”, is like a “forced marriage” between people who do not naturally belong together. In this respect, they threaten that if the Kongo people continue to be mistreated in their territory, for example by having to pays excessive taxes in order to cross the border or by the fact that they have difficulties finding work in their region because

members of other ethnic groups occupy many posts, the “law of history” will take action and DRC will be balkanized similar to for example the former Yugoslavia. In order to avoid this, the movement argues that the politicians of Africa should change the “forced marriage” into a “marriage of love”; doing so they advocate the installation of a system of federalism in their territory, through which they would have more freedom to govern their region and also to alleviate the restrictions on border crossings.

For BDK, the installation of a system of federalism is thus the solution to the problems associated with “colonial boundaries” in DRC and in Africa in general. Through their discourse above on the difference between a “nation” and a “state” or by comparing themselves with ethnic minorities over the world, they contend that in order to avoid “the law of history” of violence and balkanization observed elsewhere, a system of federalism is necessary in order to contend with the boundaries established at Berlin in 1885, which they denote as “crazy, absurd, and irrational”. A few other reasons that they give in favor of federalism are the fact that the DRC is too large a country in order to effectively govern it from Kinshasa, as well as what they perceive as “injustices” against the Kongo population as mentioned above, and the fact that it is against the will of the people and of their god Akongo that they be “tortured” by the problems associated with the current boundaries.

In an ideal world, their political future would be to arrive at a federal system inspired on the models seen in Western Europe and in North America. In this ideal, the whole of Central Africa would become a federation, which they call the “Union of Ntsimansi”, as seen in annex 3 (p. 19), which would be made up of smaller federations, as seen in the same annex. In this confederation, the current DRC would be the centre of the ensemble, like we can see in annex 4. Once this could be achieved, a greater ideal would be to turn the entire African continent into a federation, at which the “Union of Ntsimansi” would be the centre, as clear from annex 5. Before they could arrive at this ideal however, a more realistic objective would be what they call the “Congolese Confederation”, as they picture in annex 6. In this ideal DRC, the capital would be in the centre of the country instead of at Kinshasa, and the country would be made up of autonomous states which would be governed from the centre.

Practically, the movement diffuses this political message by distributing pamphlets or bulletins, or by using their internet site for those in the Kongolese diaspora. In previous years as well, the movement organized large religious cults in the Bas-Congo region; because of the prohibition of the movement by the government and because of its violent past however, the religious wing of the movement is officially forbidden to act and to reunite members.

Nevertheless, in secret, the pamphlets and bulletins continue to be dispersed and adepts continue to meet, be it not in large groups.

Altogether, the BDK movement thus has a relatively ambiguous status. On the one hand, by advocating federalism and by getting actively involved in their country's future through their political party, they seem to be concerned with the future of the Congolese state and to wish to solve the problems associated with colonial boundaries. On the other hand however, by accentuating their ethnic identity and by explicitly differentiating themselves from other ethnic Congolese groups, they go against governmental attempts to procure a sense of national unity and nationalism. This makes them a controversial group which government agencies try to keep in check, also because in the past, members of the movement have proven to be aggressive against state structures and representatives from time to time.

4. BDK's reaction to colonial boundaries through their cultural philosophy: exploitation of religion and ethnicity as means of political and cultural resistance

By translating their concrete experiences into a cultural philosophy on boundaries, BDK adepts react to the menace associated with colonial boundaries by trying to redeem what they perceive as going lost. In this way, they try to preserve their cultural identity and political power in the Bas-Congo region, which they see as endangered among other things because of the continual existence of colonial boundaries. In reacting against the general boundary situation, BDK offers support in two ways. First of all, through the movement, adepts conserve their ethnic identity. In this way, the movement gives the adepts a clear identity in a postcolonial situation influenced by several mentalities and possible identities. Secondly, BDK offers support practically and politically concerning a concrete reaction to the situation. Through these ways of offering support and by accentuating their ethnic identity, the movement also permits the adepts to come to terms with other dimensions of their identity, thus allowing them to create a hybrid identity.

Concerning the support of identity the movement offers, by glorifying their past and ethnic identity, adepts are given psychological support in a situation where they feel dominated by other groups in their region and divided from their kin, who live in the same cultural zone of the Kingdom of Kongo. By being a part of the BDK movement, adepts thus receive confirmation that their ethnic group, identity, and language are worthy of consideration. In this way, they conserve and value for example their language, which they feel as being dominated by languages of ethnic groups in their region. Throughout their identity discourse and their comparisons with other groups, we can thus say that they preserve their group and the conceptual boundaries with other groups in the manner which was

described by the Norwegian Fredrik Barth in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, a study which has entered the canon of work on boundaries. As Barth describes, here also the group upholds its existence through contact with other groups and by explicitly differentiating itself from those other groups and upholding the conceptual boundaries with those groups.[6]

However, the movement goes further than conceptually differentiating its members from others through their identity: while trying to re-create the Kingdom of Kongo in their imaginary, they try to apply their ideals in reality as well. Thus, by conceptually taking distance, they express that they want to see this distance realized in practice as well. In this way, affirming their ethnic identity in the region through the movement becomes a political tool: while denouncing the artificiality of colonial boundaries which separates "blood brothers", BDK also denounces "injustices" against and domination of the Bakongo people and of BDK in the region by government officials and by the presence of other ethnic groups. Using the problems they encounter as arguments, BDK thus advocates the installation of a system of federalism in DRC by secretly distributing their pamphlets to adepts and through their official political party, Bundu dia Mayala. In this way, we can agree with for example, Roger Bastide when he asserts that messianic movements are not a regressive influence for those involved, by contrast, they are a sign of a people who are culturally conscious and aware of their value, and they express a crisis of growth. As Bastide says,

> If manipulated from the outside by intelligent leaders who convert the movement, for instance, into a political party, messianism can become a form of apprenticeship to new ways of thinking and acting on the part of the masses.[7]

Examining this political reaction, we can compare it to Igor Kopytoff's theory on the creation of new African societies. Kopytoff takes Frederick Jackson Turner's conception of the "frontier" and its influence on American culture and adapts it to an African context. Doing so, he suggests that on the African continent, we can explain the cultural resemblance of communities across the continent by looking at the way new societies have been created. In contrast to the classical tribal model, Kopytoff suggests that new societies are created by marginalized individuals in an existing society who become marginalized in the literal sense. Namely, these individuals depart from the centre of society to its frontiers, where they found a new group, which often attracts marginalized individuals from other societies, and in turn can become a new metropolis from where the cycle restarts. In our case, we see something

[6] Barth, F. (Ed.). (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organisation of Culture Difference.* Prospect Hights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc.
[7] Bastide, R. (1966). Messianism and Social and Economic Development (1961). In I. Wallerstein (Ed.), *Social Change. The Colonial Situation* (R. A. Wagoner, Trans., pp. 467-477). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , p. 475.

similar: BDK adepts feel marginalized in their own territory conceptually. Thus, given that they don't find governmental support in their region, they organize themselves in a new group which gives them support concerning their identity and political power. Like in Kopytoff's theory, we see also that individuals literally go to the boundaries of their region in order to find the support elsewhere: in this case, members of the Bakongo ethnic community cross boundaries when they do not find what they need in their own region. In contrast to Kopytoff's theory however, in their case they do not move to an open space and restart a community; instead they organize themselves as a transnational group and a network situated in different countries and simultaneously organized from the centre of the society where they feel dominated through their political party. In this perspective, like in Kopytoff's theory, they are literally pushed to the frontiers of society: in everyday life, they rely on boundary crossings to live; in addition their support group is organized across several political boundaries.

By reorganizing themselves however, the group thus becomes politically influential by asserting their ethnic identity. By organizing themselves as a single group also, BDK groups several smaller ethnic groups into a single, large group of Bakongo, through which they create a political majority in a country that has over 200 smaller ethnic groups. Thus, as the government tries to procure a sense of national unity by presenting the Congolese nation as a whole, BDK acts in the same way in presenting the Bakongo people, situated in the territory of the ancient Kingdom of Kongo, likewise as a unified whole.

In addition, the choice of an overall "Kongo" identity that BDK offers seems to help overcome the difficulty of choosing between identities in this relatively small region which is divided by several boundaries. By asserting their "Kongo" identity, this sphere of meaning serves as a foundation through which they can place other aspects of a hybrid identity influenced by a postcolonial situation where several dimensions of identity overlap and intermingle. In the relatively small Bas-Congo region, BDK adepts are in between several mentalities influenced among other things by the three ex-colonizers and their respective languages. By accentuating the ethnic dimension of their complex identity, they avoid having to choose between several identities.

Thus, an overall "Kongo" identity becomes a transnational identity that includes several national identities and their respective colonial influences, as well as dimensions of "modernity" and "tradition". In this way being "Kongolese" means that adepts who have affiliations with several countries, for example through family connections, do not have to choose between being for example "Angolan," with Portuguese influences, "Congolese from DRC," with Belgian influences, or "Congolese from RC", with French influences, nor for that

matter between being "traditional" or "modern". Namely, as mentioned above, the movement advocates the junction between tradition African values and modernity. An overall "Kongo" identity thus encloses other dimensions of a complex identity and permits to place these dimensions instead of ignoring their presence. As André Mary for example says in referring to messianic movements and hybridity, adepts make the choice of not choosing.[8] Whereas most researchers of messianic movements refer in this regard to not choosing between spheres of influence connected to colonists' Western civilization and spheres of influence connected to tradition African societies, in this case we can thus add a dimension related to postcolonial times: the dimension of national identities.

In general, we could thus postulate that the current political-religious BDK movement reacts against the existence of colonial boundaries in a similar way as the preceding movements reacted against colonialism and the influences of Western civilization. In postcolonial times in which colonial boundaries still exist however, the situation seems to have become more complicated as the dimension of national identities, also of those in the Kongolese diaspora, adds itself to the foregoing dimensions.

5. Conclusions

How BDK will influence Congolese politics and the future of the management of the boundaries surrounding their region and those in the rest of the country, the future will show. In general however, we can already conclude here that the movement of Bundu dia Kongo goes further than "silent encroachment"[9] to the situation created by the border, which proves to be exceptional. As an organized group, they translate their everyday experiences with national boundaries into a philosophy specifically centered on the subject of "colonial boundaries" and the problems they create, thus also offering ideals, hopes, and possible solutions. In this way, the group offers psychological and practical support to its members: on the one hand, the affirmation of their identity asserts that their culture and language are worthy and that the division of their Kingdom of Kongo is artificial, on the other hand, by creating a political party they try to practically improve the situation caused by the boundaries by advocating a system of federalism in DRC. In this way however, the group maintains an ambiguous status: on the one hand, the affirmation of their ethnicity often procures them reproaches of secessionism, on the other the political party appears to try to improve the situation from within the DRC. Finally, by offering support in these ways, the movement also

[8] Mary, A. (2000). *Le bricolage africain des héros chrétiens.* Paris: Les Editions du Cerf. See also for example, Bastide, 1966 ; Laurent, P.-J. (2003). *Les pentecôtistes du Burkina Faso. Mariage, pouvoir et guérison.* Paris: Karthala.
[9] Raeymaekers, 2009.

allows adepts to choose for an overarching “Kongo” identity, and thus giving them the option of avoiding the choice between other dimensions of their identity, like the several national identities in the region.

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7. Annexes

Annex 1: the Bas-Congo region in the Democratic Republic of Congo



The Bas-Congo Region

The Democratic Republic of Congo

Annex 2: Colonial Boundaries according to BDK

LES FRONTIERES COLONIALES DU ZAIRE ET DE LA ZAMBI

L'AFRIQUE FALSIFIEE PAR DES FRONTIERES COLONIALES



La frontière coloniale du Zaïre forme une queue qui pénètre au coeur de la Zambi.

Trouvez-vous normal l'existence de cette queue inventée par le colonisateur sans tenir compte de la volonté des Balamba et des Babemba dont le pays a été ainsi balkanisé anarchiquement à cause du cuivre ?

LES FRONTIERES COLONIALES DE LA NAMIBI



Dans ses frontières coloniales, la Namibi a une queue qui servait aux Racistes Boers de lancer facilement leurs troupes contre les Nationalistes africains campés en Zambi, en Angola, et au Zimbabue.

La Loi de l'intangibilité des frontières coloniales dit qu'il est strictement interdit de modifier cette frontière insensée !

Ainsi, avec sa queue, regardez cette carte ridicule de la Namibi!...

LES FRONTIERES COLONIALES DU MALAWI ET DU MOZAMBIK



Regardez le Malawi et le Mozambik dans leurs frontières coloniales.

Une partie du Malawi est totalement à l'intérieur du Mozambik!

Pourquoi ne pas effacer ces frontières coloniales en réunifiant le Malawi et le Mozambik ?

Intangibilité des frontières coloniales !...

Des frontières absurdes, folles, insensées !

L'AFRIQUE FALSIFIEE PAR DES FRONTIERES COLONIALES



A l'Ouest, la frontière coloniale du Zaïre divise le Royaume du Kongo en trois pays souverains : le Kongo Français, le Kongo Belge, et le Kongo Portugais (L'Angola).

Voilà l'Afrique falsifiée par des frontières coloniales qui ne tiennent pas compte de la volonté des peuples concernés.

Annex 3: The Union of Ntsimansi (1)



Annex 4: The Union of Ntsimansi (2)

Annex 5: The African Union



Une ancienne prophétie des Mages Fondateurs du Royaume du Kongo dit ceci :

- **Mu tandu kia Kinatimasa, Katiopa dina vutuka kituka Tanu, kansi Ntimansi yina kala Tatu dina buta kumi na zole.**
- **A l'Ere du Verseau, l'Afrique redeviendra Cinq, tandis que l'Afrique Centrale sera le Trois, qui donnera naissance au Douze.**

Makaba 6:17

Annex 6: The Congolese Confederation





Fragile Borderlands as Breeding Grounds for Regional Instability:
The Cases of Ecuador and Southern Sudan

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1 INTRODUCTION

The Andean region comprising Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela faces 'a profound crisis of authority, governance, democratic legitimacy, and territorial security' with soaring homicide rates, although the trend of both interstate and intrastate conflict is falling.[1] Actually, Colombia is the only Andean state facing intrastate conflict. Starting in 1946, the conflict between the government and leftist guerrillas has been lasting for decades, with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army persisting today. Due to high murder rates, in the 1980s paramilitary militias were formed to respond to the killings, but soon they became perpetrators themselves.[2] On the one hand, the conflict's perpetuation and the regional ramifications are the result of its multidimensional nature and the fact that many different actors have a stake in it. On the other hand, this is due to policy responses such as Plan Colombia and President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy which have hardly taken account of the conflict's regional embedment. These policies provoked its impacts' increasing transnationality: military activities in peripheral regions increased refugees flows; fumigations shifted coca cultivations beyond the borderline; and illegal armed groups use governance voids in borderlands to gain power. Furthermore, networks of violent actors engaged in the drug business now span the region, while, formerly, they were mostly present in Colombia – a development which seems to accompany the Andean states' politico-economic, societal and state erosion.

The region in Africa comprising the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Uganda is marked by 'conflict which has devastated the region'.[3] While each of these states has been facing internal turmoil, since 1986 Uganda confronts an internal conflict which impacts on the entire region. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which initially fought the Ugandan government in Northern Uganda, especially in the Acholi areas, crossed the border to Sudan around 1994 to conduct its operations from Eastern Equatoria. It was backed by the Government of Sudan, apparently 'in retaliation against Ugandan and international support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)'.[4] Although this support has vanished a lot, it allowed the LRA to accumulate considerable power. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, from 2006 to 2008 the government of Uganda engaged in the Juba talks, a series of negotiations with the LRA over a ceasefire and potential peace agreement, facilitated by the Government of Southern Sudan. The process's failure entailed the military offensive 'Operation Lightning Thunder', launched on 14 December 2008, between Uganda, DRC and Southern Sudan to end the conflict by force. However, rather than the rebellion's end, it provoked the LRA's regional expansion from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, where attacks seemed to have become less frequent, to the DRC and the CAR. This has entailed new refugee flows, undermined the region's socio-economic development and eroded the people's social cohesion by spreading fear and terror.

Conventional solutions to tackle the regional ramifications of intrastate conflict aim at strengthening the central state without considering the fact that the periphery is central to regional stability. Drawing on the Ecuadorian Northern Border Zone (ENBZ) and the Sudanese Southern Border Zone (SSBZ), I argue that the periphery's centrality is due to two phenomena typical for borderlands: the fragile situation and the high-risk-high-opportunity environment. My hypothesis is that the combination of them with the conflict's neighbourhood effects produces dynamics which contribute to regional instability and the conflict's perpetuation. To substantiate this argument three conceptual approaches (border zones, fragile situation, neighbourhood effects) are presented and synthesised into the Borderland-Fragility-Neighbourship-Model. Applying this framework to the ENBZ, Chapter 3 analyses the paper's hypothesis. Chapter 4 compares the ENBZ with the SSBZ to examine the research results' generalizibility and the concluding chapter sums up the findings. The literature reviewed for this paper mostly reflects state-centrism, hence, borderland dynamics are little known. By using the above mentioned comprehensive framework to analyze these dynamics, I assume a cross-fertilising perspective which few scholars have taken so far. Apart from narrowing this research gap, the paper reduces an empirical deficit by building bridges between different regional expertise and identifying entry points for engagement with borderlands across the globe.[5]

[1] Serrano/Kenny (2005); Shifter (2004); Marcella (2008), p. 1; Bonilla/Moreano (2007), pp. 128-129; Briscoe (2008), p. 1.
[2] Poe/Isacson (2009), p. 2.
[3] Borzello (2007), p. 387.
[4] Schomerus/Tumutegyereize (2009), p. 6.
[5] The theoretical part draws on history, political science, sociology and international political economy, the empirical part on field work in Ecuador (for the ENBZ) and secondary literature (for the SSBZ).

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter develops the case studies' theoretical framework. First, its components border zones, fragile situation and neighbourhood effects are presented, then they are synthesised into the B-F-N-Model in order to explain the dynamics emerging in fragile borderlands adjoining a conflict.

2.1 Border Zones

This paper distinguishes between borders and borderlands/border zones. Though being social constructs, borders are 'fixed, legal geopolitical entities'[6] which confer sovereignty and territoriality to nation-states. Borderlands are 'regions situated on the edges of states which straddle an international border'.[7] They distinguish themselves through being less state-controlled than the 'heartlands' and their transnationality. Studying borderlands requires considering both sides of the border as one spatial unit of analysis because, though borderlands are separated vertically through borders, they are interconnected horizontally through the flow of goods, people and ideas. Borders' importance is contested between realists, globalists and international political economy (IPE) scholars. Whereas realists emphasise their traditional military function, globalists argue growing global interdependence has made borders progressively less relevant. IPE scholars explicate borders' increasingly global significance with their transformation, arising from the borderlands' transnationality. Cross-border commercial activities rely on this transnationality and benefit from connecting two different economic systems. However, due to the borderlands' high-opportunity-high-risk atmosphere, these features turn them into an enabling environment for illegal activeties. Furthermore, borderlands often are not properly integrated into the national economy, thus, the borderlanders' loyalty to the government may yield to self-interested illegal economic interactions with those beyond the borderline. While such cross-border movements have long been common, their global interconnectedness is rather new. Thus, though neither military considerations nor border-blurring effects can be neglected, policymakers should realise borders' mounting importance if they are to cope with the threats emerging from border zones.

2.2 Fragile Situation

Given the discrepancy between borders' globalised importance and borderlands' vulnerability, I now examine the 'fragile situations' approach to explain this vulnerability. In the current debate on fragile states a shift away from generalising concepts towards a more nuanced approach is taking place. Three components of this new approach stand out: first, the objects of study are fragile *situations* rather than states because fragility operates at the sub-state level. Second, fragility is understood as a *continuum* implying that situations are characterised by a certain degree of fragility. Third, there are *different forms* of fragility.[8] This paper draws on Picciotto, Olonisakin and Clarke's approach; it views fragility as a function of capacity and resilience.[9] Capacity means the ability to deliver public goods such as security, education and an enabling environment for the economy. Resilience can be achieved 'through accountability and participation that define responsive policy options.'[10] The concept relies on Hirschman's model of exit, voice and loyalty, with voice as interest articulation being paramount in achieving resilience.[11] It considers the resort to violence as the ultimate form of exit, thus, resilience and capacity help to prevent violence. Loyalty is generated by voice and legitimises a government. Hence, legitimacy is embedded in resilience. This model underscores that fragility can take different forms, depending on a state's degree of capacity and resilience. It suggests that the borderlands' vulnerability stems from their experience of a fragile situation.

2.3 Neighbourhood Effects

While the likelihood of intrastate conflict to trigger interstate war or internal conflict in neighbouring states is rather low, the generally adverse conditions it provokes in its neighbourhood are common. Murdoch and Sandler, for instance, show that economic growth in such regions is negatively affected by a conflict and Collier et al. additionally mention social spillovers.[12] The paper's basis is Brown's neighbourhood effects model, because apart from comprising the three dimensions presented above (interstate war, conflict contagion, general impacts), Brown goes beyond the conventional wisdom of unidirectional spillover effects:

[6] Goodhand (2008), pp. 226-227.
[7] Ibid., p. 228.
[8] Rocha/Othieno/Evans (2008), p. 2; Einsiedel (2005), p. 16.
[9] Picciotto/Olonisakin/Clarke (2007), p. 169.
[10] Picciotto (2007), p. 12.
[11] Hirschman (1970), p. 32.
[12] Murdoch/Sandler (2002); Collier et al (2003), pp. 33-41.

'[p]roblems come from two directions – from the places where conflicts originate and from neighbouring states – and they are often the products of discrete, deliberate decisions taken by leaders and governments', thus, neighbourhood effects are 'the effects of internal conflicts on neighbouring states and the actions that neighbouring states take with respect to these conflicts'. [13] Brown cites five of them: refugee problems, economic problems, military problems, instability problems and war. *Refugee problems* include the economic burden on the host country, the security problems which arise, for example, when rebels recruit them, and radicalisation and political instability resulting from refugees allying with their ethnic brethren in the neighbouring country. *Economic problems* cover the disruption of trade, communication, transportation, access to commodities and a decline in foreign investment. *Military problems* comprise four aspects: first, neighbouring territory serve to supply rebels with equipment; second, it is abused as sanctuary; third, rebels attack their neighbouring country or promote their cause internationally; finally, hot-pursuit operations or interdiction campaigns provoke military clashes. These three categories imply the previously described general impacts of internal conflicts on their neighbourhood. The fourth category, *instability problems,* can be equated to conflict contagion, resulting from the first three categories' extreme intensification. The last category*, interstate war,* can result from hot-pursuit operations or may serve to distract attention from domestic problems.[14] Regarding the neighbours' actions, Brown cites humanitarian, defensive, protective and opportunistic interventions as well as opportunistic wars.[15] According to a study conducted by Harbom and Wallensteen, opportunistic interventions are the most wide-spread.[16] By providing military support, financial means or the use of their territory, neighbouring states meddle in the conflict and exploit it to upgrade their image or to advance their interests. The use of territory exemplifies that passivity or refusal to assist can also constitute an opportunistic intervention if it helps a state to spare potential costs.

2.4 The Borderland-Fragility-Neighbourship-Model (B-F-N-Model)

To explain the dynamics emerging in fragile border zones adjoining an internal conflict, I develop a model resulting from the synthesis of the three concepts presented above: the B-F-N-Model. The concepts' isolated consideration has disclosed that the state does not serve as unit of analysis. This is the case for border zones because they imply cross-border movements, for fragile situations because they vary at the sub-state level, and for neighbourhood effects because they operate across borders. Therefore, synthesising them allows us to consider border zones from a transnational perspective starting in the state's periphery, which is necessary to adequately explain borderland dynamics that alter according to the context. These *borderland* dynamics are determined by two variables: first, by the form of *fragility* as function of certain degrees of capacity and resilience deployed by a state (State A) and its neighbour (State B) in their borderlands. Second, by the character of the states' *neighbourship*, resulting from the political situation (peace/conflict) of each state.[17]

The *Ideal Case* is when both states are in peace and their borderlands enjoy high resilience and capacity. Then State A meets the borderlanders' basic needs and the states' borderlands benefit from the richness of exchange.[18] The *Worst Case* occurs when both states suffer internal conflict and are barely resilient or capable in their border zones. This context produces 'alienated borderlands',[19] characterised by State A's absence and the lack of legitimate cross-border interactions. The conflicts' neighbourhood effects exacerbate this situation. Even if State A is in peace and both states meet the borderlanders' needs by deploying high capacity and resilience, State A has to adjust its policies to the State B' neighbourhood effects, if that one is in conflict. They are most severe in the borderlands because, first, the closer the fighting, the bigger the risk for investors and the less stable the trade. Second, rebels usually stay near the border so as to strike attacks on their home country and to facilitate supply. Third, refugees, although trying to move to towns to escape prosecution, generally do not have the means to do so and stay in State A's borderlands. Similarly, the neighbourhood effects working in the other direction are most notable there, especially opportunistic interventions consisting of passivity or the refusal to assist, for example, through not accommodating refugees or not taking action against rebels. The less capable and resilient State A is in its borderlands, the more it loses the borderlanders' loyalty who thenceforth opt for violence. Something similar applies to State

[13] Brown (1996), p. 600, p. 591.
[14] Ibid., pp. 592-595.
[15] Ibid., pp. 596-598. 'Interventions' include diplomatic, economic and military measures.
[16] Harbom/Wallensteen (2005), p. 629.
[17] Interstate conflict is disregarded.
[18] Martínez (1994), pp. 5-10.
[19] Ibid.

B; although those of State B's population who interfere most with State A's borderlands' (rebels and refugees) have already abandoned their voice option in favour of exit via violence or exile respectively, resilience and capacity matter. The less resilient and capable State B is in its borderlands, the more difficult it is to secure its borderlanders' loyalty and to keep them from joining the rebels or refugees.

If State B is in conflict and both borderlands feature low capacity and low resilience, it constitutes the *FBC-Case, viz*., fragile border zones adjoining an internal conflict. The combination of a highly fragile situation in the borderlands and the neighbourhood effects acting on them produces dynamics dictated by violence. They characterise what I label Shadow Political Borderland Economy, the system of illegal economic and social activities close to and across a border in the FBC-Case. The fragile situation undermines the borderlanders' social cohesion and prompts them to engage in clandestine activities; they resort to violence as an exit option. As the fragility implies the states' failure to cope with the neighbourhood effects, rebels subvert State A's sovereignty, refugee flows lead to the basic service systems' collapse and economic problems cannot be counterbalanced – leaving the exit option as the only viable way to make a living. The armed groups present in State A's borderlands fuel violent acts among borderlanders, import violence between rivalling groups and engage borderlanders in ruthless activities. These circumstances also affect cross-border interactions: they include illegal elements to help rebels finance and conduct fighting such as weapons smuggling and human or drug trafficking. Together with the fact that these activities assume globalised dimensions with specialists of violence becoming progressively more unscrupulous and State A being unable to adequately respond to them, these phenomena turn the FBC-Case into a breeding ground for violence which easily spreads towards the heartlands and destabilize the region. This situation also sustains the armed conflict in State B since the fragility constitutes a comparative advantage for the conflict's various violent stakeholders.

3. THE PERIPHERY'S CENTRALITY FOR REGIONAL STABILITY: THE ENBZ

By applying the theoretical framework to the ENBZ I will now scrutinize the paper's hypothesis that borderlands are central to regional stability.

3.1 Fragile Situation in the ENBZ

The Ecuadorian state deploys low capacity in the ENBZ.[20] It provides little economic opportunities, making the ENBZ to Ecuador's poorest region: while in 2007 the national average of poverty was 61.3%, in Esmeralda it was 76%, in Sucumbíos 81.7% and in Carchi 59.6%.[21] As licit economic activities are either not available or are insufficient to make a living, the borderlanders engage in more lucrative illegal activities: a fisher of San Lorenzo, for example, earns US$50 per week. If he opts to work in the Colombian borderlands as *raspachín* in the collection of coca leaves, he earns between US$600 and US$800 per week.[22] Given this high profit margin, and as they are usually unaware of or downplay the illegality, borderlanders engage in such activities to accelerate their economic or social ascension. To be sure, the region does offer economic opportunities through extractive industries, such as mining, logging and palm cultivation. However, the transnational companies either bring their own workers or exploit the borderlanders' neediness by paying minimal wages. Furthermor, basic services such as the educational and health system are deficient. In the canton of San Lorenzo for instance, the illiteracy rate is 16.88% compared to a national average of 9%.[23] Due to poor provision of education and the resulting rural exodus of the youth, technical and human capacities are insufficient to develop new income sources such as tourism. Health service statistics reveal the alarming situation of the borderlanders' well-being: in the canton of Lago Agrio, the child mortality rate is 7.8%, in San Lorenzo 33.1%.[24] HIV/AIDS rates are the highest in Ecuador and sexual and reproductive health problems are rampant due to prostitution and the indigenous women's high fertility.

Two further public policy areas deserve attention: security and justice. Despite a heightened police and military presence, the state is not able to deliver security in the ENBZ. In San Lorenzo, where a modern police barrack with eighteen troops was created in 2002, the troops take turns and have to split up into judicial, migration and urban police, thus there is no effective police presence. Instead, the 'Sons of San

[20] The degree of fragility in the ENBZ varies. While in Carchi the situation is less fragile I mostly refer to Esmeralda or Sucumbíos.
[21] Celi/Molina/Weber (2009), p. 17.
[22] Moreano*, 27/07/2009.
[23] Dumas/Frank (2008), p. 9.
[24] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

Lorenzo', a self-proclaimed guards group, delivers security – not without extorted protection money.[25] Other self-defence mechanisms are surveillance committees or the population's armament, which demonstrates that violence is considered the only viable response to potential aggression. Moreover, the deficient justice system has generated a brutal self-help system. Due to insufficient human resources, inadequate infrastructure and flawed protection of judges, renditions of judgments are rare or protracted. Consequently, the borderlanders prefer to directly settle a score: a betrayed wife may hire a *sicario*, a killer, in order to take revenge on her husband. Such tasks' prices reveal the borderlanders' economic desperation: a life may be worth between US$20 and US$50.[26] This not only demonstrates the region's abandonment, which can be regarded as structural violence itself, but also violence's naturalisation.

Fragility's second determinant, resilience, is equally low in the ENBZ: as the borderlanders are denied their voice option, non-responsive policies favouring the central state's or international partners' short-term interests predominate. In Sucumbíos for example, a fast-growing cacao was introduced without consulting the borderlanders who eventually had to cope with reduced income because, despite faster growth, the cacao was of lower quality than the traditionally cultivated one.[27] The want of civil society organisations turns this exclusion into exploitation – the Afro-Ecuadorian Awá's expropriation due to foreign companies' interests being a case in point. Occasionally, borderlanders organised demonstrations, yet the state's repressive response, including human rights violations, made them futile.[28] Beyond the civil society's exclusion, paternalistic state structures curb the state's responsiveness. As policies are developed in the state's bureaucratic-technical centre, local perspectives are largely excluded. At best, they are designed in the National Secretariat for Planning and Development's office in Imbarra, two hours away from the border, so the reality on the ground remains disregarded.[29] As the view from the centre, applying not only to the Ecuadorian, but also to the Colombian case, regards the borderlands as a space where security and economic criteria predominate, institutional development and social cohesion receive little attention, underscoring a fragmented society deprived of interest articulation. In consequence, the borderlanders' loyalty towards the state withers and they resort to violence to satisfy their needs. In brief, the ENBZ experiences fragile situations which are mirrored on the Colombian side of the border and which make the borderlanders progressively more inclined to opt for the ultimate exit option: violence. If these violent dynamics remain unaddressed, societal erosion through mistrust and fear is likely to expand, putting regional stability at risk.

3.2 Neighbourhood Effects in the ENBZ

The risks for regional stability that emanate from the fragile situation in the ENBZ are reinforced by the neighbourhood effects of the Colombian conflict..

Military problems

Military problems emerge from armed groups' presence in the ENBZ. Due to the Colombian conflict's shift to the periphery, Putumayo is now one of the country's most violent regions, with homicide rates four times the national average. This development is extending to the ENBZ, where, due to the increasing presence of several FARC Fronts, various paramilitary groups, and Colombian militaries, homicide rates have also soared during the last decade. Generally, most violence occurs between illegal armed groups (IAGs) without involving borderlanders, as they are in a constant fight for territory. Nevertheless, borderlanders may get involved if they are affiliated to one side or the other. If borderlanders collaborate with the FARC, for example by housing them, paramilitaries may kill them and *vice versa*. Intergroup disputes also incite violence amongst borderlanders themselves: if a borderlander has connections to the guerrilla and another to the paramilitaries, they may kill each other to protect themselves. Apart from not meddling in the IAGs' affairs, many pay a monthly or weekly *vacuna*, protection money, in order to avoid kidnap or death, as official security measures do not reach the periphery.[30] The relationships between IAGs and borderlanders also differ. The borderlanders and paramilitaries' relationship is considered parasitic. Paramilitaries harass and displace the population to control territory. They expel the state which progressively loses its monopoly

[25] González (2008), p. 217.
[26] Ibid., p. 221.
[27] Molina*, 25/07/2009.
[28] González*, 21/07/2009.
[29] Moreano (2009a), p. 40.
[30] Carrión (2008), p. 6.

on force. The FARC and borderlanders' relationship can be described as symbiotic. Often, the borderlanders prefer the guerrillas to the state because they deliver justice with more efficient means; hence, they create parallel structures.[31] That civilians have more confidence in IAGs than in the state is alarming. It allows them to gain support for their fight and undermines the states' sovereignty.

Ecuador responded to the IAGs' increasing presence in the ENBZ with its securitisation. While Colombian military expenditures have increased by almost 100% since 2001, Ecuador tripled the number of military troops in Esmeralda in 2003 and, as of March 2009, deploys 8000 military and 3000 police troops, while Colombia deploys 7000 troops at the border. The increased military presence yielded positive results: by September 2008, 120 rebel camps had been destroyed, some coca plantations and drug laboratories discovered and weapons as well as 68 kilogramme of dynamite confiscated.[32] Nonetheless, the militarisation also had negative effects; it provoked mistrust towards the military and did not seriously reduce violence. Quite the contrary, the military perpetrates violence itself. A paradigm case was in 2003, when, after Colombian armed forces shot from a plane at indigenous people near the border to dispel them from their land, the Ecuadorian military plundered their village instead of assisting them. Ecuadorian militaries also demand sexual favours from Colombian women living in the ENBZ in exchange for not deporting them. An additional threat of exposure to violence emanates from the neighbouring counterparts; the Colombian military. Deaths of Ecuadorian citizens are provoked by military incursions, but also by the Colombian military killing Ecuadorians, presumably for collaborating with guerrillas, or shooting them 'by mistake' while they cross the border river. These incidents are facilitated by the deficient collaboration between the two militaries. With the rupture of diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia in 2008, security cooperation practically ceased. Although in 2010 the functioning of COMBIFRON, a confidence-building measure, was resumed, the results are still elusive. Innocents die due to insufficient intelligence interchange between the two militaries and IAGs continue to consolidate their presence in the ENBZ and beyond, as they have been doing already in the last years: by December 2008 Ecuador had discovered 182 FARC camps in the ENBZ and acknowledges that many more remain undetected.[33] Moreover, the government revealed that the paramilitaries 'Águilas Negras' had been operating nation-wide for two years, including in the capital.[34]

Refugee problems

Since Plan Colombia's implementation in 2000 approximately 300,000 Colombian refugees crossed the border to Ecuador. They fled violence or migrated due to economic damage caused by fighting and aerial fumigations. 250,000 of them are 'invisible'; as they have never applied for refugee status – partly because they fear persecution – they have no rights to education, employment, health or international protection.[35] Overall, as of 2009, 84,494 Colombians live in the ENBZ with 70% of them in need of international protection which makes the refugee situation the Western Hemisphere's most serious, and the second most serious world-wide (after Sudan).[36] Given the low state capacity in the ENBZ, Colombian displaced people hardly have access to basic services. Even if they do, or if they are illegally employed for extremely low wages, they provoke the borderlanders' animosity for taking their jobs or being an additional burden for their service systems. The overload of the states' limited capacities prompts more people to engage in illegal violent activities. It also nurtures xenophobia, arbitrary detentions, sexual harassment and aggressions against the Ecuadorian justice system. One further refugee problem deserves mention: more than 4,000 Ecuadorian indigenous people and peasants living in the ENBZ were also forced to leave their homes.[37] Their plight is often neglected; the indigenous people in particular are denied state assistance so that they must find their own, often violent, means to cope with their situation. The refugees' difficulties in recovering their livelihoods due to structural deficiencies in the ENBZ has further consequences which redound on the country they are fleeing from – Colombia. They make the refugees prone to being recruited by IAGs or to collaborate in illegal activities with which the IAGs finance their fighting. Thus, unaddressed refugee problems in borderlands contribute both to regional instability and to the conflict's perpetuation.

[31] Zahar (2001), p. 48.
[32] Gutiérrez*, 04/08/2009.
[33] Moreano (2009b), p. 1.
[34] El Universo 20/11/2008.
[35] Poe/Isacson (2009), p. 1.
[36] Molina (2009), pp. 4-5.
[37] González (2009), p. 26.

Economic problems

The last neighbourhood effect contributing to instability and the conflict's perpetuation are economic problems. Three occurrences damage the borderlanders' economic opportunities, making illegal activities more profitable: the decline in commercial exchange when fighting erupts near the border, the paltry investment in the ENBZ by small and medium-size entrepreneurs due to the risk of victimisation by IAGs, and the disputes for land among IAGs and transnational companies to cultivate coca or extract resources leading to displacement and exploitation of borderlanders. In addition to this, the few companies that are present and invest in the ENBZ fail to boost the local economy as, for security reasons, the workers live isolated from their environment. The workers usually being male, the only stimulus they bring is for prostitution.[38] Since the same applies to the Colombian borderlands and incentives from both states to invest in borderlands are wanting or do not bring benefits for the population, the spiral of illegality continues, eroding the formal economy of the region and fueling the conflict through facilitating the necessary financial means.

3.3 Shadow Political Borderland Economy in the ENBZ

To the fragile situation and the neighbourhood effects adds the border's high-risk-high-opportunity atmosphere, resulting in the SPBE. Due to the ENBZ's geostrategically important location for the cocaine industry and the shift of coca plantations to Colombia's Southern border as a result of Plan Colombia, progressively more Ecuadorian borderlanders have been implicated in activities such as the collection of coca, smuggling or drug trafficking which reinforce the SPBE's violent dynamics. Three practices in which such dynamics are manifested stand out: *sicariato*, youth recruitment and prostitution/human trafficking. *Sicariatio* was already mentioned as a parallel 'justice system'; relating to narco-trafficking it is a '*fenómeno económico donde se mercantiliza la muerte'*.[39] Drug bosses hire professional killers with salaries of up to US$2000 to kill rivals, spies or dissidents. Originating in Colombia, '*sicariato* schools' in northern Ecuador are increasingly common, not least because they easily find recruits there: the youth.[40] Youth recruitment results from the attraction of young males without economic alternatives to the prestige and fast money of *sicarios* or related 'professions'. Finally, women and children are driven into prostitution or kidnapped for ransom or to be sold to global human trafficking networks. Besides these phenomena, criminals profit from the easily acquirable arms and absence of state security in borderlands.

The existence of a SPBE determined by a logic of violence has far-reaching consequences for the ENBZ and beyond: as violence assumes an economic place, it is normalised and destroys the social fabric. In urban zones of Esmeraldas, borderlanders now live in a state of silence because those who break it risk death, as the Ecuadorian state does not protect them.[41] Suspicion rules since any actor may be involved in the business of violence. The region's destabilization is also the result of the deficient bilateral cooperation in border security: It converted the ENBZ in an environment of impunity: violent actors commit crimes in the ENBZ and then cross the hardly controlled border and *vice versa*. This facilitates the expansion and professionalisation of narco-trafficking and related businesses, leading to the export of violence to formerly safe places. By depicting the fragile situation in the ENBZ, the impacts that the Colombian conflict's neighbourhood effects have on it and the resulting SPBE, the analysis has shown that the ENBZ constitutes the B-F-N-Model's FBC-Case - fragile borderlands adjoining an internal conflict - and confirmed the model's implication: that these circumstances evoke dynamics dictated by violence which contribute to the regions's destabilization and the conflict's perpetuation.

4 THE PERIPHERY'S CENTRALITY FOR REGIONAL STABILITY: THE SSBZ

In this chapter the ENBZ is contrasted with the SSBZ adjoining Northern Uganda. By means of the comparison I aim to substantiate the hypothesis' generalizibility: even if borderlands that constitute the FBC-Case differ in their specific context, they are always central to regional stability.

4.1 Fragile Situation in the SSBZ

Similar to the ENBZ, the SSBZ experiences high fragility. In Central and Eastern Equatoria basic services and economic opportunities are virtually absent and Eastern Equatoria is, besides Jonglei, the state with the

[38] González (2008), pp. 231-244.
[39] [economic phenomenon where death is commoditised] Carrión (2008), p. 5.
[40] Rodríguez (2008), p. 2.
[41] Vargas*, 27/07/2009.

highest number of people in need of food assistance in Southern Sudan.[42] However, while in the ENBZ the situation is worse than in many other parts of the country, Sudan experiences fragility in almost the entire state: according to the United Nations' Human Development Report 2009 Ecuador features 'high human development' and ranks 80 on the global list whereas Sudan features 'medium human development' and ranks 150.[43] Nevertheless, even if a state experiences fragility nation-wide, addressing the borderlands' fragility should be a priority because there, it works as a multiplier of the neighbourhood effects and nurtures the SPBE's violent dynamics whose consequences become rapidly perceivable beyond the borderlands.

An example for the consequences of low capacity in the SSBZ is the absence of efficient justice and security systems.[44] The state is not able to protect borderlanders from rebel attacks or to penalize those who kill or commit crimes, ergo, Sudanese borderlanders accept to host rebels, provide them with food or marry LRA members because this protects them from being attacked by the LRA.[45] Consequently, the rebels can consolidate their power position and expand their presence. Another example are self defence groups and the armament of villagers to protect their communities from rebels crossing the border since no state force is able to do so.[46] This phenomenon leads to the normalization of violence and the proliferation of weapons, creating a reality in which disputes between individuals are settled with arms rather than with traditional conflict resolution mechanisms or the state apparatus. The African case also shows that the lack of basic services has more severe consequences in border zones than elsewhere in the country. For example, the presence of refugees, internal displaced persons (IDP)s and returnees strains the deficient health system which complicates fighting the spread of diseases. Wanting economic opportunities due to bad education and the lack of support from the state in starting a business leads many borderlanders to engage in informal cross-border trade which usually has a larger profit margin than informal trade elsewhere does. Low resilience in border zones adjoining an internal conflict can also have disastrous ramifications for the region. This is exemplified by a case in which political decisions were made without consulting those at the local level who are affected by these decisions. During Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008 leaflets were dropped over Garamba Park where the LRA was gathering to encourage rebels to leave the bush and come home. They should have reported to the closest church or army station where they would be welcomed and attended, however, churches were neither informed about the fact that they should receive them nor how to treat them. Consequently, returning rebels are killed or borderlanders become hostile against them since they are perceived to take their land and other resources and may have killed friends or relatives.[47]

4.2 Military Problems in the SSBZ

Another element which makes up the FBC-Case are military problems. As in the ENBZ the presence of armed groups in the SSBZ fuels violence. Equivalently, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF)'s and the SPLA's deployment came along with human rights abuses and (lethal) violence against borderlanders.[48] Still, the Andean and African cases differ in two substantial aspects: First, although the Andean IAGs affect Ecuadorians' lives, the majority of their operations takes place in Colombia. In contrast to this, the epicentre of the LRA's operations has shifted from Northern Uganda to Southern Sudan and from there to the DRC and even to the CAR,[49] therefore, their potential for regional destabilization is much higher than in the Andean case. Second, while the IAGs in and around Colombia use targeted physical and psychological violence, mostly against members of other armed groups, the LRA's actions are characterized by violence aimed at civilians and exceed the Andean armed groups' methods in terms of scale and brutality. In 2002, for instance, the LRA killed an estimated 520 people in one single massacre in Katire and cutting off lips and hands are common practices to terrorize borderlanders.[50] Despite these differences, focusing on borderlands is for both cases a convenient entry point to mitigate the military problems' negative impacts. Improved cooperation in regional border security including confidence building mechanisms is crucial for impeding further regional destabilization in both the Andean and the African case. It might be too late to prevent LRA

[42] OCHA (2010a), p. 2.
[43] UNDP (2009), pp. 143-146.
[44] ICG (2010), p. 5.
[45] Schomerus (2008), p. 11.
[46] ICG (2010), p. 12.
[47] Schomerus/Tumutegyereize (2009), p. 9.
[48] Schomerus (2008), p. 6.
[49] ICG (2010), p. 7.
[50] Schomerus (2008), p 11.

rebels from crossing the border into Sudanese territory through improved border security, but it is not too late to obviate that they occupy more territory and to cut their supply chain. This applies first and foremost to the smuggling of small arms and light weapons. Currently, the LRA is reported to be present mostly in the DRC and in CAR, but the arms flow in the region has its origin in Sudan. By improving border controls in the region, adjusting the differing legislations on border issues in the region to avoid impunity and better coordinating security cooperation, the rebels' mobility and the illegal arms trade could be reduced, which would help to contain the military problems arising from the armed groups' presence in border zones.

4.3 Refugee Problems in the SSBZ

With regard to refugee problems it is again possible to draw an analogy between the ENBZ and the SSBZ. Both border zones host refugees, a situation which induces xenophobia and violence because these people take resources which otherwise might have been available to borderlanders. Furthermore, in both border zones IDPs are to some extent neglected by humanitarian agencies since their mandate only focuses on refugees which, again, creates grievances among the different societal groups. However, there do exist some salient differences which have to be understood against the backdrop of the advanced regional destabilization and the higher degree of brutality that characterizes the African case. These circumstances entail that, in contrast to the unidirectional refugee flow from Colombia to Ecuador, in the African case refugee flows are multi-directional with people fleeing from Northern Uganda to Southern Sudan, from Southern Sudan to Northern Uganda and, especially since the LRA has shifted its centre of operations to the neighbouring countries, from the DRC to Southern Sudan. The second difference which results from these circumstances is that, whilst in Ecuador refugees enter the border zone in drops and live among the borderland dwellers, in the Sudanese case most refugees live in refugee camps, isolated from borderlanders. This relative isolation could lead one to think that conflictive relations between borderlanders and refugees are less prevalent yet this would be a premature conclusion. Camp dwellers usually receive health care, food packages and educational opportunities which borderlanders outside the camps do not receive. This gives reason for hostile behaviour when refugees return into normal life outside the camps where people have impoverished. On the one hand, given their education, the returnees are better equipped to do work for which borderlanders are not qualified so that the unemployed accuse them of taking their jobs.[51] On the other hand, it is difficult for returnees to cope with life once they are out of the camps and no food packages are provided automatically, turning the resort to violence into the easiest exit option for them. Furthermore, refugee camps are a convenient place for the LRA to recruit new rebels. Thus, and given the continuous change of flows of refugees and returnees and the multiple directions of these flows, both the refugees' and the borderlanders' needs have to be addressed and aid organisations should assist them in an equal manner. Hence, no matter how severe and complex the refugee crisis in a region is, assuming a borderland perspective which considers both refugees and the host population in the border zones is necessary to prevent further destabilisation.

4.4 Economic Problems in the SSBZ

Finally, economic problems such as low investment, hampered transportation and the disruption of trade can also be detected both in the ENBZ and the SSBZ. One of the most preeminent disparities between the two cases concerns small-scale traders straddling the border. Close to the Ecuadorian-Colombian border, borderlanders, especially indigenous people, have close ties to each other. The recent deterioration of Colombian-Ecuadorian relations did not impact to a great extent on their interactions; they use cross-bordertrade as an important livelihoods strategy. In contrast to this, close to the Ugandan-Sudanese border, opportunities for small-scale traders arising from economic cross-border activities are rare. This is because both sides of the border have been affected by conflict which has induced displacement on a large scale and makes it hard for borderlanders to recover their livelihoods. High and arbitrary taxation as well as corrupt customs officials further exacerbate the situation.[52] The result is again the lack of economic opportunities which turns violence into a convenient alternative to make a living. Consequently, the SSBZ shows even more straightforwardly the importance of starting from a borderland perspective to tackle regionnal instability. Border regulations such as coherent taxation and coordinated legislation on a regional level are not only crucial to encourage companies to invest in border zones, but also to give borderlanders incentives to engage in formal cross-border trade which stabilizes the region socio-economically and discourages people to resort to violence.

[51] Schomerus (2008), pp. 27-30.
[52] Ibid., p. 32.

4.5 Shadow Political Borderland Economy in the SSBZ

The last element to consider is the SPBE. Although in both cases the SPBE surfaces in violence and illegal cross-border trade, the cases' divergence is clear. The ENBZ constitutes a very specific case because most illegal activities are connected to the cocaine industry. Also the *sicariato* roots in it, even if it has become a business in its own right. In the SSBZ drug trade is an issue as well, but it does not determine the borderland dynamics in such a pivotal way, as it is counterbalanced by illegal armes trade, sex trade and other forms of illegal cross-border activities. However, the SSBZ's dynamics are characterrized by other phenomena which make them unique and yet so similarly crucial for regional destabilization. The Sudanese borderlands suffer from banditry and cattle raiding across borders which has become increasingly violent due to the easy availability of arms and is thriving because the state is not able to tackle it.[53] Furthermore, the multitudinousness of different ethnic groups with many of them living on both the Sudanese and the Ugandan side of the borderline fuels the violent dynamics of the SPBE. Due to the war experience in both countries, people tend to resort to arms very quickly to settle a dispute, leading to escalating inter-ethnic violence.[54] Despite the different catalysists of violence in the Andean and African case with the former being drug business and the latter being inter-ethnic relations, their negative impact on regional stability is the same. Again, a borderland perspective is necessary to reverse these destabilizing effects. Such a perspective shows that our knowledge of the rationale behind the violent dynamics emerging out of the *sicariato* in the Andean region and of the inter-ethnic relations in Ugandan-Sudanese borderlands is limited. The first study on 'how armed conflict by the LRA and other armed groups has affected Sudanese communities living along the Sudan-Uganda border' was conducted in 2008, thus, these specific borderland dynamics are clearly 'underresearched'.[55] Likewise, for security reasons, few external actors have been engaged in the SSBZ, therefore, first-hand experiences are scarce. Given the periphery's centrality for regional stability, this *status quo* needs to be changed if we are to induce meaningful positive change in regions comprising a state which faces internal conflict.

5 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the comparative study was fruitful in three regards: it advanced interdisciplinary research, yielded empirical insights and hopefully stimulates academics to engage in virgin fields of investigation. The two case studies confirmed the feasibility of the B-F-N-Model: equating the ENBZ and the SSBZ with the FBC-Case facilitated explanation as to why the border zones are breeding grounds for regional instability. The ENBZ's analysis has corroborated the hypothesis that in regions comprising intrastate conflict, the periphery is central to regional stability. Having juxtaposed the ENBZ to the SSBZ suggests that differing contexts do not curb the hypothesis' validity: no matter the severity of the neighbourhood effects, the degree of fragility, the scale of violence and the extent to which instability is already pervading the region, borderlands always seem to play a central role in regional destabilization. In this context, the analysis yielded five entry points to prevent or reduce regional instability and to avoid a conflict's perpetuation: first, analyzing low capacity and resilience suggested to reverse fragility in borderlands. Second, the military problems' examination pointed to the need of improving regional border security. Third, scrutinizing refugee problems lead to the insight that both the needs of the borderlanders and of those living temporarily there should be addressed in an equal manner. Fourth, considering economic problems demonstrated the necessity of better coordinated border regulations. Fifth, studying the SPBE revealed the urgency of enhancing our knowledge on borderland dynamics through more detailed research which is rooted in the periphery. Further research is also needed to examine the validity of this paper's hypothis for other cases, for example, the Pakistani borderlands adjoining Afghanistan. Whether policymakers engaged in the ENBZ have taken measures to address these five entry points and where there are still substantial shortcomings can be seen in the table in annex 1 which lists measures, their deficiencies and recommendations to overcome the flaws. Field research in the SSBZ would be useful to find out if policies regarding these issues tend to follow general patterns. To be sure, engaging with these entry points is no substitute for a conflict resolution strategy, but it can contribute to make a difference for people living in instable regions. Having provoked the engagement with the fifth entry point listed above, namely, research such as the one conducted for this paper, events like the ABORNE Summer School constitute an important step towards the goals of improving borderlan-ders' lives and creating a well-informed understanding of the destabilizing dynamics of fragile borderlands adjoining an internal conflict. Now international policymakers and academics must continue to pursue this goal.

[53] Schomerus (2008), p. 10.
[54] Carrington (2009), p. 23.
[55] Schomerus (2008), p. 10.

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ANNEX 1: EXISTING MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ENBZ

Objective	Existing (deficient) Measures	Recommendations
Address low capacity	• Implementation of Plan Ecuador to promote peace and development is lacking – short of resources – short of leadership	• Stop securitization of development aid • Foster Plan Ecuador's Technical Secretariat's institutional capacity through collaboration, provide moral and technical support to leading personalities • Strengthen local institutions and promote inter-institutional cooperation
	• Binational policies to better integrate the two borderland economies and develop the region transnationally. – Border Integration Zone (ZIF), comprising Colombian Nariño and Putumayo and Ecuadorian Esmeraldas, Carchi, Sucumbíos and Imbabura, to foster socio-economic borderland integration – Colombian-Ecuadorian Neighbourhood and Integration Commission (CVICE), to promote political cooperation and binational development – Binational Border Attention Centres (CEBAF) to improve quality of life	• Adjust legislations in both countries to each other, so that these policies can be put into practice
	• International cooperation has little impact – Not context-specific – Does harm – Does not align with local priorities – Lacks coordination – Conflict-insensitive – Institutional deficiencies (inertia, high rotation of staff)	• Conduct more comprehensive qualitative studies • Establish common data bank to share results among agencies • 'Decolonise' knowledge-management • Support Ecuadorian Agency of International Cooperation • Conduct evaluations of programmes more frequently
Address low resilience	• Despite decentralization insufficient interaction between local and national levels • Paternalistic structures prevail • NGOs have insufficient funding	• Support local leaders, strengthen local government's institutional presence • Generally fund NGO activities • Promote education
Address military problems	• National Plan for Citizen Security • human rights office in the Ministry of Defence • juridical assistance, human rights defence and the support of early warning reds by local organisations	• Address the IAGs' presence in Ecuador and Colombia • Re-establish security cooperation • Establish a confidence-building mechanism to facilitate institutionalisation of security procedures including notification of military manoeuvres • Strengthen communication channels
Address refugee problems	• 'Enhanced Registration' does not reduce refugees' stigmatisation • UNHCR funds end up in bureaucracy and international salaries • UNHCR neglects needs of the recipient population	• Pressure Colombia to acknowledge the conflict and the refugees • Pressure on Colombia and Ecuador to assist Ecuadorian IDPs • Inter-agency-cooperation to address the needs of refugees and borderlanders • community-based awareness-raising programmes
Address economic problems	• Joint work between ART-REDES Programme in Colombia and Programme on Development and Peace in the Northern Border of Ecuador to promote bi-national human development	• Improve bilateral relations • Improve security cooperation
Address the SPBE	• No regional approach despite of new arms possession law, counter illegal cross-border activities (Special Mobile Antinarcotics Group), Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act • Road-map to develop a Community strategy remains paperwork	• Back Ecuador with technical and political advice in its presidency of Union of South American Nations' Defence Council • Offer moral support for the planned foundation of a South American Antinarcotics Council
	• Apart from awareness-raising no measures to address violence • No measures to counter human trafficking or youth recruitment • No state responses to *sicariato* as the phenomenon is not legally recognised • Ignorance as regards the rationale behind the violence	• Recognise the heterogeneity of violence throughout the ENBZ • Understand the cycle of violence • Protect borderlanders better so that they proffer information • Reverse fragile situation so that borderlanders abstain from violence
Improve bilateral Relations	• Focus on restoring official diplomatic relations ignores the countries' deeper ties	• Recognise, understand and change perceptions through academic and civil dialogue • Re-establish confidence • Restore Ecuador's dignity, eliminate Colombia's suspicions by Group of Friends

ANNEX 2: THE ECUADORIAN NORTHERN BORDER ZONE



Source: PDP-FN (2009), modified by the author.

ANNEX 3: THE SUDANESE SOUTHERN BORDER ZONE

Source: www.unsudan.org, modified by the author.

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ABORNE Summer School 2010

TITLE: "State and mobility in Senegal or how migration management redefines transationalism"

This paper is analysing connections between State and "international migrations" in Senegal. I will focused on how migration management by the state interferes with the transnational paradigm (non state actors role, state sovereignty relativity) and provokes mutations and ruptures in citizenship (links between a population and a state). Therefore, the paper will take into account contributions of sate-centred theories (realism-idealism debate) as well as contributions of transnationalism studies[1] (Sindjoun). Both approaches are needed to explain the complexity, nature and scale of mobility and its connections with the state, as it is the case for forced migration (refugees) or trans-communities migrations, which have specific territory practices that cross boundaries. In many ways, practices of mobility in Senegal may corroborate the discourse of the end of the State[2] (Badie), but the paper tries to go beyond the strict separation between state and transnational actors in order to understand their interdependencies[3] (Krasner) and how it is changing citizenship and the notion of the state itself. Moreover, it is important to quote that those interdependencies are acting in the specific context of West Africa where dynamics and logics such as settled way of life, nomadism, individualism, communities' way of life, localism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism become intermingled. The main difficulty remains to consider that sociological bases of any state are the existence of a "safe and recognized[4]" international borders (Gonidec) where "floating population", defined by its mobility (smugglers, refugees, seasonal migrant's workers…) represents a potential threat to the state[5]" (Bennafla). Then how to interpret the extraterritoriality of Diaspora issues or the absence of a national migration policy? Indeed, in practice, the state of Senegal is not looking for "determine who belongs and who does not belongs, who can come and leave, and make those distinctions intelligible and applicable[6]" (Torpey). Should we deduce that the State

[1] SINDJOUN L. (1999), « L'Afrique dans la science des relations internationales », *revue africaine de Sociologie*, vol3, n°2.
(2001), « Transformation of international relations », *International Political Science Review*, special issue, vol.22, n°3, juillet.
[2] BADIE B. (1992), « L'Etat importé », Paris, Fayard
(1995), « La fin des territoires », Paris, Fayard
[3] KRASNER S. D. (1995), « Power politics, institutions and transnational relations », in *Bringing Transnational relations Back*, in Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[4] GONIDEC (1995), « La crise africaine, une crise de l'Etat », *Afrique 2000*, n°20.
[5] BENNAFLA K. (1999), « La fin des territoires nationaux ? Etat et commerce frontalier en Afrique centrale », *Politique africaine*, 73, p.25-49.
[6] TORPEY J. (1998), « Aller et venir : le monopole étatique des « moyens légitimes de circulation » », *Cultures et conflits*, numéro spécial « Sécurité et immigration ».

of Senegal has no real scope facing transnational movements? In fact, mobility is considered essential for the state and is part of its identities where state's discourses and practices on migration have consequences on citizenship (defined as a status, a practice and a process). Citizenship is central in the study of transnational relations (analyzed in this case as individuals and networks mobility) to explain its interdependencies with the state. To conclude and to clarify my objectives, I will say that the paper aims at examining "the disarticulation of the national and international order, jostling principles of state sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship[7]" (Appadurai) through the "international" migration issue in Senegal.

[7] APPADURAI A. (1990), « Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy », *Public Culture*, 2,2.

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MULTI-DIMENSION BORDERNESS AND URBANIZATION PROCESSES IN SOUTH SUDANESE JUBA

Contemporary African borderland is an area of intensive urban life concentrating people within the cities, as well as creating origins of semi-urban culture. Borderness does not only have literal dimension, but it can also be understood metaphorically – as a feeling of liminality, discontinuity, temporality, thus resembling the middle stage of van Gennep`s rites of passage. Both general dimensions are equally responsible for unique cultural reality.

In my paper I will look into different manifestations of borderness in modern reality of Juba town – not only dynamic urban centre of African borderland, but also a capital of semi-independent country - Southern Sudan. In addition, I will present a specificity of local urbanism influenced by multi-dimensional borderness. Finally, I shall expose usefulness of borderland in an analysis of modern African urbanization. The above phenomenon was object of my interest during three research seasons I had spent in Juba between 2007 and 2008. The ethnographical research was part of the project “Juba - centre of cultures and conflicts” granted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland.

Topics of power point slideshow:

Juba – the city pulling of migrants

On the borderland of South Sudan

Borderland Economy

Globalization on the borderland

NGOs

Hiding ethnicity

Borderland city and the woman

Urbanization processes and city infrastructure

Conclusion. Juba as place of liminal experience.

Border possesses a meaning that is not only literal, spatial, but also it can be understood metaphorically – as the sense of diversity. Both meanings however have their own impact on forming and establishing specific cultural phenomena.

These limitation of this district of Southern Sudan harmonises with the thresholds of historical periods of Juba and the whole of Southern Sudan, always hung somewhere between crisis and stabilization, war and peace, chaos and order. In the case of this particular city, the so called "borders" are being constantly intensified by very vivid urban development. Juba is currently in the phase of creation. Furthermore, it is also a place of intensive influence of many phenomena of a transforming nature – e.c. globalization or informal commercial trade exchange. All those causes make it possible for a specific culture to maintain, both in meaning and the processive sense very close to the third phase of Arnold's van Gennep *rites de passage* - "trespassing rituals". In this case there is also the association with another grand ethnologist – Victor Turner, and his theory on the ritual of the liminality.

Juba is a place where ephemeral, diverse and floating structures are being constantly created – and that is everything that Turner calls Liminality. The city is one great anti-structure and it generates a particular sort of a bond. A man forgets his identity and enters the world of a completely different cultural reality; an immanent culture, morality and social hierarchy. Everything he meets here is an opposition to so called *normal* social agreements and institutional ideas. Local reality is thus anti-structural and creative at the same time. It stops the monotony, it shows almost endless possibilities, it serves salutary purposes. Due to persistent existence of the cultural microclimat the city is alive and developing. A manifestation of that can be noticed in the vivid progress of spontaneous initiatives or the massive inflow of foreigners. The proximity of the country border is obviously important, but the bond between the citizens is also of a great importance.

The scenery, devastated by war, the post-martial trauma and the snappy tempo of the urban development invokes the feeling of being alienated. Everything here is subordinate to one purpose, and that is survival. Everything else is less important. It doesn't really matter if you are a migrant from one village to another, a repatriate or you work with a charity organisation. And there is also the flood of migrants, the uncontrolled inflow of various ethnic, racial or social groups.

The city is like a melting-pot full of different cultures, even if only several years ago no-one knew of its existence. Most people treat it as a temporary accommodation spot. Nobody combines their future with it. The ex-refugees want to go back home or to travel further abroad. The migrants from small villages want to simply improve their position in life. The foreigners who work with charities are here only temporarily.

The proximity of the border is somewhat bonding; it evokes the same antagonist feelings of hope and fear before the unknown and strange world which is being immediately and intuitively associated with evil. It is a place of real possibilities, but also some metaphysical fear. There is a manifestation of that fear and it is constantly present in the city life as the strong belief in evil, psychic creatures that serve the foreign sorcerers.

All that is basically responsible for the decadent atmosphere of the local culture. Nobody knows anybody – everyone here is a stranger, *tabula rasa*. It's a major inconvenience but also a developing factor that makes it easier for the social relations to form. It's a bonding factor. I could see it for myself during my research. Same as in the case of the pilgrimage rituals, described by Turner: when a group of people is excluded from the society, they always get brought together by their mutual goal. An ephemeral, temporary but still bonding; an extremely diverse city which gives the opportunity to survive both the village migrant and the foreigner from a non-governmental organization. Turner (2005) in his study on pilgrimage rituals puts the accent on the ritual as an eulogy of rejection of social norms and transgression. In Juba it's more about surviving in a rapidly developing city. The social function of this phenomenon can be seen in this.

Burundi, Rwanda and Borderland Culture along a Legitimate Border

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In 1962, Burundi and Rwanda emerged from a colonial union to become separate individual nations. Their borders are often cited as rare examples of continuity from a pre-colonial state of affairs, but this can in some ways be questioned; both pre-colonial kingdoms underwent expansion immediately prior to and after the arrival of the Europeans, and the few years of official German rule were dominated by military campaigns to bring certain regions under central control. The territory of Burundi in particular was scarcely the defined, strong kingdom the claim of 'legitimate borders' would suggest. In the 1980s, Michele Wagner found the people of southern Burundi still holding a distinction between themselves as 'Baragane' and the 'Banyaburundi' to the north, a current memory of relatively recent incorporation within the state. In order to control the dense populations recently brought under his nominal authority and to discourage wars of succession, the ruler of Burundi in the first half of the nineteenth century established a system of chieftainships, distributed between new dynasties formed from the sons of kings; by providing these dynasties with their own areas of power he intended to prevent challenges to the chosen heir to the throne, but in so doing he limited the power of the central monarchy, making it little more than a symbol without substantial control of much of the kingdom's territory. The European powers found it more productive to support the dynastic chiefs against the ruling monarch, and further weakened the territorial unity of the country.

One border that does appear to have been relatively well grounded in historical, political and social precedent, however, was the shared frontier between Rwanda and Burundi. Oral accounts of the history of the *abami* (sing. *mwami*, 'king') of the two kingdoms suggest that the Akanyaru river had long been the default border between their states, and the burial grounds of the early Barundi kings (from at least the eighteenth century) that overlook this river seem to support this. While their ancestral home and centre of power was further south, the choice to raise their burial mounds in Ngozi in the north makes them appear as a prominent marker of an important borderland. Stories of kings killed in raids into southern Rwanda, only to be brought back to Ngozi to be buried, fit well with this picture; the banks of the Akanyaru river formed a borderland established through long conflict and substantial

During Belgian control this border functioned as an internal boundary between Rwanda and Burundi as two administrative territories of the single ‘Tutelle’ of Ruanda-Urundi. This presents a very peculiar situation; two societies with similar cultural and social make-ups, yet separated by a long-contested boundary, were combined in an administrative regime that minimised the legal ramifications of this divide. While in the following decades the two countries developed in some ways into mirror states of ethnic domination, the events surrounding Independence raise intriguing contrasts; the nature and level of exchange in the borderland, as well as the ways in which the border itself was invoked and perceived in this time, are greatly informative about the dynamics of change in the region, and provide valuable comparative material for the study of other borderlands in Africa and elsewhere.

Where Paul Nugent argues that arbitrary boundaries in Africa have come to define accepted mental space since their wholesale adoption in the post-colonial period, the border between Rwanda and Burundi seems to have already functioned in this manner long before the departure of the Belgians. Nevertheless, it still functioned as a conduit of people and ideas, with many refugees from Rwanda in particular crossing into Burundi during the Rwandan Revolution from 1959-1962. This was cross-border integration of a very particular kind, however. The established ‘mental space’ of the borderlands was not substantially undermined, Banyarwanda and Barundi maintained their distinct identities and attachment to their respective countries in whichever territory they resided, and so a cross-border *community* did not initially emerge; a clear cross-border *culture*, on the other hand, can be discerned, a culture of conflict that functioned within the contrasting political frameworks on either side of the border. It was not a case of a single conflict spreading from one country to the other, but of the state of violence within one political competition spreading to bring a similar conflict to a substantially different political contest. The peculiarities and ironies of this complex situation are fascinating, and it is hoped that they can provide some useful contrasts for related situations in other contexts.

From a methodological point of view, the years following 1959 demonstrate the potential and the problems associated with the use of archival material for the study of borderlands. The particular concern with border regions exhibited by governments everywhere combines with the heightened political activity at the introduction of party politics in 1959 ahead of elections over the following three years to provide an immense wealth of documentary sources, derived from a range of voices, including party political tracts and

easy to see in all these sources, and the lasting question will be whether the conclusions they encourage can be extended beyond the political elite that dominate the documents as authors and subjects, but the variety of perspectives is highly productive. This was a time and a place of intense interest to all sides of politics and society, and the archival material demonstrates this great significance.

While the study of the borderland necessitates consideration of both sides of the frontier, the emphasis here is on Burundi, both because it has received much less scholarly attention, and because of the peculiar combination of unique circumstances that characterise the northern regions of the country, particularly the province of Ngozi, the central point along the border. First of all, it is useful to discuss the way that the border was perceived and the manner in which it entered political and social debate in these years, in the hope that this can provide us with some kind of conceptual background to its position in society. Following this, one particular sequence of events that occurred on the border prior to Independence will be examined, for the light it sheds on life in the borderland and the strange relationship between the spread of conflict from across the border into the local political divisions in northern Burundi. Finally, the events of the 1960s after Independence will be briefly addressed, illustrating the ways in which the dynamics of the final years of colonial rule shifted with the dramatic changes they instigated.

Despite the Belgian and UN preference for continued union of the two countries, the dominant view in both Burundi and Rwanda prior to 1959 appears to have been one of amiable disinterest in each other's affairs. While the two countries have since been called sisters, twins, or false twins, primarily because of their similar ethnic composition, at this time they appear rather as friendly but distant cousins, recognising their familial ties but not holding a great deal of store by them. Mwami Mwambutsa of Burundi explained his position in these terms, apparently foreseeing the preference for a larger union along the lines of the EAC rather than the forced association of Rwanda and Burundi: 'Urundi and Ruanda ought to evolve separately in the framework of the Belgian *Tutelle*. The politics of the Belgian Government should not be to seek to make of these two countries a unified State, but rather to put in motion the necessary means to permit them, if they freely wish one day, to associate themselves in a federation which will eventually include other neighbouring states'. Attached to this quotation in the archives is the Belgian analysis, which notes that 'the numerous recommendations of the Conseil de Tutelle, tending to

individualist spirit of a Murundi people who feel no attraction towards Ruanda'.[1] Such observations from Belgian analysts are surprisingly frequent. When Mwami Mutara of Rwanda died during a medical procedure and rumours rapidly spread that he had been assassinated by Belgian doctors, an intelligence bulletin (rated A/1, indicating a highly regarded source providing well-trusted information) states laconically that 'the death of Mwami Mutara has been received in a rather indifferent manner by the Barundi. If they are persuaded that the Belgian authorities and the Missions formed a coalition to make him disappear, they nevertheless consider that the death of a Mwami of Ruanda does not concern them at all.'[2]

The formation and platforms of the new political parties reflect this contrast of interest. Almost every party was territorially limited to one nation or the other, with little consideration for union being expressed by any group. Only one political party, *Union nationale du Ruanda-Urundi* (Unaru), attempted to make the continued union of the two countries its primary goal, but it made very little impact either on politics or society; its leadership and membership was almost exclusively made up of Swahili-speaking Muslims largely resident in the *centres extra-coutumières* that were exempt from the 'traditional' systems of rule by sous-chefs, chiefs and Mwami, a social and cultural division that suggests a useful approach to society in the borderlands. The party struggled to extend its appeal into the Barundi and Banyarwanda populations who remained deeply invested in their separate nations.

It is at this point that it is necessary to describe some of the key contrasts of character and event between the two countries that contributed to this divide. Firstly, while the ethnic designation of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa was shared between the two, Burundi featured a far more complex social hierarchy; Barundi Tutsi were notably divided between northern 'Banyaruguru' and southern 'Hima', Hutu featured far more commonly in higher social positions in Burundi than in Rwanda, and while the Mwami and the ruling class of Rwanda was resolutely Tutsi, the highest echelon of society in Burundi was considered *ganwa*, distinct from all the categories below them. Furthermore, while the Tutsi Mwami of Rwanda had largely been a strong monarch ruling a highly centralised kingdom, the Burundi system of dynastic chiefs described above established a form of institutionalised competition between various royal dynasties that left the mwami as a fundamentally weak, yet beloved and, by the 1950s, a socially unifying figure. Where ethnic competition

between Hutu and Tutsi arose as a dangerous divide in Rwanda in the 1950s, the major division in Burundi was between the Bezi and the Batare dynasties, both of whom drew support from Hutu and Tutsi and who ruled a patchwork of chieftaincies across the country. From 1959, this political division was manifested in party politics, with the establishment of the largely Bezi Uprona (*Union du progrès national*) and predominantly Batare PDC (*Parti démocrate chrétien*), the two most successful parties in Burundi. Uprona was fiercely nationalist, demanding immediate independence, and was led by the most prominent Bezi prince Rwagasore, eldest son of the Mwami; with substantial success, it presented itself as the only party of the Mwami, and its opponents as traitors to the Crown. Rwagasore and his party were hated by the Belgian administration, which devoted astonishingly disproportionate resources to monitor the party's activities and the prince's movements, leaving enormous files of material in the archives today. The PDC, the preferred party of the Belgians, was led by Chief Baranyanka, a *ganwa* noble who had been very close to both the German and Belgian administrations and, as the leading Batare chief, was frequently treated by both friends and enemies as a balancing power or even rival to Mwami Mwambutsa, though he always insisted on his loyalty to the Mwami. Both Baranyanka and Rwagasore had their own personal chieftaincies in Ngozi province, marking this borderland as perhaps the most contested and contentious area in the whole of Burundi.

With Burundi politics defined by this division between the Bezi dynasty, the Uprona party, and Prince Rwagasore on one side against the Batare dynasty, the PDC, and Chief Baranyanka on the other, beneath a monarchy to which all major parties and individuals expressed love and devotion, the ethnic division in Rwanda had at first little chance of spreading across the Akanyaru river. The Rwandan Revolution of 1959-1962, when Hutu politicians and militants, with Belgian backing, overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and established a Hutu republic, was met with some bemusement and substantial horror in Burundi. The reactions to the Revolution show the border thrown into a new light. The Barundi perception of fundamental difference was confirmed, although the utilisation of the border as a rhetorical and political tool, invoking Rwanda as a nightmare possible future for Burundi, is interesting. A key Uprona tract, published in an initial print run of up to 100,000 copies and distributed right across the country, is particularly eloquent in this regard. It exhorts the Barundi to contemplate the events of Rwanda; 'Cast your eyes beyond the Akanyaru', it exclaims, dwelling on the slaughter of Tutsi, but careful not to

Burundi, they will imitate the violence of Rwanda not so much in ethnic conflict, but in rebellion against the monarchy and the destruction of society. The river is again shown here as a natural, fundamental divide, but its cultural background makes it a valuable political resource; the suggestion that the PDC would transgress this divide, would bring Rwandan cultural aberrations such as Revolution south of the river, is powerful imagery that supports Uprona's self-image as defenders of Burundi as nation, society and tradition.

The reaction of Belgian authorities in Burundi is equally fascinating, as it shows a substantial shift in their treatment of the border. The Revolution was welcomed by the Belgians in Rwanda, as it suited the administration's political and moral position; having previously favoured Tutsi for all political positions, in the 1950s this shifted to support of the Hutu masses as suppressed feudal subjects of Tutsi overlords, which necessitated a continued Belgian presence at least until a complete social transformation had been completed in two or three generations' time. But to their disappointment, no sign of Burundi following suit were evident. Some confidential discussion was held at the highest levels regarding the likelihood and potential benefits of a mirror revolution in Burundi, but the advice that was returned to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi was that 'the situation in Urundi is, despite everything, fundamentally different', that Rwagasore and Uprona 'represent the great majority of 'public opinion' in Urundi', that there were no viable Hutu leaders in Burundi to lead such a revolt and that the Barundi Hutu were in fact content to be 'feudal' subjects of Tutsi overlords.[4] The decision seems to have been made to write Burundi off as a lost cause for the Belgians, but to maintain security since the desired outcome of violence could not be ensured. And so the Administration began to treat the border as the Barundi perceived it, as an international line that required protection, making the eventual separate evolution of the two countries inevitable. The northern provinces of Burundi were set under military rule, political rallies and meetings were banned, and the possession of weapons was prohibited; they feared not ethnic war, but a revolt against the Belgian administration, seeded by Tutsi monarchist refugees from Rwanda agitating in support of Uprona.

While Burundi did indeed show no signs of following the path of ethnic revolution, the borderlands experienced a great amount of stress in the face of the Rwandan Revolution. To examine the impact this had, and the nature of the borderland communities that it reveals, a close study of a single community is greatly informative, and demonstrates the

that came closest to an armed uprising took place in 1961 in the commune of Mparamirundi, right on the border where the main road from Bujumbura crossed the Akanyaru on its way to Butare and Kigali. Uprona members set up road blocks, forced people to purchase Uprona membership cards and issued penalty fines for having subscribed to the PDC; they distributed small leaflets featuring a photograph of Rwagasore and encouraged people to display them on their doorposts, declaring 'Prepare yourselves, arm yourselves, soon we are going to begin'.[5] Threats against the life of the new Provincial Administrator, a Murundi and a PDC man, were very prominent, and groups of armed men, both of the PDC and Uprona, were frequently reported numbering up to 1000 people at a time. In April 1961, a group of Uprona local leaders announced to the community that 'the 15th August 1961 is the deadline for civil war in Burundi, which will begin first of all with Baranyanka and his people, and then it will be the turn of all those who are in the PDC'; they claimed that they had the blessing of the Mwami to begin the killing.[6] The leader of the Upronistes in Mparamirundi, a man named Nahagere, was reported as possessing 'a book in which the members of the PDC are registered, who will be massacred sooner or later, by hook or by crook ['bon gré mal gré']'.[7] The use of roadblocks and lists of names are particularly reminiscent of the tactics used in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, as well as other periods of extreme violence in the region.

A number of individuals were sent to try to bring about calm, including the Mwami and senior members of Uprona and the PDC. As time went on, however, clashes between militants left several dead and many injured, the rumours and violence spread to nearby communities, and eventually a major military operation, accompanied by a significant delegation of Administration officials, was launched to quell the anticipated uprising, arresting the leaders of the rebellion.

The fear of the authorities that this could be the beginning of a major revolt, as well as the personal involvement of figures such as Baranyanka and the Provincial Administrator, Jean Ntawe, mean that this small community is exceptionally well recorded in the archives; detailed surveillance of nearly 60 inhabitants of a single hill creates an extraordinary picture of conflict and political agitation on the border, and multiple reports, including those written by Ntawe himself, by the Minister of the Interior (who also happened to be Baranyanka's son), by the police and the military, and by an all-party panel of Barundi leaders, provide an immensely rich body of critical accounts and rival interpretations. The

potential for analysis of this borderland manifestation of a national political conflict is great.

A secret military report on the political situation in November 1960 stated hopefully that the situation in Ngozi was calm, albeit with Mparamirundi as the least stable area, and reported a preposterous ‘complete political reverse’, that the population had previously been 80% behind Uprona, but was now only about 15% in support of Rwagasore’s party. Most notably, however, the Commander who wrote the report claimed that in Ngozi ‘a trend marking the Hutu awakening seems to be crystallising (proximity to Ruanda), but in a form much less acute than in Ruanda’.[8] While this spread of ethnic identification appears a likely product of borderland integration, it seems that the military intelligence here is as flawed as in its perception of a massive drop in Uprona support; Uprona went on to win by approximately 80% of the vote a year later, and no mention of ethnic identification emerges even in the letters written by the inhabitants of the area over the following months. Instead, such letters dwell exclusively on the same issues of the political competition of Baranyanka/Rwagasore, Batare/Bezi and PDC/Uprona. These letters seem to have been written by *bashingantahe*, community ‘elders by common assent’, but their fluent signatures are joined by thumb prints of illiterate members of the community; though clearly driven by party cadres, they suggest that the political struggle illustrated by the nationally-distributed tracts and highest level intelligence reports was indeed matched by competition at the community level. These letters tend to be copied to the Mwami, the Governor General of Ruanda-Urundi, the Resident of Urundi and the Territorial Administrator of Ngozi, essentially the complete hierarchy of indirect rule above their local chief, about whom the letters usually complain. One letter objects that although political reforms were meant to abolish the sous-chefs (the local ‘traditional’ chiefs that had been appointed to administer local communities under Belgian rule) and replace them with elected representatives, this had not taken place in Mparamirundi; the letter alleges that only Uprona sous-chefs had been dismissed, and that Baranyanka was sending his own underlings to confiscate Uprona membership cards in the name of the Mwami.[9] Others, in direct competition, object that people were being forced to buy Uprona membership cards when they were already subscribed members of the PDC.[10] Ethnicity does not appear as a topic of complaint, with dynastic and party politics entirely dominating. Families of single ethnicities divided along political lines; all the reports identify a legal dispute as a key

trigger event to the ‘uprising’ in Mparamirundi, when a father devoted to Baranyanka disinherited his son, who was aligned with Rwagasore.

If the political divide in the borderlands was exactly in line with the rest of Burundi, and completely different to the division just across the border in Rwanda, the heightened level of conflict along the border raises interesting questions. It is useful to note that in their dissection of the reasons behind the problems in Mparamirundi, officials are quick to identify a long-standing crisis of authority along the border, despite the manifest pedigree of the frontier as an accepted delineation of the territory of the central Burundi power. Ntidendereza, Baranyanka’s son and Minister of the Interior at the time, introduced his report on the *événements* by stating that ‘the political climate of this region which marks the frontier with Rwanda has been troubled for a long time ... The region of Mparamirundi/Busiga has never been the object of a politics of authority, but on the contrary a politics of procrastination’.[11] But this weak authority along the borderland is not, as might be assumed in other border areas, due to a feeling of greater affiliation with the neighbouring state or some other authority. The insurgents, as extremist Uprona members using Rwagasore as their talisman and claiming direct endorsement from Mwami Mwambutsa, were fanatical Burundi nationalists. Ntidendereza’s statement is not necessarily incorrect, however, even if it is influenced by his father’s perspective as the local authority that is being spurned. Baranyanka had originally been imposed by the Belgians in the 1920s as chief of Nkiko-Mugamba, a newly-forged chieftaincy, after the last armed conflict of the colonial period had been put down. A man named Kilima had emerged from Eastern Congo in the early years of the twentieth century, claimed descent from a former Mwami of Burundi, and challenged Mwambutsa for the monarchy while the Mwami was still a child. Kilima controlled a substantial part of western Burundi, including the future chieftaincy of Baranyanka in Ngozi, for many years before he was eventually defeated, and his name became vilified as an ‘anti-roi’, a treasonous criminal who rejected the rule of the Mwami and represented the ultimate in social destruction. Official records observe that Baranyanka ‘was sent to this land of Kungiko [Nkiko-Mugamba, in Ngozi], of which the administration was especially difficult, and his mission was to restore order there’.[12] The heritage of revolt against authority in this borderland was in fact a rejection of *local* authority in preference for *central* authority; Baranyanka was regularly rejected as a ‘second Kilima’ by the Uprona insurgents, his prominent position as leading member of the Batare and potential rival to Mwambutsa lending itself to inflation into outright treason in

Jean Ntawe, the Provincial Administrator whose life was threatened by the insurgents of Mparamirundi and so played a key role in the unfolding of the troubles, amplifies the difficulties of control in the borderland. Ntawe appears as a rather feeble figure in the archives, rejected by his constituents in his previous role as a bourgmestre, clearly despised by the inhabitants of Mparamirundi, and scorned by the Belgians, whose assessment of his character and job performance is dismal. But his defensive report on Mparamirundi contains an interesting description of the confluence of social and political divisions on the border. 'The troubles derive on the one hand from a hatred guarded for a long time against the old governors of the region,' he states, 'but on the other, these troubles derive from rumours circulating for a very long time in the frontier regions. We have on the side of Burundi the political parties Uprona, PDC, Uprohutu, PP, and on the other side [in Rwanda] Parmehutu, Aprosoma, Unar. The role of traffic on the great route Usumbura-Astrida [now Bujumbura-Butare] must not be forgotten, from which a friendship reigns between the inhabitants of our frontier and those on the Rwandan side.'[13] The 'old governors of the region' are, of course, simply Baranyanka and those associated with him (such as Ntawe), for whom many Uprona members harboured hatred, but the direct association of unrest with the border is an important observation. Ntawe suggests that the juxtaposition of political conflicts raises the temperature of each, a fact that is exacerbated by frequent movement between communities. Importantly, however, one conflict does not spread into the neighbouring country; the border brings together cultures of conflict, but the intense atmosphere of antagonism manifests in the local terms of competition, either Bezi vs. Batare or Hutu vs.Tutsi.

In assessing the value of Ntawe's observations of political problems arising from movement across the border, we may note that Ngozi province emerges from the archives as a key assembly ground for refugees and political actors from across the region. The Belgian administration and the American Red Cross were supporting up to 17,000 Rwandan refugees in the province in 1961, with the total number outside of their protection undoubtedly much larger.[14] Reporting 'shifty goings-on ['agissements louches'] in Ngozi', the Belgian Territorial Administrator observed that 'currently there is a flood into the Territory of Ngozi of people from Congo, from Tanganyika Territory and above all from Banyarwanda claiming to be in the service of Rwagasore - there are also many Barundi from other Territories who are sheltering all over the place'.[15] Close surveillance

of individuals bears witness to the simple movement across the border, the same report describing how ‘Le Comité Régional des Banyarwanda’ held weekly meetings in various Ngozi locations, but when one meeting was disrupted they decamped to a hotel in Astrida (now Butare, in southern Rwanda) at the last moment. Unar (*Union nationale rwandaise*), the Tutsi nationalist party that fought in support of the Rwandan monarchy and was thus very close to Uprona, made particular use of the Burundi borderlands as a halfway point between its militants in Rwanda and those who took refuge in Usumbura and Gitega, with important meetings held in Ngozi between them all.

The political character of such migrants colours the perception of all Banyarwanda in northern Burundi in the archival records. Banyarwanda are considered Unar militants, Tutsi murderers, Uprona allies, and the most dangerous element in the region, since ‘it appears that all the Banyarwanda have to do their best to bring it about that Urundi also has a civil war’.[16] While explicit agitation is not entirely apparent outside of this administrator’s opinion, violence did occur that was directly related to the refugees; in 1959 ‘the murder of a Muhutu leader, taking refuge in the territory of Ngozi, by a Tutsi commando coming from Rwanda provoked great emotion in the province, and the sentiment of antipathy towards the Banyarwanda was reinforced’.[17] Notably, this ‘antipathy’ is not specified as against Tutsi or against any particular political inclination, but simply against Banyarwanda in general, for importing such violence. This seems not to be limited to those of any particular political allegiance in Burundi; Belgians and Uprona enemies such as the PDC vilify the murderous Banyarwanda for their association with Uprona, while Uprona condemns the violence of Rwanda for its anti-monarchic genesis. Both sides are likely to have sympathised with or sheltered certain Banyarwanda refugees, but both associate Rwanda with an abhorrent violence against their own political ideals and goals.

In the end, we may return to Mparamirundi to illustrate the divisive role of Banyarwanda in the politics of the Burundi borderlands. In an area just a little further along the border from Mparamirundi, PDC members wrote a letter of complaint agains the intimidatory practices of their Uprona sous-chef, in which one of their key complaint was that ‘he is advised by the Banyarwanda who have taken refuge with him’.[18] In Mparamirundi itself, the roles were reversed and the PDC sous-chefs wrote a vicious response to their own constituents’ letters of complaint, scornfully asking, ‘These Banyarwanda murderers you

are hiding, is it they who are telling you what to do?'[19] Refugees are equated to killers chased out of their country by the Revolution, and now agitating for war in Burundi, but they are stripped of their domestic political connotations and subsumed into the local conflict. The borderland friendships that Jean Ntawe described are likely to be seen in the way that some refugees were being sheltered by private citizens, but this does not indicate a broad-based transborder community; the refugees remain outsiders, stereotyped as murderers and Uprona militants in the discourse of political conflict in Burundi. While the actions of some may have directly contributed to the struggle of their hosts, the presence of all heightened tensions and the tenor of political rivalry. Thus the presence of Rwandan refugees in Ngozi was having a substantial impact on Barundi order and conflict in the borderland, but not by spreading the Rwandan ethnic conflict into Burundi. The violence of Rwanda was reinterpreted to the Burundi context, the Rwandan militants integrated into the local competition, and rather than such cross-border integration creating a single order of ethnic conflict in the borderlands, it exacerbated the particular conflict occurring on either side of the frontier. The border became a resource for belligerents in the Rwandan Revolution, providing Unar in particular with a rear base from which to operate, while refugees in Burundi and their experience of or association with violence injected a new tension and energy into the local conflict of Uprona and the PDC.

Eventually, perhaps fuelled by the energy brought by Rwandan exiles, but certainly buoyed by its association with the Mwami and a popular rejection of Rwandan-style revolution against the monarchy, Uprona won the final elections by a massive count. Prince Rwagasore was elected Prime Minister under his father as constitutional monarch, but before he could take office he was assassinated by a Greek mercenary, apparently hired by PDC politicians, possibly by Ntidendereza himself and under Belgian support. The shock to the country was devastating, with massive outpourings of grief and total vilification of the PDC. The Bezi/Batare competition was effectively ended, since the Batare were now permanently associated with the murder of the most beloved prince in the country and could gather no popular support, while the Bezi were in disarray as they lost their most prominent leader. Uprona became the dominant party of government, but internal rivalries left it fatally weak. The Mwami intervened again and again, dismissing several governments over the next three years, undermining his own support by appearing responsible for the instability and playing favourites. This culminated in 1965 as another Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe, was assassinated.

At the same time as politics in Burundi lost its defining structure, Rwandan Tutsi refugees began to launch raids on their homeland, seeking to overthrow the secure Hutu government. These armed incursions were met with more slaughters and more refugees, and the political identification of Hutu and Tutsi seems to have taken root in northern Burundi during this period. Barundi and Banyarwanda maintained their distinct identities and great attachment to their homelands, but as cross-border violence increased, cross-border communities of Hutu and Tutsi correspondingly emerged. Without the domination of the Bezi/Batare conflict, this new ethnic understanding of politics spread quickly from the borderlands to define the central problems in Burundi just as they had in Rwanda, and the ethnic identity of the various cabinets, of the men the Mwami chose to dismiss and those he selected to rule, were closely observed. With a military coup in 1966, when a group of southern Tutsi deposed the Mwami and instituted a government that systematically excluded both Hutu and northern Tutsi, this ethnic definition of politics and oppression was confirmed.

This discussion has examined one example of an established and accepted border in African history. Although the border did legitimately represent two distinct mental spaces, the unity of these spaces was fundamentally in doubt; the combination of a border grounded in social acceptance with two fractious but contrasting political conflicts on either side, saw the emergence of a borderland culture of conflict through the movement of people, even as the persistent social reality of the border prevented the development of a corresponding borderland community. Only when the initial framework of political competition in Burundi became obsolete could the cross-border communities of ethnicity emerge in the region. Even so, however, the border has remained a genuine denotation of social space and personal identity. Cooperation and support along ethnic lines across the border grew, and the plight of the suppressed ethnicity in the neighbouring state became a political resource for leaders in both countries to use as an example of fear and the necessity of hegemony. But Rwandan Tutsi refugees remained determinedly Rwandan, and Burundi Hutu, fleeing in large numbers especially after genocide in 1972, remained resolutely Barundi; both used the borderlands to full effect, taking support from the new borderland communities of ethnicity, but both fought to return to ‘liberate’ their countries, culminating in the wars of the 1990s.

The study here has demonstrated the enormous potential and surprising detail to be found

combination of both will prove a productive rather than a contradictory pursuit, this discussion should at least demonstrate the value of archival study in laying the historical groundwork for any borderland research; the level of subtlety, the variety of perspectives and the substance of debate and action that are contained in these documents make them an exceptional resource. Borderland areas of this kind and complexity demand as many points of approach as can be found.

AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL : QUELLES SIGNIFICATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES ET POLITIQUES DANS LES ZONES FRONTIÈRES. LE CAS DE LA GAMBIE, DE LA GUINÉE-BISSAU ET DU SÉNÉGAL.

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En Afrique, depuis cinquante ans, des bouleversements profonds sont survenus suite à des choix politiques, à l'évolution de l'environnement mondial ou aux stratégies des acteurs. D'un point de vue géographique, l'on pourrait rapprocher ces bouleversements à ce que l'on appelle dans la littérature consacrée, « la déterritorialisation ». Dans cette perspective, le territoire est entendu au sens large du terme, dans sa dimension de vécu et d'interpénétration entre entités spatio-politiques constituées. Il est ainsi multiple, complexe et recouvre les dimensions nationale, sociale (ethnique), transnationale etc. Les temporalités politiques et socio-économiques de la territorialité procèdent par ancrage dans le passé, adaptation aux situations présentes et projections dans le futur en rapport avec l'espace.

En effet, l'instauration des frontières en Afrique a été considérée dans plusieurs littératures comme étant une discontinuité spatiale et économique dans les espaces traditionnels qui se construisaient lentement (Igué, 1995 ; Enda Diapol, 2007 ; Bary, 1981 ; Diop, 1974) et que les dynamiques en cours dans les zones de frontières constitueraient un remake et/ou redécouverte de ces mêmes territoires (Alvergne, 2003). La Sénégambie[1] fait parti de ces espaces africains où se superposent et surimposent les territoires. Ce qui du reste peut être un élément probant de son dynamisme extra national.

Ailleurs, la généralisation des échanges et la mise en place de territorialités à géométrie variable rendues possibles par la mondialisation, viennent brouiller les politiques frontalières[2] des Etats-Nations en favorisant de nouvelles recompositions et reconfigurations socio-économico-spatiales. Dans ce nouveau schéma socio-spatial, la problématique du développement économique est mise en exergue. Etant indissociable de la politique, le développement économique dans le contexte de mondialisation induit l'organisation du monde en blocs politiques plus ou moins homogène. Le politique et l'économique sont des tendances lourdes dans le système organisationnel des Etats. Pendant longtemps, l'Etat national en Afrique a été l'acteur principal de la vie de son territoire. Il l'a organisé par rapport à sa centralité (capitale) construite ou héritée. Le mythe de l'Etat providence, a contribué ainsi à barricader l'Etat dans des frontières

[1] Pour alléger l'écriture, nous empruntons ce terme sujet à discussion que plusieurs auteurs utilisent pour désigner l'espace englobant le Sénégal, la Gambie, une partie de la Guinée-Bissau. Donc ce terme sera entendu tout au long de ce texte comme les territoires Gambien, Bissau Guinéen et Sénégalais.

[2] On peut davantage creuser cette problématique en analysant les écrits de Sall (1992), Antheaume et Girot (2005), Pourtier et Chaléard (2000) etc.

nationales rigidifiées. Les espaces situés dans les zones de frontières, qualifiés de périphéries (Igué, 1995) jouent un rôle sécuritaire dans le schéma politique national. En Afrique de l'ouest, deux décennies seulement après les indépendances, l'Etat providence fait faillite (Lesourd, 2009 ; Hugon, 2009) et son modèle d'organisation spatiale remis en cause.

Autrement, la crise de l'Etat providence permet le développement de stratégies de contournement (Sall, 1992) et les espaces « périphériques » utilisent les différentiels promus par les différentes politiques frontalières (Macgaffey et Al, 1991) pour construire des espaces d'échanges dans des territoires réels (Retaillé, 1993).

Les frontières africaines ont connu des mutations qualitatives qui impulsent une vie économique et sociale nouvelle. Dans ces espaces tri-territoriaux composés de : territoire socio-culturel (stabilisé), de territoire économique (en cours de construction) et de territoire national (remis en cause dans certains cas), les enjeux réels se posent en termes économiques et politiques.

Dans ce papier, nous mettrons simultanément en exergue le propos théorique et les observations empiriques sur le terrain. Nous considérons l'ensemble des espaces emboités en Sénégambie comme étant un système et par conséquent composé de plusieurs échelles. L'explication du phénomène spatial suppose que l'on se doit de le situer sur une séquence temporelle (Claval, 2003), et nous faisons de manière délibéré dans cet article abstraction aux situations antérieures pour nous inscrire uniquement dans les faits présents et à venir. C'est ainsi que nous ferons tous d'abord le bilan de l'Etat-nation, surtout en terme de sa politique territoriale, pour ensuite aborder les questions économiques, politiques et sociales en rapport avec les problématiques de l'aménagement du territoire et de développement local.

L'ETAT EN AFRIQUE : SA POLITIQUE, SON TERRITOIRE.

Toute étude africaine s'inscrivant dans une perspective temporelle est indissociable de la place de l'Etat en tant qu'animateur et organisateur principal des territoires et des sociétés. La problématique de l'Etat en Afrique s'inscrit en une logique binaire composée d'une part du principe de construction d'une identité territoriale nationale centrée sur la capitale, mais également des stratégies de contournement et de dédoublement de celui-ci à travers les réseaux d'acteurs transnationaux. S'il est, dans la perspective de l'Etat-nation, un principe qui le sous-tend comme une centralité vivante des sociétés africaines depuis cinquante ans, c'est la frontière. La construction territoriale de l'Etat-nation s'est faite en synergie avec la consolidation des frontières héritées de la colonisation. Alors qu'en Europe, les féodalités et l'Eglise ont crée la nation (Sassen, 2006 ; Badie, 1995) en la circonscrivant dans des territoires et qu'en Amérique la conquête de l'ouest sous l'impulsion du chemin de fer et du télégraphe ont forgé la nation américaine (Sassen, 2006), en Afrique, se sont les frontières qui ont

légitimé et consolidé les territoires des différents Etats constitués au lendemain des décolonisations. Elles sont à la base de leur existence (Sutter, 1982). En 1963, le sommet des chefs d'Etat d'Addis Abéba consacra de manière durable les territoires des nations à bâtir. Le dogme de l'intangibilité des frontières a permis pour ainsi dire des recompositions profondes et nouvelles dans les principes d'organisation traditionnelle des espaces africains. La rupture spatiale survenue avec l'avènement des frontières a permis de délimiter les nouvelles nations et à leur donner une âme (Wackermann, 2003).

Partant les nouveaux Etats-nations africains s'appuient sur des structures politico-spatiales se recroquevillant sur elles mêmes. En Gambie, en Guinée-Bissau et au Sénégal, les structures de l'Etat-nation qui sous-tendent l'espace public national sont centrées autour de la capitale, des lois nationales, d'une langue de communication. La fixation des principes fondateurs de l'espace public national autour de ces tendances centrales, a extraverti le mythe de l'Etat-nation. Le paradigme de l'Etat-nation en Afrique a ainsi entrainé la fragmentation territoriale et sociale des espaces nationaux. Il a permis l'étirement de l'espace national, la mise en perspective de forces centrifuges dans les espaces limitrophes qui pendant longtemps ont communiqués en vases closes avec les autres forces centrifuges des espaces qui leurs sont contigus. La politique de mise en place de la nation produit en retour des couronnes de complémentarité et de compétitivité autour des frontières nationales.

Sur un autre registre, cette politique de l'Etat a contribué à la mise en place d'inégalités spatiales criardes. Dans certains cas, ces inégalités datent même de la période coloniale et ont été perpétuées par les Etats indépendants (Bennafla, 1999 ; Walther, 2009). Toute la problématique de l'aménagement du territoire des Etats africains a d'abord consisté à la correction de ces inégalités et différentiations spatiales en vue d'un développement harmonieux et équilibré. Le rééquilibrage spatial passe par la correction des inégalités dans l'occupation de l'espace afin d'arrêter l'exode massif des populations en direction des capitales et des zones utiles. Tel a été le début du processus d'aménagement du territoire en Afrique (Diop, 2004 ; Alvergne, 2008), principe reposant d'abord sur l'intra muros des Etats Nations.

Ce biais territorial mis en place par les politiques étatiques a concouru à un remodelage de l'espace économique et social. Dans les zones où les effets directs des politiques de construction de l'identité nationale ont eu des effets limités, la sociabilité « primitive » a par effet de résurgence pris le dessus sur la sociabilité moderne et post-moderne. Rognant sur le territoire de l'Etat-Nation en Afrique, ces nouveaux territoires hybrides reposent essentiellement sur les forces sociales et économiques (Badié, 1995). La politique de l'Etat-Nation a fini par produire des solidarités transnationales (Elissalde, 1984 ; Sanka, 2007) de plus en plus puissantes et qui produisent de nouvelles territorialités qui sous-tendent dans le contexte africain, ce que nous pouvons appeler la modernité africaine, entendue ici dans le cadre d'espace public économique transnational.

Ce revers de la médaille de la territorialité politique nationale fait jouer à la frontière un rôle capital dans les territorialisations en cours. L'effritement du mythe de l'Etat providence qui donnait une certaine légitimité à la politique de mise en place de la nation, conjugué aux effets pervers de l'économie, à la redynamisation des réseaux sociaux dans leur territoire (qui transcendent les cadres définis par les frontières), produisent en Afrique de nouvelles rapports aux centralités territoriales.

Les décompositions des territoires des Etats-Nations africains sont d'une part constituées de la contestation de son territoire, donc de son ordre politique (Giraut et Antheaume, 2005)), et d'autre part liées à l'identification des individus qui l'habitent à des réseaux économiques, marchands, culturels, religieux, migratoires transnationaux (Badié, 1995)

Le dédoublement de l'Etat, et le contournement des frontières ont permis la construction de territoires partagés par des acteurs économiques et sociaux des espaces contigus. Cependant, du point de vue politique et plus particulièrement pour ce qui s'agit de la mise en place d'infrastructures, ces territoires économiques ne sont pas interconnectés. Dès lors, les stratégies d'aménagement du territoire qui optent de plus en plus pour une logique transnationale dans leurs démarches (Muller, 2008 ; Monod, 2008) peuvent constituer une nouvelle signification économique et politique de ces espaces, devenus par la force des dynamiques qui s'y développement de nouvelles centralités.

AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE EN SITUATION DE FRONTIERE

L'étude du transfrontalier en Afrique, permet d'analyser les interactions économiques, sociales et même écologiques qui se développent entre Etats limitrophes. Ce qui est important et qui apparaît primordial dans cet entrecroisement de mobiles spatiaux, est la mise en perspective de territorialités économiques induites par le développement et l'accélération du commerce transfrontalier. Ces échanges transfrontaliers se lisent en termes géographiques, du moins pour ce qui est du premier constat, sur une échelle restreinte. Il est avant tout une connectivité territoriale à petite échelle, celle de villages en communication sociale et qui au demeurant mobilisent des acteurs, des supports multiples. Ainsi, nous avons pu constater en Sénégambie que les échanges s'effectuent d'abord sur une petite distance (Stary, 1995 ; Sall, 1992) entre localités voisines avant de s'étendre à des espaces plus lointains (Diapol, 2007). Dans ce cas les échanges se font dans le cadre d'une continuité territoriale d'abord avant de s'étaler à d'autre.

Dépassant le cadre restrictif dans lequel on lui a longtemps cantonné, à savoir son rôle de palliatif à la crise et à l'absence de l'Etat-central dans les zones dites de

périphéries nationales (Igue, 1995), le commerce frontalier et les espaces transfrontaliers sont des éléments clés de la compétitivité territoriale des Etats. Ils occupent une place importante d'autant plus que la question de compétitivité économique se pose avec acuité dans un monde davantage globalisé. Les pays du sud, soumis à une impasse économique, semblent se tourner vers ces espaces qui au vu des dynamiques africaines, peuvent être considérés comme étant les espaces des économies réelles africaines. Le souci de bien organiser son territoire pour le rendre attrayant et compétitif économiquement a amené les Etats à mettre en place un cadre à la fois politique et technique. Ainsi, la politique d'aménagement du territoire devient un instrument indispensable dans la mise en valeur et la cohésion territoriale. D'abord politique strictement réservé à l'espace national, l'aménagement du territoire va dans les 1990 devenir un instrument de cohésion territoriale des espaces communautaires. Dans l'exemple ouest africain et plus particulièrement celui du Sénégal, de la Gambie et de la Guinée-Bissau que nous analysons, la prise en compte de l'aménagement du territoire comme outil de complémentarité et de compétitivité territoriale transnationale repose en premier sur une analyse des faits économiques locaux.

A- FAITS ÉCONOMIQUES ET SOCIAUX, VECTEURS DE TERRITORIALITÉ

Les dimensions économiques des faits spatiaux frontaliers produisent des mouvements circulaires à répétitivité hebdomadaire. Le mouvement produit des flux qui permettent la mise en place de points nodaux, et donc de territoires interdépendants. Dans le cas de l'espace que nous analysons, ces mouvements constituent selon la formule de Retaillé dans son analyse du marché frontalier, un seul mouvement pour un seul marché. L'étude du marché révèle que l'acteur est un élément central du dispositif et qu'en réalité se sont des motivations économiques, voire même sociales qui l'animent. Le marché traduit ainsi une forme d'organisation de l'espace basée sur l'opportunisme et la complémentarité économique. Cette organisation spatiale dans les zones de frontières repose sur les localités où se déroulent les marchés. Ce type d'ancrage dans l'organisation de l'espace transfrontalier est dual avec comme pierre angulaire les villes et les villages marchés. Le marché introduit une symétrie des lieux qui ont en charge l'orientation spatiale des différents acteurs. À des degrés divers, les lieux centraux structurent l'espace avec comme locomotive, la ville. La ville accélère la mise en marche de l'espace (Walther, 2009) et permet de tirer les dynamiques des espaces ruraux. La présence du marché introduit pour ainsi dire un rééquilibrage spatial et une harmonisation économique, plus connus sous le vocable traditionnel de relations (ou complémentarité) ville-campagne. Dès lors, l'analyse de ces espaces renvoie aux faits économiques, aux mouvements des acteurs qui l'animent, aux réalités sociales, en somme à la géographie des frontières[3]. Les flux qui découlent de ces mouvements permettent la mise en relation de villes (Cheneau-Loquat, Lombard et Ninot,). Les villes

[3] On entend par géographie des frontières, l'ensemble des faits politiques, sociaux, économiques, culturelles qui fait la vie des hommes habitent ces espaces et ou qui pratiquent la frontière, pratique dans le sens où il est entendu comme étant le passage).

ainsi mise en relation dans l'espace Sénégambien et qui fonctionnent en dynamique réticulaire sont : Banjul, Brikama, Basse Santa Su, Farafégni, Sérékunda etc. coté Gambien, Tamba, Ziguinchor, Kolda, Bignona, Kaolack, Velingara, Nioro, Koungheul etc. coté Sénégalais et Sao Domingos, Ingore, Bafata, Farim, Bigene, Gabu etc. coté Bissau Guinéen.

Partant, les villes transfrontalières du Sénégal, de la Gambie et de la Guinée-Bissau centralisent la vie économique, sociale et culturelle dans un élan de territorialisation transnationale. Sous-tendue par des mouvements permanents à motivation économique et sociale, cette territorialisation remet en cause le bien fondé d'une frontière rigide qui séparerait des Etats avec des traditions républicaines différentes. Au demeurant, ce principe territorial dans les zones de frontières a révélé des phénomènes longtemps minimisés et qui constituent de réelles opportunités économiques et politiques qui participent ainsi à la construction de territoires transnationaux. Les centralités économiques et sociales de ces espaces (Bennafla, 1999) recomposent les espaces nationaux à travers le continent. Dans le cas Sénégambien, ces recompositions fabriquent des territorialités à géométrie variable où les structures socio-économiques se densifient et se complexifient davantage. Le système de marché ainsi créé, produit en retour des échelles géographiques restreintes paramétrées par des variables économiques, culturelles et sociales. La mise en relation de ces différents variables juxtapose les échelles et produit du coup une échelle locale reposant sur des similarités de part et d'autre de la frontière.

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Les marchés de Diaobé, Cambaju, Sao Domingos, Diaroumé, Brikama Ba, Basse Santa Su, Ziguinchor etc. sont devenus des éléments d'organisation spatiale. La mise en liaison des localités dans le contexte de frontière produit des hiérarchies spatiales, où les centralités se définissent par leur niveau d'équipement et leur facilité d'accès. Les infrastructures de communication sont ainsi de puissants moyens de mise en relation des différents centres de la vie économique et sociale transfrontalière. Or, dans le cas de figure que nous analysons l'insuffisance des infrastructures et la faiblesse de l'épargne nationale font que la réalisation des infrastructures et autres équipements est nécessairement communautaire.

A- UNE POLITIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE

Pendant longtemps, l'Etat-national détenait à lui seul le pouvoir de contrôle et d'aménagement, étant du coup l'acteur principal dans la construction territoriale[4]. Il en résulte de cette politique, l'insuffisance des réseaux physiques dans les espaces périphériques. Or, ces espaces regroupent des marchés importants avec des acteurs qui pratiquent constamment l'espace. Les réseaux de communication qu'ils empruntent

[4] Il a procédé par le maillage administratif, la construction de réseau de liaison entre les différentes parties du territoire. Par cette politique, l'Etat a systématiquement exclu les réalités économiques des Etats voisins de son champ d'échange. Cette orientation politique est concrétisée par des politiques douanières rudes à l'égard des productions des Etats limitrophes.

longent les frontières, ne les traversant que dans de très rares cas. En plus de cet état de fait, ils sont largement insuffisants et défectueux. Pourtant, l'accompagnement des dynamiques territoriales dans les zones de frontières nécessite une co-élaboration des politiques publiques territoriales. Dans ce scénario de dépassement du cadre physique des Etats, l'aménagement du territoire pourrait constituer un objectif politique commun à tous les Etats contigus liés par des rapports économiques et sociaux intenses. Le territoire devient alors la finalité des politiques publiques. Il s'entend dans ce cas comme étant la pratique de l'espace, le mouvement des hommes et des biens, la disposition de ressources à mettre en valeur. L'observation de l'espace Sénégambien prouve que ce territoire est transversal, transfrontalier. Le mouvement des populations dans l'espace et la transformation des passifs territoriaux en actifs de développement aboutissent à de la transnationalité. Cette dimension multi-scalaire du territoire n'est pas desservie par des infrastructures de communication à caractère interétatique.

L'exemple du marché que nous avons analysé ci-dessus permet à lui seul d'orienter les significations politiques et économiques des zones de frontières africaines en général et de la Gambie, de la Guinée-Bissau et du Sénégal en particulier. Á coté du marché, la ressource territoriale est aussi un élément d'orientation des politique d'aménagement du territoire frontalier.

Il n'en demeure pas moins que pour nous la première signification politique de l'aménagement du territoire en contexte de frontière repose sur la valorisation physique de l'espace. En effet, les infrastructures de communications (routes) demeurant parallèles aux lignes de frontière, limitent l'interpénétration et le développement effectif des échanges. À l'évidence, les faits économiques dans les espaces contigus du Sénégal, de la Gambie et de la Guinée-Bissau sont de puissants leviers à la refonte de l'action publique des différents pays et inscrivent ces questions dans une logique transversale et transfrontalière. Il s'agit ici de territorialiser les politiques publiques en les donnant une dimension transnationale. La transversalisation territoriale de l'action publique (Dubresson et Jaglin, 2005) en contexte de frontière présuppose des vertus de la proximité spatiale (Idem). Et la proximité spatiale peut s'interpréter ici en termes de ressources transnationales « saillantes » (vallées partagées[5], bassins versants transfrontaliers etc.). Dès lors, la politique d'aménagement consiste en une vision partagée de la valorisation de ces ressources. Car, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la production locale commercialisée sur le marché, vient majoritairement de l'exploitation de ces vallées et autres ressources transnationales. En termes clairs, il consiste en deux réalisations fondamentales : la mise sur pieds de routes et pistes transfrontaliers et la construction d'équipements marchands partagés. Le bitumage ou la construction des pistes permettrait à l'économie locale transfrontalière de réaliser des surplus qui vont permettre aux communautés de réaliser des épargnes susceptibles de consentir des investissements de grandes envergures. La réalisation d'infrastructures communes en Sénégambie est nécessaire d'autant plus que le marché et les réseaux de communication sont devenus des faits spatiaux déterritorialisés, hybrides et transnationaux. Mais l'aménagement des zones transfrontalières pose des problèmes singuliers pour des raisons qui tiennent aux traditions politiques des différents Etats, à la volonté politique.

[5] Vallée de Katouré entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal dans la zone de Boutoupa Camacounda, la vallée de Kabajo dans la frontière Gambienne etc.

En outre le fait que les opérations d'aménagement des territoires nationaux soient orientées vers les capitales, rend la mise en place de politiques d'aménagement communes de ces espaces économiquement partagés problématique. Des auteurs comme Habermas, Muller, Veltz ont montré le caractère de plus en plus extraverti des Etats Nations en matière de politiques. Cette extraversion est sans nul doute liée à l'imposition de l'échelle mondiale et aux recompositions territoriales qui tendent en Afrique à désaxer les centres de gravités de nombre d'Etats nations. Les politiques nationales sont dès lors de plus en plus subordonnées aux directives des organisations communautaires. Le cadre national devient une échelle locale dans le communautaire.

La signification politique de l'aménagement du territoire dans les zones de frontières devant permettre une connexion des différents territoires et la mise en valeur de leurs ressources, est en plein dans l'esprit de développement local. Il concoure tout comme les acteurs à produire des territorialités nouvelles. En effet, la mise en relation des faits économiques et des réalités sociales est, en Sénégambie une mobilisation en sourdine de l'ensemble des acteurs autour d'un projet de territoire transfrontalier.

DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL TRANSFRONTALIER

Selon la littérature scientifique, le concept de développement local est apparu à la fin des années 1960 et au début des années 1970. Son apparition coïnciderait ainsi en Afrique avec les premiers signes d'affaiblissement de l'Etat-nation et l'émergence d'acteurs extranationaux. S'il est dans l'esprit des dirigeants perçu comme un système politico-social d'allégement des charges de l'Etat, le développement local au nord comme au sud est apparu dans un contexte de crise du totalitarisme étatique. Il a ainsi pris diverses formes. Les milieux urbain et rural sont les espaces où le développement local a été le plus étudié. Il est apparu comme un concept et un mode politique qui n'obéi exclusivement qu'à l'espace national. L'accent est alors mis sur la participation citoyenne, corollaire d'un dynamisme démocratique, source de stabilité et d'un développement polycentrique. Or, les réalités empiriques des Etats africains montrent l'existence d'une troisième composante spatiale du développement local : la transnationalité (ou transfrontaliarité). Cette composante s'entend ici comme l'évolution puis la mutation du concept de développement local en développement territorial d'une part, et d'autre part comme les différentes interactions, complémentarités, inter échanges entre des territoires contigus.

Ce troisième pilier soulève une problématique empirique et géopolitique. En effet, la transfrontaliarité met en avant la question territoriale du développement local dans un contexte marqué par la présence d'une limite (frontière). De quel territoire s'agit-il et qu'est ce qui le sous-tend? En faisant un feet back sur le concept de développant local entendu selon la définition que lui donne Xavier Greffe : « le développement local est un processus de diversification et d'enrichissement des activités économiques et sociales sur un territoire donné, à partir de la mobilisation et de la coordination de ses ressources et de ses énergies. Il est donc le produit des efforts de sa population. Il met en cause l'existence d'un projet de développement intégrant ses composantes économiques, sociales et culturelles. Il fera d'un espace de contigüité un

espace de solidarité active », nous retenons deux mots clés : territoire et espace de contigüité. En Gambie, en Guinée-Bissau et au Sénégal, le territoire auquel on se réfère est un territoire social et construit par les acteurs qui dans le cadre de leur activité ou de leur vie sociale traversent de manière permanente la frontière. Ce territoire renferme une double identité : il est à la fois social et économique. La production du local met en perspective une unité solidaire de lieux (Retaillé, 2007). Nous ajoutons que le local transfrontalier est espace de production et de circulation qui produit du territoire et des réseaux. Deux logiques animent par conséquent ces continuités territoriales : les logiques verticales (cadrages nationaux se manifestant par la présence des postes de contrôles économiques et sociales dans les zones de frontières) et les logiques horizontales (relevant des pratiques économiques, culturelles et géopolitiques dans l'utilisation de l'espace). Les supports spatiaux sur lequel repose le développement local dans les espaces contigus que nous avons noté plus haut ne sont pas seulement humains, ils sont aussi physiques. Et à la suite de Longhi et de Splindler nous répétons que le développement dit territorial (ou local) en situation de frontière prend en compte trois facteurs que sont : le hardware, le software, l'orgware. Le premier renvoyant aux infrastructures, aux facteurs, le second aux caractéristiques socio-culturelles et enfin le troisième comme la capacité d'articuler l'ensemble, d'engager tous les acteurs dans des dynamiques à même de générer apprentissage collectif et solutions nouvelles, c'est-à-dire de créer les conditions du développement local. Ces trois dimensions engagent dans les zones de frontières et plus particulièrement en Gambie, en Guinée-Bissau et au Sénégal, la mise en valeur de ressources dont la proximité des populations permet le partage via le mécanisme des échanges transfrontalier.

Plusieurs types de ressources transnationales peuvent exister entre deux ou plusieurs Etats contigus. En Sénégambie, ces ressources vont des disponibilités de matières à exploiter à l'état naturel, aux différents produits finis disponibles sur place ou exportés de l'étranger et qui font l'objet d'échange de part et d'autre des frontières. La mise en valeur de ces différentes ressources permet la mise en branle du processus de développement dans un territoire construit sur le principe d'échanges complémentaires dans les zones de frontières. De manière concrète, les ressources disponibles dans l'espace contigu qui sert de support spatial pour l'analyse de ce papier, s'articulent autour d'un principe fédérateur : le marché et dans une moindre mesure des centralités sociales. L'existence de ces réciprocités de part et d'autre des frontières est un élément catalyseur de la coopération transfrontalière qui est par ailleurs la signification politique la plus pertinente du développement local en contexte frontalier.

COOPERATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE

S'il est dans les zones de frontières, un cadre qui fédère à la fois les dimensions économiques, sociales et politiques, c'est bien la coopération transfrontalière. Elle est transversale du point de vue spatial, politique et économique. En Sénégambie, la coopération transfrontalière est d'abord portée localement par des micros projets des populations qui ont une frontière commune en partage. On peut dans ce sens citer l'exemple du projet de maraichage autour de la borne 135 entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau. Le sens politique de la coopération transfrontalière se manifeste ainsi par la mise ne valeur de ressources transversales. Ici, l'exemple des vallées partagées illustrent bien l'esprit de la coopération transfrontalière, dans une échelle restreinte et territoriale. Dans le cadre de la décentralisation, cette notion reste intimement liée au

développement local et est entière que dans le cadre d'une décentralisation effective. Toutes deux réalités récentes, ces deux notions renseignent aussi sur les mutations des sociétés modernes et participent au dépassement des frontières comme discontinuité fonctionnelle et spatiale. La coopération transfrontalière et le développement local exige en retour une réflexion approfondie sur la réorganisation des territoires communautaires et/ou étatiques. L'applicabilité de ces deux paradigmes contraint les Etats à des compromis opérationnels entre démarches territoriales inscrites dans les politiques communautaires et réglementations nationales souvent incompatibles à la vision communautaire. En d'autres termes le binôme coopération transfrontalière/développement local évoque la limite, ici la frontière. Ceci revient à dire que la coopération transfrontalière s'inscrit directement dans le processus de recomposition territoriale dans les espaces limitrophes. En elle-même, elle constitue une pédagogie de la régionalisation, une didactique de l'intégration. Dès lors, la frontière se positionne comme un médiateur entre deux systèmes économiques, politiques et institutionnels. La non-conformité entre ces systèmes se pose dans la plupart des cas comme un blocage au partenariat entre deux entités spatiales contigües. Dans ce contexte, les espaces transfrontaliers peuvent être marqués par la léthargie et constitués de vraies périphéries nationales. On assiste alors à une juxtaposition de territoires frontaliers sans connexions institutionnelles. La signification politique de la coopération transfrontalière, est le passage de l'étape de juxtaposition territoriale à celle d'émergence de territoires transfrontaliers. Et dans le cadre des trois pays qui font ici l'objet de l'analyse, ce territoire semble exister et est pratiqué socialement, économiquement. Ce préalable que constitue la coopération transfrontalière, s'affirme dans l'apprentissage à gérer des situations complexes entre deux espaces contigus (il s'agit ici de la gestion de la paix et de la sécurité, des ressources partagées). Et c'est justement à ce niveau que la coopération transfrontalière constitue un laboratoire de l'intégration régionale.

Ailleurs, le développement local, vue dans une perspective simpliste d'un Bernard Pecqueur renvoie à la mobilisation de tous les acteurs en présence dans un espace donné en vue de transformer les ressources en actifs. Par cette transformation des ressources en actifs, les acteurs produisent du territoire, et donc élabore une politique de développement local. La signification politique du développement local revient alors à chercher une échelle pertinente d'intervention dans un contexte de plus en plus marqué par la déterritorialisation et/ou reterritorialisation de tout processus de développement. Il va de soi que cette recherche de pertinence territoriale soulève aussi une question d'une importance capitale, celle de l'harmonisation des échelles d'intervention. En Sénégambie, la divergence notée en matière de politique territoriale entre les différents Etats est un cas préoccupant dans le développement de la coopération transfrontalière. Ceci appelle à prendre en compte le principe de subsidiarité, qui doit être compris ici comme étant un équilibre adéquat entre les différents niveaux de gouvernement territorial.

Autre part, il ne peut y avoir de coopération transfrontalière effective sans la prise en compte de la dimension sociale, économique et culturelle des localités bornant la frontière. C'est en ce sens qu'un projet pilote a été développé autour de l'axe Diouloulou (Sénégal)-Brikama (Gambie) et est dénommé la « culture au profil de la paix ». Ce projet répond à un impératif politique de recherche de la paix, de prévention des conflits et de bon voisinage via le canal social et culturel.

En définitive, la décentralisation surgit comme étant un élément fédérateur entre politiques d'aménagement du territoire et développement local dans les territoires marqués par une limite.

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Résumé :

La question territoriale et celle de la régionalisation sont devenues deux paradigmes centraux tant pour les pouvoirs politiques que pour les spécialistes des sciences humaines et sociales. En Afrique, le croisement de ces deux réalités renvoie inévitablement aux zones tampons interétatiques où se développement des phénomènes nouveaux. Pour les chercheurs, l'étude de ces espaces frontaliers soulève toute une batterie de préoccupations conceptuelles et méthodologiques, alors que pour les décideurs, elle renvoie à des enjeux géopolitiques et à des opportunités économiques. Dans la question territoriale, les soucis de mise en ordre sont traduits par les politiques d'aménagement du territoire, et ceux de responsabilité et de libertés sont incarnés par les politiques de développement local avec comme force politique, la décentralisation. Pour ce qui est des processus de régionalisation, la question des échelles d'intervention est plus que préoccupante après l'échec de ce qui est appelé intégration par le haut.

Ainsi, nous posons la question suivante : et si les politiques d'aménagement du territoire et de développement local dans les zones de frontières étaient la forme politique la plus achevée de la régionalisation ? Poser cette question relève d'un pari scientifique qui va croiser et/ou opposer les théories scientifiques sur la problématique de l'intégration et les réalités empiriques de terrain.

Les bouleversements socio-économiques contemporains poussent-ils les sociétés à effectuer un lien nouveau entre les situations locales et les situations globales sans passer par l'étape autrefois nécessaire du national. Ce sont là deux dimensions spatiales que l'on retrouve parfaitement dans les zones frontalières à la fois espace limite dans le monde des Etats mais d'ouverture dans le monde mondialisé. L'Afrique est un continent où les espaces frontaliers jouent ce rôle économique et social plus que politique. L'activité socio-économique peut-elle dès lors entraîner le politique ?

Les espaces frontaliers, par ailleurs de riches capharnaüms, regroupent une multitude d'acteurs. Mais au niveau étatique, aucune coopération concrète dans le domaine de l'aménagement du territoire n'est effective; du moins pour ce qui est de la zone contiguë du Sénégal, de la Gambie et de la Guinée Bissau. Il faut toutefois oser avouer que le manque de

synergies politiques et territoriales est un handicap pour l'économie locale essentiellement soutenue par le commerce transfrontalier. Quid alors du développement local censé théoriquement mobiliser tous les acteurs transfrontaliers ? La recomposition de l'action publique transfrontalière essentiellement dans le domaine de l'aménagement du territoire pourrait être l'élément fédérateur manquant de la territorialisation transfrontalière, et, par delà, de la mutation de l'Etat.

Mots clés : Aménagement, territoire, développement, local, frontière, politiques publiques, intégration, régions, gouvernance, transfrontalier, mondialisation, commerce, acteurs, méthodologie etc.

Abstract:

Title: Regional planning and local development: What economic and political meanings in border areas? The case of the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.

The territorial question and regionalization became two centrals' paradigms for public authorities for social and human sciences specialists. In Africa, the combination of these two realities returns inevitably to inter-State buffer zones where is developing many phenomena. For researchers, the study of these border areas any raises a battery of conceptual and methodological, concerns while for decision-makers, she returns to geopolitical issues and economic opportunities. In the territorial question concerns of sequencing are translated by spatial planning policies and those freedoms and responsibility are embodied by local development policies with as a political force, decentralization. As regards the process of regionalization, scales intervention is that worse after the failure of which is called integration from the top.

Thus, we dare to ask the following question: and if policies of land use planning and local development in border areas were shape policy more completed regionalization? This question is a scientific wager will cross and/or oppose scientific theories on the issue of integration and the empirical realities.

Also, the upheaval socioeconomic contemporaries grow companies perform feedback in the direction of the local and the global. Here are then to two spatial dimensions found perfectly in border areas of finitude and opening on the world that is also our space. Africa is a continent where border spaces play more economic and social role as policy. May socio-economic activity therefore condition political synergy?

Namespaces border, also rich capharnaüms, includes a multitude of actors. No practical cooperation in the field of spatial planning at the State level, is effective; at least when it comes to the contiguous zone of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau. However, should dare to say that the lack of political and territorial synergies is a handicap for the local economy essentially supported by cross-border trade. Quid then supposed to local development theoretically be mobilization of all stakeholders-border? Therefore, redial public action-border mainly in the field of spatial planning seems to be the unifying element missing from the cross-border territorialisation.

Keywords: land, territory, development, local, frontier, political public, integration, regions, governance, cross-border, globalization, trade, actors, methodology, etc.

Mozambican literature beyond the imperial centre: Mia Couto's *language-frontier*[1]

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> Para si, meu filho, para si que estudou em escola, o chão é um papel, tudo se escreve nele. Para nós a terra é uma boca, a alma de um búzio. O tempo é o caracol que enrola essa concha. Encostamos o ouvido nesse búzio e ouvimos o princípio, quando tudo era antigamente.[2]

> For you, my son, for you who studied in school, the ground is a sheet of paper, everything is written on it. For us, the earth is a mouth, the soul of a seashell. Time is the snail that shapes this shell. We put our ear to the shell and we hear the beginning of it all, when everything was of yore.[3]

Introduction

The Portuguese language is a contentious terrain of (dis)encounters between post-imperial Portugal and its post-colonial Others. This essay will explore Mia Couto's text to reflect on imperial continuities and reconfiguratins in the space of the Portuguese language.

The essay aims to identify the transgressive character of the language imagination that Mia Couto is proposing and critically reveal his negotiations with the Luso-centric identities embodied in the hegemonic language narrative (*Lusofonia*). This perspective invites analysis through the critical gaze of border studies. The essay will carry out the scrutiny of language metaphors making recourse to the themes of the border – centre, horizon, margin and frontier. Finally these metaphors will be associated to the context of Portuguese post-colonialism and the author's location within this realm, to forward an understanding of how his 'counter-hegemonic project' emerges and submerges in this "contact zone"[4].

Mia Couto is the most celebrated Mozambican writer of the moment in his own country, in Portugal and further internationally. As a child of Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, and one of the protagonists in the construction of Mozambican national identity, he occupies a double position of insider and outsider to a Portuguese cultural identity presented as transnational.

Mia Couto's writing career started successfully with journalism and poetry but it was with fictional prose that he acquired his current status. Attention centred in his transgressive games with language. Nelson Saúte argues that Mia Couto "is a paradigmatic example, one of the protagonists in manipulating and experimenting the limits of the Portuguese language"[5]. Yet, the writer received praise for his aesthetics beyond linguistic experimentation. Commenting

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[1] Draft version under review for publication. Please do not quote.
[2] Couto Mia, *O último voo do flamingo*, Lisbon, Editorial Caminho, 2000, 190.
[3] Couto Mia, *The last flight of the flamingo*, London, Serpent's Tail, 2004, 147. Further citations - in text - are extracted from this English translation. Translated citations from all other sources in Portuguese are my own.
[4] Pratt Mary Louise, *Imperial eyes: studies in travel writing and transculturation*, Routledge, 1992, .
[5] Translated from citation in Ornelas José N., "Mia Couto no contexto da literatura pós-colonial de Moçambique", 2, Special Issue: Luso-African Literatures, 33: 37-52 (1996), 46.

on his first novel *Terra Sonâmbula* (1992)[6] Patrick Chabal asserted that "both its subject matter and literary quality are eminently innovative", altogether "his short stories like his novel […] are remarkable for imagination and language"[7].

O Últimо Voo do Flamingo (2000) is Mia Couto's fourth novel.[8] In 2001, the prestigious Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation of Portugal awarded it the *Prémio Mário António*[9]. This novel is of particular interest to this investigation for language is central to the story, as the narrator is a translator. Hereby the author hints to colonial history and further elaborates on cultural contact among asymmetrical power relations.

The novel takes place in the remote village of Tizangara, in post-war Mozambique, where a mission of enquiry arrives to investigate the tragic and bizarre explosion of United Nations peacekeepers whose only remains are their severed phalluses. Tizangara's 'administrator' appoints an 'official translator' to the Italian Massimo Risi, in charge of writing a report to clarify the mystery. In his research, Risi traverses the worlds of fantasy, of the dead, of witchery and of the supernatural, through the encounters with the villagers. Here translation is hardly used in the narrow sense of exchanging languages, as the Italian speaks Portuguese and the translator does not speak Italian. Mia Couto asserts that in *Flamingo* "The issue of translation is not approached at the linguistic level. It is rather a question of translation of worlds"[10].

Idílio Rocha coins Mia Couto's narrative an "own ideolect, beautiful and unique"[11]. The term refers to an individual vocabulary, or the vocabulary proper of a community. Yet beyond that, Mia Couto explains: "When I changed the words, I wanted them to say something else. It wasn't only an aesthetical, linguistic operation, but a way to break the wall showing that, on the other side, there was another light."[12]. This 'light' emerges out of a reading that deciphers the myths inscribed in language, following Roland Barthes. It entails exploring what language has naturalized and how, namely the history and the position of the speaking subject that have been rendered universal. It is the mashing of form and meaning that must be disentangled as "[i]t is this constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which defines myth". Ornelas paraphrases this path "from semiology to ideology"[13], highlighting "Mia Couto's role in the transcription and metamorphose of the Portuguese ideolect; the pillars in the constructin of new ways of thinking and of representing reality"[14]. The writer is then deciphering the myth through subverting its very core, while proposing an alternative. For Mia Couto, writing is "experiment the limits of language itself and […] transgress in the sense of creating a space of magic"[15]. His 'ideolect' must then be understood in its post-colonial condition and postcolonial possibility.

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[6] Sleepwalking Land (2006).
[7] Chabal Patrick, *The post-colonial literature of Lusophone Africa*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1996, 77, 78.
[8] As the case will mainly draw from this novel, it will show in the text as a shortened version: *Flamingo*.
[9] Prize awarded to a work of fiction of a writer from an 'African country of Portuguese language' or from East Timor.
[10] Translated from citation in Nunes Maria Leonor, Mia Couto: 'Sou um poeta que conta histórias', Lisbon, 2006, 14.
[11] Translated from citation in Ornelas, 37.
[12] Translated from citation in Nunes, 10.
[13] Barthes Roland, "Myth today", *A Roland Barthes reader*, (Susan Sontag), London, Vintage, 1956, p. 114-115.
[14] Translated from Ornelas, 47.
[15] Translated from citation in Laban Michel, "Encontro com Mia Couto", *Moçambique : encontro com escritores*, Porto, Fundação Eng. António de Almeida, 1998, III, p. 1016.

The writer breaks away from the rigid normative Portuguese borrowing from Mozambican Portuguese to create his new language. He explains:

> Those words transport other viewpoints, other feeling, and another logic that the standard Portuguese is hiding, that it is putting to sleep. The idea is this: to depart, to fracture the words, to reconstruct them and then say: after all the window that the word opens can show other worlds …[16]

This enterprise has given Mia Couto's literature the renown of a libertarian practice. For Ornelas "every linguistic renewal of Mia Couto's texts is, afterall, an expression of cultural autonomy and emancipation", it is a departure from the 'Portuguese model"[17]. Chabal coins it Mia Couto's "*linguagem*" that "represents a true innovative direction to the writing of Portuguese from Mozambique"[18].

Yet however important it is to read Mia Couto through his linguistic innovation, the linguistic perspective to his texts has supported their subsuming to a voracious Portuguese centre. The neo-colonial implications of this reading have been recently explored. Phillip Rothwel argues that Mia Couto had been hereby turned into an agent of the Portuguese empire based on culture, which resonates with Hardt and Negri's concept of 'Empire'[19].[20] The critic calls attention to the fact that reading Mia Couto "solely as a reaction to Portugal's presence in Africa" conceals the radical liberating aspect of his writing[21]. Isis Butôt highlights the danger of this perspective to feed the celebration of the vitality and versatility of the European language. She detects the appropriation of Mia Couto's literary language as expression of the 'Portugueseness' that supposedly characterizes Mozambican culture as a whole[22]. *Flamingo* incorporates the very challenge to this subsuming of Mia Couto's oeuvre, for its explicit thematisation of language. Hereby he writes language to talk about other things.

Conceptions of Language

Language *rooted* in the journey

In *Flamingo* the translator is needed to provide explanations to Massimo Risi. "I can speak and understand. The problem isn't the language. What i don't understand is this world here" (26). Language comes out here as a limited source of understanding. Beyond the knowledge that a language detached from the place provides, understanding encompasses wisdom. It is only through the lived experience at Tizangara, that the Italian will understand. He, who "had no experience of travelling the roads of the world" (79), will learn to walk in that soil and speak its languages. This is a journey towards encountering himself. The role of the translator is then to accompany this process of learning languages. While Massimo Risi seeks quick answers that he himself can translate into the language of Modernity (the UN report), the

[16] Translated from citation in Ibid, p. 1040.
[17] Translated from Ornelas, 46.
[18] Translated from Chabal Patrick, *Vozes moçambicanas : literatura e nacionalidade*, Lisbon, Vega, 1994, 68.
[19] The 'Empire' stands for the late stage of liberal capitalism (Hardt Michael and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, Massachussetts, Harvard University Press, 2001.).
[20] Rothwell Phillip, *A postmodern nationalist: truth, orality, and gender in the work of Mia Couto*, Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 2004, 18-19.
[21] Ibid, .
[22] Butôt Isis, The literary as translation: the linguistic homelessness of the language of the novel, Master of Arts Thesis, Utrecht, Utrecht University, 2009,

villagers require the translator to explain "our reasons […] in due course" (24, 25). Language therefore does not preclude one's own journey.

Flamingo is a journey between worlds, through the encounter with its intermediaries. It happens in the place of such encounters, that is always a margin. The critical symbol of this locality is the veranda. The translator locates it: "Before it lay the world and all its infinites; behind, lay the house, the first source of refuge" (165). For his mother the veranda, for its frontier location, is the best place to cry. Mia Couto privileges the margin as the place where humanity manifests itself. It is the possibility to touch worlds and to live in a fluid position that enables one to encounter the true self and others.

In Mia Couto's literary reflection the plural self and the plural worlds coexist and crisscross. Language constitutes one of several possible margins or frontiers between worlds. The most critical statement of *Flamingo* is then about what language is not beyond its quality of frontier. It is not universal. Rather it is particular, plural and incomplete. In its particularity language manifests the multifaceted character of identity. Each of *Flamingo*'s characters lives in more than one world. Amongst other dimensions, the whichdoctor transits between the sacred and the profane, the translator between the city and his rural roots, his father between life and death, the Italian between Modernity and the dream. Each of these worlds requires its own language, which is exemplified in the translator's arrival at his father's remote refuge: "What use was my city knowledge?" (37). However each of these languages does not suffice to convey the plurality of the self and of lived experience. The translator tells: "School, for me, was like a ship: it gave me access to other worlds. But education didn't make me complete. On the contrary: the more I learned, the more stifled I was" (31). Here Portuguese constrains in its ambition of universality and concurrently denies the lived experience in this world. The core of Mia Couto 'ideolect' is in the idea of complementarity in harmony.

Language naming place & *passage*

Language manifests this plurality and intermediates the frequent passages through worlds. First of all language is an intermediary between the world outside and the intimate world. Old Sulplício protected his intimacy against such unwanted incursion: "He would keep quiet. That European wasn't going to enter his sould through any words he uttered" (106), said the translator. For his father a name reveals one's true self: "a person' name is intimate, like a being within a being" (106). Yet beyond, Mia Couto's 'naming' reveals the encounter between the self and the outside, it tells one's story. This is the case of each of *Flamingo*'s characters (such as the prostitute Ana Deusqueira and the 'old woman Temporina') as is the case of the writer himself. Mia Couto tells that, as a two-year-old living amongst the cats that inhabited his building, he declared to his family "I want to be called Mia [miauow]". Since then he kept this name. "To me, I don't have other name. If you called me António I wouldn't know that you were calling me"[23]. The name is therefore language in the context self/world, the "social responsibility" rather than the "legal responsibility"[24].

Again here meaning is only found in language as part of a located experience and above all in the implication with others. Outside of this realm there is no name: "The town had been gradually abandoned, so much so that things were losing their name" (51). Language, in Mia Couto's *Flamingo*, does not stand on its own. It is actually outside and beyond language that truth and wisdom house. Wisdom is found in silence and above all in contemplation: "My

[23] Translated from citation in Laban, p. 1033.
[24] Translated from citation in Ibid, p. 1034.

mother's advice consisted merely of silences. She spoke with the accent of a cloud" (29). And they escape the written text: "You, sir, read the book, while I read the ground" (125).

Further, Mia Couto hints to what is hidden from speech and written text. His narrative recurrently contrasts light and shadow, silence and rhetoric: "there's a lot out there hidden away in those African silences" (55). For him Modernity does not suffice to comprehend Africa. It is only its front side, whereas "in an African house […] everything happens […] in the back yard" (104). Wisdom is out of sight, beyond language, and is not pronounced. One must then read and listen elsewhere; Ana Deusqueira reads the eyes: "it's through people's eyes that I see most things. […] Everything's written in a person's look" (63); his mother reads through the flamingo's flight: "And with each flap of its wings, the bird was slowly turning the sky's transparent pages" (92).

The displaced language

In *Flamingo*, the concept of language is constructed upon the rejection of a narrow western rationality. Mia Couto finds meaning beyond the single norm, in the actual encounter between the West with the mythical, imaginary, and everyday Mozambican worlds. This 'new way to think and represent reality', borrowing from Ornelas above, corresponds to what Chabal coined the 'African quality' already found in Mia Couto's first novel. It is the quality of conveying the African collective unconscious that blends the everyday experience with its particular African mythology[25]. The Portuguese language that Mia Couto conceives, understood as a representation of this plural reality, is 'African' or better Mozambican.

Language then feeds from the worlds experienced in the locality. As Mia Couto has displaced other dichotomies, the natural/national against foreign is also a distinction that becomes blurred. What is local here is not necessarily national. The stranger is the outsider, however also the stranger within each character. This is the very condition of the translator's father, in colonial times, fighting at the side of the Portuguese against his own people: "the enemy was inside him. The target he was firing at was not a foreign country, but a province of himself" (109). And this is the post-colonial condition of otherness: "Once upon a time we wanted to be civilized. Now we want to be modern", says Sulplício, and his son 'translates': "we continued to be prisoners of the desire not to be ourselves" (150). Or even foreign are those strangers to our place and ways: "One of those foreigners […], either a local one or one from outside" (122). What qualifies the outsider is therefore a detachment from the local cosmology, rather than nationality in the narrow sense.

This reflection on the boundaries of the community and of the self is critical for the construction of a concept of language vis-à-vis nationality. Through appropriation, the language that is foreign becomes one's own – of the nation, and of the self. The foreign language can belong as much to the local, as to the outside – as in "a shout in a foreigner's English" (88). Hereby the divide between national languages is imploded.

The post-colonial language

Local African languages have though a primacy in reaching the interior of Mozambican' rural peoples. In *Flamingo* villagers express themselves naturally in such languages: "He was so sleepy that, at first, he spoke in Chimuanzi" (57). They convey a fuller expression of their plural worlds, hidden beyond the surface of Portuguese: "The witchdoctor had stopped talking

[25] Chabal, *The post-colonial literature of Lusophone Africa*, 83-85.

in Portuguese. He went over to speaking the local tongue, expressing himself with his eyes closed" (118).

Yet in Mia Couto's story local languages lack authority in the power chain to the West. Power holders hide behind the lack of comprehension of local languages. They draw from the low value attached to African ordinary peoples to disqualify their languages. "It's just that I can't understand this folk's dialect very well", says the minister about the uncomfortable revelations of the prostitute (65). In the downward trajectory of this disqualification, Portuguese is the language of the Mozambican urban South, while rural Mozambique speaks 'no-languages' or 'dialects'. Portuguese is still identified as the imposed language of power. At the other end of this chain, power is exercised through the refusal to speak Portuguese. The translator's father is exemplary of this defiant attitude.

> The first time he had tried to speak to him, the administrator had felt the weight of ridicule. There he was, all style and manners, if you please here, excuse me there. And the other fellow, not a word, his brow bolted, licking his own tongue. That is: not speaking Portuguese, but the local language. Old Sulplício didn't respect any presence (82).

The translator explains: "I knew it: my father dwelt far from the favour of those in government. But the people held him in respect, because of the collection of ancestors he could call upon from eternity" (82). The choice for local languages in face of power reveals that authority at the local level derives from other sources, namely the bonds with land, place and its history.

Linguagens

In Mia Couto's writing there is always another language of another world that the self touches and crosses. From here emerges the concept of language as version that tells a story. "The only speech I've got is for what I invent", says the witchdoctor Zeca Andorinho (124). Language then does not convey and is itself not a universal truth. When the Italian reveals the tale of his own conception and childhood, deepened in religiosity, it is the turn of the translator not to believe. Ultimately all stories are inventions and versions. Equally stricken about the story of his own conception, the translator doubts his father: "Sulplício was imagining that story at that precise moment. […]. But I accepted it. After all, everything is belief" (132). Hereby Mia Couto implodes the universality of the West, as it is a story amongst stories. "We are waiting for you whites to tell us your stories" (84). These stories fashion language and are manifested by it.

Above all there is no single language. As the translator listened to the Old woman Temporina's explanation of the three worlds that lived in that village: 'Tizangara-land', 'Tizangara-sky' and 'Tizangara-water', he was himself lost: "I smiled. Now it was I who needed a translator" (51). The translator does not reach to the spiritual and natural dimensions of the place – which fits into his portrayal as uprooted. Yet *Flamingo* is a story of restoring plurality. Its most subtle but also most powerful image is the translator's father learning 'bird language' (128). It is a language that connects Tizangara's land, sky and water.

Ornelas argues that Mia Couto has recourse to the imaginary of the Mozambican people to reconstruct a reality in their own terms.

> It means that the initiative in the aesthetical production will fall, at a larger degree, upon the representation of cosmic harmony. That means that it will lay claim and/or objectify a

> differentiated reality, which is closer to the essence of the Mozambican. It is a realiy that was erased by colonialism and by the imported ideologies.[26]

Detaching what is to be Mozambican from a primordial 'essence' and placing it instead in its 'Mozambican quality', enables an understanding of Mia Couto's text. The imaginary that feeds his conception of language is shaped through Modernity, myth and imagination through the (dis)encounters between Mozambique and the West. He rejects western all-encompassing rationality, found in language as *língua*, i.e. a single representation of a presumed universal reality. Instead he thinks language in its plurality and instability, as it is a margin and frontier rooted in oneself and in the locality. It is *linguagens*.

Conceptions against location

Margarida Fonseca associated Mia Couto's work with border theory, for its possibility of overcoming the rigid dichotomies of western thought[27]. Rothwell asserted the postmodern character of this operation that above all, decanonises the West[28]. Hereby Mia Couto transgresses the western centre through the demise of its meta-narrative which asserted its originality, singularity and universality. Further following Fonseca, Mia Couto forwards a postcolonial alternative through the consistent attack on the idea of separated 'pure cultures', recognizing instead "that frontiers are spaces which allow […] transcultural contact"[29]. The Portuguese language that emerges is an expression of its encounter with Mozambican worlds.

However any recourse made to border theory requires critical awareness. António Ribeiro asserted the epistemological productivity of the concept of the *fronteira* given to its rich metaphorical dimension. Yet this very richness signals to the possibilities of inscribing contradictory meanings to a 'purely arbitrary symbol'. It is either the border that restates the lines of colonial separation and affirms the canon, or the border as borderzone or interstitial space of communication[30]. Border studies tended to explore border metaphors in their emancipatory and utopian connotation.

Fonseca argues though that Mia Couto's literature and commentary are more ambiguous - than most of border theory – in terms of overseeing the actual transformation of the imagination of the centre:

> [T]he Mozambican writer does not fall into naiveté vis-à-vis the concept of the border and of the potentialities implicit in its transgression revealing, with great critical acuity, a perception of the existing asymmetries, in terms of the cultural sovereignty, between the centre (western) an the periphery […].[31]

Rothwel has argued further that *Flamingo* presents a fierce critique to the very agents of the 'Empire', both national and international elites that have contributed to Mozambique's loss of

[26] Translated from Ornelas, 50.
[27] Fonseca Ana Margarida, "Between Centers and Margins - Writing the Border in the Literary Space of the Portuguese Language", *Postcolonial Theory and Lusophone Literatures*, (Paulo de Medeiros), Utrecht, Portuguese Studies Center, 2007, 1, p. 45.
[28] Rothwell.
[29] Fonseca, p. 50.
[30] Ribeiro António Sousa, "A retórica dos limites. Notas sobre o conceito de fronteira", *Globalização: fatalidade ou utopia?*, (Boaventura de Sousa Santos), Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 2005, 1, p. 469.
[31] Fonseca, p. 55.

sovereignty, as it becomes integrated in global capitalism[32]. The same awareness regarding power asymmetries is reflected in his concept of the Portuguese language that is appropriated and transformed but simultaneously gives continuity to social and cultural hierarchies in an entangled global world.

However, the subaltern quality and challenging potential of Mia Couto's texts are far from undisputed. Again here I recur to Ribeiro's critical contentions on the metaphorical uses of the border and their ideological implications, and the importance of contextualisation[33]. It is paramount to reflect on the border metaphors of Mia Couto's text against the history of the Portuguese empire and colonial contact and the perspectives of writer and reader.

Mia Couto portrays himself as a plural identity, de-ambulating and in process. He is himself a crossing of cultures inspired in his childhood that took place "in this duality of house and street: the house that gave me an European cultural basis […]; and the street, which brought to me the other part, the African part of the world"[34]. Yet the critical crossing that reflects upon his work is for him the condition of being an African writer, found in the same "place of confluence" as his black colleagues. This is a "border place between cultures". "This undefined condiction – this being inside and outside – is a privileged place in a world that is loosing borders. Being, at the same time, indigenous and alien, gives them a position of privileged visitor, of tailor between different cultural cloths". He argues that the ambivalence of this position, its "*mestiçagem*" enables creating. It is an "instrument to find one's own solutions"[35].

According to Rothwel this position is intended to depict the end of clear cut political ideologies – and borders - in the Mozambique of the 1990's. Yet further it asserts that ideology has been hiding in such divisions[36]. In this sense, *mestiçagem* fits the perspective of hybridisation as defined by Jan Pieterse. It makes "an empirical case: that processes of globalisation, past and present, can be adequately described as processes of hybridisation. Secondly, it is a critical argument: against viewing globalisation in terms of homogenisation"[37]. This is a project of overthrowing the distinctions and exclusions erected by the territorial empire and associated national projects. Accordingly it belongs to what Sousa Santos defined 'counter-hegemonic globalisation' as one of such projects "that struggle for transforming unequal exchanges into exchanges of shared authority"[38].

Yet despite being born out of such critical *mestiçagem*, the aesthetics of Mia Couto's text allows cooptation into the category of African cultural merchandise. Hereby the text is simultaneously deciphering the colonial mythology and feeding a post-colonial myth, namely the 'Empire'. This is the current hegemonic narrative that has incorporated hybridity and diluted difference into a homogeneous global identity.

Within the realm of the Portuguese language, *mestiçagem* resonates the trademark of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism, a benevolent force out of which racially harmonious

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[32] Rothwell, 20.
[33] Ribeiro, p.
[34] Translated from citation in Laban, p. 1007.
[35] Translated from citation in Fonseca, p. 54-55.
[36] Rothwell Phillip, "Fuzzy Frontiers - Mozambique: False Borders - Mia Couto: False Margins", 1, fronteirasborders, Fall: 55-62 (1998).
[37] Pieterse Jan Nederveen, "Globalization as hybridization", *Global modernities*, (Mike Featherstone, et al.), London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1995, p. 63.
[38] Translated from Santos Boaventura de Sousa, "Os processos da globalização", *Globalização: fatalidade ou utopia?*, (Boaventura de Sousa Santos), Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 2005, 1, p. 79.

societies emerged. This symbolic heritage, analysed by Vale de Almeida[39], lives through in contemporary Portuguese culture, against the evidence of historical and ethnographical research[40]. Further, it is fundamental to consider Mia Couto's belonging to Mozambican cultural elite in its association to Portuguese/European culture as an important factor in his success and incursion into the literary canon. This readership and the association with authoritative publishing houses in Portugal locate him "in the mainstream of contemporary Lusophone literature"[41]. The dynamics of book production and availability are critical too. Portugal is the door to African literature written in Portuguese, as Mia Couto explains that to get hold of African books "we always go through Lisbon"[42]. The Portuguese language therefore enables access to a wider (western) audience, while this very process reproduces the old colonial dynamics whereby African engagement incurs in submitting to a relation of subordination to a benevolent center.

Butôt pointed out, "there is a certain limit to [the influence the author has over his message] in the sense that once into the world his work can be received in signifying-systems he may never have imagined"[43]. Far from getting into an impossible debate about the intention of the writer to feed a particular cultural narrative, in this case *Lusofonia*, it is more productive to focus on the metaphorical possibilities the text offers in the dialogue with the cultural narratives inscribed in the field. Butôt argues that the language debate, which started in the literary field "seems to be held mostly outside of it, in a socio-cultural and political reality which heavily influences the reception of the literature it concerns"[44].

'My language is my homeland'[45] epitomises this debate on the Portuguese language. Authored by Fernando Pessoa's heteronym Bernardo Soares, this phrase turned synonymous in contemporary public discourse to the centrality of Portuguese identity in the language. It has been so often repeated to give force to nationalistic claims in such disparate contexts and circumstances that António Tabucchi coined it "a trade of toothpaste to conquer the Market"[46]. Mia Couto wittingly subverts the nationalistic meaning the phrase gained in Portugal, asserting that "my Portuguese language is my homeland"[47]. He offers another Portuguese language, found in one's literary expression fed by places and a history of crossings.

However this emancipatory proposition is often overlooked, the writer being himself trapped in the construct of otherness, according to which the other has a plural identity while the metropolitan self is singular and original. In interview Mia Couto is asked if "his literary and philosophical position doesn't derive from Mia Couto's circumstance of being made of two 'waters', the European and African culture". He explains: "We are all made of various intersections, of various lives and cultures". Inquired on "what is to be African in his literature" Mia Couto avoids fixation: "Knowing that I will never know it, because it is something that is moving." Concurrently he distances himself from the binary equation

[39] Almeida Miguel Vale de, Crioulização e Fantasmagoria, Brasília, 2004.
[40] This is a critical aspect on the construction of identities in the field of the Portuguese language, which I elaborated in the conference paper: Schor Patricia, Africa dislocating the Portuguese language: José Eduardo Agualusa's novel trespassing the border, Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009, September 11.
[41] Rothwell, "Fuzzy Frontiers - Mozambique: False Borders - Mia Couto: False Margins", 60.
[42] Translated from citation in Carvalho António, Furacão Tabucchi sobre Paris, Porto, 2000.
[43] Butôt, 102.
[44] Ibid, 18.
[45] Translated from Pessoa Fernando, *Livro do desassossego: páginas escolhidas*, Porto, Arte e Cultura, 1961.
[46] Translated from citation in Coelho Alexandra Lucas, A lusofonia é 'uma marca dentífrica', Lisbon, 2000.
[47] Translated from citation in Almeida Onesimo [Onésimo] T., *Lusofonia - Some Thoughts on Language*. Available at: eScholarship Repository, University of California: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/050521. Acessed in: June 4, 2007.

Tradition versus Modernity: “For instance, that which is called African tradition, which is another myth, is always being remade by modernity”. Persistently the writer challenges the construction of Africa as traditional and Europe as universal. Mia Couto presents Portugal beyond its Modernity: “Lisbon has the same magic than anywhere in Africa”[48]. It follows that the language his works argue for is plural, Lusitanian and Mozambican Portuguese being manifestations of this plurality.

Conclusion: emerging & submerging in the contact zone

Rothwell has called attention to the need to reflect upon Mia Couto’s intended audience, that is intellectualized, for an understanding of his literary project[49]. This point might only be partly accurate, as Mia Couto has a critical engagement in Mozambican broader cultural terrain. Referring to the other part of his audience, which is western, Rothwell’s point refers back to that ‘Mozambican quality’ of Mia Couto’s texts. Through the ‘portrayal’ of one magical archetypical Africa, the writer entertains the western reader with an aesthetical experience, which will invite her into an epistemological exercise. “Western perceptions of reality [will be] called into question not by African cultures, but by ‘the interaction’ of western and African cultures in a way that distorts the integrity and delineation of both”[50].

A dynamics of appropriation, transformation and continuity are present in Mia Couto’s (dis)encounters with Portuguese contemporary culture. The fact that this contact occurs around and about language enables such games, as language offers a place for ideology to hide under apparent neutrality. *Flamingo* unveils this neutral construction, revealing the West as a particular locality among those that compose a language. The radicalism of Mia Couto’s project is found in deciphering the myth erected by the imposition of western epistemology. He defies the very categorization of language. Hereby the writer is addressing a post-colonial centre beyond Portugal. He speaks of ‘the West’ as a metaphor of epistemological separation.

This separation is problematised throughout *Flamingo*. The novel ends in the abyss - frontier between worlds - where a story of displacement closes with two encounters. Sulplício assigns the translator the task of telling Tizangara’s story. Hereby Mia Couto rescues agency in constructing Mozambican history. Yet *Flamingo* is also as a story of re-encountering the dimensions that compose the self. The son, the uprooted Mozambican, for whom “the ground is a sheet of paper, everything is written on it,” (147) was now able to tell a story without paper or a ground below his feet. It follows the encounter between the translator and Risi, the western outsider: “He looked at me and seemed to read my inner thoughts” (179). This is the destination of a trajectory from dissociation to conciliation. Hereby ‘the West’ meets Mozambique, sharing the intimate language of those who traversed a journey together: the ‘bird language’.

For Mia Couto The Last Flight of the Flamingo “It is a piece of writing that hopes to embrace the dialects of the land, become the sap of the plants and, from time to time, dreams of flying on the scarlet wing”[51]. The open character of the language he conceives and the ambiguous

[48] Translated from citation in Nunes, 13-14.
[49] Rothwell, "Fuzzy Frontiers - Mozambique: False Borders - Mia Couto: False Margins".
[50] Ibid, 61.
[51] Couto Mia, *Um sol do outro lado do mundo: Speech made on receiving the Mário António Prize presented by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, for The Last Flight of the Flamingo*. Available at: www.deza.admin.ch/pictures/Temp_docs/couto.pdf. Acessed in: April 9, 2010.

possibilities out of the (dis)encounters it highlights turn it into a place to reflect on past and hope for a future, a horizon. Seeking what is beyond what we have known as limit, it is a frontier. Devoid of imperial or neo-colonial voracity, it is a precarious and unstable place of contact traversed by tension. It is an intermediary zone within set historical borders, which is however not completely consumed by ideology and not completely intelligible. This undefined character gives it the possibility of novelty and therefore transcendence of boundaries.

As previously argued, the use of such border metaphors requires historical awareness as they served the 'Empire' in the institution of its particular western locality as universal and canonical, and the Portuguese empire in inscribing itself as centre of a transnational identity. However it is critical to reclaim this metaphorical space and resemanticise its vocabulary. With this in mind it seems proper to characterize Mia Couto's practise as one of the border in its emancipatory promise. The symbolic appropriation the writer carries out places his text within a strategy of 'counter-hegemonic globalisation'. Yet this very characterization reminds one of the forces it dialogues with, namely hegemonic globalisation or the resilient and ever re-fashioned 'Empire'.♣

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Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?: The Allied Democratic Forces in the Uganda / Congo Borderland

KEY WORDS

Uganda; Democratic Republic of Congo; Great Lakes Region; Borderlands; Borders; Regional conflict

INTRODUCTION

Described as a 'rebellion without a cause', the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has been inflicting damage and destruction on the Rwenzori region of Uganda for well over a decade now (IRIN, 1999). The ADF is a rebel group which came onto the scene in the mid-1990s, mounting brutal attacks on Bundibugyo, Kasese, and Kabarole districts, and causing the displacement of 180,000 people – which includes 80 percent of Bundibugyo's population (*The Economist*, 1999a; Lancaster, 2007; IRIN, 2001). While originally based in Western Uganda, it quickly came to establish itself across the border in the vast state-less space of Eastern Congo.[i] In this borderland area, firmly integrated amongst the local Congolese community, the ADF was able to continue attacks on Uganda, while at the same time becoming critically enmeshed in the wider Great Lakes regional war via contact with groups such as the Mai Mai rebels, former Rwandan army and Interahamwe militias, and ex-Congolese forces.

Through forceful and targeted military operations by the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Uganda and the Congo, including various joint ventures in later years with the United Nations peacekeeping operation MONUC, the ADF was somewhat quelled by late 2005 (Romkema, 2007; Muhanga, 1999c). Indeed its numbers have dropped significantly over the years, from around 4,000-5,000, to an estimated several hundred today. Nevertheless, and contrary to what official sources might like one to believe, the group has by no means been fully eradicated (Romkema, 2007; C.I.). Areas such as Bundibugyo have continued to be threatened with small attacks, and the UPDF maintains a very 'alert' presence in potential ADF border hot-spots (C.I.; Mugisa, 2008). The rebels are still based deep in the Congo bush, where they have remained connected with various regional groups wreaking havoc on North Kivu province and Ituri district. Despite all of this, the ADF as a group has largely gone undocumented. Even at the height of its activities, there was a lack of serious or sustained attention accorded to it on the part of the media, conflict management actors, donors, and academics alike (IRIN, 2001; Hovil and Werker, 2005). Resultantly, the ADF rebellion has been one marred in mystery, and subject to poorly informed interpretive frameworks.

Due to a paucity of information and scholarly analysis, the movement has been written off as a peculiar, marginal, and largely *Ugandan* phenomenon. However, this paper seeks to explore the idea that the ADF has represented something more than a mere peripheral nuisance to the Ugandan state. It investigates the possibility that the movement has interconnected with the Congo in a way which goes beyond simple territoriality – beyond the mere use of the Congo as a convenient base from which to launch its activities. Thus, the central questions which this paper attempts to answer are the following: 'How can the ADF's connections to the Congo best be explained?' More specifically, 'Has the ADF movement indeed been an internal, Ugandan phenomenon with 'spill-over' links to the Congo, or have there perhaps been more profoundly transnational processes at play?'

I argue that the seemingly Ugandan intrastate conflict between the ADF and national government has to be placed within a wider regional context – one which recognizes the integral transnational character of the ADF movement. And this can only be done through the adoption of a borderland, as opposed to traditional state-centric, analytic framework. Through an examination of the social/political and military/economic character and networks of the group, this paper will highlight how the ADF is the product of an historical, borderland-defined process. It is a process which stretches back to the colonial era, and continues to the present day, having been activated and sustained by two phenomena constitutive of, and unique to, borderlands: (1) the role of the state in these 'peripheral' areas, and specifically the lack of consolidation of state sovereignty, and (2) the role of the border, and consequent interaction with neighbouring borderlands. Both phenomena have proven critical to the transnational character of the ADF movement, and to its consequent ability to act not just as a Ugandan destabilizing force, but pivotally – through its intertwining with the wider polywar being played-out in the Congo – as a regional one.

THE BORDERLAND PERSPECTIVE

Before delving into the social/political and military/economic dimensions of the ADF, it is important to first define what exactly a borderland is. With few exceptions, conflict theorists have been uninterested in borderlands, viewing them as mere passive and reactive hinterlands, or

marginal, outlying areas with no state presence and thus of little strategic importance (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997; Jackson, 2009). Following from this, borders themselves have tended to be thought of in strictly statist terms, as barriers of penetration, lines of separation, and the legal limits of a state's sovereignty (Van Schendel, 2005; Baud and Van Schendel, 1997; Donnan and Haller, 2000). In terms of conflict analyses, then, the spread of violence from one state to another has usually been understood through concepts such as 'contagion', 'knock-on effect', and 'spill-over'. However, the embedded statism within these notions misses the profound cross-border interconnection found in many situations of regionalized violence – the interlinking of neighbouring states' peripheries to such a degree that to talk of distinct states is almost futile. As this paper will attempt to demonstrate, denying borderlands the recognition of being important zones or entities in their own right, can also deny conflict analyses the ability to move beyond superficial paradigms of cross-border violence. Accordingly, it is important to consider Stephen Jackson's perspective, namely that 'Copernican shifts in ... frames of reference and institutional action are urgently needed: from the national to the regional, and from simplistic oppositions of 'centre' versus 'periphery' to more subtle notions of a 'central periphery'' (Jackson, 2006).

Constantly changing and being renegotiated, especially during times of conflict, a borderland is at the most basic level a non-state (or even anti-state) geographic area. In fact, just like a state, it can be outlined on a map (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997; Goodhand, 2005). Central to the borderland, is the border itself. As Jonathan Goodhand notes, 'borders separate people and the separating qualities of these borders influence interactions between them' (Goodhand, 2009). Also critical to the borderland is its position of being on the margins of states. Oscar J. Martinez describes how it is accordingly subject to what he terms 'frontier forces': these can include unusually strong pressure from neighbouring countries, for example; influences from further abroad; or perhaps most importantly, a lack of state presence (Martinez, 1994). An important element of frontier forces is the resulting myriad activities and actors operating co-terminously in the same area. As Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham point out, it is nearly impossible to identify whether these forces are squarely local, national, or international, and thus traditional levels of analysis are often unhelpful (Kassimir and Latham, 2001). Instead, these political spaces with such a strong hybrid quality to them should be thought of as 'transboundary

formations', where dynamic interactions and intersections of all kinds exist (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008; Latham, 2001).

In order to take account of the unique dynamics which both the presence of a border and the position of being on the margins of states engenders, it is important to conceptualize a borderland as extending across *both* sides of a border. Of course, exactly how far the borderland reaches into each state differs, largely depending on the strength of the states in question and their ability to project power and control (Nugent, 2008). Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel have produced a classification system to account for the variations. Most significantly, there is the 'borderland heartland', the area straddling the border and completely dominated by its existence; next is the 'intermediate borderland', where the border's effects are felt, but only in the range of moderate to weak; and finally there is the 'outer borderland', which experiences the border's influence just occasionally, usually during periods of intense political activity such as war (Baud and Van Schendel).

Borderlands also differ in terms of the border's hardness or impermeability, which affects not only borderland practices, but in turn can also influence the dynamics of the entire region. They are thus clearly more than simply a geographic location where states come into contact with each other and geo-political relations take place. As will be expanded upon below, by way of their distinctive social, political, economic, and military patterns, borderlands form the arena through which violence such as that practiced by the ADF is constituted.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ADF

The unique, but pivotal, place of borderlands in the conflict arena is perhaps most visible when one considers the social and political spheres. Firstly, a border represents not only partition, but also opportunity for different societal forces to come into contact and interact with each other (Brambilla, 2007). As Hastings Donnan and Dieter Haller note, 'borders have an ambivalent character: they represent dividing lines as well as thresholds of passage, they have a 'hinge function', simultaneously bounding and excluding' (Donnan and Haller, 2000). Borderlands are thus areas where social identities can converge, coexist, or conflict (Brambilla, 2007; Flynn,

1997). There are numerous documented cases of borderland populations coming together to adopt a creole or syncretic culture, independent from, or even in opposition to, their respective national ones. Referring to the American-Mexico borderland, a 1983 *Newsweek* article described this situation well: 'in truth [the border] is a world apart – a third very unsovereign nation, not wholly American and not quite Mexican either, with its own customs, mores, values, and even its own language, Spanglish' (Martinez, 1994).

Unfortunately, however, when these 'unsovereign nations' are composed of the following populations, instability can also characterize them: transborder ethnic or religious groups with members divided across a border, ethnic populations which 'appear' to be culturally close to a group in a neighbouring country, poorly settled refugees, and economic migrants (Jackson, 2006). This instability can be compounded by the borderland's position of being on the margins of states, and the consequent substitution of frontier forces for state presence. The remoteness from centralised control is often felt not just in a physical sense, but in an administrative and political one as well, leading to a diluted sense of national identity on the part of the inhabitants. A 'sense of being different' from their fellow citizens frequently leads to visions and interests fundamentally at odds with those of the capital (Martinez, 1994). These factors combined, therefore, can mean that acceptance by other groups in the area is shaky. Disputes are common, for example, between supposed 'autochthons' and 'allochthons' – namely, between those who claim they arrived in the area first and have indigenous status and rights to the land, and those who apparently came later (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005). In essence, as Jackson says, the social and political dynamics of borderlands can render these regions 'ready environments within which insurgencies can emerge' (Jackson, 2006).

The Rwenzori borderland has struggled with such issues since (at least) colonial times, and this volatile social and political situation is something the ADF has fed off of and exploited. The Bakonzo and Bamba tribes living on the slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains, were separated from their fellow kinsmen when a border between the British Protectorate of Uganda and the Free State of the Congo was imposed by colonial powers (Uganda National Museum). Although accordingly subjected to very different political trajectories, the Bakonzo and their counterparts in the Congo (the Banande), and the Bamba and their Congolese equivalents (the Bavira and

Batalinge), have maintained strong connections with each other (Mbalibulha, 2008). Today their languages and cultural practices remain strikingly alike, intermarriage between the groups is very common, and travel across the Ugandan-Congolese border to visit, shop, or trade is a daily occurrence for many (Rwenzori Forum for Peace and Justice, 2007; Facci, 2009; Mbalibulha, 2008; C.I.). The ties amongst these groups over the years have in fact been stronger than those with their fellow countrymen. It is this very identifiable and independent borderland culture that sowed the seeds for tension in the region.

When the British introduced indirect rule in the country in 1900, the Bakonzo and Bamba were controversially placed under the administration of the Toro Kingdom. Owing to their later arrival in the area, physical differences, depressed economic condition, and most of all, unique customs and culture, the Batoro relegated the Bakonzo and Bamba to minority status. Opportunities for educational advancement and political participation were severely restricted (Rwenzori Forum for Peace and Justice, 2007; Muhindo, 1994). In 1962 a low-level guerrilla struggle known as the Rwenzururu Movement was initiated by the Bakonzo and Bamba, pressing for the realization of greater rights through the creation of their own district. Failure in achieving any concrete headway with the Movement provoked the creation of a more radical offshoot: a breakaway 'state' known as the Rwenzururu Kingdom, with a 'government' whose goal (one still to be realized) was to create an independent nation for the Bakonzo, Bamba, and their kinsmen in the Congo.

The secessionist rebellion found an especially strong military following amongst the Bakonzo high in the Rwenzori Mountains (Doornbos, 1970). Due to a lack of roads linking them to the rest of Western Uganda, they were virtually cut-off from mainstream society and the influence of the Ugandan government. Instead, their center of interaction lay with their neighbours across the border in the Congo. This was a natural situation considering the historic affiliation, but one also greatly facilitated by their specialized knowledge of mountain passages and ability to survive in terrain deemed uninhabitable or non-traversable by others (Doornbos, 1970). According to these Bakonzo, then, subjugation to the Batoro or Ugandan political system in general, made very little sense. Furthermore, despite its violent nature, Arthur Syahuka Muhindo notes that the nationalism sentiment appealed to those on *both* sides of the border: "Many local chiefs and the

peasantry welcomed the Rwenzururu leaders and the idea of uniting and forming a single nation" (Muhindo, 1994). Incorporating the Congolese Banande into the Kingdom was definitely accorded a high degree of importance, and plans were even made to establish the capital of the Kingdom in Kivu province (Muhindo, 1994).

While the Movement came to an inconclusive end in 1982, a yearning for a truly independent and recognized Kingdom – and with it the idea of a reunified nation, consisting of kith and kin on both sides of the border – has survived through the years. Also to have endured has been the feeling of structural oppression amongst many Bakonzo and Bamba, and resentment towards the government for its alleged neglect of the area (it was the last to receive electricity or a decent road network, for example) (McGregor, 2007). Added to these could be the continued animosity towards the Batoro (and vice-versa), the complex ethnic composition of the region, and general state of strife (F.O.; Rwenzori Forum for Peace and Justice, 2007). The borderland has thus proven to be quite a spawning ground for insurgency activity. A rebel group known as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), for instance, with a nucleus formed of ex-Rwenzururu militants, mobilized support in the 1980s via reigniting former animosities. Operating largely out of the Congo, with bases in border towns such as Beni, NALU inflicted great insecurity on districts such as Kasese in Western Uganda (Ojulu, 1995; Nzinjah, 1993b; Vision Reporter, 1993). Despite many local Bakonzo and Bamba inhabitants opposing the violence practiced by the group, NALU was nevertheless successful in re-awakening and manipulating the unaddressed historical grievances (Omach; Owino, 1990; Mugisha, 1990).

More importantly, NALU – together with a group of fundamentalist Tabliq Muslims who had earlier been ousted from Kampala, and Hutu radicals from Rwanda, among others – went on to form the ADF in the mid-1990s (Prunier, 1997; C.I.). Through somewhat of a grafting process onto the region's previous rebellions and revolts, the ADF made Western Uganda its theatre of operations, and quickly thereafter the Congo its official base headquarters to launch invasions from (Malisaba, 1996; Muhanga, 1999b). Despite a portion of the original top leadership coming from areas outside of the Rwenzori region, this borderland was nevertheless a logical arena from which to stage a rebellion against the Ugandan state (which was the purported, though very questionable and poorly executed, objective of the group). The main reasons for

this included the following: the mountainous topography, tradition of resistance against the state, exploitable deeply-rooted ethnic/cultural tension, and immediacy of the border and history of cross-border interaction (IRIN, 1999; Jourdan, 2008; Boas, 2004). Hans Romkema notes that 'the dynamics behind the formation of ADF cannot be understood without a comprehension of the local tradition of armed resistance' (Romkema, 2007). What should be added to his observation, however, is a thorough understanding of the forces *behind* the local tradition of armed resistance – namely, social and political borderland dynamics.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE ADF

The historical, borderland-defined process of which the ADF is a product, has also been defined by the area's unique patterns of military/economic activity. Contrary to what traditional explanations of state collapse often argue, the lack of a strong state presence in peripheral zones by no means results in a void of leadership. With regards to military endeavours, it opens up a space in which a wide variety of military players are able to compete for authority or influence (Vlassenroot, 2008; Latham, 2001). Neighbouring states, warlords, rebels, and militias are some of the many actors that vie for the opportunity to exert their presence in this arena. Indeed, to understand this dynamic and innovative space, it is necessary to break out of what John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach refer to as the 'single sovereign' perspective. As they explain, 'state actors are but one group of elite actors who must be considered in their relationship to other local-subordinate, elite and international groups. To exclude other forms of political community and political-economic networks ... obfuscates analysis' (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008). The new and 'emergent' forms of authority which arise, especially during periods of conflict, utilize a variety of means to maintain their military and/or economic control (Raeymaekers, 2009). A commonly employed strategy has been the forging of transnational alliances, where actors on both ends use the network to renegotiate their own power positions.

In a more economic sense, state absence in the peripheries – and the corresponding remoteness and alienation from the alleged core – tends to breed economic independence and self-assertiveness among borderlanders. Not only does this importantly result in economic activity

being directed outwards and over the border (versus towards the capital), but it also emboldens an attitude of ambivalence with regards to cooperating with national customs and trade regulations (Martinez, 1994). According to Martinez, 'borderlanders find it morally and culturally acceptable to breach trade and immigration regulations that interfere with the 'natural order' or cross-border interaction' (Martinez, 1994). By virtue of their unique place on the border, borderlanders across the world have forever been practicing illicit economic activities like smuggling. As Judith Vorrath explains, 'smuggling is completely dependent on the existence of the border since differences in prices, monetary currencies and the general 'atmosphere commerciale' between neighbour countries are naturally the incentives and driving forces of these activities' (Vorrath, 2007). In fact, one of the most prevalent features among borderlands is a tradition of having been crucial nodes in trading routes, with a corresponding history of cross-border commercial ties based on kinship, religion, profession, and so on (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997; Jackson, 2006). The system nowadays is often supported by the local population, who not only remain wedded to traditional economic practices, but are highly experienced in the exploitation of different states' border regulatory regimes (Van Schendel, 2005). The ease with which activities like smuggling can be conducted in borderlands, thus accords conflict actors there the ability to conduct lucrative business in the export of natural resources, for example. Indeed, the unique military and economic character of borderlands translates into rebel groups with very accessible avenues and resources through which to pursue their conflict agendas.

This has certainly been the case with the ADF, as its formation and perpetuation were greatly influenced by an ability to build-off of cross-border military and economic patterns used by rebels before it. Foremost, it continued the tradition of establishing bases in the non-state space of Eastern Congo, and making contact with other rebellions operating in the area. During the Rwenzururu revolt, for example, headquarters were placed in a Congolese forest just beyond the border, and strategic connections were made with guerrilla supporters of the Congolese political dissident, Pierre Mulele (Boas, 2004; Romkema, 2007). Some years later, NALU not only regularly fled back and forth between Uganda and its Congolese bases, but it also attempted to garner support and recruits through linking-up with a variety of Ugandan and Congolese groups in Eastern Congo. For example, in addition to recruiting Banande militants, there were reports of

negotiations with Nubians, as well as attempts at uniting with the West Nile Bank Front rebels (Nzinjah, 1993a; Mugisha and Nzinjah, 1995) .

The ADF's practice of utilizing transnational alliances can thus be viewed as an extension of previous military patterns. And its social and political grounding in a borderland culture allowed it to take advantage of the possibilities opened-up by conflict in the Congo. The violence in that country, which erupted at approximately the same time as the ADF came onto the scene, essentially meant two things for the group. Firstly, it increased the (already considerable) size of non-governed territory in Eastern Congo, and thus its potential recruiting and roving ground. As Major Shaban Bantariza of the UPDF stated, 'They [the rebels] have taken advantage of the non-existence of the state in much of eastern DRC to move around' (IRIN, 2004). Secondly, it meant a blossoming of rebel groups, and thus bountiful supply of potential 'partners in crime'. One humanitarian official aptly described the situation when he stated, 'This [the ADF] rebellion was concretised by the war in Congo' (IRIN, 1999).

The following quotations from Ugandan newspaper articles provide a flavour of the kinds of networking and activities the ADF was resultantly able to conduct: 'It is very clear that most of the attacks in the district [Bundibugyo] were carried out by a joint force of ADF, Interahamwe and the Mai Mai'; 'The Ugandan authorities claim the ADF rebels have teamed up with Congolese militias to beef up their capacity'; 'ADF, PRA [People's Redemption Army] and LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] is active in Congo, they are re-grouping and trying to reactivate their contacts in Uganda'; 'the ADF was establishing fresh linkages with a Lendu militia gang in Ituri, to plan new attacks'; 'The rebels [ADF] plan to fight alongside the Wangelima [ethnic group of Congolese warriors] to defeat Zaire's Banyamulenge rebels'; 'A large number of ADF rebels, former Zaire (Congo) soldiers and remnants of the Interahamwe invaded the country and overran Bundibugyo town' (Muhanga, 1999; IRIN, 2000; *The Daily Monitor*, 2007; Mugabi, 2008; Sserwanga and Nzinjah, 1997; Sserwanga, 1997).

While the transnational alliances were crucial to the ADF's continued survival, the insurgency suffered from a lack of popular support due to its brutally violent practices and lack of coherent or identifiable political agenda. It was thus forced to secure help from other arenas, and so

turned to cross-border trade, something practiced in the area since the imposition of the border (Hovil, 2003). During the era of the Rwenzururu Movement, for example, the Bakonzo's opposition to federal taxes and the national monetary system resulted in a thriving cross-border informal economy. Its vibrancy was greatly aided by the lack of any strong or effective state authority in the region, especially on the Congolese side (Pennacini, 2008; Alnaes, 1969). Rwenzururu rebels even engaged in a scheme where they garnered a profit from imposing a 'protection' tax on cross-border smugglers (Raeymaekers and Jourdan, 2009). NALU rebels went a step further, and integrated themselves amongst the Congolese population in order to more thoroughly engage in economic activities such as agricultural cultivation (Romkema, 2007). This not only proved lucrative in a smuggling sense, but was also a valuable means of acquiring Congolese recruits. The ADF continued this practice, so much so, that its force became 60 percent Congolese (the majority of which were Banande) (Romkema, 2007). The ADF also branched-out economically into a wider variety of fields, including mining, logging, poaching, fishing, and coffee cultivation (Wasike, 2005; Romkema, 2007; IRIN, 2006). In fact, today, in partnership with Congolese businessmen, it appears to dedicate the majority of its time to trafficking minerals (C.I.; Romkema, 2007).

Of course, the ability to engage in such activities at all, is down to the integrated nature of the borderland – the profound interconnections between those on either side of the official border. And indeed the importance of this has been no secret, which is why border towns with their thriving border markets, have continually been the object of monitoring and regulation schemes by the authorities. A 1992 article from a Ugandan newspaper, covering the reaction to a NALU attack, demonstrates this well: 'The RC [Resident Coordinator] III Chairmen of Karambi and Kitolhu are reported to have ordered the closure of foot-paths leading from Uganda into Zaire. The two officials have also stopped Zairians from coming to Ugandan border markets.' (Vision Reporter, 1992). With regards to the ADF, attempts were initially made by the UPDF to control the border, and thereby severe the group's supply lines (IRIN, 1999; IRIN, 2000). Eventually, however, this practice was largely abandoned; there was simply too much civilian cross-border traffic to permit any effective targeting of smuggling, recruitment, or other rebel activities (C.I.). Presently during 'market days', for example, when towns on either side of the state line open their bazaars, people stream continuously back and forth across the border. Needless to say,

ADF recruitment continues, cross-border trade thrives, and the borderland in general retains its dynamic atmosphere (C.I.).

CONCLUSION

Although the ADF 'rebels slash businessmen' – as one expert on the group describes them – are today deep in the remote Congolese forests, concentrating on their various business ventures, and undertaking 'token' attacks to demonstrate their continued existence, there is no denying that earlier in its history the ADF was a force to be reckoned with (C.I.). And while the destruction wreaked on Western Uganda was substantial, it was the ADF's wider impact that was perhaps more significant. Firstly, its alliances with actors such as the former Interahamwe and Mai Mai made the group an integral part of the larger regional system of conflict centred in the Congo. Although it was one of dozens of groups operating in Eastern Congo, it was certainly a noteworthy contributor to the further regionalization of the violence. As Romkema states with reference to the ADF, 'The continued presence of armed groups that operate across borders is an immediate threat to the consolidation of peace in the Great Lakes Region of Africa' (Romkema, 2007).

Secondly, the ADF was pivotal in stoking animosity between various governments in the region. One dimension of this concerned its role in the long-running 'undeclared war' between Uganda and Sudan. The ADF's acceptance of significant Sudanese sponsorship encouraged Kampala to increase its own assistance to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, which was fighting the Khartoum regime (Prunier, 1997). Of course this resulted in a serious deterioration in the two governments' relationship, but it also served to direct Uganda's focus to the rampant insecurity problems being posed by Eastern Congo. This state-less space facilitated Sudanese activities such as the following, described in a *New Vision* article: 'A Sudanese military plan airlifts supplies regularly to the ADF rebels in the Rwenzori Mountains region of the DRC. An ADF female reel commander who surrendered last week, alleged that the military aircraft drops food, ammunition, uniforms and other supplies to the rebels' (Nzinjah, 1997).

It was not only Sudanese aid that the ADF was receiving, however, but Congolese support as well (Matsiko and Thawite, 1998). While it is still debated as to whether Kinshasa's assistance was as extensive as that of Khartoum's, or was instead more indirect in nature – such as a failure to prevent the use of Congolese territory for anti-Ugandan activity – Kampala authorities were definitely concerned (Clark, 2004). Their response was to invade the Congo, marking the beginning of an extremely controversial involvement in the Great Lakes regional war. That Uganda faced a security risk from the ADF's presence on the border is beyond doubt. However, to have used that as the principle reason for entering the Congo was a weak justification, especially when one takes into account the nature of that intervention (*The Economist*, 1999; Otunnu, 2004). As Prunier explains, 'the fact that the UPDF is deployed more than 1,000 kilometres from [the Congo-Uganda] frontier is *prima facie* evidence that Museveni and his government have other goals' (Clark, 2004).

In any case, the sustained presence of the ADF on Congolese soil equated to a continued excuse for the Ugandans to be in the Congo. In fact, the rebels have maintained somewhat of a protected status from the Congolese government to this day, which has not only hurt the ADF peace process, but has hindered the overall course of regional reconciliation as well (C.I.). In an important sense, therefore, while the ADF's most tangible effects were felt in Uganda, its influence has extended to a broader regional sphere. Andrew McGregor captures the essence of this well: 'the ADF has been an integral part of a wave of violence that has denied security and development to millions of Africans in the Congolese-Ugandan-Rwandan border region' (McGregor, 2007). What this points to, then, is the very *non*-peripheral, *non*-marginal status of borderlands. Defined by their unique lack of state presence and position on the border, these arenas generate social, political, military, and economic activity that is transnational to the core – and that, as the ADF demonstrates, can be a pivotal determinant in a region's state of stability. We thus need to stop seeing the spread of violence across countries as instances of mere conflict spill-over. Rather, borderlands should be accorded the recognition they deserve: as generators and incubators of conflict that is by its very nature cross-border, regional, and extremely destructive.

NOTES

[i] For the sake of simplicity, this paper will refer to what is currently known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as simply the 'Congo'.

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Refugees/Displaced, Cross-border Governance, and the making of political order in borderlands: A comparative perspective of refugee contexts in northern and southern borderlands of Senegal (Senegal-Mauritania, Senegal-Guinea Bissau).

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Abstract

The tendency has been in Africa that driven away by conflicts and other natural or human-made disasters, refugee and displaced communities settle alongside state borders. The subsequent involvement of these populations in order-making in margins raises the question of the extent to which this would challenge national attributes as long as the nature and meaning of borders just as state building embodied in the latter. Thus to what extent refugee/displaced practices of border spaces would affect the way they are perceived by state and host communities is a matter of concern especially as refugee/displaced situations questioned state building throughout border crossing and settlement. It is in that perspective we focus here not any more on the refugee/displaced per se but on the whole picture, that is refugee-state and refugee-society relations. Consequently, this paper looks at political order making in borderlands and the extent to which it is influenced or influencing those relationships and the refugee/displaced as peoples and groups that have belonging. Attention is also paid to the effects of conflicts (ended between Senegal and Mauritania and still raging between Casamance and Guinea-Bissau) and the relationships between neighbouring States as they operate in various and nearly opposite terms.

The two borderlands we are studying here are the refugee contexts between towns of Dagana and Gaye (Senegal) and Dagana-Mauritanie and Ghaani (Mauritania) on the one hand and those between Ziguinchor (Senegal) and Sao Domingo (Guinea-Bissau) on the other. We have specifically looked at to what extent and how political order making would be affected by the two difference situations: a post community conflict and inter-state dispute in the former case, and a protracted conflict situation in the latter.

In both borderlands refugee/displaced situations falls in the agenda of cross-border governance and is part of translocal politics of order making involving both state and non-state actors at varying degrees and at different levels. Even though refugee participation is a matter of political relationships and institutions, it is seen as a mere humanitarian idea and value which state building from margins has to appropriate. The low commitment or “avoidance behaviour” of government agencies and the subsequent complying of international agencies like the UNHCR, whatever may have done NGO’s and refugee/displaced associations, are even seen as a key condition to political order making whereby this helps to reinforce statehood. This situation is not altered despite the relatively voiced claims of local authorities and their constituencies for greater support in the “relief burden”, with different forms of refugee/displaced participation. Refugee phenomenon is a concern for government agencies, whether local or national, as long as it remains a challenge to statehood and that coping with it participates to consolidating state order. On the contrary, and as a matter of fact, refugees as peoples still face ill-definition and neglect as political order making in terms of state order does not include recognizing and granting them citizenship and other rights such as relating to livelihood and security. This state of affairs remains undisrupted by consequent clashes between discourses of political order making: on the one hand state-centered liturgies of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the lines of territorial integrity and sovereignty claims center-stage position for governmental authority – which appears in the equating of (cross-border)governance as state agency-oriented monitoring of humanitarian aid and (post)conflict state-building, while on the other,

discourses from village chiefs, refugee/displaced associations and NGO's (the latter do not contest state authority and central role) advocate inclusion, participation, citizenship, justice and solidarity. Nor does the weakness and absence of State structures in Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania and low level violence in Casamance prevent from enforcing such an order.

These discourses of inclusive political order making have not yet been able to affect power relationships in favour of refugee/displaced as they lack leverage in local politics and social capacities, mainly in the Ziguinchor Sao Domingo borderland. In the Casamance-Guinea-Bissau borderland the "ni paix ni guerre" situation and subsequent extraverted war economy have added to the non inclusive character of translocal political order, notably because of militarization which forces humanitarian and reconstruction agencies to comply with both army and guerilla constraining. In addition, and this applies to both borderlands, many refugee/displaced representatives and associations (in reduced numbers in the Mauritanian-Senegal borderland) are involved in strong politicization of aid or development policies as well as in the neopatrimonial governance-style that surrounds administrative institutions and aid or ordinary service delivery. Therefore, if refugee/displaced are endowed participation through representative, associative and solidaric channels, they are denied genuine participation in return programs in (i.e. in Mauritania), and consequently full citizenship, as shown by their precarious legal status and socioeconomic condition.

Even though it convokes and reproduces translocal identities (multi-ethnic or cosmopolitan belonging as well as bi-nationality) that accompany kinship and neighbourhood channels of support, cross-border governance in post or protracted conflict and refugee contexts does not always mean the emergence and prospering of 'non' or 'anti' state orders, including in the conflict torn Casamance-Sao-Domingo borderland. In our findings it is precisely about using cross-border politics of governance as multi-actor and multi-layer reconstructive steering and social policy to redraw state building. In other words, the intervention of non-state actors in reconstruction and humanitarian aid, whether inter or non-governmental, reinforces state building and statehood in its difficult trajectory. Indeed, and most interestingly, the top ranking of the issue of inclusion and citizenship which shows the permanence of states (states in their imperfection) is ultimate evidence to this finding.

Chris Vaughan (University of Durham, England)

Colonial rivalries and borderland politics in Condominium Darfur 1916-1956

It is a truism that colonialism in Africa was a boundary making enterprise. Colonial states created territorial boundaries, marking out the extent and limits of state, province and district level authority. This process was often seen as an imposition of European fixed lines of separation onto what had been a more fluid, shifting pre-colonial conception of borders and frontiers.[1] On a more abstract level, colonialism is usually also seen as having depended on the policing of a boundary between coloniser and colonised. The imagined right to rule of the colonial state, sometimes conceived of as 'prestige', depended on its distance from local societies, and its capacity to create what Timothy Mitchell has termed a state-effect: that which makes 'the state appear as an inert 'structure' that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives.'[2]

Yet in the case of Darfur, in Western Sudan, often described as one of Sudan's several peripheral, or marginal, zones, we can observe various counter-examples to challenge this narrative. Firstly, colonial authority here depended not just on the ability of officials to maintain a boundary between themselves and their subjects, but also on their ability to, at times, step into the imagined border zone between coloniser and colonised, and inhabit an in-between, indeterminate political role. Some officials followed strategies of rule that resonate strongly with Priya Satia's perspective on early twentieth century British intelligence agents in the Middle East. Applying her analysis to Darfur, one might suggest that some officials here believed, like their covert counterparts, that they could gain a profound, intuitive understanding of subject peoples by complete immersion in local culture. This was an understanding which facilitated colonial control, and simultaneously reinforced the status of the district official as an 'expert' on 'their' people, aiding their claims to act themselves as uniquely effective intermediaries and translators between local societies and the colonial state. Not all officials followed this strategy: but several of the most famous, and perhaps most significant of them, certainly did. None of this is meant to understate the fact of colonial rule: as Satia suggests, 'imperialism is a political relationship more than a perspective; intimacy does not make it go away.'[3]

The successful performance of African chieftaincy also depended on the ability to straddle the border between coloniser and colonised, between the state and 'non-state': chiefs and officials therefore shared a kit of performative tools in the construction of their authority. Both also tested the limits of the imagined, somewhat illusory, political and cultural categories of coloniser and colonised, although it was chiefs who ran a greater risk of punishment by failing to stick to the finely tuned scripts of enacted chieftaincy.[4] But here, I am principally attempting to reconsider the

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[1] A Asiwaju, 'The Conceptual Framework' in A.Asiwaju (ed.), *Partitioned Africans* (London, 1985), pp.1-18

[2] T. Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics', *The American Political Science Review*, **85** (1991), p.94.

[3] P.Satia, *Spies in Arabia* (Oxford, 2008), p.5.

[4] Compare Judith Butler's discussion of performed gender roles in 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory', *Theatre Journal*, **40** (1988), pp. 519-531.

figure of the European official in colonial history, as being a crucial factor in the negotiation of state authority in its 'margins' . It can hardly be argued now, as Anthony Kirk-Greene attempted, that 'the DC was the government and the government was the DC': we know far too much about the crucial roles of local intermediaries in forming the colonial state to suggest this.[5] Rather, officials in Darfur (and in neighbouring territories) were often pushed and pulled about by the vertical connections between them and their chiefly intermediaries. District commissioners were meant to be the distant, authoritarian and detached governors of their territories: in fact, the 'distance' between them and their subjects was at times nowhere near as great as was imagined, thanks to both their own fantasies of chieftainship, their individual performances of rule, and the initiative of local elites in mobilising their patronage. Colonial officials in rural areas, it might be argued, were constantly undergoing a process of mental 'splitting': they knew they were supposed to be at a distance from their subjects, but at the same time, often isolated from other European members of the colonial state, they wanted to be effective, authoritarian leaders, fathers of their people, 'white chiefs of Africa' as Mamdani puts it.[6] This latter tendency created opportunities for local elites (and indeed sometimes ordinary local subjects) to approach the power of the state very directly in remote Darfur. Or as Das and Poole put it, 'the indeterminacy of the margins enables strategies of engaging the state as some kind of margin to the body of citizens [or, in this case, subjects].'[7] This indeterminacy never fully dissolved the imagined boundary between coloniser and colonised, and indeed, in the course of contact and mutual mimicry across that boundary, a sense of division and separation was also simultaneously reconstructed. But I am stressing the potential that existed for local subjects to use the state on their own terms, and the ways in which such usage actually constructed the state in a zone where its influence might appear at first sight weak and sporadic.

These negotiations and interactions can be observed in several arenas, or theatres: chieftaincy disputes, as shown by Sara Berry's work, are a prime case for showing the ways in which the state could be constructed by interactions with local communities.[8] But the state's involvement in setting territorial boundaries, in managing relationships with other officials across those boundaries, and in representing the demands of local elites at an inter-district, province, or state level, is also a rich arena for observing very similar processes. Material from Darfur also suggests that we might also re-assess our view of the colonial state as eagerly introducing territorial boundaries wherever possible as a means of increasing state control of local populations. The view that fixed boundaries reduced flexible inter-group relations and increased the risk of conflict was often expressed by local administrators. Moreover, administrators were sometimes uncertain whether their involvement in inter-tribal politics, for instance via the construction of elaborate grazing systems, made things better or worse. To some extent this discussion also mirrors contemporary discourse about conflict resolution, itself riven by disagreement over whether Darfuris could resolve their own problems if they were only left to their own devices. Contemporary discourse on the role of 'traditional' leaders in peace making sometimes

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[5] A. Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966*, (Basingstoke, 2000), p.186.

[6] M.Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, (Princeton, 1996), p.114.

[7] V.Das and D.Poole. 'State and Its Margins: Comparative Ethnographies,' in V.Das and D.Poole (eds.), *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* (Oxford, 2004), p.29.

[8] See S.Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries* (Oxford, 2001).

sentimentalises chiefs as peacemakers, and many Darfuris themselves hark back to an earlier time when 'local' mechanisms of conflict resolution could contain whatever limited problems arose.

This paper uses examples from both the inter and intra state boundaries of Darfur to construct a view of territorial boundary making processes and attempts at inter-group relationship management enacted by uncertain, hesitant colonial officials. It emphasises common experiences of fracture and weakness within state networks, sometimes provoked by the attempts of state officials to behave as effective chiefs of 'their' people, rather than as representatives of a disembodied, detached, neutral state apparatus. The bureaucratic state was only very imperfectly implanted in Sudan: beneath its veneer of order and correspondence lay personalised, patrimonial structures of clientage which sometimes trumped attempts at creating a 'state effect.' Yet it was the functioning of these very structures which worked to construct the colonial state at its margins.

The state as reluctant, often failing, boundary maker

As so-called 'experts' on local cultures, some officials acquired a sceptical attitude towards boundary setting, creating ambivalence in colonial boundary discourse, and serving to limit the extent of fixed boundary demarcation. Of course, others argued that boundaries that were 'very clearly defined on the ground' would serve as effective means of containing local tensions and disputes, by making the rights of rival groups and leaders more clear and distinct. But equally, many officials claimed that the imposition of 'arbitrary' demarcated boundaries by the government increased rather than reduced inter-group tensions, and should only be carried out as a 'last resort' where disputes became intractable.[9] This was particularly the case in the reluctance to precisely delimit pastoralist boundaries: the border between Kordofan (the province east of Sudan) and Darfur was an area where it was thought 'undesirable to align boundaries' in what was a 'grazing ground for Darfur and Kordofan nomadic tribes.'[10] This argument gained particular prominence after the first ten years of colonial rule in Darfur: poor decisions made by administrators with limited knowledge of local realities in the early years of colonial rule were often seen to be responsible for provoking early rebellions. The Nyala rising of 1921 was partly the result of an unpopular ruling by Tenant McNeill on the boundary between the Habbania and Masalit in Southern Darfur; the Malwal Dinka rebellion of 1920 was also believed to be the result of setting the inter-provincial boundary between Dinka and Rizeigat in a way overly favourable to Rizeigat claims.

It was particularly notable that officials in Darfur sometimes stressed the merits of maintaining or creating buffer zones between different groups in the province, rather than creating fixed lines of separation. One official complained in 1925 that his predecessor had been directly responsible for increasing tensions along the Fur-Masalit boundary in Western Darfur by imposing a fixed boundary between them: before this (and in line with much of what is said about pre-colonial boundaries) a

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9 Nightingale, DC SDD, Note on Fujagh inter-district meeting, 4 Oct. 1938, NRO Darfur 7/3/10.

10 'Narrative of proceedings: NDD and EDD district boundary', 1938, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/5/27.

buffer zone of uninhabited country had separated the two peoples. Now, the two groups faced one another across the Wadi Azum, a key water resource, and the risk of conflict was heightened as a result. In contrast when officials delimited a boundary between Zayyadia and Berti in Eastern Darfur, an effort was made to keep belts of forest or 'uninhabited bush' between the tribes, in a conscious attempt to create an effective buffer zone between them.[11] Lines of hills were often preferred as boundaries to *wadis*, particularly when around them there was 'a good margin of useless and uninhabited country on either side.'[12]

Nonetheless, the colonial state often did construct lines of separation between peoples, and between different colonial jurisdictions. But officials were also often keenly aware of the obstacles to creating effective boundaries, regardless of their preferences for more or less rigid lines of separation. The absence of 'natural' (or physical) features along some district boundaries made demarcation an awkward enterprise. And 'natural' boundaries were often far from 'natural' lines of division. *Wadis* (such as the Wadi Azum mentioned above) were notoriously bad boundaries as 'villagers tend to cultivate both sides of a *wadi*. This involves difficulties in collecting cultivation and other dues.' [13]

Aside from these environmental obstacles, the confusing and contradictory interpretations of 'historical' boundaries given to officials by local elites often caused a considerable amount of confusion. Local leaders took the initiative to claim as much territory as possible, exploiting the ignorance of colonial officials. Sometimes there were well understood existing boundaries to be described to officials: in one section of the Zalingei-Dar Masalit border two Fur chiefs, a Daju chief and a Masalit chief all knew the boundary

> 'runs from an unnamed genewid near Rigl Tangalgei to some high stony ground known as Mura Fuka; thence straight to Hillet Balla near to which it makes a turn northward to a large mahogany tree on Jebel Noyei; thence to Get Nyergei; and thence to the spur of Jebel Achamara which comes close down to Wadi Azum.'

This was detailed consensual knowledge of the boundary's course. However this was far from a universal experience. History indeed might not help at all: on the Fur-Masalit boundary, the relatively recent construction of the Masalit sultanate meant 'the Fur were debarred from putting forward claims of pre-Mahdiyya date, because these claims, if admitted and pressed to their logical conclusion, would involve the suppression of the Masalit Sultanate altogether.' Recent patterns of district taxation were instead taken as the best indicator for the running of the boundary, set by the Resident of Dar Masalit, and seen by the Fur for years afterwards as an open Masalit land grab. Dinka-Rizeigat historical claims on Darfur's southern border with the Bahr el Ghazal were particularly complex. At a 1924 meeting to settle the boundary

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[11] Narrative of proceedings, NDD-EDD district boundary, 1938, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/5/27.

[12] Assistant Resident Dar Masalit report on Darfur-Dar Masalit boundary, 2 Apr. 1932, NRO Darfur, Dar Masalit 6/1/1.

[13] Assistant Resident Dar Masalit report on Darfur-Dar Masalit boundary, 2 Apr. 1932, NRO Darfur, Dar Masalit 6/1/1.

between the two groups, both Dinka and Rizeigat produced 'odd individuals who were indistinguishable from the Arab or Dinka people of their adoption, who claimed to be Shatts and the only true owners of the river.' Dinka and Rizeigat presumably both had memories of the river belonging to neither of them, but to another group altogether. This had no salience with the colonial officials however. Both groups then claimed rights of conquest, each claiming rights to land 'up to their furthest penetration, which occurred with the Dinkas when the Rizeigat were being hunted by the Khalifa, and at a later period with the Arabs, when Dinka tribal conditions were disorganised by the government post at Nyamlell and Arab slave raids.' In the end, the government's closeness to the Rizeigat leadership resulted in a compromise that favoured the Rizeigat.[14]

Multiple claims to land had to be sifted through by officials who then imposed relatively arbitrary boundaries on local peoples, often dependent on the strength of local patron-client relations with chieftaincy elites. But where these were imposed, they did not always become fixed or immutable lines of separation between peoples or administrations. Boundary demarcations were often partial and incomplete. Sometimes local disputes might be resolved at one particular section of a district or *dar* boundary, only for another dispute to emerge at another undemarcated section of the line. Moreover, officials might make multiple rulings on boundaries over time, one sometimes contradicting another. At one dispute officials saw 'both sides dive into pockets and bring out carefully folded papers,' which contained earlier colonial rulings on the boundary,. None of these rulings however covered the territory which had come under dispute.[15] Boundaries, and their local significance, were also affected or challenged by environmental or economic change: the growth of the gum tapping industry in eastern Darfur led to the reappraisal of earlier border settlements.[16]

Interestingly, chiefs were sometimes more eager for the boundaries of their territories to be demarcated than were colonial officials, often pushing officials into action. Officials often asserted that boundary conflicts between groups were in fact often driven by chiefs who were concerned with the assertion of their rights to collect 'customary' dues in these contested territories. Chiefs, for their part, asserted that where demarcation was clear, disputes were non-existent.[17] At times they demanded that officials find copies of earlier government-brokered boundary agreements in areas under dispute: one demanded that his DC give each rival 'a sketch in his hand showing his boundaries.'[18] The phrasing suggests both the importance of close personal contact between officials and chiefs in quelling disputes, but also the desire for something close to a 'map' to visibly represent the border in an authoritative manner. The logic of the map was thus appropriated by local elites. Chiefs might also find it useful to let outsiders make the ultimate decisions over the course of a boundary. One official noted of a boundary demarcation between Northern and

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[14] Stubbs, ADC Northern Bahr el Ghazal, 'Notes on Rizeigat Arabs - Malwal Dinka dispute', c.1930, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 8/1/2.

[15] Note on Tissoma-Burush boundary disputw

[16] DC Central and Eastern District Darfur, note on 'Boundary between Simeiat and Mellit districts.'(n.d. c. Jan 1930), NRO 2.D.fasher (A) 8/1/5.

[17] Nightingale, DC SDD, Note on Fujagh inter-district meeting, 4 Oct. 1938, NRO Darfur 7/3/10.

[18] President of Mellit Court to DC NDD, 30 Nov. 1936, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 8/1/5.

Eastern Darfur that it was obvious that the chiefs 'preferred the DCs to find the line, while they discussed the issues with the interested parties at the night halts.'[19]

Confinement and migration

Evidence from the colonial archive therefore suggests that the image of the colonial state as a powerful imposer of boundaries between its various subject groups captures fairly little of the complex, negotiated realities of border politics within Darfur. Similarly, attempts to control movement between *dars*, districts and states (in the case of the border with French Equatorial Africa) had limited success. Colonial boundary setting was also about confinement: about keeping peoples within known boundaries, where they were known, controlled and taxed by their 'proper' chiefs. But projects of confinement often splintered along the lines of inter or intra state rivalries or indifference, as well as because of local resistance. This was particularly the case along the border with FEA where French officials desperately tried to control large scale movements of people eastwards into Sudan, pulled by economic incentives or pushed by oppressive administration.

Those whom we would term refugees were termed by the French to be 'transfugees', translated as defectors, deserters or renegades.[20] But British officials were often ready to accept the testimony of migrants escaping abuse: one wrote in 1924 that 'knowing the fate of any returned fugitive I cannot in common humanity return them'.[21] His predecessor had also stopped returning migrants 'after one of them had been literally run to death by his French escort.'[22] But quite apart from any 'humanitarian' reasons that troubled the consciences of officials, it was also the case that it was exceedingly difficult on a practical level to locate, identify and then control the return of migrants. Attempts to collect migrants by officials and police often foundered on the obstacles posed by the landscape itself: the country near the border with Zalingei was 'all long grass and cut up by wadis in all directions affording innumerable hiding places.'[23] Even if they could be identified, migrants often escaped the villages they were based in before the arrival of British police or officials. Sometimes, the host community the migrants settled in acted to protect them against their pursuers, using the language of territorial sovereignty against colonial power. One chief in Darfur stated that French officers were 'in Sudan territory without right' and beat his war drums to summon men to resist French troops. The French performed a rapid volte-face.[24] And even after migrants were captured, they often broke away from police control during the process of being 'returned.'[25] Most discomforting of all to colonial states that

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19 Narrative of proceedings, NDD and EDD district boundary, 1938, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/5/27.

20 See file titles in series NRO Darfur 3/1.

21 Pollen, Resident Dar Masalit to Governor Darfur, 23 July 1924, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 59/1/2.

22 Governor Darfur note on Pollen correspondence, 8 Sept. 1924, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 59/1/2.

23 Grigg, Resident Zalingei to Governor Darfur, 1 Jan. 1929, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 59/3/8.

24 Evans, Resident Dar Masalit to Governor Darfur, 27 Aug 1928, NRO Darfur 3/1/5.

25 DPMD January 1931, NRO Darfur 1/26/41.

constantly worked to acquire reliable 'knowledge' of their subjects, of their identities and communities, it was clear that the fluidity of ethnic identities in the borderland made the process of identification itself extremely difficult. Arabs who crossed from FEA to Darfur were particularly difficult to repatriate as they were 'widely scattered, and tend on crossing the boundary to become absorbed by local Arabs, upon which they change both their name and tribe.'[26] Officials were sometimes painfully aware of the complexities of ethnic identities in the borderlands: Guy Moore, the DC of Northern Darfur in the early 1940s referred to the 'myth of Bedayet and Zaghawa distinction.'[27] Writing about the difficulties of repatriating migrants he argued that it was impossible for chiefs to 'pick out and expelling people of their own flesh and blood who had formerly lived with them under the same rule.'[28] This ethnic complexity also meant that quite apart from those seeking refuge from a predatory state, there were also a large number of migrants who simply moved across the border to reconnect with family across the boundary. This sort of movement was equally difficult to police, and posed its own problems for effective tax listing and collection.[29]

The difficulties of imposing control over population movement often led British officials to adopt a *laisser-faire* approach to control of their border. The most relaxed approach to border control was that taken by Guy Moore, one of Darfur's most 'domesticated' state agents. He agreed with his French counterpart in 1944 that 'the necessity of driving (the Zaghawa and Bedayet) to one side or another of the frontier (should) be avoided leaving them to come and go on their lawful occasions as seasons, economics and family affairs directed.'[30] The Zaghawa and Bedyaet were mobile pastoralist populations: it would be impossible to prevent such movement in any case, to some extent determined by the changing availability of grazing grounds and patterns of seasonal migration. But even officials who started out with the intention of rigorously controlling population movement among 'sedentary' peoples soon caved in. Philip Broadbent, a Resident of Dar Masalit in the early 1930s started out by trying to ensure that anybody found in Dar Masalit without a French pass was sent back to Tchad. But by 1933 he wrote to irate French officials that 'after three years of tedious work of chasing refugees I have taken a well earned holiday.' He had also modified his view of migration by then: thousands were bound to cross the border each year, Adre and Geneina were after all 'economic centres for both grain and labour and sale of cattle.'[31] With such volumes of movement, much of it on 'legitimate' grounds of commerce, it was impossible to control the border with limited resource. And of course, migrants often did provide a very useful source of labour and potentially tax revenue.

Making and preventing conflict

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[26] DPMD September 1931, TNA FO 867/24. Also see Asiwaju, *Western Yorubaland*, p.147.

[27] Moore to Governor Darfur, 18 May 1944, TNA FO 867/24.

[28] Moore, DC NDD to Governor 18 May 1944, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 59/3/9.

[29] Broadbent, Resident Dar Masalit to Governor, 18 Aug. 1931, NRO Darfur 3/1/5.

[30] Moore, DC NDD to Governor 18 May 1944, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 59/3/9.

[31] Broadbent, Resident Dar Masalit to Chef Dar Sila, 1 Apr. 1933, NRO Darfur 3/1/5.

Officials also struggled to control movement across district boundaries within Darfur: colonial knowledge of those who were 'unauthorised' migrants was too limited to be particularly effective. Mobile populations, particularly the Northern Rizeigat camel nomads, constantly defied colonial attempts to confine them in one *dar*. In the present day, the absence of a *dar* for an ethnic group is read as implying the marginalisation of these groups from the state: in the colonial period, escaping the confines of a *dar* was part of resisting the control of the state. But alongside efforts to confine went other policies which recognised the fact of movement across boundaries (especially the seasonal movements of some pastoralists) while making greater efforts at regulating and managing inter-ethnic relations, particularly as regards shared access to natural resources. Unsurprisingly, areas of shared resources were also flashpoints of potential conflict, and officials intervened in various ways to attempt to regulate the relationships between different ethnic groups in these areas: the creation of grazing systems in areas of shared access to natural resources was one, the arrangement of 'inter-tribal' gatherings another. Local officials, however, remained uncertain as to whether their interventions restricted or encouraged border conflict. One frequent concern aired by officials at district and provincial level was that local officials were biased in disputes towards the peoples they governed, and that these biases were used by local populations to increase the force and extent of their demands. This returns us to the introduction to this piece, which emphasized the malleability of officials when faced with claims to land or resources made by their subjects. Others though, particularly in the face of what they saw as unchanging, immutable inter-ethnic 'incompatibility' believed that state intervention was crucial in restraining the 'natural' tendencies of rival groups towards violence. This tension in colonial thinking remained unresolved, perhaps even up to present day conflict resolution discourse in Darfur.

In one case, state policy indeed directly engendered a violent confrontation. Hugh Boustead, DC of Zalingei in Western Darfur, had imposed local orders in Zalingei in 1938 banning the cutting of trees in cultivated areas: Fur *shartais* and *dimligs* (chiefs and sub-chiefs) were responsible for the enforcement of these orders, fining all offenders. However Boustead and his chiefs expressed frustration that 'offenders' in the border zone with Dar Masalit, the neighbouring district, had been firing the countryside and burning trees, and then simply moved their houses across the district boundary. They thereby put themselves beyond the reach of the Fur chiefs, even while retaining their cultivations in Zalingei. One *demlig* complained that he could literally see forty-five of his people across the boundary just ten minutes away by foot. Zalingei chiefs now moved, with Boustead's encouragement, to eject these 'offenders' from their cultivations in Zalingei, and to assess tax in the border zone, including amongst Masalit cultivators who were farming across what was perceived to be the boundary. After a four day stand-off across the border provoked by this initiative, an open affray exploded in which two Fur *demligs* were killed and eighteen men suffered knife or spear wounds. The fight was only stopped by the readiness of Zalingei police to open fire on the Masalit, wounding three more men in the process. Here the state had tried to assert its authority in a contested border zone, also supporting the rights of one group over another, and in so doing had sparked the very conflict it was meant to avoid. Rather than engendering a 'Pax Brittanica', officials could also produce conflict. Similar patterns of violence can be seen across the border between Darfur and Chad: at various times, particularly in the 1920s, the French

colonial state gave unofficial sanction for its chiefs to pursue migrants as they crossed the border, sometimes resulting in relatively large numbers of casualties and deaths.

But of all Darfur's boundaries, that which attracted most official attention was between the Rizeigat and Dinka in the south east of Darfur. Officials across a provincial dividing line struggled with one another in efforts to prove their individual potency to their subjects. Unlike all Darfur's other boundaries, its borders with the south, particularly by the end of the 1920s, were seen to be a key cultural fault line between Northern, predominantly Arab, Sudan, and the south, which was to be preserved against contact with Arab, Muslim culture, and indeed modernity more generally, at all costs. Southern policy to some extent reflected British understandings of interaction between north and south Sudan as involving a history of violence, exploitation and slavery, with southerners as the victims in this narrative of misery. Collins's work shows how until the 1920s, when the Bahr el Ghazal administration became more serious about administering the Northern District, relations between the Rizeigat and Dinka indeed remained wracked by violence.[32] Darfuri elites in the colonial period often labelled southerners, and even non-Arab groups in Darfur, as slaves (*abid*), and the practice of slavery had of course been far from eradicated. Managing the border between Rizeigat and Dinka was not just a matter of keeping cultures separate, but also, for the officials of Southern Sudan in particular, of preventing further enslavement of southerners by Arabs. This of course resonates into more recent history, particularly the experience of the late 1980s when Rizeigat Arabs were mobilised by the Khartoum government to carry out attacks and raids on their southern neighbours, as a proxy of Sudan's larger civil war. But the policy also underplayed the very real links between Arab and non-Arab cultures along the north-south border.

The key practical issue around Rizeigat-Dinka relations from the 1920s was to determine how the two groups should share access to grazing and watering points. The colonial government in 1924 recognised Rizeigat claims that the boundary of their *dar* lay fourteen miles south of the Bahr el Arab, a major watering resource. This was a claim intensely disputed by the Dinka after the settlement had been made, but it nonetheless remained the official boundary throughout the colonial period. Dinka rights of fishing and grazing up to the south bank of the river were therefore secondary rights, as compared to the primary rights of the Rizeigat, which extended all the way south to the dar boundary. Essentially therefore, the river, its southern bank, and the land fourteen miles to the south was all a shared resource: one big frontier zone. However, even on its own terms, this was hardly an easy arrangement to enforce. One DC described the geographical complications: 'the Dinka are as often south as north of [the river] in the summer. In its many windings it is often difficult to say whether one has camped north or south of it.'[33] And the creation of a fixed and distinct boundary between the Dinka and the Rizeigat was more of a priority for the southern administration, who remained protective of 'their' Dinka subjects against Rizeigat depredations, and tough on the enforcement of 'southern policy', than it was for officials from Darfur, who frequently took a more relaxed approach to the question of movement and interaction. This was a boundary where the fractured nature of the colonial state in Sudan became most obvious: officials on either side

[32] Collins, *Land*, pp.185-190.
[33] Lampen memoirs, SAD 734/10/136.

were frequently vehemently opposed to one another, wishing to project the image of an effective patron/protector to their subjects, and 'bias' on each side was a matter for frequent complaint.

Tensions were particularly high in the early 1930s when repeated drought drove Rizeigat and Dinka in greater numbers to the Bahr el Arab, and the Dinka complained to their DC about increasing numbers of forced or unauthorized marriages between Rizeigat men and Dinka women. The DC of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Stubbs, made increasingly explicit noises about a continuing trade in Dinka slaves, which the Governor of Darfur grumbled 'might be taken as a serious reflection on the administration of Southern Darfur District.' Meanwhile, the DC of Southern Darfur confessed privately that 'I felt from my Arab associations some of the Baggara prejudice against these people as barbarians confronting the fringe of the civilized world.'[34] This was not just Baggara prejudice of course: it also fitted neatly with British imaginings of racial hierarchy. But the closeness of Ibrahim Musa, *nazir* of the Rizeigat to the officials of Darfur meant that insisting on the protection of Rizeigat interests on the river was a default position for administrators. The next DC of Southern Darfur, Crawford, wrote a blistering attack on the Bahr el Ghazal administration in 1932, which also revealed significant anti-Dinka prejudice. Crawford was skeptical of good relations evolving between the two groups, partly because of irreconcilable inter-group prejudice: 'The Arab still considers the Dinka as an inferior being.' But it had also to do with the attitudes of southern provincial administration. In Crawford's view, Stubbs had mistakenly treated the Dinka as 'a civilised and disciplined race and have trusted them further than from their behaviour on the river seems wise.'[35] Crawford went so far as to claim that a rising tide of what he labeled 'Dinka nationalism' had coincided with Stubbs's arrival. The Dinka had been made to feel 'sure of a government to champion their claims' and 'really believe that all boundaries have been washed out.' In Crawford's view 'their insolence is almost incredible.' And while Stubbs supported Dinka rights on the river to the hilt, for officials in Southern Darfur the river was a 'joke.' More input was needed from the Darfur side. Indeed, both peoples had to be made to see (in the familiar refrain) 'there is only one Government whose aim is law and order.'

Responding to this open the Governor of Bahr el Ghazal defended Stubbs as an 'unbiased' official, with an 'intimate knowledge of the Dinka, their language, customs and mentality, and the requirements of their administration.'[36] But the question remained: did 'intimate knowledge' at some point tip into a threat against the unity and 'prestige' of the colonial state, when affective ties to the colonised overwhelmed the imperatives of colonial government? Arkell, when acting as Governor of Darfur, wrote to the Civil Secretary that all tribes had to see that 'any old ideas as to the relative merits of blacks and Arabs are out of date, but that both tribes are equally subject of a Government which insists that black and Arab shall live together in unity.'[37] The desperate repetition of this theme exposes how thinly the veneer of the

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[34] Lampen memoirs, SAD 735/1/50.

[35] Crawford, DC SDD memo, 19 Apr. 1933, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/2/9.

[36] Brock, Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 20 July 1933, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/2/9.

[37] Arkell, Acting Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, 12 Aug. 1933, NRO 2.D.Fasher (A) 54/2/9.

impartial state lay over the imperatives of local politics, and the deeply racialised imaginations of colonial officials.

In 1935 an inter-provincial meeting agreed a framework for setting out defined areas for grazing on the south side of the Bahr el Arab, providing each side with some exclusive space, and the rest of the territory being labeled as common grazing. But despite the detailed and precise nature of the arrangements made, it is striking that by 1941, DCs on either side of the province boundary both made it clear they were in favour of 'slackening the strict application of the 1935 Agreement, except when complaints are received which cannot be settled by the tribes without our intervention.'[38] This was really recognition of the impossibility of enforcing the elaborate system the state had created: it was also a moment when officials leaned away from an interventionist role and towards the idea of relationships between Rizeigat and Dinka being essentially self-regulating. A more extended report by a Darfur official in 1948 after he toured the river stated that 'one gets the impression that the various agreements... made by DCs... are disregarded, and to a great extent unknown by both Rizeigat and Dinka.' The various areas established in the 1935 agreement were clearly not being adhered to, and a Dinka *wot* (camp) had been established in a reserved Arab area for the last five years with the acceptance of the Rizeigat *wakil* on the river. In normal years

> both tribes move about and graze their cattle in the area south of the river as they have done for generations, respecting each others' well-known *ferigs* and *wots* and altering their arrangements by temporary agreements to suit the season and the flow of the river - irrespective of what may have been decided at past meetings.[39]

This was seen to be a 'wholly desirable' state of affairs, and the ADC believed any threat to public security 'has been exaggerated in the past by DCs on both sides.' The important thing was for inter-province meetings to continue: and the Rizeigat *wakil* himself proposed an annual trek between him and the Dinka chiefs around the river to agree on the division of grazing and point it out to one another and their subjects. It seems as though chiefs had internalised some of the colonial logics of 'touring' and 'pointing out' territory. Ibrahim Musa had also agreed that the Rizeigat would accept the jurisdiction of Dinka chiefs' courts for any offences they committed in Equatoria.[40] The ADC concluded that

> DCs have been too prone to range themselves on the side of their respective tribes, their work has too often been tinged with partiality and some of their arguments make strange reading. It has too often been forgotten that officials on both sides serve the same government.[41]

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[38] Note on conversation between DC SDD and DC Aweil, 9 May 1941, NRO Darfur 7/2/7.

[39] ADC Baggara trek report, 2 -6 Mar. 1948, NRO Darfur 7/2/7.

[40] Governor Darfur to Deputy Govvernor Bahr el Ghazal, 4 July 1946, NRO Darfur 7/2/7.

[41] ADC Baggara trek report, 2 -6 Mar. 1948, NRO Darfur 7/2/7.

Conclusion

Colonial experiments with boundary making sometimes contributed to the growth of inter-group tensions, and official 'bias' was a prominent explanation for both high levels of tension, and sometimes even for setting off conflict. The state, both in boundary-making enterprises, and in managing inter-group relationships, was operating with a severe knowledge deficit. Officials were frequently used by local elites to represent their versions of local histories and their own immediate interests to outsiders with different interests. When the governors of different provinces clashed over basic issues of administrative policy, we can see how local elites on the ground could send shockwaves upwards through the colonial state's bureaucratic apparatus. Chiefs made claims to protection and patronage that officials, craving legitimacy, and perhaps desiring to be seen as good chiefs, were often unable to ignore. The colonial state's strength in resolving disputes was meant to come from its distance from society: an outsider can arbitrate disputes more effectively than an insider. But where parallel administrative structures became involved in local disputes, the definition of an insider was stretched, all the way to the top of provincial administration.

This also suggests that the idea that the present-day local state is hopelessly politicised, and cannot serve as an effective mediator of disputes, is not an altogether new phenomenon. The colonial state was not so removed from society, or the concerns and prejudices of its subjects, as it wished to suggest to local actors. The performance of a united front was all-important, but chiefs knew that the performance masked a more powerful set of anxieties related to the local state's capacity for effective governance, at the level of the psychology of the individual official. Whether or not officials believed they played a constructive or destructive role, they were inevitably drawn into border conflicts and disputes. They were also always instrumental in the resolution of these disputes. But away from the episodes of tension and drama, it was also the case that the limits of the state's authority over its subjects were relatively clear. In this sense, Mamdani's argument about the importance of the colonial construction of bounded ethnic homelands in creating the patterns of present-day conflict, misses the point that colonial boundaries were simply not observed by Africans. Attempts at confinement were limited in impact, and could not prevent migration. And local elites were very much capable of managing the interactions of their people on an everyday level, management which did not involve respecting the details of colonially brokered agreements. So it was the varied tugs upwards and downwards along the vertical ties between officials, local elites and ordinary subjects, the ongoing negotiations inherent in the dynamics of colonial rule, that produced both tension, occasional conflict and, more often, the 'Pax Brittanica'. It also marked the production of the colonial state at its margins.

"Up to now it's the cows killing people" Southern perspectives on the north-south borderline in the last year of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's interim period in Sudan

Paper for ABORNE Summer school, Thürnau 26 – 30 July 2010

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Introduction

"[A]ll that needs to be done by anybody who wants to know the boundaries between the Southern Region, is to consult the official map of administrative boundaries in force on 1.1.56. Any map of boundaries between the Southern Region and the North made subsequent to 1.1.56 must and should conform with the boundaries of 1st January, 1956."[2]

This quote was part of a reaction of Abel Alier to the new map made after the discovery of oil in mainly the South. The new Sudanese map re-aligned most of these resources as part of Nothern Sudan. (Y. Wawa 2005 p. 272)

This statement was made in 1980 and things have not turned out as easy as Abel Alier suggested back then. Till today the demarcation of the border between the north and the south is a big problem mainly because the north seeks reasons to confuse the process and

[1] The material for this paper was collected during a three-week fieldtrip – 20th February till 12th March 2010 - as a team member of the British peace building NGO Concordis-International. Aim was to assess the situation along the north-south borderline for their Cross-Border Relations Project. Places visited were Unity State (Abiemnom, Rubkona, Mayom and Pariang County), Upper Nile State (Malakal, Renk, Manyo County) and the Abyei Area. The opinions and errors in this article are entirely my own and do not reflect in any way the position or view of the organisation. In the paper I will refer to Concordis International as the NGO and to the cross border relations project as the project.

[2] Abel Alier's address to the Southern citizens in Southern Sudan Magazine, December 1980. Published in Y. Wawa (2005), p. 273. Abel Alier was the President of the High Executive Council, which was the administration of the Southern Region under the Addis Ababa agreement

does not to accept the border as it was at the 1st January 1956. Already right after the discovery of oil, the debate about the border started. Back then the SPLA war had not yet started and the Southern pursuit for self-determination was not yet equal to the current referendum for an independent Southern Sudan.

This referendum, planned in January 2011, is the last milestone of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) through the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). There is a great chance that Southerners will vote for independence and as a consequence the current administrative line dividing northern and southern Sudan might become a new international border between two sovereign countries sharing a history of more than 4 decades of fighting[3].

This paper explores the impact and meaning of this 'border' in the eyes of the people living on the southern side of this imaginary line. I will put those local notions of borders in perspective with the interest of the two political centres in Sudan; Juba and Khartoum. The role of the international community in working with Sudanese partners on issues regarding the borderline will lastly be discussed. Aim of the paper is to show that the people living at the border and those who work there do not necessarily understand the notion of the border or analyse the situation in the same way. The setting of is provided by a trip made by one of the NGOs focussing on the North-South borderline.



Map of the north-south border States. Source; International travel maps, Sudan 2009. Picture taken of part of the map

[3] 'The North' comprises of 15 States and has Khartoum as its capital. On the other side lies what is currently referred to as the semi-autonomous area of Southern Sudan, comprising of 10 States, governed by the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Its capital is Juba.

Attempts to Focus

In February 2010 a team of three people working for a Britisch NGO arrived in Unity State, the oil State of Southern Sudan, before proceeding to Abyei and Upper Nile[4]. The team was on a three-week assessment mission to document issues related to the North-South borderline to feed in the organisations project on cross border relations. This project aims at contributing to a process ensuring cooperative, secure and economically viable relations across Sudan's North-South border. In practice this means a series of regional cross border workshops and conferences in all border States bringing together all stakeholders[5].

In order to gain insight in what people are facing regarding the border at the eve of the referendum, this NGO went to the some of the Counties bordering 'the North" to visit Commissioners, traditional authorities and community organisations to discuss their ideas and concerns with regards to the border. In the introduction of the project, it was explained that the focus of was only on the North-South borderline. Despite this precision in the beginning, it was rare that this element did not need further emphasis during the conversation because people started to explain their problems with neighbouring communities. After a few meetings the introduction became even more focused, sometimes going as far as, in the beginning of the interview, stating that the organisation realizes that 'people possibly face more problems relating to other borders but that unfortunately the focus of this project was on the north-south borderline'.

This reveals a few important matters of different nature. The first and most interesting one is, why this precision needs so much extra emphasis? In other words, which things people do associate with the border? Secondly the types of answers once the interviewees reconfigured their answers. They can be divided into answers related to what can be

[4] The author was part of the Concordis-International team comprising of a British colleague, a Sudanese colleague and a lecturer from Juba University who joined for a few days.
[5] See for details about the organisation and the Cross Border Relations Project: www.concordis-international.org (website visited on 14-7-2010)

understood as (potentially disturbed) relations between *communities* and secondly to those related to the *current de-facto borderline currently* and where it is *supposed to be*.

Setting the scene

Before answering the questions raised above, a picture of the areas visited is needed. These were all lying on southern side of the border[6]. Although quite some of the issues at stake are similar along the stretch of land, there are also differences in dynamics along this line. This paper focuses on Unity and Upper Nile state in Southern Sudan. Both States are part of what is called Greater Upper Nile[7]. Unity State, the most oil rich state in the south with its capital Bentiu, became a State by itself during the administrative reshuffle of 1994.

Unity and Upper Nile state both share a long border with the Northern States of South Kordofan, White Nile, Blue Nile and Sennar. The two Southern States are inhabited by the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk, and a minority of Maban farmers in Maban County, bordering Blue Nile. The Northern States are mainly inhabited by a range of Arab descendant groups (Baggara), mainly the Messiriya. The history of fighting during the 1983-2005 has varied over time and place and took place against the background of oil discovery, factional and sometimes tribal fighting and support by regime in Khartoum to who-ever interested[8].

The actual borderline cannot be visited; the military presence is heavy and in some of the areas even the UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) is denied access. Along the north-south borderline there are rumours of heavy military build up, especially in the areas with oil. There are many military checkpoints, and generally they will let travellers pass after having checked where you're coming from and where you're going. The quality of the roads is relatively good compared to the rest of the South due to the presence of the oil

[6] Travelling to 'the north', or rather, leaving the territory of Southern Sudan is for many internationals not possible because they do not have an official visa for the whole country but instead a 'travel permit' provided by the GoSS and valid throughout southern territory.

[7] Southern Sudan is often divided in three main regions; Greater Equatoria for the southern part of the country, bordering Kenya, Uganda, DR Congo and CAR; Greater Bahr El Ghazal bordering the CAR and to the north Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan. The highly disputed area of Abyei is divided in Southern Kordofan and Bahr El Ghazal. The third region is Greater Upper Nile. The material for this paper was mostly collected in what is called the Upper Nile region.

[8] The support to militias within the South was not exclusive for Unity and Upper Nile States but a bit more prevalent then in other areas in the South. See for example D. Johnson 2003 and 1998 and J. Young 2003.

companies who build those roads for their own transport and as compensation to the communities. This is especially the case in Unity State where the oil fields are quite wide spread. In Upper Nile the situation is different; oil is concentrated in Melut County[9] but roads in the rest of the States are quite poor.

The borderland of Unity State is inhabited by cattle keepers who cultivate sorghum and millet during the rainy season. The land is extremely flat and empty with occasional villages. On a yearly basis, in the dry season between October to May, people from communities in the North migrate to the lands of Unity State to look for water and grazing land for their cattle. This migration has a long history and is seen by the local Chiefs as an accepted and understandable practice by their 'Arab brothers'. There is an equally long history of trouble associated to the return of the Messiriya when the rains start in May. They will attempt to steel cattle to take with them on their way back, because their dependency on the resources in the South is temporarily over. Upper Nile also welcomes Baggara and Messiriya during the dry season but most of them migrate much lower south of Malakal[10].

In terms of trade, Bentiu and Unity State in general does not seem to be very important. The trade routs from the north to the south seem to pass via Kadugli in Southern Kordofan via Abyei area in the direction of Bahr El Ghazal and to the east via Renk for the supply of Malakal and beyond. Renk County is the most northern County of Upper Nile. It borders the North, and from Renk it takes a 4 hour drive on a tarmac road to Khartoum. This compared to a 7 hour drive over a dirt road in bad condition to Malakal, the State Capital. The majority of the people is Muslim and the main tribe is Dinka although all other tribes of Upper Nile are also present in the town. The people and authorities in Renk consider themselves as an SPLM stronghold and strongly support secession. Despite this the atmosphere feels more 'Arabized' than any other place visited in the South. This might be due to the many northern traders in town, the Islam as most

[9] Melut county does not border the North directly. Passing the oil area in Melut on the way between Malakal and Renk you'll cross a high quality new tarmac road that is not open for public use.
[10] The team did not visit the areas welcoming northern cattle keepers.

important religion and long standing relationships with the northerners living in town and those bringing in cattle on a seasonal basis[11].

Generally, along the borderline in both Unity and Upper Nile, there is a long history of cohabitation including certain codes of conduct between communities on different sides of the border. These codes and old habits of cohabitation are however under pressure. The relationship with northerners is seen as problematic, but is certainly not the only complex relationship people are dealing with.

The border as community

As explained earlier, the organisation sought to concentrate the conversations and interviews with people on the North South borderline had to put a lot of emphasis on this because only in a few cases they started talking about the north south border as their first 'border concern'. The concerns of the border communities are by far not exclusively related to this yet to become border alone. In most of the cases the interviewees started referring to the latest fighting they've been facing, not necessarily related to the north. While discussing their border problems and references to fights and clashes, one element turned out to be of particularly relevance; the border in the minds of the people is the community.

If there is trouble in daily life of people, it often derives from conflicts between communities. This is demonstrated in the first reactions to the project during the interviews:

- "We are a county full of borders" says the Commissioner of Abiemnom County in Unity State in Southern Sudan. "We have our problems with the Nuer in Mayom County; to the west we meet Warrap State and to the north we border Abyei." (Visited 24/2/2010)
- "The border that is in our mind is the border of Warrap State, we have a lot of problems there" say the chiefs of Mankien in Mayom County. (Visited on 25/2/2010)

[11] During the one day meeting organised by the NGO there were one Messiriya paramount and 3 sub chiefs present among about 30 southern chiefs from the rest of the county. (Renk 09-03-2010)

- “Here in Upper Nile we have a big problem between the Shilluk and Dinka; everybody knows that Malakal in the land of the Shilluk and yet there is conflict” says the Director of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission in Upper Nile State. (Visited on 3/3/2010)
- “Last year the Dinka came and killed 7 f our people and their cows ruin our crops”, explained a priest from Maban County in Malakal. (Meeting with Faith Leaders, 5/3/2010)

In many cases the causes of conflict are related to cattle raiding by, most often, youth, which is complicated by the fact that many of these communities seasonally migrate to greener pastures in search for grazing land and water.
These migrations can lead to conflict over scarce resources and cattle raids are an ever present threat for all. These migrating cattle keepers are not exclusively ‘Arab’ groups from ‘the north’. Especially during the dry season cattle moves in from Kordofan but there is additional movement within the south between Unity, Warrap and Bahr el Ghazal States.

The only real example heard during the visit that referred to the north-south border or maybe rather to northern community is one from Pariang County; “Up to now it’s the cows killing people” the people of Pariang County explained. “In 1984, Nimeiry (Sudanese president between ’69 – ’85 LdV) was arming Messiriya civilians who came and stole all cattle of the area in one month. Until today revenge has not been taken and local youth still legitimizes their raids by reclaiming their cattle.”[12]

Especially in the eyes of the chiefs and community organisations, it is clear that in the cattle raiding is contributing to mutual mistrust and tense relationships between communities. Seen from the cattle keepers perspective, the communities in the north are no exception. During the discussions however, especially when focussing on the north

[12] This massive loss of cattle became the reason why the people of Pariang County went to Ethiopia and joined the SPLA. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M had just started his movement and was mobilizing people from all over the country. The Pariang people were told that in Ethiopia they could get a gun which they could use to take revenge. Instead, they were lured into training and send to go and fight. Douglas Johnson (2005) describes similar stories of people leaving Ethiopia thinking they could get a free gun to take home and settle their local issues.

south borderline, the relationship with 'the north' turned out to be somewhat more complex. They've been increasingly violent over the past years, according to some. They carry unnecessary amounts of guns on their way south, state others. They do not keep their promises, said many.

On the 4th February 2010, northerners came and attacked Abiemnom County without reason, not even taking cows. 39 people, including women and children, were killed. This attack definitely broke with the pattern of targeting cattle and conflict over resources. The 'codes' that used to exist between the communities was violated. Especially the Nuer Chiefs in Mankien, Mayom County, seemed genuinely surprised by this attack outside the common pattern. They used to know their neighbouring chiefs in the north and had longstanding relations. The loss of lives used to be compensated between the communities and despite the occasional violence, these rules used to be respected. This time the rupture with the old patterns was obvious and matter for concern and confusion.

Is it the cows killing the people?

Many areas in Southern Sudan have the pattern of youth raiding neighbouring communities for cattle. The remark that "up to now it's the cows killing the people" is still very true and accurate for a large number of incidences, especially in terms of conflict between Southern communities sharing internal County, State, tribal or clan 'borders'[13].

It seems however that in some cases, as shown in the different nature of the Abiemnom-attack last February for example, it is not just the cows, and the cattle raiding that is killing the people. It is a highly sensitive thing to suggest but could there be an interest by the regime in the north to heat up the smouldering fire of old grievances and mess up longstanding relations between communities along the north-south borderline? Cows, being ongoing source of potential dispute, are used as an 'instrument' by those coming from the north to start fighting. Or might it even be possible that some of these attacks

[13] Within the Southern Sudan, tribal clashes and cases of cattle raiding are often subject to rumours about support from 'the north'.

got nothing to do with cows? Are the chiefs of Mankien and others simply being 'naïve' in thinking that disputes related to those northern communities will have a cow-related reason?

The answer seems yes, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to paint a full picture of the Sudanese politics of divide and rule[14]. In this last year of the CPA however, it is interesting to see that southern chiefs and community leaders claim that communities from the north have always moved south and that they have the right to do so. As long as they respect the rules, leave their guns behind and chiefs are informed about their coming, they will always be welcome. Neither the requirements for bringing in cattle, nor the characteristics of the fighting and raiding is any different from their other neighbours.

The issue of leaving the arms at home is matter of ongoing debate. But one element is really important to the people of Abiemnom, Mayon, Pariang, Renk and Manyo; that is the acknowledgement by the northerners where their land used to be. Almost all people interviewed suggested that 'their brothers in the north' know where the border used to be. They used to be in regular contact with the traditional authorities on the other side, as is still the case in Renk and in Abyei. In Mayom they have not been in touch with their neighbours since one year but they used to know each other pretty well.
Although the Southerners were forced to move southwards during the wars, all people coming from the area – whether northerner or southern - still know where their lands used to be. Now however, 'they' claim that land from where the Nuer (originating from Kuak in current Southern Kordofan) and Dinka (originating from Kur Ayuel in current Sennar). In the case of Unity State has recently become worse, 'they' now even claim up to the river Kirr or Bahr El Arab[15]. The difficulty in discussing this issue was the 'they', it remained unclear who 'they' were, since it did not seem to be their neighbours.

[14] Please note that these are suggestions based on a few weeks of research combined with common sense and study of political plays in Sudan. Everything suggested in this paper, especially in this section, is matter for debate and a lot of further research.
[15] Along the Southern borderline people were complaining heavily how names of places have been changed from the original name to Arab names.

The issue of border demarcation and where their land used to be was not the issue the people interviewed started to refer to (Renk was an exception in this respect) but certainly was the issue provoking a lot of emotions and debate. The chiefs feel neglected in the border demarcation process. They have not been consulted once on where their lands and the 1.1.56 border used to be[16]. One chief in Renk summarised it as follows: "if you want to tell the truth; you better bring a stick to defend yourself." (Renk Chief meeting, 9/3/2010)

The international interest in 1.1.56

So why does the international community focus strictly on the 'one one five six', as it is casually referred to? As said in the introduction, the currently administrative divide between north and Southern Sudan will probably become an international border breaking the current sovereign Sudan into two smaller sovereign political spaces. In this last year of the CPA, donors and NGOs engaged in the support to the peace process, focus on the last milestone. If the South votes for independence in January 2010, the consequences will be numerous for both, north and southern Sudan.

The support to this process by the international community can be roughly divided by those interventions focussing on the technical side of breaking one political space into two and secondly by interventions on the consequences for the people if the South breaks away. On the technical side there are negotiations about general issues such as sharing of the national debt and questions related to citizenship. More specific for the border are issues of movement of persons and goods, access to grazing land and of course the demarcation process itself, which is inextricably bound up with the oil resources along the border line. The demarcation is also crucial for the delineation of who has the right to vote in the referendum[17]. These negotiations about the technicalities of the post-referendum arrangements take place in the weird reality of a supposedly unknown outcome. It is rather the donors within 'the international community' who support and

[16] Again beyond the scope of this paper but it would be interesting to have the 1.1.56 map and make a precise overview of where the lands are that the chiefs claim.

[17] The situation with regards to all of these issues is even more complex in the case of the disputed oil-rich area of Abyei, which for the moment has a separate administrative status directly under the presidency. A separate referendum has to take place in which the people of Abyei can decide on whether it will be part of Southern Kordofan and thus the north, or the South. This paper is not about Abyei.

contribute to these negotiations. This support is needed in order to ensure the last crucial step in the CPA and to help preventing a renewed conflict between the regime in the north and the SPLM. The issues related to the border and the demarcation are crucial.

The (I)NGOs often focus more on the softer side related to the referendum and therefore the north-south border. They concentrate the potential conflict side of a new border and work with communities on the sensitization and conflict prevention and resolution. As shown, most of the conflicts, especially the cattle and community related ones, are however not exclusive for the north-south relations but much more widespread and persistent among Southern communities in itself. These are the type of conflict where an intervention is imaginable for example by bringing together the different communities and organise reconciliation[18]. Facilitating people to meet one another creates trust. The problem however seems that in case of the north-south borderline and the build-up of mistrust from southern communities towards the north is not necessarily driven by these northern communities of Messiriya coming to graze their cattle in the south. In other words, the promotion of peace and reconciliation takes place between people who might not be the drivers of conflict. The drivers of conflict are those who have an interest in creating confusion among communities. In this respect, one of the things that have to kept in mind is that northern communities are in a way also victim just as their southern colleagues.

Concluding remark (unfinished)

Boundaries demarcate political space (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996) and thus access and entitlement to the resources present within that political space. This is the setting in which the ingredients of the north-south borderline should be read. The people living in the area have their own concerns and are victims of bigger political processes in which they are not involved.

[18] Pact Sudan is one of the organizations very active in this field, however only in the South. They don't have a cross border perspective.

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