LINES IN THE SAND AND PIXELS ON SCREENS
Boat migration and the making of a Euro-African border

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Thanks in large part to the phenomenon of clandestine migration, a Euro-African border is under construction at the southern edges of Europe. Vast amounts of money have been spent on radars, satellites, computer systems and patrols by sea, land and air to prevent migrants from leaving the African coastline. From the high seas of the Atlantic to Mediterranean beaches, from European control rooms to rundown West African borderposts, the building blocks of a new border regime are being put in place. But what is the nature of this regime, and how does it track its principal target, the "illegal immigrant"? This article will take an ethnographic look at the border controls instituted between West Africa and Spain in recent years, focusing on the materialities and transnational networks that have contributed to their efficacy. The Euro-African border under construction, it will be argued, is created and sustained through a double process of reification and diffusion where the metaphor of the sea hides and enables the extension of border practices through transnational terrains.[1]

Borders are potent zones of symbolic and political struggle over sovereignty. In academia, this very potency has contributed to the expansion and even inflation of the border concept (Donnan and Wilson 1999). Alvarez (1995:449) distinguishes between scholars approaching borders and borderlands "literally" and those favouring an "a-literal" approach of exploring the social boundaries around the border, while warning of the risks of extending the border concept uncritically and metaphorically (see also Pelkmans 1999). While the European Union's bordering processes are made more complex by the fact that its southern edges are traced through the high seas, making them subject to the sovereign claims and counter-claims that define maritime borders, it should still be clear that the Euro-African border is a "literal" not a metaphorical process. Donnan and Wilson (1999) define a border through three elements: the juridical borderline, the state agents who demarcate and sustain it and the "frontiers" or zones away from the border (cf Baud and van Schendel 1997) – three elements that are all present in the case of the emergent Euro-African border.

Questions of sovereignty are at the heart of the border regime. Donnan and Wilson (1999:1) have called borderlands "sites and symbols of power" and "markers

of sovereignty", but whose sovereignty is being symbolised at the southern edge of Europe? And where, exactly, is this power exercised? Malian migration activists recently asserted that the border of the EU had reached their country's sand-swept Mauritanian frontier, leading them to stage protests there. Is the Euro-African border such a line in the sands of the Sahara, or is it best captured by the pixels representing migrant boats on Spanish surveillance screens?

To take these questions seriously means charting what Guild (2008) calls the "migration of sovereignty" into African territory. This paper will do this, first, by looking at the clearest manifestation of such a "migration", the patrol boats navigating African coasts. Next, it will consider the discourses on which this borderwork hinges: the narrative and practice of humanitarianism and a complementary discourse centred on migrants-as-risk. Underpinning this discursive borderwork are the transnational networks that unite African and European policemen, which have grown quickly despite tensions around the sharing of resources, information and manpower. These networks are hardwired into technologies of surveillance that manifest themselves in the control centres in Las Palmas, Madrid, Dakar and Warsaw, and in the invisible webs of communication that spread from these centres in an emerging "virtual border" landscape. By unpicking these key components of Europe's border machinery – patrolling and command; humanitarianism; the risk discourse; the social networks; surveillance and information flows – we might get a glimpse of the elusive Euro-African border in relation to its principal target: the statistically minuscule but productive contemporary figure of the "illegal immigrant".

Joint Operation Hera: the birth of sea operations

The mass arrival of wooden fishing boats packed with migrants in the Canaries in 2005 and 2006 took Spain by surprise. But as the *crisis de los cayucos* ("boat crisis", as it became known) hit frontpages worldwide in 2006 and nearly 32,000 boat migrants arrived in the islands, Spanish authorities were quickly finding their feet. Spain's Socialist government scrambled for EU support, signed bilateral accords with Mauritania and Senegal, and soon launched unprecedented policing operations along African coasts. The Atlantic waters lapping against the Canaries would become the

laboratory for a "migration management" model soon to be exported across Europe's southern borders.

Key to this borderwork was Frontex, the recently created EU border control agency, which set up the "joint operation" Hera along Canarian and West African coasts on Spain's insistence. The goddess of marriage in Greek lore, Hera has achieved a perfect union between Spain, the EU and West African states. Hera I, launched in May 2006, brought experts to the Canaries to help identify the nationalities of detained migrants (Carrera 2007). Hera II, launched a month later, sent European patrol vessels to the Atlantic and the coasts of Senegal and Mauritania. For the first time, Spain, the EU and West African states were patrolling Europe's borders together.

Hera has pride of place in the Frontex pantheon and has generated widespread debate among policymakers and in academia. In the Frontex stock-taking booklet *Beyond the Frontier,* Hera is described as "pivotal in achieving success. Before Operation Hera everything was theory. But after Hera the way forward was clear… [it was] the birth of sea operations" (Frontex 2010:37). A brief look at the numbers shows why Hera proved so popular. Migrant arrivals in the Canaries fell from over 31,000 in 2006 to 2,200 in 2009. By 2010, the flow had virtually stopped. Moreover, none of the handful of recent arrivals were sub-Saharan Africans, and none had departed from Mauritania and Senegal, instead using the shorter route from Western Sahara to the eastern Canary Islands. The direct passage from West Africa to Europe had effectively been "closed".

The Hera deployment had been impressive. By the summer of 2006, Guardia Civil vessels patrolled first the Mauritanian and then the Senegalese coasts in alliance with their African colleagues; Frontex-funded and Spanish military planes circled the open Atlantic; and the rescue vessels of Salvamento Marítimo scoured the high seas in search for boat migrants. The proliferation of agencies involved in patrolling needed a co-ordination centre, and this took the form of the Centro de Coordinación Regional de Canarias, CCRC. It was to be run by the Guardia Civil, an ideal choice according to one *guardia*: "The military won't get upset and the civilians won't get angry since the Guardia Civil has a civilian scope." Arteaga (2007) called the CCRC "an experiment in security that is ahead of its time… its mission represents a new

generation of security: one that goes beyond what can be defined as purely internal or external, national or international, civilian or military".[2]

In 2010, the CCRC was managed from four offices strung around a patio at the back of the military palace in Las Palmas: one each for the chiefs of operations, intelligence gathering, international "liaison officers" and the *centro de control*, CECON. In CECON, the patrolling area was visualised on a large electronic map showing the Canary Islands and a scattering of Guardia Civil boats and vehicles on seas and land. Numbered sections of the high seas indicated zones assigned to military planes monitoring the Atlantic under the Defence Ministry's Operation Noble Sentry.[3] CECON oversaw the whole operational zone, about 425,000 square kilometres of open sea between the Canaries, Cape Verde and Senegal (ibid:3). The CCRC's "multi-disciplinary" model on show in CECON, since exported and updated in the form of the International Co-ordination Centre in Madrid, enabled an unprecedented visualisation and control of the southern maritime border.

Hera's innovations and success came at a cost. Sea operations are the single biggest expenditure for Frontex – in 2009 they made up almost 40 per cent of its total budget, and the trend continues.[4] They also depend on the willingness of EU member states to contribute with officers and vehicles, which are not always forthcoming. Border patrolling is labour-intensive, and Spain has increased the security personnel dedicated to border controls and the "fight against illegal immigration" by 60 per cent in seven years, going from 10,239 officers in 2003 to 16,375 in 2010.[5]

"Sea ops" also involve political and legal complications. Senegal allows joint patrolling throughout its "exclusive economic zone" of 150-200 nautical miles from the coast, while Mauritania only allows for patrols in the "contiguous zone" of 24 miles. Senegal lets non-Spanish, Frontex-funded boats and planes patrol; Mauritania does not, allowing only the Guardia Civil to patrol. But the most tangible legal mechanism is the "mixed crew". Each European patrol vessel needs to have a local officer on board who is formally the one taking the decision to intercept boats and send them back to port. This is "to provide legal cover", said the CCRC Comandante. The shipmaster is still European, and decides where his boat goes and what his crew does.

The patrol boats – whether from Spain, Senegal or a Frontex partner – are assigned an operational area that they search for signs of migrants. The crew might

spot a large wooden boat (*pirogue* in French, *gaal bu mag* in Wolof) leaving the coast, and assess whether this boat might be used for clandestine migration. How many passengers are on board? Around 30 is normal for a fishing trip or *mare,* in which Senegalese fishermen set out for days across open sea. Does it have fishing gear in the hull, or is it empty? The latter raises suspicions, as does the presence of any petrol canisters. The *guardias* or Frontex officers, under Senegalese authority, make a note of the person in charge of the boat, and later check it has returned to coast. At night, the patrols use radar and infrared camera. "And planes are on patrol," explained the Guardia Civil chief in Dakar. "They film and take photos… [If suspicious] they send an alert, and sea patrols are sent out."

The patrols are, as mentioned, the most concrete manifestation of the "migration of sovereignty" towards African shores. As such, they provide a selective "spectacle" of the border. Dramatic rescues on open seas are beamed out through the media in a display of the sovereign power to control lives and territories. Along African coastlines, the patrols also have another audience: potential migrants in Senegal's coastal communities. Hera's operations in African territorial waters were previously vaguely referred to as "diversion", and sometimes as "interception"; Frontex now labels them "deterrence". In such "border performances", the EU's "inside is projected externally" (Vaughan-Williams 2008:67). Sea patrols are an example of what Andreas (2000) labels the "ritualistic performance" of border policing, making the border more solid and real. But a narrative is needed to justify this "recrafting" of the image of the border (ibid) in African waters. In the Spanish case, humanitarianism would provide such a narrative.

Humanitarianism on the high seas

Hera, according to one Guardia Civil Comandante in Madrid, was "the protoype that Frontex would like to export to the other joint operations". They work "in the jurisdictional waters from where they are leaving, it's the ideal operation", he said. "You have to prevent them leaving, you can't wait for them to arrive… That way you save many lives."

His comments were echoed by other high-ranking Guardia Civil officers and border agents, whose discourse was suffused with talk of humanitarian intervention.[6] Indeed, Frontex itself is now, according to the agency's five-years-on report, "the largest search and rescue operation on the planet" (2010:37). Humanitarianism is, of course, a convenient trope for the consumption of the media, academia and the larger public, but it also fills a larger function. Drawing on a growing body of academic scrutiny of Frontex operations by legal scholars, I argue that the humanitarian discourse fulfils a key function in legitimising operations on high seas and in African territorial waters while allowing officers to develop "second-order rationalisations of duties", with echoes of the work of the US Border Patrol studied by Heyman (1995:28).

First, humanitarianism legitimates border controls. Tondini argues that "interceptions may be in principle legally justified only if retained [as] rescue interventions" (2010:26), and this seems to be a lesson that high-ranking officers have taken to heart. In the words of the former project manager of Hera, "the priority is to save human lives, [and] this means [*conlleva*] that all the boats that try to arrive in Spain are intercepted before they arrive at the [Spanish] coasts". The basis for these interceptions, he said, was "saving lives" based on SOLAS, the international convention for the safety of life at sea.

The high seas are legally speaking *Mare Liberum,* a non-sovereign space, but are still subject to a patchwork of rules under international law. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts (2010:8) have identified a "new geo-politics of the Mare Liberum" (ibid:17) in which amendments to the international search and rescue regime (SAR) and SOLAS have created loopholes in which Mediterranean states such as Malta can heave off responsibilities for rescue, interception and diversion to European or North African neighbours. This disavowal of humanitarianism contrasts with Spain's approach, which has instead used its extensive SAR responsibilities to the full in migration controls.[7] "What matters is helping people," said one *guardia,* "whether it's at one [nautical] mile, or 15, or 30, or 200… when helping a boat there is no limit." While in Malta, migrant boats are only considered in "distress" if they are sinking (ibid:21), Spain's Salvamento Marítimo considers any migrant vessel as a virtual shipwreck (*naufrago*). In the words of one Salvamento chief, a *cayuco* or *patera* (the generic Spanish term for migrant boats[8]) is an *a priori* "danger for navigation" and

akin to a coach racing down a highway "without brakes". Such reasoning enables early intervention, including the pre-emptive controls along West African coasts.

Second, humanitarianism allows for the rationalisation of border control duties. The *guardias* and police try to come to terms with their twin task of rescue and interception and the uneasy but necessary mixing of the two. Officers regularly complained about having to "play the role of the baddie" in carrying out the "most thankless task" of policing with little recognition for their often dangerous humanitarian rescues at high sea. A Spanish policeman stationed in Africa recalled a public row he had with a Red Cross worker who criticised the policing of the border. "I asked her, who has saved more lives, you or me? You give them blankets, something to eat and so on when they arrive in the Canary Islands, but we are out there rescuing people." The police work was "99,9 per cent humanitarian", he said: "What I want to do is to save lives… I might have been the baddie but my conscience is clear."

SAR zones (Spain's in deep blue), from www.salvamentomaritimo.es

Guardia Civil-produced videos and slideshows highlight and "purify", in Latour's (1993) terminology, migration-related borderwork as humanitarian to an audience of fellow professionals and external visitors. One such video on "migrants" showed boat rescues to soft, melancholic music while a complementary video on "drugs" followed patrol boats at full speed to an adrenaline-fuelled rock soundtrack. A Guardia Civil

slideshow, meanwhile, described the four stages of intervention: detection, identification, follow-up, and finally "interception or rescue". I asked the Comandante responsible for the videos and the slideshow what the difference was between the two terms. "It's the same, what happens is that intercept refers more to drugs, migration is usually more of a rescue because it's more humanitarian."

Humanitarianism provides the missing piece in the puzzle of bordering the Spanish section of the Euro-African border, and does this by dissolving the patchwork of maritime boundaries for the purposes of migration control. Arteaga (2007:6) argues that "police units both intercept and rescue, which undermines their image as a dissuasive force", but this very humanitarian-policing nexus is what legitimises and lends efficacy to Hera operations in African and international waters. The following section will look at complementary border regime discourses furnished by Frontex, in which migration control is rendered as risk management instead of rescue.

Frontex: reconceptualising the border

Frontex is an elusive agency. Still little known among the European public, it is charged with managing "operational co-operation" at the EU's external borders, and does this from five floors scattered across a skyscraper in central Warsaw. Its main task is halting irregular migrant flows into the EU, and for this it has been provided with an (until recently) exponentially growing budget, going from €19.1m in 2006, its first full year of operations, to €87.9m in 2010.[9] Endowed with legal personality and thus extensive operational autonomy, it is a "depoliticised body" whose mandate covers the politicised field of "fighting illegal migration".[10] Criticism of the agency has focused on this contradiction as well as on the legal pitfalls in border patrolling and the pushback of potential asylum seekers to unsafe third countries (Tondini 2010; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts 2010). But still, little is known of the agency's internal workings and its day-to-day role in Europe's increasingly transnationalised border regime.

The first part of this section will debunk the prevalent view among activist groups and scholars of Frontex as an all-powerful border agent fomenting the

"militarisation" of the external EU border. The second part will argue that its main impact instead lies in *reconceptualising* this border.

The Spanish experience underpinned Frontex's work. Hera was the "acid test for the agency", its (Spanish) deputy director told me in Warsaw, later correcting this to a "benchmark". But he immediately downplayed Frontex's role in the success. "The joint operation might have helped," he said, "but [this] was also the time when Spain was negotiating agreements" with West African states. These bilateral agreements were not just for surveillance but also for policing co-operation, repatriation and "arresting smugglers". "We do not pretend to be the key players in this success," he said. His comments were echoed by one Frontex spokesperson, who said: "We have to be very careful when we talk about the reasons for the reduction… We can't take the glory."

This was surely a communications strategy that aimed to strike a balance between visibility and invisibility for Frontex. But the agency had indeed been a hanger-on, not a leader, in Hera. As one Frontex officer put it, the police who arrived to interview migrants "took it as vacations, going to the Canary Islands…. We had to guide them." In the words of Arteaga (2007:5), "Frontex has not come to the Canary Islands to provide experience, but rather to acquire it" and Hera gave it "an opportunity to develop its operational procedures". But this was not just a temporary state of affairs. The former Hera manager recalled the 2010 deployment of an Icelandic patrol boat to Senegal. "They asked for a Frontex delegate to be with them [and show] how the operations are carried out. For them it's a completely different reality, nothing in common with Iceland at all."

The dependence of Frontex-funded assets on Spanish leadership is one sign of the agency's limited impact; another sign is continued state responsibility in patrolling. Frontex critics have singled out the blurred limits to responsibilities in sea operations, but the deputy director was clear on this point. "Once the operational phase is implemented, the national authorities [of the member state] are the ones who have the command and control of the assets." This means an Italian boat patrolling the Senegalese coast under a Spanish-run Frontex operation with local authorities on board would fall under Italian responsibility if, say, refugees were to be turned back (under *non-refoulement* principles) or if anyone was harmed. Frontex agreements with

third countries, now under negotiation, might not even change this, the deputy director indicated.

Europe's borderwork is, then, largely dependent on member state priorities and responsibilities – and Spain has more than other member states been a driving force behind Frontex's development since the time of the "boat crisis" in the Canaries. In the words of Hernández i Sagrera (2008:4), "Frontex is still an agency that lacks independence, whose performance depends on the political agenda of states such as Spain, who in this way transfer their domestic interests to a European level." Seen in this way, the border still remains a bilateral business, reducing Frontex to being a funnel for European funds and a megaphone for member states.

However, such a conclusion would miss Frontex's main impact in reconceptualising the border and transnationalising border policing. Its "thought-work" (Heyman 1995) has helped redraw the patchwork of borders in southern Europe within a larger narrative of "the external border" of the EU. Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya, Greece-Turkey: these are now frontlines in a common European endeavour, and Frontex provides the language to make sense of and "operationalise" this frontline in terms of migration.

Frontex operations are organised along the lines of corporate ventures. "Project teams" are assigned to handle joint operations (JOs), drawing in staff from most Frontex units: analysts from the Risk Analysis Unit (RAU), a support team from the admin division, at times someone from "returns" (forced deportation) and staff from "ops" (operations) including the "project manager". The Risk Analysis Unit prepares "tethered risk assessments" (TRAs) on a region and "based on this, define area and timeframe" of the operation, explained one analyst. Next follows a series of meetings with member states. If the hosting state decides it needs help, RAU prepares a TFA or "tactical focused assessment" identifying the "main themes and risks". Member states decide whether to participate, and an "operational plan" is drafted on "who can provide what, when and where". The plan is circulated internally, "to legal, PR and so on". The host state gets a say, and the end result is a "final draft" and a full operational plan. "After this the real hard work starts," said the analyst. Operational area, timeframe, assets member states can contribute – patrol boats and planes, for example, or "human assets" – are set out. The JO is ready to go.

JO, RAU, TFA, TRA: Frontex lingo is as impenetrable as any business jargon. Its reports speak of "business fields" active in the "operational theatre" of the external border. The "operational portfolio" includes delivery of "strategic and operational risk analysis products" to "customers", also known as the border guards of member states (Frontex 2009:16-17, 20 and 2009b). "There's this business fashion, and Frontex is as much a victim of it as any international agency," one spokesperson argued. But the business language points to the agency's view of itself within the EU border regime: as a purveyor of "solutions" and "best practice" for the border guard community.

Frontex helps reconceptualise the border through the export of its growing vocabulary to member states. Terms and definitions, in part based on the Schengen Borders Code, are used for EU-wide statistics collection on border crossings. Meanwhile, formal and informal exchanges between border guards in Frontex operations, training programmes and information-sharing networks spread the jargon and a common approach to the external border.

One key element of this Frontex discourse is migration-as-risk. The Risk Analysis Unit contrasts "risks" with "threats": the latter covers crime, including drugs and people smuggling, while risk largely means migration. RAU collects intelligence from across Europe via the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), which helps extend this conceptualisation (in Spain, FRAN is centred on Frontex's "national focal point", the Comisaría General de Extranjería y Fronteras of the national police, and specifically the anti-smuggling police unit, Ucrif). Through the language of risk, Frontex re-prioritises borderwork towards halting migration. Anything else is an exception that confirms the rule: detecting oil spills, assisting boats in danger, intercepting drugs on high seas. As the spokesperson put it: "[Mediterranean joint operation] Indalo [is] interesting in terms of... side products. Our mandate is border controls as such, controlling illegal migration," but in Indalo they have "seized 4 tonnes of hashish while they were at it". Border controls *as such* mean irregular migration, first of all, and Frontex as an "intelligence-driven agency" has made it its task to define and understand this object through the language of risk.

Risk is made real through a world of arrows. In a Frontex meeting room, the risk analyst spread printouts of a map prepared by the migration think-tank ICMPD for tracking clandestine migrant routes across the table. Arrows diverged across the deserts of Libya, Niger, Algeria and Mauritania before converging on migrant nodes such as Nouadhibou, Oujda, Agadez, Tripoli. In Frontex lingo, the routes are

"closed", "displaced" and "reactivated" in what seems an elaborate traffic management exercise (cf Sossi in Agier 2011:17), while "transfers" of "pockets" of migrants are talked about in the academic language of "push" and "pull" factors.

i-Map screenshot highlighting the "West African route": https://www.imap-migration.org/index2.html

The analyst traced her finger along the arrows, from Mauritania on the coast to the Algerian desert. "There was a displacement effect" in 2009 "from the Atlantic to the Western Mediterranean route", she said. "Up to 2009, this was the most dangerous route migrants could take, the West Saharan route." But with increasing pressure on both the Atlantic and eastern fronts – the route via Libya to Italy – this was the only

route left. "The only way was going up," she said. The "pocket" had to be "transferred"; Spain's Indalo area of operations was being "reactivated".

Those who do the transferring and reactivation – the people smugglers – are known in Frontex parlance as "facilitators". This covers anyone who has "intentionally assisted third-country nationals in the illegal entry to, or exit from, the territory across external borders", ranging from taxi drivers on the Greek-Macedonian frontier to organised trafficking rings.[11] Through "debriefings" with migrants in detention, Frontex finds out about migrant routes and facilitators' *modus operandi,* data that are later synthesised in risk assessments.

The streamlined terminology of "facilitators" and "risk" veils the complex realities of the border. Is an Afghan refugee as much of a "risk" as a Senegalese boat migrant? Are Macedonian taxi drivers and Nigerian trafficking gangs equal "threats"? Frontex lingo, through its neutrality, facilitates the swift translation of border terminology, furnishing a unitary vision of the border as the place where homogenous migrants and "facilitators" are fought back and apprehended.

This unitary vision contrasts with the complex reality of boat migration, which can only be touched upon briefly here. In Senegalese fishing neighbourhoods, a whole chain of workers was involved during the 2006 boat departures. The *coxeur* found clients on behalf of the *convoyeur* or *borom gaal*, the trip organiser and owner of the boat. Once all "tickets" were sold, the *convoyeur* contracted a *capitaine* or *guide*, who would handle the GPS on board, as well as several *chaffeurs*, who piloted the boat in exchange for free passage. To Frontex, the *convoyeur, borom gaal, coxeur, capitaine* and *chaffeur* can all be seen as "facilitators". In Spain, such reasoning has facilitated the conceptualisation of those piloting the boats as *patrones* (captains) who can then be sentenced as smugglers.

Frontex's unitary vision of the border is not just linguistic; it resides in its infrastructure and operations. To keep up to date with migrant routes and the tactics of "facilitators", Frontex needs a fast-moving operation. Five offices in a Warsaw skyscraper will do just fine for this purpose. Frontex has – not yet, at least – any clumsy patrimony to handle.[12] Instead of the old-fashioned working arrangements of Europe's border guards, it provides a lean, flexible operation across the whole external border. "Frontex", then, is not a militarised border force reified in what

borderworkers in the Canaries called *el Frontex* – the command and control centre of the CCRC. Like the blue Frontex armband its officers wear in joint operations, it is flexible, moveable and removable. In this lightweight fashion, in the shadow of still-powerful states, it quietly goes about its business of bordering the continent.

Seahorse: building the border circuit

If Frontex provides the conceptual building blocks for the Euro-African border while fomenting transnational policing between EU member states, Spain has extended this transnationalisation to West African forces. "All member states are aware that there's no other way to fight migration than to co-operate with third countries," the Comandante in Madrid insisted. This was a lesson the Spaniards soon took to heart. In 2005, the new Socialist government embarked on a political offensive across West Africa that involved the rapid expansion of its foreign aid and diplomatic presence in the region (Gagrielli 2008). At the root of this was policing co-operation through the signing of Memoranda of Understanding with states including Senegal and Mauritania. Through these deals, a vast policing network was quickly being built up around Europe's southern border.

Key to this development was the Seahorse project that, starting in 2005, received more than €6m of EU funding to establish "an effective policy to prevent illegal migration".[13] Seahorse, managed by the Guardia Civil, aimed to tie police forces into a tighter network through high-level conferences, training on "illegal migration" for African forces, and the increased cross-deployment of "liaison officers" and joint patrols.[14] The Seahorse secretariat organised, among other events, the annual Euro-African policing conference on migration that was fast becoming a "tradition", in the words of the chief of the Guardia Civil and the National Police. Spanish officers also trained African police on irregular migration in West African capitals and invited high-ranking officers to Spain for tours of control rooms and police academies. These conferences, courses and visits served not only "to see how other countries work on migration", as one Spanish police attaché put it: they were also junkets for African officers that fomented a shared vision of the border while creating informal connections.

But Seahorse was, above all, a high-tech venture. It would not only expand the transnational policing networks around the figure of the "illegal immigrant"; it would also hardwire these networks into a secure communications system via satellite. Technology triggered co-operation. The secure system, the Seahorse Network, had by 2010 pulled in Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Morocco.[15]

Hera built on this network, which spun out from the CCRC in Las Palmas in a widening web. Senegal, Frontex's most eager collaborator, created a national co-ordination centre (CCO) in Dakar's navy base. A joint chiefs of staff there had constant contact with all four forces involved in migration patrolling: the Gendarmerie, the Air Force, the Navy and the border police (Direction de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières). If any of these Senegalese agencies spotted a suspected migrant boat, they contacted the CCO, which in turn communicated with Las Palmas via a second control centre located in the Senegalese Interior Ministry. In the Spanish embassy, the Guardia Civil and police attachés were in constant contact with both the CCO and the CCRC. The communication links were flexible, however. A Senegalese liaison officer explained how he would email all relevant agencies from Las Palmas, circumventing the secure Seahorse channel and the established route through the Ministry. Through such day-to-day usage, the communications network grew ever more intricate, its transnationalism increasingly taken for granted.

But the information did not stop in Las Palmas. The International Co-ordination Centre had full command over Hera from 2010, and a steady stream of real-time information was funneled from Las Palmas, Dakar and elsewhere along the African coast into the control room located in the Guardia Civil Comandancia (headquarters) in Madrid. Via daily briefings, "flash reports" and teleconferences, the ICC team then sent the information to Warsaw, providing the Frontex Situation Centre with another piece in the surveillance picture this control centre was building of Europe's border operations.

A rough sketch of the Euro-African border focused on surveillance communication networks between Senegal and Spain would look something like this (information from Senegalese and EU officers):

Frontex (Warsaw)

FSC

Sea Ops

RAU

Madrid

ICC Guardia Civil

Ucrif

Comisaría General de Extranjería y Fronteras

Regional Guardia Civil Comandancias/ SIVE control rooms

Rabat

Comandancias/SIVE control rooms in Tenerife and Las Palmas

Las Palmas CCRC

Nouakchott and Nouadhibou (Mauritania)

Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) stationed in third countries (e.g. Bamako, Mali)

Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cap Verde (limited implication)

Dakar

CCO (marine)

Rosso-Senegal (Mauritania border)

Senegalese Interior Ministry

*2

Spanish embassy

*1

*DPAF (Direction de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières), consisting of Division de Lutte Contre les Migrations Irregulières, Commissariat Spéciale du Port, Airport police and central secretariat, plus border posts including Rosso and Oussouye

French embassy

Div. Lutte contre les mig. Irregulières

Port

Secretariat

DPAF*

*1, 2 Senegalese Gendarmerie and Air Force

Airport

Oussouye (close to the Guinean border)

16

One thing stands out from this depiction of the border regime: all information travels through Spain. No lines unite Mauritania and Senegal, or Senegal and Gambia. The information network was, like the migrant boats it was meant to stop, a one-way street.

The border theorist Ladis Kristof long ago drew a distinction between "boundaries", which are "inner-oriented", distinguishing insiders and outsiders, and "frontiers", which are zones of contact and "the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown" (cited in Donnan and Wilson 1999:48). Ironically, to close off, Spain first had to reach out. It had to create a zone of contact – that is, a frontier. In doing so, Spain had used copied-and-pasted Memoranda of Understanding to impressive effect. It had knocked on all the right doors in order to close its own. But Spain's frontier-making only got it that far: the smooth communication channels generated friction around the unequal sharing of information and the uneven distribution of EU largesse. This article cannot consider such tensions due to lack of space, but suffice to say that the delicate edifice of the Euro-African border was built on fragile ground, always in danger of breaking apart, as seen in Libya and Tunisia during the 2011 uprisings.

Surveillance: mapping the border

The social networks and discourses of the border depend, as in the Seahorse network, on technological know-how and infrastructure. The next two sections will look at the role of technology in the Euro-African border regime, focusing on the surveillance and information-sharing networks that are fast turning Europe's southern edges into a "virtual border" environment.

Screens are the eyes of Europe's border regime. In the control rooms of Warsaw, Madrid and the Guardia Civil Comandancias dotting the Spanish coastline, the border is made visible, legible and operational. In this endeavour, Spain is again in the vanguard. Its "integrated system for external surveillance" or SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior) combines radar, cameras and patrols in a powerful surveillance network that is credited with the sharp decline in migrant boat arrivals.

The SIVE consists of mobile and stationary sensors in secretive locations along the coasts. These track any vessels approaching Spanish shores by radar and camera and then feed this information into the control rooms. "The radar detects an event and filters, treats and then shows it," explained one *guardia,* but it is down to the operators' experience to interpret the signs on screen. The operator monitors the SIVE map on his terminal, looking for signs of migrants approaching the coastline. Suddenly something might appear on the map: a small, pixellated object the shape of a boat, with a vector attached indicating its speed and direction. The object's size reflects actual size; the length of the vector corresponds to the object's speed. The *guardia* brings the map up on the control room's wall projection, takes a closer look. It could be nothing, he knows. Maybe the radar has just detected the crest of a wave, a small fishing boat, or even a whale. The radars detect objects up to 20 nautical miles from the Spanish coast: software helps filter out most large waves, but other indications of a *patera* are down to experience.[16] What is the weather like? If the hard, easterly Levante wind blows across the Mediterranean, migrants rarely set out from Algeria and Morocco. How does the object move? A sinuous, zigzag path, represented by a trail of pixels, means it could be a *patera*. Is it moving fast? In the Canaries, where the large wooden *cayucos* groan under the weight of perhaps 100 passengers, a slow speed gives migrant vessels away. In the Strait of Gibraltar, if the object is small while its speed vector is large, it could be drug smugglers or migrants in a fast, lightweight zodiac. With a right-click on the mouse, the *guardia* can "identify" the *patera* by assigning it a name. When it gets closer, he will do a follow-up. As the *patera* approaches the coast, at about six nautical miles, the high-definition cameras get to work, or the infrared cameras if it is misty, rainy or dark. The *guardia* steers the camera with his joystick into line with the object: he then brings the image up on the wall projections. Is it a migrant boat? If it is an *avistamiento de patera* (patera sighting), he activates the protocol, routine by now, all agencies working hand in glove. The Guardia Civil patrol boat shoots out, followed by the Salvamento Marítimo rescue ship, sometimes with a small Red Cross vessel in tow. The four steps of an intervention are about to be completed: detection, identification, follow-up, and "interception or rescue".

Through a combination of the operator's experience and the advanced surveillance systems he uses, the boat migrant has been visualised, made legible, and become an object of intervention. This surveillance changes the "cat-and-mouse

game" (Donato and Wagner 2008) of the Euro-African border. Most sub-Saharan migrants, knowing they will be spotted by the SIVE, play the game according to the rules.[17] Everyone – "facilitators", migrants, rescue services, *guardias* and police – have their assigned role. Migrants or their associates often alert the Spanish authorities after they set off from Morocco. Sea rescue boats search for them, bring them to port for a medical check followed by detention and – after 60 days – liberation if their nationality has not been ascertained. Other migrants, at much greater risks, try to skirt the radars and limit costs by using tiny, inflatable "toy" boats to traverse the deep, rapid waters of the Strait. But they, too, are usually detected by camera or by the thousands of commercial ships passing through.[18] By 2010, almost all migrant vessels were spotted and intercepted – the impromptu arrivals among sunbathers on Spanish beaches were a memory of the past.

The Euro-African border appears as a diffuse area of intervention on the SIVE screens, devoid of clear borderlines.[19] What counts is the range of your radar, the specs of your cameras, the reach of your patrols – all represented visually on screen. But as migrant tactics change, SIVE is not enough. "We have to extend it much further," said the Comandante in Madrid, outlining his vision of border surveillance in three layers. First, the SIVE and patrols covering the coasts. Second, planes, ocean-going ships and satellites monitoring the high seas. And third, joint patrols scouring African territorial waters, as in Hera and to a lesser extent in Morocco.[20]

"The future of maritime surveillance is via satellites and unmanned planes," the Comandante said. To some extent, this is already happening. The European Maritime Safety Agency is providing satellite coverage in the first Frontex "multi-agency" operation, Indalo. GMES, the European programme for Earth observation, has launched a collaboration with Frontex under its €15m G-MOSAIC programme for "situational awareness" of regional crises, its website showing footage of car tracks in the Algerian desert and colour-coded maps of "border permeability".[21] And Frontex, through its research and development unit, co-ordinates research and links up academia, EU authorities, border guards and the defence industry. Electro-optical sensors for sea, land and air surveillance, advanced command and control systems (C4I) and vessel tracking tools are all on the cards in a fruitful back-and-forth between the security industry and Europe's border regime (see Frontex 2010:55).

In the "scopic drive" to visualise the border, satellite systems and unmanned aerial vehicles are at the pinnacle, attracting policing dreams and activist ire. The vision, in the Comandante's words, is "a complete surveillance cover" of the border region and beyond. This will be achieved through a project known as Eurosur – the "European external border surveillance system". The building blocks of Eurosur are in place, a "big pilot" project has begun. In parallel to Eurosur runs another project, Perseus. At an estimated cost of almost €44m, Perseus will support Eurosur through the integration of existing national maritime surveillance systems and technological innovations.[22] With Eurosur, the policing dream of an all-seeing, omnipresent surveillance system could soon become reality.

Eurosur: the border, informatised

Some border officials call for caution in the rush towards new technology, however. Control systems such as SIVE are resource-heavy and labour-intensive, while satellites still do not provide real-time information.[23] "In Hera, maybe the information can be of some use if it gets to you within six-seven hours," said the former Hera manager, "but in Greece or Italy, the [migrant] boat can cross the sea in this time, it doesn't have added value." The Frontex Situation Centre, meanwhile, still does not have real-time coverage of border operations on screen, although this is in the pipeline.

There are also concerns that industry lobbying may trump actual border control needs. "Satellites are useless," quipped one officer involved in the Eurosur project. He compared satellite pictures of North African border areas where displaced people gathered after the recent upheavals in the region with other, more actionable, information. "I've just seen this border on Al Jazeera, I've learnt they've been there for three days and don't have water, that is a *push!*" Unmanned flights are just as useless, he said, since they cannot fly in civilian zones because of safety regulations. In short, Humint (human intelligence) trumps Imint (imagery intelligence). The former provides 95 per cent of the results, the officer said, while satellite might provide just 5 per cent – at a cost inverse to its proportion. Further, information-sharing is hampered by factionalism among competing border agencies and states, who do not want to let go of their monopoly on information.

Eurosur would get around these problems. If the border is a field for information-sharing and information is a precious commodity, it has to be shared in just the right doses. Eurosur does so by filtering out most information as noise, meaning in principle anything not related to the movement of people across the EU's southern borders. Even this is proving difficult, however. The solution is to make the network decentralised, just exchanging "illegal immigration plus other common interest information".

In Eurosur, each country will have one national co-ordination centre (NCC). Through a seamless link between NCCs and Frontex, complete surveillance of the Euro-African border is for the first time a possibility. The Eurosur officer sketched this new border regime – the two upward-facing triangles represent member states with a shared border, the arrows are information flows, and the downward triangle is Frontex:

The border, in this vision, is a channel for the smooth exchange of information. It appears as something akin to a cell membrane, a selectively permeable surface that communicates with nearby cells sideways, downwards and upwards in a chain of signals. Look at the bottom arrows: they refer to maritime surveillance but point outwards, towards African states. Sharing of information with African forces is already happening: Spain spots a departing *patera,* for example, and notifies the Moroccans or Algerians. To Frontex, however, what in Eurosur is termed the "pre-frontier" is still anathema – the agency's official mandate, staffers insist, ends at "the

external border". The Eurosur sketch indicates a more complex vision for future border policing. "Frontex doesn't have a border but it has another requirement," the officer said while drawing the pyramid labelled CPIP, the "common pre-frontier intelligence picture". Eurosur will, through CPIP, make the "pre-frontier" palatable.[24]

The "virtual border" might still be hostage to political, financial and technological limitations, but in presenting a smooth, exhaustively mapped maritime area of intervention, SIVE and Eurosur gloss over and skirt these tensions. In the process, they provide the most compelling evidence of the current possibilities and faultlines defining the Euro-African border under construction.

Conclusion: the momentum in bordering Europe

Hera was devised as an "emergency" response but had, by 2010, become a permanent operation. A "recovery of the territory by law enforcement agencies" had fast been achieved, in the words of a Senegalese border police chief. No one left along these routes. Hera the divine match-maker had successfully tied the knot between police, military and industry in Africa and Europe. So why continue?

Donnan and Wilson's (1999) delineation of three key border components (borderwork, frontiers and the borderline) might throw some light on this. First, the borderwork imperative ensures continued patrolling and investment. "We can't leave the deployment we have in Mauritania and Senegal," said the Comandante in Madrid. "If we leave, the avalanche will return in two days' time." The former Hera manager agreed: "Both Spain and the African countries have said several times that it would be a big error to withdraw the deployment because this could give a signal to the candidates for migration to try to leave again from there to the Canaries." A minimal, pre-emptive deployment will keep the border "spectacle" alive until it is no longer needed.

Second, the creativity unleashed by the frontier keeps growing. The Euro-African border is generating its own momentum, its own sense of necessity through the asymmetrical zones of contact it has generated. It has become a site for ever-growing investments, a place where the defence industry and border agencies can

apply their creativity and entrepreneurial skills, a blank slate upon which European leaders can project their fears and visions. Such a frontier economy, extending selectively to African forces and polities, creates a fruitful feedback with the border regime.

Third, Europe's boundary-making draws on deeper desires too. The Euro-African border is the result of a symbolic and political urge to define the outer frontiers of the Union. This bounding was always a fraught enterprise, as shown in the summer of 2011 when the Schengen agreement was coming under unprecedented strain because of the migrant boats leaving Tunisia. The Frontex deputy director did not want to be drawn on the consequences. "We are not an actor in this debate," he said, but added that the idea of the space of free movement was that it "gives the feeling that you are an EU citizen". The creation of the EU's "common space for freedom, security and justice" depends, he implied, on his agency's continued work on the Euro-African border.

It is a commonplace observation that a "constitutive outside" is needed to bind a community or polity, but Europe's way of doing this is nevertheless a peculiar enterprise in defining as its main target the "illegal immigrant" and in drawing on the special characteristics of "wet borders". In Frontex operations, an asymmetrical divide between land and sea borders, or "green" and "blue" borders, is evident in naming conventions (Greek gods for sea, planets for land) and the command structure (separate "land ops" and "sea ops" management), but above all in their relative importance. Frontex, in the words of one observer, "loves the sea" since the maritime setting provides a perfect laboratory for a new form of border management.[25] In Frontex operations such as Hera, the Euro-African border has been reified through recourse to the sea metaphor. This metaphor enables a useful indeterminacy to envelop the border, in which Frontex, as a cosmopolitan, fast-moving agency, can thrive.

To return to Guild (2008), the sea metaphor smoothes the path for the "migration of sovereignty" by delineating an ideal space for a humanitarian discourse and by creating a neutral backdrop to the wide-reaching patrolling, technological and surveillance networks discussed above. These networks exist, of course, in constant interaction with other border-makers outside the scope of this paper: among these are the irregular migrants themselves, the aid industry, the media and the increasing

transnational activism that has denounced an EU border in the desert zones of Mali and Senegal. As this paper has tried to show, locating the border is a fraught enterprise, however. ==The Euro-African border draws its power from its diffuse, far-reaching structure: as a network of networks, it resists any clear delimitation or localisation.==

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Notes

[1] Spain's North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla follow different and complementary logics that will not be considered in this paper (see Ferrer Gallardo 2008)

[2] See English translation at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI%2054-2007

[3] Operación Noble Centinela, which supported Guardia Civil and Frontex sea operations, ended in 2010 (Frontex, personal communication)

[4] See https://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2010/05/17/details-from-frontex-general-report-2009-post-2-of-2/. In 2011, sea operations are predicted to use up €24m of Frontex's €52m operations budget: see http://frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/budget/budgets/budget_2011.pdf

[5] See Interior Ministry press release, "Balance de la lucha contra la inmigración ilegal 2010", January 2011. This figure includes National Police and Guardia Civil officers at all Spanish borders and in all migration-related operations

[6] 44 border officials were interviewed in the course of fieldwork, including Guardia Civil, Frontex and Senegalese officers. The majority of Guardia Civil interviewees were high-ranking due to access restrictions. This paper does not assume the humanitarian discourse works similarly throughout the Guardia Civil. However, its role at the *interface* between different bodies is what is of interest here

[7] The Spanish SAR zones cover more than 1,500,000 sq km, of which the Canaries zone constitutes about 1,000,000 sq km

[8] *Patera* literally refers to a small wooden fishing boat used by Moroccan migrants in the 1990s. Migrants have since moved on to zodiacs, dinghies and inflatable "toy" boats, but *patera* has stuck as a generic term among Spanish agencies

[9] For year-on-year figures, see Frontex (2010:10)

[10] As other authors have noted, Frontex's work is politicised as regards the definition of "emergencies" and as regards the influence of member states and Brussels on it (Hernández i Sagrera 2008)

[11] Definition provided by Frontex via e-mail

[12] The revised Frontex regulation, set to enter into force before end 2011, will give Frontex powers to acquire its own assets as well as give it a co-leading role in joint operations. The deputy director indicated that little was likely to change in the short term, however, and that co-ownership of assets with member states was the likeliest option

[13] The funding came through the 2004-2008 Aeneas programme, which has been superseded by a "thematic programme" for migration co-operation with third countries. On Seahorse, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/migration-asylum/documents/aeneas_2004_2006_overview_en.pdf

[14] See Guardia Civil Seahorse presentation at www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/Ministerio.../SEAHORSE_ES.ppt

[15] See http://www.mir.es/gl/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/PDF_notas_de_prensa/2011/np011805.pdf

[16] Differences between the SIVE systems created by the companies Siemens, Amper and Indra are glossed over here

[17] North Africans, by contrast, avoid detection since they face immediate deportation upon arrival

[18] Spanish authorities encourage commercial vessels to inform them of any *pateras.* Media reports say the SIVE radars *can* detect "toy" boats, though the Guardia Civil says they do not; cameras have to be used (the confusion might stem from the media equation of SIVE and radar). See El País, 26 Aug 2011, *La Esperanza de Volverse Invisible*: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/esperanza/volverse/invisible/elpepiespand/20110826elpand_10/Tes

[19] SIVEs covering the Strait of Gibraltar do indicate "borderlines" in the form of edges delimiting the *autopista del Estrecho,* the passage designated for commercial ships

[20] On bilateral basis, the Guardia Civil and the Moroccan *Gendarmerie Royale* hold two high-level meetings a year, station liaison officers and carry out monthly joint patrols, with officials swapping between Algeciras and Tangiers, Granada and Al Hoceima and Las Palmas and Dakhla (Guardia Civil, personal communication)

[21] See http://www.gmes-gmosaic.eu/node/112

[22] See http://www.ateneadigital.es/revistaatenea/revista/articulos/GestionNoticias_4508_ESP.asp

[23] The Asociación Unificada de Guardias Civiles has denounced the lack of SIVE staff. See http://www.laverdad.es/alicante/v/20110211/provincia/augc-denuncia-falta-personal-20110211.html

[24] Eurosur and Seahorse might in future be integrated, reinforcing this tendency

[25] Christoph Marischka quoted on the w2u blog: http://w2eu.net/frontex/frontex-in-the-mediterranean/

THE JASMINE REVOLUTION AND THE LAMPEDUSA CRISIS

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INTRODUCTION

On 14th January 2011, Tunisians managed to end the totalitarian regime settled 23 years ago by the General Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in what has been called the *Jasmine revolution*.

The *Jasmine revolution* had many political, economic, social and diplomatic impacts in Tunisia but also in the neighboring countries, as for example Italy. This study examines one of these consequences: the "invasion" of the nearby Italian island of Lampedusa by more than 20 000 undocumented Tunisian migrants, nearly immediately after the Revolution. That was a dramatic event for Italy, especially when we know than there are only 5 000 Italian inhabitants living on the island.

What were the main factors behind the Lampedusa crisis? Is it true that most illegal migrants to Lampedusa are criminals escaped from jail during the *Jasmine revolution*? How did both Italian and Tunisian governments manage this crisis? To what extent can we conclude that the enormous investments made by Italy in high-technology devices were not useful in this crisis? These are some of the questions to which I will try to find answers in the study.

The research is organized into three sections. The first one reminds briefly the circumstances of the Lampedusa crisis. The second part of the study discusses the representation of the Italian/Tunisian border, and the attempts made to secure it and face the Lampedusa crisis. The last part of the research proposes some realistic recommendations in order to prevent and manage such humanitarian crisis.

1 / THE LAMPEDUSA CRISIS

Before examining the circumstances of the Lampedusa crisis, it is important to remind briefly how the Jasmine revolution started.

A / THE JASMINE REVOLUTION

It is difficult to determine precisely when it all began. As in most popular uprising that took place in the world, the Tunisian revolution was the result of the accumulation of a multitude of micro-events, ending with a violent, mass reaction.

This is precisely what happened in Tunisia. Since 1987, when Ben Ali came to power, many small events took place, creating then consolidating a sentiment of frustration: racket, corruption, confiscation of land, unmerited promotions or abuse of power. When a citizen expressed his frustration in a dramatic way, all turned suddenly upside down.

If the young Mohamed Bouazizi did not immolate with fire on 17th December 2010, someone else would have, a day or another, committed a suicide, an attempt or a hostage-taking. Today, we use to say that all started in Sidi Bouzid[1], but it could have began anywhere in Tunisia.

Although it is difficult to determine the exact date of the beginning of the Jasmine revolution, we will suppose here that all started on 17th December 2010, when a young man, unemployed although graduated from the university, was selling fruits in the street and has been confiscated his equipment by the police. Vexed, he splashed himself with fuel and set fire to himself in front of the governorate headquarter of Sidi Bouzid, provoking immediately a wave of popular protests, that will end on 14th January with a general strike and a riot grouping more than one million persons in front of the ministry of interior in the centre of Tunis.

B / THE RUSH TO LAMPEDUSA

Since early 1990's, Lampedusa became well known as an illegal migration destination. In the last years, it hosted 8 000 clandestine migrants in 2003, 13 000 in 2004, 23 000 in 2005, and 31 700 in 2007. The "Gate to Europe" is a monument built in Lampedusa

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[1] Poor town situated in the Centre of Tunisia

and dedicated by the Italian artist Mimo Paladino to the memory of the thousands of clandestine migrants who lost their lives during the attempt to cross the Mediterranean.

Just a few hours after the departure of the former President, thousands of young Tunisian fled to Italy, towards the nearest Italian island, which is Lampedusa, distant only 138 km from the Tunisian coast. 5500 illegal migrants arrived during the first week after 14th January, pushing Italy to announce a humanitarian state of emergency. In fact, Lampedusa is a small island (20.2 km²), with only 5 000 habitants. But the state of humanitarian emergency was also a legal mean to empower the local authorities (prefect, mayor), making them able to take immediate measures without consulting their hierarchy.

Mario Marazzitti, member of the community of Sant'Egidio, asked the help of Europe, saying: "*We have to face an international crisis. Europe must unite to find a solution to help Italy support this burden*". Italian still remembers the crisis they had to face in early 1990's when more than 40 000 Albanian fled the fall of communism and migrated illegally to Italy.

As soon as they arrive on the beach, Tunisian clandestine are caught by the police and imprisoned in the detention camp of the island, which used to be empty since the Italian government reached an agreement with both Tunisia and Libya to secure their respective maritime borders. The Lampedusa retention camp being too small, with a limited 800 person's capacity, additional migrants were sent to camps in nearby Sicily.

The Tunisian migrants to Lampedusa have more or less the same profile: they are young (aged between 20 and 30), originate from the South East, and live near the coast (Gabes, Zarzis, Jerba,). They are unemployed although some of them hold secondary and in some cases University degrees. They have paid their journey between 500€ to 1000€, sometimes rented by relative and friends.

Since 26th February 2011, the influx of *harragas* (Tunisian clandestine migrants) reduced, but did not stop. In the meantime, due to lack of space, the sanitary situation of the Tunisian migrants became dramatic, with problems of water closet, showers and food.

Regular revolt reactions take place in these confined spaces, as Tunisians try to escape the cruel living conditions. Many International Organizations and NGO's are asking for a better treatment for the migrants, and in particular Amnesty International or the Red Cross.

At this point, it would be interesting to try to analyse the representation of the Italian/Tunisian border.

2 / THE ITALIAN/TUNISIAN BORDER

To understand the Lampedusa crisis, we have to examine deeper the representation of the Italian border in the eye of the Tunisian.

A / THE GATE TO HEAVEN

The island of Lampedusa is the nearest European shore to Tunisia. In fact, it is distant only 138 km from Tunis. For that reason, Lampedusa has always been considered as the gate to Europe, and in particular to France. The journey to Lampedusa is in most cases just a first step in a longer trip, ending in France (see annex 1 to 3)[2]. In the eye of the Tunisian *harraga* (clandestine migrant), Europe is considered as an Eldorado, with high perspectives of securing rapidly a well-paid job[3].

Not all illegal migrants are honest people who decided suddenly to flee the political conflict. In fact, most of them are young men who were planning since long to migrate to Europe in search of employment. Curiously, the new perspectives opened by the revolution did not change their minds. Rumors that Europe would help Tunisia by accepting thousands of migrants and offering to them employment spread among young Tunisians, strengthening their willingness to leave urgently the country. It has been said for example that Germany would accept 2000 migrants, France 1000,…

This paradox explains why none of them managed to obtain the status of refugee. In fact, the conditions of the status of political refuge were no more fulfilled in such circumstances.

B / AN INSECURED BORDER

As an immediate result of the turmoil, Police, National Guard and army forces were totally devoted to stabilize the internal security. The borders were then more or less

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[2] Most Tunisian are francophone, and many have relatives living in France, which make it easier for them to settle on the French territory

abandoned, and that was an opportunity for anyone wishing to leave the country to do it. The North Western maritime borders of Tunisia - those in the middle of the Lampedusa routes - were completely out of control, as Europe did never represent a threat to Tunisia.

Thousands of prisoners took the opportunity of lack of security to flee. And we know today that a great part of the Tunisian who reached Lampedusa are criminals escaped from jail[4].

As the upheavals are carrying on in other Arab countries, Italy and the EU felt threatened by an increasing influx of migrants at its borders. Tunisians were no more the only people crossing the Mediterranean towards Lampedusa. In fact, following the Jasmine revolution, Egypt and Libya entered in 2011 into turmoil. Since that time, as it happened in Tunisia, hundreds of Libyans try daily to reach by sea the Italian island. Many Sub Saharan African immigrant workers fleeing the fights try also to reach Lampedusa starting from the Libyan shores.

Italy has signed in the past an agreement with the President Kadhafi concerning the control of the Italian/Libyan maritime borders, but a possible fall of the Kadhafi's regime will probably open the door to massive influx of Libyan and Sub Saharan undocumented migrants.

After having examined the representation of the Italian/Tunisian border, the next chapter will discuss the response of the various sides implicated in the Lampedusa crisis.

C / THE REACTIONS

The first Tunisian migrants did not seem to have particular integration problems with the Lampedusa population. But things changed soon, with the rising number of migrants. The Italian minister of interior, Roberto Maroni, announced that many Tunisian migrants were terrorists escaped from the Tunisian jails, provoking tension, fear and xenophobia reactions among the insular population.

He also evoked the idea to intervene directly in Tunisia to prevent undocumented Tunisians to cross the Mediterranean, which has been rejected by the Tunisian transitory government. The Italian government threatened also to expulse 6000 undocumented migrants.

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[3] Bouhdiba Sofiane, *The Tunisian NGOs facing the return of the young illegal migrants from Italy : strategies and implications on Euro-Mediterranean relations*, 9th research meeting, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Montecatini Terme, Italy, March 2008
[4] 11000 prisoners escaped from jail during the revolution

The mayor of Lampedusa, Bernardino De Rubeis, considered the phenomenon as a "Biblical exodus".

The Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi met the Tunisian provisional prime minister Beji Caïd Essebsi in Tunis to convince him to take back 22 000 undocumented migrants. The Tunisian government refused and asked Europe to make the effort of disseminating them in small groups and integrating them in the various European countries. He argued that Tunisia was in a delicate transition situation and had already made great efforts to deal with more than 500 000 Libyan refugees.

Following this meeting, Silvio Berlusconi decided to give a temporary permit to 6000 migrants, making them able to circulate in the European Union, and in particular to enter France. That decision provoked a great debate among the other European nations, and in particular neighboring France.

The French government, understanding that France was the final destination of these thousands of people, asked a reinforcement of Frontex operations[5]. That will be released on 20th February, in an operation named *Hermes 2011*, consisting in the deployment of additional aerial and maritime assets in the region, the deployment of experts in charge of migrant identification and the urgent organization of return operations to the countries of origin. Eleven EU member countries participated to this operation.

In order to find a long term solution, the French government proposed also to give a financial help to Tunisians, and to rethink about the project of giving to Tunisia the status of privileged country in its economic relation with the EU[6].

Despite high internal pressure, the Tunisian government, has made great efforts to secure its maritime borders, especially in the South, in the region of Gabes.

Europol has also been implicated, to avoid that criminals and terrorists take the opportunity of the chaotic situation to infiltrate Europe through the Tunisian clandestine corridors (see annex).

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[5] Agency created in 2004, in charge of controlling the European borders, based in Warsaw, and running with a 80 Million €budget
[6] At the moment, Morocco is the only Southern country benefiting this status

3 / RECOMMENDATIONS

After having had an overview of the situation, it should be interesting to discuss some proposals to find a durable solution to the Lampedusa crisis.

A / SECURING THE BORDER

It comes clear today that the Tunisian/Italian border is insufficiently secured, for many reasons: first, the shore is large and needs huge resources, which are not available in Tunisia. Secondly, due to the difficult situation, the Tunisian armed forces (army, national guard and police) are not in a position to focus on the control of the Mediterranean borders. In fact, the Saharan borders need urgent presence of both army and national guard. There are regular attempts made by armed terrorist groups to enter the country through the Libyan and Algerian borders. The massive fluxes of Libyan refugees fleeing the war need also the presence of the armed forces.

B / COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY AND TUNISIA

The situation needs more technical cooperation between Italy and Tunisia, and in particular concerning security electronic devices and naval equipment.

The cooperation between the two countries should also be at the economic level. It could be possible to involve an Italian financial institution to create a Tunisian bank specialised in micro-projects credits, for example. Some successful attempts have been made in the Southern regions of Tunisia, known to be providers of illegal migrants towards Italy. In particular, UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) managed a fund in the region of Gafsa to resettle returning migrants by offering to them possibilities of creating micro-projects. This fund was supported by Italian regions and communes.

C / PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE PROGRAMS

We know today that it is not sufficient to drive back an undocumented migrant to end the migration process[7]. In fact, returning migrants will soon try again to cross the Mediterranean, in search of better life.

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[7] Bouhdiba Sofiane, *The Tunisian NGOs facing the return of the young illegal migrants from Italy : strategies and implications on Euro-Mediterranean relations*, 9th research meeting, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Montecatini Terme, Italy, March 2008

The returning illegal migrants need medical help, but not only. In fact, they need a logistic help to get back home from the place of capture, and not being abandoned in the harbour of Tunis, for example. They also need a psychological care, because they have been shocked. This is particularly true when the migrant is an adolescent. It may take weeks for the young man to bypass his trauma.

The returning migrant needs also to understand that it is not a shame to have been expulsed, and it is very important that we avoid creating in him a hate for the foreigner, for instance (European are not criminals, Italy is not hell,…).

Unfortunately, the persons who take care of the returning migrants are not sufficiently skilled and need training in psychology.

D / EDUCATION PROGRAMS

The Tunisian ministry of education should include a chapter in the educative programs in schools, dedicated to illegal migration and its dangers and focusing on the family and nation values.

We should also promote a specific education programs for the parents. This action was a really success in West African countries. In fact, in Senegal for instance, mothers used to collect money to make their sons able to cross the ocean and reach the European coasts. Now, these same mothers have joined altogether to create small NGOs preventing the Young to migrate illegally. The objective of this action is to spread a positive behaviour in the families, pushing them to accept the return of the migrant as a benediction, and not as a shaming failure. Otherwise, the returning migrant, after a few times in his home, will have one only idea in his mind: try again his illegal attempt.

The education programs can use the large, popular, networks of the Red Crescent and the Scouts. Education can also be made at a higher level, by developing scientific programs with the Tunisian university, and organising conferences and workshops on illegal migration issues.

E / EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS

Obviously, the quest for a job is the main engine of clandestine migration. Efficient employment programs must be based on the self-management of once life, and there are two ways we can help the returning illegal migrant in this regard.

The first kind of actions is to improve his skills according to his environment. This can be made by offering to him a complete technical training in a manual job needed in his neighbourhood, as carpentry, metallurgy or electricity.

The second way is to help the returning migrants in obtaining micro credits in order to create little activities. These kinds of actions were successful in fixing poor, non-educated populations in the rural regions of the North West of Tunisia. The selection of the beneficiaries of small bank loans could be made according to specific criteria, as for example the geographic regions from which there exist a big flow of migrants.

It could be possible to mix these two actions, and offer to the Young both a training program and a micro credit, so that he can manage the social integration of his own society, forgetting any idea of illegal migration.

F / SOCIAL PROGRAMS

The Tunisian government should initiate social actions in the departure regions, acting directly in the quarters. These street-programs, lead by street-educators, consist in giving real-life assistance to the returning illegal migrants, especially the Young.

These kinds of programs had great success in the French working-class suburbs, where social educators - coming themselves from these suburbs - act as "big brothers" to help the Young facing unemployment, discrimination and poverty. As they reduce the gap between the educator and the educated, these social programs can help the youngest illegal migrant stop looking for negative solutions, as trying again the illegal attempt, or being recruited by criminal organisation. It can also avoid the Young to join extremist religious groups promising to them a better life.

To run such programs, it is possible to use the services of former trafficker who can engage in the advisory of illegal migrants. That was made successfully again in Western African countries, and in particular Senegal and Mali, where former trafficker are now helping local NGOs in changing the mind of the young candidates to illegal migration.

This may be the most difficult part of the program, as it must be based on mutual confidence, open-mind and solidarity. In addition, the social assistants must be aware of the reality of the neighbourhood, as unemployment, poverty, trouble with the police, criminality,… Otherwise it would be just like preaching in the wind.

G / STRUGGLE AGAINST TRAFICANTS

Smugglers gangs are operating in Tunisia, proposing trips to Lampedusa between 500€and 1000€ There is a need to struggle against trafficker's recruitment activities.

H / THE ORGANISED MIGRATION

Tunisia and Italy should collaborate closer in order to simplify the legal temporary migration procedures. Both sides could benefit from such strategy: the Italian authorities can control the movements of the migrant and have the possibility to expulse them at any time, after a probation period (if no job is found after a 6 months period, for example). From the Tunisian migrant side, this is a safe way to make his attempt, and to understand that Italy may not be the Promised Land.

There already exists a procedure, according to which the Italian employers can consult a database (Anagrafe) composed of Tunisian candidates to migration to Italy. But this did not really work, probably because of the complexity of the selection procedures. In all the ways, such system should be improved and be more flexible.

CONCLUSION

The study led to two main conclusions: although it was a local and conjectural event, the Jasmine revolution had tremendous implications on the whole Mediterranean region, provoking a "migrant phobia" in Southern Europe, and in particular in Italy.

The second conclusion we could come with is that the enormous investments made by Italy in high-technology security devices did not seem to be much useful during the Lampedusa crisis. Even the reinforcement of Frontex was no sufficient to stop the influx of Tunisian migrants.

The lasting solution is probably not downstream, but rather upstream. In fact, the European Union members must sit together, and cooperate with the Tunisian government, in order to settle a long term strategy preventing Tunisians to migrate to Italy at cost of life.

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
ANNEX

Annex 1: the route from Tunisia to Lampedusa

Mer Méditerranée

ITALIE

Détroit de Sicile

Tunis

ALGÉRIE

Golfe de Gabès

TUNISIE

LIBYE

100 km

Superficie	163 610 km²
Population	10,5 millions d'hab.
PIB / hab (2009)	3 800 dollars
Taux de chômage (officiel)	14,7%

Bizerte

Tunis

Pantelleria (ITALIE)

Sicile (ITALIE)

Nabeul

Zaghouan

Sousse

Monastir

Kairouan

Mahdia

Lampedusa (ITALIE)

Une île italienne située aux portes de la Tunisie

TUNISIE

Sfax

Gabès

Île de Djerba

Zarzis

100km

36 951

22 939

Février : 5 000 clandestins

Nombre de débarquements clandestins en Italie

Source : gouvernement italien

2005   2008   2011

Annex 2: the route from Tunisia to Lampedusa (2)

Sources: FRAN data, Frontex Risk Analysis Unit 25-02-2011

**Annex 3: the route from Lampedusa to the rest of Europe**

Les autorités italiennes ouvrent les portes de l'espace Schengen aux immigrants

LES PAYS DE L'ESPACE SCHENGEN

Pays membre de l'Union européenne (UE)

Pays non membre de l'UE*

Pays de l'UE en dehors de cet espace

FINLANDE
NORVÈGE
SUÈDE   EST.
LET.
LIT.
IRLANDE   DANEMARK
ROYAUME-UNI   PAYS-BAS
ALLEMAGNE   POLOGNE
BELG.
LUX.   RÉP. TCHÈQUE
FRANCE   LIECHT.   SLOVAQUIE
SUISSE   AUTR.   HONGRIE
ROUMANIE
SLOVÉNIE
PORTUGAL   Vintimille
BULGARIE
ESPAGNE   Manduria
ITALIE   TURQUIE
GRÈCE
TUNISIE   MALTE
Lampedusa
*ainsi que l'Islande   CHYPRE
Source : Union européenne

FENCES, NETWORKS, PEOPLE
Exploring the EU/AFRICA borderland

Pavia, Faculty of Political Sciences, 15-17 December 2011

--------------------DRAFT PAPER – WORK IN PROGRESS – NO QUOTATION--------------------

Luca Ciabarri (University of Milano)

Beyond Europe's frontiers: the rise and fall of the migration route Libya-Lampedusa and the forms of mobility from the Horn of Africa.

This essay draws on field experiences conducted since 2003 in Somaliland – Horn of Africa – related to forced migration and population movements as well as on research conducted in Italy (in 2005 and 2009) on the trajectories of migration of people from the Horn of Africa. In addition, I've conducted extensive bibliographical recognition on the migration route I wi²ll focus my attention: the land route from the Horn of Africa through Libya and from here the sea passage to Italy (what I ha²ve briefly called the Libya-Lampedusa route).
This set of sources should allow to develop an all-comprehensive view of this migration route and, from this unitary perspective, specifically reflect on two points:

1) Repression is the common trait that unifies any segment of the migration route: As cause of the migratory movements, as experience along the route, in the systems of regulation and control of mobility in the receiving countries. Of course, actors, systems and forms of this repression are, for any segment, completely different. However, this common trait builds up unexpected proximities and distances between the actors involved (this was for instance apparent in the behaviour of the European governments – Italy and France in the frontline – vis-à-vis the migration flows generated by the Arab Spring).
Moreover, the forms and efficacy of the European systems of control and repression of mobility (the so-called externalization of frontiers) take shape and are deeply influenced by other kinds of dynamics which characterize the various segments of the migratory routes (of course also the opposite holds true). In other words, the form of power exercised by European countries to control mobility represents only one partial form of power regulating the migratory flows.
My interest thus lies in assessing the kind of power exercised by the European apparatus and the way they interact with other forms of power.

2) The migration route towards Italy which, from various African regions converged to Libya to reach the Sicilian coasts (shortly the Libya-Lampedusa route), has reached massive proportions only between 2005 and 2009. It is thus the result of specific contingencies, which have put in connection several migratory regions and routes otherwise disconnected. This calls into question the way migratory routes and corridors are represented:

General features
Before describing the dynamics of formation of the Libya-Lampedusa migratory route, I'll mention here a few general features highlighted by the researchers who have dealt with this topic:

1) the Lybia Lampedusa route, in its massive forms, emerged in the early 2000s as the combined result of the relationships historically developed between Libya and the Sahelian countries, of changes in the Mediterranean routes of migrants smugglers and in the European policies of control and, as for its south-eastern link, of the exacerbation of factors of crises in Sudan and in the Horn of Africa.

2) Migrants involved in this route originate especially from two regions: ~~the~~ Northern Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco) and the Horn of Africa (including Sudan along with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia). According to Perrin (2009) in 2004 2/3 of the migrant arriving to Lampedusa from Libya were from North Africa, data confirmed by the Shengen Committee of the Italian Parliament (2009), which reports that in 2004-5 the 50% of them were Egyptians. In 2006-7 on the contrary Moroccans citizens prevailed, in correspondence with the incidents of Ceuta and Melilla which stopped the access to Spain. In 2008 the majority was constituted by Tunisian people, followed by Nigerians, Somalis and Eritreans. According to the Shengen Committee the number of the arrivals was: 13.594 people in 2004; 22.824 in 2005; 21.400 in 2006; 16.875 in 2007; 34.540 in 2008. The route has also been used by people from West Africa, following migration circuits from those regions to Libya existing since long time.

3) As for the Horn of Africa, most of the migrants are refugees who potentially can request the international protection. UNHCR (UNHCR Italia 2009) reports that in 2008 about 75% of those who arrived at Lampedusa applied for asylum. About 50% of them actually attained either ~~the~~ refugee status or ~~the~~ subsidiary protection. The Lampedusa question thus eminently regarded asylum and the legal duty of the receiving countries, according to the Geneva Convention, to provide protection or to conform at least to the principle of non refoulement. In addition, according to the European ~~regulament~~ regulation Dublin II ~~introduced~~ stipulated in 2003 that the duty of assistance normally falls on the State of first arrival.

4) The number of migrants arriving to Lampedusa each year represented a very limited amount of the total number of new migrants entering Italy, also solely considering illegal immigration. According to Monzini (2007) quoting data from the Minister of Interior, in 2007 arrivals to Lampedusa represented the 13% of the total irregular immigration entering Italy. Actually, if the system of control really functions, there is no illegal migration in Lampedusa since those who arrive are either sent back in compliance with the readmission agreements signed by Italy with the sending countries (signing these agreements along with negotiating quotas of legal entry to Italy actually represent a central dynamics in the Lampedusa question) or present request for asylum. ==Irregularity occurs only when the system of control does not work, for its own inconsistencies, for procedures too slow or too complicated, for congestion. .==

The rise and decline of the route Libya-Lampedusa – a macro-description

Despite its extreme visibility, studies on the Libya-Lampedusa corridor are still rare. A number of analyses regard Libyan internal labour market and Libyan relationships with its southern neighbours. Scholarly and journalistic accounts describe the link with West Africa. Very few studies on the contrary regard the Horn of Africa, and few studies have tried to connect the various factors at work and the different regions involved. There is however a general consensus among the scholars on the main determinants which concurred to the emergence of this route.

The factors that have to be taken into account are: the dynamics of the internal labour market in Libya; the development of its relationships with the southern African countries and the European countries; the variation of the migration systems which cross Mediterranean in relation to the strategies of control of the European countries and the counterstrategies of the migrants' smugglers. In correspondence with the development of the oil industry in the 1960s and 70s, Libya becomes a country of intense immigration, attracting in particular people from the neighbouring North Africa states, chiefly form Egypt. Through short term contracts which often implied seasonal movements

in and out of the country, migrants were employed in the oil industry but also in ~~the~~ infrastructural and agricultural projects, in the administration and education ~~field~~ (Pastore 2008, Hamood 2006). Initially, the number of workers from sub-Saharan Africa wa~~i~~s limited: only in the 1990s there is a decisive increase, due to the new political scenario and the new policy inaugurated by Gheddafi towards the African continent at that time. The decade in fact corresponds to the international isolation of Libya and the embargo of the United Nations due to the alleged involvement of Libya in cases of international terrorism, in particular after the Lockerbie attack in 1988. Accusing the neighbouring Arab countries of not supporting enough Lybia in this conjuncture, Gheddafi shifts his attention towards its southern frontier and inaugurates a new policy of alliance and influence on the sub-Saharan countries. Through diplomatic agreements and announcements on the media, the southern land ~~frontier~~ border was made permeable. The tension along the ~~frontier~~border, Lybia was at war with Chad for instance until the late 1980s, was replaced by smoother relations. Even though for different reasons and in a different context, the move resembles to what was happening in the same ~~years~~ period in the Middle East, where after the first Gulf war in the oil economies of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates workers coming from the Arab countries were replaced by new immigrants coming from further East, in particular southern India and Pakistan (cfr. Jaber/Metral 2005). The experience_s_ of these new African workers in Libya ~~was~~ were accompanied ~~however~~ also by a number of difficulties due to the declining fortunes of the Libyan economy under embargo, the seesaw of Libyan relationships with its new allies at the southern ~~frontier~~ border and the recurrent ~~, as in the past,~~ expulsions and controls of the foreign workers.

Overall, the dynamics of the regional labour market and the economic differential, in addition to the political circumstances, have strongly integrated in the 1990s Libya and its southern ~~frontier~~border. This relationship however draws also on deeper and longer ~~term~~ historical processes.

Pliez (2000; 2004a; 2004b; Bredeloup/Pliez 2011) has since long studied the socio-economic dynamics of the belt that connects south_ern_ Libya with the ~~frontier/~~Sahelian countries (Chad, Niger and~~,~~ Sudan). Setting apart the suggestion of looking at the ancient transaharan caravan routes as the basis for ~~the~~ current relationships, he describes a process of growing integration and spatial density which since the 1950-60 has modified the landscape of the desert towards an increasing urbanization and settlement of the population. In those years the southern Libyan space slowly return_ed_~~s~~ to be an area of communication and exchanges with the Sahelian countries, absorbing the fractures created by the disruptive Italian war against the Senussia brotherhood (1920-1930) and by colonial occupation. Commercial and religious networks strengthened by the return to Libya of those who fled during that time overlapped also with other forms of integration: the penetration from the south of livestock traders, the drought in the 1970s which produced further forms of mobility and groups heading north_wards_ looking for opportunities. Local wars and peace-processes, between Chad and Libya or the Tuareg rebellions in Niger, generated further movements of population towards the north. On the other side, from north the Libyan state move southward contributing to the integration of different spaces: driven by the oil rent, the State expanded in the desert through a number of gigantic development projects. Kufra for instance, the last bastion of the Senussi resistance, after long years of isolation has emerged as a pivotal urban centre in the Sahara. Here hybrid and mixed figures of traders, migrants looking for job, refugees, ex soldiers, look for chances in the state-driven development projects and in the spontaneous economy of trade and transportation emerging around them. These actors connect the new Saharan centres, border towns or transit nodes along the communication routes (the centres of Kufra and Sebha for instance described by Pliez – 2000; 2004b). Organized around such urban centres, t~~T~~he transformation of Sahara thus~~, organized around the urban centres,~~ occurs through phenomena of spatial density, integration and constant mobility.

French scholars – Pliez, above quoted, or Gregoire (2004) – as well as a number of well-informed journalistic accounts (Liberti 2008, Gatti 2008) have described the migration line between south Libya and West Africa through the belt of Chad and Niger. Equally, Sudan has also witnessed similar dynamics, as described by Bredeloup/Pliez (2010) and Hamood (2006). From Sudan, the

routes leading to Libya cross Northern Darfur, but also Khartoum is at the crossroad of relationships with Libya, as the flourishing Libyan market in the city attests. Khartoum, however, is also a place frequented by ~~-~~migrants, refugees, traders and students coming from the Horn of Africa. The importance of Sudan thus also lies ~~also~~ in the fact that it connects two migratory circuits. It integrates, in different times and with variable degrees of success, the Libya/Sudan space with the belt Sudan/Horn of Africa. In the 1990s the states of the Horn have witnessed a long time of instability and conflict, producing several and stratified movements of population. Eritreans ~~people~~ ha~~ve~~d been hosted since a long time in refugee camps in Sudan, reflecting the long conflict with Ethiopia. In the early 1990s, with the achievement of Eritrean independence, part of these refugees started to return to their country (Kibreab 1996). Afterwards, however, in the growing repressive trajectory of ~~the~~ independent Eritrea, the exit of people restarted. The Sudan itself is linked to Libya not only through trade and labour circuits but also through the flight of Sudanese refugees, from the war in the South and in Darfur, just to mention the two most visible foci of conflict. In Ethiopia also, a number of political crises have compelled people to move: linked for instance to the border war with Eritrea in 1998 or to post-election disorders in 2005. Finally, Somalia throughout the 1990s and 2000s has continued to produce refugees and population movements: in massive forms in the early 1990s, at the beginning of the civil war, and with a new acceleration from 2006, in correspondence with the Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu. In these instabilities, Addis Abeba and Khartoum have always represented two important hubs for the Somali refugees, as a shelter but also as a new starting point for further mobility. Of course, Sudan and Libya never were the only destinations of Somali wanderings. From Kenya to South Africa or from Yemen to Saudi Arabia or the Emirates eastward, more destinations have been followed as final shelter or transit to other areas by the Somali migrants.

The integration between the Libyan space and migratory circuits located further south however is not sufficient to explain the emergence of the Libya-Lampedusa route and to understand how Libya, from immigration zone, has also become in recent years a transit area towards Europe. In order to understand this, we have to add an analysis of the migration routes in the Mediterranean sea. Here the policies of control carried out by the European countries have progressively narrowed the spaces and the possibility to reach the northern shore.

With regard to the routes converging to Italy, it is possible to identify exactly in the early 2000s a significant shift. Nearly closed were? the routes from the Balkan peninsula formed in the 1990s as a consequence of the Yugoslavian collapse and Albanian instability, the Libya route emerged specifically, as ~~stressed~~ emphasized by Monzini (2008), from the decline of two other routes: the one through the Suez canal and the one from Tunisia. The first one was clamped down through military collaboration and diplomatic agreement between Italy and Egypt (Vassallo Paleologo 2008), the second one through the signing of readmission agreements with Tunisia. In the background, also the progressive closure of the routes leading to Spain from Morocco and West Africa played an important role (cfr. Coslovi 2007, de Haas 2008).

All these changes produced the concentration on Libya of the flows of migrants. Monzini (2004, 2008), drawing on an extensive analysis of juridical cases, highlights that the starting was favoured by the movement to Libya of traffickers previously operating along the Tunisian and Suez corridor. The thesis which refers to the activities of organizations of migrants smugglers is confirmed also by the initial localization of the departure (the Libyan locality of Al Zwarha, close to the Tunisian border), by the homogeneous types of ships used and strategies used to cross the sea. In their most mature forms, these strategies involved the abandoning of ~~the~~ migrants in international or domestic waters, challenging the duty of the states to rescue the migrants. The command of the boat was also given to one of the migrants, who could thus have a discount for the trip. Typical consequences of the systems of strong control and repression, another strategy included multiple departures at the same time, in order to congest the procedures of screening and control at the arrival.

The change in the strategies of migrants smuggling in the Mediterranean has thus transformed Libya into a territory of transit to Italy. Other factors however have then determined the success of

this route, the enormous dimension that it acquired and its final congestion. With regard to this, the influence of the smuggling organizations has not to be overemphasized, particularly the more we get far from the immediate managing of the sea crossing from Libya. Research conducted thus far reports that initially foreigners (Tunisian people for instance) were involved in the high level organization of the smuggling in Libya. In the contact with the migrants however more frequently their co-nationals were at work, often ex-migrants who stopped along the road (Monzini 2008). Networks illegally organizing migrations are described, along this route, as loosely structured, localized in the different segments and nodes of the route but never controlling it entirely (Hamood 2006). In addition, there are along the way different forms of *passeurs* and facilitators, though never constituting a precise organization. Frequently, those who organize the traffic just tend to spread information along the migration corridors and in its nodes, but most of the times this same information circulate autonomously and without control from above: the illegal organization of mobility is one of the elements that influence the formations and success of the migratory routes but never entirely and without the capacity to explain their major dynamics, particularly when we consider those segments far from the Mediterranean sea. Migration routes are phenomena that interweave local and regional mobility, economic exchanges as well as religious or education networks, systems of border crossing, flows of information which move along them.

The concentration of the traffic on Libya, last comer in the market, derives from the progressive clamping down of other routes in the Mediterranean. But the success of this route also and most relevantly derives from its deep integration into the routes of mobility previously described which put in communication several migratory circuits, and from collecting flows from areas of conflict and destabilization or from routes that couldn't be followed any longer. This exceptional combination of elements has unified diverse migration circuits into a unique long-distance route. There is finally a political factor to take into account in order to complete the full picture. Internationally isolated during the 1990s, Libya has witnessed since the end of the decade and the beginning of the 2000s a process of rapprochement to western countries. In the shadow of much bigger stakes and interests, the issue of migration has become an important element of discussion, even a tool to start the same rapprochement process (Pastore 2008) and argument to gain leverage in negotiation for both the parties. This essay won't go into the details of the negotiation between Libya and western countries, and in particular in the details of the treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation stipulated between Italy and Libya in that process (cfr. Pastore 2008). The whole process however has deeply transformed the migratory dynamics in Libya, producing more rigidity and repression on the migrants and foreign workers living in the country. Uncertainty on the status of foreign workers and recurrent repressions and expulsions have always marked the dynamics of the labour market in Libya. From 2000 however these forms of repression – along with increased difficulties in absorbing the manpower present in the country – were part of the politics of externalization of the border and of the pressures carried out by the European countries to have more control of the migratory flows in Libya. Initially, this pressure has even produced an increase in the attempts of the migrants to reach ~~from Libya~~ the Italian coasts from Libya (De Haas 2008, Coslovi 2007).

From the diplomatic interaction between western countries and Libya two specific categories have emerged, which, in their apparently descriptive form, conveys profound consequences: the category of transit and the category of sub-Saharan migrants. The first one represents the idea that Libya is essentially a corridor of transit of African migrants who try to reach Europe. Pastore (2008) suggests that in this interaction, which has regarded Libya as well as many other African countries, the idea of transit was a sort of invention of the African leaders to build up a negotiation power. Increasing the number of the potential migrants on transit was part of this dynamic. The number was based on an estimation of the migrants that yearly were crossing the southern Libyan frontier, without considering the fact that the same individual could enter and leave the country in different times or just stop in the country without having any intention to cross the sea. These assumptions thus denied the long history of Libya as an immigration country. The category of transit has been

then fully appropriated by the European countries, creating the general impression of an uncontrollable invasion of people from Africa. Furthermore, the category of transit conceals the fact that the protagonists of the sea crossing were mainly north African citizens (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco). Opposed to the category of north Africans was the one of sub-Saharan migrants. This term however generates other concealments, since within this category falls a number of diverse motivations, trajectories, areas of origin. In particular, what is concealed is the issue of the refugees, that is to say the most vulnerable category of migrants along that route. In the next two paragraphs I'll refer to a specific context of departure of refugees – the Somali region – in order to see the complex and multi-faceted nature of the processes of forced migration.

2006-2009: leaving Mogadishu

Civil war in Somalia since 1988 has recurrently produced massive outflows of refugees towards the neighbouring countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti – and to a less extent towards further places. These included countries with historical links to Somalia – colonial links for Italy and UK or religious and economic links for the Arabian Peninsula – or new ones, in part following a new geography dictated by western countries' asylum systems: Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and France, USA and Canada. In a later time, the growing barriers to international mobility and the search for opportunities have opened up further destinations, such as South Africa, Malaysia or Australia. Part of these movements have occurred through official programmes of re-settlement of refugees, others through self-managed programmes and strategies. Families whose members are scattered in diverse continents and the ongoing mobility between these different places of secondary migration represent a common outcome of this process (cfr. Farah 2003).

After intense out-movements of population in the early 1990s, the early 2000s have been characterized by increased difficulties due to the reduced possibility to access the European countries. On the one sidehand, the international community had to face the problem of recognizing a situation of extreme instability but not always characterized by open conflict, on the other side the new atmosphere of war on terror added to this, bringing in further suspicion towards those form of mobility developed outside the official forms, since, as in the case of the Somalis, migrants belonged to a State no longer existing or originated from territories identified as hosting movements and people linked to al Qaeida. The invasion of Ethiopia and its occupation of Mogadishu on December 2006 has represented not only the return to war and massive destructions in Somalia, with the *en masse* flight of the civil population, but also a partial return to an official recognition of the population movements originating from Somalia, within the language of asylum and international protection. The flight from Mogadishu however has confirmed all the complexities and ambiguities typical of the population movements from Somalia, aggravated by the obsessive external focus on security issues typical of the post 9/11 years. The war in Mogadishu between the Ethiopian army and the Islamic Courts has caused the flight of about 800.000 people, while the total number of displaced people considering the surrounding regions corresponds to about 1.100.000 (Lindley 2009: 5). In this framework, Kenya in January 2007 has closed its border with Somalia, refusing the entry of new Somali refugees, arguing that that among their ranks there could be found members suspected of connections to Al Qaeida. During the military operations led by Ethiopia, US forces actually directly intervened several times to bombard within the Somali territory specific targets identified as terrorists. On the other side, during the war the Islamic Courts frequently attacked personnel and means belonging to the UN humanitarian agencies. This provoked the impossibility to create a safe humanitarian space where to provide assistance for the civil population (Guglielmo 2009: 17). As reported by Guglielmo, the Kenyan blockade however did not prevent the refugees from crossing the border but just changed the way they could do it: empowering local human smugglers and producing risky adaptive strategies pursued by the refugees. The most vulnerable subjects – children, old people, women – were in several cases abandoned along the

border, compelling the assistance agencies on the Kenyan side to rescue them and take them to the refugee camps already existing in the area since early 1990s, while men usually preferred to find a way across the border in order to reach the urban centres in Kenya, where they expected to find more economic opportunities (ib: 19). Many refugees thus remained within the Somali borders (qualified as IDP, Internally Displaced Persons, by the UN international agencies), in the surroundings of Mogadishu or moving further away: towards their area of origins, towards other safe areas or heading to other international borders in the north. A few groups went to Somaliland, a region that since early 1990s has successfully restored internal peace and stability, other moved to Puntland, in the north-east corner of Somalia, trying, from there, to cross the sea to Yemen. The sea route to Yemen, always used by Somalis, reached in the second half of the 2000s high visibility, when UNHCR started to recognize the Somali refugees heading there and providing them support. Like in the Mediterranean, this sea route has over years claimed a vast number of victims, mostly undocumented (cfr. Human Rights Watch 2009; MSF 2008). The route was used not only by Somalis fleeing from Mogadishu, but also by ethnic Somalis escaping from the repression carried out in Ethiopia by the national army, in particular in the Ogaden region (Human Rights Watch 2008) and by Ethiopian citizens looking for jobs and economic opportunities in Yemen and, from here, in Saudi Arabia. Anna Lindley (2009) has analyzed a few pathways followed by migrants fleeing from Mogadishu, highlighting their extreme variability and the constant changes occurr~~inged~~ during the flight, in relation to shifting perceptions of security, of the available opportunities and of a number of unpredictable contingencies. The micro-narrations she has collected offer a complex picture of forced migration: there are multiple forms of conflict and violence as well as multiple ways in which people perceive the degree of violence and insecurity and multiple ways in which this affects people's decision to leave. The flight, whereas in some instances is immediate and reactive, in other cases represent one of the possible ways utilised by people to escape insecurity and decline. The direction and destination of the flight is equally subject to innumerable variables, from the perception of the safe places to the resources available to reach them to the effects of the many uncontrollable events which can occur along the way. Only from these areas of initial refuge, longer trajectories are then planned or organized (including the attempts to reach the Mediterranean), often through the hubs of international migration as Addis Abeba, Khartoum or Cairo. The flight thus appears as a sum of pathways and attempts, which can cover vast spaces and periods of time.

After forced migration: the diasporic society of Somaliland and the time of *tahrib*

In 2007-08, the time when I carried out my last long-term fieldwork in Somaliland, the country was crossed by different kinds of population movement. There were groups of Ethiopian citizens on transit trying to reach – via Puntland – the Yemen; there were people who had fled from Mogadishu; other ethnic Somali groups, formally Ethiopian citizens, were also heading to Yemen to escape Ethiopian internal repressions; in addition, Somalilanders, especially young people, were trying to reach the western countries, through air routes, for instance in the case of family reunification, or via land, especially for those who had to rely on irregular channels. Part of them set foot to Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya, trying to do what locally came to be known as *tahrib*. Also in the case of Somaliland, these forms of mobility draws on more profound historical stratifications, from the emigration towards the oil economies of the Arabian peninsula in the 1970s and 1980s to the forced displacement to Ethiopia during the civil war of 1988-91 (Ciabarri 2008). The profound insertion of this regions into the circuits of international migration thus started in the form of labour migration to Middle East, but was then progressively linked to various forms of instability, from the drought of mid-1970s to political violence in the 1980s and 90s. Starting with the civil war in 1988 then this insertion took decidedly the form of forced migration and the language of asylum. Once the condition that determined the massive out-flow of people during the civil war in the early 1990 ended, however, there was no return to the previous situation. The experience of forced

migration has repositioned Somaliland society on entirely new bases. Somaliland diaspora has built up a kind of society where remittances – as already happened in the 1970s-80s – play a fundamental role. Remittances in fact have strongly contributed to the internal reconstruction and development which accompanied the peace process, by assuring the restart of the local economy, by supporting most of the families and by setting up fundamental education and health services. The outward projection of society which characterized the times of the flight was transformed into a permanent option, one of the strongest social forces to produce local development and ensure security for any family group. The communities living abroad, in particular through their effects at local level, thus act as pole of attraction for new migrations. Their role is fully included in the local economy, determining a social dynamic that compels also the new generations to emigrate. Other elements of economic development, in particular international trade and the development projects carried out by the international community, have a minor significance if compared to the remittance economy. The major economic resource of Somaliland, the export of livestock towards the Arabian peninsula, has suffered in these years by the ban imposed by the Arab countries. Besides the economic impact, the new diasporic society builds up also new dynamics and sources of inequality. One of the major axes of differentiation develop between those groups and individual who have access to the transational society and those who have not, between families who have members living abroad and sending remittances and those who have not or in a limited part. The struggles for social inclusion, the search for upward social mobility, the economic aspirations of the families and the individuals are directed outward and prescribe a passage abroad. Especially from the standpoint of the youngest generations, who have very little chances to find a job and social stability in Somaliland, this mechanism function by dictating the forms of the social values and of social ascent and by building up a strong push for further emigrations. However, whereas past emigration could occur under the publicly recognized mark of the asylum law or other legal forms, the new outflows are hardly recognized, apart from the form of the family reunification. The oil economies of the Arabian peninsula now in fact preferably recruit their labour force in countries like India or Pakistan, while legal entries to Europe don't contemplate normally these areas of origin, even for educational purposes. This closure of the European borders has thus produced various routes for irregular emigration. In correspondence with the rise of the Libya-Lampedusa route and its strict integration with circuits of migration located deep inside the African continent, this route has been included among those available for the Somaliland youth, who could follow the path of other refugees and migrants gathered along the migratory hubs of Addis Abeba and Khartoum. This possibility, particularly during the 2000s, has given birth to a real fever and obsession to leave among local youth, the fever of the *tahrib*. Tahrib is an Arabic word meaning contraband, illegal trade. Hamood (2006) reports that this was the accusation informally made by the Libyan police against those migrants arrested while they were planning to cross the sea. But for the Somaliland youth, *tahrib*, which for them also implies danger, challenge and freedom at the same time, meant to take the road of adventure and personal emancipation, getting rid of those links and limitations of a society without opportunities. It is a survival strategy for the most marginalized groups, for whom sending somebody outside is a form of insurance for the future. But it is also an act of rebellion for the better off teenagers, or the two things altogether in other instances: rebellion against the past generation who could build its security by migrating abroad, against the fathers who prevent their sons from setting off on risky and uncertain travels, or again against the difficulty to find a job. But it is also – and this is explicitly declared by these young people – a rebellion against the rigid forms of control and limitation of migration from the south of the world set up by the Western countries (not the only ones however), which impedes any form of regular and safe migration.

Conclusions:

At the conference.

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Encapsulated Migrants: living outside your heart in bordered Johannesburg

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The 'story' of Congolese immigrants to Johannesburg is to some degree that of forced migrants to anywhere, depending on local conditions in the receiving country and the expectations and resources of the immigrant community. And so I recall the smiling faces and shining eyes of the African graduates as they arrived for advanced study in America. Within a year these were exchanged for long, gray faces and tired, hollow gazes as they struggled through the lonely, often poverty-plagued stretch of their course abroad. I have seen the same stressed expressions and worried gazes on the faces of the male Congolese immigrants to Johannesburg who have studied with me or whom I have met through Congolese colleagues. Many of the Congolese immigrants to Johannesburg have come with high hopes, but as we all know, in English the word 'hopes' is all too often seen in the company of its partner, 'dashed'.

Since the 1990s, migration from Zaire, later the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could be characterised as middle-class flight, partly from economic uncertainty, but also from political instability and violence. As avenues to immigration to Europe and North America rapidly closed, post-apartheid South Africa seemed to offer an attractive alternative or way-station, with its 'first-world' economic sector, African-dominated government, and – on paper- pro-continental policies. As a result, Congolese migration to South Africa is primarily middle class, young and male. The average Congolese refugee is 32 years old; 43% are single and a further 23% do not live with their spouses. Congolese refugees in South Africa are extraordinarily well educated; 47% have a tertiary education and a further 33% have matric; 36% were students in the DRC, 20% were skilled professionals, and just 4% were unemployed. The extent to which Congolese refugees are informed about life in South Africa before they migrate is unclear. Most respondents said they had only limited contact with their relatives in the Congo because communication between South Africa and the DRC was so poor. Writing or phoning was nearly impossible because the Congolese postal and telephone systems barely functioned. Several respondents, however, used the internet to learn what was going on at home. A strikingly large number had e-mail addresses they used at internet cafes around town.[1] Emigrants are persuaded as much by their own hopes as by the smooth-talking entrepreneurs called *Tindikueurs* (Lingala, 'pushers') who misrepresent South Africa as a place of refugee stipends and plentiful employment. Sadly, while 4% of Congolese migrants were unemployed in the DRC, 29% are unemployed in South Africa. A further 50% are in work they

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[1] A sample survey carried out in Johannesburg in 2002 found that the Congolese respondents were in fairly regular contact with people back home, mainly over the internet, suggesting quite a strong flow of information (Lauren Landau, personal communication).

describe as unskilled – street vending, cutting hair, washing and guarding cars – while just four 4% are in what they regard as skilled work. If the majority occupied the upper echelons of the Congolese labour market and education system, their situation in South Africa is pretty much reversed. It appears that the "businesses" of the vast majority of Congolese street traders are not so much dynamic SMMEs as meagre survivalist enterprises. These figures throw into sharp relief the journey many Congolese refugees have taken – from middle-class privilege back home to the very bottom of urban society in South Africa.

The story of Congolese migration to South Africa is associated with sudden economic collapse, war and societal implosion. A group of young people, groomed to take their place among the professional classes of their society, have the rug pulled from under their future, and end up living in a foreign land where they cannot access credit, open a bank account, or appeal to the police when in trouble. In these inhospitable conditions, they develop few ties with outsiders, cluster into defensive networks, and negotiate life from the fringes of the urban economy. What sort of sensibility do they bring to this dismal segment of the South African labour market? Upon arrival, the immigrants find the Congolese do not have a consolidated structure as a community that could offer assistance, nor is there any formal structure or association that unites all of them. Instead, Congolese refugees move in tight-knit ethnic networks. People who share regional, ethnic and linguistic identities live together in rented rooms and negotiate the city together. Very few have close friendships with people from other countries, and relations with Congolese from other ethnic groups ranged from the acrimonious to the mutually suspicious. A major cultural fault line divides the French and Lingala-speaking Congolese of the west from the Swahili (sometimes even English) speakers of the east and south. French provides an unsatisfactory bridge over this divide. Even so, there are also economic migrants from the DRC who have been able to establish themselves successfully in South Africa. Relatively strong, though narrow social networks characterize the Congolese refugee community. Congolese are known to offer each other accommodation or lend money to each other, although long-standing regional and tribal subdivisions determine between whom. Most service providers perceive the community as unorganized and characterized by regional and ethnic divisions which make it difficult for people to agree. There is, therefore, no formal way to mobilize or communicate with the community.

Most Congolese have limited contact with South Africans, and hardly any have ever been to an African township. All are essentially ghettoised within the inner city. Besides church, there were few places where refugees and native-born individuals encountered one another because most refugees did not work or go to school. Most people did come into contact with refugees from other countries in the apartment buildings where they lived or at church. The exceptions are those, primarily men,

who have South African girlfriends or wives, a topic I shall address further on. In general, Congolese have transferred the ethnic or sub-national borders they lived within in a hostile DRC to South Africa. The associations they do form are call themselves "families" or "tribes". Apart from organising assistance for new arrivals or those in trouble with the authorities, these play an important role in preserving once localized forms of culture, teaching children their 'tribe's' language, folk narratives and songs, and re-invented traditions, and making sure none are raised by outsiders. Most importantly, the 'tribes' and 'families' pursue an anti-assimilationist agenda, severely criticizing South African mores and practices, downplaying its attractions, and attempting to channel their members' aspirations toward returning eventually to what is hoped to be a better and more-liveable DRC.

The South African Government has chosen from its accession to 'integrate' refugees into local communities, rather than build segregated camps for them, with all the expense, difficulties, and international scrutiny that would entail. In effect this means that most refugees flow, like drainage water, down to the areas of lowest social status and income in distressed urban and peri-urban areas. The Refugee Act of 1998 initially permitted refugees to get work permits. But by the time the Act was implemented in April 2000, the government had added a clause disallowing individuals with asylum permits to work. The Department of Home Affairs, which issues asylum papers, felt South Africa was being overrun by foreigners and that it was responsible for keeping people out. Refugees can work and live where they want, which in effect means fending for themselves, while the perceived 'burden' of accommodating them falls upon locals who are already among the dispossessed. The refugees' relative freedom brings with it major difficulties in negotiating South Africa's political, social and economic landscape. For Congolese, their physical features, bearing, clothing styles and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages make them more distinct and easily identified by local residents as 'foreign' than are nationals of bordering countries. African immigrants/migrants never thought of learning the language of the locals. They like sticking in their network and they are reluctant to mingle with black South Africans. In public arenas their inability to respond to questions in the vernacular evokes instant discord. In addition, when a population has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming. The isolation of South Africans during the apartheid years has meant that South Africans are unused to nationalities beyond southern Africa and find incorporating them difficult. This cannot be said, however, of the resentment and discrimination directed at refugees from neighbouring Zimbabwe or Mozambique, who have been immigrating into South Africa for a century or more. Further, it is important not to make too much of the issue of national or geographical/cultural 'othering' in a context where belonging is most fundamentally a quality of local (often long-term) community residence. This was

revealed by research conducted in the wake of the May 2008 'xenophobic' outbreak of violence against 'foreign' Africans. During those tragic events, a full 21 of the 63 people killed by armed gangs of locals turned out to be South African citizens. South Africans, regrettably, have no reservations against excluding one another from social entitlements whenever the opportunity arises. (see Coplan 2009). In at least some cases, it was the physical and social vulnerability of 'foreign' neighbours, and their unprotected possessions, that motivated the attacks rather than foreign nationality as such (Coplan 2009). This attitude is manifested whenever public resources are allocated or change hands in poor peri-urban settlements. New houses and other resources are routinely allocated or irregularly made over to people who have somehow 'jumped the queue'. Some government housing also inevitably ends up in the hands of foreigners, who have no choice but to buy or rent the houses from people to whom they have been officially allocated, a means for these locals to accumulate some cash income. This fosters the perception that resources that should rightfully go to those who 'belong' are being appropriated by those of their neighbours who 'do not'. The Congolese were not the direct target of organised xenophobic attacks, primarily because they are confined to depressed inter-city areas where a police presence and social order is nevertheless largely maintained. Many locals believe that the inner-city refugees are prospering, given relatively high inner-city rentals, since they have not seen the abandoned buildings and cramped, unserviced flats that accommodate up to twelve Congolese at a time. Tensions run particularly high between Black South Africans and refugees because members of each group see the other as their direct competitors for housing and jobs. Black South Africans feel that refugees were taking their jobs and there were few enough of these to begin with. They believe refugees contribute to rising rates of crime and disease. Further, 'The stranger is thought ungrateful because he fails to acknowledge and affirm the culture that has given him shelter and protection' (Cohen 1994, p. 207). Jonathan Crush, in a story in the newspaper *The Citizen* (04.11.2004) (Crush, J, 2002: 92) quotes Landau to report:

> Other myths were that non-nationals were needy and strained public service resources and were an economic threat. Research had shown that non-nationals were in fact contributing to the economy and even employing South Africans for their language skills and knowledge of local business…some non-nationals complained that the police saw them as 'walking ATMs.'

Francois, a young graduate from Congo Brazzaville complained: "Whenever I go to look for a job, they ask me for an ID (identity document). I have attended many job interviews. But I never got a chance of being employed simply because I don't have an ID. They always promise to call but they never call." (Kutikuza 2006: 67). With the customary enterprise shown by immigrant communities throughout the world, the Congolese survive by self-employment and self-sufficiency. They argue

they have no need to compete with locals for employment, and that on the contrary, they employ locals in order to attract local clients or customers. Due to their enterprise, the main market in Yeoville, an inner-city fringe suburb of Johannesburg? that shelters many Congolese, is now nicknamed 'Gambela' after the largest informal market in Kinshasa.

Conversely, the harsh treatment has also encouraged a tendency to view South Africans as the inferior 'Other'. Congolese experience has contributed to their strong negative stereotypes of South Africa and South Africans. Apart from the feeling that South Africans are prejudiced and parochial, a prominent perception is that South Africans, especially black South African men, are extremely violent. South Africa was portrayed as a country where social relations are in tatters. Another common view is that South Africans are poorly educated and ignorant and that prejudice rather than material circumstances was the driving force behind the lack of concrete assistance to refugees. Black South Africans are portrayed by African immigrants in Yeoville as unenterprizing and wasteful. Their negative perceptions of South Africans are also fuelled by four other critical issues: crime and violence; police corruption and brutality; unemployment and financial problems; and non-citizenship status. For most of the Congolese immigrants crime was the most negative feature of everyday life in South Africa. Living in the inner city and being a foreigner made it far more likely that they would be victims of crime, spreading the fear of criminal attack- what Covington and Taylor (1991) have described as 'indirect victimisation'. The targeting of African immigrants and migrants in Yeoville by local criminals and by the police implicitly undermines their rights to freedom of movement and speech. This renders them vulnerable and insecure. The desire and willingness to participate actively in civil society thus decreases, and African immigrants in Yeoville show little desire to assimilate. If they are denied opportunity to participate meaningfully in the society and to engage positively with the authorities and the locals, they will increasingly find strategies to avoid or outwit authority and to regard black South Africans negatively. In any case, most came to South Africa with the intention of transiting to Europe, North America or Australia. Relatively few want permanent residence; some want it for travelling because the majority are refugees or asylum seekers. They do not have passports and if they have dot, they are is either expired or without a valid South African visa that allows them to apply for a visa in any European or North American country.

The negative treatment meted out to Congolese, however, has not impacted on their own self-image. The prejudice they experience, combined with the issue of language and a residual familiarity with their own countrymen (however fraught), encouraged them to cohere and assert their own national identity to counter the racism directed at them. As Richmond has argued: "To the extent that immigrants from particular countries eventually exhibit some degree of social cohesion. it is

often in response to discriminatory treatment in the receiving society" (Richmond 1988, p. 50, cited in Morris 1998, p.1126).

African immigrants in Yeoville perceive that they are discriminated against and treated in a xenophobic manner by black South Africans. A common view is that locals, especially blacks, are not welcoming and that they treat outsiders harshly. This brings anger, surprise and anguish for African immigrants who think that they deserve better treatment from black South Africans because their countries gave support to South Africa during the struggle against apartheid. Often black South Africans do not accept that other countries helped them to fight apartheid. Many argue that African countries helped their political leaders who were in exile but not them as a population at the grassroots level. They do not identify themselves with their leaders who went into exile, while they were trapped at home to bear the brunt of the oppressive system and the dangerous, violent struggle against it. The South African government argues in vain that African immigrants should be given respect because their governments sheltered South African political exiles.

There are two domains in which Congolese do come together in close association with one another and with South Africans. The first of these involves virtually only Congolese men and South African black women; marriage or unmarried cohabitation. While such unions are often seen cynically by observers and by the Congolese who engage in them as well, testimony also reveals a necessary affection and mutual regard. Undeniably, male Congolese immigrants contract such unions to obtain legal South African residence and a passport for overseas travel, or for other practical reasons. South African women marry or partner with Congolese men for financial support, physical security, non-material assistance, and better accommodation, but we should not rule out some foundation for the relationship in that thing called love. In some cases such spouses make the unusual effort of learning to speak Lingala or Swahili if they are women, Zulu if they are men. The Congolese male partners occasionally attend gatherings held by their partner's families, but rarely larger, more anonymous social occasions. On the negative side, children seldom result from such relationships, and the partners are often untruthful and insincere about their long-term intentions. Sudden dissolutions are common when one or another of the partners achieves his or her goals for the relationship and choose to move on to a more preferred situation.

The second social domain of national and cross-national encounter is the churches. In addition to the established Roman Catholic Church in which most Congolese immigrants have been brought up, there are quite a large number of evangelical churches created by Congolese and other African immigrants in Johannesburg. The Victory Gospel Ministries, for example, has over 126 Congolese congregants, some of whom employ South Africans who are also members of the church. Some

Congolese congregants are also learning South African local languages as a means by which to participate more fully in the society. Conversely, some South African congregants, who have never been in the Congo, have become conversant in *Lingala* and *Swahili.* Church is the main institution bringing together Congolese, other immigrants, and South Africans in forms of meaningful interaction. Clergy work with NGOs and other social service agencies to involve immigrants in community activities, but it is quite difficult to persuade the immigrants to engage.

Overall, the situation of Congolese immigrants in Johannesburg is one characterised by a Congolese graduate student at my university as "living outside their hearts". Their physical being and consciousness are in Johannesburg, devoted to fulfilling dreams that seem to recede with the passage of time, while their hearts are in Congo with the family and friends left behind. Whatever the immigrants may say about South Africa, the reality is not only that there are few jobs at home, but that they dare not return without evidence of some measure of success to show for their time away. Hopes of moving on to a European or North American country fade. For the reasons described, the Congo9lese are largely unable to integrate into or participate in South African society, or to form a cohesive community of their own. Perhaps neither condition is unsurprising, nor can the immigrants' "encapsulated marginalisation" be blamed on the practices of social exclusion so imbricated in South African black society and reflected in official responses to refugees. The Congolese themselves, along with other immigrants, need to accept the challenge of building bridges with locals at all levels, no matter how daunting the apparent task. Why they so often fail to do so derives from hopes of either moving on or returning home within the foreseeable future, hopes that must fade as the months and years in their new environment stretch on. I am not Congolese, but this is my 'story' as well......

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Borderizing the island
Setting and narratives of the Lampedusa border play[1]

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Abstract
Lampedusa is definitely more 'border' than other Italian and European islands. Though, its 'borderness' is the result not only of its geographical location, but also of a specific 'borderization' process. Lampedusa has been transformed by specific measures and practices of border controls (also including the construction of a detention centre) not only into a hotspot of the Italian and EU border regime, but also into a stage on which the narratives of the 'tough border' and of the 'humane border' coexist in the performance of the 'border play'. After summarizing Lampedusa's 'borderness' from different points of view (the volume of immigration by sea, the deadly consequences of border controls, their compliance with human rights, the agency of migrants), this paper analyses the narratives prevailing, between 2004 and 2011, in five different acts of the 'border play'.

1. Introduction (Some islands are more 'border' than others)

Not only most Italians but also many other EU citizens would immediately link the island of Lampedusa with keywords like 'irregular migration' and 'migrant boats'. In the last two decades, in the European imagery, Lampedusa has more and more become a border island. All islands are borders, of course. But some islands are more 'border' than others. The degree of 'borderness' of an island in a given historical context is, at least to some extent, always a consequence of its geographical location: more or less far from the core of the relevant state territory, more or less close to 'other', 'foreign' territories. From this point of view, no wonder Lampedusa is more 'border' than other Italian (e.g. Capri or Elba) and European (e.g. the German Rügen or the French Oléron) islands that are geographically closer to the mainland, and – although being formally no less 'external borders of the EU' than Lampedusa – are located far away from any current migration route and, more generally, from third country (non-EU) territories.

And yet, the geographical context alone would not suffice to explain why Lampedusa is definitely more 'border' – not only in our perception but also in practical terms – than Pantelleria (another Italian island in the Strait of Sicily, which is even closer to North Africa).

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[1] A previous version of this paper has been submitted for the workshop "Irregular Migration in Islands and Archipelagos of Europe", Malta, 9-10 December 2011.

The 'borderness' of Lampedusa very much depends on political choices – on policies, practices and discourses that have been developed in and around the island, 'borderizing' Lampedusa and transforming it into the quintessential embodiment of the European migration and border regime. Before analysing, in sections 3 and 4, the policies – and the relevant narratives – that have contributed to the 'borderization' of Lampedusa, I will summarize, in section 2, the main features of Lampedusa's 'borderness'.

2. Lampedusa's borderness (The border observed from the border)

Indeed, writing the history of Lampedusa's 'borderness' would mean writing an epitome of the Italian and EU migration and border regime history. And at the same time it would confront us with almost all the main issues that have been the most recent object of migration and border studies; it would provide an ideal test bench for verifying many of the main insights and findings resulting from academic research on migration management and control in the last two decades.

First of all, Lampedusa could be analysed with regard to the number of migrants landing there (see annexed table). Over 150,000 migrants have arrived from North African coasts to Lampedusa in the last ten years. In the same period, comparable figures can only be found outside Italy, at similar outposts of the EU border regime, like Greek and Spanish islands. And yet, it is widely acknowledged that this is only a little percentage of irregular migration in Italy (Ministero dell'Interno 2007: 336) and Europe, the largest part of undocumented residents consisting either of persons who have crossed the land border irregularly or (and mainly) of persons who have entered EU territory with a valid visa and then overstayed its expiry date. Indeed, the number of people entering or trying to enter Europe illegally by sea is much smaller than it is generally perceived as a consequence of the widespread rhetoric of 'invasion' (De Haas 2007), particularly if we compare it with the demand for foreign workforce (every year millions of migrants legally enter Europe through national schemes for the recruitment of foreign workforce, or receive legal status through legalisation programmes) and with a EU population of half a billion inhabitants.

Furthermore, border controls have been criticized for their lethal impact on human lives (Spijkerboer 2007; Kiza 2008). Indeed, Lampedusa is the place where hundreds of migrants have touched Italian ground only as dead bodies, after losing their lives during the sea crossing (while thousands of others went missing on their way to Lampedusa). Some of them are buried in nameless graves in the local cemetery, while others were transferred to Sicily or mainland Italy and buried there instead.

It has also been pointed out that border control policies and practices indirectly causing such lethal effects (also including, besides casualties, the traumata – whose causes range from slavery to

sexual exploitation – that many of the migrants landed in Lampedusa had to experience during their journey) are, nevertheless, more and more encouraged and considered politically acceptable (Albahari 2006; Klepp 2011). Writing the history of Lampedusa's 'borderness' would show that the very act of saving lives at sea may result in criminalisation, and that there is a growing indifference towards the obligation to rescue people in distress at sea. Lampedusa is the place where seven Tunisian fishermen were arrested on 8 August 2007. After rescuing 44 migrants on the high seas, they had decided, according to international law, to bring them to the closest safe haven, which was Lampedusa. Though, they were accused of facilitating illegal immigration and consequently put on trial. Significantly, four months after the Tunisian fishermen had been arrested, an Italian fisherman was seized in Lampedusa under the accusation of murder: after meeting a boatload of migrants in distress on the high seas, he had pushed back into the sea one of them, who had swam to the fisherman's boat and climbed on board asking for help – the migrant's body was never recovered. More recently, on 4 August 2011, 377 sub-Saharan migrants that had set off from Libya landed in Lampedusa after a dramatic six days journey, and accused NATO navy ships of omitting to rescue them while they were in distress. Tens of their journey mates had therefore died during the sea crossing.

Ironically, though, saving human lives is presented as one of the priorities of border controls. As Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011) point out, "measures to contain boat migration are typically presented as serving to prevent both illegal immigration and the loss of migrants' lives during perilous journeys". Praising border controls for their life-saving purpose aims at making control practices more acceptable. Undoubtedly, Italian authorities have rescued thousands of migrants in the waters south of Lampedusa – and on several occasions they even had to put their own lives at risk to do so. And yet, the actual aim of border controls is not so much to rescue migrants, as rather to limit and control their freedom of movement.

Consequently, the high death toll at the external EU borders can be also explained by the fact that migrants are continuously forced to change their routes in order to escape controls. Indeed, the shifting routes of irregular migration represent another privileged topic of research, particularly for think tanks cooperating with states in designing the policies of migration management, like the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD 2007). Also in this regard, Lampedusa proves a privileged observatory. It has witnessed, among other things, the arrivals of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, who had been forced to abandon the route of the Suez Canal (which was safer insofar as it was covered with larger ships) after this had been put under strict control by joint Italian-Egyptian patrols, and therefore had to afford a much longer and dangerous journey to Africa first, then across the Sahara, and finally from Libya to Lampedusa on board of old and

overcrowded nutshells and dinghies. Similarly, the number of Moroccans arriving to Lampedusa from Libya skyrocketed after Spain and Morocco strengthened surveillance on the Ceuta and Melilla borders as well as on the Atlantic route to the Canaries.

Besides for their deadly consequences, border controls have been put into question also with regard to their compliance with human rights obligations, and particularly to detention conditions and forced returns.

Between October 2004 and March 2006 over three thousand migrants were returned to Libya after landing in Lampedusa. Some were pushed back directly from the island, while other return flights took place only after the migrants had been transferred to other Italian detention facilities. Allegedly, such returns have been carried out in breach of the Council of Europe's 'Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms'[2] and of the UN 'Convention relating to the status of refugees'[3]. Returns to Libya were continued even after a resolution of the European Parliament (2005) called on Italy "to refrain from collective expulsions of asylum seekers and 'irregular migrants' to Libya" and after the European Court of Human Rights stopped the deportation of eleven migrants who had exceptionally had the chance to file an appeal in time («il manifesto» 2005a).

The same allegations have been made about the push-back operations carried out against over 1,000 migrants intercepted in international waters south of Lampedusa and returned to Libya between May 2009 and 2010. While the UNHCR expressed "deep concern over the fate" of those "who were rescued […] and sent back to Libya without proper assessment of their possible protection needs" (UNHCR 2009), the Council of Europe (2010: 25) stated that "Italy's policy, in its present form, of intercepting migrants at sea and obliging them to return to Libya or other non-European countries, violates the principle of *non-refoulement*". A case against Italy was filed by 24 Somali and Eritrean migrants who eventually had the chance to do so after they were returned to Libya. The case is still pending before the European Court of Human Rights (Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme 2009).

The inhumane conditions of detention in Lampedusa have been the object of reports from Italian press as well as from international organisations, criticizing the centre for being overcrowded and for lacking the basic hygienic and health care conditions, and Italian authorities for humiliating migrants with degrading treatments (Gatti 2005; Amnesty International 2005: 30-36; Council of

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[2] The Convention forbids not only any collective expulsion (art. 4 of its Protocol No. 4) but also any transfer of persons to territories where they would be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment, according to the principle of *non-refoulement* (art. 3 of the Convention).
[3] The Convention forbids the expulsion or return of refugees to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (art. 33).

Europe 2009: 2, 17). On several occasions the duration of migrants' detention exceeded the maximum period allowed for by law,[4] and migrants were not granted access to legal advice (Sossi 2006; Sciurba 2009; Vassallo Paleologo 2011).

The very 'closed' nature of detention facilities makes it easier not only to commit but also to hide violations. This is why claims have been made that access to detention centres should be free for journalists, human rights organisations, and researchers. Instead, access to the Lampedusa detention centre has been restricted far beyond the limits set by Italian law. Although Italy is party to the 1951 UN 'Convention relating to the status of refugees', the UNHCR (the UN agency that should guarantee the application of the convention and ensure that every refugee can exercise the right to ask for asylum) has been denied access to the centre, and has thus been prevented from exercising its mandate (UNHCR 2005). Although members of the Italian Parliament have the right to freely access, anytime and without prior notice, all Italian detention facilities, deputies from both Parliament Chambers were denied access to the Lampedusa centre on several occasions («il manifesto» 2005b; Ansa 2005).

As one of the most important detention centres in Italy and Europe, Lampedusa could also tell us a lot about the nature of such total institutions, which have been seen, on the one hand, as the places where the state of exception takes form and migrants' bodies are reduced to bare life (Agamben 1995), but have been also considered, on the other hand, for their role of slowing down migration (Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2007) within the process of selective and differential inclusion of migrants (Mezzadra and Neilson 2008). In this sense, Andrijasevic (2006) has already pointed out the specific role of Lampedusa in the process of 'production of illegality'. While for some migrants Lampedusa is the place where they have been buried, and for some it is the place from where they have been pushed back to Libya or transferred to other Italian centres before being repatriated, for many others it is simply one of the many steps made on the way towards their current status of – more or less regular, more or less irregular – foreign residents in EU territory.

Finally, the agency of migrants could also be examined from the Lampedusa 'observatory', far beyond the obvious consideration that each sea crossing testifies of the motivation and strength of migrants trying to realize their migratory projects. Lampedusa has also been a place of riots, of self induced injuries, of protests and escapes, during which migrants also happened to join the local population in rallies against the Italian government. And in 2011 over 20,000 Tunisians who had landed in Lampedusa between January and early April obtained from the Italian government the recognition of humanitarian protection: thus they were not only granted a permit of stay (even

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[4] This happened in cases of exceptional provisional measures for the enforcement of a deferred refusal of entry (see section 3) as well as in cases of ordinary detentions for the purpose of expulsion.

though for only six months), which meant that they did not run the risk of being pushed back, but they also gained a *laissez-passer* enabling them practically to move across internal Schengen borders and enter the territories of other EU countries – which was, indeed, the aim of most of them.

3. Borderizing Lampedusa (Manufacturing the border)

Above I have argued that Lampedusa is more 'border' than other Italian and EU border spots, and that it is therefore a privileged observatory for the study of the Italian and EU migration regime. Though, Lampedusa's 'borderness' is not a given fact. It is not so much the fatal result of the geographical location of the island as rather the result of a 'borderization' process. Lampedusa's high degree of 'borderness' has been essentially determined by political choices, of which I am going to give a few examples here.

First, it may be worth remembering what might sound trivial. Originally, the roots of Lampedusa's current 'borderness' lie in the birth of Schengenland and in the adoption of more and more restrictive immigration regulations at national and EU level, beginning with the two most 'classical' instruments of migration control: the imposition of the visa obligation on citizens of most non-EU countries, and of sanctions on carriers transporting undocumented migrants across state borders. Without these measures, undocumented boat migration would not exist, and Lampedusa would still be just one of the many minor Italian islands living on fishery and tourism, as it used to be until the 1980's.

Having said this, I will now refer back to the number of boat migrants arriving in Lampedusa, which is relatively low, as pointed out above. Though, migrants arriving by sea (including casualties) have a much stronger mediatic impact on public opinion than overstayers and immigrants entering the country illegally by land do have. This is why the sea border was turned to a stage on which media and political actors perform the 'border play' – and thus 'borderize' the whole stage. In other words, the attention of political actors on boat migration seems to be driven by the intention to easily gain electoral benefits, rather than by the real need to contrast actual threats resulting from the phenomenon itself. Furthermore, attempts made by both mid-right and mid-left Italian governments to link the fight against illegal immigration with the fight against Islamic terrorism (ANSA 2004; Camera dei Deputati 2006; «Il Messaggero» 2008) have increased prejudice towards black, non-European and non-Christian immigrants, and therefore fuelled fear against arrivals from North Africa, especially after September 11. Together with the decline of migration from Albania, this caused the shift of the spotlight from the East to the South of Italian sea borders.

At the same time, other political acts contributed to transforming Lampedusa into 'the Southern border' *par excellence*. I will name here three exemplary ones.

The first was the adoption of a measure, the so-called *respingimento differito* ('deferred refusal of entry'),[5] that has transformed the whole island of Lampedusa in a border zone. According to Italian law, undocumented foreigners trying to enter the national territory can be refused entry at the border (the relevant measure being called *respingimento alla frontiera*). Undocumented migrants who are apprehended within the territory receive an expulsion order, instead. While the expulsion order entails rights including the judicial review with suspensive effect of the expulsion, the right of appeal granted (on paper) to persons refused entry at the border has no suspensive effect. By extending the applicability of the refusal of entry also to those who are apprehended immediately after irregular border crossing (whereby the Italian word for 'immediately' – *subito* – has no precise meaning and can therefore be interpreted flexibly by authorities with regard to the distance in space and time from the place and moment of actual border crossing), Italian law has created a flexible and undefined border zone inside the official demarcation line of the territorial border (Vassallo Paleologo 2009). Since its adoption in 1998, this regulation has been applied also to territorial waters, and – of course – to Lampedusa. Significantly, after the European Directive 2008/115 on returns became automatically applicable in Italy (in the absence of Italian legislation implementing it), the vice-minister of Interior, Mantovano, while complaining that this would make returns "more complicated", pointed out that procedures taking place in Lampedusa are not affected by the directive, since Lampedusa is a "border zone" («Il Sole 24 Ore» 2011), and migrants arriving there are not returned, but rather refused entry.

The second political act contributing to the 'borderization' of Lampedusa was the construction of a detention centre for migrants in 1998, as the only such facility existing on a minor island in Italy.[6] This had at least three major consequences: a) migrants, who would otherwise be immediately transferred to Sicily or mainland Italy, remain for longer periods on the island instead; b) Italian authorities carry to Lampedusa all the migrants intercepted in the southern Strait of Sicily (while at least some of them would otherwise be transferred elsewhere); c) the management of the detention centre and, more generally, of higher numbers of arrivals requires the work of military and police force, as well as of humanitarian organisations, whose massive presence has deeply transformed the composition of the population and the very landscape of the island.

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[5] Article 8, paragraph 2, of law 40 of 6 March 1998, now article 10, paragraph 2, of the *Testo Unico sull'immigrazione* (legislative decree 286 of 25 July 1998 and its following amendments).
[6] The current official list of facilities for first aid (CDA), asylum seekers (CARA) and detention for the pur pose of expulsion (CIE) is available here: http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/immigrazione/sottotema006.html.

The third factor was the Tunisian turn of 2004. From 2004 to 2010, the relative increase of arrivals to Lampedusa was also the result of the restrictive legislative measures adopted by Tunisia in 2003 and 2004, and of the following strengthened surveillance of Tunisian coasts (Boubakri 2004: 106). This was a direct consequence of Italian pressure on Tunisia (Cuttitta 2008), and resulted in Algerian and Tunisian migrants moving towards Libyan shores and thus towards the Lampedusa route, while the routes leaving from Tunisia (whose destination was not only Lampedusa but also Pantelleria, the Egadi Islands and the Western Sicilian mainland) were almost abandoned.

4. Lampedusa on stage (Performing the border play)

The whole sea border of Italy has thus been concentrated – in the border play performed by Italian political and media actors – on the island of Lampedusa. And Lampedusa has been turned into the main – if not the only – site of the performance. While multiple and dispersed stages may confuse the audience, concentrating the show on a single stage makes it easier not only for the actors to play but also for the spectators to follow the performance. This is the more true, the more a performance is articulated in different acts and different narratives.

The 'Lampedusa border play' oscillates between the narrative of the 'tough border' and the narrative of the 'humane border' (Neilson 2010). While the latter finds its utmost expression in the period 2006-2008, under the second Prodi government (whose mid-left coalition fell apart after less than two years, resulting in new elections), most powerful manifestations of the former can be found in several acts of the border play that were performed under different Berlusconi-led mid-right governments.

The first is the series of deportations carried out from Lampedusa to Libya between October 2004 and March 2006 (see section 2). This was meant to be a sober show: what counted was the message to be sent to the audience, which sounded more or less like "we are defending our borders, we are pushing them back". No particular scenic design was needed for this, as reporting the bare daily pieces of news on the number of people returned to Libya was more than enough. On the contrary, since the government was aware that it was acting in breach – or at least at the edge – of law, it tried to prevent any detail of deportation procedures from being made public. As Sossi (2006) points out, institutional media only showed 'neutral' pictures of the port, of the coastline, and sometimes of migrants upon their arrival. The only film frames available portraying the handcuffed migrants lined up on the airport runway and pushed by force into the airplane, as well as the desperate attempt of a migrant to escape, were shot by the Rete Antirazzista Siciliana, an anti-

racist organisation whose activists eventually managed to access the terrace of a private house in front of the airport while a deportation was being prepared.

The narrative of the 'humane border' prevails over the narrative of the 'tough border' only after the electoral victory of the mid-left coalition in April 2006. Though, it deserves to be mentioned that there was a transition period before the elections. After the Italian government had been criticized and put under international pressure for returning migrants to Libya, it decided to reduce and then stop deportations to Libya (only one return flight took place in 2006, cfr. Paoletti 2010: 64), probably fearing that negative repercussions in the forthcoming elections could exceed the positive effects, if deportations should be continued. Furthermore, in February 2006 the legal status of the centre for migrants was turned from that of a detention centre to that of a first aid facility, where migrants would be held only for a limited time and then transferred to the mainland, after a screening to be carried out jointly by the Italian government, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Italian Red Cross (CRI) and the UNHCR, within the "Praesidium" project. The latter is a scheme financed by the EU "Argo" programme and the Italian ministry of Interior, that was started in March 2006 and is still ongoing.[7]

During the 2006-2008 period, the cooperation with the mentioned organisations – as well as with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which was entrusted to provide an initial medical screening upon arrival of the boats at the port – ensured that the screening system would be both 'efficient' and 'humane' at the same time. Furthermore, since there was 'nothing to hide', the detention centre was open for visits not only from members of the Italian Parliament, but also from journalists and researchers. After few months, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, declared that "many progresses have been done" and "the situation is improving" (Ansa 2006). In January 2008, the chief of the Italian IOM office, Peter Schatzer, declared that the detention centre of Lampedusa "can now represent a model for other countries" (Ansa 2008). After visiting Lampedusa in September 2007, the Council of Europe issued a report in which, although expressing "concern about the legal status of the reception centre", since "there is no legal basis for detaining persons" there, it "congratulates the Italian authorities for the improvements they have made and for the integrated approach they have adopted for running the centre" (Council of Europe 2008: 17). While the Prodi government increased cooperation with the Gadhafi regime, in order to prevent migrants (also including refugees) to embark from Libyan coasts (which resulted in migrants being held in detention centres under infamous conditions, subjected to abuses from the Libyan police, cfr. Human Rigths Watch 2009), and while it also signed the agreement with Libya upon whose

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[7] Since 2008, given the considerable number of unaccompanied minors arriving in Lampedusa, the non-governmental organisation Save the Children has been also participating in the project's activities.

basis push-back operations from the high seas would be started by the following Berlusconi government in May 2009, the domestic *côté* of the Italian sea border regime – that is the Lampedusa stage – was maintained immaculate not only by enforcing migrants' human rights, but also by completely stopping deportations to Libya.

A new act of the border play was started at the end of 2008. The narrative of the 'tough border' re-conquered the Lampedusa stage, as the new government slowed down transfer procedures while arrivals increased. As a result, the centre soon became overcrowded. While its maximum capacity was 804, it hosted 1560 migrants on 11 November and 1572 on 28 December. Most of them were Tunisians, some were Egyptians, others came from sub-Saharan countries. On 30 December the government announced all migrants would from now on be held in detention on the island until their repatriation. It also declared that even asylum applications would be processed there, and ruled therefore that an asylum commission be transferred from Trapani to Lampedusa. Between November 2008 and March 2009, hundreds of migrants were detained for periods longer than allowed for by law, even if the Lampedusa centre was not a proper detention centre anymore, but rather a centre for first aid and assistance. Discontent grew not only among the migrants themselves, but also in the population of Lampedusa. As a reply, the government sent hundreds of policemen, *carabinieri* and *guardie di finanza*: reportedly, 450 were stationed in Lampedusa at the end of January («il manifesto» 2009), in a relationship of around one to eleven with the number of inhabitants. When the government not only declared that the already existing centre had been transformed from a first aid into a detention facility, but also announced the construction of a new centre, the inhabitants of the island organized a protest rally, that took place on 23 January 2009. On the same day, many of the 1840 migrants who were being detained managed to escape from the centre and eventually joined the rally. On 17 February migrants started a hunger strike to protest against their repatriation, and on the following day they set the detention centre on fire. The building was partially destroyed, which resulted in hundreds of migrants being transferred to mainland Italy. On the other hand, the partial destruction of the detention centre contributed to strengthening the perception of a state of emergency as well as to the further criminalization of migrants. It was in this climate, two days after the fire in Lampedusa, that the government issued a decree extending the maximum duration of detention for the purpose of expulsion from 60 days to six months.

In fact, some of the declarations made by the government in this act of the border play were disregarded. Except for a small number of asylum seekers, whose applications were processed in Lampedusa immediately after and according to the government's announcement, all others were transferred to the mainland. And also hundreds of so-called 'economic' migrants were transferred

from Lampedusa to the mainland before being repatriated – or before being released, in the end, because all Italian detention centres were full or because the maximum duration of detention had been reached. Though, what counted was the toughness of both the government's stance and the situation in Lampedusa. Indeed, the exceptional conditions created on the island did not only represent a means to pressure Tunisian authorities (which had been always reluctant to readmit their nationals before, in spite of a readmission agreement signed with Italy as early as 1998), but they also provided the dramatic scenery of invasion and emergency that would justify, in the eyes of the public opinion, the adoption of restrictive and repressive measures, the most dramatic of which was the decision to resume deportations to Libya few months later. This act of the border play ended, indeed, on 18 March 2009, when the government announced that over 3000 migrants had been successfully repatriated so far, and that arrivals had been drastically reduced – and would be further reduced when joint patrols with Libyan authorities would start, from 15 May on at the latest.

The next act of the border play I am going to summarize here takes place over one year after the new wave of deportations – the 'push-back operations' from the high seas – had started in May 2009. This improvement in Italian-Libyan cooperation, also including a strengthened surveillance of Libyan national waters, resulted in an unprecedented reduction of migrant boats. In August 2010 minister of Interior Maroni proudly announced that the number of irregular migrants arriving to Lampedusa showed a 98% decrease, comparing the period from August 2009 to July 2010 with the previous twelve-month period. Lampedusa thus became the stage for the 'zero immigration' show – a brand new variety within the narrative of the 'tough border'. The detention centre remained closed for the whole year, while the few migrants who managed to penetrate the network of border controls and were intercepted only after entering Italian territorial waters were mostly not escorted to Lampedusa, but rather to other ports of mainland Sicily, in order not to disturb the play.

Also the last act of the border play I am going to present here is exemplarily permeated by the narrative of the 'tough border'. In this case, though, this narrative was mixed with that of the 'humanitarian crisis'. In early 2011, in the wake of the 'Jasmine Revolution', thousands of Tunisians took the chance of the power vacuum in their country, resulting in the lack of sea border controls, and set off towards Sicilian coasts. Most of them landed in Lampedusa, or were diverted there after being intercepted by Italian authorities (and after it had become clear that the performance of the 'zero immigration show' could not be extended any longer). The first fissures in the Tunisian border control system had been opened as early as in autumn 2010, when arrivals in Lampedusa from Tunisian coasts significantly increased for the first time since 2004. Though, the Lampedusa centre had been kept closed: rather than spoiling the set of the 'zero immigration' show, authorities decided to host the first groups of migrants in hotels. After the fall of the Ben Ali regime

in mid-January 2011, the number of Tunisian migrants suddenly skyrocketed, while the centre still remained closed, and no transfers were carried out to the mainland. On 12 February there were 4000 migrants sleeping on the streets. 1500 were eventually 'hosted' in the local football ground. The day after, the Italian government declared the state of humanitarian emergency in the whole national territory. Only then the Lampedusa centre was re-opened, and still there were thousands of migrants who did not find accommodation there, its capacity being of only 804 persons. Before being *declared*, though, the humanitarian emergency had been *created* by the government, as it had been done two years before, by refusing to transfer Tunisian migrants to the mainland. Unlike in 2009, though, migrants were 'accommodated' in the centre only after the whole island had been transformed in an open-air camp – which it still remained for long: on 22 March 2011 the number of the migrants being held on the island was higher (6000) than that of the local population, and it further increased to touch a record 6200 one week later. While even basic food supply became problematic, transfers to the mainland – also starting as late as mid-February – were carried out only in small numbers, as the capacity of Italian detention centres was limited, and the government did not want to simply release them on the Italian territory with an expulsion order.

Again, migrants were held detained in an undefined legal status, for periods longer than allowed for by law, in a context that was even more chaotic than that of 2009, the *de facto* detention in the 'open air camp' represented by the whole of Lampedusa being an unprecedented event. By declaring the state of humanitarian emergency, the government introduced – besides the securitarian – also the humanitarian element in its narrative. This was aimed at obtaining from the EU the adoption of temporary protection measures according to the relevant EU directive (Council of the European Union 2001), which would have obliged all member states to share the burden that was currently being borne by Italy alone. In other words, the Italian government would have been able to get rid of most of the migrants arrived, if these had been recognised as temporary refugees by the EU. As it became clear that this would not be the case, the government decided to act unilaterally. On 5 April, after signing a new police cooperation agreement with the Tunisian transitional government, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi issued a new decree granting the status of humanitarian protection to all "nationals from North African countries" arrived from 1 January to 5 April. From that moment onwards, all others would be pushed back. The first return flights to Tunisia were carried out immediately afterwards, and arrivals from Tunisia were strongly reduced in the following months, while those who had been granted protection – even if only by Italy and not by the EU – could now be released and were thus free to cross Schengen borders to neighbouring countries (in spite of tensions, particularly with France, that partially resumed border controls), which was the aim of most of them. Thus, also the aim of the government – to find a

solution that would not contradict the expectations of its voters – was fulfilled: Tunisian migrants were kept away as long as possible from mainland Italy (and particularly from the North of the country, where the populist and xenophobic 'Lega Nord' – an important coalition partner – is based), and then put in the best possible condition for leaving the country.

Thus, it was by introducing a humanitarian element into its narrative of Italy's southern border, by playing the humanitarian emergency act in the Lampedusa border play, by fluctuating "between a humanitarian and a securitarian frame" (Campesi 2011), that the government managed to strengthen the securitarian narrative of the 'tough border'.

Conclusions

In this paper, while regarding to Lampedusa as the quintessential embodiment of the Italian and European border, I have not only shown what the 'borderness' of Lampedusa consists in, but I have also shown how this 'borderness' is produced.

Whatever the perspective from which we regard the Italian and EU migration and border regime (be it the volume of immigration by sea, the deadly consequences of border controls, their compliance with human rights, the agency of migrants etc.), Lampedusa is a privileged observatory and field for research.

And yet, Lampedusa's 'borderness' is the result not only of its geographical location, but also of a specific 'borderization' process. Lampedusa has been transformed by specific measures and practices of border controls (also including the construction of a detention centre) not only into a hotspot of the Italian and EU border regime, but also into a stage on which the narratives of the 'tough border' and of the 'humane border' coexist in the performance of the 'Lampedusa border play'.

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ANNEX – TABLE

Irregular migrants apprehended at Italian sea borders				
Year	Lampedusa	Total Sicily	% Lampedusa on Total Sicily	Total Italy	% Lampedusa on Total Italy
1999	356	1,973	18.04%	49,999	0.71%
2000	447	2,782	16.07%	26,817	1.67%
2001	923	5,504	16.77%	20,143	4.58%
2002	9,669	18,225	53.05%	23,719	40.76%
2003	8,819	14,017	62.92%	14,331	61.54%
2004	10,497	13,594	77.22%	13,635	76.99%
2005	14,855	22,824	65.08%	22,939	64.76%
2006	18,096	21,400	84.56%	22,016	82.19%
2007	11,749	16,875	69.62%	20,455	57.44%
2008	30,657	34,541	88.76%	36,952	82.96%
2009	2,947*	8,282	35.58%	9,573	30.78%
2010	459*	1,264	36.31%	4,406	10.42%
2011	44,639	n.a.	n.a.	51,881	86.04%

* Also including the minor island of Linosa and the uninhabited isle of Lampione, which are, besides Lampedusa, the remaining part of the *Pelagie* Archipel.

N.B.: 2011 data refer to the period 1 January – 3 August.

Routes, cracks and vehicles and the production of elsewheres among African foreigners

suspended in Dakar, Senegal[1].

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INTRODUCTION: I AM A VENEZUELAN VISA

"The noblest part of man is his passport," said a German in exile. He was right and I have been glued here on page number nine of this passport to further elevate its nobility. I am three years old. I was issued the 4th of July 2008, in Abuja, Nigeria. I am 10 cm long and 8 cm wide. My corners are graciously rounded. The color of my surface is light yellow and a thin transparent shiny plastic layer protects me. I am proud to grant you multiple entries into the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

I have a six-digit control number on the upper left side next to the Venezuelan shield of arms that occupies the upper left corner. Across the upper side is written the name of my country: República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Then right underneath it says Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. If I go on telling you all that is written on my surface you will get bored. Suffice it to say that most information is written in font Lucida Handwriting Upper Case, and that in the center there's the picture of my holder, a Nigerian man born on October 23rd 1978 in Onitsha.

This Nigerian man from Onitsha used to carry his passport with care in a hard case that he himself made using newspaper and glue. But since he was not allowed to leave Dakar two years ago, he doesn't take care of his passport anymore and he refuses to look at me. He wonders if I am no good. Sometimes he blames his situation on me. Sometimes he blames the Dakar Airport's Customs officers.

The German in exile I mentioned before also said "A man can come into existence anywhere, anywhen, in the most stupid way, by accident. But not a passport. That's why it's accepted if it's good, but a man can be as good as he wants and no one will accept him." The man is right: a passport and, I would add, a visa are much better than a man, but he wasn't aware that even when we are no good we can be accepted. We can carry people through. If the Nigerian man didn't get through, it's because he didn't do the right gamble. Ndo! Sorry! Pailas!

I'm singular, unique, I'm unlike any other Venezuelan visa. I have no barcode, no watermark and the Venezuelan map, with reclamation zone to Guyana, isn't tattooed in a darker color on my surface. I have to add that my holder paid for me a hundred times the official price of a Venezuelan visa. That is something he often forgets.

Things are like this: Imagine a white horse that gallops across the Orinoco plains toward the viewer's left side, gazing straight at the dawn of independence. That horse is in the Shield of Arms of Venezuela. Unlike current Venezuelan visas, the horse in my shield of arms gallops toward the right (viewers angle) and turns his neck to the opposite side, as if distracted by his owner who calls him back and doesn't want him to step over

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the fence. That is how the Venezuelan shield looked until 2006, when it was modified.

Yes, your suspicions are right. I was forged, but I am no worse than the ordeal of payments, receipts, authentications, copies, errands, headaches, misunderstandings that are entailed in applying in the official way for an official visa with a horse that runs and looks straight to the left. It will be necessary to gather documents in order to get it. And what happens if you forget to include one? If your name on your birth certificate doesn't match your name on your identity card? In order to apply for a visa, you will need a business card or admission to a foreign university; you need a good conduct certificate and a balance statement from your bank. Chico, if you don't speak my language how will you deal with all these people at the Consulate in Abuja, in Dakar, in Bamako, in Bogotá?

The most visible element in a bundle of relations that would carry Stanley through, a Venezuelan visa was to blame for prolonging Stanley's time in Dakar, Senegal. He stayed in Dakar for about two years, experiencing the difficulties of being a moneyless African foreigner, roaming around, idling, but also trying strategies for "finding money" and taking off. Visas are not living things but under particular circumstances they acquire overwhelming power: they stand for people and the chance to achieve their aspirations. As I will show in this paper, Among African foreigners I met in Dakar other entities played similar roles and opened potential gateways for people to leave. Sometimes these entities turned out to be something other than what they seemed and failed to bring my interlocutors where they wished to go. They would stay in Dakar for indeterminate time: while some stranded African foreigners I met had been there for a few months, others had been trying to leave for over ten years.

When I heard Stanley's story I was surprised that his destination was Venezuela and not a European country or the United States. After talking to him different times, I realized that it might as well have been Brazil, Colombia, or any other destination where there were stories of wealth and fellow countrymen, which in his case could be anywhere in the world. Not only where Stanley and others would travel was a reference hard to pin down; when would they take off was an ever-postponed upcoming moment. It was also hard to know if once arrived to their destination, new ones would appear in their horizon. This evidence made me think of destination as *elsewhere*, a malleable

place where aspirations would be fulfilled, and a place with very particular meanings if compared with the predetermined and fixed destinations of other travelers (e.g. vacationers businessmen or academics on their way to a conference). This paper looks at the role that *elsewhere* plays in the itineraries of African foreigners whose journey gets interrupted in Dakar. It focuses on the ways in which elsewheres trigger movement, the performative power of certain elements that come together to open routes and vehicles, and the temporalities that looking for these routes and vehicles generates. The fact that some entities were potentially not what they seemed surrounded the journey with uncertainty. This turned choice into practices of trial and error, which themselves turned into a constant task of creating futures.

Thinking of elsewhere is related to a larger reflection on "*errance*" in my dissertation, which consisted in opening a window to this ever-prolonged interruption of African foreigners' journeys in Dakar. I looked at the ways that past and present circumstances, and future alternatives manifested in different people's life situations. Errance invokes different dimensions (spiritual, physical, social) and qualities (divergent, daring, aimless) of movement. The term is a transliteration from French. It doesn't exist in English proper but there are cognates such as errant and errantry, err and error, that are used with some frequency. These words connote adventure, travel, deviance, mistake, and a journey without a predetermined end. I build on elaborations in francophone aesthetics and art (Laumonier 1996, Depardon 2003, Berthet 2007) that define errance as the quest for the acceptable place ("*lieu acceptable*") and give *elsewhere* an important role in the production of errance.

I also draw from literatures on suspension, a recurrent topic of study in anthropological literatures on economic crisis, youth and migration. Suspension can be understood as circumstances that prevent people from crossing social and geographical borders. It refers to the interruption of social ties (at home, on a journey, at a point of

destination), and to a temporal slowing-down that manifests in absence of plans in the present, plans deferred to the future, prolonged waiting and inability to improve one's life conditions. Literatures on suspension come mainly from studies based on ethnographic work in Africa (Ferguson 1999, Newell 2005, Mains 2007, Jeffrey 2010). However ethnographies from other corners (Jeffrey 2010, Xiang 2007, Faier, Chu 2010) suggest that similar processes are taking place worldwide.

Interestingly, most literatures on suspension focus on time, a dimension that, according to Mezzadra (2009), studies of globalization and capitalism too often neglect. A common figure of time in these literatures is a crisis of narratives of progress and modernity, where the future—understood as the prospect of a better life—doesn't actualize (Ferguson 1999, Newell 2005, Mains 2007). Another way of looking at time emphasizes how narratives of other times and spaces—for example, doomsday prophecies among evangelics and stories about lands with greener pastures among the youth—translate into an emptying of the present (Melly 2011, Guyer 2008, Pandolfo 2007). Yet other works conceptualize suspension as alienating conditions at home (Chu 2010) or at a destination point (Nyamnjoh 2005, Xiang 2007). While different approaches describe the temporal implications of being unable to leave home or being stuck at destination, I look at the spatial and temporal dynamics as they are experienced in an already started but interrupted journey. I focus on how entities invested by excessive power and temporal relations other than arrow-like chronological time shape the lives of people in errance in Dakar.

WHAT IS ELSEWHERE?

African foreigners I met in Dakar came from neighboring countries and other corners of Africa as far South as Rwanda and as far East as Sudan. They had different nationalities and religious beliefs. They spoke different languages. Most of them were young, but

some were older. Most of them were men but there were women too. They had different reasons for stopping their journey in Dakar: the draw of long distance kinship ties, the presence of consulates and international organizations, deportation from Europe or North Africa, the promise of an easy gateway or simply randomness. In Stanley's case, the agent in Lagos told him that it would be cheaper to fly from Dakar and that there it would be easier to deal with customs officials than in Nigeria.

For most people, Dakar was not the place where they wished to stay. Life conditions were as harsh or even harsher than they were at home. Zafiyya, whose husband was killed by rebels in her country of origin, had found peace in Dakar but after being there for two years, she realized that peace all alone was not enough and in order to educate her two daughters and not worry about food and shelter she would need to go to a wealthier country. Even those who had been in Dakar for more than a decade kept making plans for leaving. Doctor William Akroffi, well known in Rebeuss neighborhood for his natural plants Healing Center, complained about how hard it was to earn a living in Dakar: his patients, instead of paying for his treatment, often asked him for money. He had been away from Ghana, his home country, for fourteen years. He spent time in Mauritania, Guinea Conakry, Senegal and Gambia as he tried to get a visa to join his family in Canada. His visa application was rejected for the second time seven years ago and since then he had been in Dakar trying to save enough money for restarting the journey. Every time we met, he had plans for leaving Dakar that were boiling. When the deadline expired, he came up with new ones. Sometimes he considered returning to Ghana but he wouldn't do it with empty pockets.

But what awaited people elsewhere? What could be found there that was not in Dakar? In principle, expectations differed from one another as much as backgrounds and imaginaries. KC who like Stanley, came looking for an easy gateway, made a distinction between *Whiteman kontry* and *Blackman kontry*. In *Whiteman kontry*, the

minute he landed at the airport, someone would approach him and offer him a place to stay and a job. Bribes wouldn't be needed in order to get a job and he would be willing to humble himself because he would earn a lot of money. In *Blackman kontry*, in turn, he had to have an "upper hand" (having the right acquaintances) in order to get what he needed. Peter the Writer, who had escaped religious persecution, hoped to find a Christian country, far away from heathens, where he could dedicate himself to writing his memoires. Camara Vamba was expecting to have access to the culture and life styles to which he had attuned himself as he grew up in his home country. He wrote fiction, had had a hip-hop group and owned a designer clothing shop. However, materialistic values prevalent in his social milieu back home prevented people from recognizing his abilities. In his destination site, he would find recognition for his skills as a writer, singer and fashion seller.

Only for a few people I met, Dakar had turned into something different from an ever-prolonged interruption of the journey. Peter the Barber, for example, had tried to reach Europe from Dakar with a visa that he had bought from an agent. For a few years, he tried to leave and while the chance appeared, he started working as a door-to-door barber in order to survive. One client from Sonatel[2] who liked Peter's job hooked him up with his colleagues and other civil servants. Working within this network, he realized at some point that barbering would allow him to earn enough money to pay for his daily expenses and save up money. When I met Peter, he was expecting to go back to Ghana after a few more years of cutting hair in Dakar. Europe didn't lie in his horizons anymore. Ossondu too had stopped dreaming of going to Europe or the United States. He came from Nigeria and after different plans for leaving diluted across the years, he decided to stay. He owned two different businesses: a shop where he made shoes and cut hair and a Nigerian food restaurant. Unlike Peter, Ossondu had decided to settle in. He had

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[2] Sonatel is the National Telephone Company of Senegal.

married a Senegalese woman and had two children with her.

Despite their specificity, achieving wealth, finding a safe haven and having one's dignity respected were themes that traversed my interlocutors' images of elsewhere. I relate these themes to Francophone thinkers' idea of *errance* as a quest for the acceptable place (Laumonier 1996, Berthet 2007, Depardon 2003). These authors argue that, to the extent that it represents the possibility of fulfillment, the idea of *elsewhere* invests the journey with purpose. A similar understanding of the journey can be found in scholarly works that analyze the meanings that traveling to Europe can have for young Congolese Sapeurs[3] (Thomas 2003; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Gondola 1990). Thomas, for example, affirms: "The dimension of displacement locates the transportation of the individual in what is a quest for self, for the exploration of the individual—and this is where the journey's impulse is actually enacted[4]." (2003:963). Among African foreigners I met in Dakar, looking for peace, wealth and dignity would provide this impulse. It encouraged people to come up with routes, find vehicles and wait for cracks to open and allow them to take off. As they were the places where aspirations lay, elsewheres became engines that fueled movement.

WHEN THE DESIRABLE IS NOT AVAILABLE...

I wondered why the Venezuelan visa brokered by the agent from Lagos lured Stanley into her promise of an elsewhere even before Stanley himself applied for it at the Venezuelan consulate. He asked me to help him to find a way out. I proposed we try to get a visa at a consulate. Besides the Venezuelan embassy, the Brazilian embassy was

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[3] "*Sape*" refers to a movement of young men in Brazzaville and Kinshasa who relate to French designer clothing and other icons of French culture as a way of countering colonial and post-colonial domination. Sape is an acronym for "*Société d'Ambience et de personnes Elegantes*," and a French slang word for dressing.
[4] Thomas (2003) analyzes the relation between fashion trends among Sapeurs and postcolonial imaginaries in Mabanckou's novel "Bleu, Blanc, Rouge."

the only South American diplomatic body in Dakar. At the Brazilian consulate, there was someone I knew whom we could at least ask for clarification about the procedures. So one morning we went there. The embassy was located downtown but we didn't know exactly where. We took a cab that left us at the *Place de l'Independence* and walked from there. As we passed cross the Marché Kermel looking for the embassy, I asked him why in first place he had decided to go to Venezuela and not another country. He had heard about people he knew who were doing good business there. He said that his top destination was South America. That was the desirable but if the desirable was not available then the available became desirable. If God had him to do business in Dakar he would do business there but in Dakar things moved small small. He wouldn't make good money there.

The embassy was located at the top floor of an old, more than ten-storey building. We weren't allowed to walk in the hallway because we didn't have any form of identity cards on us. However, we managed to get instruction guides for student and business visas. When I read the requirements, I started to understand the charms of Stanley's Venezuelan visa. In order to apply for a visa at the consulate through the official conduct, Stanley required a business card, and a bank account, if he was traveling as a trader, and if he traveled as a student, he would need admission to an education center in Brazil. So against the Kafkaesque world that one would need to deal with, if one was to follow the official procedures, Stanley's Venezuelan was a powerful alternative.

Three months after I came back from Senegal to Colombia, Stanley and I met on facebook and chatted. He told me he was seriously planning to leave Senegal. He was seeking a passport of another nationality. I asked why not a Nigerian passport and he told me that it would take at least two years to get it. There were too many citizens applying for a passport. Only if he paid extra money, he would receive his passport in

due time. So it ended up being less expensive to apply for another foreign official passport than to apply for the Nigerian one. Sometimes, passports of other nationalities offered a wider spectrum of visa free destinations.

The landscape through which Stanley and other African foreigners arrived in Dakar, the interruption of their journey and the field of connections that potentially took them elsewhere resulted from different forces intersecting. In the configuration of these landscapes, the encroaching of EU borders plays an obvious role. Fueled by rising unemployment rates and rising hostility toward foreigners within its frontiers, the EU has begun to encourage African countries to increase border surveillance; EU member countries have also adopted stricter requirements for granting visas. As these measures are implemented, travelers get stuck at the fringes of these swollen borders. Senegal and Dakar are at one of these fringes. Senegal is part of the ECOWAS free circulation space and as such, it allows travelers coming from West African countries to stay in its territory without a passport for a maximum of three months. Senegal also receives those who are deported from countries outside the ECOWAS space: Morocco, Mauritania and even Libya, further east.

However, in order to understand the emergence of routes and elsewheres for people in errance, other elements need to be taken in account. Networks established by ancient kingdoms and the diffusion of Islam dating from pre-colonial times—for example, they set up routes for religious pilgrimage—as well as divisions between French and British territories during the colonial period—which at times, favored movement within colonies, and at times, movement across them—carved corridors and barriers for movement for West African societies in the present (for example, while Nigerian citizens require a visa for Morocco, Ivoirians who come from a French ex-colony like Moroccans do not). After independence, the development of diplomatic relations with countries outside former colonial spaces within and beyond the African continent further shaped

this landscape by establishing rigid or flexible travel requirements for particular destinations. Since the 1970s, agreements fostered by regional organizations like ECOWAS[5] have given continuity to forms of movement within West Africa. Economic downturn and increasing instability for livelihoods, inefficiency and power abuse within state institutions play an important role in the configuration of these geographies as they set a stage for civil servants to request extra money from nationals for services such as issuing travel documents. Extra-legl faculties of civil servants also allow for ways for switching nationalities to thrive.

Lastly, the constant recreation of these geographies depends on the knowledge, skills for mobilizing acquaintances, stubbornness and spirit of adventure of individuals in errance; it also depends on the events that encourage people to start the journey and their desire to attain wealth, peace and dignity.

Through the intersection of these multiple forces geographies then emerge that transform as people struggle to find better horizons and as forms of controlling movement actualize. As Minh ha, reflecting on the US-Mexico border strengthening puts it: "You close down, we walk around. You erect, we dig. You dig, we dig and dig further. Bind and soon you will be tearing up madly at the wall" (Minh Ha 2011). As the EU border swells people shoot themselves like darts in order to pierce it. But among African foreigners stranded in Dakar, routes are dug that lead, not only to Europe, but to other unexpected destinations.

Sometimes, elsewheres were imagined (and often pretty well known at distance) centers of cosmopolitan production, a way of relating to destination that resonates with Sapeurs' travel aspirations, which are oriented toward a center that is at the same time

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[5] Economic Community of West African States. This entity was created in 1975. In the present, it is constituted by 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The protocol of free movement of people within the ECOWAS space was signed in 1979. Permanence without visa for ninety days was ratified by all member states in 1980 (Agyei and Clottey N.A.).

individual, the self, and cosmological, a geography in which France is in the center (Thomas 2003; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Gondola 1990). Other times, elsewhere was back home; yet under other circumstances, elsewhere was anywhere as long as people could find compatriots and prosperity. In these cases, a history of diplomatic relations between countries would factor into choosing a destination. Ghanaians can travel to Singapore without a visa. Once landed there immigration authorities review their case and grant or reject the visa. South Korea is visa free for Liberians for three months. Barbados is one of the few countries outside the continent for which Nigerians don't neeed a visa.

Elsewheres then can be both, wealthy North Atlantic destinations or ex-centric destinations in other continents. Camara Vamba wrote and spoke French probably better than many Frenchmen; he dreamed mostly of traveling to France. KC wanted to go to some country like Spain or Italy but he also wondered about the Bahamas. Peter the Writer was between Cuba and Jamaica. I warned him about the strength of Santeria in Cuba but he insisted that a Caribbean country would give him enough peace for writing. When he had the strength to deal with the refugee aid system he spent long hours at the *Immeuble Ferdinand Colli*, the headquarters of the UNCHR in Dakar, and navigated the internet seeking information on private sponsorship in Canada. Zafiyya felt uneasy about going to a country where she didn't know anybody. She didn't know where her religious believes would be respected. When home didn't lie in Doctor William's horizon he wished to go to Costa Rica, where he had an online girlfriend who he planned to marry. Mohamed the Muslim, who had endured civil war in Liberia, and had worked for four years coordinating activities at a refugee camp in Guinea Conakry wished to continue his studies and researched about fellowships in Malaysia and Japan. He also tried to find private sponsorship in Australia and Canada.

These divergent destinations and routes push us to consider how for one

individual elsewheres more than permanent are ever-changing, their emergence

depending on the circumstances that surround individuals and the ways in which they

are able to cope with them.

FINDING VEHICLES THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR

The day the Venezuelan visa failed to take Stanley out of the continent was in

September 2008. At a travel agency in downtown Dakar, Stanley had booked his flight to

Caracas with TAP (Transportes Aéreos Portugueses), and he paid 1600 dollars for it. He

arrived to Yoff airport two hours before the flight, crossed the airport's main entrance,

found the TAP counter for check in and stood in line. While he was waiting, customs

officers requested his travel documents and after a prolonged inspection, they told him

that his visa was false. He protested but didn't achieve much. He didn't speak French or

Wolof, Senegal's most commonly spoken languages. After some time arguing he figured

the only option that he had left was paying for passing through customs or staying.

Although he was out of money he could have collected it through his friends in Nigeria.

However, once landed in Caracas, how would he manage to enter Venezuela? Most

likely he would be deported back. Stanley was angered and frustrated. He had paid

300,000 naira (roughly 2,500 dollars) for his visa. He contacted a friend at the ICPC

(Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences) in Nigeria who told him

that he could file a petition online against the agent that brokered the visa but the case

wouldn't develop if he wasn't in Nigeria to follow up with it. Going back meant undoing

the trek so Stanley decided to stay in Dakar.

For almost two years he slept in a tent build on a terrain of rubbles next to the

railroad station, as he put it "in the bush." During that time, he went twice to Banjul

hoping that a Gambian passport would take him away. The first time, he paid 350 dollars

to an agent but never got anything back. The second time, he received a Gambian

passport but after he came back to Dakar, he checked its validity at the airport and the

passport turned out to be fake. All these drawbacks didn't persuade him of giving up on taking off. "God is the only one that turns things around" he used to say.

In errance, sometimes visas as well as other entities turned out to be something different from what they were, a circumstance that resonates with academic works that analyze how instability permeates to different degrees everyday life in contemporary Africa (Mbembe 2001, Simone 2005, Larkin 2008). Larkin, looking at the aesthetics of Nigerian films, puts it this way: "Things seem to be one way, and then change utterly for no apparent reason" (Larkin 2008:193).

When Stanley told me about the ICPC, I looked it up in the Internet. I found their website, which at the time warned the public about scammers who deceived people pretending they were ICPC agents. The warning read:

> SCAM ALERT: ICPC DOES NOT COMPENSATE SCAMMED VICTIMS AND ICPC DOES NOT COLLECT MONEY NO MATTER HOW LITTLE TO INVESTIGATE A CASE. If anyone tells you or sent you an email that ICPC is going to compensate you or demands money to investigate your case, please, DO NOT SEND ANY MONEY. Report the person to ICPC via our contact page.

In part as a consequence of deepening inequality in West and Central Africa which generates this sense of instability and, in part, as a consequence of being in errance, among my interlocutors in Dakar, finding a way out was surrounded by uncertainty and choosing meant submitting to dynamics of trial and error where chances of doing the right gamble were thin.

Although multiple forces would factor into making the right choice, often single entities would condense the relations that potentially allowed departure and stood for them. These entities and the relations that they embodied constituted vehicles. Money, flying tickets, identity and travel documents, job opportunities, people (women, managers, friends, refugee sponsors) and books, could both allow departure or prolong the stay in Dakar. In Stanley's case the Venezuelan visa was his vehicle and his faith in God, his friends in Nigeria, the money he paid and the contacts that introduced him to

the agent in Lagos, among others, were the relations that shaped his potential departure through the Venezuelan visa.

Others had different vehicles in mind for leaving Dakar or blamed them for their prolonged stay there. Mohamed the Muslim, for example, had gotten a Cuban visa for him and his wife through one of his in-laws who was a powerful politician in Guinea, but he didn't have the full amount of money for the flying ticket. A friend in Conakry put him in touch with a Sierra Leonean man in Dakar who would lend Mohamed the missing amount. Mohamed traveled to Dakar, where the Sierra Leonean man welcomed him. Mohamed trusted the man the money so the man could by the ticket. But the man never bought it. He duped Mohamed with a flying reservation, telling him that it was the actual ticket. When I met met Mohamed he had been for two months in Dakar, looking for a job or new possibilities for taking off. Jeff expected that the novel he was writing (by now he is almost done with his manuscript) took him out, ideally to France. KC concentrated his energy in finding a girlfriend online who would send for him to Dakar. Mr. Albert hoped be resettled to a wealthier country after the Senegalese government granted him asylum. However, the refugee aid system in Senegal gave refugee status to very few people every year and the possibilities of being a lucky one were small.

Vehicles acquired excessive power through the relations they stood for. They would take up attributes of people, their aspirations, desire to move and connections as well as the faculties of institutions like endorsing individual identity and nationality as well as allowing or preventing entrance to a country. The uncertainty that surrounded finding them also contributed to vehicles' power. They embodied the ambiguity of being and not being and, under auspicious circumstances, even being forged, they could take people to their destination. If Stanley had had enough money to pay for his way through customs in Dakar and Caracas, he might have made it through with his fake Venezuelan visa.

For most of my interlocutors life in Dakar was about avoiding building solid ties with locals. Many dedicated a good part of their days to waiting: waiting to find a job, to be assisted by NGO's, waiting for friends and contacts to send money. Dakar was not the place to see one's aspirations fulfilled and in that sense it represented an emptied present. This dimension of life in Dakar resonates with the postponed aspirations that literatures on suspension describe. However, coming up with elsewheres and finding vehicles for getting there entailed relations to time different from a temporal slowing down. Intense negotiations were required contingent upon individuals' abilities for imagining and reimagining themselves. In this sense, finding elsewheres would turn into a constant task of creating futures. Thus Stanley had tried the Venezuelan visa and twice the Gambian passport; after investing his money in the flying ticket to Cuba, Mohamed tried a Dutch electronic visa, which he later realized was counterfeit. Another time, he almost paid fees for an online job application for a humanitarian NGO.

Until one day a crack opened…

SLIPPING THROUGH CRACKS

Last April Stanley called. He told me that he had bought a passport of another nationality. He also promised that soon he would be in South America. I was happy for him but I was skeptic. Later on he called and announced a departure date. This date arrived and I didn't have news from him. Two weeks later he called from Quito. Although his passport was official he had to pay to make it out of Dakar. He has a new name, nationality, date and place of birth. Things are better in Quito than in Dakar, but still hard. I guess there's a new destination for him but I haven't dared to ask.

Reflecting on the drive to increasingly secure borders Minh-ha affirms: "The incessantly fortified line dividing here from there may turn out in the end to be an 'optical illusion.' Always lurking are the cracks and fissures whose invisibility may at any time

turn visible with a dice of destiny" (Minh Ha 2011).

Cracks open for very brief moments when forces randomly align, but as Minh-ha affirms, they are always lurking behind. Most of the people I met in Dakar are still there, roaming around. But once in a while someone pierces the walls asserting their right to move as they look for a place to fulfill their aspirations.

'Stranded in the Maghreb': The Experience of Nigerian Europe-bound Illegal Migrants Repatriated from Libya

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Abstract
Nigeria is a populous black country with more than140 million persons. Infrastructural and human development has   not matched the demographic profile of the country. Crude oil revenues have orchestrated an etiolated social classification with a few rich elite and a great mass of poor people. Hence Nigeria ranks very low on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Indicators. This is clearly a typical example of resource curse. Poverty has greatly affected the welfare of large sections of the populations with particular reference to the youthful population. A major reaction to this situation in Nigeria is migration. Many young Nigerians are in the Diasporas trying to attain high level of social and economic development that eluded them in Nigeria. Unfortunately, many of these are illegal migrants. Europe features prominently among destinations of choice among youthful illegal migrants and this is where the Maghreb region comes in as the part of Africa that is closest to the European borderline. Many Nigerian youths that find themselves in the Maghreb on their way to Europe face culture shock and most are actually stranded having stayed longer to make the crossing than was envisaged. Thus they have become a major challenge to countries like Libya, Morocco and Egypt and by extension the European countries across the Mediterranean. Those that are convicted of crimes are languishing in prison or on death row while some have been executed. A lot are repatriated from time to time. This study is interested in scrutinizing this migration phenomenon through narratives involving persons who have had the Maghreb experience. The study sought to understand the drivers of Europe-directed migration decision; adjustment in the transit Maghreb countries; the implications of the sub-Saharan Africa originated illegal migration for the social and economic character of the Maghreb; and the effect of the phenomenon on the country of origin, Nigeria. The narrative is based on the experience of five Nigerians (three men and two women) who have tried to enter Europe through Libya and who have lived in Libya for at least one year. The respondents were identified at the point of their forced return following the conflict in Libya. Findings from the study show that (a) the major driver of Nigerians in the Europe-bound migration is poverty and joblessness; (b) Maghreb countries are under intense pressure from Europe-bound migrants and (c) Nigeria has lost fortune in terms of manpower and capital on account of this form of migration. It is seen from the experience of this study that interest of all stakeholders is best served by the attainment of the identified basic development goals in Nigeria.

1.0   Introduction

Estimates from the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees show that at the end of year 2008, refugees worldwide numbered 15.2 million (UNHCR, 2009). Kane (1995) quoting UNHCR noted that Africa had 'surged past Asia to have the most, with 11.8 million [refugees]. In Africa, Nigeria, perhaps due to its relatively high population ranked ninth in the world, contributes a high number of migrants. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco and Nigeria have the strongest showing as countries of origin for African migrants (DRC, 2007).

Nigeria had an estimated population of 140 million in 2006 (APRM, 2008). It has an average annual population growth rate of 3.2% and is the most populous black country in the world.

Agriculture is the main economic activity in terms of employment and linkages with the overall economy (NPC, 2005). Nigerian economy has a widely spread primary production sector. This primary sector is dominated by agriculture which is followed by crude oil which represents 22%. The secondary sector, mostly manufacturing, accounts for 3.8%. Nigeria is one of the least industrialized countries in Africa (APRM, 2008).

Nigeria's economic strength is derived largely from its oil and gas wealth. For instance, in 2006, the oil and gas sector contributed 99% of export revenues, 78% of government revenues and 38.8% of the GDP. Other

contributions to the GDP in 2006 included agriculture 32.5%, wholesale and retail 13.5%, industry excluding petroleum 2.9% and other sectors 1.5% (APRM, 2008).

The growing importance of oil has brought such advantages as substantial surpluses on the current account of the balance of payments and enabling the country to increase its foreign reserves. On the other hand, over-reliance on oil has had a number of disadvantages. Notable among them is the neglect of certain important sectors of the economy such as agriculture and manufacturing.

Overall, Nigeria has the potential to build a prosperous economy, appreciably reduce poverty and provide the basic socially and economic services its population deserves. Regrettably, infrastructure and human development have not matched the demographic profile of the country. Crude oil revenues have orchestrated an etiolated social classification with a few rich elite and a great mass of poor people.

Poverty has greatly affected the welfare of large sections of the populations with particular reference to the youthful population. A major reaction to this situation in Nigeria is migration.

Young Nigerians are in Diaspora trying to attain high level of socially and economic development that eluded them in Nigeria. Unfortunately, many of these are illegal migrants. Europe features prominently among destinations of choice among youthful illegal migrants. This is where the Maghreb region comes in as the part of Africa that is closest to the European borderline.

Nigerian youths that find themselves in the Maghreb on their way to Europe face culture shock. Most are actually stranded having stayed longer to make the crossing than was envisaged. Thus they become a major challenge to countries like Libya, Morocco and Egypt and by extension the European countries across the Mediterranean. Those that are convicted of

crimes languish in prison or on death row; some have been executed. Many are repatriated from time to time.

This paper scrutinizes the migration phenomenon and brings out the grim realities of illegally trying to enter Europe through the Maghreb region. This narrative is based on the views of Nigerians who have had the Maghreb experience. The rest of the paper is structured into the following headings: methodology, drivers of Europe directed migration decisions, arrival and adjustment in Maghreb transit countries and implications of the Sub-Saharan originated migrations. The paper concludes with some recommendations.

2.0   Methodology

The study is based on narratives by persons who have had the Maghreb transit experience in Libya. The study subjects are 5 in number including 3 men and 2 women who have had at least 1 year stay in Libya while trying to get into Europe. These persons were identified at the point of their forced return to Lagos following the escalation of conflict in Libya in 2011. They were identified at the Murtala Muhammed Airport in Lagos. Though preliminary interviews took place at the airport, more in-depth narratives were secured much latter at their Nigerian addresses. They fielded questions on their motivation to travel to Europe, their adjustment problems in Libya and the nature of illegal migration into Europe. On their own request, they have been identified in this study with pseudonyms – Efosa, Charles and Mike for men and Jane and Eki for females. The narrative also included accounts of deportees obtained from secondary data.

3.0   Drivers of Europe Directed Migration Decisions

Libya's oil-driven economy and its relative prosperity mainly make it a society of mass immigration. About 600,000 Sub-Saharan Africans are estimated to live among Libya's population of 6.5 million.   Some

500,000 Nigerians are in Libya (Daily Sun March 7, 2011). The migrants are lured by a relatively stable currency and the availability of jobs that many Libyans decline to do. We will not however fail to notice Nigeria/Libya differentials in such indicators as life expectancy which is 46.47 years for Nigeria and 74.1 years for Libya and Gross National Product (GNP) per capita which is 390 USDS for Nigeria and 4,450USD for Libya (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). These differences alone cannot account for Nigerians' gravitation to Libya. Mauritius with a Gross Domestic Product per capita of $13,700 (Perry, 2007) comparable to Libya's at $14,328 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008) has not drawn Nigerian migrants in equal measure. Hence we can conclude that geographical proximity to Europe has become a problem for the Maghreb with particular reference to Libya in terms it is a problem of externality costs.

Europe directed immigration involving Libya is a tasking enterprise for Nigerians going by the tortuous winding journey. One of the routes is Nigeria→Benin Republic- Togo→Ghana→Liberia → Mali → Burkina Faso → Mauritania → Morocco → Europe. The other route involves moving from Nigeria → Niger → Chad → Libya → Algeria → Morocco – Europe (Efosa, 2011). It can therefore be seen that the drives of Europe directed immigration are quite strong to overcome such route obstacles (physical and socio-cultural distance).

Very much similar to the basic drive for a gold rush is the drive for emigration to Europe. Mike in answers to his reasons for decision to move to Europe said

> I made the move in order to have better condition of
> living and to have the sensation [sic] of Western
> world.

Evidently a utopian understanding of Europe pervades African society. This is to the extent that major sacrifices are made to attain the idealized European life. The Maghreb experience, though challenging and hazardous may not dampen the drive for Europe. Many Nigerians deported from Libya at the end of October, 2007 after being brought out from various Libyan prisons had vowed to go back to Libya (Akinsanmi, 2007). What fuels such powerful drive? The factors include:

a.   Poor Government Expenditure on Human capital: Nigeria mirrors many sub Saharan African societies Encyclopaedia Britannica (2008) noted that as a result of borrowing at the end of the 20th century an ever increasing share of the national budget was needed for debt repayment, which with corruption dominating government, operations meant that very little of Nigeria's income was being spent on the people and their needs. One instance of this neglect is in power production and distribution. For a country of more than 130 million people, its production of less than 4000 megawatts of electricity is very poor. Many in the formal and informal sector alike are therefore unable to survive. It is also a compelling reason to migrate. Charles noted

> My beer retailing shop was not a going concern. I hardly had cold drinks for customers and I could not afford all the diesel to power my old fuel-guzzling power generator. I was not making enough gains to keep afloat I wanted out".

b.   Attitudes: Boundaries naturally fall within difficult terrains that are equally difficult to traverse. It is such difficulty that made them places of limited occupation in the first place. The European African borderland with an expansive water body is one such boundary area.

However the deterrent effect of the physical environment is subject to the human spirit just as Muir (1981:129) observed "the barrier function of boundaries will be determined far more by adjacent state attitudes and policies than by the nature of the border terrain". The attitude of the Maghreb states, the attitude of Government and peoples of sub-Saharan Africa and the attitude of European Governments are implicated in the vulnerability or otherwise of the borderland. Diffusion in terms of migration is strongest where the gradient of indicators is sharpest. An impoverished sub-Saharan Africa tends to show a carefree attitude to risks associated with illegal migration. A population level of risk aversion is an indicator of well being. The European emigration project is also not cheap as Charles indicated.

> I sold my shop to raise money. The total money I
> traveled to Libya with was ₦450,000 ($3000) If your
> eyes are really on Europe, then you have to put aside
> a lot of money. A trip from Libya to Europe cost at
> least $1500 and there are no guarantees that your first
> trip will be successful.

There is really an attitude problem in substituting an existing livelihood guaranteed by shop ownership in Nigeria with a vague hope of better livelihood in Europe and this kind of substation is common.

c. Poverty: Nigeria is well endowed; it is essentially poor. Poverty is instrumental in many migration decisions involving Europe. Hence Nigerian people's migration patterns seem to have followed her economic history just like it has been for Puerto Rico which saw a number of its nationals in New York City moving from 187,000 to 613,000 in the 1950s but which has recorded progressive decline in migration as the economy grew (The Economist, 2001). Puerto Rican

migration into the US has reduced even as economic differentials between Puerto Rico and the United States persist. (The Economist, 2001).

If the tide of illegal migration is to be stemmed, a regime of incentives is necessary. This realization has led to training and job placement for returnees in the Philippines; micro loans for migrants to start businesses in China and assistance to jobless returnees to the tune of $20m by State of Kerala, India (Schuman, 2009). In the case of Nigeria, migrants are hesitant to return even in the face of crises at their destinations. From the 2nd to 4th March 2011 (3-day interval) 6 Nigerians lost their lives as 7000 passed through hell at UNHCR emergency camps in Libya (Daily Sun, March, 7, 2011). By September 2011, 20,000 Nigerians had rejected evacuation in Libya (Daily Independent 6th Sept. 2011). Even as these Nigerians are quite misunderstood in the Nigerian media, the absence of such incentives listed earlier seems to justify their position.

d. The Lure of Remittance Opportunities: Many Nigerians are lured by the prospects of sending home remittances which is making the difference between poverty and decent livelihood among many Nigerian homes. This implies that Nigerian migrants are essentially economic migrants. The drive for remittance is in fact reason Europe and the Maghreb feature strongly among their destinations. Europe has 7 of the top 10 remittance sending countries of 2008 which included the Russian Federation – USD 26.1b, Switzerland – USD 19.0b, Germany – USD 15.06, Spain – USD 14.7b, Italy – USD 12.7b, Luxembourg – USD 10.9b and Netherlands – USD 8.4b (UNDESA, 2008). United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and France feature strongly among the most important remittance senders to Nigeria while Egypt and Libya are among the most important sending African counties (World Bank, 2009). It can therefore be seen that the Maghreb tends to be a satellite of Europe in terms of African originated migration. Nigeria migrants just like

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many other African migrants, are however not in a technical position to play a major economic role in Europe that will make them major conduits for out bound remittance. Though Europe is the major sending region, Europe also dominates remittance receipts with the top five recipients of remittance in 2009 being France (USD 15.6b); Spain (USD 11.7b); Germany (USD 10.8b); Belgium (USD 9.1b) and Poland (USD 8.5b) (UNDESA, 2008). Generally remittances emanating from Europe end up in Europe. This has not slowed the remittance drive as many migrate solely with remittance in view. There are disappointments however as Efosa pointed out.

> Only very few people can send money home [from
> Libya]. And these are mainly people in crime. This is
> because monthly income for men is about 70 Dinars
> or about USD 67 while through prostitution women
> can make about 347Dinars or USD 333. With
> personal upkeep, nothing may remain to be remitted.
> One's break comes if he eventually makes it to
> Europe. For me, all through my stay in Libya I sent
> nothing home. Rather I received financial assistance
> from home (Nigeria) time and again.

On his own, Mike's migration was a family investment with profit motive and he recounts:

> My elder brother, a successful shoemaker in Aba
> brought a major part of the ₦485,000 (USD 3233) I
> left home with. Part of our agreement was that I pay
> back through remittance within the first 2 years.

e. Social Crises

Nigeria has been passing through series of social crises involving internal displacements. There have been ethnic conflicts in most parts of Nigeria with particular reference to the northern parts leading to loss of lives. Incidentally many Nigerian asylum seekers around the world cite these acts of violence as their compelling reason for seeking asylum. Jane recalls the events leading to her migration to Libya:

I was actually doing well in Jos in the textiles market before the year 2007 riots and killings.

I lost everything in the crises and I decided I have had it with Nigeria. I gathered whatever remained and left for Libya with the intention of going to Europe if only to escape such horror of 2007.

The question is why must it be Europe that will be chosen as destination? She illuminates:

Europe is free of the kind of crisis that I witnessed in

Jos. I wanted peace of mind and opportunity without

war and bloodshed.

The foregoing illustrates the difficulty in keeping populations at home in the face of local financial environmental and social crises. Migrants tend not to be very mindful of international boundary lines in their bid to harness opportunities. Incidentally, proximity to Europe makes it a choice destination for sub-Saharan Africans.

4.0 Arrival and Adjustment in Maghreb Transit Country.

This section is divided into two namely:

a.   The journey and the arrival; and

b.   Adjustment in the Maghreb.

4.1 The Journey and the Arrival

All the respondents narrated that they made the journey to the Maghreb overland. They entered Libya from Niger. This journey by road, on the average, took the respondents one week from Niger. Some of the migrants took along with them food items. None of them ever had a bath while the long journey lasted.

These migrants spent days and nights going through dunes and mountains, violence, pain and suffering risking their lives in sweltering temperatures as high as $50^{o}C$. The major overland route to Libya via Niger is the Zinder-Agadez-Blima-Sabha-Tripoli. In addition to being subjected to extortion by corrupt and heartless policemen, soldiers and border officials, migrants also lose such personal belongings as money and mobile phones to those corrupt officials.

On arrival in Libya, the migrants would locate pre-arranged contacts and networks. Where there is no pre-existing network, a new one is forged in the course of the journey.

For must Nigerians immigrants, life in Libya is pathetic. With almost no chance of crossing into Europe, no work or decent accommodation coupled with the stark reality of trying to adapt to a strong cultural and social environment many resort to such crimes as drug trafficking, prostitution, unauthorized brewing and sale of alcohol etc.

4.2 Adjustment in the Maghreb

North Africa has been identified as a transit region and destination for African and other migrants en route Europe (International Organization for Migration IOM (2008). While this has been the case, outsiders have become a sort of nuisance in the Maghreb, having largely failed to integrate into the society particularly in Libya which holds firmly to its non-secular stance. Though the Libyan leadership under Muammar

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Ghaddafi made a volte face to embrace Africanism, this never translated to a more hospitable and immigrant-friendly citizenry and government. Khaled (2001) illustrated this with the attack in the year 2000 of migrant workers from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Ghana. The attacks have since year 2000 worsened rather than abated. As at September of 2011, there were massive arrest and detention of Nigerians in Libya while over 2000 were said to be in underground cells (Yusuf, 2011). The nature of the experience of Nigerians was captured by Nigeria's foreign Affairs Minister who identified in Libya "killings, rape, and extortion of money from these helpless Africans who have taken refuge in camps as well as those in detention" (Ashiru, 2011).

A major factor in the adjustment problems of Nigerians in Libya is the fact that while most migrant Nigerians come from a secular and egalitarian society they certainly get confronted by culture shock having to survive in a place ruled according to religious laws (of Islam). Jane reports her discomfort from restriction on fashion.

> In Nigeria, you are free to wear whatever you choose. In Libya the individual is highly controlled. Fashion is not free and you will incur the wrath of society if you try to be different. Punishment is meted out according to Islamic law.

However, the discomfort of fashion restriction pales when compared with work experience and even freedom of movement.

Efosa noted that:

> Prospective employees daily gather at the Shogo ground for employers to hire them for menial activities like construction work. There is no work in the formal sector for Nigerians, who also are usually illegal migrants. For a day's work we get paid 20 to 30 Dinar per day. While Egyptians work in the Mazzara (farms) pride will not allow Nigerians to do such work. Ghanaians survive through their fine art but Nigerians usually go for quick money –fraud,

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counterfeiting currency. In any month 360 Dinar about ₦25,000 or 167 US Dollars is the highest income possible in the informal sector. To be on salary you have to work in the home of Europeans or rich Libyans. Prostitution thrives among the ladies. It is the most lucrative trade among illegal immigrants.

It is evident that the defining character of occupations among illegal migrants is insecurity and no fulfillment is possible with the jobs. A decent living will therefore require a great deal of work given low income obtainable in the informal sector.

On the other hand, freedom of movement is highly restricted for the illegal migrants. It is a cat and mouse game between them and the police. The illegality of their stay is cashed in on by the police

Mike recalls that:

The illegal immigrants are constantly raided in a barbaric fashion described as 'cash cash' meaning that you either pay cash for your temporary respite or you are forced into one of the camps for confinement. At the Zanzu camp which is mainly for deportation, there is no good food, water or hygiene and the only way out is bribing the police. Gacron camp is the first port of call on the way to jail. Nothing good comes from the usual police question 'where are your documents? One only prays it does not come to him/her'.

The illegal status is a major source of vulnerability exposing Nigerians and other nationalities alike to sundry abuses. Incidentally the physiological differentiation of these dark-skinned sub-Saharan Africans enable their identification and profiling in non-black Libya.

While many Nigerian illegal immigrants may at some point in Libya put off their original plan to enter Europe, some are determined to get to Europe as Efosa confirms.

Any trip by immigrants to Europe from Libya using any of the illegal routes Patera (canoe) or stowing away is a death wish because the waves of the sea may capsize a canoe and the entire crew will drown. Many work in Libya for more than 3 years without succeeding to cross. This does not imply that they do not try regularly to cross over to Europe. In most cases there are many fraudulent crossing contacts. You may work hard to raise 1500 to 3000 US Dollars to finance your crossing, all for the trip to be fraudulently cancelled midway on the grounds of roughness of the seas. There are no refunds for such eventualities. One such experience is enough to demoralize one but those who are determined will not be deterred. Several lives have been lost at sea on these trips. I will put the crossing chances of any boat at about 35 percent.

Life in the desert for those entering Libya en route Europe is equally as challenging. Mike paints a macabre picture of the desert experience thus:

Many people die of frustration, sickness, hunger and bandit attacks. Some people get lost in the vast desert because the so-called guides (expert desert guide) may miss their way and all will be lost in the heart of the desert heat. Everybody may perish. If people die in the desert, members of their group will simply bury them in shallow graves without elaborate arrangements but with a sign that indicates a grave. There are many such graves in the desert. Relatives only get to know of the passing on if there is any in the group that knows them. Hunger and thirst are major desert problems. Many stranded in the desert have to take their own urine to survive.

Illegal immigrants' access to social services is also impaired by their status. One limitation works through their financial disempowerment, the other works through the illegality of their existence as has been noted by Eki

> About 5 to 10 persons live in one room. Going to hospital when sick may earn one arrest and detention and possible deportation. Apart from these, arrests for deportation might take place at midnight while one is asleep. There is never a chance to fix anything before one is whisked off.

Ijediogor, Akinwale and Obinor (2000) reported of one Chibundu who though had lived in Libya for 2 years came under the attack of 'Asma' boys who carried out raids to rid Libya of blacks. Hence it can be that apart from pursuit of Government policy to contain migrants, migrants have to contend against a Libyan citizenry increasingly buying into anti immigration ideas.

4.2.1 Indignities and Inhumanities Inherent in the Maghreb Experience

The Maghreb experience is incomplete without highlighting the risks indignities and dehumanizing circumstances the migrants encounter in the course of their search for greener pastures in North Africa (Libya) and Europe (Spain and Italy). In effect, the search for greener pastures in Europe by crossing the Sahara Desert to North African countries (Libya) is grim, hellish and senselessly suicidal.

In the beginning, the migrants sold all their belongings, and additionally generated money from family and friends for investment in the journey through North Africa to Europe. A part of the money was invested in the procurement of travel documents (valid or invalid) and in paying their way through the journey. According to Kirkpatrick and Sayare (2011), many of the migrants were desperately poor people made even more so by investment of up to $1000 each to pay smugglers to bring them across Libya's Southern border.

Other hazards encountered by the immigrants include abduction by such rebel groups as the Salafist or the marauding Toureg gangs who often robbed and raped their victims. (www.nigeriatripoli.org accessed June, 2011). Among the migrants are young girls who embark on the journey with the hope of working either in Libya or Italy. For instance, in the account of Oyedele (2011) Aliyah and her friend Mariam both left Nigeria in 2010 for Libya. According to Oyedele, they were horrified to realize that they were expected to go on to Italy for prostitution. They refused to be associated with prostitution and were physically battered by the human trafficking contacts in Libya. They escaped from their contacts without their passports only to be taken in by a seemingly kind Arab woman who gave them jobs as housekeepers. In Nigeria, they would never contemplate taking up this housekeeping job. Ironically, they did this job to a strange Arab woman for about a year without receiving even a dime for pay. She not only withheld their pay but also beat them up, and did not allow them out of the house. They dared not complain to anyone since they were irregular migrants.

There have been cruel tales that Nigerian illegal immigrants apprehended aboard ship while trying to cross to Europe through the Mediterranean were criminally thrown overboard. According to one of the respondents, female illegal immigrants received preferential treatment: "The immigration officials negotiate with the girls, many of who are in the Maghreb en route to Europe for prostitution". They asked the girls if they would choose to be thrown into the sea and be prey to sharks or be kept alive in return for sexual favours. The helpless and hopeless young adults end up being kept as sex slaves in immigration detention camps. Immigration detention centres in Libya are located in Ziltan, Twaish and the prison of Surman.

The Nigerian criminal justice system is radically different from that of Libya (www.nigeriatripoli.org). What can pass for an individual's right in Nigeria may attract severe punishment in Libya. As an illegal immigrant, one literarily has no rights. The following account of Segun chillingly bears out this statement. "Actually, when I left Nigeria eight years ago, I wanted to go to Italy, not Libya. When I settled in Libya, I worked for one Arab in his farm and was not paid for a year. When I protested, he brought in the police. I was arrested and locked up. I was in jail for seven years". Segun lamented that during the trial, he did not get any legal representation and that the court proceedings were conducted in Arabic which he did not understand and had neither a translator nor an interpreter. He said he had spent a couple of months in prison when one of the prison officers, who spoke on smattering English told him that he was sentenced to life in prison for stealing and rape!

We have so far presented some of the horrible experiences of some Nigerians in their life and death search for better life in the Maghreb. Unfortunately, many did not live to tell their experiences. For one thing, the desert is littered with the carcasses of those unable to make the journey to the expected destination (www.nigeriatripoli.org). Worse still for some, they are buried in the belies of the aquatic habitants of the Mediterranean Sea (Oyedele, 2011). And for others, they had the ultimate encounter with the hangman (Kalu, 2009).

Let us now look at the implication of Sub-Saharan Africa originated illegal migration.

5.0 Implications of the Sub-Saharan Africa Originated Illegal Migration

The implications of the migratory flow are examined under the following headings:

(a) Implications for the socio-economic character of the Transit country;

(b)   Implications for the socio-economic character of the European Borderline countries; and

(c)   Implications for the socioeconomic character of origin country, Nigeria.

5.1   Implications for the Socioeconomic Character of the Transit Country.

The 1990s witnessed a surge in trans-Saharan migration to Libya and other North African countries (De Haas, 2007). Within this period Libya and to a limited extent, Algeria, influenced increasing immigration of labourers to the sweltering Saharan hinterlands where oil wells, mines and new farms were located but where nationals often refuse to work (Spiga, 2005).

The air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council in 1992 and 2000 precipitated an unintended but critical role in increasing migration to Libya. Disappointed by the assumed lack of solidarity from Arab countries during the embargo, the then government in Libya embarked on a radical reorientation of Libya foreign policy. Thus, Libya facilitated the entry of foreign nationals into her territory. In the spirit of Pan-Africa Policy and Pan-African solidarity, coupled with the demand for abundant cheap African migrant labour, the Libyan government particularly welcomed sub-Saharan African to work in Libya. Subsequently, Libya became a major destination for sub-Saharan migrants.

According to De Haas (2007), most West African migrants made the trans-Saharan crossing in order to work in Libya. However, fundamental shift took place when Sub-Saharan migrants began to join the flow of Maghrebis who had earlier started crossing the Mediterranean illegally on account of Italy and Spain introducing visa requirements for North African workers in the early 1990s. The increasing presence of West Africans in Libya, the persistent demand for migrant labour in (Southern) Europe where

salaries and living conditions are much better than in Libya and the existing networks of smugglers helping Maghrebis across the Mediterranean were necessary conditions for the shift. Additionally, these conditions brought an increased pressure of migrants on both sides of the Mediterranean coast. As a result, there was palpable resentment against immigrants.

Following the September 2000 violent clashes between Libyans and African workers, in which 130 Sub-Saharan migrants died, the Libyan authorities instituted a number of repressive measures. According to De Haans (2007) these include more restrictive immigration regulation, lengthy and arbitrary detention of immigrants in poor conditions in prisons and camps, physical abuse and the voluntary and forced repatriation of tens of thousands of immigrants including asylum seekers. Between 2003 and 2005 the Libyan government had departed approximately 145,000 irregular migrants mostly to Sub-Saharan countries (HRW 2006) including Nigeria.

While it may be true that those deported were illegal immigrants, there can be no justification for savagery and barbarism being visited on any category of migrants.
According to the Guardian Newspaper editorial of Wednesday, October 11, 2000, before the deportation exercise of that year commenced, gangs of Libyan youth were allowed free rein to attack settlements populated by black Africans in major cities like Tripoli and Benghazi and outlying villages such as Zaura in the border areas. Continuing, the editorial stated that Libyan police either participated in these attacks or looked the other way while they were going on even in the camps where the victims took refuge.

We have gone to this extent to present a background to the implications of the character of Libya as a transit country in the North African-European migration landscape. The Libyan migration policies as they relate to the perceived Pan-African solidarity are characteristically erratic, and consistently tends to hold one race superior to another. Hostility

to migrants, no matter their status, is incompatible with the proposed union of African states. Neither Libyan laws nor relevant international statues support this kind of hostility. Because demand creates its own supply, migration from Sub-Saharan Africa is continuing because of persistent need for cheap labour in Libya. These migrants, it has been argued, end up taking menial and manual jobs which the destination/transit nationals do not ordinarily go for. For the destination and/ or transit country do violence to the migrants is as unthinkable as lying in ambush for ones guests.

5.2   Implication for the Socioeconomic Character of the European Boarder land Countries

Hostility and repression meted out to migrants in Libya and other Maghreb regions tend to precipitate the surge and urge to migrate to Europe. According to Ridgeway (2011), Libya's exports to Europe are mainly fossil fuels which Italy desperately wants and migrants which it decidedly does not.

During the Libyan uprising, the Italian foreign minister had warned that it could result in 350,000 unwanted immigrants landing in the European continent. Italy therefore asked the EU for support in stopping the migrants who mostly enter through Italian shores.

In May 2009, Italy agreed to begin controversial joint patrols with Libya, turning back thousands of illegal immigrants aboard boats in the Mediterranean. During the crisis however, the then Libyan leader hinted that he might unilaterally scrap cooperation by allowing migrants pass though his country to Europe if the EU sided with his opponents.

It is evident that the flow of illegal immigrants to Europe is not only unwanted, it assumed the unique position of scare tactic in the Libyan-European diplomatic relations at that time. Thus EU countries reacted by intensifying   border   controls   towards   the   Maghreb   countries   and

transforming the border into a buffer zone to reduce the migratory pressures at Europe's southern border (GoldSchmidt, 2006; Lutterbeck 2006; Perrin, 2005; Schuster, 2005). In the views of De Haas (2007) in practice the emphasis of policies has been on increasing border controls, development-instead of-migrating policies are often merely mentioned consequently the EU countries have the onerous added responsibility of controlling the borders of contiguous Northern African countries.

5.3 Implications for the Socioeconomic Character of Nigeria as a Sending Country

Some countries have encouraged international migration as a deliberate approach to development (Nwajiuba, 2005). According to De Haas (2007) the economies of receiving and sending countries have become increasingly dependent on migrant labour and remittances respectively. However, there are concerns that sending countries are deprived of their best human resources and leads to abuse and exploitation of the workers. These concerns are cogent and relevant to Nigerian migrants to Europe through the Maghreb.

The migrants are characteristically young adults. They sell off their belongings and additionally borrow in bid to raise money for the dicey search for greener pastures in the Maghreb and Europe. According to De Haas (2007), the large informal and formal labour markets in Spain, Italy and also Libya for agricultural labour, construction and other service jobs have become increasingly dependent on the influx of cheap often irregular migration labour.

It is ironic that these migrants who provide the agricultural labour in Libya and other locations during their odyssey tend to look down upon such income generating activities back home. It is true that economic migrants are

a symptom of the inequalities of the global economic order. It is also true that Nigeria is yet to formulate effective policies to mitigate the trend.

According to Guardian Newspaper editorial of Wednesday October 11, 2000 the policies of successive Nigeria governments have made many young Nigerians economic refugees, who are at the mercy of hostile hosts. The paper noted that all over the world, Nigerians are subjected to maltreatment on account of unsavory conditions at home. Some of the recurring repulsive conditions at home include large scale unemployment and sluggish economy. Another includes the weak naira which makes whatever handful of money earned abroad by Nigerians to turn to at basketful of naira (Nigerian currency) on exchange. It should be emphasized that unless and until Nigerians find sufficient sustenance and good governance at home, the motivation to travel abroad by any means will perpetually draw our productive youths away.

Harsh economic situations are not by themselves the only excuse for citizens to flee their homelands. Notably, the scales come down heavily on the side of economic factors as the major reasons for international migration from Nigeria. It therefore stands to reason that Nigeria's economic policies are sufficiently deficient in attracting and holding our active populations who in desperation desert the country for unknown future in strange lands overseas including the Maghreb.

6.0   Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

Nigeria , the most populous black country in the world has agriculture as her main economic activity in terms of empowerment and linkages with the overall economy. Nigeria's economic strength is largely derived from its oil and gas wealth.

Over-reliance on oil has had a number of disadvantages. One of them is the neglect of some important sectors of the economy namely: agriculture and manufacturing.

Nigeria has the natural endowments to build a prosperous economy. Unfortunately, infrastructural and human developments have not kept pace with Nigeria's demographic profile. Poverty-linked characteristics have manifested in large sections of the youthful population. A major expression to this situation in Nigeria is the outflow of able-bodied Nigerians to such countries as Libya, Italy and Spain.

Nigerian young adults are in Diaspora trying to eke out a living. Regrettably, either by omission or commission, many Nigerian migrants overstay their visa, yet others travel with fake document. They eventually end up being categorized as illegal, irregular/undocumented immigrants.

This paper narrates the experiences of these migrants who traveled through the Maghreb on their way to Europe. The paper is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was obtained from the respondents identified at the point of their forced return from Libya.

The relatively high standard of living in Libya together with its nearness to European borderline makes Libya an attractive destination en route to Europe. Majority of the migrants entered Libya by road. The major overland route to Libya is Kano-in Nigeria to Niger and then Libya.

The migrants spend days and nights going through dunes and mountains, violence, pain and suffering in sweltering temperatures as high as $50^{o}C$ in addition to being subjected to extortion by corrupt officials, migrants also lose such personal belongings as money and mobile phones to the officials.

For most Nigerian immigrants, life in Libya is death. It is like being stranded in hell. It is akin to being between the devil and the deep blue sea. With almost no chance of crossing into Europe, no work or decent

accommodation coupled with grim reality of struggling to adapt to a foreign cultural and social environment, the migrants tend to resort to such crimes as drug trafficking, prostitution, brewing and selling of alcohol.

In the process of coming to terms with life in the Maghreb, the migrants sweep the streets; work in restaurant and related menial and manual work. They even work in agricultural farms – an activity neglected back home.

The Maghreb experience is incomplete without drawing our attention to the risks and indignities encountered by the migrants in the hellish search for greener pastures. The search for greener pastures in Europe en route North Africa is senselessly suicidal.

The hostility experienced by Sub-Saharan migrants in Libya is obviously incompatible with the Pan-Africanism philosophy of the then leader. The gory tales of the host country visiting violence on migrants is akin to a host laying ambush to an unsuspecting guest.

Evidently, the flow of illegal immigrants to Europe is not only unwanted it had assumed the special position of scare tactic in the Libyan-European diplomatic relations.

Some countries encourage international migration as a conscious effort to development. However, there are issues that sending countries are divested of their best human resources. There is also the issue of abuse and exploitation of the workers. These challenges are relevant to Nigerian migrants to Europe through the Maghreb.

Conclusion

Majority of Nigerians in Libya are illegal immigrants with all the inconveniences that go with the status. Part of the reasons for this status is that Libya is only but a transit country in a migration experience that targets European countries. Nigerian migrants in Libya largely see migration to Europe as escape from poverty in Nigeria. These illegal immigrants choose

to stay in Libya even in the face of dangerous sociopolitical developments like the one that precipitated the Libyan civil war in 2011. Two things can be deduced from this stance: the condition of Nigeria as a push factor for migrants is critical and the nature of Europe as a pull factor for Nigerian migrants is not abated. In the middle of these two geographical areas is Libya. Libyan attraction is simply geographical; a product of its location in the Mediterranean area, which is strategic for migrants with a view to illegally entering Europe. This is also strongly reinforced with Nigeria/Libya differentials in such indicators as life expectancy and Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. Hostile socioeconomic conditions in Nigeria generate fertile grounds for the production of migrants, legal and illegal alike. Nigeria's harsh economic environment is devoid of basic incentives for youth empowerment. As a result, many young Nigerians are effectively turned into economic refugees who are the mercy of hostile hosts. There is obviously no justification for this cruelty and hostility to legal/illegal Nigerian migrants anywhere in the world. The risk associated with illegally trying to migrate to Europe en route Libya is senselessly suicidal. The savagery visited on the migrants in the Maghreb region is like a host laying ambush to an unsuspecting guest.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are proffered:

- There should be conscious effort on the part of the European Union to embark on transparent investment in human capacity development in Africa. Emphasis should, to all intents and purposes, be shifted from enormous investment in high technology devices to substantial investment in developing human capacities in Africa to secure its territory against uncontrolled flow of migrants.

- African Union should deliberately adopt measure aimed at wise use of remittances from the Diaspora. This can be done at regional, national and individual levels by ensuring that remittances are not frittered away but instead in generating employment, provision of social amenities and building of human capacity.

- Nigerians in Diaspora have a role to play in stemming the flow of illegal Nigerian migrants by regularly reporting on their experiences in their search for better life overseas. They can also lend a helping hand in investing in employment generation ventures, provision of social amenities and human capacity building.

- The clear signal is that the Nigerian government has to do a lot to embark on job creation programmes and youth empowerment that will sufficiently attract and hold our active population.

- Because of the key role of agriculture in the provision of employment, there is the need to diversify the economy.

- There is the need to restore the dignity of Nigerians irrespective of the country they live in. Our embassies the world over should be able to offer requisite, timely and lawful assistance to our nationals in distress.

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Rough Seas: beyond the 'no border' agenda, towards Euromediterranean social movements

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On 11April 2011, during a short trip to my home region in the province of Parma (Northern Italy), I visited Casa Cantoniera, a *centro sociale* (social centre) near the centre of Parma[1]. It was Monday night, the day designated to the weekly meetings of the main political collective in the *centro*. As I stepped out of my car and moved towards the building, I noticed around thirty people sitting around a table – three times bigger than I was accustomed to seeing less than a year earlier. They were all new faces to me, mostly students in their early twenties who had got to know and then joined the collective in the course of the students and workers' protests that had taken place since the autumn of 2010 in Italy. This was not the only novelty. Still rubbing my eyes at such a multiplication of activists, I took a seat around the table and sent smiles to the faces I knew. Three 'comrades' had come back from Tunisia a few hours earlier. They had been on a 'Caravan' organized by Ya Basta! (of which Casa Cantoniera hosted a branch), the main pro-Zapatista organization in Italy. In the audience, eyes were glued to Domenico, Luca and Luigi, eager to know about their meetings with Tunisian activists in Tunis, and about their visit to the refugee camps at the border with Libya, where the Caravan (around 30-40 people from all over Italy) had delivered some medical aid. "The situation", said Luca talking about the Tunisian political scenario, "is very fluid": loosely organized political groups mushroomed all over the place, each offering a different vision to continue the Jasmine revolution. Among other issues, the increasing presence of Islamist groups, and clashes with other groups thereof, were making the situation ever more volatile. Nevertheless, the three activists stressed, there was room to "build something together with some of the activists we met [during the Caravan]". A month later, a Euro-Mediterranean meeting was organized, summoning social movements that had participated in social justice struggles across Europe and the Mediterranean sea. At the beginning of July, another such meeting was called in Regueb, centre-south Tunisia, one of the main towns of the uprising. By this time , I took a flight and joined Italian activists from other centri sociali across Italy.

This paper describes the attempt to imagine and create a Euro-Mediterranean space 'from below' by a number of Italian, European and Tunisian activists in the aftermath of the 2010/1 mobilisations that ran across Europe and, most notably, south of the Mediterranean. In post-revolt[2] Tunisia, numerous political

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[1] Centri Sociali (social centres) are a distinctive feature of radical movements (especially of the left, but also of the right) in Italy (see below). These are usually abandoned state owned buildings reclaimed, occupied by activists in order to organize self-managed political, social, cultural and recreational activities. Casa Cantoniera is a former warehouse used for road maintenance. It has an attached four-flat building, which was originally the target of the occupation carried out in 2003, when four immigrant families with no access to housing have been accommodated here. In 2005, the Province of Parma, the owner, formally leased the premises to the Associazione Senza Frontiere (Association Without Borders) upon presentation of a self-refurbishment and cultural promotion project. In contrast to many other *centri sociali*, Casa Cantoniera is no longer "occupied".

[2] I prefer the term 'post-uprising' or 'post-revolt' to 'post-revolution', for two reasons. First, although Tunisian activists whom I met used the word *zaura* (Arabic: ثورة) and translated it to French as both *révolte* and *révolution*, revolt and uprising better describe in my view the protests and clashes that took place at the end of 2010, beginning of 2011. Second and related, for many Tunisian

groups and non-governmental organizations inspired by the Arab Spring took to touring the country in order to 'meet the revolutionaries'. In the meantime, an unprecedented mushrooming of organizations and self-identified 'civil society' organizations took place in Tunisia. In this paper, I focus on a specific section of such movement, the Italian activists of networks and centri sociali (like Casa Cantoniera) connected to what once was the *Disobbedienti* (disobedients) movement, an antagonist, left-libertarian movement that had been one of the protagonists of the alter-globalist movement in the late 1990s, early 2000s. It documents the discourses and the practices that have led to Italo-Tunisian dialogues between activists striving to construct social movements outside institutional politics and in pursuit of social justice. As an academic, I endeavour to give an account, albeit rudimentary and incipient, of 'a fluid situation', mostly from the one-sided point of view of the Italian activists. The data I present, however, has been mostly collected as an active participant of such movement, and as such, I also hope this account will feed collective (self-reflexive) discussion among my fellow Italian, European and Tunisian striving to construct an alternative Euro-African frontier to the increasingly dehumanizing border being erected by states on both sides of the Mediterranean sea.

Broadly speaking, the paper raises three points for discussion. In the first place, rather than seeking explanatory models, my aim is "to follow social movement actors themselves, listening, tracing, and mapping the work that they do to bring movements into being" (Casas-Cortés, Osterweil and Powell 2008:28). It has become commonplace for activists and commentators alike to trace a line of descent of protest movements as diverse as Spain's *Indignados* and Occupy Wall Street to the Arab Spring. The uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East have had, indeed, a tremendous impact on movements and individuals around the world, contributing to reinvigorating claims for direct democracy and social justice, and against austerity measures. Structural elements do link some of the movements across the Mediterranean which, in the context of global crisis, increase processes of marginalization and alienation, especially among the younger sections of European and North African society. Both in Italy and in Tunisia, young people have been protagonists of protest movements that seek to address the problems of un-/under-employment, and of precarious existence more generally (Brancaccio 2005; Hibou 2011). Yet, genealogies and structural conditions alone say little about how it is all done, even, or especially, when concrete linkages are being forged, as in the case study at hand. How do activists find commonalities of understanding, of objectives, of political actions? How do they construct meaningful dialogues and concrete connections across the Mediterranean? These questions, which many fellow activists shared during the Tunisian journey to Regueb, demand a closer investigation of the movements themselves.

I follow Casas-Cortés, Osterweil and Powell in highlighting 'knowledge-practices' within the Italian post-disobbedienti movement[3]. The authors offer this concept in an attempt to overcome reductive explanatory models of the cultural/ideological aspects of social movements (such as the concept of 'frame') (cf. Goodwin and Jasper 2007), and to call on academics to engage with knowledge production in social movements:

> These knowledges are important not only because they manifest the values, visions, and theories movement actors are working from, but because such knowledges are generative of political

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interlocutors the true 'revolution' did not end on January 14, when Ben Ali fled the country, but must continue in order to fully transform the country.

[3] Defining this section of the movement with the suffix post- is definitely reductive. The lack of a term is not only due to lack of conceptualization, but to the fact, as we shall see, that this strand of the movement has reacted against hard and fast identities.

> theor___ nd of certain " realities," in which the realm of " the social" cannot be taken for granted by the analyst. (Casas-Cortés, et al. 2008:26)

As we shall see, this perspective is particular relevant for Italian activists, who place emphasis on practice and knowing through doing (together) rather than on ideology. I shall show that ongoing practices, experiences and discourses shape the Italian activists' discourse, practice and experience in their attempt at networking with their Tunisian counterparts.

This leads us to the second point. Pro-migrant and antiborder activism has been one of the central knowledge-practices in the construction of Italo-Tunisian connections. From the point of view of the Italian activists in the post-disobbedienti movement, the construction of a new, alternative Euro-Mediterranean space of social movements goes hand in hand with opposing the EU-Africa border, and constructing a different frontier across the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, pro-migrant and antiborder activism has been at the core of the movement, generating a vast amount of discourse, research, publications, debates, documentaries, public demonstrations and direct actions. Activists have closely monitored the transformations of the EU-Africa border, and like many academics, they generally understand it as a delocalized system of (biopolitical) technologies and reconfigurations of sovereignty. If prior to the uprisings in Northern Africa Italian activists mainly viewed Tunisia and the rest of Northern Africa within a discourse of borders and migration, after January 2011 a discourse of common struggles began to emerge. In the first meetings after the Christmas break, some activists in Parma were already making reference to the linkages between Tunisian youth in the streets and themselves in a common struggle for democracy, welfare and a decent future. Rather than replacing the trope of borders, this new discourse builds on it, and makes use of it in the feeding the imagination of a different Euro-African political geography. Not surprisingly, the Caravan was thought to make 'another breach in the wall across the Mediterranean' in order to meet the Tunisian revolutionaries. This shows the plasticity of the Italian movement in addressing and combining different 'issues', and enveloping them in a more general discourse on biopolitics and dignity. More generally, this shows that the making of a political space and subjectivity that extends from Italy across the Mediterranean sea (and possibly in the opposite direction as well), is not simply a call for activism 'across borders' or 'without borders' that draw on an imaginary of a borderless world; this is a discourse, action and networking that politicize, contest them and exceeds borders.

A third consideration does consequently emerge from this case study. This paper will not be concerned with border regimes, but rather with socio-political alternatives to them. Most research on the Euro-African frontier focuses on the construction of the border regime, and to some extent on the migrants as 'victim-agents' of this borderland. This is surely justified by the need to understand the recrudescence of EU border and migration policies, and their effects on migrants (among others: Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Rigo 2007; Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; De Genova and Peutz 2010). In addition, the externalization of the EU borders has raised several questions about how to best understand borders and state sovereignty. Yet, overemphasis on sovereignty might risk locking attention on the sovereign's point of view to the detriment of other discursive practices. No better example of this can be found than in border scholarship inspired to the work of Giorgio Agamben (1995) on sovereign's decisionalism and exceptionalism. Although this literature is very useful to understand the transformations of power at and through (delocalized) borders (Salter 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2009), it risks painting a scenario of hegemonic totality, which might unintentionally corroborate European states' own self-representation of being in total control of the situation. Rather than redressing this view by highlighting the agency of migrants or the cracks in the totalitarian system of control, I will explore the limit of such totality by looking at anti-hegemonic struggles

(Laclau and Mouffe 2001). I do not only pay heed to the contestation of borders in the dialectics between power and counter-power, but to what Italian activists sometimes refer to as *esodo* (exodus), the quest for an alternative imagination and practice of, in this case, geographies and frontier zones.

Past and Present of an Italian Antagonist Movement

As any other social movement, the antagonist movement I shall focus on in this paper cannot be reduced to single set of groups, organizations or campaigns. Although actual collectives and associations are part of it, it is perhaps best seen as a set of network and nodes, which span regional, and often national, boundaries (Della Porta and Diani 2006:156-60). Historically, left-libertarian movements congealed in the late 1960s and through the 1970s around students' and workers' protests. They were various forms of radical left-libertarian politics taking place outside the framework of political parties. Perhaps, the most well-known feature of this antagonist movement are the so-called centri sociali or 'social centres', which are usually housed in abandoned state-owned buildings occupied by activists as a way of reclaiming a space for autonomous politics as well as social organization (Adinolfi 1994; Ruggiero 2000). After a decade of decline in movement politics during the 1980s, the presence and significance of the centri sociali and of antagonist politics more generally was reinvigorated as a result of the rise of the global movement against neoliberalism and corporate globalization. This global mobilisation was in part triggered by the Zapatist insurgency of 1994 and the subsequent experience of self-organization in Chiapas (Mexico).

Zapatism has had a tremendous impact on the ideology, practice and forms of organization of a large part of the Italian movement. This is true to the extent that a section of the antagonist movement has progressively become differentiated as Zapatist-oriented from other sections of the Marxist-Anti-imperialist movements in Italy (Apostoli Cappello 2009; Montagna 2010). Although, as we shall see, the appeal of the Zapatist liberation struggle has subsided d in the course of 2000s, the legacy of networks, practices and projects carried out in the sign of the Chapaneco movement has been pivotal in the framing and formation of Euro-Mediterranean activism. As I mentioned, it was the main Zapatist-inspired, movement-based association in Italy, Ya Basta!, to pave the way of linkages across the Mediterranean sea by organizing the Caravan to Tunisia in April 2011.

At the turn of the millennium, the name of Ya Basta! was closely associated with that of the *Disobedienti*, who became known nationally and internationally for their practices of civil disobedience as well as for their creative and communicative forms of protest (e.g. Vanderford 2003). The label was nonetheless debated within the movement, and by 2003 it was no longer in use as a marker of political identity[4]. By this time, a more general move towards overcoming a discourse of identity and favouring one that stressed unity in difference (the multitude) to an even greater extent. The year 2003, in which the massive mobilisation against the war in Iraq led to no result, could be taken as a watershed which marked the end of a phase of the movement where the focus was on large protest events staged during global governance summits (G8, WTO, etc.), and on the Social Forums.

There followed a phase of declining mobilisation and reconfiguration of socio-political struggles. Attention to 'global' events declined in favour of more territorially-based (yet not less 'global') sites of contestation,

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[4] An turning point was the debate over disobedience as political identity vs. disobedience as political category (of action) that took place in 2003 at the Global Meeting, hosted by the centro sociale Rivolta (Venice).

like the No TAV (against the construction of European fast-train line in the Susa Valley) and the No Dal Molin (against the construction a NATO military base near the city of Vicenza) movements, and several other experiments in which activists were forced to liaise with a heterogeneous mix of campaigners, local committees, citizens not necessarily aligned to a project of radical socio-political transformation of society. As global horizons somehow shrank, the discursive and imaginative power of the Zapatista message was also affected negatively. Nevertheless, Ya Basta! has been maintained active by a number of key and long-serving activists who have, paradoxically, extended the geographical scope and significance of the association's projects in the world (especially in Argentina, Brasil, Kurdistan, Palestine). For example, apart from having many projects in Chiapas (among which is the importation of coffee), Ya Basta! has a strong linkage with the Sem Terra movement (Brazil), which results in the importation and distribution in Italy of organic sugar as a concrete support to the Sem Terra struggle.

Starting from 2008, in the context of the global crisis, there has been a new spell of the alter-globalist movement, to which the Italian activists have contributed. The protests against budget cuts and pejorative reforms of the education system as well as against austerity measures pumped new life force into movement politics (Raparelli 2009). The 2010/1 mobilisation was perhaps the most significant one, with convergences between students' and workers' movements and the creation of an umbrella movement called *Uniti contro la Crisi* (United Against the Crisis). In the wake of the Arab Spring, and later of the continuing unrest to austerity measures in the Euro-zone, these wide ranging networks converged in *Uniti per l'Alternativa*, which took part of the organization of 15th October demonstration in Rome as *United for Global Change*. Although such mass mobilisations obviously exceed the post-disobbedienti movement and the centri sociali at large, these have remained key actors and have reaped benefits from it. The three-fold increase of active participants in Casa Cantoniera I described at the beginning of the paper is a result of this. This expansion led to the occupation of an abandoned building owned by the University of Parma during the general strike of 6 May 2011 organized by students and workers, and to the birth of a new centro sociale - Art Lab – in a period in which there has been a crack down on radical movements and a number of occupied centri sociali have been evicted.

Knowledge-Practices of the Post-Disobbedienti Movement

Before I turn to border-related activism, let me single out some of the features of the movement that will help us understand Italo-Tunisian connections. As a number of new social movement scholars have pointed out, the social movements emerging in the context of post-industrial capitalism have widened the scope and base of movement politics by going beyond the classic Marxist ideology of the class struggle (Touraine 1985; Melucci 1996; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). As a single, unitary revolutionary subject, the labourer could no longer encompass the plethora of issues and ethical-political positions that the transformation of capitalist societies have been witnessing (see e.g. Ya Basta! 2001). Thus, environmentalism, peace movements, anti-nuclear activism, feminism and LGTB groups, and other activist networks have emerged as a response to the complex articulations of power, not only in the realm of labour relations, but in that of life: desires, needs, affects, and identity. Even in the domain of labour relations, the growing component of intellectual, immaterial, affective capacities in the valorization of work has called for a greater consideration of what Hardt and Negri (2000) have called, elaborating on Foucault's insights, biopower:

forms and techniques of government based on the regulation of not only bodily functions, but also other human and social faculties[5].

Movements like the disobbedienti and the centri sociali can therefore be seen as articulations of an anti-hegemonic struggle taking place at the level of biopower, rather than simply at the level of a set of issues or political agenda (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). This is not simply a scholarly caveat, but a debated issue among the activists with whom I have been in contact. Italian terms like 'biopotere', 'biopolitico', and akin ones are a part of the current political jargon used in analytical documents as well as in ordinary meetings and, sometimes, conversations among activists. The work of Antonio Negri has been widely read in these circles, and these authors have (had) close connections with the various activist groups of what used to be identified as the 'disobbedienti' area . This does not mean that the movement is highly intellectual, or that such terminologies are continuously debated; rather, as we shall see, various references to issues of control over life widely defined and to the very possibility of existence of a life of dignity pervade the language through which activists seize meaning from social reality, and the way they seek to transform it. In addition, this broad conceptualization of the political is not entirely new. The *centro sociale* is, in fact, not simply viewed as a headquarter of activism, but as a space for creating an alternative sociality which is inherently 'biopolitical', for it subtracts social life from biopower by creating a meeting point of socialization, cultural forms of cultural expression, entertainment and production (e.g. copy-left cineforums, music, arts), economic exchange (e.g. small agro-producers markets), and, at times, forms of employment (Ruggiero 2000; Montagna 2006).

The centro sociale epitomises a mode of organization as well as of transformation of society in the direction of a more horizontal and direct form of 'democracy' (Montagna 2007). It ideally practises self- or autonomous organization (*auto-organizzazione*), or 'organization from below' (*organizzazione dal basso*) built on participation rather membership and on the decisions reached through consensus rather than delegation and representation. Emphasis is placed on net-like organizations and networking, in contrast to the rigid vertical structure of political parties, trade unions and the state in general. Far from being anti-intellectual, the movement does nonetheless posit participation and collective action as a foundational element of its politics. This is a deliberate political choice or ideological premise drawn again from Zapatism. On many other occasions, I heard activists explaining that this emphasis on 'crossing other struggles' and sharing paths with other autonomous political formations sets them apart from other antagonist movements that, in their view, retreat into ideological purism and navel gazing. In the spirit of the alter-globalist motto "a movement of many movements", alliances with other movements and groups can be described as being based on convergences around particular political agendas and on networking, though not necessarily on merging, coalitions and recruitments. Diversity is, indeed, valued and experimented; "contamination" is a recurrent keyword. This is reflected in an open, and at times problematic, relation with the mass media, trade unions and political parties, especially at the municipal level. In a similar vein, ad hoc organizational forms premised on vertical organization can be used to achieve particular ends. For instance, Ya Basta! is registered as an association with a President, and decision-making organs. This was a necessary passage in order to manage bureaucratically and financially a number of projects of international cooperation with Chiapas and other parts of the world.

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[5] Hardt and Negri (2000:22-42) as well as other authors have complemented Foucault's 1978:1399ff) notion of biopower by including other, not merely bodily aspects of control, such as intellectual, affective and relational capacities.

Contesting Borders, Embracing Freedom of Movement

What is the role of migration and borders in the history of the post-disobbedienti movement? For a left-libertarian movement that abhors the state as a form of political organization, international boundaries do not have any legitimate foundation and should be abolished. Broad and uncompromising as it may be, this broad ideological position does nonetheless translate only into a narrower set of concrete knowledge productions and practices on the ground. The movement's discourse on borders (i.e. the Italian/European external borders) has been articulated especially in relation to migration, particularly to undocumented migration. The politicization and militarization of migratory flows in a frontier country like Italy has, indeed, created an opportunity for political mobilisation from across the political spectrum (Della Porta 2000).

The movement's activities with respect to migration and borders are multiple and varied. Along with other sections of the 'civil society', many social centres also run a number of services for migrants, from sheltering, to courses of Italian language, to legal assistance, to social activities, to ad hoc trade union activities, to the creation of dedicated websites of information (e.g. meltingpot.org). These are not usually 'services', but also attempts to make visible the failures and discriminations of the state vis-à-vis migrants. Although these ongoing, less visible activities constitute the backbone of the movement's politics on migration, ad hoc protests and direct actions form an important part of activists' antiborder discursive practices. Acts of civil disobedience have been carried on sites of what we might define the delocalized border regime, such as detention camps (CIE, formerly CPT), carriers involved in deportations, and companies participating in the border regime industry (e.g. managing, catering, etc. CIEs). Examples of such acts on CIEs include: spry painting CIEs to bring them to visibility (CIEs are usually in peripheral or isolated areas); activists chaining themselves to doors and windows of CIEs; stopping coaches carrying migrants from sea ports to CIEs; incursions into CIEs cutting through fences and barbed wire (sometimes enabling some inmates to flee); dismounting CIEs under construction.

The ex-disobbedienti movement links cross-border migration to a wider (bio)political discourse. Migrants are represented as both victims of an oppressive regimes and as a potential partners in the movement's struggle. In contrast with the media and political discourse on the undocumented migrant as threat, the activists are inclined to oppose the image of the migrant as a carrier of positively valued cultural diversity and relational potentials. These do not always materialize within the movement, which is by and large participated by (ethnic) Italians. Nonetheless, the potential is highlighted as an important point. This might take a slightly overstated reading of migration as an act of civil disobedience. For instance, in 2005, at a debate in a multicultural festival near Parma, an activist from the North East emphasised that "we express our solidarity to our brother and sister migrants who risk their lives on daily basis by disobeying national borders to come to Europe...". The relational potential might take a the form of a more general prescription about the migrant being an element of the antihegemonic, constituent multitude as envisioned by Hardt and Negri (2004) and further articulated by the activists.

More generally, however, the struggle for migrant rights does not aim to recruit new activists, but to oppose a border regime which is seen to be biopolitically connected to techniques of government that oppress the migrants as much as the activists and the citizenry at large (Global Project 2003; Casarini 2005). Time and again, the activists with whom I shared parts of my research and political life emphasised that the inhumane practices and exploitative mechanisms affecting migrants transform the wider system of sovereignty, government and politics of life, for example through system of surveillance and repression of

dissent. This broad reading of border regimes is in line with the view of some political scientists and philosophers, including Giorgio Agamben's (1995) notions of bare life and the camp as a nomos of the present. While his work and other political philosophers are widely read in activist circles and shape their reading of current events, the language and analogies chosen during political actions are aimed to convey to a wider audience the sense of the oppressive, dehumanizing nature of the (delocalized) of border regimes[6] (see fig. 1). Fences, walls, barriers and other images of borders and bordering are recurrent in the videos and still images produced by the activists. In this respect, the ex-disobbedienti movement shares ground with the wider 'no border' and movement in Italy, and international campaigns like *No One Is Illegal* whose slogans are adopted during demonstrations.

Fig. 1 – Action carried out at the CIE Corelli in Milan – The "Work will make you free" sign (a quotation from the sign appearing at the entrance of the concentration camp of Auschwitz) is installed near the CIE.

This sense of connectedness between activists and migratory movements can be seen in most public events. For instance, on 17 April 2011, an action called Train of Dignity was organized by Italian activists, and sustained by French ones, at the border between Italy and France, where Tunisian immigrants being issued a temporary permit by the Italian government were being refused entry into France (a diplomatic incident that shook the entire Schengen system). The Train was meant to accompany Tunisian permit holders across the frontier in order to make sure that their right to free circulation would be guaranteed. However, the demonstrators were prevented to reach the frontier and even free access to the city of

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[6] In line with the discourse on "dignity" as a central component in the Zapatist struggle against neoliberalism, Ya Basta! and other pro-Zapatist groups contribute to articulating a discourse on migration and oppressive borders.

Ventimiglia. At this point, one activist speaking on a loudhailer and video-broadcast on globalproject.info drew a parallel between the (delocalized) bordering of migrants and the bordering of protests, like one of the many 'red zones', by stressing that "today, we find borders also in this square"[7].

In sum, opposition to borders and migration do not only conjur up the ideal image of a borderless, politically horizontal world, but also innervate the languages, symbols and political repertoires through which activists of the ex-disobbedienti movement amongst others construct *and* experience political networks, events and subjectivities-in-the-making.

However, all discursive formations imply a proactive knowledge production on some objects and the rarefaction of discourse on others (Foucault 1978:17-35; 1980:112). The discourse on migration combined with that of resistance or insurgency has tended to focus on countries south of the Mediterranean within the discourse of migration and borders. In Parma, Ya Basta! and other anti-racist groups have long been in contact with Tunisian immigrants, with whom they carried out several occupations of buildings meant to provide migrants with shelter. Casa Cantoniera was not an exception to this trend. The four-flat building was made available for the four Tunisian families, while the attached warehouse was gradually transformed into a centro sociale. Some of the Tunisian migrants are involved in the committees that self-manage the various occupations, including Casa Cantoniera, and thus participate in the meetings with the activists. Until the Arab Spring, however, the political situation of Tunisia has never been a major for the activists of Casa Cantoniera. In truth, some attempts were made. One activist once told me that she had tried to inquire among acquainted Tunisians about the possibility of mobilising in this respect, but was put off by the migrants' lack of interest and fear of repercussions. Indeed, during a conversation, an inhabitant of Casa Cantoniera warned me that Ben Ali's secret services were active in the diaspora as well, and they had solid relations with the Italian police. He cited the example of a political refugee who resided in Parma and was eventually returned by the Italian police to the Tunisian authorities; in the meantime his family in Tunisia had suffered from retaliations.

Given these considerations, it can be suggested that the lack of attention to Tunisian politics prior to the Jasmine Revolution was due more to a lack of clear political opportunity in Tunisia and in the diaspora than to a lack of awareness of the political situation in northern Africa. For a movement inspired by the Zapatista uprising, the international dimension is not disregarded. In spite of becoming less participated, Ya Basta! has in fact maintained high the level of attention on international events within the movement. For instance, Ya Basta! organized solidarity, explorative and project-focused "caravans" of activists in Palestine and Kurdistan. In Parma, the political collective at Casa Cantoniera has close contacts with a number of Kurdish political refugees, and have participated in various events organized by them. Thus, while not being sufficient in itself, the visibility and intelligibility of forms of active resistance is a crucial factor in the activation of linkages with a given group or situation. This is where the Arab Spring has marked a watershed.

In many ways, the Arab Spring has been a worldwide phenomenon. Its messages and political repertoire have inspired a number of protest movements, like Spain's *indignados*, the US's Occupy Wall Street, and other protest movements that make direct reference to the Arab Spring. In the light of what I argued above, it is not surprising that Italian activists immediately related to the language of radical or revolutionary politics and of self-organized protest. In early January 2011, less than a month from wave of

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[7] "Treno della Dignità – da Genova a Ventimiglia", 17 April 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5huTzbSQf8

student and anti-government demonstrations culminated in what has become known as the "tumult" (*tumulto*) in Rome on the 14th of December, activists in Parma already made several references to the Arab Spring and linked it with their own struggles as students and young precarious workers. As we shall see in greater detail below, the question of the crisis, unemployment, youth and political freedom was seen as a one of the main shared themes between movements across the Mediterranean. This eventually paved the way for a reframing of the role Tunisia in the discourse of many movements across Italy and Europe which had important and immediate repercussions also at the local level. For instance, as a number of Tunisian migrants in Parma were moved to take public action in support of their fellow citizens rising up in December 2010-January 2011, Casa Cantoniera helped them organize a public demonstration in Parma, where minor skirmishes between the demonstrators and pro-Ben Ali migrants took place.

From Antiborder to Common Social Struggles Across the Mediterranean?

Towards Tunisia: the Arab Spring and the Lampedusa Crisis

In spite of a new picture of northern Africa, in the following months were the movement's approach to Tunisia was still dominated by the migratory question. The arrival of several thousands of undocumented Tunisian immigrants to Italy caused the movement to mobilise. In order to circumvent what appeared to be yet another spectacular migration emergency at the gates of Italy instrumentally staged by the Italian government, a number of activists mobilised and reached the Island of Lampedusa to bear witness of the events.

This marked a resurgence of the migration question within the movement. During the crisis attention had turned away from it and to internal problems, even if the government toughened security operations in the management of migrants. In addition, the Italy-Lybia friendship agreement (2009) had basically suppressed arrivals through the Sicily channel - a low point in the public debate on migration. The closure of the Sicily channel had forced undocumented migrants to take a detour through Greece in order to cross the Adriatic sea, thus causing less spectacular, yet significant security operations by the Italian police, such as deporting immigrants back to Greece. In an attempt to bring such operations into visibility, the activists launched the *Welcome – Indietro non si torna* (Welcome – there is no return) campaign in the spring of 2010 in conjunction with Greek activists. *Welcome*'s first major even was a demonstration outside the main (securitized) ports of Italy and Greece, where migrants in transit are intercepted and detained. The demonstrations did not perhaps mobilise large numbers, but maintained high a level of alert within the movement and kept oiling networks and organizational mechanisms. In fact, Welcome took the lead in establishing a permanent media (via meltingpot.org) and assistance point in Lampedusa in the early months of 2011.

Because the 'Lampedusa crisis' was so obviously related to the struggle for political liberty in Tunisia, the Welcome base in Lampedusa became the first discursive ground for a convergence between migration/borders and revolutionary movements. In 2010, the organizers of the Welcome campaign worried that the migration issue would not gain enough attention, even among sympathisers of the movement, due to the fact the 'public opinion' was concerned about the internal consequences of the global crisis and the proposal to open the borders to migrants might sound particular unpopular. In 2011, the antagonists' take on the southern border integrated a more politicized view which, on the one hand, emphasised the right of migrants to flee from political unrest and from unemployment, and on the other, that migrants protested the border as an one of the oppressive measures of the Ben Ali regime. Some

activists stressed that some of the migrants legitimated their crossing by saying that border security was part of the Ben Ali and his agreements with European states; having dethroned Ben Ali, such security effort also lost legitimacy[8]. Activists of Infomigrante_ESC, a legal assistance point based in the centro sociale ESC in Rome, produced a collection of reports (Infomigrante_Esc 2011) and a video about the "Lampedusa Emergency". The video was launched on globalproject.info and accompanied by a short text ending with a slogan "The Mediterranean can become the space of freedom and of reception with dignity" [9]. While the Tunisian situation continued to be linked to further border-related actions, like the Train of Dignity to France (see above), other activists turned south in the attempt to follow up on the migration issue *and* on the political transformation of Northern Africa.

"Another breach in the wall": The United for Freedom Caravan

The caravan organized by Ya Basta! in Tunisia on April 9-11 was fundamentally an extension of border-related activism. In a typical Ya Basta! style, the Caravan "United for Freedom" had both the aim of making direct contact with the 'civil society' and to bring concrete support, in this case medical product for the refugee camps at the border with Libya, responding to a plea for international support launched by the Red Crescent, the Islamic equivalent of the Red Cross. The call for the Caravan emphasised this was "in a continuity with the Welcome campaign", and made the political, humanitarian and geographical linkage between migration to Italy and the Arab Spring clear; the new element of the conflict and external intervention in Libya was integrated:

> Finding oneself in a refugee camp at the borders of Libya is not an accident: it is part of the war that consumes lives and hopes. Lampedusa is equally part of this war, an island transformed in an open-air prison [for migrants]. This is a war of porous borders, already initiated by the Italy-Libya "friendship" agreements with the imprisonment, killing and deportation of thousands of migrants. The very same humanitarian reasons that sponsor the bombing [of Libya] speak the same language as that of the war against the refugees and the boats that cross the Mediterranean.[10]

The call made reference to the capacity of the Tunisian society to (self)organize reception of migrants crossing the borders, and made it clear that one of the goals was to meet "the protagonists of the revolution". An even more explicit message in this sense came from Unicommon, an activist network whose focus is the University and knowledge-based capitalism, which played an important part in organizing students protests in 2010-1. In joining the Ya Basta! Caravan, with which Unicommon shares several nodes (centri sociali) and networks, Unicommon launched a "March to Tunis", in order to follow the "the wind of the south":

> We are students, precarious, unemployed, a young generation that is too much skilled for a job... We are the 'generation without future' of a Europe in crisis that we don't like and we want to change. We are students of Rome and London who have taken the streets to reclaim a better future.

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[8] Giansandro Merli, Presentation of Welcome activities in Lampedusa, at the public event "Welcome to Lampedusa 2011-Campagna", organized by Welcome and Ya basta! Parma at the *Festa Multiculturale*, 25 June 2011, Collecchio (PR).
[9] http://www.globalproject.info/it/produzioni/Lampedusa-isola-di-permanenza-temporanea/9788, Accessed 25 October 2011. "Dignity" is a recurrent trope in the discourse of the Zapatistas and, by extension, in that of the Italian movement. It is opposed to the degradation of human and social worth imposed by the neoliberal system.
[10] Appello della Carovana "Uniti Per La Libertà! Carovana dalla Tunisia alla Libia", http://www.yabasta.it/spip.php?article1505&var_recherche=uniti%20per%20la%20libert%C3%A0, Accessed 29 September 2011.

> In these months we have learned a lot from what is happened in Tunisia and Egypt, events that we have followed with attention, curiosity and apprehension. The struggles of Maghreb and Mashreq have inspired us because we have identified ourselves in the slogan of a young generation and its high expectations, that are too high for the future that corrupted regimes and government in crisis want to offer us. In these months we have learned that the struggle of Tunisi and Egypt are our struggles! For this reason we want to go to Tunisi, to meet the protagonist of the revolt and build up together a new and different Europe, that is able to go into the other side of the Mediterranean Sea: *a new space full of projects and common struggles*.
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> *Inventing a new geography breaking the borders, setting up new directions, discovering new traces*: the students of the UniCommon network will be in Tunisia starting from the 7 April 2011 together with the project United for Freedom, a caravan that will go to Lybia border in order to help who are escaping from bombs and mercenaries, to shout "no war": humanitarian war or not[11].

In this text we notice a linkage between the creation of a new Mediterranean space where the EU-Africa border zone is linked biopolitically (in the language of the activists) to the discourse on education, work and life of dignity in general. The North African revolution as well as the Italian and European protests are represented as a movements that redefine not only national spaces, but also wider geopolitical ones, thus breaking through barriers. In her final report from Tunisia on behalf of Unicommon, Vanessa Bilancetti reiterated that the Caravan aimed to "make breaches in the wall of the Mediterranean [sea]" and to construct "bridge across [it]" in order to meet Tunisian men and women who took to the streets to fight for "freedom, democracy, rights"[12].

The text highlights the generational question of youth struggling to find a future as a common denominator of the social struggles across the Mediterranean. Unemployment and the socio-economic aggravation of the youth across this space (and beyond) has been a central triggering factor of both the Arab Spring and of the European students' and precarious workers' protests (see e.g. Hibou 2011). In Italy, flexible, but precarious work contracts has been a major issue over the last fifteen years, one that in the view of many ordinary people affects not only work and economic possibilities, but also the sense of self and life possibilities (Molé 2010). This has indeed become a major ground of socio-political activism within and beyond the post-disobbedienti movement (cf. Brancaccio 2005). As the Unicommon's call for the March to Tunis makes clear, the idea of 'lacking' or of being 'denied' or 'stolen' the future has been a powerful, transnational mobilising message. It is not surprising that one of the main political formations that participated the Indignados movement in Spain was called *Juventud Sin Futuro* (Youth without future) (see also below). In the view of Unicommon and other activists the biopolitical ground of precarious youth subjectivity thus constituted a possible meeting point with the Tunisians.

While in Tunis, the participants of the Caravan/March attended meetings with students at one university, with trade unionists (esp. UGTT), and other collectives in other parts of the capital. Some Ya Basta! activists had been in Tunis for some time before the Caravan started in order to make preparations and hold preliminary meetings with potential interlocutors. As some of the Parma activists reported, meetings were all but formal events. Most of them returned home with a feeling of the complexity, if not confusion (surely

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[11] Unicommon's launch of "The Wind of the South – Unicommon March to Tunisi 7-12 April", English in the original, my emphasis, http://www.unicommon.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2684:unicommon-march-tunisi-is-coming&catid=138:italian-anomaly&Itemid=334, Last Accessed 28 October 2011.
[12] Vanessa Bilancetti, 16 April 2011, "Una breccia nel muro del mediterraneo - Diario al ritorno dalla Tunisia", unicommon.org, Accessed 27 August 2011.

exacerbated by linguistic barriers), at the composite, heterogeneous attendance in these public meeting. In open-mic meetings multiple views came to the fore, and the Italian activists too were subject to questioning with regard to their orientations and agendas. Despite the difficulty in reading the Tunisian situation, once Mediterranean barrier was breached, the search for interlocutors produced some results. Activists from Unicommon eventually established relationships with students and like organizations like the UDC (Union Diplômés Chômeurs – Union of Unemployed Graduates), one of the groups that organized unemployed educated youth in the rural and urban areas and participated in the revolution.

Let me underline that the passages between border-related to youth- and students-related activism were made possible by the fluidity of discourse and networks in the Italian movement. Labels like Ya Basta!, Welcome and Unicommon must not deceive us into thinking that these correspond to well defined, bounded groups. On the contrary, overlapping zones and multiple, simultaneous affiliations are the norm among activists. For instance, the three activists who hailed from Parma include one of the founders of Ya Basta! Parma (Luca), while the other two were younger, though experienced, activists (Domenico and Luigi) who had concentrated on the University-related struggles that led to the creation of Art Lab. Through the network of centri sociali in which Casa Cantoniera is embedded, they also participated in both Welcome and Unicommon. Thus, they partly responded to the call of Unicommon in going on a March to Tunis. The reference to borders in the Unicommon call does not, in fact, simply reflect an ideological stance to borders. Unicommon is itself closely connected to networks and campaigns that fight against (delocalized) borders and for migrants' rights. Even an apparently single-issue centro sociale like Esc (Rome), which was founded by students and researchers working on knowledge-based capitalism and acting as a central node of Unicommon, runs the above mentioned Infomigrante_Esc, a legal assistance service for immigrants. This is the same Infomigrante_Esc that made a major contribution to the Welcome expedition to Lampedusa.

In sum, the Caravan provided an opportunity for an exploratory mission of some sections of the Italian antagonist movement south of the Mediterranean. To be sure, these sections were not unique in their 'mission' to northern Africa. As I could ascertain during my visit to Tunisia, and from browsing the web, a number of organizations and collectives have taken to going on "meet the revolutionaries" tours in post-uprising Tunisia. What I wished to stress here is not the uniqueness of initiatives like the Ya Basta! Caravan; rather, I tried to convey is the ways in which this expansion which might qualify, following Deleuze and Guattari, as rhizomatic arises not only from the revolutionary moment in Northern Africa, but also from the knowledge-practices of Italian political movements and collectives, and their capacity to recombine, integrate and diversify. In the experience of Esc as well as other places like Casa Cantoniera, this has enabled them to link the politicization of Euro-African borders and migrations to broader social questions. The focus on youth, work and future prospects in a context of global crisis was to gain further ground in the construction of an alternative Euro-African political space. As Bilancetti concluded in her report the 'bridge across the Mediterranean' is meant to be walked two ways, for:

> …we know that we will meet again some of the Tunisians whom we got to know here at the Euromediterranean meeting in Rome on May 12 and 13 at the University La Sapienza, because Tunisia has taught us that Europe is large and the Mediterranean must become again a sea of union and encounter, not one of death and restriction.

Once as a common discursive ground is identified, however, commonalities have to be actually explored and constructed. This is where I turn now.

EuroMediterranean Horzions: meeting and networking

The meeting in Rome was called "The Revolt of a Generation: EuroMediterranean happening on education, welfare and new political practices". The program of the two-day happening included a seminar on the first day, and a workshop open to the audience on the second day. Some eleven international speakers were invited to the seminar, five of whom were from Tunisia alone. The Tunisians alone 'represented' the Arab Spring, and these were all activists met during the Caravan/March by Unicommon activists. The other internationals were spokespersons of collectives and movements that had contributed to protests and struggles from the autumn of 2010, in the UK, Spain, and Austria.

The titles of the workshops on the second day clearly reflect some of main themes that have animated movement and protest politics in Italy during the 2010-1 season (and earlier), and in the Europe and the Mediterranean space in general:

1. Conflictual knowledge: from Europe to Mediterranean area
2. Education, Welfare and Precariousness
3. Labour, income and democracy against the crisis

While the first two workshops focused on ongoing University-related struggles, the third workshop is better understood if viewed in the light of the convergence between the students' and workers' movements since 2010. Indeed, the presence of Maurizio Landini of FIOM-CGIL, a labour union of the heavy industry sector, and members of the UGTT, a labour union of Tunisia that opposed to the Ben Ali regime, was announced in the program. The first workshop in particular signals the attempt to not only 'make breaches in the wall of the Mediterranean', but also to try and construct alternative networks and spaces in which common or intelligible struggles (*conflitti*) is a foundational element.

The elements I highlighted in the Rome event were also clearly visible in the EuroMediterranean Meeting held on July 2-4, in Regueb (Tunisia), called "The Revolt: Towards New Horizons". The event was organized by UDC (Union Diplômés Chômeurs) and coordinated by Mondher Abidi, one of the speakers at the meeting in Rome. The meeting was a continuation of the meeting in Rome. Unfortunately, due to the timing (university exams period) and several other logistical difficulties, most of the international participants could not attend the meeting. The conference started with only four Italian activists, including myself. I came as a researcher-activist from Parma/Casa Cantoniera/Ya Basta!, while the others belonged to the Unicommon network: two (David and Giorgio) came from Pisa, and Giansandro came from ESC (Rome). Of the four of us, only Giansandro and I had previously met, in Parma, where he was invited to relate his experience with Welcome in Lampedusa. He was the only one to have participated in the Caravan. A spokesperson from *Juventud Sin Futuro* (Spain) arrived on the second day. Five other Spaniards from two different organizations (two from Tunis Spanishrevolution, three from Accion Social Sindical Internacionalista[13]) arrived and sat in the audience on the second day, and eventually were given a chance to contribute to the debate. Overall, the meeting was an Italo-Tunisian meeting, with translations between Arabic and Italian provided by Fabio, an Italian resident in Tunis who corresponds for globalproject.info and Ya Basta!. It took the form of a two-day seminar with no specific leading theme, but the purpose of

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[13] Tunis Spanishrevolution is a small group of Spaniards living in Tunis trying to link the indignados movement and the Tunisian movement. ASSI is a leftist, internationalist collective. The three activists were touring Tunisia and its movements, and learned about the Regueb meeting from the Unicommon mailing list.

shedding light on post-revolutionary Tunisia and Regueb, and on ways of constructing a 'civil society' and alliances across the Mediterranean.

The meeting took place in Regueb, a town of 10,000 inhabitants, about 30km from Sidi Bousid, the 'epicentre' of the Jasmine Revolution. Priding itself for its long history of political activism and resistance, Regueb was one of the main centres of the Jasmine Revolution. "Regueb contributed five martyrs to the revolution", we were told at our arrival, five demonstrators killed by the police when it opened fire on the protesters on January 9. Since the end of the revolution, the political and social aesthetics of the town have significantly changed. The moments and messages of the revolution are commemorated on the walls of the town, alongside the faces of the martyrs. The House of Culture, which has been taken over by the associations of Regueb that participated in the Revolt, hosts a small museum of the Revolt with objects (weaponry used by the police and by the protesters) and photographs of the uprising. This was also the venue of the EuroMediterranean Meeting. A banner hanging from the speakers table portrayed the martyrs and the phrase "Tojours avec nos martyres [always with our martyrs]".

The Meeting was held in a period when, according to most of our interlocutors, not only Italian activists, but also most Tunisians were grappling with a political situation which was difficult to read. Some citizens feared that the prolific mushrooming of parties and 'civil society' organizations would fragment the unitary spirit of the uprising, while some of the youths who made the revolt feared that their revolution would be 'stolen' by canny politicians. As some of the young men and women of the UDC in Regueb put it, looking for 'new horizons' in order to continue the 'revolution' meant for them to look for ways to both influence the process and to ensure the autonomy of organizations like theirs. The call for autonomy and the creating of alternative forms of political organization outside the state was reiterated also by a number of citizens, but by no means all, who spoke at the meeting. Although one might argue that the EuroMediterranean meeting was partly imported as a pre-packaged discourse from the outside, the Reguebien organizers saw it as an opportunity to create meaningful horizontal linkages with activists in the EuroMediterranean zone struggling for the same objectives. The objectives of the revolution as discussed in the meeting were not only the liberation from oppressive regimes, but the deeper social questions that affect Regueb and Tunisians, and the Europeans as well.

The UDC members highlighted the theme of employment and of the unemployed youth as a central thread of the EuroMediterranean encounter[14]. For the organizers, the meeting had the ambitious aim to be a step toward the construction of a "'Euro-mediterranean union of impoverished classes et marginalized militants', in this case the qualified [educated] and non-qualified unemployed, the students, and the temporary workers"[15]. While such an ambition was somehow mitigated by several other speakers, the focus on youth, work, welfare and the economic crisis ringed with the analysis and the agenda of the Rome meeting and of the international guests attending the Regueb one. Lucia, the spokesperson of Juventud Sin Futuro, explained that the genesis of this collective came with the realization of a generational crisis in which youth are "Without housing, without a job, without pension, and therefore without fear [of rising up]". It is therefore not surprising that the theme of youth, work and welfare was a common terrain of political analysis and convergence, let along the defining element of the UDC-Unicommon 'alliance'.

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[14] Mondher ??, Opening Speech at the Regueb EuroMediterranean Meeting, 2 July 2011.
[15] Brochure of the meeting "La révolte : vers des nouveaux horizons", distributed at the Meeting, Regueb, 2-4 July. The language used in the brochure is influenced by Marxist readings of the Tunisian political economy. A number of UDC affiliates have militated in the Communist party (POCT) and share some their framework of analyses. Brochure also available at:
http://www.unicommon.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3008:regueb-tunisia-234-luglio-2011-la-rivolta-verso-nuovi-orizzonti&catid=132:book-bloc&Itemid=324

The discourse of migration and borders was, in contrast, secondary in this meeting. In contrast to the coast and the south, in the region of Regueb emigration to Europe is not reportedly a mass phenomenon. Although migration is in the national news, the locals seem to worry more about the lack of development, welfare and even the predatory exploitation of the state and of business cliques linked to the political elites. Youth unemployment was viewed along similar lines, and whereas I heard some of the unemployed Reguebiens talking of leaving for the cities, very few thought to emigrate to Europe. Accordingly, only a few speakers and commentators from the audience made explicit reference to migration and borders. Some did nonetheless point out the Janus-face of Europe, which on the one hand requires Tunisia to be open to the delocalization of companies, capital flows and manufactured products from Europe, but on the other closes its gates to Tunisian migrants.

In comparison to the Tunisians, the Italian activists over-communicated the element of borders and migration. All of our contributions began with commendations of the attempt to overcome the border regime and to "establish a bridge between the two sides of the Mediterranean", as Giansandro's introductory speech made clear. He added that:

> "From one side and the other of the Mediterranean, many things are changing. Many political geographies which we had been brought to believe are being redefined. Our states and our governments have made us used to thinking the Mediterranean as a barrier, a border for dividing us. But the youth in the revolts in Tunisia, in Italy, in Spain, in Egypt, in Syria, in France are telling us that there are other ways of living together, of working together, of creating a society with more [civil] rights and social justice, and of making the Mediterranean a tool of communication between different populations […] therefore we think that meetings like this one are very important to know each other, and understand the common battles we can fight together."

While Giansandro might have been influenced by his previous experience with Welcome in Lampedusa, Giorgio, David and I made references to his idea of the Mediterranean in our speeches. Since this politicization of borders was largely unsolicited by the organizers and the audience, I see it as a clear example of the ways in which ongoing knowledge-practices of the Italian movement vis-à-vis borders characterise the imagination of an incipient Euro-African frontier of social conflicts and movements that do not necessarily focus on migration.

Our mode of presence in the meeting and in Regueb also bespoke the political praxis of linking with 'others' to which we are accustomed. This emerged clearly during the night prior to the Meeting, where the program had to be amended (due to the defection of many invited speakers). We were ask to state our affiliation and the content of our speech. Most of us thought we had come to attend the meeting only, but given the situation we readily complied with the request. In a wonderful exemplification of the fluidity of affiliations within the movement, we briefly convened and agreed to speak on behalf of four different organizations. While all except for me constituted a delegation from Unicommon, only Giorgio spoke on behalf of Unicommon. David presented Eigenlab (Pisa), a high-tech and telecommunication self-production workshop in which he is involved; Giansandro would be the spokesperson of Infomigrante_Esc, besides acting as a spokesperson for the Italian delegation; I spoke on behalf of Ya Basta!. While this setup reflected somehow our real 'affiliations', the selection was also oriented by our understandings of what our Tunisan audience would find most interesting about our movement. The content of our speeches, which we briefly discussed collectively, was somehow tailored to suit this aim. For example, I thought that I could give a

general introduction on self-organization, starting from the Zapatista experience, to then focus on the Italian Centri Sociali. The experience of media-activism was thought to interest the audience because both the element of the social media in the revolution and because there had been talks in previous meetings about consolidating an internet platform for activists at the local and trans-Mediterranean level. Likewise, given the link between Tunisia and Lampedusa situation, it was also felt that 'our' views and actions on the migration/border questions had to be relayed.

Rather than as a super-imposition of a political view on the current Euromediterranean situation, this must be in the light of constructing a bridge or initiate a dialogue with Tunisian interlocutors on the basis of shared practices, rather than shared ideas. As I argued above, ideological orientations are important in the movement but fetishisation is deliberately avoided for it prevents dialogue. What was chiefly reported in our speeches were 'how we did it' and 'what we do' stories of movements, campaigns, centri sociali, etc. in an attempt to 'share experiences and learn from each other', as it was often remarked in the speeches and in informal conversations. This was not agreed a priori, nor does it correspond to a 'international relations policy' of either Unicommon or Ya Basta!; rather, I would claim it was the manifestation of a modus operandi cultivated especially in the past few years by large sections of the antagonist movement, one that feeds on the discourse on overcoming identities and relaxing ideological differences, and that emphasises collective action and horizontal networking between struggles. In this sense, I registered that our expectations were not entirely matched by the Tunisian counterparts. For a number of Tunisian speakers the meeting rather took the form of a conference, and some of the organizers focused their speeches on more macro-scale, political-economic analyses of the social questions, sometimes ending with programmatic statements about the future of Tunisia. In addition, a number of the Tunisian speakers were clearly influenced by Marxist political thought. Some of the UDC members had militated in the Communist party. References to Marx, Mao Tse Tung, Lenin, and other Marxist thinkers of the 20th century abounded in these analyses, names and analytical terms that sometimes literally made my fellow activists shift uncomfortably in their seats, for these terms are associated with a phase and section of the Italian Left (namely, Communism) from which the movement has long distanced itself. Yet, at no point during or after the meeting, however, this was viewed to foreclose the attempt to construct linkages and common struggles. The focus was, conversely, on 'experience'. In an informal conversation I had with Giorgio, we remarked the lack of detail on how various groups organize, take decisions and mobilised. Giorgio and I craved for more detail on precisely 'how they did it', and took to chatting to activists during more informal settings to find out more about the revolutionary movement in Regueb and, not incidentally, on the town's experience of self-organization at the municipal and societal level. It must be said that thanks to the superb hospitality of the UDC and other Reguebiens, there was no paucity of social occasions in which exchanges and questions could be asked.

After two days of presentations and debates, the meeting ended with a more closed-door, operative meeting between us, UDC members and other organizations in Regueb that were interested in the EuroMediterranean project. I have not sought permission to divulge the content of the meeting, so I will not disclose details. Although this sounds like conspiring, I can say that no Big Ideas for a New Revolution were devised. More simply and practically, about fifteen people sat around a table and discussed on ideas to continue working together to create communication and connections across the Mediterranean space.

Concluding Remarks

Upon our return to Italy from Tunisia, reports about the meeting were written and circulated on the main websites of the activists' network, prompting activists to continue the construction of a common space of Euro-Mediterranean struggles. In the subsequent months, in spite of the usual slowing down of activities in the summer, at least another, more informal visit to Tunisia from a few Italian activists. A four day international meeting – 'RezO2Luttes' (networks of struggles) – was called in Tunis at the end of September, this year. Approximately 400 activists from across Europe and North Africa attended, and participated in workshops. Freedom of movement on the one hand, and youth, employment and welfare on the other, featured among the titles of the workshops. From what I gathered, the meeting was connected but independent of the ones I described in this paper; nevertheless, it can be seen as participating in the process of connecting activists across borders. This is in turn participating in the renewal of an alter-globalist movement, which is increasingly filling the calendar with international events.

The Euro-Mediterranean frontier of movements in the making, and its future is far from being written. It would be unwise, let alone rhetorical, to conclude this paper by offering predictions. Rather, in this paper I have offered reflections on the knowledge production and the practical know-how which informs the making of such a frontier. When viewed through the eyes of post-disobbedienti activists, these knowledge-practices reveal particular patterns. In many ways, the Italian activists did not 'naturally' proceed to link up with their Tunisian interlocutors on account of commonalities of vision and struggle in the domain of youth, work and the university, to mention but some of the main sites of conflict in the past year across the Mediterranean. Nor did they simply follow the 'wind of the south' blowing airs of revolution. Italo-Tunisian connections have also resulted from the discourse on migration and borders, which from texts published on websites to speeches performed in meetings, has made Euro-Mediterranean activism intelligible as an act of deconstruction as well as of construction. Overcoming the "wall", breaking down barriers and fighting against technologies of the border does not constitute mere 'borderless' rhetoric, but real politics. The trials and prosecutions against several activists participating in actions against the delocalized border in Italy (e.g. detention camps) are a reminder of the concreteness of such discourses and their repression thereof. In addition, I have shown that going beyond antiborder activism is not simply a stage in a linear (which is not) process of evolution of the post-disobbedienti, and other, movements. The fluid circulations of activists and imaginaries between Welcome, Ya Basta! and Unicommon is perhaps the best example of the way branching out to Tunisia is made possible by the 'internal' configuration of the movement.

For a scholar of the EU-Africa border this unfolding of knowledge-practices on the Italo-Tunisian axis contains a powerful reminder of the need to pay attention to the knowledge production on borders taking place outside and, increasingly, within the academia (Casas-Cortés, et al. 2008; Cunningham 2009). More importantly, it contains a methodological and political challenge: to decentre the state in the analysis of border, or to be more precise, not to remain locked in a discourse of the state (and other hegemonic political actors) as the sole agents of the politics of the border. This might sound rather bizarre in a period like this when states seeing their sovereignty on other domains being progressively chipped away by the thrust of neoliberal globalization cling to and reinforce borders as a way of legitimating themselves. And yet this paper shows that a focus on state and sovereignty is not incompatible with a focus on anti-hegemonic struggles; rather, the former makes the latter indispensable. In fact, if a critique of current border politics compels us to better research and understand how power works at and through borders, we cannot avoid the question of understanding what social movements do at and through borders. If we accept that, as

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue, social movements mark the limit of power or hegemonic articulation, then paying attention to the imagination and construction of an alternative Euro-African frontier necessarily sheds lights also on power and, consequently, on border regimes.

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Proposed title: Shaping EU/Africa border space: *the mobility of the Senegalese migrant-fishermen, border experiences and resistance*

Abstract:

As a response to resource scarcity, Senegalese fishermen have developed mobility strategies such as multiplying fishing places, extending fishing routes or migrating to Europe. Their mobility has been shaped both by the current lack of fish resources and by everyday experiences of the state at a local, national and international level. Furthermore, by its increasing development, its unpredictable trajectory and uncontrollable nature, this mobility seems to challenge - and thus shape - state responses. Competition over fish resources drives the mobility of the fishermen and leads them to experience illegality, conflicts, border controls and so forth, encouraging the emergence and the reinforcement of different kinds of boundaries.

Drawing on fieldwork interviews with returned migrants, this paper follows the trajectory of the migrant-fishermen from local Senegalese fishing places to the Canary Islands, emphasizing the way they perceive or are confronted with state regulation – in the context of the fishing crisis in Senegalese waters -, and with border practices throughout their migration journeys to Europe. This study informs on the way the nature of their mobility and resulting state responses have been shaped by the fishermen' relationship to state structures. In this context, it investigates the nature of the Africa/ Europe border space by questioning the way spaces and practices of exception, "smooth" spaces and mobile borders emerge across it as the result of the encounter between migrant-fishermen and Europe. Responses of migrant-fishermen to state domination are examined as possible forms of resistance shaping the Africa/Europe borderland.

Introduction

As a response to resource scarcity, Senegalese fishermen have developed mobility strategies such as multiplying fishing places, extending fishing routes or migrating to Europe. Their ability to move on the sea, which is understood here in terms of mobility, has been shaped both by the current lack of fish resources and by everyday experiences of the state at a local, national and international level. Furthermore, by its increasing development, its unpredictable trajectory and uncontrollable nature, this mobility seems to challenge - and thus shape - state responses. Competition over fish resources drives the mobility of the fishermen and leads them to experience illegality, conflicts, border controls and so forth, encouraging the emergence and the reinforcement of different kinds of boundaries. Firstly, this competition results in an increasing number of conflicts between small-scale fishers and industrial trawlers in the Senegalese sea. It operates at a local scale and limits fishermen' action and movement to particular areas. These limits are here seen as geographical boundaries as they are clearly constraining the physical movements of the fishermen.

Secondly, in the context of the fishing crisis, Senegalese fishermen have chosen to cross the ocean in order to reach Europe via the Canary Islands where they were hoping to find better working opportunities[1]. Again, they were confronted with another kind of boundary, namely the European border, according to which they had adjusted their routes in order to reach Spain. This boundary is materialised by border practices which unexpectedly manifest themselves in localisable places and complicates our understanding of what European borders traditionally mean.

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[1] Between 2001 and 2010, more than 90 000 illegal migrants have reached the Canary Islands. "Lucha contra la Inmigración Ilegal, Balance 2010", Ministerio del Interior, Spain, www.mir.es, Spanish governmental statistics

Drawing on fieldwork interviews with returned migrants[2], this paper will follow the trajectory of the migrant-fishermen from local Senegalese fishing places to the Canary Islands, emphasizing the way they perceive or are confronted, on one hand, with state regulation – in the context of the fishing crisis in Senegalese waters -, and on the other hand, with border practices throughout their migration journeys to Europe. This study will inform on the way the nature of their mobility, the choice of mobility as a strategy to reach Europe and resulting state responses have been shaped by the fishermen' relationship to state structures. In this context, it will investigate the nature of the Africa/ Europe border space by questioning the way spaces and practices of exception, "smooth" spaces and mobile borders emerge across it as the result of the encounter between migrant-fishermen and Europe. Finally, responses of migrant-fishermen to state domination will be examined as possible forms of resistance shaping the Africa/Europe borderland.

State effect, mobility and nomadism

According to Timothy Mitchell, "mundane arrangements" such as border practices or the application of the law produce the effect of an external structure that gives order to social practices (Mitchell, p180, 2006). The expressions of these "arrangements" lead people to identify the state as something apart from their lives that directs and shapes their movements and activities. In this case study, the state effect is perceived through fishermen discourses both in their daily fishing activities and their migration experiences to Europe. State effects are materialised, on one hand, by state actions in terms of fishery management, and, on the other hand, by Senegalese and Spanish border agents, border procedures, camps in the Canary Islands and repatriation processes in terms of migration procedures. The fishermen community conceives of the Senegalese state as an external structure apart from their lives. According to the interviews, its effect is weak as its action is criticized yet expected. Also, interviews show that Europe is perceived by the migrants mainly through their relationship with the Senegalese state. The fishermen' relationship to the state resulting from their perception of its effect seems to shape their mobility.

Senegalese fishermen especially those from the Northern region (Saint Louis) have always been very mobile even when the resource used to be abundant. As described in Cormier-Salem's work, in Senegal, fishing occurs in two different maritime spaces (Cormier Salem 1995). The first one is a territorialised space which is dominated and organised by the "peasant-fishermen"[3] and corresponds to coastal, estuary, and closed areas. It is opposed to the open oceanic spaces in which "Sailor-fishermen"[4] organise large-scale fishing trips. Today, the territorialised space of the "peasant-fishermen" becomes narrower and fishermen start feeling and experiencing its limits as increasing contacts with industrials trawlers produce conflicts on a regular basis. These limits, or boundaries, are

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[2] Qualitative interviews have been carried out Senegal (Dakar and Kayar) in 2007 and 2011 with migrants who had tried to reach the Canary Islands and had been repatriated to Senegal.
[3] Originally in French: "*paysans-pêcheurs*" (my translation)
[4] Originally in French: "*marins-pêcheurs*" (my translation)

attributed a political meaning as soon as the Senegalese state intervenes in their regulation and management and when the effect of this intervention is felt, rejected or expected by the fishermen.

The number of industrial fishing agreements signed by the European Commission and African countries has increased in the 1980's [5](Catanzano, Rey Valette 2002). In 2006, these formal agreements were not renewed with Senegal because of the serious condition of the fish resource (SSNC 2009). However, since then a number of European-based companies have settled in Senegal as joint ventures. They are officially Senegalese, count as Senegalese fishing companies, and are at the same time an opportunity for European fleets to informally fish in Senegalese waters without having to pay for fishing licences (Baché 2011). Conflicts between industrial and small-scale fishermen regularly occur; for example fishermen cannot often find their nets as they have been pulled out by trawlers, and suffer from illegal incursions of trawlers – both Senegalese and foreign - into restricted areas.

In discussions with fishermen, the state is held responsible for these conflicts as they denounce these fishing agreements, which have made possible the large number of trawlers in their fishing areas. The state is perceived as being absent in the resolution of the conflicts caused by a supposed trawlers' negligence. It is systematically identified as an external object which is criticised yet needed. When fishermen mention the state role in the management of fishery, it is for its lack of financial resources or inconsistent action[6]. In this sense, the effect of the state is weak as the state is considered incapable of solving internal issues. This is illustrated by the discourse of a returned migrant who was discussing the reasons why Kayar[7] fishermen decided to go to Europe in 2006. This testimony shows how fishermen movements are now confronted with tangible geographical boundaries; from the contact with the trawlers emerge the limits of their fishing area:

"We didn't like fishing anymore. The youth were fed up with fishing, what they earned wasn't enough. Fuel prices were increasingly rising. And still, the fishing agreements, with the trawlers, it bothers us a lot. You know here in Africa, there is the bad governance. [...] There are problems all the time with the trawlers. There had been big trawlers that came 3 km away from the coastline and they were fishing in big quantities, they damaged the fishing nets. [...]. The big trawlers, it's part of the fishing crisis issue."[8]

This migrant suggests a link between the so-called African "bad governance", international fishing agreements and his incapacity to fish in decent conditions. All of this has contributed to push him to

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[5] They have enabled Europe to develop its fishing capacity in external maritime places in exchange for a financial partnership with the signatories.
[6] For example, a fisherman mentions the following about the DPSP (Direction de la Protection et de la Surveillance des Pêches), one of the branches of the Ministry for fisheries in charge of fishery controls in Senegal: "The DPSP, we call for their action, they know that, but sometimes they say they don't have enough resources, not enough fuel, they say they can't patrol and that their units are reduced... but sometimes, they actually do these controls, they patrol in the sea and sometimes perhaps they increase awareness of the trawlers that fish in certain areas." Field interviews, Dakar, June 2011
[7] Kayar is a fishing village located 50km away from Dakar. It is one of the most affected places of irregular departures to Europe.
[8] Field interviews, Kayar, June 2011

illegally go to Europe in 2006. In this sense, this everyday state experience affects and encourages his mobility: the state is identified as an external object whose negative effect had an impact on the fisherman's migration decision. The effect of the Senegalese state is perceived by the fishermen in their daily experiences in the sense that tensions and conflicts occur when their movements run up against obstacles - such as trawlers -, and are not managed to their expectations.

Key officials of the Ministry of Fishery have confirmed that these increasing conflicts are a sign of a growing competition over a scarcer resource[9]. According to these officials, fishermen' lack of education and awareness of regulations cause these conflicts, as they do not follow codes to make their nets visible in the sea. They are considered as an informal under-developed community, unable to follow state rules and regulations. Indeed, fishermen are expected to respect standard practices in order to make their routes and fishing places visible. Failure to adopt these, keeps them inexistent and outside the regulation system. These norms are both a way to make them visible, traceable and controllable and to provide them with a certain legitimacy – from the viewpoint of the state. In fact, according to James Scott (Scott 1998), this would be viewed as a form of "legibility" demanded by the state which enables the state to reinforce its power over the small-scale fishermen. By staying invisible, fishermen therefore affirm their resistance to this power.

Fishermen' ignorance of state rules and norms, combined with an increasing unpredictable mobility can be viewed as a certain form of nomadism, over which the Senegalese state attempts to impose its control through its fishery institutions. Deleuze and Guattari give a powerful interpretation of nomadic spaces and movements that can be applied for this case study (Deleuze, Guattari 1988). It refers to "Smooth spaces" which are opposed to "striated spaces" and are characterised by their absence of limits, points and lines whereas "striated" ones are based on defined networks and routes whose fixity delimitates and structures continuous movements. Nomads progress in "smooth spaces" such as the sea and shape the space on which they move by sliding on it without following existing lines or creating territorialised routes (id, ibid, p382). Because of its unpredictability, the movement produced by nomads represents a threat and has to be subjected to state control. The Senegalese state attempts to "striate" these "smooth" spaces by regulating and tracing the mobility of the fishermen - in this case, by imposing fishing rules on them. Senegalese local-scale fisheries have long been spontaneously organised and it seems that the state is now struggling in legitimising its sovereignty in its attempts to normalise this pre-existing structure. The state regulation and management of the fishing sector do not necessarily match with fishermen' habits and expectations.

In this context and in order to cope with the fishing crisis, a number of Senegalese fishermen have chosen to cross the ocean in order to reach Europe via the Canary Islands where they were expecting to find better working opportunities. By using their mobility as a migration strategy, fishermen then became migrants. Illegal departures to the Canary Islands have intensified the nature of this

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[9] Interviews with the official in charge of the Directorate of Maritime Fisheries (Direction Maritime des Pêches) and with the official in charge of the Fisheries Monitoring and Surveillance (DPSP - Direction de la Protection et de la Surveillance des Pêches), June and July 2011, Dakar

nomadism: their routes have become even more unpredictable and they have searched to escape all kinds of control by staying invisible.

Mobile border practices and invisible routes

West-African migrants started to take irregular migration routes to reach Europe when European visa procedures were strengthened in the 1990s (de Haas 2008). Bilateral immigration control agreements have been signed by the EU and North and West African countries. This consequently allowed a move of European border controls further South outside Europe territorial borders through the development of the European border control agency, Frontex, in 2004 (Audebert, Robin 2009). Thus, in the beginning of the last decade, fishermen have organised migration routes further south, from Mauritanian or Senegalese beaches, where it was easier to escape border controls than in places such as Ceuta and Melilla[10].

Various scales of state effects are felt along migrants' journeys. They appear as expressions of "striating" actions developed by the cooperation between Spain and Senegal and reinforce the apparent externality attributed to the state power in migrant-fishermen' experiences. Migrants can be seen here as "nomads" progressing in "smooth" spaces avoiding Europe's "striating" practices – such as mobile border controls. Nevertheless, the application of the nomadism metaphor to this case study needs to be set back in a situated context in order to avoid the risk of "romanticism" mentioned by Sharpe and Atkinson (Sharp, p11, 2000; Atkinson 2000). In this sense, it is important to consider that although migrant sea trips to the Canary Islands were not as sophisticated as border patrols could be, they were prepared in advance and followed programmed GPS routes. This puts into perspective the supposed 'ignorance' and 'powerlessness' migrants are attributed. Seeing them as powerless agents struggling against a dominating Europe would lead to a simplistic dual opposition of dominating / dominated (id, ibid). Throughout the trajectory of migrant-fishermen, the identification of places in which tensions are observed, enables a form of resistance to be identified. By adjusting their mobility to border controls, migrants were resisting to the effects of a dominating European power. They secretly left the coasts during the night and were aware of the Senegalese police patrols schedules. They managed to take routes to the Canary Islands that were far enough from the coasts so that they could stay invisible. Their motorised wooden-canoes were not easily detectable by radar and satellite systems. So, they have adjusted their movements according to Europe/Senegalese controls which have in turn adopted a similar strategy to compensate. Here, a parallel with Atkinson's work on the mobility of Libyan nomadic populations used as a strategy against Italian colonial power can be made (Atkinson 2000). In the1920's, the Italian colonial army adopted mobility strategies similar to those of Libyan nomads and semi-nomads in order to impose its control over them. Although in this case study, migrants do not explicitly claim their resistance to border controls, their mobility strategy

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[10] Although fishermen played a decisive role in these trips, a large number of non-fishermen migrants willing to reach Europe were also on board.

produces the same effect: a European response constantly adjusted to their unpredictability. In this sense, Frontex border patrols, embodied by either Spanish or Senegalese agents materialise a state effect produced by an external state structure to which migrants resist by moving in the ocean in an invisible way. Another kind of invisibility strategy can be seen in the spiritual preparation of the sea trip to Europe. Fishermen recurrently called out to spiritual skills of *marabouts* to prepare the boats: *marabouts* make sacrifices and say prayers to ward off fate. Some migrants stated that thanks to the many *gri-gri* located in several parts of the canoe the boat could become « invisible » and escape police checks[11].

As most of the fishermen' state experiences occur at sea, it appears essential to explore the different border functions attributed to the ocean. As identified by Philip Steinberg, the ocean is a challenging space for the conventional organisation of societies (Steinberg 2001). It acts as a marginal space where borders are pushed away and disputed, where fixity is sought, where movement is arrested by border practices and where it finally becomes impossible to draw clear physical borderlines. On the routes of migrant-fishermen, the ocean takes the meaning of a frontier through their constant efforts to push spatial limits away and access more resources. The notion of frontier reflects the idea of an unlimited border space which could not be reduced to a clear physical limit. When some of the fishermen decided to convert themselves into "smugglers" and to use their boats in order to carry African migrants to the Canary Islands, the ocean itself has been changed into a wide border space giving access to Europe. In addition, the ocean becomes the space where Europe can affirm itself by externalising its border control and immigration policy. The development of Frontex illustrates this phenomenon as its maritime border patrols can be seen as a system of 'mobile checkpoints' positioning itself across the sea. For Senegal as well, the ocean becomes an opportunity for international recognition through this externalisation process: Senegal has seen its border control capacity reinforced by the Frontex mechanisms and took part in the fight against illegal migration by developing its control over its coastal waters (Carrera 2007). A juxtaposition of these distinct meanings and border functions attributed to the ocean are observed in migrants' experiences of the European border.

Meaningful border experiences: camps and repatriation processes

Throughout their journey, migrants went through various statuses which were shifting due to both Senegalese and Spanish state regulation: they successively were invisible migrants, visible victims, imprisoned criminals, and socially recognised repatriated migrants. When they reached the Canary coastline after having spent one week at sea, they all felt relieved. Their testimonies show they thought they had already crossed the border: this can be explained by the fact the ocean itself is considered a border space. Going through it and reaching the Spanish Islands without having been caught by border patrols, would then mean that the border – imagined by the migrants – has been

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[11] Field interviews with returned migrants in Yoff, Dakar, 2007

crossed. Instead of trying to hide themselves and looking for a convenient place to secretly land, they openly looked for assistance. They were expecting to eat and sleep and had the feeling the worst had been done. They became visible due to the media coverage and the number of images shown of these boat people taken in by the Spanish authorities. One of them stated:

"I had the chance to reach the Spanish coast but it was during the night. We found white people who were bathing near the beach. They indicated us the right direction to the place we had to go. When we arrived, we found other white people, we had to get off the boat; they called the police and the Spanish Red Cross"[12]. Another one added "we were well received; we were given sweets and T-shirts."[13]

The fact they voluntary looked for assistance shows how legitimate they feel their situation was. This feeling is strengthened by the way they are first received by Spanish agents: migrants perceive them as positive European state effects which they can trust.

When they arrived in the Spanish waters, migrants were taken in by either the local authorities or the Spanish Red Cross. After some identification process and official procedures, they were sent to camps were they had to wait for a maximum of 40 days until their case would be sorted. They were systematically repatriated after agreements had been signed between Senegal and Spain in September 2006. However, experiences of their arrivals, life in camps and repatriation procedures are testimonies of their lack of awareness of how migration is managed within Europe. Testimonies of life in camps are often described in negative terms such as "we were treated like slaves" or "like dogs"[14]. Migrants found themselves in a temporary closed space where they had suddenly been imprisoned without any information and after having first been received as victims rather than as criminals. This temporary closed space changes their condition so that they go back to illegal status and invisibility. A majority of interviewees stated that after almost 40 days in camps, they still did not know whether they would be released in Spain or sent back to Senegal. They occasionally found out they were being deported back to Senegal, only while they were boarding on the plane, handcuffed and surrounded by two policemen; or in the worst case, while they were landing in Dakar. However, some of them could call their Senegalese friends who had just lived the same experience and who told them they would be deported. They had to use parallel communication networks outside the official channels in order to find out what was going to happen to them.

The camp plays the role of a border as this is where the regulation process has stopped their trajectory. It can be conceived of as a "space of exception" produced by border practices, and, according to Simon Turner's analysis of a refugee camp in North-Western Tanzania, "apart from being a place of 'no longer', the camp is also a place of 'not yet'" (Turner, p331, 2005). What migrants only know is that they are going to stay in the camp for 40 days. This space is 'suspended' and holds them for a determined period of time, after a rough sea trip and before a possible life in

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[12] Field interviews with repatriated migrants, Kayar, July 2011
[13] Field interviews with repatriated migrants, Kayar, July 2011
[14] Field interviews with migrants, Yoff, Dakar, 2007 and Kayar, July 2011

Europe. Their imminent repatriation to Senegal is kept secret until the last moment by the authorities in order to maintain order and security and avoid any protests. The camp embodies here an external surveillance structure where information and movements are carefully controlled. However, the information given by Senegalese contacts situated outside this structure challenges this dominating power. Efforts made by detained migrants to access this information through parallel networks can be seen as a form of resistance.

Migrants' lack of awareness of migration rules makes them vulnerable and exposes them to possible abuses within the strictly organised camp structure. Their criminalisation allows a certain treatment and their ignorance of European migration management practices gives to the authorities of the camp a legitimacy to exercise power in the name of security. Being criminals for having transgressed the law, they represent a threat to security. Keeping them uninformed in order to minimise the threat they represent becomes a legitimate strategy to justify these practices of exception.

Repatriation procedures are perceived by migrants as a Senegal state effect emerging from this European border experience[15]. When Senegal signed readmission agreements with Spain in 2006, other West African countries still had not accepted the repatriation of its citizens who had illegally migrated to the Canary Islands. Senegalese migrants therefore did not understand why they were sent back to Senegal whereas migrants from other nationalities could finally go to Spain. This might have been the most tangible external Senegal state effect they felt during their experience. One of the returned migrants explained they were told by the Spanish police: "during these 40 days, you can be free and go to the Spanish territory. But if during these 40 days, your president, your government needs you, you will return to Senegal." These comments enable migrants to identify their repatriation as a decision coming from the Senegalese state. The contact with the Spanish agents has made the Senegal state effect more tangible. This was reinforced by the presence of Senegalese policemen who were sent to the Canary Islands in order to identify their compatriots in case they pretended they were not Senegalese. Indeed this might be the moment when migrants more accurately start to be called "repatriated" migrants rather than "deported" and this is when their frustration becomes directed to the Senegalese state rather than to the Spanish authorities. These repatriation procedures can be seen as another externalisation measure as well, as Spain delegates its responsibility to the Senegalese state. This cooperation has blurred boundaries and strengthened the legitimacy that has made possible exceptional practices - although after the first official repatriations, Senegal has expressed its concern regarding the way Senegalese migrants had been treated in the Canary Island camps.

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[15] Thousands of Senegalese have been repatriated from the Canary Islands. Statistics are very imprecise on the subject. Nevertheless, as an example, between September and October 2006, more than 4700 Senegalese migrants have been repatriated, after official repatriations were announced by the Spanish government. Source : « Environ 4.000 clandestins rapatriés en un mois au Sénégal depuis l'Espagne », news article, AFP, Avomm, 18 October 2006

One last observable place where the effect of border experiences can be felt is found back in Senegal. Organisations of repatriated migrants were created in the most affected parts of the country and have tried to form a national network. In the fishing village of Kayar, almost 500 migrants registered to the local organisation. These organisations embody migrant-fishermen' European border experiences, give temporary social recognition and psychological support, and are a clear expression of a detachment towards the Senegalese state. The inability of the Senegalese government to propose alternatives after these massive repatriation movements encouraged the returned migrants to create their own independent organisations (Marx 2008). Once again, the status of migrants has changed as these organisations give them the visibility and legitimacy they had lost during the repatriation process or camp experiences. They are also a response to the weak state effect they had been confronted with at their arrivals - migrants often complained they were only given the equivalent of 15 Euros and a sandwich by Senegalese agents before being sent back to their village[16]. These organisations appear to be another form of resistance which has emerged as a reaction towards the Senegalese state. They are another sign of the state perceived as an external structure according to which fishermen shape their resistance and mobility. In this sense, they show how European borders are constructed as a complex system produced by the combined action of both Senegal and Spain, yet mainly perceived through a Senegal state effect perspective. They enable the persistence of the border effect and the European experience back in Senegalese villages.

Conclusion

The Africa/Europe borderland experience tells mainly of the relationship existing between the fishermen and the Senegalese state. Migrant-fishermen position themselves according to the different forms of state effects they perceive throughout their journey. Their mobility is first confronted with state effects at the scale of their fishing places. The fishing crisis leads them to experience more and more state regulation processes through their expanding mobility. When this mobility is chosen as a strategy to reach Europe, it develops according to the same characteristics of invisibility, irregularity and illegality. The nature of fishermen' behaviour is shaped according to an external state identified through its various effects – state regulation in the case of fishery management-, border controls, camp agents and repatriation. This behaviour shapes their mobility and reactions and can be interpreted as a form of resistance against a dominating striating power embodied by regulation and border practices (although it is not claimed as such). Frictions, tensions and conflicts emerge within – and thus give shape to - this Africa/Europe borderland. Strategies of resistance developed by the migrant-fishermen have generated complex state responses and complicated the organisation of the European border.

As border controls have gained in efficiency Senegalese migrants have given up this strategy. Overall, thousands of them have tragically died while crossing the ocean. It has been obviously

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[16] Field interviews with returned migrants, Yoff, Dakar, 2007, see also (Marx 2008)

impossible to get an exact number of victims because of the invisible nature of these trips. Fishermen are now reinforcing other migration strategies in order to secure their livelihood. They fish in neighbouring West African waters and once again, are confronted with other border practices and state regulation.

Acknowledgements

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Border-induced Displacement: EU externalization and Africa

This chapter examines the development of EU border control with a particular focus on its external dimension as it is manifested towards African countries.

At the outset it is argued that international negotiations, external governance and extra-territorialization are all aspects of externalization and they are illustrated through the examples of the European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP], the Tampere and Seville Presidency Conclusions and the Frontex Agency's HERA-operations. The notion of borderscapes (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007) is then suggested as a useful analytical tool for understanding the multiple abstractions of knowledge, practices and technologies at work in EU border control. The concept highlights the fact that the EU borders change over time according to political and administrative processes and also shows how the various components of the EU's borderscapes can be seen as instances of localized geopolitics (Dahlman and Ó Thuatail 2005). Since border control re-territorialises geographic spaces according to the mobility of the people through them it has substantial geopolitical aspects (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, Walters 2004). Such a perspective on European borderscapes, however, cannot stand alone, but must be complemented with the more governance and process-oriented analytical perspective of biopolitics (Foucault 2008; Agamben 1998). This perspective also allows for useful spatial interpretations of the relations between cartographic representation of the migration phenomenon and the sovereign power involved in producing knowledge about it (Minca 2007).

By analyzing the European efforts to reconstruct its borderscapes through the externalization of detention camps to Libya, it is, however, argued that focusing only on sovereign power and the production of free circulation for some bypasses the political

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and technocratic processes which have intervened in, and securitized European asylum policies.

It is claimed that these geo- and biopolitical instrumentalizations instantiate a particular power geometry (Massey 1993). This is realized through an infrastructure underpinned by continuous corporeal, financial, material and virtuel flows designed to yield European hypermobility and non-European submobility (Hyndman 2000) and contain displaced people before they reach European territory. It is shown that these complex flows take different forms, such as programmes supporting third countries migration control (financial), the deployment of Immigration Liaison Officers [ILO's] and bilateral military agreements.

Finally, the chapter suggests that works on forced migration have tended to view border control as a reaction to the movement of already-displaced people, but that externalization should in itself be seen as a cause of displacement and forced migration, which I conceptualise as "border-induced displacement". This allows us to appraise the overall consequences of the external EU borderscapes' decentralized functionality instead of particular border control events in particular countries or regions. Conceptualizing the EU borderscapes' external dimension as the sequencing of forced flows makes it possible to identify its production of border-induced displacement and highlights the interrelated functionality of the transnational European borderscape thereby providing a lens through which the extent of its humanitarian consequences can be grasped.

The External Dimension of the European Borderscapes

During the 2000's the concept of externalization has been invoked as a description of how European states has begun to export aspects of migration control to third countries. The EU's 'Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice' (Council of the European Union 2005) thus notes, that in order to respond to the security threats of terrorism, organised crime, corruption and unmanaged migration flows, the 'development of the area of freedom, security and justice can only be successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these issues which

includes strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for human rights and international obligations.' More specifically, we can define EU externalization as EU or Member States' efforts to establish working arrangements with third countries and non-state actors concerning border and migration control (cf. Betts and Milner 2007). The external dimension denotes the fact that this control takes place outside Europe, on third countries' territories or in international waters. Since externalization takes different forms Christina Boswell (2003: 613) distinguishes between preventive externalization addressing the root causes for refugees and the export of classical migration control to other countries. Others, like Thierry Balzacq (2009: 2-3), sees externalization as instances where one actor through international negotiations gains "remote control", that is external governance, over the border policies of other countries, leading to extraterritorial migration control.

Examples of these forms of externalization abound, but I will here focus on the ENP, Seville's migration-development nexus and the operations of the Frontex Agency. Firstly, the ENP is manifested through negotiations of Action Plans and Association Agreements between the EU and its neighbours. African countries granted the ENP-status include Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria while Libya has special arrangements. Part of the ENP-agenda is to bolster these countries´ capacities for migration control. For instance, the EU-Morocco ENP agreement meant that the EU committed €40 million to the construction of an advanced radar system to detect European-bound migrants and drug trafficking along Moroccan northern coasts. While this radar system is operated by Morocco, it illustrates how EU-Morocco negotiations resulted in the creation of a control structure which extra-territorializes EU border policies Secondly, the Migration-development nexus formulated by the Seville Council (2002: 11) is a clear case of external EU governance for instance when it stated:

> The European Council considers it necessary to carry out a systematic assessment of relations with third countries which do not cooperate in combatting illegal immigration. That assessment will be taken into account in relations between the European Union and its Member States and the countries concerned, in all relevant areas. Insufficient cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union.

The migration-development nexus, in other words, makes the acceptance of the EU's immigration and asylum policies a necessary condition for non-EU states to gain closer cooperation with the union, including receiving development support and trade relations. Its demand of acceptance therefore effectively regulates the available asylum policies of non-EU states according to EU priorities by linking different policy domains under the overall priorities of migration control **(see also Tampere 1999).**

Thirdly, some Frontex operations also exemplify the extra-territorialization of control practices. Thus, between 2006-7 and following negotiations with Senegal, Mauritania and Cap Verde Frontex was allowed to conduct the HERA-operations on these countries territories. The HERA-operations targeted boatmigrants seeking to reach the Canary Islands, where they would be able to apply for asylum in Spain. To counter this movement Frontex deployed Spanish helicopters, naval vessels from Italy, Portugal and Spain and aircrafts from Finland and Italy in the territorial waters of Senegal, Cap Verde and Mauritania. Moreover, two surveillance aircrafts from Italy and Finland were flown deep into African territory to monitor migration routes through the deserts. HERA combined interceptions in the territorial waters of these countries with desert-overflights.

According to Frontex such externalization operations are undertaken as a way of `preventing them to risk their lives on the dangerous journey´ (Frontex website), however, it is by no means a coincidence that the operations also prevent migrants from reaching Spanish territory and legitimately file asylum claims. In total, the HERA-operations intercepted and diverted around 6,000 boatmigrants. As such, these Frontex operations show how externalization decouples the policing of migrants from the European states' territorial boundaries (see also **Nick Vaughan-Williams 2009: 28).** Externalization can thus be seen as a form of geopolitics that effectively re-territorializes the spaces of third countries (see also Walters **2004**: 678-9).

Borderscapes as Sites of Mobility

The concept of borderscapes captures how the European border control is not a static, geographical phenomenon, but dynamic, consisting of political power, technological practices and knowledge-production. Rajaram and Grundy_Warr (2007) defines

borderscapes as multidimensional abstractions of knowledge and technologies at territorial edges and thereby highlight how borders are fluctuating landscapes of power which are always in the process of being constructed (see also Rancière 2004). As mechanisms of social regulation EU externalization orders and re-orders the movement of people on third country territory via such practices as surveillance, interception, detention and deportations affecting the humanitarian conditions of those attempting to cross borders. Moreover, the processes determining such border infrastructures are constantly influenced by interventions from various actors and political-economic processes. Properly nuanced, the analytics of borderscapes can then problematize the EU borders as contested and dynamic spatio-political phenomena influenced by certain political interests, discursive knowledge production and technological regimes. One way of appraising the connection between borderscaping and migrants' humanitarian conditions is to consider the geopolitical and biopolitical components of borderscapes.

Biopolitics can be defined as the instrumentalization of biological processes according to political interests and biopolitical analyses therefore enquire into the `microphysics of power´ manifesting governmental power. Thus, while a geopolitical perspective asks 'why' power is manifested in certain ways, and what interests guide it, a biopolitical perspective asks 'how' this power is realized (Vaughan-Williams 2009). This brings to the foreground the many concrete instruments and practices through which the macro-perspective of geo-power is pursued. Accordingly, scholars have attempted to deconstruct the technological regimes behind European border and migration control (Balzacq 2009) building on the theorizing of biopolitical governmentality done by Michel Foucault (Foucault 2008, 2007).

According to Foucault (2008), governmentality is a distinct political economy whereby power is delegated and decentralized in order to facilitate the free circulation of people and goods. Both the EU's Schengen Area, with its free movement of EU-citizens and goods between union Member States, and externalization which delegates control capacities to third countries, accord to this functionality. Hence, governmentality is not a rationality of absolutely free movement, but functions through the regulation of individual freedom *vis a vis* the overall utility of circulations to the population (Foucault 2008: 42-3). The governmental ideal of free circulation of flows therefore requires the

preemption, through security apparatuses, of other, risky, flows. From its inception in 1985, the Schengen Convention, too, has been premised on a link between the free movement of people and compensatory ˋflanking measures´ safeguarding the internal European space against threatening and risky flows (van Munster 2009).

The security apparatuses composing these flanking measures are grounded in both political, legal and technological practices, but in 2005 a brutal example of what consequences they may have ocurred in Ceuta and Melilla, two Morrocan enclaves bordering Europe. Here, Moroccan and Spanish security forces fired upon migrants attempting to reach Spanish territory from both sides of the border-fence. The result was the deaths of 15 people from shots and falls and the wounding of a further 100 (Goldschmidt 2006: 1-2). Over the following weeks, and after considerable European pressure, the Moroccan authorities dumped 1000 irregular migrants in desert areas near the Algerian border and without food, water or medicine (Doctors Without Borders 2006). After this the geographical sites of Ceuta and Melilla were thoroughly transformed into militarized zones with high-tech surveillance technologies, three lines of fences whose height were increased to 6 meters. Also, the €40 million Morrocan radar system funded by the EU was launched in this period. Ceuta and Melilla are therefore prime examples of borderscapes' dynamic and continuous character. The Ceuta and Melilla-incidents also open the door to the 'dark side of bio-politics' (Dean 1999: 139; Dean 2002: 41), showing that the differentiation of free from forced flows have concrete and violent consequences.

Another biopolitical model, which casts further light on these dynamics of exclusion, is that of Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 1995, 1998, 2005). Unlike Foucault´s sub-legal analyses of power Agamben premises his biopolitics on states' juridico-institutional sovereignty in an attempt to call into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state (Agamben 1998: 9, 134). Since border control is a prime example of sovereign power and several scholars have expanded on what they perceive as the "eminently spatial" dimensions of Agamben's biopolitics (Minca 2007), his work lends itself to analyses of EU externalization.

Agamben defines sovereign power through its capacity to declare a state of exception whereby some human existences are banned, or excluded, from the societal

status and protection of states (Agamben 1998: 181). The process whereby some are included in lawful communities is thus simultaneously the outlawing of others and according to Agamben this exclusion is tantamount to the biopolitical production of `bare life´. What is more, bare life continues to be subsumed sovereign power, for in the state of exception sovereign power is expanded to include those that it excludes, in what is termed inclusive exclusions (Agamben 1998: 104-11).

Agamben finds the most paradigmatic example of this governance-through-exception in the technology of the camp. The camp is the territorialisation that precedes the normalization of the state of exception since it is 'the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule' (*Ibid*: 168-9; see also Minca 2007: 15). Since border control consigns migrants to exist in detention camps, or zones of exception, on the fringes of European communities, Agamben sees these as incarnating the bare life placed in inclusive exclusions (Agamben 1995, 1998). The spatial dimension of externalization takes this logic a step further, as it intercept and detain people even before their arrival on the territory of European states allow them to enter the legal category of asylum seekers. As they travel the deserts of Libya or Algeria with surveillance drones supplied by Italy roaming across the skies over their heads, the pooled sovereign power of externalization accords them only the status of "illegal migrants". As the mirror-object of bare life, the sovereign power of border control can then also be seen as occupying an indeterminate status of being both inside and beyond the law.

Minca (2007: 83) has attentively pointed out that the very existence of a rule, or norm, 'must necessarily be spatialised' in order to allow for both the repeated enforcement and the exceptions, which together define it. Governance-through-exception is, then, not only a judicial-institutional practice, but 'requires a concrete space' (*Ibid*) to be realized. This is accomplished via the production of geographic 'knowledge compromised with power', a prime example of which is the division of the world into an "organic" system of nation-states with fixed borders, each reifying each others' geopolitics of sovereign power (*Ibid*: 86-7). Others include the "militant geographies" of mass media used to explain, say, the Iraq war (*Ibid*: 90). Minca urges academics to pay more attention to these militant geographies, saying that they 'open the door' to the

foundational 'outside' revealing the metaphysics of geopolitical power-in-action (*Ibid*). This important point applies also to the production of cartographies that is part of EU externalization.

By way of example, Frontex produces a vast amount of maps of the EU's borderscapes used to explain the Agency's operations. These maps depict numerous migration routes, which criss-cross the territory of North African states and then infiltrate the European borders. However, they do not represent the degree of European involvement in boosting the control infrastructures of the same countries, nor do they describe the hazarduous conditions facing migrants. These maps then do not encompass those existences for which the protection of lawful communities has been withdrawn, such as stateless people, internally displaced persons and refugees, that is, life utterly exposed to the enforcement of power. Similarly left out of the maps is the power of violence and control that, respectively, cause and manage migrants' forced mobility. All that remains in the Frontex cartographies used to underpin the externalized EU borderscapes are porous African borders and undifferentiated flows of "illegal migrants" penetrating them. Parallel to the EU border control's judicial-institutional exclusions, the union's geographic representations of externalization then also place migrants in an inclusive exclusion. This is because migratory movement outside European territory is recorded as illegal by a "sovereign cartographer" (Minca 2007: 89), who, in the very process of doing this, excludes itself from the geography of bare life that it produces.

To be turned into bare life is an inherently vulnerable condition and the deplorable conditions in the migrant detention camps within and beyond European territory seem to lend relevance to this concept. Agambian biopolitics and Minca's spatial reading of it, lends itself to theorize the consequences that externalization has on migrants as relations of inclusive exclusions imposed through landscapes of power. However, such a perspective faces difficulties both when it comes to pinpointing the complex processes shaping border control as well as assessing migrant agency.

Envisioning Externalized European Camps

The development of EU´s external dimension in the 2000s was a complex process involving different EU actors and divergent Member States agendas. A way of illustrating the geo- and biopolitical components of borderscapes is to analyze the development of perhaps the prominent case of localized EU geopolitics of externalization, namely Libya..

The first time the idea of exporting detention beyond European territory was voiced was in 1986 by the Danish Schlüter-government. It launched a draft proposal in the UN Third Committee that called for a new strategy of the world community towards refugees. This was to be based on increased donations to countries experiencing major flows, voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement and the creation of UN-run regional "processing centers" to replace the asylum processing mechanisms of individual countries (Danish Proposal 1986: 8). The Danish proposal was, however, rejected by the UN General Assembly. Eight years later the Dutch Secretary of Justice relaunched the idea of third country reception centres to which all asylum-seekers could be deported (Noll 2003). Then, in 2001, the Danish Fogh-government, backed by the nationalist-populist Danish People's Party (DPP) strongly focused on what was termed "reception in the region", which DPP perceived as a "superb idea" (Noll 2003: 304 ft4, 5). It was similarly under the Danish EU Presidency, that the 2002 Council Conclusions stated that EU cooperation with Libya concerning illegal migration was "not only desirable but essential" (2463rd Council meeting: 5-6). Noll (2003: 304) has argued that the Danish efforts in effect paved the way for, and supported the British Blair government, which in 2003 launched the proposal called "A New Vision for Refugees" (hereafter the New Vision). This proposal reiterated the idea that the existing asylum system had failed, and that external processing could rectify its shortcomings in much more detail than the previous Danish and Dutch proposals had done. The New Vision can, in other words, be seen as the articulation of the political priorities of an influential North-West bloc within the EU.

The New Vision was two-fold: Firstly, it called for the establishment of Regional Protection Areas (RPAs) outside Europe funded by one or several states, where asylum seekers could be accumulated (UK Government 2003: 2). Moreover, some of these RPAs should also function as transit processing centers, where asylum claims to European

countries could be lodged and assessed. This was portrayed as opening the possibility for European states to administratively deport all asylum seekers to these extraterritorial processing centers where they could await decisions on their claims, and the New Vision specifically considered North African countries to be suitable for this purpose (UK Government 2003: 13, 26). The authors of the New Vision were very well aware that such an scheme of administrative deportations would pose great problems vis a vis European states' legal obligations under the Refugee Convention's article 33,1 and the European Convention on Human Rights' article 3 because of the deplorable human rights conditions in those regions under considerations. This, however, did not prompt any reconsideration of the notion of externalizing detention camps. Rather, the authors viewed these problems as indicating that it could be necessary for European states to withdraw from key articles of these protectionary tools:

> We would need to change the extra territorial nature of Article 3 (ECHR) if we want to reduce our asylum obligations. Article 3 is the only article of ECHR, which applies to actions that occur outside the territory of the State. If we only had to concern ourselves with torture, inhuman and degrading treatment that happens in the UK, we could remove anyone off the territory without obligation. Coupled with a withdrawal from the Geneva Convention refoulement should be possible and the notion of an asylum seeker in the UK should die (UK Government 2003: 9).

The New Vision gained the official support of the Danish, Dutch and Italian governments. Others considered it a deeply worrying break with the protection standards of the international asylum system (Noll 2003: 309-38). Although the New Vision's specific take on externalization would ultimately be rejected as official EU policy, it was still a crucial event in the development of European externalization to third countries like Libya, witnessed by the fact that several discussions between the JHA Council and the Commission dealt with the possibility of externalized EU detention and processing in the following years.

Thus, in 2003 the JHA Council encouraged the Commission to further develop the ideas behind the UK New Vision. The Commission responded with a communication entitled `Towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems´ (Commission of the European Communities 2003) where it encouraged the British-Danish-Dutch triade to present their views at the Thessaloniki Council later that year. Here, however, the New

Vision was rejected due to fierce resistance on humanitarian grounds led by UNHCR, Amnesty International and the European Parliament, but also by EU Member States like Sweden and France (cf. Amnesty International 2003; UNHCR 2003, see also Noll 2003). The Thessaloniki Conclusions therefore tried to bridge the gap between the drive for externalization and the humanitarian worries. Moreover it also had to take into account that the intergovernmental JHA Council preferred measures located within Member State-competences, while the executive Commission desired more common-European solutions.

The JHA Council-solution was to ask the Commission for a refined proposal and in June 2004 the Commission responded with a Communication entitled `Improving access to durable solutions´ (Commission of the European Communities 2004). It suggested a common resettlement framework, but, crucially, did not demand that migrants should be able to apply for asylum from camps outside Europe (Hansen, P 2007). While this can be seen as the Commission´s attempt to steer away from a supranational proposal threatening the intergovernmental agenda of the Council, it also dismantled the initial "humanitarian" argument for externalization found in the Danish, Dutch and British proposals, namely that migrants in the transit processing centres would be able to apply for asylum to European states (*Ibid*).

Towards the end of 2004 the JHA Council reacted with two steps. Firstly, it called for a Commission-based study into `the merits, appropriateness and feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications outside EU territory´ (Bulletin of the European Union 2004). Secondly, it sent a Commission-based technical mission to Libya to investigate the country's potential for externalization. Among other places, the mission visited the cities and regions of Kufra, Sebha and Ghat, places where Italy had already or were planning to fund large detention facilities (HRW 2009; Andrijasevic 2006: 9; Council of the European Union 2005: 59). According to the European Commission, Italy also funded 47 deportation flights out of Libya and was also, alongisde Malta, supplying a range of other equipment, including GPS equipment, 6.000 matresses and 1.000 bodybags (Council of the European Union 2005: 60). At the time where the EU considered stepping up its externalization efforts to Libya, comprehensive bilateral externalization deals were, thus, already in place, with Italy as a primus motor.

The Commission's Technical Mission acknowledged that unaccompanied minors were at risk and that the detention procedures of the Libyan authorities were inadequate and did not allow migrants to claim asylum (Gil-Bazo 2006: 592). It failed, however, to mention the numerous witness-accounts of the brutal Libyan border control, and instead said that the Libyan detention conditions were 'difficult but relatively acceptable in the light of the overall context'. As a result of this weighing of human rights against the European interest in externalization, the Technical Mission went on to discuss the need for boosting Libya's control capacity stating that the 'infrastructural and logistical setup and equipment needed to effectively control' the country's borders is 'totally inadequate'. It also noted approvingly that the Libyan authorities planned to increase the country's number of border control officers from 3.500 to 42.000 (European Commission 2005: 35, 47).

The JHA Council struck the same balance between human rights and the externalization efforts in a June 2005 statement saying that due to the Libyan conditions `any cooperation with Libya can only be limited in scope and take place on a technical ad hoc basis´ (Council of the European Union 2005: 18). However, this technical ad hoc basis turned out to be quite encompassing. Thus, the Council called for the strengthening of `systematic operational cooperation between the respective national services responsible for the sea borders´ on the Meditteranean, directly encouraging Member States to send Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) to Libyan airports and harbours (*Ibid*). The Technical Mission's and the JHA Council's reactions, then, effectively paved the way for increasing the European drive for externalization to Libya. Accordingly, from 2004 onwards the EU commenced ten externalized projects in Libya, two of which were the "Across Sahara" projects. These were funded through the Aeneas Programme, had the Italian Ministry of the Interior as implementing partner and received support from 2005 to 2009 where the Commission donated €2,6 million out of the projects overall budget of €3,2 million. Their goals were to "fight" and "combat" illegal immigration in Libya and Niger (Aeneas Programme).

In September 2005, the Commission answered the Council´s request with a Communication entitled `Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations´ (Commission of the European Union 2005). It formulated three objectives for the EU´s

external relations policy: To expedite deportations from European territory, to facilitate legal integration of immigrants and to improve the asylum-capabilities and migration-management of developing non-EU states (*Ibid*). Toward the end of 2005, then, by focusing primarily on increased return-measures and capacity-building in third countries the Commission had arrived at a proposal whose objectives were more or less identical to the already functioning operational and administrative externalization funded by Aeneas. Despite the EU´s massive funding of asylum- and migration facilities, the legal responsibility for assessing migrants' asylum claims had thus ended up with belonging to the countries hosting these externalized measures. What had initially been framed as reception centers for asylum seekers wanting to go to Europe, had ended up as detention camps for illegal migrants deported to especially Libya from European countries.

Externalization-in-action: The Libyan Option

Despite the reservations expressed by EU institutions the concerted bilateral and common-European efforts to externalize control to Libya gained pace from the mid-2000s. Illustrating this, the German minister of the interior, Otto Schily, commented in 2005 that the "Libyan option" he had pursued for years had "now become concrete policy" (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2005). This remarkable statement followed his re-launch of the externalized centers-idea the year earlier. Here, he and his Italian counterpart, Guiseppe Pisano, had noted that Germany and Italy had good colonial experiences with labour programmes in Africa, that such camps would better the humanitarian conditions for migrants, and finally that externalization would be the most effective way of combating illegal migration (Bundesministers des Innern 2005).

Several aspects are worth noting about the evolution of the idea about externalized camps from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s: Firstly, although all the proposals launched the same fundamental idea, its formulation was gradually transformed from the Danish government's humanitarian framing focusing primarily on the protection of migrants to more and more securitized framings, with the UK New Vision's goal that "the notion of asylum seekers in Britain should die" and the Schily-proposal's goal for "effective combat against illegal migration" representing the other end of the continuum. As Libya

was not a party to the Refugee Convention, the upshot of the efforts to externalize camps beyond Europe was, in fact, that migrants were not even allowed to apply for asylum in the host country of this externalization. Secondly, it is also noteworthy how the EU discussions of common-European camps gradually moved to the background as bilateral and technocratic, ad hoc cooperation became more prominent. In effect, the idea vanished from the EU-discussions right around the time when states and EU financial programmes actually succeeded in reconstructing the Libyan border control. Observing the efforts to externalize camps to Libya as they took place on the common-European, bilateral and technocratic levels therefore illustrate how political processes and various actors can intervene and influence the reconstruction of borderscapes.

The externalization to Libya of from states like Italy, Malta and Germany and the projects funded through the EU, had a massive impact on the Libyan borderscape. The biopolitics of the border control and the humanitarian conditions for migrants also changed accordingly. In 2009 Human Rights Watch assessed Libyan camp conditions as ranging from 'negligent to brutal' (Human Rights Watch 2009: 74) and according to an anonymous diplomatic source the duration of migrants' arbitrary detention in Libya varies 'from a few weeks to 20 years' (*Ibid*). A common practice has been the trafficking of migrants through the deserts. It gained systematic proportions and, according to witness accounts, involved the Libyan police, military and also smugglers in conjunction to a degree where migrants were unable to distinguish who had detained, transported or deported them. In this fashion, tens of thousands of migrants, including women and children, were circulated for days, across the vast Libyan deserts between official and smugglers' detention facilities in trucks and containers, with little or no food, and being forced to urinate and defecate while standing (Del Grande 2009; Human Rights Watch 2009: 71).

Map 1: The Libyan border system.
Sources: Amnesty 2010, Human Rights Watch 2006, 2009, JRS 2009, EU Technical Missions 2004, 2007, globaldetentionproject.org
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Map 1 illustrates how this circulatory system of forced flows seemed to function. Depending on migrants' point of entry into Libya, they were transported between numerous detention camps of which only a few is represented on the map.

The main flows have been from facilities in the North, especially in Tripoli, and to the compounds in the South, especially, a number of camps in Kufra. The camps in Tripoli and on the Northern coastline functioned as the original accumulation of migrants intercepted during the Italian-Libyan push back practice. From there, they were then sent to the deportation camps of Sebha or Kufra. From both of these migrants were either deported, or simply dumped in the desert. The authorities were well aware that the migrants would either die in these regions, or get picked up by smugglers only to enter the circulatory grid of detention, bribery, forced labour and abuse by the police, the military or smugglers all over again. Illustrating the massive scale of this system, an IOM Fact Finding Mission dispatched in the fall of 2011 established that one camp in Kufra had held up to

The witness account of Fethawi, an Eritrean migrant, shows why the geopolitical European transformation of the Libyan border control can be seen as epitomizing the

inclusive exclusion of bare life under the enforcement of sovereign power:

> We left the dead people behind. The truck driver gave us a ride and dropped us near Kufra. Soldiers stopped us. Those with money paid them bribes, but those without money, including me, were beaten. Three soldiers beat me with their weapons. They searched me for money, my mobile phone. They took one of the Somali men. They demanded money from him, and when he didn't pay, they put him on the ground and beat him with the metal crowbar from the car. I saw this. I was afraid for my life. His head was bleeding. They hit him on his ribs. We took him with us. We had to carry him because he couldn't walk. We took him to Ajdabiya and left him there. They beat me, but I can't complain because the Somali guy was so much worse off than me (Human Rights Watch 2009: 63).

Beatings with crowbars, the normalcy of bribery and the torture and murders occurring in the Libyan borderscapes, speak of a system where migrants have no rights and are at the mercy of the Libyan authorities. We can say that the sovereign power of border control and the existences of migrants manifested in the Libya border control exist, respectively, beyond and below the law.

Problems with Agambian analyses

There are, however, also some drawbacks with the Agambian biopolitical perspective. Conceptualising migrants as instances of bare life is problematic because it reifies the desire of states to reduce migrants to passive existences. It reiterates, so to speak, the wet dream of sovereign power. Even when migrants are exposed to exploitation and abuse in camps they are not only passive existences to be molded in the hands of European or African authorities. Migrants employ various strategies to maneuver within the borderscapes, such as bribing of border-guards, working irregularly, being employed by smugglers to sail migrants across seas or by staging demonstrations protesting their detention conditions. Consequently, they are agents with the capacity to act in order to better their lives (Lucht 2011, Bakewell 2008). Furthermore, the notion of bare life is unable to distinguish between the different conditions migrants experience in different countries. Put differently, a vast perspective on the dynamics of sovereign power has difficulties taking into account how geopolitics can be localized (Dahlmann and O

Thuathail 2005), and thus how the power relation between authorities and migrants plays out differently in different contexts. Conceptually speaking, their existence should therefore instead be seen as placed on a biopolitical continuum of inclusive exclusions where the degree of vulnerability depends on the degree of force applied to their mobility.

Invoking essentializing concepts such as sovereign decisionism and states of exception to account for the emergence of control structures on Libya, bypasses the webs of power and resistance, which influence borderscapes. It therefore ends up reaffirming states' claims to be able to draw a clear line between norm and exception (Bigo 2007: 4, 12). Put differently, conceptualising dynamics of exclusion as a binary relation between law and its suspension makes sovereign power an underdetermined abstractum and does not address the sub-legal processes and the actors involved in its manifestation (Lemke 2005: 8). Yet, as processes behind the European externalization of detention camp and control structures to Libya during the 2000s exemplify, borderscapes are comprised by multiple actors, technologies, and political interests and therefore undergo reconfigurations reflecting the shifting political paradigms guiding their rationalities.

Together, then, attention to the geopolitical, biopolitical and political processes in the European borderscapes help nuance our understanding of the externalization agenda's development. Moreover, it sheds light over the kind of existences that borderscapes make out of migrants. Nonetheless, while such perspectives goes some way in untangling the processes underpinning borderscapes, a further question also needs to be asked. More specifically, it is necessary to enquire into the roles played by transnational flows of capital, equipment and people in the European borderscapes and the actors facilitating them.

Flows underpinning the Externalized European Borderscapes

The EU's differentiation of circulatory flows exhibits a certain `power-geometry´ where different groups have different relationships to mobility: 'some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it' (Massey 1993: 61).

Following William Walters (2004: 678) we can see this differentiation as functioning according to a geostrategy of the networked border. While acknowledging that the EU borderscapes do not accord fully with any one geostrategy, but always has aspects of several in its rationality, the networked border nonetheless fits with Schengen´s cancellation of fixed points of control within the EU and their replacement by a transnational network of flanking measures. Schengen's networked borderscape is therefore diffuse, decentred and de-territorialized (*Ibid*: 681) and its infrastructure therefore relies on the constant circulation of financial, material and personnel flows. In the following I will consider two such flows, namely the dispersal of funds through EU programmes designed to boost third countries' control capacities and the transfers of personnel and equipment to Frontex-operations and third countries.

Examples of transnational financial flows in the European borderscapes are the recent financial EU-programmes such as Odysseus, Argo, Aeneas, Meda, Cards, ENPI, DCI and the Border, Return, Refugee and Integration-Funds of the 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme'. These programmes focus on the issues of asylum, border control and the cross-border movement in third countries experiencing large flows of European-bound migration. The emergence of these programmes illustrate the EU´s increased political focus on the external dimension of its borderscapes as does the fact that their budgets have all grown drastically. For instance, while the EU distributed €20 million to projects between 2001-2003 the Aeneas programme was allocated €250 million between 2004-6 before it was replaced by the DCI programme which, between 2007-13, is to distribute €387 million.

Above, some focus was granted to the Aeneas' 'Across Sahara'-projects in Libya and Niger, but the programme also supported other projects boosting the infrastructure of the EU's borderscapes. Thus, projects like 'Project Seahorse' and 'Seahorse Network' (2005-2008) in Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Cap Verde were supported with €4 million out of €5,1 million (*Ibid:* 12, 20). Analyzing Aeneas' support more in detail reveals the overall priorities of the programme. Although some Aeneas-projects were concerned with protecting women's rights or strengthening protective measures for asylum seekers, the main focus of the programme accorded with the containment agenda. Thus, while Aeneas supported 14 projects with €14 million in the subsectors of

legal migration and asylum and protection, this support was dwarfed by the programme's support to the subsectors of border management, irregular migration and migration management. Here, 24 projects were supported to the tune of €29 million. Out of these €14,4 million were allocated to the subsector for fighting irregular migration alone (Aeneas 2008). Moreover, the countries where most Aeneas-projects were implemented, namely Morocco (20 projects), Tunisia (10 projects), Libya (9 projects), Senegal (8 projects) and Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania (7 projects), are all located along the three main migratory-routes towards Europe; the Western African, the Mediterranean and the Eastern Mediterranean routes. The financial flows of the Aeneas Programme exhibit a particular geographic asymmetry focusing only on migrants' transit-regions rather than their regions of origin.

Aeneas illustrates how transnational financial flows are vital for the networked EU borderscapes. Yet, European countries are not only countering migration flows by funding third countries' migration management and border control. They also donate or sell military and surveillance equipment via bilateral deals and deploy ILO's to third countries.

On a bilateral level, individual Member States transfer military equipment to third countries. Helmuth Dietrich (2004) explains the case of Germany:

> The German government is also responsible for arming the North African coast. According to the German defence ministry, Tunisia will receive six Albatross speed boats from the German navy. Already two years ago, it was agreed to deliver five speed boats to Egypt. In 2002, Algeria received surveillance systems at a value of 10,5 mio €, Tunisia received communications and radar equipment for around 1 mio €, Morocco received military trucks worth 4,5 mio € (Dietrich 2004: 7).

Similarly, Italy donated 6 police patrol boats in 2009 and 2010, patrol vehicles and Unmanned Aereal Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, to Libya for monitoring the southern deserts for migrants (Corriere della Sera-website), Netherlands exported three SIGMA frigates from to Morocco in 2008, France supplied Algeria with 9 light helicopters in 2006 and the UK supplied four Super Lynx-300 helicopters to the same country between 2004-2007 (SIPRI 2009: 13, SIPRI 2010). The bilateral transfers of military hardware

complements the financial flows to third countries is the localisation of physical power to those regions experiencing the most refugees and migration.

On the common-European level, and as part of the Solidarity-programme, the External Borders Fund grants Member States millions of euros to upgrade or repair aspects of Member States' border infrastructures. In 2010, for example, the External Borders Fund granted Malta €613.280 for enhancing the border control capabilities of the Malta Police Force and €1.242.600 to upgrade its Rapid Intervention Maritime Capabilities. Similarly, €1.415.972 were granted to strengthening the material and equipment of the Spanish Civil Guard headquarters in Ceuta and Melilla and Greece was allocated €1.278.900 for the design, development and evaluation of an integrated automatic land border surveillance system (FTS Publication Preview 2011: 1, 2).

When it comes to the circulation of personnel, Council Regulation 377/2004 codified the creation of ILO-networks in third countries (Official Journal of the European Union 2004). ILO's exchange information with the authorities of these countries and make risk analyses about flows and routes of irregular migrants, their means of transports and the intermediaries facilitating such flows (Ibid: 2-3). The establishment of ILO-networks beyond European territory seems to fuse together the networked border with another geostrategy, namely that of the march placing Europe under siege (Bigo 2000: 68, Walters 2004: 686). While the figure of the march long predates the current technological practices of the networked EU borderscape, its reappearance is facilitated by the organisational possibilities offered by the decentralized network (*Ibid*). In the current European geostrategy the ILO-function is thus viewed as a first bullwark providing deflection measures against flows of migrants embarking onto Europe. The connected functionality of the different practices in the external European borderscape, like ILO's and the re-constructed borderscapes of Ceuta and Mellila illustrate how different geostrategies 'are not mutually exclusive' but complement each other in 'a shifting ensemble of heterogenous political rationalities and practices' (Walters 2004: 693). At this point, the transnational flows of funds, personnel and equipment make it relevant to examine the functionality of this decentralised border-infrastructure more in depth.

Serializing Migrant Mobility

A dominant description attached to EU border control has been that of `Fortress Europe´. However, while this understanding fits well with some instances of border control, like the fences in Ceuta and Melilla, it does not capture how borderscapes also produce mobility. Here it is useful to deploy the conceptual framework of forced migration.

Alexander Betts (2009: 5) defines forced migration as "movement that takes place under significant structural constraints that result from an existential threat". As Betts (2009: 11), however, rightly points out, understanding the causes of forced migration requires looking at global political dynamics. Here, the concept of forced migration is a particularly useful way of highlighting the fact that people often flee because of such dynamics, and for reasons which transcend the Refugee Convention's narrow interpretation of refugeehood as individually persecuted persons. Hence, besides refugees, the category of forced migration also includes migration caused by conflict-induced displacement, development-induced displacement and environmental-induced displacement (Betts 2009: 4-10). Since these kinds of displacement can jeopardize basic rights, there are thenstrong moral reasons for using the category of forced migration. On this view, then, European states may be causing forced migration through, say, fishing policies, debt-policies or military interventions, and the border control they impose is then only a response to the forced migration resulting from such policies (Betts 2009: 13-4).

For all its worth, however, there are problems with applying the concept of forced migration to the policy of externalization, for, as they stand, the categories of forced migration means that it is conceptualized as a phenomenon external to the enforcement of border control. This despite the obvious global political trends behind the engineered regionalism of migration movement enforced through EU externalization. Accordingly, the conventional categorization of forced migration bypasses the fact that the EU's decentralized border network is a socio-geographical space that enforces mobility in itself. Yet, the conventional categories of forced migration thereby do not include states' deflection and transfer of migrants between each other, as causes of forced migration. Jef Huysmans has observed that the functionality of border control within the European

states is not the cancellation of mobility, but rather the differentiated channelling of different flows:

> Modern states use more sophisticated technologies that channel people through particular procedures that determine both specific conditions of entrance for different categories of people and the modalities of their free movement once are inside the territory of the EU (Huysmans 2006: 95).

Huysmans, however, drops this point before pursuing how this channelling is realized *beyond* European territory. Yet, since the EU border system, particularly in the case of externalization and its "ripple effects" is also channeling migrants, I shall label this kind of forced migration *border-induced displacement* (Lemberg-Pedersen 2011).

When we observe the coastal regions at the Atlantic and Mediterranean Seas it becomes clear that the very same islands and territorial waters which are specialised in luxury hotels and cruise-tours for European tourists are also key infrastructural nodes in the networked European borderscape and veritable spider-webs of the interception, detention and deportation of migrants from Africa and the Middle East. Most often, migrants reaching European territory through these regions have been intercepted numerous times and have thus been moving in and out of relations of inclusive exclusion. Border control should therefore not be understood only as a response to forced migration caused by other factors like conflict-induced displacement, development-induced displacement or environment-induced displacement but also as a cause of displacement and forced migration in itself.

Conceptually speaking, the difference between original and border-induced forced migration is one between first order and second order displacement. Natural disasters, civil wars, foreign occupations or forced resettlement due to construction projects can displace people resulting in their forced migration. However, when these same people are intercepted, detained or deported in instances of border control they once again experience dis-placement, only this time induced by the inclusive exclusions of the European borderscape. Accordingly, border-induced displacement is not equivalent to the original displacement of people, which forced them to migrate, but instead functions as a second order-displacement imposed upon already-displaced

people. The displacement occuring in the EU´s border-system is therefore one where people are constantly being transferred between control-elements, entering a state of quasi-permanent displacement.

Due to the dynamics of diffusion, decentralization and restructuring in the European borderscapes, border-induced displacement is brought about by different actors and in different ways. One example is the Frontex-interceptions followed by the transportation of migrants to, say, the camps in Lampedusa whereafter the migrants are further dispersed to camps on the Italian mainland. Another example is thus the common practice of both European and African states to transfer asylum seekers between camps is one example and the Transport PLUS Service of G4S in Great Britain illustrate that both public police forces and private actors are involved in this activity. Moreover, as the case of Libya illustrate, cooperation between smugglers and police can also perpetuate border-induced displacement. According to Human Rights Watch smugglers also operate detention facilities and wear military uniforms (Human Rights Watch: 75).

Moreover, border-induced displacement also occur as a result of readmission agreements between states, for instance, Libya deported around Libya deported around 200,000 persons to other countries between 2003 and 2006 (Fortress Europe 2007: 6). Following the networked rationality of externalization, however, the migrants' displacement often does not stop there as the countries they are deported to also have readmission agreements with other countries. The network of readmission agreements therefore form channels through which migrants are successively transferred from country to country illustrating the transnational character of the border-induced displacement created by externalization. Byrne and Shacknove have coined the apt term of `chain deportations´ to describe this forced traffic of migrants (Byrne&Shacknove 1996: 189-190). For instance, after the incidents at Ceuta and Melilla, for instance, several thousand migrants were rounded up and deported to other African countries, such as Algeria and Mauritania with which Morocco had readmission agreements. These in turn deported the migrants yet again and in the end many ended up in the countries from which they had originally fled (Costello 2005: 47). Border-induced displacement is therefore a systemic feature of the European borderscapes and particularly obvious in the transnational bufferzone of externalised control.

Different from the walls of a fortress, the inclusive exclusions in the externalised European borderscapes does not preempt migration simply by halting it, but by transforming it into a different kind of mobility, namely border-induced displacement. On this view, we can view migrants as being serialized, that is, turned into sequences of forced flows which are then stored in buffer zones or transmitted across a networked, transnational border system. Accordingly, the European borderscapes can thus be seen as relying on the construction of a decentralized control system which place migrants in various inclusive exclusions designed to contain and circulate their mobility outside or on the territorial edges of Europe. The production of these sequences of forced corporeal movement then depend on other sequences, of funds, personnel, equipment and information created by security apparatuses, financial instruments, ILO's, Frontex and the SIS and EURODAC databases. Externalization thus has an inherently dromopolitical dimension, that is, it reles on politics of speed (Virillo 1977). The faster the circulation of information and equipment between the control-elements, the more rapid are instances of border control directed against the 'threats' and 'risks' of migrants.

Seeing externalised border control as relying on a series of elements rather than specific control-points, such as a specific wall, camps or patrol-boats, highlights that it does not function as a wall accumulating migrants on its outside. Rather the geopolitical interests of the EU Member States are realized through the circulation and trafficking of migrants between its many elements. These include localized geopolitical practices like Moroccan flight-deportations, European train-transports between camps, Italian-Libyan push backs or day-long containter transportations by military or smugglers in Libya. Understanding the transnational European borderscapes as a series of elements guided by the logic of sequential production of forced flows may therefore help capturing the dynamic and interrelated functionality of externalised control.

Conclusion

To conclude, as the ENP, Seville's migration-development nexus and Frontex' HERA-operations showed, externalization happens through multifacetted processes which may involve international negotiations, external governance or extra-territorialization. This

conceptualization makes it possible to understand externalization as the construction of dynamic and fluctuating borderscapes on Europe's edges and beyond. These processes are guided by abstractions of knowledge and technologies, according with the EU agenda of containing migrants in their regions of origin and transit. Since the external EU borderscapes reterritorialize the geographic spaces of third countries in order to divide mobility into free and forced flows, they have both geopolitical and biopolitical aspects. Minca's spatial interpretation of Agambian biopolitics help reveal the linkage between cartographic representations, violent geographies and the enforcement of sovereign power over migrant mobility. It provided a way to conceptualise how knowledge production paves the way and reifies the interests of EU Member States. It facilitates flanking measures designed to safeguard the free circulation within Schengen by simultaneously excluding and subsuming migrants under the power of border control.

However, there were problems with the manner in which agambian biopolitics premised itself on the notion of sovereign power both because this reify states' selfunderstanding as capable of making exceptions out of migrants and also by conceptualising them as passive instances of bare life. Yet, although many migrants in the externalised European borderscape experience exploitation and abuse, they also attempt to negotiate and resist the inclusive exclusions of border control by bribing border guards, seeking irregular work or demonstrating against their conditions showing that migrants are in possession of agency. Moreover, the development of the externalization of camps illustrated that biopolitical models need to be differentiated in order to reflect the bureaucratic and legal processes that precipitate border politics as well as the multiplicity of formal and informal, national and supranational actors intervening in the construction of Europe's borderscapes.

Exploring the transnational character of externalization, the chapter went on to identify four instances of transnational flows, crucial to the construction of externalised border-infrastructures, namely flows of funds, personnel, and equipment. These flows, it was argued, aid in the production of a power-geometry of European hypermobility and non-European submobility. It was argued that the existence of a fourth flow increasingly occuring, namely when border control is transferred from public hand to PSC's, further

problematise underdetermined notions of sovereignty since they can be seen as processes of neoliberalization.

Finally, the chapter suggested that externalised border control should not only be seen as a reaction to displacement and forced migration, but as itself causing these phenomena, which was conceptualised through the notion of border-induced displacement. It was argued that this kind of displacement is not an incidental feature, but in fact the underlying logic behind externalization. Conceptualising this logic as the sequencing of forced flows according to the containment-agenda made it possible to focus on the interrelated functionality of this decentralised border-infrastructure. At the end of the day, it was argued, this provides a lense capable of assessing the transnational and systematic production of vulnerable existences in the European borderscapes.

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FRONTIERS OF VIOLENCE

EXPERIENCES AND NARRATIVES OF AFRICAN REFUGEES CAUGHT IN THE BORDERLAND OF THE NORTHRERN SINAI

By Laurie Lijnders[i]

ABSTRACT   Refugees are confronted with constantly changing structures of power and border-regimes in different geographical and political contexts. Borders and borderlands crossed by African refugees during their journey to Israel can be seen as frontiers of violence. This paper discusses frontiers of violence from three different perspectives through the narrative fragments of two Eritrean refugees who fled to Tel Aviv. The content of the narratives presented is of a violent character. African refugees are held hostage in the borderlands of the Northern Sinai desert by human traffickers. First, this paper will discuss geographical frontiers of violence. Second, the focus will lie on bodily frontiers of violence, as the body reveals power relations and violence is experienced through the body. The experience of violence is expressed through narratives, in that light discursive frontiers of violence will be explicated. Narration can be seen as a way in which violence can become communicable, however violence also defies language and poses limits to the expressions of experiences with violence. Scars, graves and (bodily) metaphors express the experiences of frontiers of violence.

> "I would love to have died in the Sinai desert. I could not face the suffering. However, today I thank God I am alive because I can tell the story of those who suffered and passed away, for those who did not have time to tell you, for those who died in the Sinai, or for those who are still there. The people who are here now (in Israel) are a voice for the voiceless, we are spoke persons."

A young Eritrean woman in Tel Aviv, who asked anonymity, believes her voice and that of other survivors of the 'torture camps' in the Northern Sinai, speaks for those who are silenced. In speaking for herself, she also legitimately speaks for others (Das et al. 2001: 5) and so do the narrators of this

paper. The woman - let her name be Voice - entrusted me that also listeners (anthropologists amongst others) are considered spoke persons and that we - the listeners - should share the stories told. During the period from February to May 2011, I recorded a variety of narratives, related to me by African refugees[1] living in Tel Aviv, Israel. The narratives, often violent in content, focus on the multiple experiences with borders and the diverse structures of power African refugees encounter on their journey to Israel. Stories of years spent in transit, passages through cities and deserts, and various motivations and reasons for individuals to leave Eritrea in search of protection and safety in Israel. Central to this paper are the narrative fragments of two young Eritrean men[2] who, at the time of my research, had recently (varying from a period of a few days to months) crossed the Egypt-Israel border. In my attempts to understand the narratives and the experiences of violence, I am inspired by Achille Mbembe's inquiry into the meaning of the body in relation to power. Mbembe, (2003: 12) a theorist in postcolonial studies, power and violence questions: what place is given to life, death and the human body and how are they inscribed in the order of power? Whereas Mbembe asks the question in a context of war, Roberto Beneduce (2008, 516), an Italian anthropologist 'struggles' with a similar question that he localizes in the context of national borders and globalized as well as transnational expressions of migration. In this paper, the central question is: how do African refugees experience and express frontiers of violence? The title of this paper, *Frontiers of Violence*, refers to my approach of the border and borderlands from three different perspectives.

First, I attempt to understand the frontiers of violence in relation to geographical borders. A dominant focus lies on the Egypt-Israel border, which is the only intercontinental border that is crossed. However, before their arrival in Israel, Eritrean refugees cross a number of geographical (Eritrean border with either Ethiopia or Sudan; and the Sudanese border with either Libya or Egypt) and physical (defined and undefined) borders in which they encounter a number of formal and informal power structures, both national governments (police, army, border guards) and local groups (people smugglers and human traffickers), who decide on the prospect of crossing. A decision that is often taken in a matter of life and death. In the case of the two Eritrean men, but also for a great number of Eritrean refugees and other African refugees, the Northern Sinai desert is a place where the individuals are trafficked and where they are held hostage for indefinite periods of time in what are publically called 'torture camps'.

Secondly, I differentiate the bodily borders that African refugees cross. I consider bodily frontiers of violence as physical experiences with the various structures of power that control the geographical borders and borderlands. The body reveals power relations and violence is experienced through the body, as such the body is central in this paper. Additionally, alternative bodily idioms (Lammers 2004: 312), such as scars demonstrate the experience of African refugees during their passage to Israel.

Thirdly, I distinguish discursive frontiers of violence, as the experience of violence is expressed through narratives. Narration can be seen as a way in which violence can become communicable, it also defies language and limits the expressions of experiences with violence. Limits of narration are experienced not only by the narrators, but also by the anthropologist who represents these experiences in an ethnographic narrative. In the context of the 'torture camps', bodily metaphors are a way to make unspeakable suffering communicable. Narratives and personal histories can enhance the understanding of the "interplay between individual experiences and external events" (Ibid. 83) and thereby demonstrate wider social processes (Caplan 1997). Narrative analysis gives us an insight into how these young men have experienced their period of hostage by human traffickers in the Northern Sinai region and offer an empirical understanding of the experience of clandestine border crossing. These narrative fragments are the only insight into the Northern Sinai desert, as the region was inaccessible to me as a researcher. Therefore, the information discussed in this paper is acquired through dialogical relations with and observations of Eritrean refugees in Tel Aviv.

Before I will continue with the analysis of the three perspectives on frontiers of violence, I will briefly introduce the two Eritrean men, Abel and Filimon, whose narratives are central to this paper.

WHOSE VIOCES?[3]: INTRODUCING THE NARRATORS

In the hallway of the Open Clinic of Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in Jaffa[4] (Israel), patients are waiting. A mixture of Tigrinya and Arabic arise from their soft-spoken conversations. They sit on the floor, passing time impatiently, waiting for their turn. Women from Eritrea, their heads covered with colourful scarves, and men from Darfur with oversized winter jackets to keep the February cold from taking over their bodies. In the waiting room more patients sit on green and white plastic chairs, whilst in their hands they hold their medical files. A man walks around with crutches; the bullets of the Egyptian border patrol wounded his body when he tried to cross the border. The waiting room is too small for all the patients, there are more patients than the voluntary doctors can treat. The majority of the patients are African asylum seekers who remain excluded from public, social, and health services. Each month around 700 people visit the clinic. Since July 2010, more and more asylum seekers have visited the Open Clinic and the types of medical conditions require more specialist treatment and care.[5] The staff at the Open Clinic believes that a parallel can be drawn between the worsening medical conditions and the violence, which many African refugees experience at the hands of human traffickers in the Sinai desert. The refugees bear witness of repeated physical abuse and sexual assault.[6] Mostly Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees are held hostage by Bedouin smugglers and recount stories of severe violence, torture, rape and slavery. The conditions in which refugees are held are experienced as inhumane and humiliating. The smugglers extort thousands of

dollars from the refugee's families in return for their release and they can be held for weeks without water and food, sometimes months, to demand more money. The Open Clinic offers medical treatment and raises awareness about the ransom, rape, and torture in the Sinai Desert.[7] During my fieldwork, I worked as a volunteer in the Open Clinic and was part of a team who conducted interviews with new patients about their journey through the Sinai Desert into Israel.

I was first introduced to Abel and Filimon in the Open Clinic. Their narratives represent the experiences of violence inflicted by human traffickers in the Northern Sinai desert. By this, I do not want to say that the narratives presented in this paper are univocal for the diverse narratives of African refugees I interacted with in Israel. Narratives are part of a larger communicative body of stories, interactions, experiences and observations. I selected the narratives of Abel and Filimon, as these fragments represent the experiences of many others, but at the same time reflect personal experiences. The narratives presented in this paper are a combination of the interviews in the Open Clinic and more informal conversations outside the context of the Open Clinic. Where the interviews in the Open Clinic focus on the torture and the treatment of the human traffickers, in daily encounters there was more time for other subjects.

On a Wednesday evening in March, Abel (24) visits the Open Clinic in Jaffa. Abel is looking for treatment for his polio. As Abel is new to the clinic, he is interviewed about his experiences. He was held captive in the Northern Sinai for over six months with over 200 people who, on arrival in Israel, founded the Sinai group. Each month the Sinai group meets in a bar in a basement in Neve Shanaan, a street in the South of Tel Aviv where many refugees live. The people who attend the meeting mourn those who died in the Northern Sinai; remember those who are still held captive; and share their experiences of being in the hand of human traffickers. In the months that follow, I meet Abel in his home and participate in the monthly ceremonies of the Sinai group.

A few days after his arrival to Tel Aviv, in April 2011, I meet Filimon (21) in the Open Clinic. Filimon suffers from diabetes and visits the clinic for treatment and medication. I interview Filimon with Aziza Kidane, an Eritrean sister who was sent to Israel by her church congregation and works in the Open Clinic as a nurse, interpreter and interviewer. Filimon is dressed in a leather jacket that is too big, on top of his head he wears his sunglasses. Filimon believes he developed diabetes in the 'torture camp' due to the bad living conditions, torture and stress. He was deprived of food and water during his five months of captivation and claims to have first notice signs of diabetes when he secretly drank his own urine, which tasted sweet. The camps in which the African refugees are held captive are called 'torture camps'. After more and more details were narrated by African refugees in Israel this name has been given to the camps by aid organizations, journalists and the refugees

themselves. In the last three months of his captivation, Filimon was held hostage in an underground cave with twenty other Eritreans. They were blindfolded, chained in the darkness of the cave, and guarded. Filimon claims that he was kidnapped by what he calls the Rashida, a tribe living in the deserts around Kassala, a city in East Sudan, close to the Eritrean border. The smugglers told Filimon that they would take him to a refugee camp in Shegerab (Eastern Sudan), however he was taken against his will to Egypt. When I meet him Filemon seems restless. He only arrived days ago and does not have a temporary protection visa. He carries the fear of being arrested by the police for being in the country illegally. Filimon, unlike most others, did not spend time in an Israeli detention centre in the Negev desert. When Filimon crossed the border he was exhausted, caused by the diabetes and the situation in the 'torture camp' and fainted after he arrived on the Israeli side of the border. He unconsciously crossed the border and has no memories of it what so ever. He was taken to a hospital for treatment, where he woke up two weeks later. The hospital staff gave him a bus-ticket to Tel Aviv and told him to visit the Open Clinic in Jaffa.

GEOGRAPHICAL FRONTIERS OF VIOLENCE

During their journey to Israel, African refugees are confronted with constantly changing structures of power and border-regimes in different geographical and political contexts. In this section, a short outline of these structures of power and the experiences of defined and undefined geographical borders is given. Since 2005, an estimated 40,000 refugees arrived in Israel from various African countries.[8] The majority of the refugees arrive from Eritrea and Sudan. Young Eritreans claim they escape an extremely repressive state and compulsory military service in Eritrea, a country that has long been known for its grave violations of human rights; religious and political persecution, disappearances of citizens and use of torture by the government (Tronvoll 2009). Men and women from Darfur account of an ever-continuing genocide. They flee continuous persecution and mass murder of civilian populations perpetrated by the government and armed militia groups. Israel knows a smaller, but close community of men, women and children who have escaped years of governmental persecution, civil war, insecurity and a lack of social infrastructure in South Sudan. In addition, there is a small number of refugees from other African countries such as Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Somalia, and Togo where civil wars and conflict are still raging or have recently come to an end.[9]

Eritrean refugees walk for days after they cross the Eritrean border and before they either arrive at refugee camps in Sudan and Ethiopia or bigger cities such as Khartoum. Military guards on the Eritrean border have orders to shoot on sight if people attempt to flee the country (Tronvoll 2009) for they are seen as traitors. Refugee camps in Eastern Sudan (such as Shegerab and in Kassala) or in Ethiopia in Tigray Regional State (Shimelba, Maiaini and Adi-Harush) are often the first stages in the

journey to Khartoum, Europe or Israel. Often the young men and women leave the refugee camps after a few weeks, as the situation in the camps is difficult and there are no opportunities for work. The refugee camps are not entirely safe as the Eritrean military regularly crosses the border for periodic roundups in a search of 'traitors' and returning refugees. The United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around thousand Eritreans cross the border into Ethiopia each month and has titled this movement a 'silent crisis', coming at a time when the Horn of Africa is gripped by the worst drought in 60 years.[10] At the border of Ethiopia and Sudan as well as Egypt and Sudan, African asylum seekers run the risk of being arrested and deported. In September 2011, 300 Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees were deported to Eritrea after weeks of detention on charges of illegal entry to the country.[11] In Eritrea, the deported refugees face persecution, imprisonment and death.

From the refugee camps Eritreans travel for days, sometimes weeks, in the back of pickup trucks through the desert into Egypt and cross the Suez Canal either by boat or in the back of an empty truck via one of the two bridges. Abel's narrative shows that while crossing visible geographical borders the African refugees are confronted with bodily boundaries. The conditions under which the refugees are traveling contest the limits of the human body:

> "The journey from Sudan to the Sinai was a dangerous one. We were going by car for six days. We started with 105 people all together. Seventeen persons were put in a Toyota, we were going very fast. There were ten cars. It looked like a film, the wind, and the mountains. To see all this is good, but the journey is very tiring. We drove all the way to Cairo. From Cairo we traveled in a tank to the Suez canal. From there all these 105 people were put in a tank. All the girls fall down, most of the boys fainted. It is very dangerous but no one lost his or her life. We had to travel like this to cross the Suez canal. We started at eight in the evening and we finished at six in the morning. We had no food at all, we could not go out and there were no windows. I really thought that all of us would die, but everyone survived. When we passed the canal we were taken out of the tank, another Toyota came, by ten persons we were taken to the Sinai."

From 2007, the number of African refugees crossing into Israel has increased every year and at times over a thousand refugees cross the border each month. Recent events in both Egypt and Libya created new incentives to seek safety and security in Israel. The political vacuum in the countries hinders the passage for African asylum seekers. The Arab spring created a political void that is demonstrated by lawlessness and impunity, mainly in the northern part of the Sinai desert, were police presence is limited after repeated attempts to remove the police from the area.

The journey of African refugees from Sudan, Eritrea and West Africa merges in the Northern Sinai, a region that is bordered on the west by the Suez Canal and on the east by Israel and the Gaza Strip. A sizable network of smugglers, which ranges from Eritrea, across Sudan and Egypt to Israel, has been smuggling sub-Saharan refugees via Egypt to Israel. The smugglers are members of local tribes such as the Rashida and Bedouins. The smugglers live in the borderlands of the Northern Sinai and exploit the 'unique locational ambiguity' by building their lives and livelihoods around the resources that borders offer (Donnan & Wilson 1999: 87). The Egypt-Israel border route was previously mainly used for the smuggling of arms, prostitutes, drugs, cars and stolen goods. However in 2005, the Bedouin smugglers discovered another lucrative business: the smuggling of people, mostly African asylum seekers who hoped to be granted asylum in Israel. Additionally to people smugglers who illegally direct people across the border for money, there are human traffickers who hold the African refugees as hostages and abuse them for ransom. The refugees are caught in the borderlands of the Sinai desert in torture camps. 2005 marked the beginning of asylum seekers and refugees from Africa crossing the Egypt-Israel border. Reasons for the crossing to Israel cannot only be found in the tighter control of the borders of the European Union but also in the decline of living conditions for African refugees in Libya and Egypt. An agreement between the Libyan and Italian government cut off popular sea routes to Europe and helped direct the flow towards Israel. Additionally, refugees face imprisonment in Libya; abuse on racial grounds and possible forced return. Most, if not all, asylum seekers arrive in Israel via Egypt, a country in which many African refugees lived for years before crossing to Israel. Security problems, (violent) racism, and harsh living conditions in Egypt, led them to risk the illegal Sinai border-crossing.

When released from the torture camps, African refugees cross the border between Egypt and Israel. The 240-kilometer, largely unfenced border with Israel is the only border that African refugees can cross by foot. The crossing is not without risks. In 2010, Egyptian border guards killed more than 30 African refugees.[12] Since 2007, there are 85 known cases of refugees who were shot at the border, although human rights organizations believe that in reality there are more.[13] Most people crossing the border know that they risk death or imprisonment for themselves and their families. Although the actual number is unknown, it is believed that twenty percent of those who attempt to cross the border are arrested and taken to Egyptian police stations and prisons.[14]

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) regularly deports refugees back to Egypt, a practice known as "Hot Return".[15] The newly arrived refugees are directly expelled to Egypt without access to asylum seeking procedures. Egypt itself regularly deports refugees back to the countries from which they have escaped, despite the clear danger to their lives. Refugees that remain in Egypt suffer discriminatory

treatment and harsh prison conditions.[16] Refugees that successfully cross the border are held in Israeli detention facilities for protracted periods of time.[17] The refugees hope to find safety, protection and dignity in Israel; instead they are met with hostility, xenophobia, harsh migration policies and yet another struggle for life. Over the years, the language the government uses has become more aggressive and the policy implemented focuses on deterrence. Last year, Israel began erecting a fence along the frontier to prevent illegal African immigration and to preserve the 'democratic and Jewish character of the state'.[18] A 'detention facility' is built to hold 10,000 Africans who have crossed over illegally through the porous southern border.[19] The Israeli governmental policy creates a state of fear, uncertainty and temporality among the refugees.

BODILY FRONTIERS OF VIOLENCE

Didier Fassin (2005: 597), a French anthropologist who has written extensively on migration, believes that the body is "the ultimate place on which the mark of power is imprinted". The body demonstrates the evidence of power. Violence, anthropologists Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (2004: 1) write, can never be understood in terms of its physicality – force, assault, or infliction of pain – alone. Violence includes assaults on the victim's personhood, dignity, and sense of worth. The person under attack is placed in a disordered world of ambiguity and incongruency (Nordstrom and Robben 1995: 18). The resulting existential shock of torture is experienced as the deconstruction, destruction, transformation, traumatisation and ultimately, the assassination of identity and self (Ibid. 18).

> "I was so much tired, but nothing is impossible, I tolerated everything. I had a dried throat because there was not enough water. I became hopeless. When they came to beat me I simply accepted it. We could not talk to each other, if we do so they will kill us. We were abnormal; the only choice was to undergo everything. We were asking ourselves in the morning 'where are we going today?' For five months I wore the same clothes without washing them. No one allowed us to wash our bodies. We had lice on our bodies, we could fill a car with all of them. The smugglers are not interested in our lives, they are only interested in money. We were kept on the verge of dying. I did not feel as if my body was mine, I felt as if it belonged to the smugglers. It is against a human being. We were blindfolded for three months. We lived in a constant fear. I was afraid they would stab me with a knife. You don't know when they approach you."

Filimon narrates how he experienced, but mostly endured the everyday violence in the Sinai. The emphasis on the body in Filimon's narratives interests me. He no longer felt as if his body was his own dominion. The everydayness of violence was not restricted to physical pain, but extended to the

embarrassment of not being able to wash your body, to be forced to secretly drink your own urine and the constant feeling of hunger and thirst. He was not allowed to go to the toilet, instead he had to leave his needs on the spot or in a plastic bag that is passed around. The unbearable smell of human bodies packed in a small room, the sweat of fear, not being allowed to take a shower. As one person explains: "We were not allowed to change clothes or wash our bodies. Sometimes they let us wash our clothes and we dried them in the sand before wearing them again". Another person describes this lack of hygiene by referring to his body: "I felt as if I had another skin". People testify how they used parts of clothes as bandages to treat the wounds of the tortured. The hostages are given blankets that smell of the previous users, often with lice. Filimon expected to find death in the torture camps. At a certain point he stopped resisting the beatings and gave in to the situation. The state of uncertainty and fear in which the hostages were forced to live made them 'abnormal' in Filemon's eyes. The use of the term abnormal refers to the (de)construction of the Self. He and the other people in his group were kept on the verge of dying to speed up the process of payment. As Filimon analyses himself, the smugglers were not interested in their lives, only in the money they were extracting from them. Their bodies were only of significance if they could 'reproduce' money.

Bodily frontiers of violence are created by human traffickers in the Sinai borderlands. Although the bodily frontiers are not tangible like the geographical borders, it does create a great obstacle for all the African refugees who are held hostage in the Northern Sinai. In the hands of human traffickers they are confronted with their own body and the limits to experiences of violence. Bodily experiences of structures of power control the border and therefore, "perform" power over the body. Violence constitutes an assault on the self because the self is (at least in part) bodily experienced. Gay Becker, in the context of war in Cambodia (2000: 321, 322), explains how the memories of survivors - that were either beaten, tortured, forced into slave labor, or were witness to the death or harm of loved ones - are lived, first and foremost, through the body. Expression of violence violate bodily knowledge, and in doing so, render the world unknowable.

Lisa Malkki (1997:232) argues that bodily wounds are accepted as objective evidence of suffering and are regarded as more reliable than words. The use of narratives raises the question of authenticity and credibility. Ellen Lammers (2006:105), inspired by African epistemological traditions, asks not 'is what you tell me true?' but 'why do you tell me this?'. I agree with Lammers that we should not judge or distinguish true from false, but that we should comprehend people's experiences (Ibid. 96).

> "For the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to "have certainty," while for the other person it is so elusive that "hearing about pain" may exist as the primary model of

what it is "to have doubt". Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and and that which cannot be confirmed. Something." (Scarry 1985: 4)

Becker shows that notions of self and world are thrown into disarray as violence permeates the known and familiar with uncertainty and fear. However, alternative idioms help the people who experienced violence in expressing their past. The perception and the memories of the torture camps in the Sinai desert become, amongst others, tangible and expressible in scars, bodily metaphors (a form of narration) and graves. In the next part I will outline how scars can be seen as an alternative idiom.

SCARS: EMBODIED EXPRESSIONS OF VIOLENCE

The young asylum seeker from Eritrea shows the scars left by the chains, with which his ankles were chained to the other refugees.. The young man was held hostage for nine months in a small house in a compound close to the Egypt-Israel border. In the Open Clinic, refugees repeatedly show their scars, the places where bullets entered their body, where cigarettes were burned on their arms, or fingers that never entirely healed after repeated beatings. The violence inflicted by human traffickers is inscribed on bodies (cf. Daniel 1994, Csordas 1994, Six-hohenbalken and Weiss 2011: 159) and becomes visible through wounds and scars (Das 2001: 8). The scars - the remains of a vicious past - are an embodied memory of the violence they endured. Anthropologist Ellen Lammers (2004: 312), in her study on refugees in Kampala, explains that scars are indicative of the narratives of these people, and that they can replace the words people endeavor to find when speaking about their experiences. Lammers notes that "bodily inscriptions of violence" provides an "alternative idiom", which serves to assert and present oneself as the persons they have become (Ibid. 312). A young woman visits the clinic with her husband. While she is narrating about her experiences in the Sinai desert, she stops talking and opens her blouse to show us the scars of the bullets that were fired at her while she crossed the border. Her chest is covered with scars caused by the grazing of bullets, although none penetrated her body.

DISCURSIVE FRONTIERS OF VIOLENCE

Becker (2000: 322), who has written extensively on narration and the suffering body, holds the opinion that bodily experience is given voice through narrative. Narrative is a means through which embodied distress is expressed and experiences with violence and death are put into words. Through narrative people enact, or perform, their experience, and these performances constitute action (J. Bruner 1986; Laderman and Roseman 1996; Stoller 1997 in Becker 2000). The enactment, or performance, of embodied memories through narrative keeps the past alive and enables the narrator to attempt to create a bridge to the present. However, sometimes the pain is too much to narrate and

therefore people talk about what happened to others. During the interviews in the Open Clinic, I noticed that the people talk about the atrocities in the Sinai as if it happened to another person, as if their "pain resides in another body" (Wittgenstein in Das 2001). Sometimes people had no words beyond the terrible facts - "I was hanged like Jesus Christ." "A boy died after the Bedouins took out his eyes." "We had to bury the body of one of us after he was shot dead because he could not pay the ransom" - to put into words how the violent experiences had affected them (Lammers 2004: 96). Anthropologist Ellen Lammers (2004: 96) explains that although loss, pain and suffering are among the universal features of the human condition, violent experiences can be difficult to communicate. Therefore, I deal with a paradox, for I attempt to turn violent experiences into text, something that is not easily expressed either through verbal everyday language or academic discourse. The limits of language in researching or writing about violence have been stressed by several scholars (Appadurai 1996, Das 2007, Six-hohenbalken and Weiss 2011). Language appears insufficient to describe the horrors of violence (Bindford 2004 in Six-hohenbalken and Weiss 2011: 1). Elaine Scarry (1985: 5), in her book *The body in Pain,* writes that "pain defies language".

"The Rashida attacked me and tied me. I was with the smugglers for six months and three weeks. During the day we were exposed to the sun. I have polio but the smugglers did not care about that, they beat me as badly as the others. I was forced to work. We were building a palace for Abdellah (the human trafficker) There was no food, water and medical treatment. We stayed in the compound. I was locked and guarded. I was beaten with electricity, fire. They used cigarettes to torture me. I have seen everything. I have seen dead bodies with my own eyes. We were 270 in two camps together. Abdellah hit you, burn you, he put electric. He beat me for two weeks. My legs did not go anymore, I was so tired. He calls you and make you sit and does whatever he likes. He puts a cigarette on your body, he takes out your nail. These smugglers, they were all on drugs, they were smoking Hasjis all day. One day he said after he took the drugs 'please don't show me these guys, I will kill them all. 'I never expected the Rashida would do like this, this is new for me."

Whilst before Abel told me he was well aware of the atrocities in the Sinai desert – "The Sinai is a very dangerous place. This desert has a bad history. In Eritrea everyone knows about this. Even the child knows about this, if he sees the Sinai he knows is the darkest area on earth, everyone knows this. And now I have seen it myself." – he continues to say he never expected the Rashida would act like this. The violations he experienced – the reality - were worse than what he expected people were capable of and what he could imagine would happen to him. The violence continuum in the Northern Sinai refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into "expendable non-persons" and assume "the license to kill, maim or soul-murder" (Scheper-

Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 19). Smugglers torture refugees by burning them with hot irons, using electric shocks, by beating them with metal whips or electric cables on the back, feet, head or naked body. We should not forget that violence is not outside the realm of human society (Nordstrom and Robben 1995: 3) but can make the society in which we live, unknown.

"It was too terrible, when I remember these moments I feel bad. We were treated inhuman, we faced hunger and troubled moments. I cannot say nothing, I am so happy of my arrival in Israel. They were torturing us, beating us, using electronic instruments. We were treated very inhumane. We really suffered a great thing. They were demanding huge money. This is the way they do that. During the morning time and the evening time they can beat us what they want, they simply ask the money. When I paid 16000 dollar they did nothing, their demand was money. My family borrowed money from different corners of the world, from relatives around the world. This money has to be paid back and that stresses me. The smugglers started from five at the dawn, in the morning with calling 'pay the money, talk to them, tell your families we will kill you if you don't pay.' My family was crying, the smugglers told them and me I am going to die. At first I paid 3700 dollar. My brother sold his car and paid the money. I cried when one person of the group died. Death is nothing it is my expectation. I morally prepared myself to see this. I was saying to myself 'when shall I die?' When they were beating us, I expected only dead. Before I left Eritrea I did not know anything about the journey. I never expected to have this experience of torture. This is the first time in my life, no one has beaten me since I was born."

The experience of Filimon provides an insight into the experience of being held hostage. Filimon was held hostage in the Northern Sinai for over five months. He was held in a cave, blindfolded with twenty other Eritreans. He was tortured on a daily basis for weeks to extract money from his family members. Methods of torture are, what anthropologist Antonius Robben (2007) calls, "pitiful manifestations of the depths of humanity". Blindfolded, Filimon became isolated in a "social space enclosed by the blindfold" (Ibid. 217). Filimon expresses the fear and the uncertainty, the unexpectedness and surprise of the beatings. Although he was in the room with twenty others, he could not see or hear them, as attempts to make conversations would be punished with more violence. The human traffickers are perceived by the victims as being incapable to cherish life. "Their only God is money" was often expressed. Hannah Arendt (1973: 300) believes that "the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human is the greatest danger". As Talal Asad (in Das and Kleinman. 1997: 258) argues: "the modern history of torture is not only a record of the progressive prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading practices. It is also part of a more complex story of the modern secular concept of what is means to be truly human".

BODILY METAPHORS: 'MY BODY IS A GRAVE'

Although most people are released from the 'torture camps, the Sinai desert is frequently referred to as a 'burial ground for Eritreans'[20], a 'desert hell'[21], a 'human prison for African refugees'[22] and a 'place of death'[23], by the narrators of this paper, journalists, activists and the Eritrean diaspora. These metaphors are used to understand the narratives that arise from the Northern Sinai region. The use of metaphors is an attempt for individuals to make sense of the world (Fernandez 1986) and is used to "define the undefined and nascent experience of a person or group" (Low 1994: 143). Setha M. Low, a medical anthropologist, argues that metaphors allow one to "move from the abstract and inchoate of lived experience to the concrete and easily graspable". Senseless and unspeakable suffering becomes communicable with the use of metaphors, as they are "creative and infinitely generative in their allusions and meanings" (ibid. 143). Not only do people compare the Northern Sinai region with a 'burial place' or a 'place of death', they also metaphorically and symbolically consider their bodies as graves and their experiences in, and release from the 'desert hell' as "stepping out of a grave". Abel, who was held hostage for nearly seven months, feels he was given another life after his release. After narrating his experiences in the hands of the traffickers he metaphorically states: "I stepped out of a grave". Domoz, an Eritrean youngster, uses a bodily metaphor to explain his individual process of remembering and perhaps even more so a process of forgetting. He conceals his past in his body which he compares with a grave: "My body is a grave, I buried my memories somewhere deep down and I know that if I am going to open the door again, it will take me at least six months to close it again". Domoz remembers and forgets through his body, he would rather not speak about his experiences, not only because he cannot find the words to express his past, but also because he is afraid that the past will come to haunt him if he revives his memories. Graves, can however serve as an alternative idiom in itself. The bodies of African refugees, who lost their lives during their flight to Israel, are buried at a cemetery in Hatzor (Israel). The graves only display a number and occasionally a date, some graves are marked 'Anonymous Sudanese' and one grave reads 'Anonymous Infiltrator'. The humans - reduced to a number - died an anonymous death. Bullets from the guns of Egyptian border guards ended their often young lives. The graves symbolize the anonymous, silent witnesses of the 'shoot-to-kill' policy at the Egypt-Israel border. Although the bodies are silenced, the graves speak.

REFLECTION

In this paper I have attempted to show how geographical frontiers of violence influence the bodily frontiers of violence. The experiences of violence in the borderlands of the Northern Sinai desert are first and foremost experienced through the body. As there are limits to the expression of the

experience of violence and the bodily responses to violence, the body can be placed in a paradigmatic position complementary to narratives and therefore the body and textuality can be seen as corresponding methodological fields (Csordas 1994:12). However, pain and experiences of violence put limits to language and narration. Alternatively, scars, bodily metaphors and graves express experiences of violence and complement the discursive frontiers of violence. Experiences of violence thus go beyond the body and language, but can be found in alternative idioms.

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NOTES

[1] In this paper I will refer to African refugees as the African refugees in Israel consider themselves to be refugees and call themselves refugees. However, the Israeli government perceives them as infiltrators. The African Refugees Development Center recently published numbers of status granted to people who asked for asylum. Since 2009 only six people were granted a refugee status. Asylum seekers and refugees receive a temporary protection visa (2A5) conditional release visas, which have to be renewed every three months. This visa does not give any rights other than the legal stay in the country. The government confronts them continuously with the temporality of their stay. The temporary protection visa is only issued to people who can proof that they come from one of the following countries: Sudan, Eritrea, Ivory Coast or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Israeli government can not deport them due to the situation in their home countries but does not recognize them as refugees. The holder of this visa lives under a threat that the protection will be revoked. The asylum seekers are given this temporary protection as a group, an individual claim is not reviewed. Only a few thousand Sudanese and Eritreans have residence permits or six-months working visas. These visa's were granted to these specific groups respectively Darfurians and Eritreans in 2007 and 2008 after lobby by groups who work for the rights of African refugees in Israel. African refugees from other countries will first of all spend longer periods in the detention centers after arrival in Israel and will file an individual asylum claim in the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process. This process will involve them in an indefinite legal limbo of which the result is often return to detention or deportation.

[2] On their request, the young men will be unrecognizable by name and I use fictitious names.

[3] The subtitle is borrowed from Fiona C. Ross' 'Speech and Silence: Woman's Testimony in the First Five Weeks of Public Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission' in Remaking of a World: Violence, Social Suffering, and Recovery. Das et al. 2001. California: University of California Press. 250 – 279.

[4] Jaffa is a city incorporated in Tel Aviv.

[5] Interview with Shahar Shoham, head of the migrants & refugees department, Physicians for Human Rights Israel, 4 May 2011.

[6] Open Clinic Reporting to UNHCR, Project Period: July 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010

[7] Interview with Shahar Shoham, head of the migrants & refugees department, Physicians for Human Rights Israel, 4 May 2011.

[8] Interview with Amy Stringer, Programme Manager, African Refugees Development Centre, 8 February 2011.

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Border Knowledge, Rumours, and the Deterritorialised European Border Regime[1]

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As a representative of a Swiss relieve organisation I used to supervise interviews with asylum seekers during the regular asylum procedure at the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) in Switzerland. Officials of the FOM interrogate asylum seekers on their flight motives and travel routes towards Switzerland to decide their cases individually. Once, a young man in his early twenties from Nigeria was interviewed on his travel route from his hometown in Southern Nigeria over Tunisia and Italy until Switzerland. After a long journey, he finally stranded in Vallorbe. That small border village in the Jura Mountains close to the French border hosts one of the four reception and procedure centres (EVZ: Empfangs- und Verfahrenszentrum in German) in Switzerland run by the FOM.[2] At these centres asylum seekers may file their asylum application.[3]

> During the interview, the official asked him: *"How did you find the way to Vallorbe in order to apply for Asylum?"*
>
> The asylum seeker replied: *"I spent some time in Milan. Four, five weeks, I can't remember. Another Nigerian gave me shelter. He had residence right in Italy. But his advice was not to apply for asylum in Italy. 'You know my friend, life is much better in Switzerland', he told me. 'Here in Milan it is very hard for people like us…' I then found a man who took me to Switzerland by car. He dropped me at a railway station. From there, I travelled to Vallorbe."*
>
> The official insisted: *"Ok. But how did you know to apply for asylum in Vallorbe, and not in another town in Switzerland?"*
>
> The young man laughed out loud and replied: *"Well man, I tell you something: In Africa everybody knows where Vallorbe is. You have to know, I met a guy in Zarzes.[4] He knows Switzerland very well as he already asked for asylum a few years ago. His request was rejected and he was sent back to Tunisia. I followed his*

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[1] The reflections presented in this paper derive from my PhD project which is part of a broader project that analyses the emerging European border regime under the direction of Prof. Dr. Julia Eckert (Insitute of Social Anthropology, University of Bern, Switzerland). The overarching project intituled "How Does Border 'Occur'? The Deterritorialised European Border Regime and Migrants' Transnational Social Spaces", comprises three different PhD researches.

[2] The four centres are located in Vallorbe, Chiasso, Basel, and at the Zurich Airport.

[3] According to the law (cf. Asylum Act Art. xxx) an asylum application may be submitted to a Swiss embassy abroad, to a frontier post or to a custom post of a Swiss airport. Notwithstanding most of the asylum seekers in Switzerland cross the border illegally and apply for asylum at a police station within the country. They are then transferred to one of the reception and procedure centres. Only a small minority addresses themself to one of the centres.

[4] The region around Zarzes (a town in southern Tunisia near Djerba) is one of the major departing points for irregular migrants to reach the Italian coast (especially Lampedusa) in small so-called "bateaux de fortune" (cf. Daly 2001; Mabrouk 2010).

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> *advice: He told me to go to the centre in Vallorbe and ask for asylum. You may ask*
>
> *whoever you want, everybody knows Vallorbe!"[5]*

This short anecdote highlights three aspects I will focus on in this paper: First, in his surprisingly frank answer the young man comments on border knowledge and rumours circulating in migrants' transnational social spaces. Border knowledge and rumours contribute to the formation of a transnational migratory space. It is not only the movement of people that structure a transnational social space. With reference to my subject matter, I will subsequently focus on border knowledge and rumour: The border knowledge migrants acquire before and during their journey affect their decisions on the destinations, the routes they take, the means they use, and the informants they refer to. This leads me to the following question: *How can we conceptualise the contributions of border knowledge and rumour to the formation of a transnational migratory space?*

Second, the information our young asylum seeker rely on, consists of fragments of border knowledge and vague hearsays. They are a kind of "improvised news in the absence of more formal and verifiable news" (Harney 2006, S.376). Despite their blurred nature, they are as "faits sociaux" (Durkheim 2010 [1895]) very powerful in the construction of social realities. But not all pieces of border knowledge and not all rumours circulating in migrants' communities have the same impact on individual migrants' decisions. In this context, the following question arises: *How can we formulate a typology of border knowledge and rumour?*

And third, the interview demonstrates, how the state attempts to seize clandestine migrants' border knowledge.[6] Turned into hegemonic power knowledge it serves to readjust state (and interstate) agents' border control practices. This "knowledge management" is a key feature of the new emerging border control practices in the European border regime. My third question, associated with this latter aspect, is: *Which actors dispose the means (and to what extent) to control the distribution of border knowledge?*

In the ethnographic research for my PhD thesis I examine border knowledge and rumours in the migratory space between Tunisia and Switzerland with a particular focus on undocumented migrants (Tunisian migrants and transit migrants whose travel routes led them through Tunisia). I study how social relations between actors and the circulation of border knowledge and rumours are related.

Through the following three theses I address the field of research: (i) Displaced border control practices lead to a *fragmentation* of migrants' interactions. Border control practices of the different state and interstate actors intercept migrants' relations and force migrants to a permanent

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[5] Cf. personal field notes 10/25/2010

[6] In this context it is important to know, that – according to law (cf. Asylum Act Art. 7, 8) and legal practices – details on the escape routes are irrelevant for the evaluation of an asylum application (cf. SFH 2009).

readjustment of their relations. (ii) The reorganisation of borders signifies a *differentiation* of the interactions between migrants on the one hand, and state and interstate agents on the other hand. Differentiated border control practices follow very specific practices with respect to different categories of migrants (e.g. non-EU migrants, women, and unaccompanied underage migrants). (iii) To face the volatile and relocated border control practices, *border knowledge and rumour* are means to respond quickly to changing circumstances and contribute to the rearrangement of improvised social practices.

In the here-present paper I focus more on the theoretical discussion as I am at the very beginning of my PhD project and have not collected many data yet: I will conduct the main fieldwork (overall approx. one year) in 1012-13 in Tunisia, Italy, and Switzerland.

To respond to the three initial theses, I sketch out a theoretical framework, consisting of three at first sight disparate facets: the concept of the European border regime, the idea of a transnational social space, and the concept of border knowledge and rumour. I subsequently discuss my field of research through the lens of this theoretical framework. The question is, to what issues this approach may contribute to clarify the discussion on current border control practices in the EU-African borderland.

1. The European Border Regime

Through the on-going Schengen/ Dublin process since 1985, border control practices are subject to fundamental changes (Des Places & Oger 2004; Birsl 2005; Zaiotti 2011). In critical debates, this Europeanization of border control practices is often subsumed under the heading "fortress Europe".[7] I argue that this metaphor is – at least partially – misleading. We do not observe a complete sealing-off of Europe's external borders, as the term "fortress" suggests. Instead, I propose to analyse the process of the Europeanization of border control practices with the notion of the border regime. "Border" is in this view a filter rather than a fence. This perspective enables to understand not only processes of exclusion and the sealing-off of the border through repressive border control practices, but also its permeability. It allows us broadening the focus from only repressive and exclusionary practices to a wider field of border control practice, both repressive and permissive. The question then is how repressive and permissive practices are interdependent.

When I base my reflections on the concept of the European border regime, the term "regime" is of crucial significance. However, it is an ambiguous notion, that requires some preliminary notes for clarification: According to Sciortino, the notion of a regime can be defined as "a mix of implicit

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[7] For a detailed and critical discussion, cf. Euskirchen et al. (2007), as well as Tsianos and Karakayalı (2010). There are without doubts many border control practices of the EU that fit seamlessly the picture of the "fortress Europe": For exemple the metres high fences around Ceuta and Melilla speak for themselves. But rather than to reason if the EU border regime produces a "fortress Europe" or not, we should ask how practices of sealing-off of EU's external borders are interdependent to permissive practices which ensure the "porosity" (Papadopoulos u. a. 2008) of the border.

conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies and waves after waves of 'quick fix' to emergencies, triggered by changing political constellations of actors" (2004: 32). It differs from the classical definition as commonly used in the political sciences and emphasises the dynamic aspect of border. I understand the European border regime as a conflictual field of interests and "negotiations" on inclusion and exclusion between different actors (cf. Papadopoulos u. a. 2008, S.164; Hess & Tsianos 2010, S.248ff), and border as the always provisional result of "negotiations" through practice.[8] Therewith it resembles what Lévi-Strauss described as "bricolage" (1990), as it does not follow a prescribed central logic or a "master plan". A regime is therefore always in the making, a never-ending provisional arrangement: I understand border practices as improvised reactions to a given situation. A striking example of such a "quick fix" to emergencies is the RABIT-operation (Rapid Border Intervention Team) at the Turkish-Greek border in 2010 as an "emergency reaction" to the increasing numbers of illegal border crossing in the Evros region (cf. Carrera & Guild 2010).[9]

The paradigmatic shift from the analysis of repressive and exclusive border control practices to the organisation or management of mobility is often theorised within a Foucauldian framework. For example, Mau et al. observe a shift from "Personengrenze zu Grenzpersonen" (2008): The subject of control is no longer the geopolitical (and geographical exactly locatable), but the person. This resembles much what Foucault analysed as "biopolitics" or "biopower" (cf. Foucault 1976; Foucault 2004), as several studies in recent years pointed out (cf. Meyer & Purtschert 2008; Geiger & Pécoud 2010).

Analysing contemporary border control practices in the EU with the concept of the European border regime has further implications. Actors in the regime perspective I just sketched out denote not only state agents, but include also migrants. This avoids a misleading dichotomy between state and interstate actors as active subjects and constructors of social realities on the one hand and migrants as passive objects on the other hand.[10] Nevertheless, it does not imply to veil the asymmetrical power structure between state, and interstate actors and migrants. The fact that all actors involved

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[8] The term "negotiation" in this context is not unproblematic, as it implies an equal relation between the different parties involved. That is definitely not the case, as there is a fundamental inequality between migrants on the one hand, and state and interstate agents on the other in terms of access to power.

[9] RABIT is the acronym for "rapid border intervention team". It is set up by the Frontex agency. The first RABIT deployment took place at the Turkish-Greek border in November 2010 and lasted until March 2011.

[10] Moulier Boutang and other critics of this approach, oppose this false dichotomy with the expression "autonomy of migration" (Moulier Boutang 2007; Bojadžijev & Karakayalı 2007). While I agree with Moulier Boutang, that we should conceive migrants as subjects and active constructers of their respective social realities and structures, the term "autonomy of migration" tends to overestimate migrants as free subjects with a completely free will and neglects the constraints and power relations in which migration is always embedded. An alternative approach describes migration "als eigensinnige Praxis" (Benz & Schwenken 2005). This latter approach is problematic as well, as migration is not necessarily "eigensinnig" and fits often only too well the hegemonic logic of capital (cf. De Genova 2010).

in the emerging border regime are – in a certain way – constructors of their own social reality does in no way mean that they all dispose equal means and power to pursue their respective goals.[11]

Pursuing the initial theses, I would like to take a closer look at the Euorpeanization of border control practices. They take three different shapes, that can be characterised as a flexibilisation of the border: (i) Border control practices are *externalised*, and "border" takes place well before the territorial state border. For example intergovernmental agencies take over the task of national border guards and accomplish border controls on high sea (Klepp 2010). Their aim is to prevent migrants from entering the EU territory before they reach the proper territorial border. This practice is demonstrated by the Frontex operation "Hermes" in the central Mediterranean or the "Poseidon" operation in the Aegean Sea. Bilateral agreements compel migration sending countries to control the emigration of their population or transit migration (cf. Carrera & Hernández i Sagrera 2009; Paoletti 2011), while readmission agreements require that these countries to take back their rejected asylum seekers (Cassarino 2010). These border control practices push the border forward, and lead to the integration of alleged third countries into the European border regime. Another example is the IOM's education campaign to prevent potential migrants from the dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean in cynically so-called "bateaux de fortune". This shows that the externalisation of border is not limited to repressive control practices (cf. Pécoud 2010). Externalisation practices also include the attempt to control or influence migrants' knowledge to "manage" migration flows.

(ii) Similarly, one can observe the establishment of border control practices within the state or an "*internalisation*" of the border. These control mechanisms within the state may be surveillance or confinement. Surveillance strategies create a certain visibility of undocumented migrants by various means (Engbersen & Broeders 2009): In Switzerland for example, there exist separate camps for rejected asylum seekers, who have no longer any residence right and are obliged to leave Switzerland. Their stay on state's territory is "illegal" by law. Nonetheless they are accommodated in these centres, and are registered by the police. They remain in an odd status of "regulated illegality".

While surveillance strategies adhere to the principle of soft governance, confinement strategies are straightforward repressive methods. Detention camps for rejected asylum seekers (for example at airports) are "extraterritorial" places or border zones, and can be considered as heterotopias of mobility (Bernardot 2008; Kobelinsky & Makaremi 2009). These camps integrate undocumented migrants as fugitive subjects into a limited social and temporal order (Papadopoulos u. a. 2008). Such "places out of social space" are manifestations of border practices within the state (Diken & Laustsen 2005).

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[11] For the further development of this argument, cf. "Transnational Social Spaces" and the distinction of the different types of actors' cross-border actions.

(iii) Finally, the "traditional" border itself is subject to change. The *permeability* of the border is the counterpart to the externalisation and the internalisation of the border. "Doing border" does not only mean to confine mobility through border control practices, but in a broader sense the organisation of mobility. Permeability – as well as confinement – are both important elements of an adequate theoretical approach to the EU borders (Walters 2006). The permeability of the border is mainly organised by legal norms. This issue has been subject to the recent discussion to what extent the rights of foreigners with permanent residence permits can be considered in the theoretical framework of differentiated citizenship rights (e.g. Soysal 1994; Hindess 2000; Wicker 2004; Benhabib 2004).

These three moments of the EU border regime are complementary. The analysis of their interdependencies contributes to the understanding of the at the same time repressive and permissive character of border control practices.

2. Transnational Social Spaces

But as an anthropologist, I am first and foremost interested in the question, how this emerging European border regime modifies social relations. A useful concept for this analysis is the notion of the transnational social space. Unfortunately, in recent years this term has become overused and undertheorised at the same time and it remains often unclear what the term really describes.

Guarnizo and Smith (1998) distinguish between "transnationalism from above", and "transnationalism from below": The former expression refers to cross-border initiatives of state and interstate agents, while the latter refers to those of migrants and grassroots entrepreneurs (cf. also Portes 2001). As a working concept, this broad distinction marks a useful starting point. Portes refines that typology and differentiates four types of actions, conducted across national borders: "those conducted by national states; those conducted by formal institutions that are based in a single country; those conducted by formal institutions that exist and operate in multiple countries; those conducted by non-institutional actors from civil society" (Portes 2001, S.185). Following Portes' typology, I analyse in my research project cross-border actions of the first, and the fourth type. In Portes' terminology, only cross-border actions of non-institutional actors – e.g. migrants – are "transnational", while he labels cross-border actions conducted by the nation state as "international". This is an important distinction: Cross-border actions of nation-states differ fundamentally of those carried out by migrants. As a working hypothesis, a broad typology can be described as follows: State and interstate actors dispose abundant financial resources and a well-established and stable network of relations between them. Migrants on the contrary rely on non-institutionalised and unstable informal relations. But despite their very different nature, these two

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types of cross-border actions are not independent. They are related to each other. Knowledge and rumour – as we will see later – play an important role in interlinking these two spheres.

A transnational approach to migration has to avoid the trap of essentialism: A transnational social space, as I understand it, is not a given and concrete entity "out there", but rather an analytical tool to understand trans-border movements and interdependencies between people. It exists only through the active construction by the latter. But even if a transnational social space is not a given entity "out there", it is not at all the product of researcher's pure imagination: The concept of the transnational social space explains how persons and organisations are linked to each other over long distances.

There exist different modes of construction of a transnational social space. The most obvious one is the migration of people. But there are further modes of construction: The circulation of capital, goods, ideas, and practices contribute as well to the formation of a transnational social space, as Faist (2004) argues. Taking this argument a step further, I would say that also the circulation of knowledge and rumour contributes to the formation of a transnational social space. Knowledge and rumour are very close to what Faist calls "ideas". As I will outline in the following section, I am not only concerned with the circulation of border knowledge and rumour, but rather ask how border knowledge and rumour affect migrants' border practices and reshape therewith migrants' transnational social spaces.

<u>Border Knowledge and Rumour</u>

In his article "An Anthropology of Knowledge" (2002) Frederik Barth describes three faces or aspects of knowledge: Knowledge firstly contains a certain corpus of substantive assertions and ideas about aspects of the world. Secondly, this corpus of knowledge has to be transmitted and represented through different means. And thirdly it has to be distributed within instituted social relations (Barth 2002, S.3). The knowledge that Barth has in mind, resembles "traditional" knowledge in bounded communities (especially when one considers Barth's first point). He focuses more on what one could label as "tradition". The border knowledge I refer to in my research does not (or only in very rare moments) form a certain well-defined corpus of assertions, but is much more volatile and blurry. Nonetheless, Barth's threefold division of knowledge gives us a very useful systematisation of knowledge. It points to the fact that an anthropological approach to border knowledge has to consider not only the body of knowledge, but also its means and patterns of distribution. Knowledge is therefore always embedded in social relations. An anthropology of knowledge is less concerned with a one-dimensional analysis of the body of knowledge, but determines carefully how actors make use of knowledge.

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For my research design, I tend to replace "knowledge" by the term "rumour" because there is no clear defined and stable "body of knowledge" one could refer to in my field of research. There are rather pieces of knowledge and vague hearsays circulating in transnational migrants' communities. These rumours are transmitted in face-to-face interactions and have no identifiable origin. As a response to this volatile and blurry nature of border knowledge, I adopt Harney's (2006) approach to rumour. In his study on street vendors (most of them Bangladeshi) in the city of Naples and the circulation of rumours in this community, he explains rumours as "improvised news in the absence of more formal and verifiable news" (Harney 2006, S.376). Rumours on border practices, circulating in migrants' communities are exactly such improvised news. They are based on vague hearsays and personal experiences. With a lack of reliable information, undocumented migrants' decisions rely on these pieces of knowledge of very uncertain nature.

On the other hand, rumour does not just substitute more reliable and verifiable news, but it is a mean to respond quickly to changing circumstances. Within the mists of the European border regime, where "border" can take place virtually anytime and everywhere, rumour can spread news very quickly. And for migrants it is sometimes vital to dispose some news "in real time", even if they are not verifiable and nobody knows, if they are true. An incident during my exploratory fieldwork among undocumented migrants in Switzerland shall illustrate this point:

> One day I had an appointment with an informant. He did not show up at the appointed meeting-point. A quarter of an hour later, he called me on my mobile and apologised for his absence. "Well, look… I'm sorry", he began. "F. [a friend of him; DL] called me this morning and warned me, that they [the border guard; DL] executed identity controls in the trains between O. and B. So I decided not to go to work and instead to stay at home. It is too risky for me…"[12]

My informant did not know, from where this information originated that F. gave him (in any case, it was not F. that ran into a control), as he conceded. However, my informant credited this information as enough reliable to adjust his routine for a certain time(and, above all, not to show up at work, what means that he even risks to lose his job).

This example shows how rumours are in situations where reliable information is scarce, becomes very powerful. To sum it up, I conclude this section by the following thesis: Rumours that mobile border controls by the border guard in a certain area are in progress, may be more effective than the control itself.

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[12] Personal field notes 05/06/2011. The Schengen/ Dublin agreements allow border controls within a certain area beyond the proper border. For the case of Switzerland (due to its small geographic expansion) it means, that you can run into a border control even in the train between Zurich and Berne.

<u>Market Places of Knowledge in the Transnational Migratory Space Between Tunisia and Switzerland</u>

Instead of a conclusion, I sketch out in this section how I combine these three different approaches to theorise my field of research. As already mentioned my research focuses on border knowledge and rumours and analyses the production, circulation, and modification of border knowledge and rumours in the transnational migratory space between Tunisia and Switzerland. This raises the following two interdependent questions – one methodological, and one theoretical: How can we examine such a volatile and vague subject-matter as border knowledge and rumours? And how can we describe the interdependencies between the circulation of rumours, and migrants' transnational social spaces?

To answer the methodological question, I refer to George Marcus' path-breaking essay "Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography" (1995). He argues that *the* traditional method of Social Anthropology – the in-depth participant observation of a single community at a single place, well-known since Malinowski – is not appropriate for the analysis of contemporary social phenomena that reach beyond a self-contained community, or beyond the nation-state. Marcus subsequently sketched out the program of a multi-sited ethnography. According to him there are six different modes of construction of a multi-sited ethnography:[13] As ethnographers, we have to be mobile, exactly the same as our subject-matter is mobile. In his line of argument, I would label my approach as "following border knowledge or rumour". This requires a specific design of the ethnographic field work. It is a constructivist approach to the field:

Tunisia is an important waypoint for undocumented transit migrants from sub-Saharan Africa towards Europe, and a sending country of undocumented migrants (Fourati 2008; Bel Haj Zekri 2009; Mabrouk 2010). In contrast to other North African states such as Morocco and Algeria, Tunisian irregular migration has attracted little scientific attention (Nyberg Sørensen 2006; Khakhani 2008; Fargues 2004; Fargues 2009). For Tunisians, it has become virtually impossible to enter the EU territory legally. There exist mainly two possibilities to enter it illegally: A common practice is the legal entrance with a short-time tourist visa. After it expires, the migrants remain in the EU without any residence permit. The majority of irregular Tunisian migrants in the EU are such "visa overstayers". Most of them enter the EU through France or Italy, where they have relatives. The other practice is the illegal crossing of the EU border by boat via the Mediterranean. Transit migrants from other African countries have already made their choice when they reach Tunisia: They have opted for the illegal crossing of the Mediterranean by boat.

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[13] The six modes of construction of multi-sited ethnography are: (i) follow the people, (ii) follow the thing, (iii) follow the metaphor, (iv) follow the plot, story, or allegory, (v) follow the life or biography, and (vi) follow the conflict (cf. Marcus 1995, S.108ff)

The illegal crossing of the Mediterranean by undocumented migrants is commonly known as "Harga" in the everyday language of the Maghreb.[14] In recent years, the sea border has been subject to a permanent fortification by border control agencies (e.g. coast guards, Frontex) and intensified migration control under the security-paradigm (Klepp 2010). According to official data available, departures of undocumented migrants from Tunisia towards Europe have decreased since the intensified Frontex operation in the central Mediterranean (Frontex 2011a). Notwithstanding, Tunisia remains an important point of departure and transit, as the number of undocumented migrants has recently been increasing again (Frontex 2011b).

We can recognise different "hotspots" where various actors of the European border regime meet. At these specific places border knowledge is bundled and redistributed among the actors. For my research, I coin the term *"market places of knowledge"* to denote these locations. Drawn from the literature available, I accomplish an initial description of these market places. For the purpose of my research, they serve as "entry points" to the exploration of the networks of knowledge and rumours. As a working hypothesis, I classify these market places of knowledge in three categories:

Firstly, there are clandestine market places of knowledge where formal state institutions have no – or only very limited – access to migrants' border knowledge. One can find such market places of the first category in the coastal region between Sousse and Sfax (particularly in the fishing villages of Shabbah, Laouza, and others), and in the Southern region around Gabès and Zarzes (Mabrouk 2010, S.123–145; Daly 2001, S.191): Cafés and restaurants in proximity to the ports are typical meeting points to exchange border knowledge and rumours. At the other "end" of the field in Switzerland, informal meeting points of undocumented migrants are also market places of this type.

A second type of market places of knowledge is characterised through the "formalisation" of clandestine border knowledge: The interrogations of asylum seekers in Italian detention camps about their travel routes or in the reception centres for asylum seekers in Switzerland are attempts of the state to seize clandestine border knowledge and to transform it into hegemonic border knowledge by the state: The interviews described in the introduction is exactly a market place of knowledge of this second type.

And finally, there are market places where formalised border knowledge is redistributed among formal state institutions: As an example, the "i-Map on Migration", provided by the ICMPD, informs on migration flows and serves as a guideline for further border control practices (cf. Hess 2010). While the third type of market places of knowledge is well-examined, there is scarce literature

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[14] The irregular migrants are called "Harragas", what literally means "Those who burn". This word has two meanings: It refers to the act of burning or destroying their identity papers before the crossing of the Mediterranean. The other meaning is "burning" the border; a picture for the irregular crossing of the border.

concerning market places of knowledge both of type one and two. For this reason, the project focuses on market places of type one and two.

The three above described types of market places of knowledge serve in my research design as "entry point" for a multi-sited ethnography of border knowledge and rumours. As an act of constructing the field of research, I relate these different market places of knowledge to each other and address to each market places of knowledge the following research questions: (i) What types of border knowledge and rumours are important in each market place of knowledge? (ii) How does border knowledge and rumours alter between these different market places of knowledge?

These methodological remarks lead finally to the theoretical question I raised in the introduction to this section: How can we describe the interdependencies between the circulation of rumours, and migrants' transnational social spaces? As already mentioned, Faist (2004) emphasises, that a transnational social space consists not only of the movement of people, but also of the circulation of goods, capital, ideas, and practices. The question here is, if goods, capital, ideas, and practices only circulate within a transnational social space, or if they contribute to its construction through circulation. I tend to the latter explanation, because the former implies an essentialist perception of a transnational social space, a concept that I already rejected above. If we agree, as I argued in the former section, that rumour (if credited as reliable enough by the actors) can readjust practice, then it follows, that rumour not just circulates within a transnational social space, but contributes to its formation, or at least; its modification. But the question, to what extent and in what way exactly rumour is able to modify migrants' border practices, and how lasting these modifications are, can be answered only through the extensive fieldwork I will carry out in the forthcoming months.

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Geopolitics of human migration: constructing the region through crisis management and shifting regimes of state sovereignty

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There have been many names attached to regional spaces of migration around the edges of the European Union, including the Mediterranean, Africa-Europe, EU, and Schengen. Some think of the sites where regions meet as interstitial, spaces of betweenness – as in between states, and zones of crossing and transit. Meanwhile, phrases such as 'Fortress Europe' and 'global apartheid' lend the appearance of stability to regionally-organized geographies of mobility. But where *is* Fortress Europe? Where does Europe begin and end (Salter 2004), given the dynamism and struggles over entry found so readily along the margins of European territory; and even the formalized dynamism of inclusion, and potential exclusion, of EU members?

There exists an assumption that certain territorial stabilities – the African continent, the European Union, even the Mediterranean and the notion of territorial waters – can be known, mapped, and policed. But territoriality itself is an unstable concept, and the many crises unfolding in the Mediterranean signal precisely its fluidity. It is, rather, the highly unstable nature of territoriality that contributes to political struggle, geopolitical maneuvers, and uncertainty for migrants and others in regions of migration. As a result, the island and maritime spaces between regions have become central places of recurrent crises over human migration and re-articulations of state sovereignty; indeed, the very sites where land meets water are among the contested sites of struggle over entry and exclusion (Walters 2008).

Our transnational comparative work on island detentions and the historical evolution of European, Australian, and North American border enforcement practices into particular spatial arrangements has found the role of regions and islands – however contested their definition – to be highly significant in the contemporary geopolitics of migration. Each regional formation has particular histories of colonialism, imperialism, militarization, and contemporary bilateral and multilateral state arrangements. And yet proximate nation-states have actively pursued regional migration policies in concert and conflict with their neighboring states. Amid these fluid spatial arrangements, what is often referred to as 'migration management' has become one of the ways in which nation-states seek to implement and coordinate regional migration and refugee policies (see Betts 2010).

States and state actors are not alone in their efforts to assert control over mobility in peripheral zones. Activists, military personnel, fishermen, captains, lawyers, NGOs, suprastate agencies, and migrants themselves attempt to assert their agency and mobility. In so doing, they negotiate the terms of safety, safe haven, legality, human rights, political asylum, and the ever-shifting locations of border

enforcement. States' efforts to manage human mobility do not end struggles over territoriality, but rather complicate them. Moreover, these efforts intensify crises of state sovereignty at a range of geographic scales.

We argue that the constitution of the region and its geographical articulation on islands involve constant reconfigurations of sovereignty, particularly evident during times of crisis over human migration. These crises and re-articulations of sovereignty are creative uses of geography that often lead to a failure to protect human rights. In order to develop this argument, we bring feminist theorists of state sovereignty into conversation with political geographers more broadly. Wendy Brown's (2010) *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* attempts to explain the paradox that states around the world are fortifying and militarizing national boundaries even as global capitalist restructuring and neoliberal anti-state ideologies countervail against national sovereignty. Her arguments echo those made by Saskia Sassen (1996) some fifteen years ago. Rather than conceptualizing walling as a practice of strong sovereign power, both authors conclude, using distinct methods, that border enforcement illustrates the deep crisis of state sovereignty that relies on force to symbolize sovereignty rather than its limits.

Within the context of persistent crises, the geopolitics of migration and attendant forms of citizenship and access to human rights are also in flux. As Hannah Arendt (1951) so famously suggested, a community of nation-states must have the political will to do the work of protecting human rights. Yet, there continues to be considerable debate over the 'substance of rights.' Conflicts across the citizen-non/citizen divide are among the most significant and animated debates over domestic policies and national-international relations. Judith Butler's (2009) *Frames of War* broadens the field of politics constituted by the citizen/non-citizen divide by asking who is the human in human rights. To the degree that the West/non-West geopolitical divide structures who is recognized as human, and thus whose deaths are grievable or not, exercises of political responsibility involve "trying to attend to the precariousness of life, checking the transmutation of life into non-life" (177). These questions of the human and of political responsibility beyond the pale of the nation-state and spheres of formal politics are pertinent to the geopolitics of migration because conflicting claims of protection, safety, and rights structure legal geographies, material conditions for migration, and political terrain for sovereign and non-sovereign agents.

To flesh out the stakes of these issues on the ground, we draw on political geographers writing about the geopolitics of human migration (Samers 2004, Coleman 2007, Hyndman forthcoming), and on the social production of geographical scale (e.g., Marston 2001). Political geographers have used the concept of geographic scale analytically to explore the spatial arrangements of sovereign power (Brenner 2004). They have questioned the taken for granted nature of scale. John Agnew (1994), for example, argues that much thinking about the state relies on what he calls 'the territorial trap,' a conception of sovereignty that ends at the boundaries around national territory. As we know from the literature on mobilities, transnationalism, globalization, and the dispersal of the border, such national-scale spatial containers do not neatly hold. Sovereignty is being reconstituted in complex ways that simultaneously create new geographic scales and scalar configurations of

power and contestation. The boundaries of these places are at once sites of policing and containment (Frontex coordinates policing of the EU; Italy polices Italy), and sites of crossing and confusion. Island spaces and their complex legal geographies and relations to territorial and international waters are particularly rich grounds through which to explore these questions. whom, for example, do the boundaries around European states re-appear, and who exactly polices or holds responsibility for safety in Libyan or Lampedusan waters?

We organize the paper around what are often referred to as 'nested scales' in order to trace how crises of sovereignty are reconfiguring geographies of power and mobility. We move across scales of governance and political action in order to demonstrate how reconfigurations of sovereignty through regional and national management regimes have resulted in complex legal geographies and clashes of 'international,' regional, national, and subnational sovereign powers. We begin with the scale of the region, and then look at particular places (and scales) -- the island, the detention facility, and the migrant body – to trace how multiple scales of sovereign power operate through these sites, each of which operates as a kind of island. We conclude by examining the ramifications of these struggles for migration politics and the status of migrants themselves. As struggles over sovereignty rearticulate geographies of law, power, and safety, we ask who is allowed to move, who is allowed to stay, who benefits from and who loses in the migration management paradigm.

The geopolitics migration
Human migrations and the principle to freedom of mobility continue to animate geopolitical relationships and conflicts, and state responses at a variety of scales. In the introduction to a special issue on the geopolitics of migration, Jennifer Hyndman (forthcoming) explains the connections between geopolitics, rights, security, and migration:

> If the liberal democratic discourse of human rights has proven inadequate, then the politicization of such basic provisions in the guise of 'human security' attempted to revive them as geopolitics through the 1990s and early 2000s. Just as the 'war on terror' has invented the 'enemy combatant' to replace the prisoner of war, politicized spaces have emerged to protect civilians in conflict zones. Such 'geopoliticization' of humanitarianism in relation to human displacement illustrates how the flotsam and jetsam of conflict are indeed 'extra' worries that can be sequestered spatially out of view or in between the cracks of territorial jurisdiction (2-3).

By geopolitics of migration, thus, we reference the ways in which the relationships between states structure human migration, often facilitating or inhibiting mobility with the extra/territorial creativity in ways that benefit national agendas pertaining to security and economy.

Geopolitical relations often result in the restriction of access to human rights. The principle of human rights as inaugurated following World War II relies on states to exercise their sovereignty in protection of human lives, yet the history of migration and asylum-seeking points to repeated clashes between state sovereignty and human rights. Such discord between the regulation of mobility as assertion of

sovereign power and the desire of individuals to seek asylum continues in the contemporary field of migration.

Most migrants traveling by boat en route to other sovereign territories make asylum claims once they have been intercepted. These asylum claims rely on the architecture of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which member states agree to observe and implement. But the scales through which states assert sovereign power to protect are slippery, as evident when the problem of migration at sea can be framed and re-framed as the problem of Italy or Malta, or Lampedusa, or 'the EU' and 'Africa' writ large. These scalar shifts can be moves away from responsibilities of states to protect and toward the shirking, deferring, or contracting out of responsibility to protect human rights and human lives. These negotiations often lie at the heart of struggles over territorial control at sea. Who will respond, who will protect, who will push back or refuse entry, and who will provide shelter? How do states impose their own expressions of sovereignty or interests on other states and people by restricting human mobility? Often such arrangements and conflicts therein are worked out through regional solutions (cf. Marchetti 2010).

The inability for states to prevent and constrain human mobility is obvious during times of mass migration or with innovative attempts at entry. At these high-profile moments, migrant facilities and entire islands or ports of entry cannot physically contain humans assembled there. The institutionalized policies and practical responses to these events have normalized detention as part of the landscape of asylum seeking and migration. The institutionalization of migrant detention, in turn, may be understood as an infrastructure of normalized crisis (Agamben 1998, Mountz 2010). That is, states routinely struggle with a disjuncture between detention capacity and policing practices: spatial mismatches between the locations where migrants are apprehended and the existence of infrastructure with which to detain them.

Two governance paradigms since the 1980s that seek to resolve crises of punctuated 'spontaneous' migrations and migrant detention are regionalization and management. These paradigms, in turn, have institutionalized crisis in new forms, new geographic scales, and new configurations of these scales. The fact that these new paradigms are themselves in crisis points to the utter conflict (some would say irreconcilability) between the inviolability of human rights and state sovereignty. This is nowhere more evident than at sites where people are held against their will or prevented from moving freely. These clashes in part constitute the bounds of the region, cohere on the grounds of islands, institutionalize crisis through detention, and are animated by people's ongoing, corporeal attempts to move and reside freely and safely.

The 'management paradigm' gaining traction in policy circles and academic literatures presumes that human mobility in its many incarnations (economic despair, political conflict, tragic forms of displacement, global climate change) can somehow be bureaucratically controlled and responded to (see Betts 2010 and Geiger and Pécoud 2010 for background and critical treatments). But here, we argue against the very idea of 'migration management,' instead exploring the roles and meanings of crisis and crisis management. Thinking about the co-constitution of the

region by migrants and the state enables us to explore the role of crisis management and the utter failure of migration management in any rational, planned, stable, orderly, process (Scott 1998, Brown 2010). The migration management paradigm that structures the blooming industry of response to crisis (real and manufactured, itself a contested line) is state-centric and built on the reification of state boundaries. It relies on belief in state-sovereignty, even as it outsources its management to private entities at the cost of human security. Crisis in these contexts, and indeed in the divided waters between Europe and Africa, gives way to militarized regional responses.

Constructing the region

We highlight the role of the region in contemporary geopolitics of migration in order to draw attention to the historic and geographic context within which state and non-state actors are negotiating state sovereignty. What constitutes a region? We suggest that the region is a perpetually shifting field co-constituted by state authorities and migrants alike in the places where they encounter each other and negotiate entry and exclusion; passage and detention; legal status of the individual and political status of the territory where individuals are located. This paper, then speaks to political geographer Carl Dahlman's call for more research "into the mutually constitutive interactions that produce both the novel geopolitical spaces of the EU and the daily realities of persons living in Europe's 'twilight zones'" (Bialasiewicz et el. 2009, 80).

In the co-constitution of the region of migration and enforcement, we argue that state sovereignty is perpetually shifting, and fluid, as it is re-articulated across time and space. These moments of articulation often transpire in times of crisis and in times construed as crises. In other words, the crisis exists as people leave en masse, fighting for their lives; but so too does the production of crisis in public discourse enable the advancement of political agendas and practices (see Bigo 2002, Mountz 2010).

Like the United States maritime policies of the 1980s and 1990s and Australia's more recent Pacific Solution (which began in 2001), Italy in 2007 implemented its policy of *respingimento*, pushing back vessels suspected of carrying undocumented migrants (European Commission 2005: 59; Andrijasevic 2006; Cuttitta 2009; Klepp 2010). This more aggressive interception denied potential asylum claimants access to sovereign territory by refusing their entry into territorial waters and also facilitated their detention in Libya. In short, geography was used to curb access to rights. Enabling this shift in policy were bilateral arrangements for return from Italy to Libya and Algeria. Migrant travel at sea has always involved tense negotiations among neighboring territories. In the case of Italy and other routes to the EU, when intensified policing shuts down one route, migrants will seek out others. The number of migrants arriving in Italy by boat from North Africa was 19,900 in 2007, and then 36,000 in 2009 (UNHCR 2009, cited in Frelick: 19) Subsequently, as Frontex intensified policing of the Mediterranean in 2008 and 2009 (Carling 2007), the numbers of maritime arrivals on Greece and Malta increased, causing diplomatic tensions between states and perilous journeys and legal limbo for migrants (Lutterbeck 2009: 119).

Of course, these struggles are not unique to the Mediterranean. Regional 'solutions' have long been spatial arrangements that capitalize on geopolitical fields of power. These solutions are developed wherever potential asylum claimants travel by water with the hope of reaching sovereign territory to make an asylum claim. Claimant arrivals by boat intensified in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s with Haitians, Cubans, and Chinese trying to enter the southern, eastern, and western coasts. These entries gave rise to administrative changes to enforcement with the implementation of an interdepartmental task force under President Bill Clinton and to changes in policy and practice in marine policing. Apropos of the push-back policy is the practice commonly referred to in the United States as 'wet-foot, dry-foot.' Migrants who reached land (dry foot) have the ability to seek asylum, whereas those intercepted at sea are more likely to be returned or detained offshore. A similar practice ensued off the northern coast of Australia where the Tampa Incident gained international notoriety. In 2001, Prime Minister John Howard refused to allow the Tampa, a Norwegian ship that rescued 433 Middle Eastern asylum-seekers, to enter Australian territorial waters. As in the EU and the US, crisis at sea engendered a shift in policy known as Australia's Pacific Solution. The 'solution' denied access to the asylum process on mainland Australian territory, instead essentially contracting out the processing and detention of asylum seekers to detention facilities on islands such as Nauru, Christmas Island, and Manus. The Pacific Solution gave way to what has been referred to more recently as the Indian Ocean, Indonesian, and even Malaysian solutions (Marr 2009).

Similar territorial struggles involving land and water have played out around the margins of the EU, and a notorious case in point illustrates these dynamics at work. In April 2009, the captain of the Pinar E rescued 140 migrants from a vessel in distress. Like the captain of the Tampa, the Captain of the Pinar E, a Turkish freighter, sought to disembark at the nearest port, which was Lampedusa. Italy argued that the interception occurred within the search and rescue zone administered by Malta, whereas Malta maintained that the ship should travel to the nearest port. The stand-off continued for four days until the President of the European Commission appealed to both countries for a solution, and Italy accepted the migrants (Frelick 2009: 38).

In his report for Human Rights Watch, Bill Frelick demonstrates clearly the human cost paid for geopolitical squabbles involving migrants between states. One of the migrants in limbo while stranded on a zodiac during this episode recounted:

> We were calling for people to rescue us. We waved our shirts to passing ships. Some passed us. Others gave us food and water, but did not rescue us. We had no fuel and the waves were carrying us. People were crying. We prayed to God to save us. . . After four days a big Turkish ship came and threw a rope to us. We climbed into the big boat. They gave us water to drink. They gave us food, even though it wasn't enough. We spent three more days on the Turkish boat (Frelick 39).

Frelick notes (39): "While Innocent expressed his heartfelt appreciation to Italy, the Italians nevertheless prolonged his suffering by four days while they argued with the Maltese to avoid taking him."

At the scale of the region and on those islands involved in geopoliticized struggles, we see both contestations and alliances of nations engaged in shared migration management and border fortification. Not only is the region unstable in its periphery – in international waters, Italian detention facilities in Libya, and the layering of external boundaries (cf. Frontex vis-à-vis EU)[i] – but it remains internally fractious as individual nation-states and regional bodies come into conflict (Bialasiewicz et el. 2009).

In the case of the coordination by Frontex of collaborative policing of the Mediterranean, US regional solutions that relied on Caribbean islands, and Australian solutions relying on less powerful, proximate island states, the role of the region – however construed – has come to the fore. The geopolitical and economic sphere of influence imposes the wishes of the most powerful sovereign state in the region, impinging on sovereign power of policing and territoriality of less-powerful and less-wealthy neighbors. Australia compensates Indonesia, Nauru, and the International Organization for Migration to detain migrants offshore, whereas the United States quietly rents space on Caribbean islands.

Like migrants themselves, these geopolitical struggles over territorial control at sea eventually reach land. There, a new range of negotiations over status and access to asylum take hold as states attempt to shirk responsibility to protect. Whereas crisis and responses to crisis function to resolve some issues, one result is often the prolonged vulnerability of migrants at the center of power struggles over enforcement. Nowhere are these dynamics more pronounced than on the islands that emerge as hot spots during transnational journeys at sea. We move now to offer observations about the shifting sovereignty asserted at the scale of the island.

The role of islands

This section provides an overarching portrait of the role of islands and indeed the constitution of the role of islands in struggles over state sovereignty and migration enforcement. Due to their proximity to interceptions at sea, relative proximity to countries and regions of origin, and political status that often leads to ambiguous jurisdiction and legality of individual migrants, islands have come to the fore as a significant geographic location from which to examine migration struggles (Mountz 2011).

As mentioned previously, islands emerged as a significant enforcement archipelago in all of the regions where asylum is sought after, contested, and highly politicized. The Island Detention Project examines interception and detention off the coasts of Australia, North America, and the European Union. In the context of the European Union, as the process of regionalization involved the elimination of internal policing for the purposes of labor migration, several islands and archipelagos have played an increasingly important role in struggles over migration. These have included Spain's Canary Islands near the western coast of Africa, the Italian island of Lampedusa near Tunisia, as well as Greece, and Malta.[ii] Marine smuggling and policing move geographically in relation to one another. As Frontex coordinated intensified policing around the Canaries and later Lampedusa in 2008 and 2009 (Carling 2007), smugglers and migrants (and some would argue,

authorities themselves) directed marine landings east to Greece and Malta (Mutterbeck 2009).

We are interested here not only in the policing of these islands and the important research done by others in this area (e.g., Carling 2007; Cuttitta 2009; Mutterbeck 2009), but in the discourses surrounding the problematization of island detention and the broader crises of human migration along the margins of EU territory. The sheer array of people working in the response to human migration on small island territories suggests the contested nature of migration and detention there. During field research on the very small island of Lampedusa in 2010 and 2011, we encountered local activist groups working alongside Italian military personnel and international NGOs including the Red Cross, Save the Children, Medecins sans frontiers, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Organization for Migration, among others. Each organization was motivated by and worked under the rubric of competing missions and narratives to rescue, protect, serve, manage, advocate, enforce, and secure.

As a particular case in point, we now take a closer look at the island of Lampedusa, which has played a prominent role in struggles over entry of African migrants fleeing persecution, conflict, and political instability that intensified during the Arab Spring of 2011. Migrants entering the EU by sea from Africa come from a diverse array of countries, such as Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and even Asia (de Haas 2006). After peaking in 2008, boat arrivals on Lampedusa had all but disappeared by the summer of 2010 due to the push-back policy of Italy, formal agreements between Italy and Libya, and significant investment of resources from Italy to Libya. Landings continued in other parts of Sicily and mainland Italy. During the summer of 2010, the detention center on Lampedusa remained mostly empty. During the winter, Minister Maroni issued a statement suggesting the closure of the facility.

Boat arrivals increased dramatically and suddenly, however, during the political unrest of the Arab Spring in the early months of 2011. Due to the rough seas surrounding Lampedusa, ships of any kind are often unable to arrive for weeks at a time. Then, when the seas clear, a series of ships will arrive in quick succession, intensifying the atmosphere of crisis. After a relatively quiet time on Lampedusa in 2010 with far fewer landings than had arrived during previous years, the Arab Spring that began in Egypt and spread quickly to neighboring states prompted the departure of many migrants from northern Africa and a quick succession of arrivals on the island.

By mid-February, Frontex reported that some 5,000 migrants had arrived on Lampedusa. International attention again turned to a detention facility and a political setting with an unstable relation to the EU human rights community. As Lampedusans found themselves in the international news cycle once again, the framing of the crisis flagged the importance of scale and regional politics in relation to the kinds of enforcement that take place on islands. By the end of February, what had very recently been an empty facility slated for closure erupted in a series of confrontations. Migrants threatened hunger strikes and set fire to the center. The Italian national government declared a state of emergency, and local Mayor De

Rubeis issued an edict that some detainees were not allowed to leave what was once an open detention center.

Due to the numbers that arrived in 2011, the two facilities where migrants are detained on the island were very over-populated and at times closed to new arrivals. This resulted in the squatting of migrants around the island: they slept at the port and wandered the streets of the small town. On June 22, a boat arrived that amounted to the largest landing ever on Lampedusa. The Guardia di Finanza, military personnel, employees of the Red Cross, and volunteers formed a human corridor at the port to receive and process the migrants. Although they found themselves in limbo, most migrants did not stay long on Lampedusa, but were moved to other detention centers in Sicily and throughout Italy. Most notable was a large new center in the remote town of Mineo, approximately one hour outside of Catania. This center holds some 2,000 migrants, which makes it the largest of its kind in Italy.

By the end of April, an estimated 26,000 migrants had landed on Lampedusa. The island was visited by politicians (including Berlusconi), celebrities (such as Angelina Jolie), international NGOs, and the Italian navy who appeared to ferry boats of migrants to centers throughout Italy. As one local participant in our research stated, "Lampedusa was to become an outdoor prison," a "prison in the middle of the sea".

The island became contested space. Residents fought at different times to block migrants from entering at the port where they thought the national government had failed, and at other times they turned up at the local airport to demonstrate before visiting dignitaries with placards stating that "Lampedusa was not racist."

Islands are places where state control over territory intersects with international law of the sea, international human rights obligations, intra- and interregional conflicts, and the materiality of human mobility. In the case of Lampedusa, the island is simultaneously tourist destination, militarized outpost, and migrant prison for Italy and the broader EU community. It is a place where these industries and land uses often clash, where local residents contest their perceived neocolonial status within Italy, and where its physical proximity as a safe haven for distressed boats in international waters has been trumped by Berlusconi's declaration of the ports unsuitability.

Detention facilities as islands on islands
It is at moments of relatively large 'spontaneous migrations' – when the scale and punctuated nature of mass movements of people exceed the capacity of states to respond – that crises of state sovereignty (at the regional and state scale) and management are baldly evident. European states (as other states elsewhere) have responded to such moments of crisis with provisional construction and repurposing of military and civilian facilities. States also have turned to private agencies and citizens to share in the work of caring for, resettling, confining, and expelling migrants. These ad hoc responses, in turn, have been formalized into policy and institutionalized detention as an infrastructure of crisis.

Carl Levy (2010) warns against conflating all facilities housing migrants and refugees as monolithic camps of exception. There are indeed differences among the legal purposes and material conditions of these facilities, and our research suggests the importance of understanding them together comprising a migrant 'processing' complex of facilities for temporary migrant care, confinement, resettlement, and removal. Seeing these facilities a part of an ==archipelago of care and confinement== reflects the scholarly literature on the ambiguous and shifting nature of detention ==(Gill 2009)==. It also reflects the perspectives of several of our interviewees for whom the shifting terminology of Italian migrant facilities better reflects legal disputes and political expedience than fundamental changes in detention practice. One activist whom we interviewed recalled:

> In 1998 Italy set up CPTs – Centri di Permenza Temporanea – that now are ==CIEs.== … Why that name? Because illegal immigration was not a crime as it is now. So they had to find a name that would justify an administrative detention. Migrants who were caught and taken into CPTs were subjected to administrative detention because they didn't commit any crime. However, this whole idea of administrative detention was conflicting enough with the notion of a State subject to the rule of law, because in a State subject to the rule of law no one can be deprived of freedom if they haven't committed any crime. So, those centers were called "Centers for Temporary Stay" where migrants might be confined up to sixty days. Thirty days initially, later extended to sixty. When the Turco-Napolitano Law – alas, both center-left deputies - set up those places in 1998, the first CPT was in Trapani … where it still is, in an old building, an Art-Nouveau building that formerly was a hospice for the elderly. Actually, a rest home for the elderly. So, among other things, it was completely inadequate to be used as a prison, what actually CPTs were and CIEs are.

This passage not only captures the institutionalization of ad hoc arrangements (a shift from rest home to migrant center), but also reflects the tendency toward closure and captivity (equating the facility with a prison) that have come with and in spite of their changed names (Andrijasevic 2006). ==Understanding detention as an infrastructure of normalized crisis draws attention to the routinized incapacity of the state to detain people.== Where the walls symbolize fortitude, as Wendy Brown argues, people repeatedly breach detention confines through escape, destruction, and sheer numbers. Despite investments in detention construction and contracting by states across the EU, they routinely do not have sufficient detention capacity to confine. And facilities routinely are not located in the places where refugees seek safe haven or where states are focusing interdiction and apprehension efforts (Mountz et al., forthcoming). Indeed, the Return Directive adapted by the European Parliament in 2008, which allows member states to detain migrants for up to eighteen months, and Dublin II agreement, which allows asylum claims only in the first country of entry, have only amplified the problem (Karlsson 2010; Schuster 2011). As one detention worker explained about the facility changes he had experienced: "We went from about 200

beds in the old center to 800. Although these figures were still below the actual number of people being housed. … So, in a time when migrants were flooding in, it's obviously difficult even to accommodate them on the national territory."

In short, detention as an infrastructure of crisis is as much material as it is political and legal. This is especially evident in the case of migration to and through Greece. The January 2011 ruling in the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece* found that Greek detention practices routinely violate the European Convention on Human Rights prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. Further, the court found that Belgium also violated its human rights obligations by sending an Afghan asylum seeker to Greece. Conflicting EU and Greek sovereignties clashed yet again in 2010 when Frontex deployed 175 border guards to Greece's boundary with Turkey and facilitated the detention of migrants and asylum seekers in inhumane conditions in Greece. Given the "absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment," Human Rights Watch demanded that Frontex suspend operations that result in migrant detention in Greece and recommended using facilities "elsewhere in the Schengen area where conditions were compliant with EU standards" (2011, 51). Or, HRW suggested, deployment of Frontex officers "could have been made conditional upon the EU and Greece taking the necessary measures to ensure that any migrants detained would not be held in inhuman and degrading conditions" (2011, 52).

The spatial disjuncture between where migrants are apprehended and where they are detained is no small matter. State sovereignty is not simply in the power to detain, budgets, and political will, but also exercised in the actual practices of detention, practices that require facilities, personnel, logistical plans, and means of transportation. Attention to the materiality of state sovereignty at the scale of individual detention facilities and the detention archipelago highlight the repeated disjuncture between policy and practice. As states have attempted to expand and upgrade spaces for detention, reception, and exclusion in the face of increased enforcement efforts, migrant flows, and legal challenges, they face the constraints of budgets, political will, and opposition, which limit states' ability to infinitely expand capacity and site facilities. That is, the legal, political, and geographic *contingency* of detention facilities speaks to the recurrent failure of detention as a sovereign means of managing migration.

Corporeality and sovereignty

The sovereignty of the state, human agency, and materiality collide in the spaces of detention and migrant interdiction. Borderlands, seas, ports, and detention walls are places that mark state sovereignty as a relationship constituted through struggle with migrants. People's evasion of and resistance to programs of managing or 'regularizing' migration signal the limits, and hence persistent crisis of, state sovereignty. This is often a violent collision between deeply unequal actors, and the effects materialize in the harms to and deaths of migrants.

The state categorization and identification of people on the move as 'migrants,' 'refugees,' as 'irregular' or 'illegal,' as 'minors,' as part of 'mixed flows' is as politically volatile as it is legally contested. State attempts to manage and categorize mobility and identify individuals through these terms reflect efforts to

perfect bureaucracies of surveillance and management. These mechanisms are far from neutral, but track historic grooves of colonial and geopolitical subjecthood. A detention facility worker described the effective *refoulements* following Minister Maroni's so-called 'flows decree' and agreements with Libya and Tunisia:

> [B]asically they are returned to Libya even if they are Somalis or Nigerians. So it may happen that these people are coming from Somalia… The "journey of hope," as they say, doesn't entail only crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Lampedusa. Actually the journey of hope is two years long because those who leave from Somalia have to cross the whole of Africa, through the desert, only to arrive in Libya and wait before they can leave. Then they leave, and once they have left, they are carried back again. You can see how that's a sheer madness. But it's a matter of international politics and it's not up to me to discuss this issue.

Geopolitics shapes the spaces of asylum determination, which involve interrogation and sometimes invasive medical examinations, which blend criminalizing logics of fraudulence and law-breaking and humanitarianism. Two of the people whom we interviewed discussed how X-rays of hands are used to determine the age of migrants, and hence if they are eligible for protection as minors. One of them explains:

> Unfortunately, the Red Cross guys will tell you, there's not always a perfect correspondence because our reference is the Western child. So that's a child who has a certain calcification of the bones depending on a certain diet, and that will be different from a child from Central Africa, or from East, or wherever…

Not only are claims of national origin geopolitically charged in asylum determination, so too is age. While global inequalities of nutrition, shelter, and health care differentially grow into bones, medical technologies may mask these very geopolitical divides.

Such attempts to identify conflict sharply with the categorical erasure of the individual identities and histories of people who are on the move. A CPT worker whom we interviewed discussed the social and political invisibility of migrating people: "these people leave no mark, actually. Because they're nothing, they're ghosts. They're non-entities. In our system, they're nothing. And they're still nothing." This "fact," in the worker's terms, of how migrants and refugees are represented speaks to the ontologizing effects of state management practices. As Andrijasevic writes, such attempts at classification "signal the state's attempt to manage by symbolically reducing … to a single typology, the multiplicity of movements, belongings and histories that characterize contemporary migrations in the Mediterranean region" (2010).

Tactics of freedom and resistance that migrants may use are severely constrained legally and economically, and state practices of deterrence increase vulnerabilities that migrants face in their efforts to create safety, freedom, and livelihood. Indeed, embodied tactics are frequently the remaining options. Migrants collectively defy detention's spaces of unfreedom by repeatedly burning detention

facilities. They also protest captivity through hunger strikes and acts of self-harm. Sharing the news of these efforts is an important aspect of the networks (online and offline) that migrants and their supporters have created.

Political invisibility and material deaths and disappearances of migrants foster one another. In the geopolitics of human vulnerability, suggests Butler, the politics of visibility and recognition are paramount. ==Unmourned, uncontested dehumanization and disappearance reproduce an inhuman political field that blames migrants as the cause of crises while obscuring how violent state policies and practices create the conditions for and acts of migrant harm (cf. Nevins 2003).==

Migrant organizations and groups working in solidarity with them remember and use acts of memorialization to make visible the violence of state sovereignty. For a priest with whom we spoke, holding funerals for people is a basic act of spiritual recognition: "If they're professed Christians, we give them a Christian burial …. The important thing is that they are Christians. But if they're Muslims, which has never happened so far, it would be advisable to allow a Muslim to lead the prayer." For others memorialization is also more explicitly political. In August 2011, for one, the anti-racist network Welcome to Europe built a memorial in Tychero, Greece to remember the deaths of migrants in the Evros region and European borders more broadly. The memorial they built was meant to "give back a piece of dignity" to "those whose death[s] disappeared," to "those who survived," and to "all of us, who feel ashamed in the moment of these deaths because we failed in our attempt to stop this murderous [border] regime and to create a welcoming Europe" (2011).

These acts are deeply personal commemorations that attempt to "create a space for all those who lost their lives" in a "place of failure and loss." "Remembering here, means to save the stories of the uncounted face of those who died at the borders of Europe" (Welcome to Europe 2011). Such intimate acts of love and loss simultaneously work to constitute networks of family, community, and solidarity that traverse EU and other border regimes. The media (including blogs and social media) are crucial aspects of remembering the dead and creating a visible network of resistance that spans the layers of sovereign containment and deterrence at a range of geographic scales.

The construction of temporary gathering sites by opponents of sovereign borders (territorial and paper) and living spaces on the part of migrants who are on the move or are excluded from more permanent residences are evident forms of resistance to sovereign power. They are also sites of self-organization and mutual responsibility that Judith Butler regards as imperative in challenging the geopolitics of the invisible inhuman. To that end, and echoing Rutvica Andrijasevic (2010), "What is at stake is a theoretical and political challenge to recognize migration as a constituent force in the production of the European polity and citizenship."

Conclusions

This paper has shown the significance of the constructed nature of regions in the articulation and material expression of state sovereignty in order to explore the geopolitics of migration. We have argued that the use of the region in migration management has emerged as a practical means of regulating human mobility, not

only because of the inability of individual nation states to respond or because of inter-state conflict. We also focus on the material ways in which migrants and the exercise of mobility, organizing, and expression are fundamental to the shape that sovereignty takes. Struggles over sovereign and migrant power constitute the institutionalized terrain of sovereignty, at regional borders, island ports, and migrant facilities. Whether these become safe havens or open-air prisons is a measure of geopolitical power, with the terrain of the body a site where sovereignty is contested.

The bodies of migrants enter into limbo in these geopolitical spaces between states where struggles over legality, terms of safety, and border enforcement unfold. The examples and struggles detailed in this paper engender new and larger questions that get to the heart of what we see as a clashing vision between Arendt's hope for states that do the work of protection, and the alternative forms of collective responsibility and agency that Wendy Brown implies in her questioning of persistent crises of sovereignty, and that Butler suggests in her politics of mutual responsibility against sovereign acts of dehumanizing violence. Migrants and groups working in solidarity with them can be understood both in relation to and against the terms of the state. Both of 'strategies' of action and collective power pose significant challenges to state sovereignty, and factor into crises of state sovereignty.

To that end, management and regional migration regimes are the latest institutionalized attempts to shore up sovereignty. They are each significant in this moment for papering over not only systemic crises of sovereignty, but also regional and broader scale geopolitical contests. There is an assumption in managed migration discourse and practice that state sovereignty is functional, or that its failings may be made good through reconfiguration (including outsourcing). Yet this assumption treats migration as a problem, masking issues of human rights and exercises of migrant agency, whether in the name of freedom of movement, self-determination or traditional practice. The discursive/practical construction of the region as a governance and geopolitical tool, then, simultaneously papers over histories of colonial and geo-economic rule and their more recent formations that should inform immediate and historical responsibility for displacement and immobilization alike.

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[i] Map of Frontex external borders
[ii] Farther afield, asylum-seekers also attempt to claim asylum in the French territory of Mayotte. This island does not feature prominently in this paper or the Island Detention Project due to its distance from other islands in the study.

FENCES, NETWORKS, PEOPLE:
EXPLORING THE EU/AFRICA BORDERLAND

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ABORNE – AFRICA BORDERLANDS RESEARCH NETWORK

MIGRANT SUBJECTIVITIES, BIOGRAPHIES AND EXPERTISE

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"RIGHT NOW, PERSONAL AGENCY TRUMPS GEOPOLITICS: RE-DEFINING THE MIGRATION NEXUS IN EUROPE'S NEW FRONTIER" (PEDRO F. MARCELINO)

- AS HENK SAID YESTERDAY, IT'S DIFFICULT TO SUMMARIZE THE WORK OF MONTHS IN 10 MINUTES, BUT I'LL DO MY BEST AND TRY TO FOCUS ON A 2 KEY POINTS IN THIS PRESENTATION (ESPECIALLY AS I AM AWARE MY PAPER CAME IN WAY TOO LATE FOR MOST OF YOU TO HAVE ACCESS TO):

(1) LET'S TALK ABOUT FENCES: THE ELASTICITY OF THE BORDER, AND THE PREEMPTIVE AND REACTIVE MEASURES THAT ENABLE IT TO WITHSTAND PRESSURE, TO STRETCH AND TO CONTRACT, AS A SCENARIO TO THE PLAY – IF PAOLO WILL ALLOW ME THE SHAMLESS BORROWING FROM HIS WORK.

(2) LET'S TALK ABOUT PEOPLE AND NETWORKS: IN THIS ASPECT, I WILL TRY TO RE-CENTRE THE DISCUSSION ON THE INDIVIDUAL, ON MIGRANTS AS **ACTIVE** RATHER THAN **PASSIVE** SUBJECTIVITIES. IN THE PROCESS, I HOPE TO QUESTION A FEW OF THE TERMINOLOGIES AND CATEGORIES WE USE TO DESCRIBE THEM.

(1)

HERE'S WHAT I'M DOING: I AM ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY AND DEMONSTRATE NORMATIVELY THAT SEVERAL EXTERNAL SPACES SUCH AS CAPE VERDE AND MOROCCO CAN CURRENTLY BE CONCEPTUALIZED AS A *DE FACTO* PART OF A LOOSE, INCHOATE AND RATHER ELASTIC BORDER THAT HAS BEEN GRADUALLY DRAWN AND RE-DRAWN BY EUROPE IN ITS FURTHEST CONFINES, IN LIGHT OF MIGRATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST 10-YEARS OR SO, UTILIZING TOOLS SUCH AS PUSHBACK STRATEGIES, OUTSOURCED DETENTION FACILITIES, FRONTEX, OR EVEN THE EXPORT OF LEGISLATION TO ITS EXTERNALIZED SPACES.

THESE BORDERS ARE FLUID AND OFTEN DELOCALIZED (WE'VE HEARD ENOUGH ON EXTERNALIZATION AND CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY, SO I WON'T DWELL ON THAT…), AND STRETCH TO LOCATIONS THAT WE DID NOT – UNTIL RECENTLY – CONCEPTUALIZE AS PART OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, LET ALONE EUROPE. BUT THAT IS WHAT IS HAPPENING: EUROPE'S BORDER NOW STRETCHES ALL THE WAY FROM THE NORTHERN COAST OF LIBYA, IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE, IN THE ATLANTIC, NOT SO FAR FROM ACTUAL EUROPE (THE CANARIES). I WOULD VENTURE THAT PERHAPS IT STRETCHES FURTHER.

Since 9/11, dozens of political, military and social measures in Europe or in Europe's immediate vicinity have shown, time and time again, how the border stretches and contracts rather reactively to a variety of stimulae. Sometimes the border performance is taken to one location only to change stage days later. On other occasions, we've seen the border enforced in many locations at the same time. In all of these situations, we've seen policy impacting the lives of migrants at the border where they are, or all the way back home.

Never has this been so clear as in the period ranging roughly from late 2010 to the summer of 2011, with the Arab Spring causing Europe to cheer, then to panic, then to cheer, then to panic. And I'm not ure it ever came out of this panic, with the financial crisis taking over all of a sudden. this was a very calculated panic at that, performed supperbly on a stage set up for us by savvy, but all too often populist politicians, seizing the opportunity to (a) once again attempt one last grasp of Northern Africa, as suggested yesterday in the keynote address; and (b) enforce the maximum extenson of the border.

Despite its extension, however, I would suggest this is far from the "total border" that Henk yesterday conceptualized in the realm of possibility. That is because, in my view, the total border isn't possible, in the sense that it ignores the individual agency as a relevant aspect, a layer of resistance if you will…

What we see at this time could be the furthest the EU border has gone in a long time, but it still isn't enough, since, as the border expanded, some flows have already started to shift, with interesting increases in the flows to bottlenecks such as Djibouti – ever more isolated, ever more distant from the actual, real, political border, but new frontiers, new dislocated borders now co-opted into the European nexus. on this regard, I will remind you that just a couple of weeks ago IOM, UNHCR, the Red Cross and other relevany actors all flocked to Djibouti (not by hazard, I'd guess) to a large, highly publicized meeting on refugees and irregular migration –they often refer to as "mixed migration".

But let's look at more specific actors: countries that we have called "transit countries"

In fact, allow me make a brief side note to reiterate Alice's words on yesterday's opening: from the moment I conceptualized this to today, almost everything has INDEED changed. So, a 3-year, multi-sited project probably needs to be rceonceptualized. as of yet, I am unsure of how it affects what I am doing, but i know it does, as the entire border performance has been altered, discourses are extremed, and so are measures. The combination of geopolitical events in Northern Africa and in Europe itself – first the financial crisis, now the political crisis and even the as yet unimaginable spectre of the return to the internal borders – has been mostly responsible for this new status quo, whatever the status quo is right now (someone tell me if you know…).

So back to the point: the countries.

the elastic border of this Fortress Europe has now stretched to places such as Cape Verde and Morocco, which have become net receivers of migrants, along with others such as Cyprus, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, even Ecuador or Thailand, all part of global nexus of geopolitical change in which most, if not all are peripheral nodes of a global phenomenon caused by exogenous factors, ranging from international geopolitical changes to the persistence of migrant corridors against all odds.

In these countries there are also internal cracks, and some are scrambling to find solutions to often incomplete immigration policies, sometimes leaving ample space for juridical colonization by ready-made legislation and agendas sent from abroad, enforcing pushback agendas rather than consequent agendas that respond to these countries' own

NEEDS. VERY BRIEFLY, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU THE EXAMPLE OF THE CAPE VERDE CASE STUDY, ONE OF MY FOCUS SITES. THE COUNTRY CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES AN INTEREST IN TACKLING THE ISSUE, EVEN A SENSE OF SOLIDARITY (DESPITE INTERNAL TENSIONS). BY CONTRAST, IT IS OFTEN ALSO ACTING AS AN EU PROXY. LET'S SEE:

- AT THE ROOT, THERE'S THE HERITAGE DEBATE OVER WHETHER CV IS AFRICA OR NOT….
- EU PARTNERSHIP POISED AGAINST ECOWAS MEMBERSHIP (DEPENDING ON THE PARTY GOV'T)
- THE CURRENCY PEG TO THE EURO LIMITS ACTION
- CAPE VERDE AS THE POSTERBOY OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE >>> FUNDS
- NATO: OPERATION STEADFAST JAGUAR 2006
- PATROLLING OF CAPE VERDIAN WATERS BY FOREIGN FORCES, FOR PROTECTION OF WATERS FROM "EXCESSIVE FISHERIES" AND "DRUG TRAFFICKING".
- FLURRY OF TOP-RANK VISITS IN THE LAST 2-3 YEARS FROM PT, SPAIN, FRANCE, AS WELL AS HILLARY CLINTON, FORMER CANADIAN HEAD OF STATE GOV. GEN. MICHAELLE JEAN, THE CHINESE PRESIDENT, EVEN AN UN-SCHEDULLED STOP BY THEN RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DMITRI MEDVEDEV… CLEARLY THERE IS SOMETHING GOING ON, AND SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE…
- RENEWED DEBATE ON WHETHER TO MAINTAIN THE FREE MOVEMENT CLAUSE WITH ECOWAS
- EXCEPTION NEGOTIATED W/ ECOWAS, ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT CLAUSE (INFO…)
- OPTING OUT OF THE GHANA-BACKED PROJECT FOR AN ECOWAS BIOMETRIC PASSPORT WHICH WOULD ENTAIL MORE, NOT LESS POLITICAL AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
- CREATION OF AN INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR MIGRATION IN 2007, TO **OBSERVE**
- APPROVAL IN PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER 2011 OF A LAW TO CREATE THE IMMIGRATION LAW
- CREATION OF COORDINATING UNIT FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY – FIRST CONFLICTS ARRISE (EU)
- PURCHASING OF A RADAR SYSTEM FROM SPAIN, USING A SPANISH LINE OF CREDIT… TO PROTECT SPAIN, IF YOU LOOK AT THE SPATIAL LAYOUT OF THE DIFFERENT RADAR UNITS
- PURCHASING OF THE TWO FIRST ASSETTS FOR THE CAPE VERDIAN NAVY, WITH THE SUPPORT OF PORTUGAL AND SPAIN… THE LAST ON ITS WAY 2 WEEKS AGO AS I DEPARTED FROM CV, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED ON DECEMBER 12TH. THIS FRIGATTE WAS CHRISTENED: SENTINEL

SO, THIS IS WHAT'S HAPPENING ON THE INSTITUTIONAL SIDE, ON THE SIDE OF THE ENABLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE BORDER. BUT THERE IS OTHER SIDE.

WHICH BRINGS ME TO POINT NO. 2.

(2)

LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I THINK HASN'T CHANGED: MIGRATION IS STILL A HUMAN ASPIRATION, PERFORMED BY HUMANS WHO CONTINUE TO WANT TO MOVE. IF I HAVE LEARNED ANYTHING IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATIONS, IT IS PRECISELY THAT WHEN PEOPLE REALLY WANT TO MIGRATE, THEY USUALLY FIND A SOLUTION TO DO SO. IF NOT TO POINT A, THEN TO POINT B.

WHAT I WANT TO PROPOSE IS THAT WE SUSPEND – FOR A FLEETING MOMENT – THE CONCEPTUALIZATION WE MAKE OF MIGRATION, TO REMIND OURSELVES THAT MIGRATION IS JUST THAT: A HUMAN MOVEMENT. AND I WOULD ECHO POLLY'S AND HEATHER'S WORDS THIS MORNING. IT'S NOT MERELY A SET OF STATISTICS, NUMBERS, FIGURES, CHARTS, TRENDS, PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT, IT'S NOT A STUDY SUBJECT, IT'S NONE OF THOSE THINGS PRIMARILY. IT IS THE REALITY OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD, SOME OF WHICH RIGHT HERE IN THIS SPACE BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE. AND AS A HUMAN, INDIVIDUAL EVENT RATHER THAN PRIMARILY A COLLECTIVE PHENOMENON (WHICH I ALSO ADMIT IT IS, BY THE WAY!), WE MUST LOOK AT MIGRANTS THEMSELVES AS THE MAIN ACTORS. ALL OF THEM, INDIVIDUALLY. MIGRANTS HAVE NAMES, THEY HAVE PERSONAL HISTORIES AND PERSONAL NARRATIVES, THEY HAVE DREAMS, OBJECTIVES, ASPIRATIONS, THEY HAVE FAMILIES (WIFE'S, KIDS, MOTHERS, FATHERS…), AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO ONE THING FOR SURE: THEY WILL ACT AS HUMANS, AND THEY WILL FIND SOLUTIONS.

WHAT I AM ARGUING FOR HERE IS **AGENCY**. OF COUSE, IN SOME CONTEXTS, INSTITUTIONS WILL CONTRAPOSE **VULNERABILITY** AS THE PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTIC OF MIGRANCY. NOW, WHILE I AM AWARE THAT AGENCY OFTEN COMES ON THE BACK OF SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT THE CHOICE TO LEAVE MIGHT OFTEN BE A FORCED CHOICE, A LAST RESOURCE, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT EVEN THIS VULNERABILITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE AGENCY. IT IS NECESSARY TO BRING THIS ASPECT BACK TO THE DISCUSSION, I THINK, AND TO SAY LOUD AND CLEAR THAT MIGRANTS ARE NOT JUST NUMBERS OR RESEARCH SUBJECTS, NOT BODIES LIVING ABSTRACT LIVES, AND I'M GLAD THIS CAME UP SEVERAL TIMES THIS MORNING.

LET ME MAKE A LITTLE PROVOCATION: OUR SUBJECTS ARE US AND, GIVEN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE THEM. POPULAR CULTURE HAS BEEN IMPLYING THIS FOR A WHILE, AS A MIRROR OF REALITY.

LET ME REMIND YOU OF THE AMERICAN FILM CHILDREN OF MEN, WITH CLIVE OWEN, LOOKING AT A HORRIBLE FUTURISTIC EUROPE IN WHICH IMMIGRATION HAS BECOME A MAJOR BONE, IN WHICH SECTIONS OF COUNTRIES ARE FENCED OF, ENCLOSING MIGRANTS. AS MUCH OF A PUNCH IN THE STOMACH THAT MOVIE WAS, HOW MUCH OF A PUNCH IN THE FACE IT IS TO FINALLY REALIZE HOW SHOCKINGLY CLOSE TO THAT WE'RE COMING. BUT LOOK AT THE OTHER SIDE: SOME OF YOU MAY KNOW THE 2006 FILM OF THE FRANCO-BENINOIS DIRECTOR SYLVESTRE AMOUSSOU, AFRICA PARADIS, IN WHICH A FUTURISTIC, UTOPIAN AFRICA (BY THEN A MASSIVE FEDERAL COUNTRY) IS BESSIEGED BY FLURRIES OF EUROPEAN REFUGEES ESCAPING DIRE POVERTY AND FACING RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION LAWS AND ABUSIVE BORDER CONTROLS. IN ITS SATYRE, IT IS INDEED EASY TO FORGET HOW CLOSE THIS IS TO REALITY. AND IF FOR A MOMENT WE DOUBT, LET'S LOOK AT THE HARSH REALITY: 600.000 THOUSAND YOUTH HAVE RECENTLY LEFT SPAIN, MANY OF WHICH LINING UP IN FRONT OF SOUTH AMERICAN CONSULATES IN MADRID. 150.000 YOUNG QUALIFIED PORTUGUESE ARE ALREADY IN ANGOLA AND CAPE VERDE. AND IN EUROPE, WE'RE ALSO WAITING FOR THE MOMENT WHEN YOUNG GREEKS TOO, WILL SIMPLY GO.

BUT LET ME BE MORE PRECISE, AND PERHAPS MORE BLUNT:

OUR CATEGORIES OF MIGRATION ARE OUTDATED. ALL OF THEM. WE (THE COLLECTIVE, INSTITUTIONAL, EVEN ACADEMIC WE) INSIST ON CREATING NEW CATEGORIES TO REFLECT WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE GROUND, WHEN THE REALITY IS CHANGING SO QUICKLY, TRANSFORMING NEW DENOMINATIONS IN OBSOLETE TERMS ALMOST OVERNIGHT. WHAT WE NEED, I WOULD ARGUE, ARE LESS, NOT MORE CATEGORIES. LET'S DEBUNK TRANSIT, FOR INSTANCE – WITH CASE STUDIES SUCH AS THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS AND MOROCCO, THIS IS ONE I PARTICULARLY DISLIKE.

"TRANSIT" HAS BECOME TRANSIENCE AND LIMINALITY, BUT IS INCREASINGLY LACKING THE VERY THING THAT DEFINES "TRANSIT": AND THAT IS MOVEMENT! LIMINALITY IS NOT ONLY A CONSEQUENCE, BUT ALSO A TOOL OF VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY, A TOOL OF AGENCY. THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO QUESTION WHEN DOES "TRANSIT" CEASE TO BE TRANSIT? WHEN DO WE CALL IT SOMETHING ELSE? IN THE CASES OF CAPE VERDE AND MOROCCO, EVEN IF WE WERE TO IGNORE ALL THE TELL SIGNS PRIOR TO 9/11 – AND THERE WERE SOME – THE LAST DECADE LEAVES LITTLE DOUBT THAT MANY OF THE MIGRANTS THAT HAVE FOUND THEIR WAY THERE ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE. NOR DO MANY OF THHEM WANT TO. GOING BACK IS NOT AN OPTION, SOMETIMES FOR SOCIAL, SOMETIMES FOR ECONOMIC REASONS; MOVING ON IS LESS OF AN OPTION, WHEN YOU'RE FACING ALMOST CERTAIN INTERCEPTION AT SEA AND BEING LOCKED IN A DETENTON CENTRE SOMEWHERE – OFTEN IN ISLANDS, JUST TO BE SURE THEY CANNOT GO ANYWHERE.

THE TERM 'TRANSIT' MIGRATION, FINALLY, DOES NOT FULLY RECOGNISE THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE MIGRATION EXPERIENCE, NOR THE CHANGE AND ADAPTATION PROCESSES THAT PERMEATE IT. WHILE RECOGNISING LIMINALITY AS PART OF THE PROCESS, IT ALSO ATTEMPTS TO UNDERSTAND MIGRATION AS FIXED ASPIRATIONS, CHOICES AND DECISIONS, IGNORING THE FACT THAT SOME MIGRANTS CHANGE THEIR GOAL OF FURTHER MIGRATION.

RATHER SIMPLISTICALLY, ANOTHER CATEGORIES POSE SIMILAR CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE PROBLEMS: THE UNHCR UTILISES A CATEGORY OF 'MIXED' MIGRATION, RECOGNISING 'MIXED' MOTIVATIONS FOR MIGRATION, BUT PROVIDING LITTLE EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THIS IS THE CASE, AND WHAT THE UTILITY OF EMPLOYING THIS CATEGORY MIGHT BE OVER THE SIMPLE ADMISSION THAT PEOPLE HAVE VARYING ASPIRATIONS. THIS CATEGORY APPEARS TO OBFUSCATE SPECIFIC MOTIVATIONS UNDER A BLANKET STATEMENT WITH ADMINISTRATIVE GRAVITAS, BUT ESSENTIALLY JUSTIFYING INACTION, AND SHELTERING COUNTRIES WITH NASCENT POLICIES ON THIS FIELD (WHICH ARE THE CASES OF MOROCCO AND CAPE VERDE) FROM ADOPTING CLEAR TERMINOLOGIES THAT ADDRESS THE REAL NEEDS OF MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES.

THESE CATEGORIES PRIMARILY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF INSTITUTIONS THAT NEED TO CATEGORISE IN ORDER TO FUNCTION ADMINISTRATIVELY AND LOGISTICALLY, BUT DO NOT NECESSARILY WORK AS ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF STUDY. THE REALITY ON THE GROUND MORE ACCURATELY APPROACHES A TERMINOLOGY THAT WOULD INCLUDE SELF-SETTLED REFUGEES (SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENT), THIRD-COUNTRY REFUGEES, OR POST-CONFLICT TRANSNATIONALISM INSTEAD OF RETURN OR REPATRIATION (COUNTERING THE NOTION OF SEDENTARY BIAS, AS BAKEWELL CALLED IT, LONG HELD BY THE UN AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS), AND FINALLY SOCIOECONOMIC MIGRATION. EVEN THESE CATEGORIES ARE ADMITEDLY NOT WITHOUT ISSUES, OFTEN FAILING TO IDENTIFY VULNERABLE AND RIGHTS-CLAIMING SUBJECTS, RESULTING IN AN INEFFECTIVE OR NON-EXISTENT PROTECTION REGIME. IN MOROCCO, FOR INSTANCE, THE POLITICS OF DISPLACEMENT OF THE SAHRAWI IN WESTERN SAHARA LEADS THE AUTHORITIES TO TACITLY EVADE THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF REFUGE RIGHTS, AT TIMES SHIFTING THE DISCOURSE AWAY FROM THE CATEGORISATION AS 'ASYLUM-SEEKER' TO THAT OF 'ILLEGAL/IRREGULAR' MIGRANT, THUS RENDERING ASYLUM CLAIMS VERY DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW THROUGH.

IN THE CASE OF LABOUR MIGRATION, OR ECONOMIC MIGRATION, OR HOWEVER WE WANT TO TERM IT, ITS ASSUMED MOTIVATIONS ARE OFTEN READ THROUGH ONE-DIMENSIONAL AND NARROW VIEWPOINTS OF NEO-CLASSICAL 'RATIONAL-ACTOR' THEORIES, WHICH DETERMINISTICALLY EVALUATE ECONOMIC MOTIVES ABOVE ALL ELSE. BUT THESE SIMPLY DO NOT SUFFICE, AS THEY OFTEN FAIL TO GRASP THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MIGRATION, AND THE SIMPLE HUMAN LEVEL OF IT: ASPIRATION.

AND I THINK I WILL STOP HERE SO WE HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS.

THANK YOU

"Facing borders": Illegal mobility, religious imagination and gendered subjectivities in Morocco

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1. **Introduction**

Over the last decade, a key-issue has informed the political agendas of contemporary nation-states: the concern for homeland security (Wein, Baveja, Singer 2005; Amoore 2006; Coleman 2007), which has resulted in reinforcing policies for borders control and in filtering migration flows towards the European Union (e.g. Faist 2003; Newman 2006; Van Houtum 2009). From different perspectives, social scientists, geographers and anthropologists have focused on the consequences of externalization, militarization and digitalization of UE borders, as well as to the emergence of a new geopolitical imagination that have been reconfiguring the classic notion of "border" (Ackeleson 2005; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen 2002, Delany 2006). Yet the concrete ways in which people in flash and bones envision a better life beyond the Mediterranean Sea and craft their sense of selves under local articulations of border regimes require further scrutiny.

In this paper, I aim to shed light on the interplaying of transnational practices of governability, national migration policies and the forms of subjectivity arising from the contemporary Moroccan-European borders regimes. My reflections draws upon ethnographic research I carried out in Tedla Plain,[1] a rural region at the foot of Moroccan Middle-Atlas Mountains characterized by documented and illegal migration towards Italy and Spain since the mid-1980s. In this fertile rural region, documented and illegal movements of people towards southern Europe have engendered new imaginaries and expectations among young people and their families, by opening up spaces for upwards mobility, renegotiation of local hierarchies and new forms of subjectivity.

Firstly, I analyze the forms of 'illegal' migration in the Tedla Plain against the backdrop of national legislation, local debates and imaginaries of abroad. Secondly, I deconstruct the categories of 'legal' and 'illegal' migration across Moroccan-European borders, by shedding light on the different frames and set of meanings through which they are locally articulated in everyday discourses and practices. Not only has migration

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[1] This paper draw upon ethnographic research carried out for 14 months between 2008 and 2010 in the Tadla Plain as part of the doctoral program in the anthropology of contemporary worlds, University of Milan-Bicocca.

been constructed mainly as a 'male activity' in the Tadla Plain, but the gendered ideologies which inform the different strategies by which mobility is collectivity organized illuminate the intricacies of relationships and structures of power which enable and constrain border-crossing. I discuss these general issues by analyzing the life history and trajectories of mobility of Kamel and Atiqa, a young man and a young woman respectively who have endeavored to cross the Moroccan/European border. In doing so, I draw attention to the wishes and hopes, the expectations and the theological imagination (Pandolfo 2007) that guide their migratory trajectories. On the one hand, I show the ways Kamel and Atiqa have attempted to mobilize their networks of relatives, neighbors and friends in order to collect the money, gain access to information and succeed in their projects. On the other hand, I focus on the theological vocabulary through which they situate and understand their experiences of mobility. My aim in this paper is more providing an ethnographic account of their imagined, projected and failed trespassing of the frontier. Rather, I aim to address a broader reflection on the limits that an approach to the contemporary "border regimes" only in terms of their consequences pose to the understanding of the "illegalization" of migration itself (De Genova 2002: 419), as well as of the imaginaries, aspirations and gendered subjectivities which shape young people's life-worlds in Morocco.

2. **Moving along the European-Moroccan borderlands**

Crossing the European-Moroccan frontiers has become increasingly difficult and risky for aspiring migrants moving under the contemporary border regimes. Not only frontiers have been dislocated, externalized and militarized beyond the UE territories (on the base on bilateral agreements between Spain and Morocco), but also the EU has provided borders with information systems for detecting "illegal" migration, thus turning their territorial boundaries into "digitalized border zones" (Broeders 2007). In addition to FRONTEX, Spain has created the Integral System of Exterior Surveillance to contrasting migrants' smugglers and clandestine migrations along the maritime Spanish-Moroccan borders (see Carling 2007a, 2007b). The securitization of Southern Europe, thought, has not significantly reduced the presence of "undocumented" immigrants, who continue to enter the UE legally and overstay the duration of their permit or visa or move along new migration routes (FRONTEX 2010). Thus, European States' policies have recently turned inward (Broeders 2007:78), by discouraging undocumented migrants' stay through restricting of citizenship rights and by promoting new forms of surveillance through digital and electronics systems on a large-scale, such as Schengen Information System, SIRENE, Eurodac database, Visa Information System.

On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, Morocco has actively contributed in border control not only through bilateral agreements, but also by producing national policies and public debates and campaigns against 'illegal' migration. On the one hand,

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[2] FRONTEX was created in 2004 (CE n. 2007/2004) by U.E. to contrast illegal migration through sophisticated devices of control of internal and external frontiers.

Moroccan government has long attempted to consolidate its ties with the Moroccan *diaspora* in Europe and institutionalize migration through the establishment of research Institutes and Ministries. On the other hand, its ability to contrast illicit trespassing stands at the core its image within the international political arenas and its relations with Europe. The recent Moroccan migration law (02/2003), enacted against the backdrop of the increased concern of European nation-state after 16 May 2003 terroristic attacks in Casablanca, has move in this direction (Lahlou 2006).

The contemporary forms of border governmentality along the European-African frontiers raise critical questions to anthropology and social sciences. The floating corpses in Gibraltar Strait or the Canary Islands - as well, in 2005, the murders of sub-Saharan migrants crossing the fences surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla - speech out the ambiguous side of such policies. I suggest, however, that addressing the problematic of "illegal" mobility under the European-African borders *only* in terms of its consequences (Carling 2007a) may in fact risk be starting from the wrong side. As Nicholas De Genova (2002) claims, it should be put into question the historical process of "illegalization" of undocumented migration itself, and the production of particular subjects as "illegal aliens". Indeed, denaturalizing the *illegality* of migration entails shifting the focus from the standpoint of the nation-states and state law to the analysis of the legal-political economies under which the boundaries between "legal" and "illegal" are drawn (De Genova 2002, see also Kearney 2004: 136). Various scholars point out that, after crossing legal frontiers in the direction of Europe, (undocumented) migrants are incorporated within fields of power relations in particularly vulnerable positions. In this reversed viewpoint, the *bordering* (the making of the border) is conceived of as the legal-political product of processes of filtering and classification (*ordering*), which, in turn, legitimize the reproduction of social difference (*othering*) and class relations (e.g. Kearney 2004; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen 2002, Van Houtum & Kramsch 2005). Put in other words, the "illegalization" of migrations and the legal production of undocumented migrants as "illegal aliens" or "criminal" work to conceal the very fact that migrations are mostly labor migrations. Under contemporary UE/African border regimes, as elsewhere, the enforced clandestinity and illegality of migrants are reproduced and reinforced when they enter Europe under the law of particular nation states. As vulnerable, invisible and deportable subjects,

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[3] In fact, since post-colonial times, the *Office National de L'émigration* was set up in Casablanca to organize male migration to Belgium, the Nederland and Germany.

[4] E.g. Ministère Délégué Chargé de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à L'Etranger.

[5] According to the current migration law, people who enter and stay illegally in Morocco risk sanctions from 2,000 to 20,000 DH (about from 100 to 1,000 Euros) and/or imprisonment from 1 to 6 months (art.42). People who cross the frontiers illegally risk from 3,000 to 10,000 DH (about from 300 to 1,000 Euros) and/or imprisonment from 1 to 6 months (art. 50); migrants' smuggles risk from 50,000 to 500,000 DH (about from 5,000 to 50,000 Euros) and/or imprisonment from 1 to 2 years (art. 52). See Elmadmad (2004) for details.

undocumented migrants are included in informal economies as exploitable reserve of cheap labor forces.

3. **Gendered hi/stories of mobility in the Tadla Plain**

The Tadla Plain is a fertile region situated at the foot of Middle-Atlas Mountains (Central Morocco), which has attracted internal migrants' for the last six decades. Since the mid-1930s, the French Protectorate (1912-1956) created an irrigated perimeter for intensive agriculture, thereby promoting the development of agribusiness, administrative and trade sectors (Prefol 1986; Swearingen 1988). Besides processes of modernization, mass education and female access to labor market encouraged by the government in post-colonial time, transnational migration to Southern Europe since the mid-1980s have resulted in rapid social change. Compared with regions of Morocco with longstanding transnational connections with Europe, migration from the Tadla Plain to Italy and Spain is a recent, but deeply influencing phenomenon (Harrami, Mahdi 2006, 2008; de Haas 2007). Over the last few decades, it has produced rapid urbanization, upward mobility of people and groups and a widespread sense of "rural cosmopolitism".

In the 1970s, Bni Mskin, a group of cattle ranchers originated from Settat who practiced transnational mobility to Italy outside institutional channel since late 1960s (Troine, Berriane 2002; Harrami, Zmou 2010), invested in the Tadla Plain the gain of migration. "Les signes de richesse manifestés, à leur retour, par ces migrants qui occupaient la couche la plus basse de la hiérarchie sociale locale sont devenus dans la région la preuve irréfutable de l'existence d'un *El Dorado* dans l'autre rive da la Méditerranée" (Harrami, Mahdi 2006:39). Under the structural adjustment and the crisis of agriculture in the 1980s, an increasing number of men and young people started migrating to Italy, and then to Spain. In the Tadla Plain, migration (*hijra*) has long been conceived of as a male enterprise with important consequences for women and children who stay behind (Sadiqi, Ennaji 2004, Sadiqi 2008), even though an increasing number of women have migrated alone since the last decade (Harrami, Zmou 2010).

"Who does not travel, does not know the value of a man" (*Lli ma-jar ma-'arf haq rjal*) a saying goes thereby revealing the gendered nature of migration in popular imagination. Besides its religious meanings (Eickelman, Piscatori 1990), by migrating men are thought to acquire knowledge of themselves and the world. Likewise, they proof their virtues and abilities. The new decorated homes built at the outskirt of the towns or in the countryside, the purchase of land and migrants' business objectify the successful stories of migration in the public sphere. At the same time, they have contributed to the creation of an imaginary of abroad (*l-brra/ kharij*) as a land of opportunity (Bennis 2008), but also of moral corruption. Most people I talked with interpret the success of migration through local ideas of "proper male life cycles" and masculinity (Osella, Osella 1999, 2000). Migrants' long-term investments in durable goods like land and the household, as well as in marriage, fatherhood and domestic life, are imbued with religious and social meanings that epitomize the idealized trajectory from boyhood to mature manhood. Maturity, wealth, masculinity and reputation are

negotiated in various arenas of social life, in which successful migrants have to balance carefully personal interests with moral obligations within the extended family and their social networks (Osella and Osella 1990). In contrast, unmarried migrants' transient consumption practices, which may include fashion, cars, cash and also alcohol and prostitution, are blamed upon as immature and their families often try to "moralize" their conduct and canalize the resources by arranging their marriage. Yet male sporting of symbols of local distinction often fuels the desires of mobility of youths with low-class backgrounds, who claim: "if you don't have money nobody respects you" or "if you don't have a car, people don't even greet you in the streets".[6] Many young men and woman I met, either unemployed university educated people (*bitalyin*) or unskilled workers, think of migration as the possibility to "build their own future". Denouncing the corruption and nepotism, which in their view characterize Moroccan society, they image *l-brra* as a land of social justice and rights (Capello 2009). In fact, experiences, imaginaries and motivations for migrating are multiple and nuanced, and they often depend on people's social class, education and personal trajectories. Other young people also dream of abroad as the possibility of a *different* life-style, where they can enjoy freedom and self-fulfillment. As Samir,[7] a migrant man in his early 30s, told me, "Even if you work with your father and he is rich, you don't have your own money. You have to wait until he dies!". In other words, migration enables one to reach adult manhood and independence beyond paternal authority and dependency, which means collecting the resource to get married, support his family and build up his own household.

Most young people, however, once arrived in Italy and Spain, work out that making money easily and honestly to return to Morocco and invest in business is harder than they expected. They also suffer from the discrimination, loneliness and lack of a conjugal life, which shape their daily life abroad. Instead of reaching the land of opportunities they dreamt of, they found themselves working to pay the rent, the bills, and the cost of living and, if they can, they send money to their family. Moreover, the effects of the financial crisis in Europe have become visible through the returns of wives and children in Morocco as well as through the decreased investments and remittance of migrants. This situation has made many aspiring migrants aware of the difficulties of living and working abroad.

4. **Making sense to "illegal" migration**

Since the crossing of Moroccan/European border has become increasingly difficult in the last decade, reliable connections abroad and economic resources are critical factors in determining the concrete possibilities and the ways of migrating. Most individual migratory projects rest on networks of kin, friends, neighbors who provide information, support the expense of the journey and reliable networks abroad (Gardner, Osella 2003). As most young people do not own the means to migrate, the decision is taken within the family, at times involving larger social groups and the relatives abroad.

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[6] Field notes, May 2009.
[7] Field notes, June 2009.

Alessandra Persichetti (2003) argues that agnatic solidarity (*'asabiya*) plays a critical role in the processes of mobility between Italy and Morocco. According to the dominant ideology upheld by her interlocutors, patrilateral relatives are deeply bound by mutual obligations and moral duties. Yet at the margins public discourses stressing the importance of blood ties, some migrants complain about the envy, competition and conflicts that mark the relationships with their relatives in Morocco who aim to "eat" their resources and take advantage from them. In turns, some aspiring migrants argue that their relatives abroad not always provide support to their family members, or even take advantage by the sale of job contracts. In other case, ties with milk kin, friends and neighbors prove to be stronger than blood bonds.

For various reasons, thus, people I met have to turn to the local market of mobility to buy labor contracts, tourist visas, fake papers or a passage on boat, depending on the money they have or can collect (see also Ceslovi 2007). People in the Tadla Plain distinguish between two forms of mobility: legal (*qanuniya*) and illegal (*mashi qanuniya* or *bidun qanun*). As I will show, these categories do not uniform to official discourses and state law both in Morocco and Europe. According to my interlocutors, *hijra qanuniya* (lawful migration) includes: 1) family reunion (*tajamo' l'aily*) of spouses, minor children and close relatives, 2) study visa, labor contract (*contrada* or *contra*) or visa brought/sold by a relative abroad, 3) but also the purchase of real or fake documents and the arrangement of *marriage blanc*. While marriage has long been a mean for social mobility, in the last few decades it has been also regarded as a mechanism of geographical mobility (which may be included as a condition in the marriage contract). *Marriage blanc* is instead an unconsummated marriage for visa advantage arranged under payment. In other words, *hijra qanuniya* comprises various forms of documented migration (*b l-wraq*), regardless of their actual legality according to the state law. For my interlocutors, illegal migration refers to undocumented mobility either pursued by individuals who try to hide themselves in the tracks leaving to Europe or through transnational organizations for border crossing managed by *passeurs* (*arraga*).[8] Illegal migration is risky and unpredictable, but people with a few economic resources do not necessarily regard it as an extreme choice nor are they unaware of its dangers.[9]

People in Marocco use the term *l- rag* to refer to clandestine migration and to those who cross the border illegally. In Arabic, the verb *araga* (*rg* in darija) means "to burn". According to Stefania Pandolfo (2007: 333) *l- rag* evokes ideas of burning the borders but also of the "burned life", a life without name and legitimacy enclosed in a uninhabitable space. In particular, Pandolfo describes the ways youths living at the outskirt of Rabat mobilize their theological imagination and vocabulary to interpret and

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[8] For more details, see Coslovi (2007).

[9] According to the on-going research of Noureddine Harrami and Abdelmajid Zmou (personal communication), clandestine migration decreased after 2003, while the buying of contracts has increased.

make sense of their fragmented lives. Dispossession, disruption of social ties, exclusion from citizenship and chronic unemployment lead them to gamble with their lives. Engaging in conversation on death and life, suicide and endurance, patience and rebellion, Pandolfo points out that youth's religious imagination resonates with reformist discourses circulating through TV satellite, sermon cassettes and Islamist proselytism.

In conversation with scholarship on the relation between Islam and the formation of subjectivities (e.g. Pandolfo 2007; Osella, Soares 2009; Schielke 2009), I discuss the life-stories of Kamel and Atiqa. By moving through the recollections, I focus on the ways they narrate their (real or/and imagined) journeys from Morocco to a "land of promise". In different ways, they articulate their experience in terms of destiny and predestination (*qada' wa qadar*), thereby illuminating the theological imagination that informs their understandings of subjectivity, future and human agency as submitted to the divine law. The complexity of the stories that Atiqa and Kamel tell about their experiences, however, cannot be contained in a single frame. In re-telling "what happened" before and after migrating, they move and shift from different registers and life-worlds (Pandolfo 2007) and interweave personal ambitions, social responsibilities and collective dreams of a better life.

5. **Kamel: "Everyone wants to build his future (*kull wahed bgha idir l-mustaqbal dyalu*)"**

Kamel, aged 21, lives with his family in Oulad Khamis, a rural village about 20 miles away from al-Azalyya. After having migrated illegally to Spain at the age of 15, he was sent back to Morocco in 2008, when the police found him without documented. I met him in his house surrounded by his mother and siblings. Since then, he has worked as a seasonal farm laborer and as a brick layer, even though his family owns livestock and a plot of irrigated land. He said: "We have land, but my father does not behave well with us". Indeed, Kamel describes his father as a despotic and ignorant person who has never provided for his family. After selling the crops at the market, he gives his wife a sum of money insufficient for their basic needs.

Since he was a child, Kamel's uncles, cousins and friends who had migrated to Italy and Spain would return to Morocco with cars and money. Some of them replaced the traditional country houses made of straw and mud with brick-buildings and invested in land and local business. As many youths, he started thinking of migration as the concrete possibility to help his family, move away from a difficult relationship with his father and build his own future. As he explains, "I thought it was better disappearing than staying with my father."

When Kamel left in 2002, he planned to stay abroad forever. Besides his maternal aunt, he had several relatives on the paternal side in Spain on whom he could count. While his mother supported his project, his father firmly opposed to his decision to leave until his paternal cousins convinced the man and promised to support the cost of his journey and his stay in Spain. His father agreed to finance part of his journey by

selling livestock and his mother borrowed some money to her natal family. Kamel would have preferred to migrate legally, but he did not have a passport or enough money to buy the documents. On the other hand, as he said, illegal migration was a widespread practice in the area where he lives, and many of his relatives and friend leave to Europe thereby.

> I knew it was illegal because it's well-known. People heard about it at the cafés, the shops, they head that there is a *harag* (passeur) here. People who left illegally knew they went outside the law (*bdun qanun*) in a secret way (*taimshi b-tariqa sirriya*).

In Kamal's view, complicity and corruption are the basis of the illegal border crossing. Yet crossing the border illegally is always a gamble: one can be stopped at checkpoints and sent back, may risk dying during the journey or losing his/her money if the *passeur* is not reliable, "a person can never know if he will succeed or not in the order-crossing, he just gambles (*gha-tayqmro*)". Kamal's narrative of migration focuses on his dangerous journey to Spain, when he risked his life in the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea, and revolves around the control of his emotions and fears.

Fear, risk and destiny

Kamal migrated illegally at the age of 15, hidden under a coach travelling from Tangiers to Spain. He left early in the afternoon and, until 1.00 pm. of the next day, he remained tied with a belt above the wheel of the coach. "[The journey] was long. My legs, when I got out…I could not even stand" he remembers. Kamal describes his journey to Europe was an adventure (*mughamara*) laden with risks and dangers (see also Jacquement 1995), during which he had to display self control and face up to the fear (*khawf*), as a man should do. Meanwhile, migration is thought of as a pathway towards the acquisition of knowledge germane to an adult man. Living in Spain is also a challenge, as one should know how to wriggle out of unpredictable situations in a space of uncertainty. This is a fragment of the discussion I had with Kamel about his ideas of masculinity and travel, fear and destiny.

> K. Why did I go? One remains here, do you understand? Only work, home, the countryside, it's better to change. People who travel a lot, who go around, know [*taikon 'arf*]; they do not stay in the same place where they have always lived. For example, we all go to Spain to tempt our chance [*njrrbo l-   dialna*].
> L. Were you afraid?
> K. No. The one who wants to do something is not afraid. If I was afraid I wouldn't have left. As far as I am concerned, I don't know fear (*l-khawf, b-nsba liya, ana ma-n'rfosh*).
> L. But you were very young…
> K. Yes, I was very young. Men are not scared [*rjjala ma-taykhafosh*]! Fear, fear, why should you be scared? There is no fear because there is nothing to

fear. One has to try and that's it. It's said that it happens what Allah has written for you [*mktaba lik Allah khssha twq'*]. Those who have faith in Allah in their heart, are not scared, one face his life and that's it.

As his words testify, Kamal is aware of the dangers of illegal migration, but as many of his peers, he repeats that he is not scared. His conception of human beings as ontologically founded on the mercy of God reveals a theological landscape where the idea of inscrutable destiny (*qadar, mktub*) becomes knowledgeable only through the action in the world. The religious vocabulary by which he articulates his idea of personhood also mingles with another register. "A man is not afraid," he repeats several times thereby emphasizing a trait of a particular construction of masculinity (*rjuliya*), which is crafted at the margin of other trajectories of adulthood. He searches, indeed, for a runaway from the immobility in which he feels his life is caught. His friends and cousins who migrated abroad have made their fortune, while those who have not tempted their fate remain just "country guys" waiting in a timeless present.

Once arrived in Spain, Kamel called his cousins who took him by car to their house, where he remained for several months. The story about what happened after he set his foot in Europe remains unarticulated and fragmented. He recounts that with the help of his relatives he found a job as a farmhand, where he his boss gave him many responsibilities. In the years that followed, he often travelled from Spain to Italy by train, but he does not talk about the reasons of his trips nor is it clear what happened until his forced return to Morocco.

In Kamel's experience, illegal migration is only the beginning of a new life, but also an unpredictable pathway towards the getting out of the forced invisibility under Spanish law. Once he crosses the border, indeed, he becomes an "illegal alien". As such, he enters not only in black market and hence in other circuits of in dependency and exploitation, but also he risked any time to be stopped by police and deported to Morocco. Under these conditions, the social contraction of his adult masculinity through migration turns into a precarious enterprise, with its possibilities of failure and social breakdowns. Back to Morocco, indeed, Kamel has to start from the position from which his dream of a better life had taken shape.

Money and social justice

Discussing his multiple motivations to leave, Kamel interweaves the responsibility (*msuliya*) he feel toward his family, which he conceives of as part of his ideas of being a man, with the desire to build his own future. "Everyone wants to try his luck, but there are some things that are a priority for you, that make you think of migrating," says Kamel. The narrative that follows sheds light of his view of Moroccan society and the condition of immobility in which he feels his life is caught up.

In Morocco, the state does not give you your rights (*dwla ma-t'atiksh l-oqoq dyalk*). You work and the person who work for insult you all the

day! In the end of the day, he gives you the lowest payment. Bosses do not give you your rights here, do they give you the pay you deserve? The contributions? In construction, one works all day, since he gets up at 8 a.m. until 6 pm. for 60 dh (less that 6 Euros). If one wants to build his future, he can't. In Europe you work for a 60, 70 Euros per day. Here you work the whole day and you don't know what to do, you need money to dress, to live, to support your family, to build a house... who's the winner? Who makes a good life? Rich people: only those who have money can live well.

The impossibility to build a future in Morocco leads him to think of "burning the border" again. As he explains, unskilled young people who search for a job, find themselves doing backbreaking work in very harsh conditions of exploitation and lack of rights. For Kamel, only migration provides people like him with the opportunity to build their own future. In his country, in contrast, widespread corruption, nepotism, lack of rights and social injustice sharpen class divisions and social inequalities. In contrast, Spain remains a land of recognition and rights in his view, even though when he was there he has also experienced vulnerability, marginality and deportability. Kamel's words reveal different desires who lead him "to burn the border": the search for personal fulfillment, the moral duties and obligations he feels towards family ties, the need to escape from a present perceived in terms of immobility, nepotism and exploitation, the desire to move from adolescence to adulthood along and against local discourses on gendered subjectivities.

6. **Atiqa: "It wasn't written by God (*Allah ma-ktbsh liya*)"**

Atiqa is a 30-year-old educated woman who works as a teacher in a private primary school. The oldest of six siblings, she lives with her family in a popular neighborhood situated at the outskirt of Al-Azaliya, from which youths started migrating from to Italy and Spain in the late 1990s. After some years abroad, most of them returned for summer holidays with cars. Especially since 2001, an increasing number of people have migrated illegally to Italy and Spain, crossing the Sea on board of motorboats (*lancia*). Atiqa's younger brother Abdallah left with the first groups. Atiqa recounted to me his story, as her own migratory experience is intimately interwoven with that of her brother.

Abdallah was 19 when he decided to leave to Europe. His father would have preferred that he inherited the job as a carpenter, but the boy repeated that if his family did not helped him, he would have sit with folded hands. For Atiqa, Europe became a obsession for Abdallah. With the help of their neighbors' sons, one day he left to Spain on board a *zodiag*. After reaching the Spanish shores, the *arrag* went his way and Abdellah and his companions had to wait for someone who led them out of the forest

where they were hidden.[10] After two days, Abdallah called his family by mobile phone to ask their help. Despite their requests, none of their relatives abroad provided concrete help. Thus, his mother turned to the milk mother of Abdellah, who called his son in Italy. According to Islamic law, breast milk has legal value which is the origin of kinship[11] (milk kinship, *rada'a*), marriage and sexual prohibitions, but not descent or inheritance rights. As Atiqa said, breast-feeding creates ties as intimate and sacred as those of blood. As soon as Abdellah's milk mother knew that he is in danger, she called his son in Spain explaining the situation. His milk brother sent someone to bring him out of the forest and accompany to his house.

Abdellah got used to his new life in Spain quickly, found a job and got the documents. As he never returned home from 2001 to 2005, seldom called and sent money to his family, his parents who started thinking that Abdullah was not respecting his family and the moral obligations to support them. When Atiqa's milk sisters returned Morocco from Spain, they told her that her brother was leading a dissolute life, spending money in the disco and alcohol. They defined him *talf* (lost). This motivated Atiqa to express her desire to reach his brother in Spain, where she could find a job to help her family, but also "exert her control over Abdellah". In 2005, Atiqa was 26. She had finished her university studies without finding any job. She was regarded as an adult, even though she was still a *bnt* (girl, daughter, unmarried, a virgin). Not only is marriage considered to be a critical event in male and female life-cycles alike, but also Atiqa was about to reach the age that in the semi-rural environment where she lives is appropriate for a woman to get married. University graduated, unmarried and unemployed, Atiqa might have dreamt of a better life abroad. In telling her story, however, she has never speaks of her own desires, but mentions instead her responsibility towards her family as the main reason for migrating. As she said, her family would have not enabled her to leave alone. With the help of her milk mother, she organized a *mariage blanc* with a woman living in a town 20 miles away from Al-Azaliya who had three sons in Spain.

Asking for God's advise

Atiqa was very concerned about her departure and hence, the night before meeting the family, she recited *salat al-istikhara* to ask God's advise. "I knew everything and heard about this prayer on TV (*kol shi 'arft w sm'tha f-tlfaza*)", she told me referring to religious broadcasts she watches on TV satellite. Quoting a *hadith*, she explained to me that Muslims recite *salat al-istikhara* when they feel lost and confused about an important decision to take. God's revelation may manifest itself through a

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[10] Many people who cross the frontier illegally by boat told me about a forest where they waited for day, facing hanger and fear after a dangerous journey.

[11] Milk kinship is a under-theorized topic in anthropological literature. A few scholars have analyzed milk kinship as a female tie/strategy within domestic arrangements, Altorki (1980) and Khatib-Chahidi (1992), while others as a political alliance e.g. Ensel (1999), Parker (2005). French scholarship on milk kinship (e.g. Conte 200x, Fortier 2001, 2007) has been profoundly influenced by Héritier's work (1994, 1996, 1999).

dream or a strong feeling. She said "The *hadith*'s meaning, is that God, glory be to him the Highest knows everything of the world [*dnia*]: if it is good for me to go to Europe or if my faith will make it easier for me to leave. [I asked] to write the good for me, take me towards the good in Morocco or elsewhere". On the contrary, asking for people's advice and opinions (*ra'y*) can provoke even more confusion. The day after, her milk mother accompanied Atiqa to this family to agree on the money to pay: an half before leaving and the rest once she found a job in Spain. In Atiqa's eyes, "it was not written by God and therefore it did not succeed." On her way back by bus, she suddenly felt the need to cry.

> I felt a strong sense of oppression (*ddim*) as if I were about to die (*b al ila ghadi nmut*), as if something were about to happen, a strange feeling (*l-i sas ghriba*), very strange. A negative feeling on my way back home! I felt bad. It was New Year's Eve, 31 December, and people were happy. I was nervous (*mnirvia*), I got nervous (*tal' liya ddm*), I did not know what it was […] That time, God showed me that I wouldn't have gained anything from that (*Allah byan liya dik nhar blli hadak shi rah ma-fihsh*).

Atiqa repeated that she knew she that should not have signed the act of marriage (*'aqad*), but the next day she did it. A couple of months later, while she was still waiting for her documents to arrive, she started suspecting of acted against religion. She went to *Dar al-Qur'an* to consult a *fqih* (religious scholar), who confirmed her doubts: marriage is a sacred bond between the spouses and using it as a mean to migrate abroad is forbidden (*haram*) according to Islam. One had better buy a job contract to migrate. Atiqa waited for six months for her husband to send her the documents, then she went to his family, who returns her money to her. When her husband came to Morocco, he initiated the legal procedures of divorce.[12]

Bodies and social suffering

Atiqa recounts that when she realized of having acted against religion, she got psychologically sick: "my mind became ill (*nfsiya dyalti mrdat*), because I committed a forbidden action (*mu arrama*). Mariage in Islam is sacred (*hwwa shi aja sagrada, mqdsa, muqaddasa*)[13] and not something related to documents, *papiers*, no!" she describes the psychological state in which she fell as a process of becoming absent (*tanghib*) until losing control over her mind, her body, her language. "I precipitated in a state of extreme confusion (*ta t f l- ayra*)" she said. Indeed *ayra* indicates a condition of profound helplessness and anguish (Pandolfo 2007:352). Her close

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[12] They divorce *ttlaq qabla l-bina'* is a religious expression, which means divorce without having any sexual intercourse.

[13] Atiqa employs various terms from the Spanish *sagrada*, Moroccan Arabic *mqdsa* (sacred, holy) and standard Arabic *muqaddasa* (sacred, holy).

relatives and intimate friends begun fearing that she is *mskuna*, inhabited, possessed by *jinnun*.[14]

Her paternal cousin brought Atiqa to a man well-known in the region for his ability to heal by reciting Quranic verses at sick people. For two months, Atiqa gathered weekly at his place to listen to the man (mu'allim, lit. teacher), until she started feeling better. "All his words came from religion, the Quran, Sunna. My psyche got relaxed (*tatrta   nfsiyan*). He gave me water on which he had read the Quran...I went to him because my psychological situation was so severe (*li'anna nfsia dialti kant t'zzmat*) I started suffering from hysteria (*l-histiria*)", Atiqa said. In her words, the therapeutic sound of the Holy Book released the tensions embedded in her body and psyche, bringing her back from the world of absence in which her soul/self (*nafs*) was lost. Her body and mind surrendered beneath God, while, in Atiqa's view, going to a psychologist and taking medicaments would have made her sleep. Her recovery was also a spiritual pathway towards Islam, a return, against the backdrop of increased influence of contemporary reformist discourses. Since then, she has carried on memorizing the Quran and praying regularly. Whenever she has a problem or have an argument with someone, is uncertain, worried or nervous, she told me that, she does the ablution and prays, and "you get cool (*tat-brdi*), as if you haven't anything. Your soul gets relaxes [...] when you do ablutions, this thing disappears and you say 'ok, I will find the solution now!'."

Thinking over her experience, Atiqa also connects her psychological disease with the social pressures related to her status of divorced (*mtallaqa*), which continues to be perceived as a stigma for women in the context where she lives. She said: "It's a problem. Always, when you want to get married, then people say 'she's divorced.' It becomes a problem to get married again, and always: 'Is she on the wrong way (*hadik kharja   riq*)', 'where does she go alone?' " According to Atiqa, being divorced is not a problem for man, whereas women have a "bad reputation" and their sexual behavior is under people's scrutiny. Not only does Atiqa incorporate the suffering deriving from her failed attempt to migrate and the consequences she has to face, but also she articulates a reflection upon the gendered discourses and inequalities that shape the daily life of women in the society where she lives.

5. Gender, subjectivity and trajectories of mobility

In this paper, I have tried to show the complex ways in which young people living in a rural region of Morocco craft and negotiate their hopes and desires for a better life under contemporary Moroccan-European border regimes. "Legal" and "illegal" are the terms in which the political debate on migration is addressed both in Moroccan and European nation-states. In their recollections, however, Kamal and Atiqa do not locate their aspirations to mobility within the same legal-political frame, even though their stories reveal the tensions arising from their imaginary of migration that

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[14] Spirits living under the earth and potentially dangerous for human beings.

shapes youths' search for a better life and the ways contemporary border regimes that work to restrict their concrete possibilities to realize them.

To understanding their stories, I have engaged with other life-worlds standing at the intersection between present and future, here and there, visible and invisible. Both Kamel and Atiqa articulate their experiences in terms of destiny and predestination, which inform their understandings of subjectivity and the human agency beneath God's, as well as make sense to the unpredictability of future. In so doing, they evoke a form of political-theological imagination that is circulating in TV satellites and in local reformist discourses. For Kamel, however, confiding in the destiny that God has written when one's soul is infused in the body does not entail waiting for the unforeseen horizon of the future to slip into the present. On the contrary, this awareness leads him to tempt his own fate. Kamel's theological imagination mingles and interweaves with his own ideas and aesthetics of masculinity. In his words, being a man means also daring to hazard his life instead of sitting idly. In his view, the future remains unknown until a person acts in the world. Human action discloses one's destiny, which the faithful should face without the fear of death. His dream of a better life takes shape against the backdrop of a collective imaginary of abroad upholding illegal migration, but also it speaks of his desires to shun his personal family plight, social injustice and despotism in Morocco.

For Atiqa, human beings grope in the dark without divine guidance and, hence, she prays the *salat al-istikhara* to ask for divine advice before migrating. Despite God's revelation, she decided to sign the contract and ended up being a divorced woman in her mid-20s, without being a spouse even for a single day or having set a foot in Europe. In her view, by challenging her destiny, not only does she put her personal will before God's, but also she accomplishes a forbidden action: she uses the holy bond of marriage as a mean to achieve a worldly purpose. Her divine transgression results in psychological illness, loss of self and depersonalization. Only by submitting her dispossessed body to the sound of the Holy Book, she recomposes her fragmented selfhood, and her soul/self (*nafs*) comes to inhabit her body again.

The experience of (im)mobility and the failure of the migratory projects of Atiqa and Kamel have different consequences in their lives. Talking from the position of an exploitable unskilled worker after his forced return to Morocco, Kamel's narrative focuses on his journey to Spain, his ability to face fear and muddle through his new life abroad. Nevertheless, several aspects of his life in Spain and of the social consequences of his failure remain silenced. Before his fathers, cousins and neighbors, he is one who did not become rich or come back with a car in the dirt street that leads to his rural village. Atiqa's recollection focuses on her disease as the consequences of her divine and social transgression, as well as on the religious and therapeutic pathway from dissociation to present reconstruction of a moral selfhood. At another level, she speaks out the gender ideologies and social expectations connected to femininity in the context where she lives.

In telling their stories, both Atiqa and Kamel move and shift from different registers, which evoke the complex imaginaries, emotions, dreams and gender ideologies under which their migratory trajectories take shape. As gendered subjects and sexed bodies, they experience, incorporate, and challenge the Moroccan/European border, as well as the painful failure of their migratory projects.

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Fences, Networks, People: Exploring the EU/Africa borderland

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Notes on Implausible lifelines

Heather Merrill

"It is not just the dominant ideas and political practices, but the ==marginal, the implausible==, and the popular ideas that also define an age." Michael Hanchard, 2006, 8

INTRODUCTION

Maria Abbebu Viarengo spent the first twenty years of her life in Ethiopia and Sudan before her father brought her to Turin, Italy in 1969. Italy was no stranger to Maria who had previously visited the country not only in actual terms but through her imagination as a young person schooled in Italian language and history while growing up in a place briefly part of the Italian colonial empire. In her partially published autobiography, Maria describes the gradual re-awakening of the African dimensions of her identity she had felt forced to repress until the late l980s when a growing number of Africans appeared in the Piedmont region. Her memories of Africa had always been present, yet she could seldom express them. Compelled to assimilate and conform to Italian cultural identities, ==she never quite experienced a sense of belonging== in spite of the fact that her father was Italian, she spoke the official and regional languages better than many Italians, and she too was an Italian citizen. Maria wrestled with her ==multiply textured==

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her early life in Africa and relationship with her African mother, her Italianness, and the way she was perceived by Italian society. Of her experiences as a perceived outsider she writes:

"I have heard people call me, hanfez, klls, meticcia, mulatta, cafelatte, half-cast, ciuculatin, colored, armusch. I have learned the art of pretence; I have always looked like whomever others wanted me to look like. I have been Indian, Arab, Latin American, and Sicilian (74, Quoted in Ponzanesi, 2004, 161).

Maria's predicament is reminiscent of Frantz Fanon who described being caught between his own self-understanding as part of French society and experiences of erasure in France because of his appearance and designation as someone from a European colonial territory. Fanon and Maria are as he put it, "over-determined from without" in European society, perceived through a binary 'racial gaze' that demarcates non-whites as absolute others against privileged and well established social identities. Both spent the better part of their lives acquiring the knowledge, cultural codes and habits of a colonizing culture that had believed their own but then moved to Europe where they experienced a rupture as their 'sisters and brothers' refused to recognize that they existed. Maria describes in her autobiography what we might characterize as another rupture because both her self-identification as belonging in Turin was denied by the surrounding world, and the parts of her identity that were Oromo, Ethiopian and the histories of Italy's relationships with Africa were forced into hiding and effaced by her Piedmontese, Italian identity (Ponzanesi 2004).

Maria represents a particular variant on the experience of people who are part of African Diasporic belonging in Italy. She is of a broad group of first generation Africans who have lived in

Italy for twenty to forty years and experience place in Italy as integrally connected with Africa. Maria is from a former Italian colony, while many others living in Italy today spent their youths in diverse parts of Africa colonized by other European nations. They share diverse yet overlapping African cultural histories and common histories of colonization and racialization that unite them across the multiple spaces and places of the Diaspora. As Stuart Hall has pointed out, the identities of these postcolonial subjects are always in the process of being produced in struggles over representation and belonging in relation to exclusionary national and racialized frameworks that have sought to erase their histories and participation in European Modernity. Hall's observations suggest that while united by shared experiences of powerlessness and the pursuit of freedom and inclusion, a highly diverse African or Black Diaspora always also speak from somewhere, from material and discursive positions and places (Hall). Maria Abbebu Viarengo struggles to be recognized in Turin as Italian and Oromo in a context that links her transnationally with Africa and other spaces of the diaspora, but she also very importantly awakens each morning and falls asleep in Turin, so her identity is produced distinctly in that place, defined through axes of power that shape politics, meanings and practices of place and boundary, difference, hierarchy, and identity.

Among people from former European colonies, the meanings of place and belonging are particularly fraught, connected as they are with interlocking and conflictual histories around collective identities dominated or at least strongly influenced by and continually bound together with European political and cultural institutions and modern European racialized formations (Winant). This is not to say that there has not been a great deal of resistance and synthesis or that African political and cultural institutions were erased; on the contrary, African cosmologies and practices have been reproduced within the colonial ruptures and forms of displacement in

what Stuart Hall, borrowing Senghor and Cesaire's metaphor describes as a continuous "Presence Africaine" that is a source of inspiration, agency, and creation. Yet there is also always in African Diasporic formations a "Presence Europeenne," a troubling aspect of identity because the European presence has been so overwhelming, introducing the issue of Power by imposing, excluding, forcing, and appropriating. Hall cautions that movements among former colonized to locate the Presence Europeene as external, to separate all that it represents from their cultural identities rooted in Africa is problematic, for the many dimensions of the European influence are irreversible and its presence also continues (Hall). In their everyday lives, these postcolonial people embody both Africa and Europe. This applies to all Africans whose lives have been touched in varying degrees by European colonization, and it takes on some unique and compelling dimensions for those who have migrated most recently to Europe (see Gilroy; Hesse; Brown; Keaton; Carter; Hine, Keaton, and Small eds.; Andall and Duncan).

That links between identity and place have become complex in a world of increasing and routine mobility and displacement is not a new area of theoretical inquiry. However, since the first burst of path breaking reflections on the topic in the early 1990s (Clifford, Appadurai, Gupta and Ferguson, Basch and Glickschiller et. al, Malkki), much of it suggesting that displaced social actors form multiple attachments to geographically distant places through daily experiences, memories and transnational communications, there has been a tendency to gloss over the ways that power relations and the theatre of Eurocentric racial hierarchies (central components of Western modernity) have remained pivotal antagonisms for social actors whose movements are part of the African Diaspora (Marable). Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy offered early and very noteworthy exceptions, focusing on how people from the Caribbean and African countries struggled to carve out places in England in opposition to monolithic and absolutist conceptions

of British identity as white, male, and upper class. Where exclusionary constructions of place have been addressed, there has been a tendency to conceive of these problems in generalized terms around categories of difference broadly conceived in a language of 'intolerance,' 'xenophobia,' or 'cultural racism' toward immigrants whom local populations perceive as threatening to their ways of life (Taguieff; Miles; Stolke). As important as these studies are, they have fostered approaches that tend to underestimate the continuing importance of colonial histories, as well as the specific and ongoing weight of European power, and struggles over recognition, place, and belonging among descendents of Africa.

The flip side of this obfuscation of the significance of racialized identities and racism to place can be seen in sociological studies which tend to conceive the lives of people in the African Diaspora as if they operated in self contained social worlds, where social relations appear to exist in third dimensional spaces that are autonomous and not connected with wide social, political, and economic processes (Gregory;Brown). Even in the most influential work of African Diasporic studies over the past two decades, arguably Gilroy's seminal work, *The Black Atlantic* in which he clearly problematized common struggles across African Diasporic spaces and places in the North Atlantic, there is a tendency to reify diasporic space as a sort of separate and distinct, closed cultural place. While the rediscovery and assertion of the significance of African histories and the contributions of Africa and the African Diaspora to the contemporary world are extremely important, there is as Jacqueline Nassy Brown has pointed out, some danger in conceiving of diaspora as itself a place where one is by definition bounded off from European society. As Brown suggests, race is not autonomous from Place (Brown). Diasporic identities aren't usually produced in communities that are suspended in-between national territories -- even if they sometimes feel that way. Black experiences are situated in places that are products

of interconnected power relations and meanings of the present and past (Pred, Keaton, Brown, Ifekwunigwe, Carter, Twine, Lipsitz).

This paper explores the experiences, negotiations, and meanings of place, identity, and belonging among diverse first generation of Africans in Turin with whom I have done extensive ethnographic research for two decades (Merrill 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2011; Merrill and Carter 2002). These African-Italos and their descendents are as Stuart Hall put it, "taking back the Empire" as they make their presence increasingly felt in the territories of former European colonial powers. They are part of a renewed cycle of African Diasporic formation in which increased flows of migrants and displaced peoples are forced to move from war or in search of work, what Achille Mbembe described as an "unprecedented revival of the imaginaries of long distance" (Mbembe, 6). Scholars of Africana Studies have begun to note that the cultural fabric of Europe is being transformed as first and second generations of Africans challenge monolithic, Eurocentric definitions of belonging, racialized logics, and exclusionary practices (Gilroy; Hall; Keaton: Carter). Their experiences in Europe are different from those of other immigrant populations whose presence may also be contested. As Barnor Hesse suggested in the only article to discuss race in a seminal volume on place and identity politics edited by Keith and Pile, "Immigration is distinctive for blacks whose settlement in Europe is always enmeshed in racial antagonisms that affirm ambivalences and equivocations in the conditions for settling" (Hesse). Settlement is not a discrete moment for these Africans whose countries have been profoundly connected with Europe. Overturning simple teleologies, they claim place in a Europe whose history is their own and participate in the making of new histories.

There are few studies of African diasporic experiences in relation to place and identity, especially in the new cycle of African diaspora[1] formation in Europe. And because the racially essentializing logics of Western Modernity continue "to project a nightmarish shadow over the formations of Black cultural and political identities" (Hesse, 1993, 166), critical scholarship on the black diaspora must by necessity engage with issues of power, race and racial inequality. My discussion brings the separate geographical literature on place and critical race scholarship focused on the African Diaspora into dialogue by conceiving of place through the prism of race and the lived experiences and cultural identities of people whose lives are connected with Africa. Exploring contemporary meanings of place and belonging from the vantage point of black experiences[i] is a clarifying issue that may offer insights into the intersections of place and race. Viewing the production of place from the perspective of racialized subjects suggests that in contra-distinction to political and popular classifications, the national, ethnic, and even racial borders between Africa and Europe are porous, overlapping, and ambiguous, encouraging new ways of understanding place and belonging. The study of Africans in Diaspora is particularly informative for understanding the borders between Europe and Africa, which on closer inspection are like shadows on cave walls.

In what follows I begin by discussing the transformation of Turin's political culture and situated practices in relationship to African-Italian belonging and a reformulated racialization of place over the past two decades. I discuss the rise of nativism, and the resonance of Italian colonialism with current images, practices, and configurations. I then examine the lived

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[1] I use 'African' and 'Black' Diaspora and experiences interchangeably in this essay. I realize that not all people who identify themselves with African origins consider themselves 'Black', and I use the term in the same spirit as Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small and the authors in their edited volume, *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, as a cultural-political signifier among people who identify themselves as part of African Diaspora in a racialized formation.

experiences of identity and place among first generation African-Italians in Turin and suggest that their experience of being-in-the-world can best be described as <mark>being-in-polycultural-places</mark>, as part of a Trans-Syncretic place linking Africa and Europe.

SECTION II

"The materiality of a place lies not merely in its physical, visible form... but in its identity…"
Jacqueline Nassy Brown, 2005, 9

I've been working in Turin since 1990 when the first wave of the political battles over immigration crested, and have since returned for shorter field work visits almost every two or three years. During these two decades I have listened to and observed people of African origin struggling to carve for themselves and others places of dignity and inclusion in Turin. The initial period was marked by dramatic precarity when some of the most common problems included their being in highly vulnerable positions without residence papers, being rejected time and again for jobs they were qualified to do, and paying exorbitant rents for substandard housing. During later visits I sometimes caught them breathing sighs of relief, for instance as they or members of their families found work after having been unemployed for many months, their cooperatives were awarded grants from the municipal, regional governments or the European Union for various work and intercultural projects, their residency permits were renewed, or they had managed to find a landlord to rent them a reasonable apartment. At other junctures I

found them upset, anxious, frustrated and talking about how their family members were dying in African conflicts while the Italian and other European governments did nothing to help, they'd lost a job or hadn't been paid by an employer, they weren't making enough money to pay their rent, were experiencing *and* being blamed for crime, were losing jobs to competition from Eastern Europeans, or they were not being heard by anyone with authority in the Italian government, trade unions, or political parties. But I have to say that until the summer of 2010 I had never heard from my African and Italian informants such a converging and encompassing sense of despair and desperation. The 'crisi' or crisis of unemployment, precarity of work and vulnerability to job loss, rising costs and lower salaries, high taxes, and cut backs to or erasure of government supports were constant refrains among my Italian informants. Almost all of my African informants were either out of work or working part time with temporary and very low paying contracts, usually in the ==informal economic sector==. Some talked about leaving Turin.

These stories were also expressed in the ways that people in Turin inhabited and experienced place, in what Allan Pred referred to as the 'situated practices' of everyday life that intersect with what I believe are some very dramatic transformations in Turin's political culture (Pred). Labor historian, Francesco Ciafaloni described what was happening in Turin as "I think the worst situation in two hundred and fifty years," typified by the 'rovesciamento' or capsizing of the partnership of trade unions and government that had worked to represent workers and protect them from exploitation. By 2010, most of the trade union leadership had become professionalized, following middle class habits and ways of life, modeling themselves after managers of large firms or heads of offices in public administration and using their positions as stepping stones for positions of greater authority, for instance in politics (Ciafaloni, I Sindacati..). These leaders had bargained away almost fifty years of labor gains and agreements. Worker

traditions were so degraded and labor so debased that there was little if any difference by 2010

between the working conditions for those with trade union representation, and those working in

'Lavoro Nero' or the informal economy where the most egregious forms of exploitation are well

documented (Ciafaloni).[2]And perhaps the worst part of all of this, according to many of my

Italian informants, was the loss of culture, which as one complained bitterly, "Once you kill a

culture, you can't revive it." There was an overwhelming sense that the world had forever

changed, but not for the better. Vanishing were the shared desires for equality, trust in

leadership, and general regard and responsibility for each other, including those who owned

little or nothing. Perhaps most disconcerting was the fading away of collective consciousness,

political and social participation, and the rise of ==political apathy== especially among the youth who

either did not vote or supported political parties that promoted highly localist and binary

ideologies in defense only of the rights of those who appeared to be Italian citizens, and against

'foreigners.'

Turin has long had a localist culture based on closely knit social and political networks

along with a global vision of itself not only as part of a broader Europe but of the world of

workers. That the Northern League, a party with a divisive, tightly communitarian and anti-

immigrant ideology that promotes images of a closed territory under threat of invasion and

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[2] On Sunday, October 23, the New York Times published an opinion piece by Alexander Stille, a Professor of international journalism, suggesting that the U.S. has a high tolerance for economic inequality and also for cultural diversity in contrast with Europe, which has "maintained much more economic equality but is struggling greatly with inclusiveness and discrimination." Citing a number of American sociologists, Stille argues that European counties have done a much better job than the U.S. in protecting workers' rights and salaries (NYT, Sunday Review, "The Paradox of the New Elite"). I don't think his statements about worker protections in Europe hold up against the continual erosion of worker protections that have characterized the past thirty years in Italy. And I also think he's walking on thin ice by suggesting that the U.S. is now racially inclusive. One has only to examine the recent Pew Research Center report on record wealth gaps between whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the U.S. (Pew Research Center 2011).

pollution by people that follow inferior ethno-cultural beliefs and practices, recently won the

regional elections in Piedmont is therefore somewhat of a paradox[3]. The Italian Communist

party subscribed to an inclusive ideology that incorporated many Catholics and internal

migrants from agricultural zones in the South and Veneto. Gramsci, founder of the party, was

from Sardenia. An industrial city, home of the Fiat automobile company and one of the principal

engines of Italian economic expansion and also of the Royal House of Savoy, the city was until

recently both provincial and expansive. And on the surface of it, this expansive, global sense of

itself has been nurtured over the past two decades as municipal and regional governments have

embraced economic and cultural union with the rest of Europe and supported the construction

of several multicultural sites such as the Alma Terra, the Gate, the Centro Interculturale and

plans for the construction of the second mosque in Italy (the other is in Rome).

Officials have promoted an image of Turin as a cosmopolitan city, and on the outside it

does appear this way much more than it did in the past. Investments in urban renewal made in

preparation for the 2006 Winter Olympics have improved many of the roadways, lending to the

to the city's more urban feeling with amplified traffic and more people driving Fiats and other

automobiles manufactured in Europe than the noisy 'motos' that had only recently rivaled cars

for domination. One of the foremost symbols of Turin's transformation from a predominantly

industrial to a city of research, services, and tourism was the conversion of the old Fiat Lingotto

plant into a massive shopping complex with grocery store, movie theatre and hotel. In recent

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[3] The 2010 local and regional elections saw a surge in support for the anti-immigrant right. 13%
of the national vote went to the Northern League. Bossi's party won governorship of Piedmont
and the Veneto, and expanded into areas outside its Po valley homeland, into 'red' Emiglio
Romagno where it won 14% of the vote. The League may not be as overtly racist as other
European extremist parties such as the National Front in neighboring France, but its policies
include turning back would-be immigrants at sea (as against the Geneva Convention), and
setting up centers for identification and expulsion- policies that have already been implemented.

years this site has picked up considerably in popularity with the addition of Turin's "Eataly"

grocery store, cooking school, and restaurant with a series of kitchens specializing in single

course meals, all featuring locally produced Slow Food products[4]. This has become, along with

the shopping complex, a favorite site for dinner among young, fitness and health conscious

professionals who don't have enough time to cook, yet still have very well trained palates and

high standards of consumption and are now willing to frequent a restaurant that in spite of its

claims to being part of the Slow Food movement, might be characterized as serving impersonal,

albeit healthier and authentically Italian 'fast food.' In late 2010 an Eataly site opened in

Manhattan near the historic flatiron building on 23rd street, and it's even more popular than the

original Turin location, attracting millions of New Yorkers and tourists for a rather expensive

taste of Italian cuisine. Turin has also recently exported a Gelato site, Grom, which like Eataly

promises consumers healthy, Slow Food, rooted in the cultural and territorial traditions of

Piedmontese gastronomy. In July 2007, Fiat re-launched in Turin with great ceremonial display

along the River Po and culminating in the grand Piazza San Carlo its iconic automobile, the "500"

or "Cinquecento." The Cinquecento appears in the popular film, the *Bourne Ultimatum* (2007),

and was released in the United States in 2011, promoted by the international pop star, Jennifer

Lopez. The expansion of Eataly, Grom, and the Cinquecento seem to provide evidence that

Turinese are becoming more globally minded and open to cultural differences, but these

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[4] Turin is the birthplace of Eataly, founded b Oscar Farinetti. Turin is also the birthplace of the Slow Food movement, which seeks to re-recreate lost connections between farmers, producers, cooks, and consumers. The Slow Food organization is a consultant for Eataly, and its members inspect its products and farmers for quality. Eataly also showcases sustainable agriculture and food production.

developments instead point more strongly to the emergence and exportation of an ethno-regionalist culinary identity and culture of consumerism.[5]

Another noteworthy development is that every warm night of the week until the wee hours of the morning with the exception of Sunday, one can observe bars with tables stretched on sidewalks and in piazzas packed with young Italians. The Italian press refers to these youth soirees as "La Movida," actually a Spanish term for the end of the Black Satanic Mills of industry and the culture of tourism and consumerism. Yet as much as it is tempting to characterize this in uplifting terms as evidence of globalization and expanded wealth in Turin, many of these consuming youth are unemployed. Like the Eataly phenomenon, this spectacle of contented consumerism and sociality hides the ugly underbelly of growing poverty, unemployment, poor working conditions, very low birth rates, intolerance and anti-Islamic, anti-black racism that the non-analyst may not see. Turin of Piedmont, like much of Northern Italy, is in a struggle to contain any transformation within the logic of its own inwardly directed and spatially inscribed notions of ontologically pure, traditional and authentic ways of being.

As Italy seeks to grapple with its new identity as part of the European Union and as a country of immigration, some effort has been made by local governments and NGOs to promote acceptance of cultural differences. But in general the country has relapsed into localism and nationalism, while multiculturalism has been countered by racism (Di Maio). As the ILO has suggested, in the past two decades in Italy there has been a sort of 'involution" in terms of anti-racism and egalitarian norms (ILO 2000). The Italian *Zeitgeist* has changed, and a significant

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[5] Luke Mckinley has written an outstanding undergraduate honors thesis examining the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiments and the Slow Food movement in Piedmont ("Yes to Polenta, No To Couscous!: Constructed Identities and Contested Boundaries Between Local and Global in Northern Italy's Gastonomic Landscape," Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2010).

portion of the population rejects anti-racist norms. Populist rhetoric often based on old

prejudices and stereotypes has returned to characterize public debates. People no longer believe

they need to be tolerant of or open to people who appear different from mainstream Italians

(Volpato et al). These attitudes are promoted by politicians currently in power, as was clearly

demonstrated in the remarks made by the Italian Foreign Minister and member of the European

Parliament, Mario Borghezio, who following the July 2011 tragedies in Norway said that the anti-

multicultural positions of the perpetrator of the mass murders, Breivik, "Could certainly be

agreed with." Borghezio said thatthe Oslo killings were, "The fault of multiracial society," which

he described as "disgusting." (NYT July 28, 2011)[6]. Borghezio's Northern League (la Lega)

promotes the idea of a pure and culturally homogenous territory under attack by ethnic and

cultural pluralism.

As Tim Creswell has pointed out, in the creation of place the definition of what lays

'outside' plays a critical role in defining what is 'inside' (Creswell). The Lega, which has achieved

growing influence, re-defines Northern Italy as a culturally and territorially distinct space where

out of place foreigners are destroying local Italian identity. People from Northern and

Subsaharan Africa in particular are perceived as belonging elsewhere, in the culturally-

geographically separate and backward territories of their origins, 'South of the South'

(Huyseeune). The Lega sees the northern River Po basin of an imagined Padania as belonging to

a Celtic-Germanic culture and European Italy as opposed to the Greek-Latin culture of African

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[6] Another telling example comes from the Italian Prime Minister himself. When Sylvio Berlusconi remarked that Barack Obama was "Young, handsome and even has a good tan" the conventional wisdom in Italy seemed to be that Berlusconi was just being Berlusconi. But as Jeff Israely suggested. " That's telling in itself. In many ways, mainstream Italian society is several generation behind the rest of the West when it comes to race. In supposedly polite company, one can still hear the word, Negro, (pronounced neh-grow) which essentially translates to the N word." He added that Northern Italians joke that dark-skinned Southerners are "Moroccans." (Time World, Oct . 1, 2002).

Italy, i.e. the Mezzogiorno and beyond (Cachafeiro). The party has responded to the

transformations in the Italian economy by self-consciously inventing a newly imagined

community and manipulating territorial imagery to create a sense of cultural and economic

distinctiveness, reifying its claims with definite borders. This discourse of ethnic absolutism has

gained increasing traction in replacing the Left/Right and class oppositions that dominated

Italian politics until the early 1990s with a strong sense of Insider or 'Us' identity (Agnew and

Brusa 1999). The Lega gained strength in the early 1990s in the wake of the political collapse of

the parties that had for decades been seen to defend industrial workers, the erosion of racialized

communitarian ways of life and the tertiarization of the economy as against what was seen as

the corruption of the state and its Southern Italian public sector representatives. But the party

also endorses and promotes widespread prejudices against 'coloured immigrants' (Cento Bull,

179). Their exclusivist discourse is currently aimed particularly toward 'Arabs' and those with

darker skin whom Umberto Bossi, leader of the Lega depicts as the least assimilable among

foreigners or those perceived as the most culturally and ethnically distant from the host

population (Cento Bull)[7].

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[7] The Northern League was first and foremost a regionalist part that created an imaginary of its own pseudo northern Italian culture based on social and economic differences from an underdeveloped Southern Italy, symbol of a corrupt and parasitic state. Yet one needs to realize that the discourses of race and racialized science in Italy were formulated around distinctions between Northern and Southern Italians, the latter allegedly born with atavistic 'primitive' traits found among African 'savages.' This racial discourse was indeed put forward in Turin, where Cesaire Lombroso was a Professor of Psychiatry and Criminal Anthropology and where he wrote his *L'Uomo delinquente*, postulating that Southern Italians and Africans were genetically predisposed to criminality. One of Umberto Bossi's slogans is, "Africa begins at Rome" (Agnew and Brusa 1999). The Lega sees its mythical Padania as a culturally monolithic territory especially threatened by the cultural differences long associated in Northern Italy with the South - which, again, includes Africa. The party uses criminalizing images and discourses about Africans, Muslims and other newcomers to promote its parochialist fixation on the purity of Northern cultural space. Its political posters are most telling examples of an exclusivist politics (Huysseune, Portelli, Cento-Bull; Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005).

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Political representations of a unified Italian identity (in this case Northern Italian) and the cultural borders between Italy and Africa have been widely interpreted by scholars as fabricated, contradictory, and fleeting. But the Lega's electoral triumphs and growing influence on political discourse and culture are hard to dispute. Moreover, the exclusionary discourses and images of Africans and Arabs used to re-invent Italian identities currently circulating in the media did not appear out of an historical vacuum. As part of the fascist regime's campaign to create national unity, it delegimitized Africans and Jews, introducing Italians to anti-semitism and recirculating old narratives that European culture had used to dehumanize Africans for centuries. And today, Lega narratives and posters bear striking resemblance to those that circulated during Fascism. The targets have changed; the strategies have remained the same (Volpato, et al). Thus, many Italians today respond to the growing presence of Africans and other migrants through the optics of old ideas (Carter 1997;Merrill 2006). Indeed, the fact that there has been an ongoing effort to suppress from Italian collective memory and consciousness any negative features of the colonial experience and especially the crimes perpetrated in the African colonies explains in part the current redirection of old ideas and attitudes toward immigrants (Carter 2010).

Italian colonial amnesia and the myth that Italian colonialism was benign are deeply embedded in popular consciousness in spite of a recent flourish of critical historiography (Del Boca, Fuller ed., Palumbo ed.).[8] There is widespread resistance to acknowledging and even

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[8] There is a growing literature that grapples with the myths and realities of Italian colonialism, beginning with Angelo Del Boca's seminal works, *Gli Italiani in Africa orientale: Nostalgia delle colonie*. Roma-Bari: Laterza 1984, and *L'Africa nella conscienza degli italiani Miti, memorie, errori, sconfitte.* Bari: Laterza, 1988. Also see work by Nicola Labanca, eg., *Storia dell'Italia coloniale*, Milano: Fenice, 2000. In English, see the collections by Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller eds., *Italian Colonialism,* Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 and Patricia Palumbo ed., *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present*, University of California 2003.

wishing to know about Italy's colonial past, so it remains hidden in the shadows where it guides current ideas and practices (La Banca). The legacy of Italian colonialism includes some atrocious acts of containment and extermination (ref) as well as racial segregation and preoccupation with hierarchy and differentiation between Italians and colonial subjects (Fuller, Barrera, Andall and Duncan ed.). Moreover, as Italy expanded into Africa it projected an image of a distinct national identity in opposition to black people, marked as other (Ponzanesi). Such patterns of hierarchy and distinction do more than linger in the Italian collective unconscious; they permeate current perceptions and practices and are reinforced through a variety of legislative and institutional mechanisms (Merrill). One Lega official recently proposed washing down the buses that 'blacks' had ridden and creating segregated compartments. According to my informants as well as those of Jacqueline Andall, Italians are most hostile to people with dark skin and perceived to be from Africa (including Egypt) whom they perceive as belonging to "unacceptable" immigrant groups (Andall).

The Lega's expanding influence on and resonance with popular sentiment regarding the exclusive place of Northern Italy in modern racial hierarchies seems to now permeate quotidian practices in Turin. Over the past decade, there has been a gradual removal of visibly identifiable foreigners from central locations to the shadows of common spaces. In the l990s the city appeared to have been becoming culturally diverse, as one would frequently travel or shop next to people of color, some culturally identifiable because dressed in colorful flowing or white robes or African print shirts and dresses and caps or hair coverings. Once highly visible in the city and particularly in the residential areas around the Porta Nuovo train station, shops in the San Salvario neighborhood, on the streets in the retail arcades along Via Po, and in the Sunday 'balon' or multiethnic market, people of African descent are now much less frequently seen in

public places. They are there, but less visibly in their flats and workplaces or the 'black spaces' of occupied buildings, detention centers, and homeless shelters (Merrill in progress). Informants speak of the heightened and more frequently chilly reception they often experience while going through their everyday activities.

Place politics can be exclusionary and reactionary, where one group such as the Northern League seeks to define itself with a monolithic, territorial sense of belonging as against outsiders (Keith and Pile, ed. Creswell; Adams; Soelscher; Duncan and Duncan; Till). Yet as Doreen Massey suggested, from an analytical perspective places can be conceived as products of interconnecting flows and routes of people, ideas, and things (Massey). Instead of conceiving of Europe as a distinct, geographically bounded discursive place, I think it is crucial to re-imagine its cartography through the ontology of people in the African Diaspora with air, water, and virtual arteries to and from Africa in a single, hierarchical social configuration produced through the continuing legacies of colonialism, cultural exchange, capitalist expansion, and human movement. The life experiences of many people born in Africa and living in Italy are far from simply and singularly 'African' any more than they are simply and only 'Italian." For them, Italy and Africa constitute overlapping worlds, or what I call Trans-Syncretic Places. As Achille Mbembe has suggested, 'African identities' are not monolithic, they are multiple, straddling several different cultural, local, and regional identities (Mbembe). In Heideggerian terms, the Being-in-the-world of these African-Euros is a polymorphic being, a Being-in-Polymorphic places. This being in the world has to be grasped as simultaneously, and syncretically African and European. African-Italian multiple subject positions contest and displace the Lega's monocultural perspectives, suggesting different ways of belonging in the contemporary world.

SECTION III

"The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully the topography of power… For if one begins with the premise that spaces have *always* been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection."

Gupta and Ferguson, 1997

In her pathbreaking study of race, identity, and the French educational system, Trica Danielle Keaton suggests that a second generation of African Muslim girls are perceived and spatially marginalized in France as 'Other,' even though the French state doesn't officially recognize racial and ethnic minorities. According to an absolutist and color-blind political philosophy and state policy the French educational system equalizes by sublimating all differences to 'common cultural' norms. Nevertheless, these teenagers from the Maghreb and West Africa who live in urban projects located on the urban peripheries, are treated as less than fully 'French.' Socialized in French public schools, the young women practice and inhabit a French cultural 'habitus' of learned dispositions and taken for granted practices, and when in public space are forced to hide the parts of themselves that participate in the cultural and religious habitus of their parents. Their subjectivity is shaped by a sense of not being recognized as truly French along with their identification with the African and Arab worlds that are perceived in France as different, dangerous, and illegitimate. These young women challenge discourses of belonging by classifying themselves as 'French' even though they're black and

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othered, and also by positioning themselves as part of overlapping cultural worlds. Keaton

suggests that actual practices contradict myths of national identity and cultural boundary:

"...The world, including France, belongs to no single people – despite popular perception to the contrary-

and the cry of *je suis francais (e), 'c'est mon pays* now opens the gates of fortress France to its children of

various African (and Asian) origins; opens the doors, that is, to these "being perceived" (88-9).

Struggles over identity and belonging faced by a second generation of Africans in

Keaton's study resonate with the experiences of first generation Africans in Italy. Both first and

second generations are widely perceived to hold illegitimate claims to cultural citizenship, and

both inhabit multiple cultures that straddle Africa and Europe (Andall and Duncan 2011).[9] For

decades Maria Abbebu Viarengo wrestled with the various parts of her African identity that she

was forced to sublimate, and when more Africans began to appear in Turin she was able to

marshal collective support for recognition. She and other Africans from diverse areas in Eritrea

and Ethiopia, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya and other parts of

the African Diaspora worked together and in smaller groups to make Turin a place where they

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[9] Conflicts around racialized identity and citizenship have been expressed in at least two widely
known controversies on the national stage. The first surrounded the crowning of Denny Mendez
as Miss Italy in 1996. Mendez was born in the Dominican Republic and later moved to Italy when
her mother married an Italian man. The controversy began when two of the panel judges
reportedly said that a black woman could not represent Italian beauty, sparking criticism and
cries to close the borders to further immigration. Another such dispute around racialized
identity surrounds the soccer player, Mario Balotelli who was born to Ghanaian parents but
raised by an Italian family in Brescia. When he played for Milan's Internationale club, Balotelli
was verbally attacked with racial slurs, especially when playing against Turin's Juventus team
where spectators held banners reading "A negro cannot be Italian!" Balotelli has since defected
to a team in England partly to avoid the chants and cries against him as a black player although
he's also a member of the Italian National Team. He has said that he was proud to be black and
Italian (eg, David Taylor, "Mario Balotelli speaks out about Italian culture of racism in new book"
The Guardian, 14 December 2010).

would be recognized. Their efforts led to the production of designated multicultural and religious spaces for the expression of African and other cultural practices. Until the growing economic crisis and political traction of the Lega, there was considerable social and cultural exchange initiated by migrants in collaboration with a variety of Italians active in old and new Catholic and non-governmental associations connected with the political left (Merrill 2006). In certain neighborhoods such as San Salvario and Porta Palazzo, there was also in the late l990s a surge in the presence of Africans buying and selling in the daily markets and the opening of African and Asian hair styling salons, restaurants, video stores, and especially phone calling/Western Union transfer centers. However, over the past decade the majority of non-Italian managed shops in San Salvario have closed, and the African presence there has diminished greatly as people have left Turin or have been moved out to the urban peripheries.

Part of what differentiates the way place is experienced among descendants of Africa from such experiences among other immigrant groups is the legacy of European imperialism and Africa's integral role in European modernity (Said, Goldberg, Miles, Guillamin). Informants from former Italian colonies or trusteeships in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia report that in spite of their long presence in Italy, Italians tend not to distinguish between them and recent immigrants, and they are classified according to dominant tropes generated in the media. As one of Jacqueline Andall's Eritrean interviewees remarked, "If you're dark (Italians think) you're Senegalese, if you're fair you're Moroccan" (Andall, 200-1). People from Italy's former colonies dispute this conflation with other Africans, arguing their right to be recognized and treated as members of an extended Italian community. However, people from parts of Africa colonized for example by the French, English, Portuguese, or Belgians also contest their invisibility and claim belonging in Italy (Carter 2010). The recent growth in writing in Italian by people like Maria

Abbebu Viarengo, Tahar Lamri (Algeria), Gabriella Ghermandi (Ethiopia), Kossi Komla-Ebri (Togo), Igiaba Scego (Somalia) and many others speaks directly to the deepening paths connecting Italian and African place and identity (Orton and Parati; Parati). My informants include people from African countries where French or English are national languages, and who conceive of Italy as a place in Europe that might have been more welcoming to Africans than either France or England. From their vantage point, Italy was another location in a kaleidoscope that included other European countries with historical and continuing presences in Africa. From their point of view, this meant that they, too, had a shared historical and continuing presence in Italy. Yet, many Italians did not acknowledge this in the early 1990s, and do so even less today in spite of African-Italo participation in many aspects of Turin's identity as a fading city of workers and trade unions and the making of new meanings and places of activism and sociality.

More than ever before, there are many different ways of being "Italian" and "African," and first generation Africans-Italos in Turin experience place and identity in ways that at once relegate them to the shadows of local Italian life and locate them as crucial participants in the making of a world linking Africa to Italy in new ways. Although I have been until now referring to my informants collectively as united by common colonial histories and their legacies, they are a heterogeneous group and there are some significant differences between them. Some are women with children married to Italian professionals, others are women or men married to a compatriot with and without children living in Italy or in Africa, and some are single mothers who have never had stable, long-term formal sector employment Italy. They come from counties with different political histories, including Senegal, Mali, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Morocco. Like Maria Abbebu Viarengo, they all experience Turin as a place where African cultural identities are recognized principally in performances or as

spectacle, in performances of traditional African dance and music. Expressions of African philosophies, religions, or social relations that cannot be reified or commodified as exotic for Italian public consumption are scorned or ignored, while Africans are collectively denied a sense of being 'at home' in Turin. Nevertheless, first generation Africans continually critique the ways they are misperceived as racialized outsiders, and affirm in their everyday activities and narratives that they are Italian, and also African. Following is a case study that typifies and describes the contradictory racialization of Africans in the invisible shadows and the centrality of their membership in quotidian life in Turin. Like many other such stories, I think this demonstrates the sense of being-in-polymorphic places experienced by African-Italos.

As I suggested above, "La Movida' or youth soirees have become standard sites for nightly youth gatherings at bar-restaurants whose tables blanket sidewalks and piazzas. The businesses now compete for customers with high quality appetizers, service and music, some quite successfully. In a renovated enclave of what has come to be known as a neighborhood with a high concentration of North Africans, one restaurant-bar among a string of such sites is particularly well regarded and popular. Until at least 2am each night, customers hang about to nibble, drink, chat, and laugh. The enterprise regularly hires young women from other parts of Europe, but for years the owner has held a man from Dakar, Senegal in his employment. I met Malik in 1990, when he first arrived in Turin. A native Wolof speaker who attended schools in French, he could not find gainful employment in Senegal and moved initially to France where he found himself under so much scrutiny as an 'illegal' without any hope of employment or regularization that he decided to seek a livelihood in Turin. He arrived at a moment of ferment when the first real immigration legislation was established, the political party structure (PCI or Italian Communist Party, the DC or Christian Democrats, and the Socialists), that held power

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since the war had not yet collapsed, Bossi's Lega Nord and Fini's neo-fascist party (MSI or Italian Social Movement currently called the People of Freedom Party) had very little influence, and the trade unions (still connected with political parties in Turin) held some legitimacy and authority. Early on, Malik found limited term contract work cleaning parts for a local Fiat firm. During off times he worked with some of his compatriots as an itinerant trader for which he traveled throughout the country and sometimes to France or Switzerland. Eventually he was given a longer-term contract with the Fiat company where he worked extremely long hours including Sundays, but he joined a trade union and was paid according to standard union rates for the job he performed. Malik is a legal resident of Italy with working papers. He speaks Italian quite fluently, moving easily between the language and his native Wolof. He has at least one Italian friend with whom he worked at the Fiat company. As the restructuring of Fiat and its subsidiaries and contractors in Turin has held pace with the rest of the industrial world and moved many of its manufacturing firms to rural and parts of the less economically developed world including Eastern Europe, Malik worked less regularly and he took a second job at the popular bar-restaurant. Eventually the Fiat company closed its local shop entirely, and he lost his job. As industrial jobs have increasingly vanished or have become unstable in the Turin area, consumer and professional service jobs have expanded and Malik was fortunate to have been working for a bar-restaurant that was thriving during the economic downturn. Malik was hired as a full-time bus-boy and all around handyman. He works in the kitchen, where customers don't see him and yet he seems to be crucial to the success of this business, heavily depended on by the owner who phones him at all hours of the night if needed. Malik was also fortunate to have been able to acquire subsidized housing via the municipal government. He lives in a tiny one bedroom flat on the top floor of a building that he has at various times shared with two to five

compatriots, sisters and their spouses. His apartment is located off a cobblestoned street and above several upscale bar-restaurants. His wife and children have remained in Senegal for these twenty plus years and he has sent most of his earnings to support them and his mother. His father passed away several years after he moved to Italy, and he has since held primary responsibility for the family as the eldest surviving son. His wife and mother have also earned income through trade, but have increasingly depended on Malik to cover rising costs.

Malik's two younger sisters and his aunt all live in Turin. His aunt arrived with him around 1989 and lived with him initially in a flat packed with Senegalese men for whom she did most of the cooking. She currently lives alone in a very tiny flat paid for by her husband who visits but spends most of his time traveling for work or in Senegal. One of Malik's sisters, now married to a Senegalese man whom she met in Turin, arrived in 1991 and the other in the late 1990s and also married to a Senegalese man whom she met in Turin. Malik also has a brother in Southern Italy who is married to an Italian woman and they recently had a child. Malik's sisters all speak fluent Italian. Both of his sisters have moved in and out apartments, some subsidized and some not. One of the sisters lost her home because it was designated as a space for a family with children and try as she has for many years with her face scarred from fertility medications, she has never been able to conceive. Even after having lived in Italy for over twenty years, the municipal government took their one bedroom flat and sent them packing because she couldn't give birth to a child. She and her husband have moved in and out of stable employment for over twenty years. The other sister in Turin who has a university degree in information technology in the early 2000s held a stable job working for a firm on the outskirts of Turin that made resin for yachts but soon after the trade unions organized the almost exclusively female and immigrant employees to strike against toxic working conditions, the company moved out of the country.

She told me that her advanced degree meant nothing in Italy because she was "solo una colonizzata" (only a colonized). The other sister, Awa, once opened a phone calling/Western Union site where she feared for her safety in a neighborhood with growing crime rates, and she struggled to keep it afloat during the economic downturn but was unable to keep up with the rent payments. She has since traveled to trade in African clothing, handbags and other items while searching for regular employment.

In the summer of 2010 Awa was deeply despairing about the conditions in Turin and the virtual impossibility of an African over 35 finding work, particularly when up against competition from Romanians, Poles, Yugoslavians and other Eastern Europeans who for a number of reasons were preferred. She had finally been offered a job for a few weeks that paid well under the union standards watching an 82 year old woman who was the mother-in- law of a Senegalese acquaintance and married to a wealthy Italian. The family was going on vacation and the grandmother didn't want to stay alone. Awa's husband had been out of work for a very long time but had just found temporary and part time very low paying work as a security guard for a Chinese operated gambling casino in Turin. Awa worried about his safety walking back from work late at night as public transportation was unavailable.

When we first began talking with this Senegalese family over twenty years ago we communicated in French and they were struggling to navigate the local social and political landscape with the help of mediators with knowledge and connections with representative organizations in the local government, church, and trade unions. Following an initial period of uncertainty when they struggled for basic housing, residence documents, and health care, they became more settled in Turin, making connections with supportive Italians as well as Senegalese in leadership positions with the trade unions or associations. They learned to follow national

and local political developments in Italy and in Senegal, and they can identify local political leaders whom they pass on the street. Their cooking now combines elements of Senegalese and Italian ingredients, although they are able to obtain many of the same ingredients they use in Senegal in one of the local Chinese owned groceries. They follow Italian soap operas, American television shows dubbed in either French or Italian, and Senegalese sports competitions and music videos in French or Wolof. The "Presence Africaine" is of course very strong for these members of the new African Diaspora who lived in Senegal for some twenty years and have been able to maintain continual exchanges with their countries of origin via television, telephone, networks with other Senegalese in Europe, and deliveries via family and compatriots. Yet during the past several years coolness and even hostility toward the visibly non-Italian and non-European sanctioned by the nativist rhetoric of the Lega has become acceptable practice. In this context, they don't really choose to wall themselves off from Italian society. When asked about their national identities, they have for some time readily defined themselves as both "Italian" and "Senegalese." And in fact Malik had already defined himself in part as European even before he arrived in Italy, having been educated in French language, history, and culture and from a country where the French presence was felt in many domains of everyday life. Yet today, when they walk out the door of their apartment and through Italian consumption sites they are often stared at, especially when wearing African clothing. In these racialized, Italianized spaces where there is tremendous anxiety about loss of a distinctive cultural identity, difference is not allowed. Sadly, these Senegalese have turned increasingly inward, focusing on their Muslim religious rituals and speaking regularly of wishing to return to Senegal where life is so much better than in Italy because people treat them with kindness and hospitality. They focus more today than in the past on gaining status through Senegalese networks.

Conclusions

Italy is widely represented and understood as the birthplace of Western Civilization, the

epicenter from which European intellectual, artistic, political and economic leadership

flourished and expanded throughout Africa, the Atlantic World, and eventually all over the globe.

Every year millions of people visit the country's Great urban centers to discover a little of their

own histories instantiated in architectural and artistic achievements and to experience a sense

of unity with humanity through Italian cooking and the warm and friendly people whom they

expect will welcome them. These images and expectations were as salient among a first

generation of postcolonial Africans when they first arrived in Italy as they are to the continuing

flow to visitors who claim diverse European descent. All identify in varying measure with an

Italy of creativity, achievement, and human warmth. And arriving on national soil most visitors

find this, in varying degrees. However, those who remain in the country and don't demonstrate

biological or hereditary roots are far less warmly welcomed than those without them.[10]

Frequently people associated with African places conceived as separate and radically distinct

from Europe, regardless of their legal status, are at best kept at a social distance and are at worst

ruthlessly exploited in the labor market (Merrill 2011).

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[10] Italian citizenship is awarded to people with a maternal or paternal grandparent who had
Italian citizenship. A contested status, it is rarely awarded to foreign residents today and not
even considered until one has lived in the country for ten years and has considerable financial
resources. Refugees can apply for Italian citizenship after five years, but refugee status is itself
seldom granted in Italy.

Over a half century has passed since Europe's fascist policies and practices that sought to control populations through racial purification, anti-semitism and the extermination of people classified as weak and 'foreign' were exposed as grossly tragic historical mis-steps. Yet even though the historical distortions of the racially essentializing logics of Western modernity legitimized in anthropological and eugenic sciences have been laid bare, the racialized hierarchies that nourished them have remained pivotal. The rigid silences that surround colonial atrocities by Italy and other European countries in Africa, the relations of force, cultural imposition, and racialized exclusion serve not only to reproduce the relations of power but also to remove from view the histories of people of African descent and their continuing participation in European modernity. African diasporic belonging in Europe is experienced as a being in poly-cultural places, where Africa and Europe are embodied in everyday lives as against absolutist, monolithic assertions of identity, being, and place. Situated in place, blacks participate in multiply textured ways to the transformation of culture in Turin.

Over the past two decades, Africa has come to signify in Italy unwanted immigration through proliferating images of African prostitutes and more recently boatloads of nameless people capsizing at sea or landing on Lampedusa, an island off the coast of Sicily. In fact, there has been considerable effort to stem the flow of newcomers through restrictive legislation and by fortifying, militarizing, and expanding Italian maritime borders. Policies and dominant negative tropes make the enforcement of the geographical borders between Italy and Africa painfully real as people are turned back or deported and the racialization of place continues to contribute to nightmarish experience of being "overdetermined from without." These are real experiences, even among people of African descent like the soccer player, Mario Balotelli, who

grew up in Brescia, speaks the local dialect, and knows little to nothing about the world of his Ghanaian birthparents. A climate in which the Italian zeitgeist is to reject anti-racist norms established after fascism doesn't make it easy for Maria, Malik, Amu and many others to express openly the multiple dimensions of their identities, their participation in trans-syncretic place. Yet the binary narratives that divide Italy from Africa don't even begin to describe the complexity of their experiences and self-understandings as postcolonial Africans in Diaspora.

If there are is any lingering doubt that Europe's frayed narrative of itself as the closed space of phenotypically, ethnically and culturally white people is being rewritten, one need only follow the headline news from the summer, 2011. From far right terrorist attacks against multicultural policies in Norway, to protests demanding the right to live legally in Italy, to riots against racial profiling in areas of concentrated cultural diversity in England, a steady and escalating current of discontent has unhinged exclusivist notions of belonging. These eruptions all express differing subjectivities, forms of experience and knowledge about who is or ought to be classified as a legitimate 'insider' with all the attendant rights and privileges, and who by contrast does not belong or is if not in fact then symbolically an outsider belonging on the other side of the European border. In spite of drastic measures that include contracting with the Libyan coast guard to patrol the southern coasts or erecting more detention centers both on and off-shore, Italy has over the past two decades irrevocably become a country of immigration. If one takes demographic trends as any indicator, it's evident that the country is rapidly becoming more ethnically diverse. Birthrates among immigrants are 2-4 times what they are among native Italians, which are among the lowest in the world. This country that until at least the late l980s identified itself solely as a sender of Italian migrants and not a receiver of foreigners is now

increasingly multicultural, and its future depends also on the children of African and Arab

descent. A non-fixed future.

The contradictions of the Melilla and Ceuta border fences

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the border fences of Melilla and Ceuta act not only to separate the populations of Europe, Africa and elsewhere, thus consolidating the borderland between the two continents but are contradictory spaces materially representing the contradictions of liberal universalism found in the discourses of neoliberal globalization[1] and the inclusive narratives of the European Union and the exclusive practices of separation that often result. These contradictions of separation thus highlight contradictions between opening and closing; rich and poor; universalization combined with exclusion and stratification; the world of shrinking space and increasing flows and the world of increasingly sophisticated border fortification; the world of the free flow of goods under global capitalism and the sovereignty of the nation state and the security of the subject (Andreas 2003; Brown 2010 and Castells 2000). In addition these fences act as spaces of political mobilisation bringing divergent communities of people together. They separate and yet they are also productive spaces that facilitate political action challenging the separation function of border fences. However, as spaces of resistance and the focus of borderwork (Rumford, 2008) the fences also serve to re-produce and re-enforce the border in the imaginary.

Introduction

The European borderland itself is not simply geographically fixed but is spatially multifarious and can be located throughout Europe, for example, wherever a detention centre or immigration office is situated. However, for the purpose of my argument I will focus on the territorially fixed and clearly demarcated borders around the Spanish exclaves

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[1] I refer to the current period of globalization as neoliberal globalzation throughout this paper in recognition of the fact that this period of global interaction is not in and of itself new and that human societies have always interacted over time and space. This challenges the dominant discourse of globalization that argues for a compression of time and space as being unique to the post-Cold War era facilitated by technological and socio-political changes. I argue that technological advances and socio-political changes have always facilitated such 'shrinking' processes.

of Melilla and Ceuta. The borders around Melilla and Ceuta, while being (the only) land borders between the EU and the African continent, are also visibly delineated by the border fences that surround both towns. These fences are part of the ongoing territorialization and re-territorialization of not only Spanish sovereignty but also of the European Union itself, with the EU having contributed millions of Euros to the building of the fences. The Schengen Agreement may have removed many of the border functions from within the Schengen Area; however, it has not erased borders. Instead many border functions have shifted to the edges of Europe with the effect of re-enforcing the EU as a separate region, spatially, politically, economically, socially and culturally.

The borderland that is created by the fences around Melilla and Ceuta is a space of contradiction on three fronts: firstly the fences are aimed at protecting a society that is thought of as open, liberal and democratic, a society at the vanguard of neoliberal globalization and post-Westphalian ways of living. However, these fences represent the opposite and create cities that are closed, illiberal and highly militarized. Secondly, the fences, located at Europe's periphery, fail in their defensive role aimed at separating Africa from the European heartland. In drawing attention to the separation of Europe from its southern neighbours these fences become the focus of debate and resistance around the migration-management practices of the EU and the consolidation of Europe's outer-borders, in turn, becoming sights of interaction between migrants and activists. Thirdly, as the focus of attention and as sites of resistance against the normative and material consequences of European separation and migration-management policies, the border between the EU and Africa with its identity of separation is reproduced and reinforced.

Firstly, I will start by discussing the emerging conceptual literature that addresses the phenomena of fence building in a supposedly globalized age and the geopolitical context of Melilla and Ceuta in a Mediterranean dominated by European interests. Secondly, I will outline the securitization process that has led to the building of the border fences in question. Thirdly, the fences themselves are discussed while fourthly I will outline the opposition to the fences before finishing finally with a discussion of the contradictory nature of these fences and spaces and their role in the consolidation of an Africa/EU borderland.

Conceptualising and contextualising fences

Fences and walls are increasingly being built between states, a physical reality that stands in stark contrast to the dominant discourse of globalization that argues boundaries are disappearing (Shapiro and Alker, 1996) to create a borderless world (Allen & Hamnett, 1995). The international is increasingly presented as a shrinking space of increasing flows (Castells 2000) where state boundaries are thought to be losing their barrier functions which in turn is understood as a general crisis of the Westphalian system of states (Kolossov 2005, 614). Globalization and apparently unprecedented human movement across boundaries are having profound implications for traditional concepts of international relations.

Wendy Brown (2010) has recently argued that the promulgation of walls and fences in differing parts of the world is a result of the supposed crisis of Westphalian sovereignty. Neoliberal globalization has the effect of appearing to reduce state sovereignty and the resulting walls and fences are an easy way of ensuring the continuation of sovereignty even if such sovereignty is according to Brown somewhat illusionary.

> "Most walls continue to draw on the idea of nation-state sovereignty for their legitimacy *and* serve performatively to shore up nation-state sovereignty even as these barriers do not always conform to borders between nation-states and are themselves sometimes monuments to the fading strength or importance of nation-state sovereignty" (32).

In addition Brown argues that most walls and fences are constructed by nation-states and draw on the easy legitimacy provided by sovereign border control functions while aiming to act as barriers against 'postnational, transnational or subnational forces that do not align neatly with states' or their territorial boundaries. However, others may appear as national boundary markers, but are actually driven by what she terms 'postnational investments in barriers to global immigration' (Ibid). According to Brown the fences of Melilla and Ceuta fall into this latter category (Ibid). However, I suggest that the Melilla and Ceuta fences can be understood as all three categories: as a sovereign investment by the Spanish state, as barriers against 'postnational, transnational or subnational' forces and as a 'postnational investment' to prevent migration, with the postnational in this case referring to the EU.

Therefore, what are the 'drivers' behind the Melilla and Ceuta fences are they sovereign or post-sovereign articulations? Perhaps we need to first ask: what does sovereignty mean in this context and how are its boundary functions practiced within the context of the EU? An EU which seeks to erase internal sovereign boundaries between member states while consolidating and strengthening external boundaries between Europe and its southern and eastern 'others'. In the case of Melilla and Ceuta the border is both one between Spain as a member state of the EU and the EU itself (even if Melilla and Ceuta may fall outside of the Schengen acquis for reasons of migration-management).

The EU's border policies and migration-management practices create and enforce a European region that clearly delineates European citizens from non-European peoples through the Schengen acquis that transfers state-boundary logics to regional-boundaries (Bort, 2005). These in turn consolidate the EU as a region with a distinct geopolitical identity. The Mediterranean region is integral to this discourse of separation and exclusivity and as a historical-geopolitical region the Mediterranean has often been presented in these exclusive terms. In addition it has also been romantically understood as an *espace mouvment* (space of movement), as the cradle of civilisations with common historical roots favouring dialogue, interdependence and region building (Braudel, 1973). Both of these concepts make the Mediterranean region one of central importance to the EU's normative identity and its strategic interests (Pace, 2006, 2007a & b, 2010). The Mediterranean in this context can be understood as part of the constructed borderland that separates Europe from Africa and is classified as an important sub-region as a result.

The construction of the Mediterranean as a borderland can be understood as part of the shift away from focusing on the line of the borderline (van Houtum, 2005: 673). Such a shift away from focusing on the line is representative of the increasingly spatially differentiated and externalised practices of border-management that results in the focus shifting from the material demarcation in space that is the boundary, border or barrier. However, as much as the Mediterranean functions as a space of separation the borderland between Europe and Africa can be found in more specified and localised sites. The Melilla and Ceuta fences, while they may be the product of current border-management practices, focus our attention back on the line as a 'real' boundary that impedes human movement and gives notions of separation and exclusivity material reality.

Thus as some, such as Brown, believe that the increase in walls and fences are symptoms of the threat to sovereignty created by globalization others, such as Heather Nicol and Julian Minghi, point out 'although borders and boundaries are continually being transgressed and challenged by people, culture and capital, we have yet to see national territories, boundaries and sovereignty give way to the impact of globalization' (2005: 680). I argue that the Melilla and Ceuta fences while being material articulations of current national and regional forces (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011a, b, c & d) operating within processes of neoliberal globalization, they do not mark an end to sovereignty, or the power of the state/region when we shift our gaze to the domination and practices of resistance they create. They can be seen as products of sovereignty, as products of national and regional strategic interests and as part of the continuation and consolidation of existing global hierarchies between 'north' and 'south'. But the fences are as William Walters suggests the best material representation of the idea of Fortress Europe (2004: 692).

Securing the EU, securitising migrants

There have been attempts to explain the creation of walls and fences through increasing securitization that is part of the exclusive response to the openness and universalization of neoliberal globalization (Bigo, 2002, 2008; Buzan, 1991; Wæver et al., 1993 & Huysmans, 2000, 2004). The fences around Melilla and Ceuta can be understood within the overall process of securitization that has seen migration coupled with issues such as organized crime and terrorism. Brown suggests that what she calls 'the popular desire for walling' is tied to the desire for 'protection, containment, and integration' and these are promised by a Hobbesian state sovereignty. Thus, according to Brown walls and fences generate a 'reassuring world picture in a time increasingly lacking the horizons, containment and security that humans have historically required for social and psychic integration and for political membership' (2010: 26). Therefore, according to Brown the responses of society to these walls and fences come from feelings of insecurity. However, we must bear in mind that these walls and fences are themselves constructed by discourses of insecurity but are also products of institutions, be they state or regional and in addition they also produce material realities that determine everyday lived realities.

During the past two decades in Europe and elsewhere migration has been constructed as a destabilising force that endangers domestic, regional and international stability. Over this time migration has been both discursively as Thierry Balzacq explains and socially

constructed as a 'threat' (2008) and has been categorised along with terrorism and organised crime as something that the state and other institutional bodies must guard against. The construction and classification of migrants as destabilising is made possible by their location 'outside' the territorial state (or regional) unit and their ability to challenge one of the primary functions of the state-unit, that of border control, which is itself understood by scholars such as Michael Anderson (1996) as a core state activity. All states maintain the exclusive right to determine who and what can enter their territory. However, in recent years border policy has shifted from one of traditional defence and the taxation of trade to one of policing. As Peter Andreas highlights 'more intensive border law enforcement is accompanying the demilitarisation and economic liberalisation of borders' (Andreas, 2003: 78).

Now while the EU model might to some extent eschew this categorisation through the removal of internal borders under Schengen, through the continued use of military vessels in securing the southern-border in the Mediterranean and the use of military personnel along the eastern-border, the building of heavily militarised fences around Melilla and Ceuta and now on the Greek-Turkish border, the policing aspect of border policy highlighted by Andreas very much applies to the construction of migrants and migration as a threat. Meanwhile, more widely, it is clear that European militaries are now being used for 'crime-fighting' as opposed to traditional defensive and 'war-fighting' purposes (Andreas & Price, 2001). As "clandestine transnational actors" (Andreas, 2003: 78) migrants must be denied territorial access as their clandestine character threatens the territorial integrity of the state, a territorial integrity that is at the heart of determining what the state as a political unit actually is, as argued by Anderson.

Migration's inclusion into the debate on securitisation was first charted by Barry Buzan in his book *People, States and Fear* (1991), one of the first publications within the field of security studies to assess the link between security and migration. The construction and classification of migrants as a destabilizing force that must be secured against is most closely associated with the Copenhagen School's discursive constructivist approach to securitisation, represented by the work of Ole Wæver, Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) that gave rise to a considerable literature on the role of discourse in securitisation. Meanwhile Didier Bigo has focused his research onto the role of social structures in guiding the process of securitisation (Bigo, 2008). Meanwhile Jef Huysmans (2000; 2004) has explored the nexus between the discursive practices proposed by Wæver

and the Copenhagen School and the social construction of migration proposed by Bigo in the context of EU policy and its implementation. This dialogue between the discursive and social elements behind the construction of migration as a security threat frames the policy and material responses of the EU and member-states, as argued by Huysmans, and has fed into the literature on EU border policy and the practices of externalization.

When migrants threaten the territorial integrity of European space they need to be kept out of that space at all costs. This coupled with a normative EU built around liberal democratic ideals results in the conclusion that the threat posed by migration must be managed outside of Europe for fear that carrying out the policies deemed necessary to police the threat should taint the liberal democratic identity of the European project. Something highlighted by some of the methods used in the construction of the Melilla and Ceuta fences, where the needs of securitization have to be balanced with the need not to appear illiberal. In addition the liberal democratic nature of the EU has lead to political and legal systems designed to protect human rights, which also contribute to the practices of externalization. Migrants must not enter European space because they can exploit the norms and values of the EU that have been legally encoded to ensure their rights as migrants. A similar dual normative and strategic logic lies behind polices of rendition and the use of authoritarian regimes in the questioning of terror suspects. Thus, externalization as a practice has been increasingly employed, argues Matthew Gibney (2005) and Elizabeth Taylor Nicholson (2011), as a way for liberal states and regions to preserve their territory as a liberal space and to circumvent legal codes designed to protect human rights. Therefore, the fences around Melilla and Ceuta make up part of this practice of externalization by ensuring migrants cannot enter European space and thus be subject to European norms and laws.

Fencing Melilla and Ceuta

As has been discussed the border fences surrounding the Spanish exclaves of Melilla and Ceuta are part of the wider practice of EU migration-management, much of which due to practices of externalization increasingly take place outside of European space. Melilla and Ceuta, as part of Europe in Africa – an anachronistic throwback to the role African space has played in European colonial practices – are at the interface between the practices of migration-management within and an externalized migration-management without, most prominently in North Africa. Events of recent months have highlighted the role of many North African states in the practices of European migration-management and thus it is

increasingly clear that for many the borders of Europe start in the deserts of Algeria or the prisons of Libya. Melilla and Ceuta fall into this logic. As Europe in Africa they are the last line of a European defence that is seeping ever southwards. They are not for example the only barriers employed for European migration-management purposes. The Moroccan government has received €200 million since 2004 under the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for use in security related areas. Under this Partnership Instrument €40 million was for the specific purpose of strengthening border controls with the funding agreement being renewed in 2007 (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2010: 61). Some of this money has been used to turn the sand barrier designed in the 1980s to stop the tanks of the Western Saharan Polisario into a high-tech migration-management tool in a move that highlights the shifting nature of border management from traditional defence to policing as argued by Andreas and Price (2001).

As Spanish exclaves since the fifteenth century Melilla and Ceuta have always been fortified and fenced as can be seen from the historic defensive fortifications designed to deter the rival Portuguese and the surrounding, non-European, non-Christian populations. The construction of barbed wire fences around Melilla and Ceuta began in 1996 and 1993 respectively. The fence around Melilla being 10.5 km long and that around Ceuta 8.2 km. However, these fences served little defensive purpose as they were too easy for migrants to breach. During the period between 1993 and 2005 when the fences were fortified to their current standard the fences were upgraded in a piecemeal fashion costing many tens of million of Euros. Serious attempts at fencing in the two cities began in 2005 when it became clear to the Spanish government and the EU that the existing three metre high fences were insufficient for securing the border. The three metre high fences were replaced with six-metre high barbed-wire fencing. The fences have been equipped with the latest in high-tech gadgetry to deter and monitor attempts to breach the border. Watchtowers, infrared cameras, motion and noise detectors allow the Spanish authorities to 'secure' their border from in front of a monitor. However, the fences are also flanked by roads that allow for militarised border patrols and the border guards on both sides, Spanish and Moroccan, are equipped with weaponry. Thus, migrants are treated to the latest high-tech surveillance and control methods and age-old violent methods of defence employed in Melilla and Ceuta for centuries.

Spain argues that the new high-tech fortified fences are not only more secure – and this is indisputable as the building of these fences has seen migrants increasingly attempting to

cross the Mediterranean in boats from Tunisia and Libya shifting the 'problem' to Malta and Italy and consolidating Tunisia and Libya's role in the externalized migration-management nexus of the EU – but more humane. The Spanish government argues that the new fences were built after continued images of bloodied migrants scaling the fences and being shot where shown on European TV night after night. Moreover such practices unsurprisingly resulted in migrant deaths, the exact number of which is not clear and there is some confusion between eleven and fourteen, with Der Spiegel (2011) recently putting the number at fourteen. Deaths and bloody images are surely no good for Spain's (or the EU's) liberal democratic identity [2] and so there has been a shift towards technologies that can control without harming.

This focus on 'humane' securitization and border control can be witnessed in the removal of barbed wire from the two six-metre high fences around Melilla and the installation between the two of a third fence consisting of a tripod-like rope structure that is meant to be more 'humane'. In reality it acts like a spider web trapping the migrants within it. However, what happens to those migrants who manage to scale the first fence undetected by the motion and noise detectors and the infrared cameras only to be caught in the spider web of non-harmful ropes is not clear. Migrants caught in this rope trap are technically within Spanish territory as the fences are built within Spanish territory as they cannot be constructed within Morocco. Once the migrants are within Spanish territory they must be afforded certain rights even if Spain and Morocco have a migrant exchange agreement. If a migrant having entered the exclaves claims refugee status European laws state that their case must be heard and they cannot be expelled. Thus, better that the fence is impenetrable at all costs making the humane rope-trap seem like humane liberal appeasement. The need to stop any form of penetration shifts the burden onto the Moroccan authorities, a burden for which the EU provides funding but also a relationship with clear hierarchical and post-colonial power differentials.

This high-tech fortification of the fences has cost in excess of €30 million the majority of which came from the EU – 75% of the cost in the case of the Ceuta fence (Alscher, 2005: 11) and 66% of the cost in the case of Melilla (Gold, 2000: 130). Thus the fences are both products of national sovereignty and postnational regional institutions with a materiality

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[2] Interestingly Melilla's position as a liberal space is like the rest of Spain with its history of Francoism questionable. However, in the case of Melilla claims to being a liberal space are even more contestable considering it was from Melilla that Franco launched his attack on mainland Spain and Melilla harbours the last remaining public statue of the dictator.

that renders visible the norms of separation and the specific border control practices of both Spain and the wider EU. Border control practices that do the following: highlight the increasing consolidation of the external border of the EU; highlight the increasing trend in externalization; highlight the shift of border control from one of traditional defence to one of policing subnational and transnational threats such as migration and highlight the increasingly high-tech nature of border control[3] that renders the traditional cross-border encounter as one between two peoples a thing of the past. The high-tech, highly fortified fences of Melilla and Ceuta appear to reduce the encounter to a collection of pixels or the glow of infrared heat on the screen of a monitor or the lens of a pair of goggles.

Resistance to the fences

The apparent removal of the human from the border experience that the fences around Melilla and Ceuta suggest is however challenged by the focus on these fences as spaces of resistance. The fences, while containing many meanings and being the product of multifarious policies, are materially meant to serve one principle purpose and that is to separate, to keep out, and to bar entry. However, they fail in this purpose. As sites of resistance they in fact act to bring people together in human encounters. As such the fences are productive spaces creating a bridge between the EU and Africa, between north and south, rich and poor. They focus attention on the inequalities between a fortified Europe barring entry to those less fortunate non-Europeans. Moreover, they act as magnets for and catalysts of socio-political action, meaning that while they seek to geopolitically control the space between the EU and the rest of the world to south they also open up new space for resistance. The action generated by the fences is diverse both geographically and politically; it is both localised at the fences through migrant/activist/NGO encounters and dispersed throughout Europe and North Africa through the work of activist groups/networks, campaign organizations and NGOs. It cannot be represented or analyzed as a single response yet it is facilitated by the visibility and materiality of the fences.

Following the high-tech fortification of the fences around the exclaves some in Spain and Europe began to refer to them as "walls of shame" (Der Spiegel, 2011) while activist networks were clear that "Ceuta and Melilla visualize and symbolize the brutality of the

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[3] I recognise that border control mechanisms have always incorporated technological advances, however, the recent developments in border control have seen an incorporation of technology that appears to remove the human from the interaction of the border.

European border regime against flight and migration" (NoBorders UK, 2010). The resistance generated by the fences takes many forms and can be understood through a variety of theoretical and conceptual approaches. Traditional understandings of civil society and social movements (della Porta et.al, 2006; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Diani & McAdam, 2003) can be used to understand the role and work of various NGOs – including the EMHRN, GADEM (Groupe Antiracist d'Accompagnement et de Défense des Étrangers et Migrants) in Morocco and Migreurop and December 18 in the EU (to name but a few) – in the collection and dissemination of information, the raising of awareness and the lobbying of stakeholders. These NGOs along with other networks and bloggers – see Migrants at Sea (http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/) for an excellent example of information dissemination – also help to frame the issue of the fences and thus any subsequent action.

However, not all of this framing views the fences or the systems they represent in the same way. Some of the NGOs and migrants rights groups working within the pre-existing European order present the fences as a human or migrants rights issue guided by liberal European norms and values. The very liberal norms and values that have played a role in the construction of the fences. Others such as the NoBorders network frame their resistance within their opposition to territorial borders, their demands for freedom of movement as a fundamental right and their wider rejection of the Westphalian state system. In addition migrants themselves who encounter the material reality and domination of the fences engage in resistance often alongside European activists who join them in solidarity to protest. Thus, as diverse as the resistance to the fences is, they work to bring people together across a divide that they materially represent and enforce.

In addition, those political activists and migrants that focus their resistance on the border and the fences turn these spaces into productive ones while concomitantly engaging in a form of 'borderwork' (Rumford, 2008) that reproduces the power of the border itself. In his work on borderwork Chris Rumford challenges the dominant idea that the state is the primary agent in the construction, consolidation and reproduction of borders by arguing that citizens themselves can and do participate in the making of borders. Rumford suggests that this borderwork can be empowering to the citizens involved. I would suggest that while the activity of resisting the various realities, legal and material, represented by the Melilla and Ceuta border fences is no doubt empowering as much socio-political activism aims and claims to be. However, those concerned are not necessarily conscious of the fact

that they are engaged in borderwork. They do not engage in such borderwork to reproduce the border with greater meaning and power, breathing new life into it in the process.

In fact I would argue that those activists involved in resisting the various realities of the Africa/EU borderland would not like to think about their own role in reproducing such a system of domination.[4] The empowerment Rumford talks about is the empowerment communities feel when they engage in the practice of othering that is inherent within the process of borderwork. However, I would argue that the activists challenging the various aspects of the Africa/EU borderland and its material embodiment in the Melilla and Ceuta border fences are not empowered by processes of othering and in fact seek to differing degrees to challenge the process of othering generated by the construction of borders. However, what is clear from the concept of borderwork and the argument that those resisting the fences may themselves be engaged in giving them meaning and power and thereby inadvertently reproducing the separation that their activism at first appears to challenge is just one of the contradictions to be found in the Melilla and Ceuta border fences and the spaces they create.

Contradictory spaces

Just as the Africa/EU borderland is contradictory in itself as a space of separation but also as a space of concomitant histories that have each helped shape the other. The border fences of Melilla and Ceuta, while inscribing the materiality of the borderland in space are also contradictory on multiple levels:

1. They are designed to separate Africa from Europe but instead focus our attention on this separation making us question it.
2. They aim to protect an European society that is thought of as open, liberal and democratic at the forefront of neoliberal globalization that advocates for a shrinking world of increasing flows and a society that has created to a certain degree a post-Westphalian system of government and ways of living. The fences are in fact that very product of this exclusive system that only affords rights to certain people

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[4] Perhaps we might all take the time to think about how we are engaged in this very practice of borderwork. However, the idea that we all may be engaged to some degree in borderwork is to a certain degree troubling from a methodological standpoint and seems to suggest a philosophical cul de sac from which it impossible to escape.

dependent on citizenship. While they create cities which are closed, illiberal and highly militarized.

3. In contradiction to the closed nature of the cities the fences also allow for the regulated control of certain flows that facilitate the neoliberal economy and the citizens of the cities. That is they allow the regulated entry and exit of permitted Moroccan workers and those who come to spend money. Thus, entry is permitted for those whose presence aids the economic growth of the cities, Spain and Europe as a whole.

4. The fences are designed in such a way as to be apparently 'humane' as a consequence of European liberal norms. However, this is a very immediate and spatially specific idea of what constitutes 'humane' as it fails to take account of the 'humane' fences role in the stopping those fleeing violence elsewhere, those seeking asylum, those fleeing environmental degradation or economic injustices brought about by the inequalities of neoliberal globalization.

5. The fences do not solve the problem of migration or the security and economic problems it is believed to create. Instead they disperse the responsibility amongst the Moroccan authorities and shift migratory routes further east along the southern Mediterranean to Algeria, Tunisia and Libya and then into Malta and Italy.

6. And finally in questioning this separation or lack of produced by the border fences we are ourselves engaged in a form of borderwork which reproduces the very border and its role of separation we seek to question.

In Africa not of Africa

Walls and fences have two sides often appearing different depending on which side the viewer is situated and how the subject experiences the fence. Whether the fence is designed to protect you or to deter you. In addition fences and walls can change their appearance and function over time. Take the Berlin Wall with its graffiti once a sign of resistance to walling and a space of freedom of expression is now reduced to a small strip made up of the 'East Side Gallery' a site for tourists where the material reality of domination and the human misery that the wall once meant for those affected is reduced to paintings of human universalism and commodified into postcards and lumps of rock. The Melilla and Ceuta fences are no different in this regard.

As Peter Gold has argued Melilla and Ceuta as cities themselves are contradictory spaces. They are geographically located in the world's poorest continent but belong to the richest

trading bloc in the world. Moreover they are physically in Africa but the majority of their citizens are full European citizens (Gold, 2000: 1-2). This geopolitical contradiction in itself and the fences built around the cities as products, protectors and perpetuators of this contradiction, makes these cities and their walled existence the focus of academic enquiry for those interested in the construction of borders and the politics thereof. Moreover the everyday lived realities of these cities at Europe's southern frontier and thus, as important players in the continued consolidation of Europe's external border makes them sites of study for those scholars interested in the migration-management practices of the EU as well as those interested in polices of externalization and the politics of migration. In addition the cities geographical location in Africa but not if Africa and the subsequent fences this paradox has created make them the focus of socio-political activism of those concerned with the inequalities between Africa and the EU, issues of migration, its management and the socio-politics of borders and the state itself.

Depending where we are located we will view the cities of Melilla and Ceuta and their border fences differently. As citizens we may view the fences as spaces of protection, as border guards as spaces of employment, as migrants as spaces of sanctuary and material well-being or as spaces denied. Alternatively we may view these fences as spaces of separation that inscribe the legal and bureaucratic sovereignty of Europe in African space. In addition we may choose to resist these fences due to their logics of separation because we believe that they challenge the inclusive, liberal and democratic norms of a European modernity. In challenging the separation logics we will employ these norms in arguments against them, however, paradoxically these Janus-faced fences are themselves products of these very norms.

The guardian and the child of liberal democracy
Wendy Brown in linking the contemporary process of what she terms 'walling' not to historic practices of authoritarianism that we might assume walls represent but to what we think of entirely modern, contemporary and liberal processes argues that:

> "…contemporary walls, especially those around democracies, often undo or invert the contrasts they are meant to inscribe. Officially aimed at protecting putatively free, open, lawful, and secular societies from trespass, exploitation, or attack, the walls are built of suspended law and inadvertently produce a collective ethos and subjectivity that is defensive, parochial, nationalistic, and militarized They generate

an increasingly closed and policed collective identity in the place of the open society they would defend" (2010: 40)

This is highlighted by the people of Melilla and Ceuta often being referred to as 'prisoners in their own cities'. Brown thus presents the border fences of Melilla and Ceuta as contradictory structures that are meant to protect an open, democratic Spain and EU but in fact end up producing in Melilla and Ceuta a society that is closed and undemocratic and highly militarized, where exclusive and citizen dependent rights to space and freedom of movement are routinely controlled through legal-bureaucratic and coercive means.

However, this description of Melilla and Ceuta as closed societies claiming inclusive norms that make them European while in fact enacting exclusive policies, is not limited to these fenced exclaves in Africa that are of Europe but not in Europe. Such a description could just as easily be used to describe the migration policies of the EU as a whole where freedom of movement, while a fundamental tenant underpinning the everyday functioning of the Union, is in fact restricted to those who have the correct papers meaning those who are citizens or those who are 'legal'.

The fences of Melilla and Ceuta are thus both the products of a liberal and democratic Europe and the protectors of it. They are produced by the same logics that underpin the practices of externalization, where liberal states/regions seek to carry out illiberal and undemocratic practices against 'threats' that are thought to threaten their liberal and democratic identities. However these practices, as illiberal and undemocratic, themselves threaten the liberal and democratic identity of the state/region and thus must be carried out outside of their liberal and democratic space. Migrants cannot be allowed to enter European space and be party to the exclusive rights afforded to European citizens as they have been securitized as a 'threat' that threatens the liberal and democratic identity and economic well-being of Europe.

Selected permeability, stopping and facilitating the effects of neoliberal globalization
Interestingly while the fences around Melilla and Ceuta may be designed in part to protect the economic well-being of Europe from the feared deluge of economic migrants seeking solace from the ravages of neoliberal globalization they also facilitate the movement of people thought to aid the economic well-being of Europe. Thus while the fences may be designed to stop the movement of people, they are only designed to stop the movement of

certain groups of people. This selected permeability (Berg & Ehin, 2006) sees Moroccan citizens of the adjacent provinces of Nador and Tetouan allowed to enter Melilla and Ceuta without visas respectively. Citizens of Nador and Tetouan are thus allowed to apply for a permit that allows them to enter and exit the fenced exclaves daily for a period of one year. However, these visas do not allow for entry to the rest of Spain or Europe and are only available to those who can prove they are residents of Nador or Tetouan.

These permits, allowing exclusive entry to some Moroccans, are designed to facilitate the economy of the exclaves that are economically tied to a far greater extent to Morocco than to Spain and to allow for the easy flow of consumer goods, such as fruits and vegetables into the cities. As such these Spanish cities are the work places of thousands of Moroccans. It is estimated for example that somewhere in the region of 20,000 to 30,000 Moroccans cross into Ceuta everyday. They cross to work in the cities, often in unregulated jobs that can pay as little €10 a day. In addition others cross into the cities because they are de facto tax free zones and thus certain products are cheaper than their Moroccan alternatives.

All of this, the bountiful supply of cheap labour that can be easily controlled through the granting of permits, that luckily goes home to sleep at night meaning the municipal or national authorities do not have to provide amenities and the tax status making Melilla and Ceuta attractive shopping destinations, facilitates the growth and expansion of neoliberal practices prevalent under globalization and ensures the relative economic well-being of the cities, Spain and Europe in comparison to the Moroccans on who's labour and purchasing power some of this capital is based. Through this selected permeability designed to furnish the forces of capitalism with cheap labour and markets varying degrees of separation are created between the migrants from outside Morocco, to Moroccans from provinces other than Nador or Tetouan, to those Moroccans with one year visas, to European citizens.

Humane fences, inhumane fences
These fences with their high-tech accoutrements and their spider web rope traps attempt to be humane articulations of European liberal and democratic values while at the same time aiming to prevent any breach to the outer fence to avoid having to grant migrants the rights they are entitled to under these same liberal and democratic values. In addition the idea of these fences and their design as being humane suggests a very specific and very immediate definition of humanity limited to the space of the fences themselves and the time of attempted crossing. Thus, while their technology may allow for humane treatment of

migrants in their immediate encounter with the fence what they fail to consider is the way they contribute to and compound what the inhumane treatment many of these migrants have left behind. Is it humane to prevent an asylum seeker scared for their live from claiming asylum, however humanely you do it? Is it humane to, through the humane denial of entry, to prevent an economic migrant from seeking the paid employment necessary to feed their families and forcing them back into and to remain in a system of economic inequality? Is it humane in stopping migratory flows at the fences that this results in migrants seeking alternative routes through other North African states whose treatment of such migrants is anything but humane? Is it the resulting flotilla of un-seaworthy vessels attempting to cross the Mediterranean humane? All these fences do in stopping this flow of people northwards, driven by economic inequality, conflict and environmental degradation (White, 2011) is disperse and transfer the problem.

External dispersal and transferral

One of the clear practical contradictions of the fences around Melilla and Ceuta is that while they may seem to work in reducing migration into the cities themselves they simply act to disperse the migrants across a wider geographical space and transfer their management to different legal-bureaucratic entities. As the fences are designed to stop any initial breach into Spanish space the responsibility to manage-migration falls increasingly on the Moroccan authorities who are additionally tasked with preventing migrants reaching the fences at all. For this policing work, as we have seen, they receive funding under the ENPI and thus they are fully integrated into the EU's externalized systems of migration-management and the economy of migration-management that is its by-product and works to consolidates uneven power relations between Africa and the EU (see Paoletti, 2011).

As the route to Europe through Melilla and Ceuta is now effectively barred migratory routes have dispersed (to a greater extent than before the fences) throughout North Africa, into Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, consequently integrating these states into the EU's externalized migration-management practices and the migration-management economy. From these states the migrants then attempt to cross the Mediterranean into Europe more often than not ending up in Malta or on the Italian island of Lampedusa if they are lucky not to drown at sea. The fences thus, do not stop the migratory 'threat'.

In addition the fences are only effective at keeping migrants out of Melilla and Ceuta if the Moroccan authorities effectively police the migratory flows in the surrounding borderland.

Because the fences for all their high-tech gadgetry have one major weakness, they only stop migrants attempting to enter from land. As coastal cities the Melilla and Ceuta are thus reliant on the Moroccan authorities preventing migration from the surrounding coastline. This was confirmed in the summer of 2011 when increasing numbers of migrants started arriving in Melilla and Ceuta either by boat or by swimming. This increase in migrant numbers (approximately four hundred) it has been suggested was the result of a reduction in Moroccan police in the borderland as the Moroccan government deployed this manpower elsewhere in response to large demonstrations over a new referendum on the Moroccan constitution (El Pais, 2011).

Borderwork

The Melilla and Ceuta border fences are the products of and the producers of contradictions. They are clear material embodiments of many of the contradictions of EU liberalism and neoliberal globalization that makes them spaces of contestation and a focus of resistance and scholarly analysis. Consequently being the subject of our gaze, the focus of attention, we the observer are part of the final contradiction by inadvertently giving them meaning and power as borders. Our role in the production and reproduction of borders cannot be ignored or avoided. Nor should we avert our gaze from the injustices these fences represent. Therefore, I would advocate for a focus on the material, everyday lived realities of the fences and the role they play in EU migration-management practices, the policies of externalization, the resulting economy of migration-management and ultimately the consolidating the Africa/EU borderland.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the border fences of Melilla and Ceuta are products of and producers of contradictions. They are products of the contradictions within neoliberal globalization that argues for an inclusive liberal democractic universalism and an expansion of capital aided by a world of free flows that is accompanied by a concomitant need to close, regulate and control producing exclusive, illiberal and undemocratic practices. They are products of a securitzation discourse that sees migration and migrants as a threat to the liberal and democratic nature of Europe where in turn they produce illiberal, undemocratic practices of migration-management outside of Europe's liberal democratic space, where such practices are not possible and thus ensuring its sanctity. As material articulations with everyday lived realities they produce contradictions of separation based on practices of selective permeability that itself facilitates practices of neoliberal globalization and ensures

continued inequalities between the EU and Africa. In addition because of the contradictions represented by the fences they become the focus for resistance, such resistance challenges the separation logic of the border and its fences by bringing people together around a frame of reference, however, this is also contradictory as such attention helps to discursively reproduce the border itself.

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Forced departures - Nigerian Women through the deportation and rescue industries

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Tessy, Vivi, Grace, Ann, Lola and Esther[3] have been deported to their native Nigeria after selling sex on European streets. Prior to deportation, they spent between two days and six years in Italy, England, Germany, Denmark, Norway or Spain, before they were either identified by an NGO or captured during a police raid. As undocumented women migrants selling sex, these women are often described and categorized as victims of human trafficking who presumably should be 'rescued' from their perpetrators. Yet, the abovementioned women were all detained and subsequently deported to Nigeria against their will. This presentation gives an empirical insight into this complexity of control and care during the intertwined processes of deporting and rescuing, in particularly looking into the gendered aspects of deportations. In a little while I will return to one of the women, Tessy. But first a bit more on the subjects of deportation and rescue.

The politics of deporting and rescuing appear quite contradictory. In practice they are often carried out simultaneously in ways that incorporate multiple migrant categories and identities and connect a variety of governmental, private and social constituencies. Constituencies, which are rarely combined in other realms but human trafficking. Yet, contemporary trafficking arenas engage and connect actors spanning the police, immigration authorities in sending and receiving countries, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), security companies such as G4S, FRONTEX, airline companies, private service companies running detention camps, Red Cross, feminist and faith based NGOs – creating an often invisible deportation and rescue industry constituted by a curious group of strange bedfellows. What Chowra Makaremi also calls a "hybrid confinement

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[3] All names are pseudonyms

system of actors". The 22 different actors the women in this study met during their journey to Nigeria testifies to this.

In this presentation I want to explore this zone of simultaneous exclusion and humanitarianism, which exhibits a blend of governing rationales, care, technologies, and industries. The question is – what are the ways in which such two appearingly contradictory politics and processes of exclusion and humanitarianism co-exist?

My argument is that there seems to be several agendas at play in this zone – in which rescuing the purported victims of trafficking is only but one. At the same time there is a dual mission of morality and security. First, there is a mission of protecting the reputation of Nigeria from being an immoral nation stained by its womens undocumented migration and sexuality. This protection is done through practices and discourses on dignity and immobility of potential and returning women migrants. Secondly, there is a mission of protecting and securitizing the borders of Europe against transnational crime, undocumented migration and the dangers of prostitution – challenging among other issues European ideas on gender equality. Linking these two missions a subsequent argument of mine is that a close analysis of deportation and rescue industries illustrate how contemporary migration policies and moralities of the global South, becomes aligned with gendered moralities as well as the migration management norms and aspirations of the global North – illustrating the ways in which transnational flows of global moralities manifests themselves empirically. Yet, in all if this such agendas and narratives are challenged and contested by the involved women migrants navigating in this complex zone of anti-trafficking and migration actors, while trying in pragmatic ways to secure the livelihoods of their families.

According to Andrijasevic the field of sex trafficking brings together two panics - a panic of undocumented immigration and a panic concerned with women's sexuality (Andrijasevic 2010). From these merged panics, three narratives evolve; first, an abolitionist narrative, which is predominantly concerned with sex work as violence against women and in, turns how to eliminate it. In particular abolitionists are involved in questions of demand – that is an understanding that the root-cause to international trafficking is not poverty and organized crime, but the demand of cheap, in this case, (sexual) labor in the Global North. Thus, they often campaign for criminalization of sex

buyers to put an end to demand and thereby end trafficking. The second narrative is concerned with the aspects of security, organized crime, criminal justice and undocumented migration. This narrative is engaged in questions of the ways in which undocumented immigration and organized transnational crime, such as human trafficking, constitute security threats to the nation states of (primarily) the Global North. This narrative often sees migration and border management as a solution to global security threats. Finally, the third narrative is born out of post-colonial studies and is concerned with the gendered aspects of migrant labor analyzed from a transnational feminist perspective. Here the focus is on the political economy of human trafficking and the ways in which strict immigration laws, the restricted flow of migrant labor, global inequality and concerns with women's sexuality and agency are deeply intertwined (Ibid).

Thus these two panics manifest themselves as a powerful focus and anxiety on sex trafficking in women simultaneously with an increasing anxiety in European states towards undocumented immigration which has spurred frequent street raids, both to rescue the purported victims of trafficking, but perhaps even more so to identify undocumented immigrants and subsequently deport them. In Europe few countries offers residence to individuals who have been categorized as so-called victims of trafficking, and even if they are ascribed such an identity it is a very long and difficult process to obtain the residence permit. Thus, most of the women end up being removed to their country of origin, or at least having an order of removal.

Migration industry literature tends to focus firstly on practices of pre-, sustaining and controlling migration. Although the approach of this paper is an understanding of processes of migration as continuously shifting in time and space, the concept of post-migration helps to situate practices of deportation and rescue within the migration industry framework. Secondly, migration industry literature has commonly focused on the profit-making actors and less attention has been paid to non-profit humanitarian actors in the migration industries, neither has much attention been paid to deportations as an industry. Practices of rescue in post-migration activities are often comprised of services offered to migrants ranging from: rehabilitation, to vocational training programs, to legal assistance and migrant rights. Specifically, for the case of trafficking, the migrant rescue industry is primarily projects that are intended for victim rescue, rehabilitation, repatriation or resettlement. Typically, the organizations that assume these responsibilities are humanitarian in scope and often faith-based. As also Hagan notes there has been a growth of faith based and humanitarian

organisations that provide for migrants {Hagan, 2008 #2827} In Nigeria anti-trafficking organisations are often faithbased and primarily funded by European countries and in this way, one could argue that in the process of deportation, humanitarianism becomes outsourced to NGOs in the country of origin.

The data for the research is gathered over the time course of a year through fieldwork in Nigeria, Edo State, Benin City, among women who have been deported from a range of European countries. Participant observations and interviews were also conducted among faith based NGOs, IOM and the Nigerian governmental anti-trafficking unit NAPTIP. In order to situate and map the range of actors and experiences the deported migrants are exposed to, the presentation furthermore draws upon interviews and fieldwork among an anti-trafficking police unit in Denmark and among social workers and Nigerian sex workers in Spain.

Benin City is a contested city in Nigeria; it is a widespread narrative in Nigeria that this city is where most of the women who sell sex in Europe originate. It is estimated that up to 85 percent of Nigerian women selling sex in Europe originate in Edo State (Aghatise 2005; Achebe 2004; Marusca 2010). There are multiple and intersecting ways to explain why Benin City and Edo state became the epicentre of human trafficking in Nigeria, which I do not have space to explain here. But, Benin City is a poor and dusty city with very few steady employment opportunities and few possibilities of upwards social mobility besides migration. Increasingly, however, the city is no longer merely a site of migration, but instead a site of deportation. Billboards along the main highway entering the city advertise for language classes in Spanish, Italian, German and Swedish, a shop is called Little Italy Plaza with main office in Turin in Italy. The links to Europe are manifold. Among these symbols of migration an increasing number of deportees are trying to re-establish their lives. When women deported from Italy, who sometimes walked the same streets in Turin or Rome meet in the streets of Benin City, they often pretend they never met before. The embarrassment, the women explained to me, of deportation are too much to handle in public space. Still, in Benin City it is difficult to find an extended family that does not have a family member, mostly women, who migrated to Europe. In Nigeria, the issue of trafficking came to the fore as a result of media publicity over the mass deportation of young Nigerian women migrating to Italy for sex work. The furore generated by this incident made the Edo State Government to enact a law to prohibit traffic in persons as well as the prohibition of prostitution (Attoh 2009).

Among the thousands of women migrating and being deported I will in this presentation focus on one Nigerian woman, Tessy to illustrate the range of actors she met in her deportation process. Tessy is now 24 years old. She was born in Delta state, Nigeria, and grew up not knowing her dad. As a result the mother sent Tessy to an uncle in Benin City, in adjacent Edo State. After a while the uncle began abusing her and Tessy ran away to Lagos, where she got in contact with a lady, also from Benin City, who arranged the travel for her to the UK.

Tessy's emigration was part of an increasing migration from Nigeria to Europe. Nigerians began migrating to Italy in the 1980s as a response to its high demand for low-skilled labor in agriculture and services, and women who sold sex were only one of many groups that migrated. The first sex workers tended to work independently, but in the early 1990s, immigration restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly dependent on large loans in order to pay their journey, which provided an opportunity for the migration industry actors – smugglers, guides and what now is called traffickers (Carling 2005; De Haas 2006). It is important to stress that, for Nigerian migration, trafficking seems the exception rather than the rule. The large majority of Nigerians migrate voluntarily for economic reasons, and even in the case of trafficking it is clear that the line between voluntary and forced migration is blurred (De Haas, 2006).

The blurred process of sex trafficking, loans and undocumented migration illustrate that the concept of human trafficking is not easily defined, resting primarily upon conflicting perspectives on sex work or/and migration as a voluntary versus an in-voluntary act in which the concept of consent remains the main yardstick by which sex trafficking is measured (Doezema, 2010). The primary question being whether an individual can consent to sell sex. Consent is a concept not easily deciphered and, thus, human trafficking has increasingly become a phenomenon with more ambivalence and tension than clear answers. Hence, the approach of the paper is an understanding of human trafficking as fluctuating on a trafficking/migration-continuum. That is, the precise point at which tolerable forms of migration end, and human trafficking begins will vary according to political and moral values not easily captured by legal definitions {Anderson, 2003 #2035).

Lets return to Tessy. She was not aware what kind of documents she was travelling with, and was when I met her, still unsure. But during a police raid in London she was detained by the police

accused of overstaying her visa and working with no legal work permit. During her time in the UK, the lady who had arranged her travel, invited men to her home to have sex with Tessy. After some months Tessy ran away, and lived randomly in the UK for four years until she was detained by the police and deported from UK in December 2010. I met her in Lagos in January 2011. Tessy had filed for asylum, on cause of human trafficking, while sitting in Yarl's Wood detention center in the UK, but was deported while her asylum case was not decided upon.

Yarl's Wood is an immigration removal centre run under the UK Detention Centre and has become the main removal centre for women from the UK (Agency 2011). Serco Ltd who runs Yarl's wood is a private, international service company which are contracted for national and local governments to provide services within the areas of public service, including health, education, transport, science and defense (Serco 2011). During her stay at Yarl's Wood Tessy also met the British NGO Cross Road, IOM, Red Cross and a minor NGO called Befriendsters who gave her 20 Pounds on the day of her deportation. Thus, Yarl's Wood manifests itself empirically as a zone of simultaneous exclusion and humanitarianism, exhibiting governing rationales, care, technologies, and industries.

Tessy in particular emphasize her meeting with G4S, the major private security firm contracted in the UK and many other EU countries to oversee Home Office deportations. She described G4S as "over seas escorts" whom were not the police but "immigration workers of this company called G4S" and further "They were there as security and paramedics". Later Tessy was not sure if the medics were actually G4S. Tessy's account of G4S illustrates the ambiguities often facing the deportees. They are often not sure who is handling their case, to who they should direct their questions, and who has the overall responsibility for them and their case. Being a rather experienced migrant, however, Tessy could reflect upon the differences in the ways regular migrants and deportees were handled. Being asked, Tessy, continuously used the word "they" to describe the actors she met. "They" were used interchangeably between governmental actors, humanitarian actors, private actors such as G4S or/and NGO's.

In the following Tessy describes her day of removal: "I learnt of IOM that they could support you if you want to return voluntarily, even while there (in the UK) they could assist you get your luggage…So I was trying to. On the very day of removal, I was very ill I was very weak and I told them. Before my flight there was a guy, an Angola guy that died on the plane while they were

removing him and the news went about maybe like for few weeks and then it died down again nobody said anything about it, you know. I was saying to them that I don't want to loose my life because I am being deported. I'm not feeling well I'm not fit to fly, they should allow me get fit but they insisted that I should fly. They got a doctor, I don't know what he did, and they weren't all truthful they are all; they just treat people very unfairly. Because the doctor knew quite all right that I wasn't well but they just want to make sure you are removed".

The Council of Europe Convention suggests, but does not insist, that these kinds of deportations should take the form of 'assisted voluntary return', rather than 'non-voluntary return'. In most cases the deported women including Tessy, narrated that they felt they had no other choice than to agree to the deportation. Crucially here is that most of them became convinced by IOM that they would receive assistance upon the return to Nigeria. As one woman explained to me; "In a way I felt forced to be voluntarily removed – I gave up". Which paradoxically is the same way they narrate how their migration initially began. They decided to migrate with the help of a trafficker, because they felt their life-situation - not the trafficker - gave them no other choices.

In the cargo area in Lagos, the women are in some instances received by an NGO – if in the category of official trafficking victims – but most of them are not. They are deported by joint flight operations arranged by FRONTEX. The organisations which receives them or where the women search for help are mostly faith based. The faith based anti-trafficking NGOs and churches in Nigeria are primarily Nigerian Pentecostalists, often funded by US evangelists, which thrives immensely in Nigeria and is based on a mixture of evangelism, which incorporates African traditional beliefs. African/Nigerian Pentecostal followers are repeatedly told that the "Holy Spirit changes lives so that sickness and calamity only befalls non-believers", which transferred into anti-trafficking rhetoric translates into "Only non-believers" becomes victims of trafficking or/and travel undocumented to sell sex. The second faith based groups of NGOs deeply involved in anti-trafficking are Catholic missions, funded by their US or EU chapters, but also receiving funding from European anti-trafficking organisations and European governments.

Recently returned deportees, as did Tessy, find help from NGOs or churches in the local area. They get their help because they are now within the category of being a child of God. A fallen daughter (or son), who in the narrative of most of the faith based organisations, are possessed by the devil of

prostitution and greed, but is now home where they belong in the ascendance of God and the motherland – the Nigerian nation. Most Catholic NGOs state this by arranging "home coming parties" for the newly arrived deportees.

Another illustration of the ways in which faith based NGOs circumscribe deportations into a story of homecoming to both the Nation and God is illustrated in these two paintings hanging on the wall at a Catholic deportee/trafficking-victim-receiving-NGO in Lagos. At the first painting we see the well-known parable of the Lost Son. The parable describes how a younger son travels to a distant country and wastes all his money on wild living. When a famine strikes, he becomes desperately poor and is forced to take work as a swineherd. When he reaches the point of envying the pigs he is looking after, he finally comes to his senses and say; "I will get up and go to my father, and I will tell him; Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in your sight. I am no more worthy to be called your son. Make me as one of your hired servants."' He arose, and came to his father. But while he was still far off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him. (Luke 15:17-20, Western English Bible). End quote.
Here we learn how travelling to distant countries is connected to sinning and loss of senses. When you come to your senses you return home to your father, to God – and he will welcome you.

In the second painting the parable is creatively circumscribed. Here we see a deportee, a young man in Western clothes surrounded by three comforting men in traditional tribal outfit. The three men represent the three largest tribes in Nigeria, the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. The analogy is, of course, that the deportee is now home where he belongs protected by not only God, but also powerfully his Nation – a coherent united Nigeria. He is no longer a sinner, but ready to be restored. Of course there is a gender aspect here, the paintings depict a young man – yet this parable is often voiced even stronger in regard to women returnees, who upon return in the rhetoric of the organizations now have a possibility to marry, return to their children or get children – to become dignified.

What about the Nigerian State then? In 2003 Nigeria establishes the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP). NAPTIP has the responsibility to enforce laws against trafficking in persons and coordinate the rehabilitation and counselling of trafficked persons; and related matters (Nwogu 2005). Furthermore, after the trafficking-law was signed a range of locally based, but often state or internationally financed

NGOs are now running shelters to protect and assist victims of trafficking by providing counselling, medical and social follow-up, and in some cases, legal assistance. The NGOs also carry out so-called enlightenment campaigns in the communities most affected by trafficking (Sesay & Olayode 2008). Understanding the dynamics of anti-trafficking in Nigeria therefore in some ways requires unravelling the complexities of the state-society interconnections inherent in government-NGO partnerships within the field of anti-trafficking.

"Make your country proud, stay and build up your nation". The citation stems from a widely spread poster and TV-campaign produced by NAPTIP recommending potential women migrants to stay at "home". When looking at the TV-spots and awareness raising campaigns which NAPTIP produce, one wonders whose interests they are in. Critiques has been raised that the Nigerian State are more concerned with protecting its image as a State that combats trafficking, and aware of the moral stigmatizing which might transfer from Nigerian women directly to the image of the Nigerian state. As a nation for sale, as being promiscuous, as being the brothel of Africa. These are also debates circulating in the public media concerning trafficking and womens migration. So far, the focus of Nigerian migration policies has been on the prevention of sex trafficking of women and children to Western Europe and other African states. This partly reflects domestic concerns, but also the priorities of international donors. Nigeria has been under intense pressure particularly from the US to 'combat' trafficking, whom also emphasize how trafficking is seen as harmful for Nigeria's image abroad (De Haas 2007:6).

Although Nigeria has done a lot to target the problem of trafficking, and is respected as one of the African countries who has done the most, there is little evidence that Nigeria's new anti-trafficking policies have led to a measurable decrease in trafficking, although most reports states that Nigerians are now 'more aware' of the dangers of trafficking. However, in a study done by De Haas (2006) some of the participating interviewees criticized the public awareness campaigns for; "having the character of general anti-migration manifestations which try to convince the youth that they should not migrate" (p,12). These are narratives I heard intensely in Benin City among deported and potential migrants. Neither Nigeria or Europe wants us to leave, these campaigns are not for our own good, but for theirs. End Quote.

To return to Tessy and the other women. They expressed a feeling of an overarching forced immobility, which stemmed from not only the deportation, but also Nigeria's increasingly most used strategy to combat transnational trafficking which is interception at the border – not letting women migrants out of the country. Furthermore the women are very pragmatic when it comes to restoring their humanity through God. Although they most Sundays went to church and often claimed that their fate was in Gods hand, a common theme was also the ways in which life sometimes required them to place God on standby in order to survive – to challenge family values and ideas of dignity. Migrating undocumented and selling sex was practices that required them to place God on standby hoping he would forgive them at a later stage.

To conclude I have tried to explore empirically the ways in which appearingly contradictory politics and processes of exclusion and humanitarianism co-exist. What I have illustrated is that there seems to be several agendas and narratives at play – in which rescuing the purported victims of trafficking is only but one. Co-existing are missions of morality and security.

A subsequent argument was that a close analysis of deportation and rescue industries illustrate how contemporary migration policies and moralities of the global South, becomes aligned with gendered moralities as well as the migration management norms and aspirations of the global North – illustrating the ways in which transnational flows of global moralities manifests themselves empirically. That is transnational and highly gendered narratives, which justifies deportations in order to rescue women. Under this construction the European governments in conjunction with Nigeria are absolved of their responsibility for having fostered the broader socioeconomic conditions that feed the trafficking phenomenon and the deportations, instead the way forward is to restore the humanity and dignity of the women.

Tessy in now with an aunt in Lagos, after a year she still hasn't received money from IOM, I will meet her again in Nigeria in January.

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i

A jungle in the Villa
On borders, boundaries and African asylum seekers in Israel

Haim Yacobi

I have had nothing to lose… I did not plan to go to Israel – I just wanted to escape from Eritrea where my life was in danger. Europe is impossible for us, I really had nothing to lose anymore… Like many others, I have no future elsewhere (interview with T. Eritrean refugee, 29 June 2008).

I took the decision to close Israel's southern border to infiltrators and terrorists. This is a strategic decision to secure Israel's Jewish and democratic character (PM Benjamin Netanyahu http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-to-build-nis-1-5b-fence-along-egypt-border-1.261141)

In a special meeting of the Committee for Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament), the impact of immigration on the "demographic balance" of Israel has been discussed (January 24, 2011). Special attention has been given to the origin of the arrival of immigrants to Israel over the past decade. One of the speakers, Prof. Arnon Sofer, warned the committee members from the dangers of losing control over the Israeli demography, in view of the arrival of asylum seekers, not Jews, from various countries in Africa:

... Because of that climate change everything is going to dry up, we [Israelis] can desalinate water, overcome and win while from all over the world a wave of measurable people will want to enter Israel ... I just want to say that right now there are 35,000 African migrants. Look, five years ago it was 3000, 4000 and in the last year 17,000. I do not want to discourage you here but around 300,000 of them are on their way toward the Israeli border. Million, we estimate, are sitting today on the outskirts of Cairo. They were told that they have no chance to enter to neither to France nor to Italy. And they know that for 3,000$ they will reach Israel. Ggentlemen, you must hear the story, I presented it to the government. It is an amazing story. They fly to Tripoli in

> Libya, they fly to Cairo, then they take a "special al Arish, they take a guide to the Israeli border, where they are told - wait a few minutes, the Jewish army comes, money you will get later, but bread and food - immediately. Each of them [the asylum seekers] takes out a cell phone to make two calls. First to their contacts in north Tel-Aviv and secondly to the friends in Somalia - Guys, there is a fool country, come over (Minutes No. 132 Committee meeting for Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs Monday, January 24, 2011).

I would suggest that these words reveal not only a racializing discourse in Israel vis a vis the arrival of black immigrants, which are perceived as "real existential, strategic, social and health threats" (Sofer, 2009:9). But rather, unexpectedly, these words illustrate the denied geographies of the State of Israel which shares borders not just with Middle Eastern countries but also with Africa trough the Sinai Peninsula.

But such geopolitical context is culturally repressed and politically denied as part of the imagined geographies of Israel as "a villa in the jungle" (Bar-Yosef, 2004) – a well known saying in Hebrew (importantly coined by Ehud Barak) encapsulating Israeli construction of identity as being white, "European-like", democratic and enlightened; a villa which dominates a whitened and modernized "wild" territory surrounded by walls and borders that are apparently not penetrable. However, as I will show tangible geography matters as we can learn from the fact that over the past four years, asylum seekers from Africa have begun arriving in Israel, violating the image of its hermetically controlled borders and boundaries as will be detailed in this paper.

The discussion of transnational migration, in general, and with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, in particular, highlights not only the issue of mobility rights itself but also as the effect of these rights on the social and spatial boundaries of the national identity of the hosting society. Tesfahuney (1998) argues it is of particular relevance to the growing body of critical geopolitics, suggesting that while globalization does enable some cross-border flows (cyberspace and capital, for instance), borders and boundaries still characterize our social and political hierarchy. But despite the relevance of geopolitics to the study of immigration, there is a tendency in the literature to treat geopolitics and immigration as separate topics of analysis (Nagel 2002: 972). Thus, in the context of this article geopolitics will be used as an analytical tool for studying the transnational flow of people and capital that subverts the distinction between domestic and international affairs habitually taken for

granted in political geography (Dijkink and Mamadouh 2006: 207). It is also the case that globalization establishes new transnational linkages between states that previously had limited, if any, connection.

Against this background, in this paper I aim to critically analyse the migration of African asylum seekers crossing the border from Egypt into Israel, as they search for safe shelter. Following the recent analysis of Elias and Kemp (2010), I suggest that the arrival of African asylum seekers in Israel has contributed to a further change of Israel into 'a *de facto* "normal" immigration state as opposed to an exclusively Jewish immigration state, a change that demands that we take into account new analytical variables such as race and citizenship. The Israeli migration regime falls within this ideological context: it is based on the 1952 Law of Nationality that complemented the 1950 Law of Return which is based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, which gives Jews – and only Jews – the right to immigrate, while the Law of Nationality grants them Israeli nationality almost automatically (see: www.knesset.gov.il). In the context of such a migration policy, Israel's asylum system is still embryonic, using its 'immigration and citizenship system as its main normative reference point rather than international refugee law'. The consequent effect is the considerable 'exclusion of asylum seekers who are not rendered physically absent, but rather they are rendered absent from the legal order and social life and denied political visibility' (Kritzman 2009: 626).

Sudanese migrants started arriving to Israel in 2005, mainly from the Darfur region, and the continuation of this migration in 2006, when more and more asylum seekers crossed the border from Egypt into Israel. By the spring of 2007, the number of asylum seekers had increased significantly, reaching 50 to 100 per day (interview with Eithan Shwartz, previous spokesman of the Committee for Darfur's Refugees, 3 May 2008). According to a report by Israeli Television's Channel 2 (23 February 2008), 5,000 Sudanese asylum seekers entered Israel in 2007, while by early 2008, the number entering Israel from the south had already reached 2,500. Other sources report 8,000 - approximately 2,400 African asylum-seekers, including about 1,700 Sudanese (25-30% of them from Darfur), with other asylum-seekers coming from Eritrea,

Ghana, and Kenya. According to the available data, this number has now reached 30,000 people.[1]

Under the definition of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, an asylum seeker legally qualifies as a refugee if he or she is a person who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm). In Israel, those who qualify as refugees are eligible for a temporary residence status that can be extended every two years. The provision of temporary protection, rather than the required protection according to the Refugee Convention, is currently common in many countries (Fitzpatrick quoted in Kritzman 2009: 322). Yet, temporary protection is subject to criticism, since it enables the host country to grant fewer rights to all those being protected. An additional problem stems from the fact that whereas there are clear standards for the termination of the protection of refugees, there are no such standards for the termination of temporary protection.

The debate around the arrival of these refugees presents important challenges to Israeli social, territorial and political discourse, which is caught between its own ethnocratic ideologies and a wider commitment to universal human rights (Ben Dor and Edut 2003). Through examining this tension, I will argue that 'walling' "the villa" has become a solution for dealing with the 'African problem' in Israel. The demand for surveillance technologies to combat the infiltration of irregular migrants as part of the emerging discourse of walling and separation in Israel expresses the persistent attempts of the Israeli authorities at demographic engineering.

Crossing borders

Since 2003, the Darfur region has seen civil war escalate into genocide.[2] Egypt, Sudan's northern neighbour, has accepted Sudanese refugees since 1994. The number

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[1] Official estimates from Israel's Police force, Interior and Justice Departments state that before 7 July 2010, 26,635 refugees had illegally entered into Israel from Egypt. 1,900 of them are currently detained. See Gilad Natan, 'A Report on Crime Activities and Rate among Asylum Seekres and Infiltrators', *The Israeli Knesset Research Center* available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02625.pdf (last accessed on 13 Aug. 2011) (in Hebrew).

of refugees in Egypt is not known, but Cairo has one of the five largest urban populations in the developing world; estimates vary widely from 500,000 to 3 million (Sperl 2001). As Yasmin Fathi (2004), an Egyptian journalist, has indicated, 'what refugees find most painful of all are the racial slurs that are often thrown at them by the locals. Sudanese walking around Cairo find themselves being called *soda* and *samara* – derogative words for black – by both adults and children in the street'. Despite certain gestures towards refugees, such as that of human-rights organizations or the Mufti, Dr. Ali Gomaa, who issued a *fatwa* approving *Sadaqah* – a charity – for all Sudanese refugees during *Eid Al-Adha* (Azzam 2006), coverage in the Egyptian media has been characterised by reports about refugees and 'non-Muslim *kuffar*' stealing Egyptian jobs, or 'foreigners' who should be sent back where they came from (Azzam 2006). Such attitudes towards the refugees and the ongoing deterioration of their socio-economic and health conditions seem to be the reason why Sudanese refugees began to relocate to Israel.

On 30 December 2005, there was a watershed event for Darfurians in Egypt that encouraged many to cross the border to Israel: thousands of Egyptian security personnel forcibly removed approximately 2,500 Sudanese refugees from a small park near the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in the Mustafa Mahmood area. This central urban space in Cairo was a protest site where refugees had been living for few months. The significance of the break-up of the protest was not simply the actions of the Egyptian government, in which 27 refugees and asylum seekers were killed, including women and children, but rather the removal of thousands of protesting refugees and asylum seekers to various holding centres in and around Cairo. Though the majority of refugees was eventually released, a few hundred were deported (Nkrumah 2007a).

Since this incident, the number of Sudanese refugees fleeing to Israel across the Egyptian border has risen considerably. This crossing begins with a long journey

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[2] The conflict started when the opposition Sudanese Liberation Army initiated armed actions against the government. The government reacted by encouraging the *Janjaweed* militiamen to attack villages in Darfur (for further details, see Amnesty International 2007). It is believed that since 2003 between 200,000 and 400,000 people have been killed in Darfur and that about 2.5 million people have been displaced (http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/474ac8cb0.pdf). Moreover, between 1983-2005, during the Second Sudanese Civil War, which ended with a treaty between the Islamic government in the north and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement in the largely Christian south, 1.9 million southern Sudanese civilians were killed and more than 4 million were displaced. Despite the fact that these events have taken place not only in Darfur but throughout southern Sudan, international organizations such as the UN have tended to focus their efforts in the Darfur region.

across the Sinai Desert. The starting points are the tourist resorts of Sinai, where hundreds of Sudanese work because of their proximity to Israel. They pay Bedouin smugglers hundreds of dollars to help them cross the border, despite the risks of being caught by Egyptian border patrols.[3] Y., a Darfurian refugee in Israel, describes his experience which also illustrates the geographical continuation between Africa and Israel:

> I left Egypt in July 2005 towards Sinai. Initially I aimed to stay in Sinai to work, but the Bedouins convinced me that crossing the border [between Israel and Sinai] is possible. I was afraid of the Israeli and the Egyptian army and, in the morning that we crossed the border, I handed over myself to the Israeli soldiers. They took me to the army camp, where I was arrested with five Bedouin smugglers; the conditions were harsh (Interview 1 June 2008).

The news that it was indeed possible to infiltrate into Israel in this fashion reached many refugees from other African countries, such as Eritrea, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. The consequent extensive human smuggling has taken both Israeli and Egyptian authorities by surprise. When the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, visited Sharm El-Sheikh in June 2007 to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, he also emphasised the need to repatriate the Sudanese refugees, many of whom were being housed in Israeli jails. The Israelis apparently wanted assurances from Egypt that the Sudanese asylum seekers returned from Israel to Egypt would not then be deported to Sudan. At the end of his meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Olmert announced that Egypt had guaranteed that it would not deport any Sudanese refugees returning to Egypt from Israel. Yet, as Nkrumah (2007b) reports, Egyptian officials declined to comment on this matter, suggesting that the subject was too sensitive to receive coverage in the Egyptian press, save some comments on Sudanese migrants being caught while trying to cross the border into Israel. The deportation of

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[3] Human trafficking between Israel and Egypt is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is the main source of women trafficking that serve Israeli "Sex industry". Thousands of women, mainly from the former Soviet Union, are smuggled into Israel over the Egyptian border. During the height of the phenomenon, from the beginning of the 1990s to the early years of 2000, an estimated 3,000 women a year were brought to Israel on the false promise of jobs and a better way of life. The United Nations named Israel as one of the main destinations in the world for trafficked women http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7070929.stm. However, this issue has been hardly discussed publically and generally ignored by both Israeli public (except some NGOS) and politiciens.

refugees from Israel is officially contingent upon Egypt's assurances that it will treat refugees well, but Egypt has denied making such a guarantee.

The incident of the killing of four refugees in Egypt on 1 August 2007, the discovery of the body of a 30-year-old refugee in the northern Sinai, and continued violent tactics on the part of the Egyptian forces belie that supposed guarantee. Moreover, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry condoned the killings and responded to news of the incident with the following statement: 'If those crossing refuse to heed the orders of authorities to stop, then authorities are forced to deal with them in such a manner as to ensure respect for the law' (Frenkel 2007a; Frankel 2007b). It is important to note that despite the great difficulties and the risk that the refugees face while trying to cross the border; many of their testimonies suggest that this is the only option they have in the face of the fortification of Europe on one hand and the conditions they encounter in Egypt, on the other (for further discussion see: Yacobi, 2011).

During 2007, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) caught refugees who had been smuggled across the Egyptian border, they took them to the city of Beer-Sheva and abandoned them, with no official body taking any responsibility. At that time, activists and students, who were sympathetic to the plight of the refugees, tried to help the refugees by finding them temporary shelters in the city of Beer-Sheva and its surroundings. As an act of protest, these refugees were taken to Jerusalem, where a 'tent city' was established close to the *Knesset* (the Israeli Parliament) in Jerusalem.

Despite the difficulties, Israel is perceived by many refugees as a preferred destination. But even when the refugees do manage to cross the border, they face another complication: the Sudanese government does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, and it judges any Sudanese citizen, including refugees seeking asylum who set foot in Israel as guilty of high treason. Y's experience exemplifies this situation:

We were taken to the court and the judge said that it will be impossible to send us back to Sudan, which is an enemy country. But she also said that if the state will support us, two million refugees will come to Israel and it will be a disaster. Then we were sent to Ma'asihu Prison, where I stayed for 14 months (Interview with Y. a Darfurian refugee, 1 June 2008).

Finally, despite the efforts of Israel to isolate itself through military and strategic efforts along its borders and closure of its legally defined ethnic boundaries, non-Jewish, non-white migration is taking place. This situation has challenged Israeli public discourse, for which there was initially no clear information about the flow of African refugees to Israel or about the difficulties they face.

The limited boundaries of common fate

The turning point in bringing the issue of Africa asylum seekers to the attention of the Israeli public was reached when the campaign against their deportation focused on the Holocaust, pointing out that the Jewish people had themselves needed shelter and protection during and after the World War II. The Jewish historical experience and collective memory became a convincing tool in the public debate especially about the Sudanese refugees, as noted, for example, by *Yad Vashem* (the main Holocaust memorial museum in Israel) chairman Avner Shalev, who said: 'we cannot stand by as refugees from genocide in Darfur are knocking on our doors' (in Patience 2007). This discourse constituted the background to the announcement of Meir Shetrit, then Israeli Minister of Interior Affairs, on 4 September 2007 that Israel intended to grant citizenship to several hundred refugees from Darfur. The decision was widely praised in Israel, and sixty-three Knesset Members, from both right and left, signed a petition demanding that the Darfurians not be deported. However, this gesture was accompanied by a message to the refugees that any further border crossings would be considered illegal and that all migrants would be sent back to Egypt under the terms of an agreement with the Egyptian authorities (Kreshner 2007).

The Holocaust discourse remains central to the question of the African refugees in Israel. Just before Passover, in April 2008, a group of African refugees volunteered to help Holocaust survivors with cleaning, painting and renovating their flats. This event was covered by the Israeli media, emphasising the common fate of Jewish and African refugees. Also, a *Seder* was attended by 200 African refugees in Tel Aviv. The *Seder*, which was conducted in Tel Aviv's Lewinsky Park, one of the well-known refugee hubs in Tel Aviv, was billed as, 'Out of Egypt, a Refugees' Seder'. In 2009, too, hundreds of Africans and Israelis participated in a *Seder*. The

'Refugees' Seder' marks an interesting connection between the modern memory of the Jewish people as asylum seekers, the national myth of the exodus and the geopolitical reality in which the current situation is located (between Egypt and Israel). This historical construction presented powerful arguments to those who wanted to help the asylum seekers; one such example was stressed by a personal monologue published by Israel's most read newspaper Yedio'ot Achronot under the title "you too were once refugees":

> My name is Anthony Dadod, I am an illegal infiltrator from Sudan ... I live in Hatikvah Neighbourhood ... yesterday I saw the big demonstration against the foreign workers and the infiltrators ... the neighbourhood residents must be forgetting that once not so long ago they were refugees as well in Europe and some thousands of years ago, the Israelites were refugees in Egypt.[1]

Daodd's biblical reference is not an exception. On another occasion a Darfurian refugee named Immanuel told reporters how, during the treacherous voyage from Darfur through the desert, he walked with the bible in one hand as a guide: "When we crossed the border it was like when the Israelites crossed the Red Sea ... we prayed and thanked God… [the Israeli soldiers] were nice to us, gave us food and water and then put us into jail".2

Beyond the symbolic dimension of such acts, the imagined common fate of Jewish and African refugees is central for policy demand. The spokesman for the Israeli Hotline for Migrant Workers, Romm Lewkowicz, charged Israel with violating the provision of the Geneva Conventions that sets out a government's obligations toward refugees from an enemy state. Moreover, Lewkowicz pointed out that it was Israel – mindful of the shelter German Jewish refugees had received in Britain – that promoted that provision after the World War II (in Franklin 2008). Echoes of the historical experience of many Israelis make the plight of the Sudanese refugees that much more poignant. Yiftach Miloe of The Israeli Organization for Aid to Refugees and Asylum Seekers (interview 22 May 2008) suggests that, at the very beginning, the numbers of refugees were relatively small, and thus the campaign was effective, arousing public sympathy. However, as the flow of refugees continues and part of the

media has resorted to the politics of fear, claiming that 'the Jewish state is in danger' because of 'those Africans', the public has become less supportive.

It should be noted that until the beginning of 2008, the State of Israel had no clear policy on the increased flow of refugees, which included not only Sudanese nationals but also refugees from Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Congo and other countries. Its main response was deportation and attempts to prevent refugees crossing the border, as in the case of the 48 Africans, most of them Darfurians, who were deported on 18 August 2007 back across the Egyptian border. Since it was clear that those refugees who were forced to return to Egypt in this way would be brutally treated, Israel found itself under pressure from different Israeli NGOs (Yacobi, 2011). Over the past four years, Israeli families and businesses have donated food and clothing, doctors have volunteered their medical services, and volunteers have provided general care for traumatized refugees.

The other scale of this discussion has relevance for the organisation and control of Israeli geopolitics, i.e. the intention of the authorities to place African asylum seekers at the periphery of the country. Such an attitude has been given a judicial dimension by the Infiltration Act (1950), which allows infiltrators to be imprisoned for as long as the authorities wish without judicial review and was aimed especially against Palestinians who fled the country during the fighting. The infiltrator act of the 1950s was meant to be supplemented by a new one from May 2008. The Knesset approved the first reading of the bill to prevent irregular entry into the country. The bill, passed by a vote of 21-1, specifically addressed the contemporary problem of asylum seekers from Africa, while also replacing the bill from the 1950s.[3] Thus discursively the "original" Palestinian infiltrators of the 1950s were legally replaced by those from Africa (Ram and Yacobi, forthcoming).

Although clearly stating that no security threats were authenticated regarding most of the infiltration cases of recent years, the proposed law imposes a sentence of up to five years on those who cross the border illegally, *including refugees and labour migrants*. Infiltrators from enemy states such as Sudan could be sentenced to as many as seven years behind bars. The bill also authorises the state to hold 'irregular' entrants, including asylum seekers, for up to eighteen days without bringing them before a judge for arraignment. In addition, the bill would authorise 'hot returns' (i.e., immediately returning those caught entering) back to Egypt, a practice that endangers

the lives of border crossers.[4] The intended law triggered a considerable amount of civil opposition and was eventually postponed due to public protests. Since its provisions are extremely harsh, it is unlikely to be an improvement. Yet the bill is a clear evidence of the implication of collective memory, not only in the public sphere but also in the legislative arena. It is important to clarify that I do not suggest that the references to the 1950s directly caused the government to form such a bill, but rather that the latter is based on the experience of the state developed in order to block the entrance of Palestinian infiltrators.

In this context let us also mention that both symbolically and tangibly the same disciplinary space created in order to control Palestinians was converted in order to tackle the asylum seekers. Upon arrival African asylum seekers are detained in Ketziot, a detention centre near a jail for Palestinian prisoners in the Negev desert. Although this facility was built to house 1,000 asylum seekers, it has now been extended to house approximately 2,500 people. Very often it is necessary to free some of them, often minors, in order to house those who have just arrived (interview with Sigal Rozen, the Hotline for Migrant Workers, 22 May 2008). This act demonstrates the direct linkage between the tactics employed in order to tackle the Palestinian population and African asylum seekers. The labelling of both as infiltrators also enabled the treatment of the latter by means employed so far only for the former.

Urban boundaries

During the past three years various solutions have been suggested to solve the 'refugee problem', including the gradual replacement of some of Israel's non-Jewish labour migrants and undocumented workers (Yacobi 2008a). As part of this solution, 100 refugees from Eritrea received work permits from the Ministry of the Interior. They are the first of almost 1,000 refugees who will be given such permits in the near future. The permits are being awarded following a special decision by the previous Minister of the Interior and the head of the Population Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. Yossi Edelstein, director of the Population Administration's Department of Aliens, says that 'the decision stems from humanitarian considerations in light of the United Nations' request that the Eritreans not be returned to their country, due to severe infractions of human rights there'. The Ministry of the Interior

views the six-month work permit as an interim solution, providing permits first to refugees living in shelters in south Tel Aviv, to allow them to move out and make room for those now housed in Ketziot Prison (Wurgaft 2008). The refusal of responsibility is also reflected in the way in which African refugees are released from Ketziot and sent to Tel Aviv on buses, with no one waiting for them to provide support. This practice has created a situation in which an estimated one thousand African refugees are staying in temporary shelters in southern Tel Aviv in bad physical and hygienic conditions.

In many other cases refugees and migrants are attracted to urban environments, offering better access to services such as public transportation as well as to informal employment (Briant and Kennedy 2004). This situation has been discussed by several scholars; Jacobsen (2006), for example, suggests that displaced communities of people, such as refugees are increasingly likely to end up in urban areas rather than camps. This is the case for some districts in Tel Aviv-Jaffa that have housed both authorized and unauthorized non-Jewish labour migrants (Sabar, 2008; Fenster and Yacobi, 2005) since the 1990s, and are thus also considered by many refugees as places of possibility. As one refugee put it when he was caught crossing the border: 'let me go to the City' (interview with N., asylum seeker from Nigeria, 4 April 2009). The City, in the eyes of the refugees, is Tel Aviv, where they hope to find employment and housing. As widely discussed in the literature (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Sabar 2008), the massive flow of 'foreign workers' to Israel has created social, economic and cultural networks among the labour migrants. An example of the importance of these networks was the opening of the African Churches in Tel Aviv to house the African refugees (who are not necessarily Christians) upon their arrival in the city. But the existing informal networks have been unable to respond to the needs of the refugees; following the growing numbers of African refugees arriving to the city, *Messilah*, a special municipal unit initially established to support the labour migrants in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, has also found itself dealing with the needs of the refugees.[4]

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[4] For a wider discussion of this matter see: Yacobi, 2011

The growing numbers of asylum seekers has led, in some cases, to their settlement in peripheral cities.[5] In Eilat, for example, the asylum seekers, mainly from Southern Sudan, are working in the tourist resorts; this case is considered a success, since these asylum seekers have received work permits and found housing and employment. By 2010 the number of asylum seekers employed by the tourist industry of the city rose to 1,600. During that year a wave of anti-African protests and anti-immigrant feelings began to emerge (meeting with Dr. Gili Baruch, the Chair of the Israeli Organization for Aid to Refugees and Asylum Seekers Governing Council, 8 September 2008).[5] Most of the African newcomers in Eilat gathered in one neighbourhood. The main building in which most of them resides is aptly called "Sing Sing" after the infamous prison. There, almost 1,200 live in a block of 200 apartments.[6] This attracted a local objection. At the end of June 2010, 15,000 pamphlets were spread all over town warning residents that:

> The Sudanese have conquered Eilat ... 10,000 refugees have taken control of the city, fear and terror reign the streets. We will not wait for the first rape and murder. The police are hapless ... one million infiltrators wait in Egypt to penetrate Eilat and the Government is silent!!! A nightmare in the streets!!! We must fight for our home.[7]

The language of the message clearly shows how the asylum seekers are represented as a mass hazard that rampantly spreads terror in the once organised and pastoral urban space. The connection between imagined memory, attributed culture and geopolitics of fear is poignantly summed up by the man who spread the pamphlets, Simon Ben David, a local ex-politician:

> In 1949 Golani and Givaati [The first I.D.F infantry brigades] presented Israel with a present: Eilat. We today are giving "Sudan City" to the government of Israel. They [the Sudanese] are hot minded and unstable. They speak Arabic in different accents. They need to be taken from all Israeli cities and placed in refugee camps.[8]

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[5] In the scope of this article I will not be able to discuss the policies and everyday life of African asylum seeker in peripheral towns in Israel. For more details see: Yacobi, 2011; Rama nd Yacobi forthcoming.

Indeed the remark regarding "Sudan city" is telling; it points to a fear masked by sarcasm that the government can take the city from its Israeli inhabitants for it became "Africanised". In another case a group of twenty-two Sudanese asylum seekers were deported from the city of Hadera, an act that was accompanied by racist comments from the Mayor:

> When I was told that people saw them, four or five men standing near the shopping mall and drinking beer, all my body shook. Because these are single men here without women… and if, God forbid, there is a rape – I don't want to think what people will say about me as the city's Mayor.[9]

It is important to discuss the above incident, since in the literature that deals with racism and gender there is a strong emphasis on the ways in which gender discourse and the control of sexual intercourse is central to the racialization of minorities (see for example: Thompson 2001; Stoler 2002). The incident is also a coherent expression of Etienne Balibar's view of racialization as a fear of miscegenation, a call for the 'necessity' to purify the social body and to protect the personal and collective identity from every risk of interbreeding (in Shenhav and Yona 2008: 19). Through this perspective, Balibar also points to the new patterns of racism that are formatted and organized around sociological signifiers that replace the biological marks. To put it differently, the predominant factor in this form of racism is not the biological fact that the refugees are non-white and non-Jewish but rather their presence in urban space and their uncontrolled flow through borders.

An additional example relevant to the above discussion is expressed in the creation of linkages between the refugees' origin and the fear of diseases. According to a tribunal set up by the Prisons Service and Health Ministry at the end of July 2008, twenty-two cases of tuberculosis have been discovered at Ketziot, twelve of which were not in need of medication. Four of the refugees with active tuberculosis were transferred to the Prisons Service's medical facility at the Nitzan Prison. A report in Haaretz (Reznik 2008) mentions that 'the tribunal determined that the rate of active tuberculosis among inmates at Ketziot (four cases out of 3,000) is 13.3 times greater than the ratio in 1997 that led Israel to re-establish medical facilities for eradicating the disease and to give it the status of 'dangerous and infectious'.

Nevertheless, the Ministries of Health and Interior allow the refugees to move to other parts of the country without conducting chest X-rays that would identify the disease and without other essential tests. The director of the Department of Tuberculosis and AIDS in the Ministry of Health testified before the tribunal that the lack of testing and vaccinations, as mandated by the Ministry of Health, constitutes 'a danger to public health'. I would suggest that the above discussion must be contextualized within Alan Ingram's argument concerning 'global health security', i.e., the tendency 'to locate the causes, origins and responsibility for the threat of infectious disease outside, elsewhere, and with others…' (Ingram 2008: 76).

The above considerations give further weight to the ambiguous approach towards the African refugees; on the one hand, Israel perceives itself as the 'only Western democracy' in the region and so it must respect human rights. But, on the other, it must 'protect' its ethnic character by limiting what Olmert referred to as 'a tsunami of infiltrators' (http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3522404,00.html). The racialization of the refugees is expressed not solely through the linkage between the flow of refugees and a natural disaster; take the words of Shmulik Rifman, the Chairman of the Ramat Negev Regional Committee, who criminalizes the refugees while comparing them to the infiltration of terrorists:

> I see it [the infiltration of refugees] as a national disaster. The decision makers do not understand the meaning of it... 200,000 of them are sitting in Egypt and are waiting to make their salaries in the Holy Land [i.e. Israel]. The feeling is that these are Darfurian refugees, but this is not the real story. There is a danger in those who are looking for a job and their infiltration is even more dangerous than the infiltration of terrorists. (www.hagira.gov.il/ImmigrationCMS/NewsPapersParts/ynet_18.02.08.htm)

I would suggest that one must analyse the racialization of the African refugees in Israel in relation to the existing ideologies and power relations that are not always explicitly manifested.

The racialization of the African asylum seekers has implications for policy implementation; the flow of refugees to Israel's urban core, Tel Aviv and its surroundings, led the Ministry of the Interior to renew work permits for 2,000 Eritrean

refugees in north of Hadera and south of Gadera where they would have greater chances of finding work. This act was followed by protests on the part of the refugees' leaders, and the Ministry on Interior then refused to extend their visas or work permits. Indeed, refugees' migration affects the demographic and spatial diversity of Israeli cities, despite the domination of one ethno-national group. Yet, this 'diversity' should not be idealized; rather the abuse of the right to the city[6] of these city dwellers is still based on an inequality of status and the racially based distribution of resources and urban goods.

Discussion: walling and the politics of fear

As noted in this article, the arrival of African asylum seekers to Israel across its border with Egypt has become a focal point in Israeli national and politics. The flow of refugees is continuing despite the authority's best efforts to control it. Israeli discourse, shaped as it is by the media and by politicians, is complex. On the one hand, some Israelis identify these African asylum seekers with Jewish refugees in and after World War II, but, on the other hand, there is a strongly xenophobic attitude towards them.

As I have detailed throughout this paper, a new ethnic and racial landscape has arisen in Israel. The discussed wave of non-Jewish and non-white migration validates the argument of Shuval and Leshem that 'Israel is becoming more and more like other societies in which there is a large-scale immigration' (Shuval and Leshem 1998: 39). This process involves both formal policy and collective cultural discourse framed by the powerful logics of ethnic dominance. The analysis of public discourse, meanwhile, as presented in the media and by politicians, is an analysis of the politics of fear linked to 'moral panic' (Pain and Smith 2008: 9). Similar findings were mentioned by Tesfahuney (1998) in a discussion of changes in discursive and institutional practices with regard to international migrations in Europe. As he points out, the social and political construction of migrations as 'threats' to the West involves racialization and securitization – both also discussed in detail in this paper.

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[6] In the scope of this article, I will not discuss the notion of the right to the city, as theorized by Henri Lefebvre and extensively discussed by several scholars. For a detailed discussion of this concept and its relevance to the presence urban condition see: Mitchell 2003; Yacobi 2009.

The reaction of the authorities discussed in the previous sections of this paper, were subject of legal and social criticism. However, "walling" the border with Egypt is considered as legitimate act of a sovereign state. In more details, a discussion attended by the members of the previous government (including Defence Minister Ehud Barak, Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann, Social Affairs Minister Isaac Herzog, previous Foreign Ministry and Social Affairs Ministry representatives, and Health Minister Yacov Ben-Yizri, as well as Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter) expressed the general confusion over the issue. The Internal Security Minister argued that the IDF has been unsuccessful in preventing refugees from entering Israel, but that it is necessary to make sure that each refugee, when found, is returned to Egypt since 'the solution must be that we arrest them on the border with Egypt and immediately return them. If we fail to deal with them on the border, immediately after they enter, it will be complicated' (Avi Dichter, YNET 24 February 2008). Indeed, according to Dichter, Israel's alternatives are either imprisonment or expulsion. However, the deportation of foreign nationals is complex, as a refugee cannot be put on a plane back to his/her homeland without a passport.

While Dichter focused on the question of what to do with those who have already arrived in Israel, Defense Minister Barak, during this meeting, called for the construction of a fence on the Egyptian border and asked the Finance Ministry to allocate the necessary funds for the construction of this 132-mile 'smart fence' that is 'needed'. This approach, I would suggest, is discursively connected to the political technologies that have been used by Israel in the last few years. In fact, the pressure to construct the 'smart fence' between Israel and Egypt could be said to be linked to two parallel and significant events that occurred in the summer of 2002. The first was the establishment of the Immigration Authority, which aimed to prevent the entry of new foreign workers into Israel and the deportation of those already working without the necessary permissions. The second, following renewed and continuing violence between Israel and the Palestinians, was the Israeli government's construction of a security barrier separating Israel from large sections of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

The plan to erect a barrier between Israel and Egypt has been approved by the current government in order "to prevent migrant workers from infiltrating and 'ensure Jewish character' of Israel" (http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-to-build-nis-1-5b-fence-along-egypt-border-1.261141). The fence will be built only in two areas; the

first will run south and east from Gaza for around 30 miles, while a second, which is the focus of this paper, will run north from the Israeli city of Eilat over another 30 miles. It will have two layers of fencing, one with barbed wire, and a radar to alert Israeli border patrols to anyone trying to cross. Electronic devices will cover the area between the two fences because of the topographical conditions.[7]

But the use of terminology such as "infiltrators", "foreign workers" or "terrorists" (instead of asylum seekers) is not accidental; rather it is part of the use of politics of fear which according to Pain and Smith (2008: 9) is both social and collective experience rather than an individual state. But fear, as we can learn from this paper, is also "embedded in a network of moral and political geographies (Pain and Smith 2008: 9). Indeed, as the works of Sandercock (2002; 2003) and Bauman (2003) reveal, the fear of the Other is a central component in the discourse of politics. Furthermore, Sandercock suggests that the presence of fear is not a simplistic reflection of social reality but rather it is itself a mechanism that produces 'reality' – one that is mediated through discourses of fear, hygiene, and order (Sandercock 2003: 123) – as also detailed in this paper. Furthermore, fear, in its political dimension, is intensified when significant transformations occur. To some extent, the presence of African refugees in Israel is a good example of the way in which the discourse of fear focuses on the 'what' and 'whom' we should be afraid of.

Walling the border intended to stop Africans looking for asylum Israel, rather than to prevent terrorist attacks. When complete, this geopolitical project, I would propose, will almost complete the isolation of the Israeli "villa" from the surrounding "jungle" as Israel and parts of the occupied west bank will be almost entirely walled as on its international borders with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan Israel already has heavily-patrolled fences. This total isolation is indeed a final step in the attempt to protect the "Villa" in the "Jungle" as accentuated lately by Ehud Barak:

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[7] As detailed by Gordon (2009), Israel's separation barrier has become an important testing site for several Israeli homeland security firms. Here the case of "DefenSoft L.T.D" is telling. This Israeli company was selected by the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Defense Forces to supply its "LIGHTHOUSE" a geo-spatial software system for planning deployment of detection and surveillance sensors, communication devices, fences, patrol roads, response units, barriers, and other security related infrastructure (http://www.defensoft.com/advanced_technology.htm). It should be mentioned that among its clients are African and European countries, searching for an efficient border control.

We need a fence, as I said 10 years ago, with all of our neighbours… With the Palestinians we need two states for two people, a fence that will surround a solid Jewish majority, we will be here and they will be there.

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3 See http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/BillGoverment/381/381.pdf (in Hebrew, last accesed: February 2011).

4 Yacobi, '"Let Me Go to the City"'.

5 In this context, it is important to note that there are internal tensions between different groups of refugees: while the Darfuris are organised and have been granted more stable status, the southern Sudanese feel excluded (interview with Yiftach Miloe, the Israeli Organization for Aid to Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 22 May 2008).

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