

**2013 ABORNE PhD Winter School**

To be held in conjunction with Gaston Berger University in Saint-Louis, Senegal  
9 – 12 January 2013

**ABSTRACTS**

**Wednesday 9<sup>th</sup>**

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**11:15 – 12:45** Session 1 chaired by **Prof. Werner Zips**

**Drawing Africa's Map: The Decision to Uphold Colonial Boundaries**

**Cris Boonen**

PhD Candidate, Leiden University  
December 2012

**Abstract**

How did the African statesmen come to agree upon maintaining the colonial map and how have alternatives to the inherited colonial boundaries been marginalised and forgotten? The decision to uphold the colonial boundaries was not straightforward, nor was it universally supported on the African continent around the time of decolonisation. Over the course of the negotiations, the formally expressed border demands of Africa's independence movements shifted from abolition in 1945, to adjustment at the All-African Peoples Conference in 1958, to stability at the OAU's founding summit in 1963. So although alternatives were available – and considered – at this critical junction, African statesmen dismissed them by subscribing to the prevailing norms on border stability. In this paper, I argue that this decision was based on a conceptualisation of the unknown, that is, on how uncertainties were presented as risks. Under the circumstances of serious *uncertainty* about future (inter)national security and the potential threats to it, the African statesmen deemed that the potential risks for the international order related to alternative boundary regimes would be grave while adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle would prevent major destabilisation. But I hold that this perception of the situation was not the only possible outcome. Rather, it was shaped by three sets of factors: 1) changes in the international environment, particularly in international representations of causes of conflict and legitimate statehood, 2) the development of institutional constraints during the process of decolonisation, and 3) evolution of domestic preferences on the basis of the negotiators' information on conflict potentials and ideological differences between themselves.

**Keywords:** Boundary politics, *uti possidetis* principle, uncertainty, risk management.

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**SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION REFLECTIONS ON STUDYING THE STATE AT  
SOUTH SUDAN'S BORDERS WITH CONGO AND UGANDA**

**Lottje De Vries**

AFRICAN STUDIES CENTRE, LEIDEN, THE NETHERLANDS

**Abstract**

This paper proposes a reflexive analysis of the researcher's presence at the border as lens through which state performances can be studied. National borders are naturally scene to relatively large presence of state agents who have the task to protect the sovereign territory.

The intentions of an outsider not to cross the border but to stay and investigate the manifestations of the state embodied by its agents at the border, mobilizes suspicion among those who claim representing the authority of the state, especially when investigated in a post-conflict situation. The paper will zoom in on the border triangle of South Sudan, Congo and Uganda, which is particularly interesting because, as will be shown, it allows insight in the arena in which the rudimentary foundations of today's independent South Sudan are rooted due to performance of agents claiming authority and enforcing state-like powers long before the South's secession in 2011. Based on fieldwork at South Sudan's borders with Congo and Uganda it is argued that on the one hand the researcher is conditioned in his/her investigation due to the suspicion raised by his/her presence. On the other hand, this mere fact also provides

important insight into the process of state---building and the particular position of state-agents at the border in this process.

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## **Contemporary African State and Trans-border Ethnic Identity: The Case of Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia**

**Happy Mickson Kayuni**

### **Abstract**

In International Relations (IR), the Westphalian model provides the assumption that states are independent actors with a political authority based on territory and autonomy. Despite a large number of critics against the model, it has not completely been dismissed in explaining some elements of the international system. This is evident by the underlying assumptions and perspectives that still persist in IR literature as well as the growing contemporary debates on the model (especially on its related elements of state, sovereignty and citizenship). It is generally agreed that due to globalisation and other related forces, the concepts of state, sovereignty and citizenship are taking a new meaning which is a further departure from the classic understanding of Westphalian model. In Africa, available literature analysing this new meaning normally focuses on the formal structures and ignores the role of informal *trans-border* traditional political entities (Specifically, how trans-border traditional political entities affect the re-definition of state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa). Such ignorance has led to a scholarship vacuum in African IR of the potentiality of the informal to complement on the formal intra-regional state entities. This paper focuses on the *Chewa* Kingdom as a possible case study to further understand the re-definition of Westphalian model's state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa. This is within the context of the recent emerging body of literature which is re-opening the debate on the meaning, experience and relevance of state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa. The *Chewa* Kingdom (formerly Maravi Kingdom) cuts across three modern African states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and its paramount King GawaUndi is based in Zambia. Using focus group discussions, key informant interviews and wider review of relevant literature, the paper interrogates whether the *Chewa* Kingdom (of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) is challenging, contradicting, compromising, complementing, confirming or calling for a reconstruction of the contemporary Westphalian Model. The major proposed argument offered is that the recent revival of the informal trans-border traditional political entities such as the *Chewa* of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique offers a new, exciting and unexplored debate on the Westphalian model that is unique to the African set up.

**Keywords:** Westphalia, *Chewa*, State, Sovereignty, Ethnic Identity, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, International Relations.

**14:15 – 15:45** Session 2 chaired by **Prof. Cristina Udelsman Rodrigues**

**LOCAL STATE AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES:  
GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS IN A BORDERLAND AREA**

**Patrício, Marta**

**Abstract**

In the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border there are two chieftaincies called Mapungwana – one in each of the countries. However, the territory of the Mozambique's Mapungwana spreads along the international border and includes parts of Zimbabwe's territory. Both chieftaincies are *ndau* and, according to this ethnic group traditional political order, the chief from the Mozambican side owes obedience to the Zimbabwe's Mapungwana, who is considered the 'land owner' (his chieftaincy was established previously) and therefore is seen as wiser and more powerful.

Both Mapungwana chiefs meet each other in a certain regular basis in order to solve political, juridical and ceremonial questions concerning their populations. However, these meetings have the local state approval and the chiefs' dislocations for that purpose are in the local state cars. Some questions can be raised out from this scenario. Firstly, it has to be analyzed the principle of the national state territorial integrity (in this case, Mozambique) in apparent collision with the conservation of a traditional political territory that is ultimately important for its chief's legitimacy. Then there is the need to incorporate legal pluralism in the picture as a possible response or way for understanding this relationship between both states and their respective traditional authorities. And finally there are the works about African international borders' artificiality or arbitrariness and the borderland communities' daily practices that must be analyzed and considered in order to understand such *status quo*.

This article will try to approach all the raised questions and, since it intends to be an insight of the author's PhD thesis first chapter, it will also include literature review on the named subjects. This PhD thesis is a research about the articulation between state and traditional authorities, with a focus on land and border governance, in Mossurize – an inland district in central-western Mozambique and in the border with Zimbabwe. It draws on original fieldwork and will articulate the author's preliminary empirical findings with some of the works already produced by scholars about this issue in the same region (for example Alexander (1997), Florêncio (2005) and Kyed (2007) ).

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**Insulating the Borderland: Security and Securitisation along Rwanda's  
Western Frontier.**

**Hugh Lamarque**

London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

**Abstract**

The Rwanda-DR. Congo border functions to separate one of Africa's most internally secure territories from one of its least. This is most apparent in the borderland conurbations of Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu, where despite extensive local cross-border interaction, violent criminality is confined predominantly to urban districts on the Congolese side of the

international boundary. This paper is concerned with the tensions and interactions between - as well as the relative capacity of - state and borderland modes of governance when it comes to sustaining cross-border imbalances in internal security.

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## **Exploring the shifting identities between refugees and locals at the Dagahaley refugee camp, Kenya**

**Ikanda, Fred Nyongesa**  
University of Cambridge

### **Abstract**

Approximately 500, 000 Somali refugees crossed into neighbouring Kenya between 1991 and 1992 when Somalia became stateless following the overthrow of the then president Siad Barre. More than two decades later, Somalian refugees are still being hosted at Kenya's Dadaab Complex (comprised of Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo II, and Hagadera refugee camps which are within a 17km radius from Dadaab). Like refugees, the local residents are also Somalis who had previously been interacting with Somalis across the porous Kenya-Somalia border due to kinship and religious ties, nomadic pastoralism practiced by Somalis, and political factors rooted in the mismatch between Somali nation and nation-state. Although Somali refugees went into exile as persons already enmeshed in previous relationships, cross-border movements are usually circumscribed by the Kenyan government due to past insurgency activities that had been inspired by the wish of Kenyan Somalis to be incorporated into Somalia at its independence. Based on 12-months ethnographic research I recently conducted at the Dagahaley camp, I show that these political and historical circumstances have rendered local-refugee identities amorphous and shift. Somali locals and refugees have therefore devised various categories to differentiate interactants and manage the complex linkages across the border, camps, local villages and herders in the surrounding bushes. Through highlighting the many complex ways in which "locals" and "refugees" are constructed as categories while they often have overlapping relationships and experiences, this paper describes how fluidity is used as a strategy to access opportunities. It then contrasts substantive bureaucratic categories against formative pragmatic categories within the context of the on-going negotiation of belonging to different categories at once.

**16:15 – 17:45** Session 3 chaired by **Prof. Anthony Asiwaju**

**“*TOKUNBO* VEHICLES TRADE ACROSS THE NIGERIA’S NORTH-WEST  
INTERNATIONAL BORDER”<sup>1</sup>**

***Abubakar Sama’ila***  
*Usmanu Danfodiyo University*

### **Abstract**

Cross-border trade has been one of the dominant themes in African border studies. The West African sub-region has been an important hub for cross-border trade. One dominant

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is an extract from the draft of the three chapters of an ongoing PhD work entitled “Cross-border Automobile (*tokunbo*) Trade in Nigeria: A study of North-West International Border, 1982-2011”. (See Appendix IV for the summary). The paper is prepared for the **2013 ABORNE PhD Winter school**, to be held in conjunction with Gaston Berger University in Saint Louis, Senegal, 9-12<sup>th</sup> January, 2013

commodity in contemporary cross-border trade across Nigeria's north-west border is second-hand vehicles, popularly known as *tokunbo*. Cross-border trade in *tokunbo* is a thriving business in Nigeria and in spite of attempts by government to control it, it continues to expand. Second-hand vehicles from Cotonou and Lome mainly enter Nigeria through the extreme end of north-west border areas of the country. This border area is located within the Kamba-Gaya-Malanville region, between Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republics. As at the year 2000, *tokunbo* automobiles constitute about 90% of the imported automobiles in Nigeria and most of these imported automobiles come from Benin Republic as about 90% of second-hand vehicles imported into Benin from overseas end up in Nigeria. By the year 2010, 200,000 used vehicles were officially declared in Nigeria. The porous borders between Nigeria and its neighbours in the north-west facilitate the *tokunbo* trade. This aspect of cross-border trade has grown from an insignificant economic activity, particularly in the 1970s to a significant one in the 1980s and 1990s. Much as the trade has been expanding and creating opportunities to several individuals, scholars seem not to have given adequate attention to it. This paper therefore, is an attempt to fill this vacuum in the economic history of the area. The paper examines the nature, character, and trends that have accelerated cross-border trade in *tokunbo* vehicles across the Nigeria's North-West international border.

**Key words:** Cross-border trade, *Tokunbo*, Second-hand vehicles, Nigeria

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## **Global/Local; Security/Border: Drug Trafficking, Security and the (re)Constitution of Borders in West Africa**

**Adam Sandor**

University of Ottawa

First Draft/Work in Progress- Please do not cite. Comments are welcome

### **Abstract**

This paper asks two questions: What is the relationship between global security interventions and bordering processes in Africa? And how can we theorize the diffusion of security practices related to borders on the continent? Control over territorial borders is conventionally understood as a governance benchmark: those states that can provide security at the border are commonly viewed as 'strong' while those that cannot/ do not are understood as on the brink of 'failure' or 'collapse'. Western policy-circles increasingly operate under the consensus that such 'weak states' in the Global South incubate transnational security threats. International organizations have paid considerable attention to West and North Africa with regard to this security problematique. While the veracity of the claim is far from definitive (see Hehir 2007; Piazza 2008), this security discourse has had two demonstrable effects for security politics in Africa: First, a global extension of innocuous practices of intervention via capacity-building programmes proffering security-related technical expertise meant to shore up African borders; and second, a political reorientation of local African populations and governments towards global actors in pursuit of global security rents and prestige (Bayart 2000; Jourde 2007; Fisher 2012). If this is the case, I argue that the diffusion of security practices on the continent must be theorized in spatial terms which are not premised on territorialized or container-like states. Instead, these developments highlight how security governance on the continent is performed at multiple sites of application which stretch beyond state borders. To move in this direction, the paper proposes an understanding of the diffusion of border-related security practices through the lens of multi-sited performative security assemblages. The paper demonstrates this theoretical position empirically through an analysis of struggles over global programmes implemented by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and sponsored by

the European Union at Senegal's airports, seaports and border regions aimed at interdicting illicit drug flows and trafficking networks. Specifically, local customs, police officers and gendarmeries simultaneously cooperate and compete with international capacity-builders and programme coordinators, and amongst themselves, over which group is most appropriate for accomplishing the tasks associated with curbing illicit smuggling. Through these competitive struggles over who should be a border's guardian and how it should be guarded, we see how new security practices and understandings are devised, as well as how borders become (re)constituted.

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## **Is West Africa Borderless? : Non-State Actors in Intra-Regional Migration in West Africa**

**Fayomi, Oluyemi**  
Covenant University,  
Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria

### **Abstract**

The inter-state borders remain mini “iron curtains” and “narrow gates” through which migrants traverse with pain, stress and tears. Visa requirements have been removed but migrants continue to be confronted by customs and police harassment, resulting in considerable economic loss and humiliation. The barriers erected on the trans-boundary roads are done on the pretext of security, which impede traffic and are a major cog in the wheel of the ECOWAS dream of borderless West Africa. In January, 2007, the Heads of State of the member States of ECOWAS had reached an agreement in January 2007 that only two checkpoints should be maintained along common borders, but up till now, the agreement is yet to be implemented. The paper will utilise multi-methods which include ethnography and case study in analysing the intricacies surrounding the borders and ineffective Protocol on Free Movement in West Africa and the effects on the non-state actors. An empirical analysis show that some of the overzealous security personnels at the borders use touts as agents to extort illegal levies; these are not uniformed men, but they enjoy *de facto* recognition by frequent migrants or commuters and the implicit acceptance of (official) operatives who benefit from their illegal activities. These touts who act as fronts for the security officials are familiar with and have regarded West Africa as a sub-region of free movement. Independence has altered the traditionally borderless migration systems, while recent political and economic crises in formerly labour-importing countries of the sub-region have led to restricted regulations on migration and a series of threats of expulsions. The free movement of persons within the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) community is an enduring achievement of the organization. Targets are set for a community passport and a single monetary zone. The formation of ECOWAS was a legal seal on the interaction, cooperation and socio-economic symmetry and satisfied the yearnings of the States for closer collaboration, as shown by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Ghana and Nigeria have been playing pivotal roles in the formation and administration of ECOWAS; they have emerged as natural leaders of the region by virtue of their economic clout and relative political stability. The Ghanaian and Nigerian diasporas living in Nigerian and Ghana respectively are used as the case study of the non-state actors that move back and forth within the region. It is against this backdrop that this paper discusses the reasons for the formation of ECOWAS and the need to implement the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons ratified by the 15-member States. The implementation of the Protocol by the government of the member States and the officials at the borders will lead to borderless West Africa.

**Keywords:** ECOWAS, Borderless, Protocol

**Thursday 10<sup>th</sup>**

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**08:45 – 10:45** Session 4 chaired by **Prof. Boubacar Barry**

**The process of national identities on the north Senegalo-Gambian boundary  
(1970-1990)**

**Caroline Roussy**

CEMAf, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

**Abstract**

Currently, many researchers support that African people, contrary to their governments, do not feel concerned with the « artificial » borders inherited from colonization. Since the same ethnic groups may be found equally on both sides of a border, they pretend that relationships between the people have not been affected by the European border imposed on them. In short, African people would have lived for many decades as if the borders had not been in existence. These specialists use the expression « bottom-up integration » to designate this phenomenon. This “bottom-up integration” would, actually, contrast with the inability of African States to create conditions for Panafrican integration. Contrary to this thesis, I will demonstrate through an analysis of their spatial practices, that Senegalo-Gambian people have not only integrated the usefulness of the border, but also that they have taken part in its establishment. Based on a ground investigation, I will analyze the modifications of fields ruling on the north part of the Senegalo-Gambian boundary. In the aftermaths of lands' penury, that appeared in the 1970s, particularly in the peanut basin, border people asked locally and punctually for state intervention. The enclosure of landlords' horizon on a line tends to prove that the process from a zone to a line is on its way and may confirm the administrative and political role of the boundary. Regarding identities, the intermediation of states can be considered as a sign of nationalism in the sense that people have integrated that states protect their interests. As a matter of fact, one may consider with Peter Sahlins that states did not simply impose their values and boundaries on local society, rather, local society was also a motive force in the formation of nationhood and the territorial state. But the integration of the border (both mentally and physically) was not incompatible with remaining transborder practices. For daily purchase, visiting family, or for contingent advantages identities may be renegotiated by the people. I define this as dialectical allegiance both to local and national identity. These permanent renegotiations of identities do not contradict the emergence of a national territory or a national identity although they tend to attenuate and weaken those two projects.

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**“They’ll Burn in Hell.” Cross-Border Trade, Transportation and Social  
Justice from the Margins of the State to Urban Spaces in West Africa**

**Mariama Khan**

University of Edinburgh, UK

**Abstract**

Micro-level interactions at the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Niorro border areas of The Gambia and Senegal affect the outcome of macro-level trans-boundary policy and political relations. Using the two border areas as a case study, this paper identifies dynamics of cross-border trade and transportation mediated through notions of social justice as well as the links between what happens at the borders and urban spaces in the Senegambia. By this approach, the paper answers the question “how are micro-level cross-border dynamics linked to macro-

level political relations between The Gambia and Senegal from 1960 to date? As new cross-border processes are reconfigured by new trade and transport realities, so too, are cross-border power and political relations. The need to understand how micro-level interactions shape macro-level happenings between the two countries is paramount as discussed in this paper. The Karang-Amdallai border area continues to be an important cross-border circulation point for goods that have both commercial distinction and strategic value such as cement and cooking gas. The Farafenni-Niorro border constitutes a vibrant hub for the exchange of agricultural goods, which respond to trans-boundary price differentials. As farmers tap into their cross-border social networks to get better bargains for their produce, little attention is paid to cross-border control mechanisms that renders the cross-border exchange of some produce like groundnut subject to state's notions of smuggling. The organic interface between trade and transportation means that as non-state actors subject transportation to disruption through interference, trade is hindered. The consequences of a breakdown in trade flows, as a result of border blockages and other restrictions, is a stall in market linkages, the business of trading networks, communities in the border area and urban spaces and government. In contrast, the smooth running of the transport corridor facilitates cross-border circulation and the benefits derived from it. As a conduit of cross-border exchange, micro-level interactions in these border areas create a hybrid political complex that instigates double reactions from the state as a sovereign entity. For example, The Gambia's liberal trade regime is contradicted by "artificial" protectionism that is practiced at the backstage of its national economic policy. Traders, who want monopoly as local "producers" of cement and cooking gas, use un-official channels to protect their trading interests by blocking competition. On the other hand, Senegal's state protectionism of its trading corridor thrives with covert encouragement of slippages that account for "smuggling." The ways in which trade and transport unfold to shape the political temperaments between the two countries as well as mediate notions of social justice between the border and urban space is what this paper investigates. Cross-border trade and transport merge with urban consumption, policy-making, politics and information flow, to reinforce how the borders and urban space constitute spatial continuities that are mutually interdependent and reinforce both local and trans-boundary relations in the Senegambia region.

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## **Borderwork assemblages and the security-development nexus in Senegal and Mauritania**

**FROWD, Philippe Mamadou**  
McMaster University

### **Abstract**

Although the proliferation of borders and the intensification of security practices in the West have been well documented, similar trends in Africa's borderlands have largely been overlooked. This paper seeks to highlight the actors, practices and logics of a broad range of border management practices in Senegal and Mauritania. The paper is organized into three main lines of argument. The first section engages with border studies literature and introduces the concept of 'borderwork' as a way of capturing the material and discursive labour behind border control practices. I suggest that borderwork in West Africa is undertaken by transnational assemblage-like formations which transmit Western norms about how borders should be run. The second section of the paper engages with literature in critical security studies and on liberal interventions to develop the idea of borderwork as a form of security governance that is increasingly interweaved with development. This linkage is reflected empirically in the use of pedagogical and capacity building practices as well as a turn to technological solutions to border issues. Although the paper provides a range of illustrative



examples throughout, the final section presents an in-depth analysis of one case that is at once symptomatic and justificatory for the conceptual framework. This final section discusses the European Union's cooperation with Senegal and Mauritania on migration management, paying particular attention to FRONTEX patrols, Project West Sahel, and the International Organization for Migration's construction of border control posts. This paper is an early iteration of a broader research project, and will be supplemented by data obtained from semi-structured interviews and participant observation set to take place over the course of 2013-2014.

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## **Mobility and Borders: The Integration Of Self-Settled Casamance Refugees In The Gambia.**

**Ray, Charlotte**  
Coventry University, UK

### **Abstract**

The Gambia has hosted Casamance refugees fleeing from a low-level civil conflict in the southern region of Senegal for nearly 30 years. It is West Africa's Longest running civil conflict. Official registration figures (although ambiguous) Estimate 11,000 Casamance refugees are permanently located within rural Gambian communities. In this context, international legalities are clearly set out as in any other refugee situation. Casamance refugees have taken flight across an international border and until they are able to return they have been granted refugee status and protection in The Gambia under the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, the parameters of refugee terminology are confused as refugees are self-settled in host communities rather than formally settled within refugee camps. Refugee literature tends to investigate the impact of camp-based refugees on local communities. Rarely does this literature investigate local integration through the process of self-settlement. Self-settlement as a concept has been emerging over the past decade academic literature has varied on its definition and has often caused confusion. This case study applies the concept of self-settlement to refugees who have been externally displaced as a result of conflict and settle outside refugee camps and formal settlements. Refugees negotiate the terms of their settlement directly with host communities who dictate the rate of integration and concomitant access to resources. In the case study presented, the historical cultural and socio-economic ties between The Gambia and Senegal have encouraged mobility across the porous international border, and this is heightened (in both directions) as the conflict escalates and subsides. As a result of increased demographic pressures within host communities, there are additional difficulties for refugees in accessing natural resources, securing sustainable livelihoods and receiving basic legal rights, challenging the process of self-settlement.

**11:15 – 12:45** Session 5 chaired by **Dr. Bernard Lututala**

**Ethiopian historiography and the conceptualization of the country's  
“internal” and “external” boundaries**

**Marzagora Sara**

sara.marzagora@soas.ac.uk  
SOAS, University of London  
ABORNE Winter School 2013

**Abstract**

Historians like John Markakis have argued that Ethiopian history can be read through a centre/periphery dynamic. The Amharic- and Tigrinya-speaking highlands always constituted the hegemonic centre, progressively pushing towards, and then incorporating, the lowlands periphery. Ethiopian history can thus be interpreted through the shifting of its internal borders, and the processes of negotiation and struggle linked to them. Following Markakis' suggestion, my paper will explore how Ethiopian political philosophers and historians answered to two questions: What is Ethiopia? And where does it belong? The first part of the paper will address the definition of Ethiopia national borders during the process of imperial expansion that took place from the 1880s to the 1900s. The historiography of the period is still highly politicized on a central issue: did Emperor Menelik reunite under his rule a nation that already existed? Or were Menelik's campaigns a process of colonization of peoples that had never been part of the Ethiopian nation? The debate is thus focused on the perceived borders of the Ethiopian polity throughout history. Menelik's expansion marks the transition from the porous and fluid conception of borders typical of pre-colonial African polities, to a Weberian-like conception of territorial fixity. The Ethiopian case study is particularly interesting when it comes to analyse this transition, as the new conception of borders was not externally imposed by European colonial conquest, but autonomously pursued by Ethiopian rulers themselves – either as a defence against encroaching European colonialism (the first historical interpretation) or for the opportunistic desire to take part to the Scramble for Africa alongside European powers (the second interpretation). The conceptualization of the country's borders has another, external dimension: where does Ethiopia belong? For decades, Ethiopian intellectuals and politicians assumed the existence of a cultural, social, religious and political border separating Ethiopia from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopian emperors like Tewodros and Yohannes wrote letters to Queen Victoria, asking Britain's help in annexing territories deemed to rightfully belong to Ethiopia: regions as far away as Egypt and the Holy Land. The sense of belonging to the Middle East starkly contrasted with the Pan-African vision of Ethiopia as the symbolic centre of the whole of Subsaharan Africa. Black nationalists and Pan-Africanist thinkers "dragged" Ethiopia towards the African continent, pushing the continent's boundary towards the Red Sea. Indeed, the feeling of an Ethiopian exceptionalism gradually lost its strength, and, starting from the 1960s, Ethiopian thinkers began conceptualizing their country more as African rather than Middle Eastern. The discussion over the continental position of Ethiopia has always been prominent in scholarship about Ethiopia, showing the arbitrariness of the continental boundaries "invented" (in V. Y. Mudimbe's sense) and imposed by the European colonizers.

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**Narrating and Practising the state border between Uganda and South Sudan**

**Hollstegge, Julian**  
Bayreuth University

**Abstract**

For the last decades the Sudan/Uganda borderland has been the arena of several interrelated violent conflicts in which successive governments and army forces supported rebel groups on the respective other side of the border. The border has been extensively studied with reference to these conflicts, the refugee movements they have created and related 'informal' cross-border flows. Following the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the subsequent (semi)autonomy of Southern Sudan and the demise of rebel activity in Northern Uganda, cross-border flows have taken on a new quantitative and qualitative dimension. This paper looks at current geopolitical, economical and social dynamics in the borderland based on fieldwork on both sides of a North-Western Uganda/Southern Sudan border crossing. It asks in detail how those who live at, work at and deal with the border 'story their border experience, and their relations with the other side. By examining border people's everyday narratives, practices and border management performances, this paper lays bare competing meanings and the symbolic functions of the border. It finally relates them to actual processes of state building, regional integration and identity formation.

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## **A political and social narrative of population movement on the Togochole border of eastern Ethiopia<sup>2</sup>**

**Matshanda, Namhla Thando**  
The University of Edinburgh

### **Abstract**

This paper traces the political and social history of population movement on the eastern Ethiopia and northern Somalia border. The focus is on what the paper deems as key indicators of the political and social nature of an international boundary: cross-border trade, refugee movement and immigration practices. These, and the influence they have on the surrounding borderlands reveal the breaks and continuities in the nature of the state in Ethiopia. The policies of three successive states - the imperial, socialist and federal states are explored and are found to be reflected in the changing social and political dynamics of this border. Contrary to popular understanding, this border has been implicitly central to domestic and regional policies of the state in Ethiopia. In addition, the paper demonstrates the extent to which the regional political context often shapes and influences the state's attitude towards this border area. The neighbouring Republic of Somalia emerges as the perpetual thorn on the side of the Ethiopian state. However, a distinction is made on this northern sector of the long boundary between the two countries. This distinction is important as it reveals a specific characteristic of the borderlands, one largely characterised by the population found on either side of the boundary and their movement across the border.

**14:15 – 15:45 Session 6 chaired by Dr. Kristof Titeca**

### **"Assainissement" on the Kinshasa-Brazzaville Border**

**Clara Devlieger**

Cambridge University; affiliation with Université de Kinshasa (UNIKIN)

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<sup>2</sup> This paper is not to be cited or circulated beyond the winter school meeting. The paper forms the basis of a chapter [six] in a thesis that is provisionally titled "The Ethiopian state at the margins: the politics of administration on the eastern borderlands". The thesis explores the continuous processes of state making in Ethiopia by focusing on the eastern border and surrounding borderlands with northern Somalia [Somaliland].

## **Abstract**

Written at a very early stage of research, this paper is a beginning in conceptualising the social construction of an African border area through bodily experiences. Much of the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, Congo-Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (RC, Congo-Brazzaville) is formed by the mighty Congo River. The river forms at once a rural and an urban boundary, notably between the capitals Kinshasa and Brazzaville. All along the border and at various times in history, it has been subject to various "assainissement", "cleansing" campaigns. Between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, the river's islands served as refuges for those who wished to stay out of sight of the state, and were often subject to state raids with the objective of "purging". Along the entire border, international sanitary conventions were supposed to "cleanse" the border and the state of contagious illnesses. "Cleansing" the urban border in Kinshasa of Ngobila Beach (Beach Ngobila, or the Beach), has been attempted many times in the past, mainly in the form of attempts to eradicate corruption and smuggling, and more subtly, the presence of those associated with it. Indeed, part of the Beach's negative image is due to the people associated with the area. One group often subject to "cleansing" are the disabled traders who have created a niche in border trade thanks to reductions in passage and import fees received in the 1970s. For them, the Beach has been described as a "court of miracles", considered as a rare place where such socially marginalised figures are able to thrive, although attempts are often made to eradicate their niche. In this way, whatever the situation or time at the DRC-RC river boundary, the border is variously depicted and presented as "state-less", "chaotic", "orderless" or "wild". Beach Ngobila, which forms the main crossing point over the Congo River to Brazzaville, is located in the city centre and yet is constantly portrayed as separate from and peripheral to the rest of the city. The state's preoccupation with "assainissement" on the border thus appears to show a body politics on the border, influencing the bodily experience of crossing and living on the border. In this regard, this paper draws attention to a vital characteristic of (African) border areas that has been undertheorised and is in need of further research: the border as a site that affects bodily experience, an element that influences the social construction and imagination associated with a border area. In this paper, I use archive documents, newspaper articles, documentaries, and preliminary fieldwork with the disabled traders operating at the Beach as a basis on which to begin considering the social construction of a border zone located in a city centre and the experience of bodily borders. I start by considering the fluctuating historical relations between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, before considering three examples of "assainissement" on the border, and the implications of these examples for the understanding of bodily borders.

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## **The Impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction on poverty reduction: a case study of Tanzania**

**NDILE, Wilman Kapenjama**  
University of Dar es Salaam

## **Abstract**

In this paper, we argue that there is adequate Tanzanian economic policy analysis literature seeking to explain the extent to which cross-border food crops' trade restriction promotes or hinders the attainment of the goals of Tanzania's overall national poverty alleviation programme. However, there is inadequate literature on how cross-border food crops' trade restrictions impacts on poverty reduction efforts at the local level within the context of whatever may be considered overall national policy intervention successes or failures. There

is therefore a need to investigate through empirical evidence on the impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction at the local level. The evidence from the review of the literature and that derived from insights reconstructed from interviews with relevant individuals as well as from FGDs does support the general view that for a large extent does the cross-border food crops' trade restriction contribute to poverty reduction in a given border area in Tanzania, the relevant case being the Namanga border area, on the Tanzania- Kenya border. Specifically, interview, FGD and literature review evidence does confirm that in the last five years, normal trade transaction was observed to have continued to take place before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. It was also observed that the main actors in the cross border crop export trade at the Namanga border area would seem to have remained the same both before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. These tended to include large-scale traders as well as small and medium sized operators who were invariably driven into engaging in food smuggling trade practices by the official trade restrictions. The conclusion and the derived recommendations ought to contribute to the continuing national and EAC regional discussion on the consequences of agricultural products export restriction. Indeed, the findings of the study do confirm the necessity of continuing to urge Tanzania government policy makers to adopt the stance of being ready to rethink the consequences of export restriction and other non-tariff barrier interventions. These measures may often be taken in the name of promoting food security but one should always be ready to review them in the light of emerging evidence-based analysis of opinions including those of cross border communities whose poverty ought to be at the centre of government development endeavours.

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## **Vigilant Citizens on the Edge of a Paranoid State: Burundi, 1962–1968<sup>3</sup>**

**Aidan Russell**  
Oxford University

### **Abstract**

As they parted ways from their enforced colonial union, Rwanda and Burundi viewed each other with deep suspicion. Rwanda, emerging from a bloody revolution, feared that its new, ethnic Republic lay in mortal peril from the armed Tutsi exiles who found refuge jus beyond its borders. Burundi, having lost its talismanic leader to assassination month before Independence, feared the shakily-maintained ethnic unity of its unstable monarchy was fated to be infected by Rwandan politics of division. As the two young states faced each other across the border that had stood between them for centuries, now suddenly rediscovered at Independence, the communities that peopled this perilous frontier were caught by doubt and deviance. This paper explores Burundi's experience of this antagonistic border across its most traumatic decade. Within days of acceding to internal autonomy from Belgium, borderlanders found that their national and political belonging was under hostile question from a state that exhibited extreme paranoia regarding the presence of Rwandan refugees in the borderland, and the political infiltration of the local population. Their response was remarkable. Displaying themselves as 'more state than the state' (Feyissa, 2010), they took to filling the role of voluntary border guards, selectively. The state lacked the capacity to police its feared frontier, and reacted strongly to the patriotic and political claims of borderlanders who appeared to fulfil its desire for a rigid barrier on the border. Individuals approached the state to perform their loyalty through vigilance on the border, apprehending Rwandans or local Barundi who, they claimed, had exposed themselves a politically alien to the nation. The

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<sup>3</sup> Draft paper - Please do not circulate or cite

performance continued throughout the decade, and the paper explores two further exemplary incidents: first, a moment of local crisis as rebels crossed from Rwanda and burnt hundreds of homes on the unprotected frontier, and then a peculiar incident during a time of international rapprochement, as Rwanda and Burundi sought to defuse their enmity, while the borderlanders continued to insist loudly on protection. As the state became dependent on the local community's vigilance to create the border, and the borderlanders repeatedly invoked the state's presence in their lives, each found an uncomfortably close relationship difficult to throw off when it became politically awkward. The majority of the paper is based on an abridged and adapted chapter from my thesis. The preceding chapter considered a conflict on the borderland at the end of colonial rule, one that took on the characteristics of an anti-colonial revolt yet manifested in predominantly vigilante violence between adherents of rival political parties. Subsequent chapters explore how the terms of vigilance established in the border conflicts here explored were applied to bring the state into local political struggles. Finally, the thesis analyses how the terms of vigilance developed from the limits of the border context, and became expressive of political linkage across the nation, most terribly applied against society when the state demanded 'vigilance' of its supporters in pursuit of genocide in 1972.

**16:15 – 18:00** Resource person presentations chaired by **Dr. Manuela Zips-Mairitsch**

- 🕒 **Prof. David B. Coplan:** *Africa's Contribution to Global Cross-Disciplinary Borderlands Theory*
- 🕒 **Prof. Pierre Englebert:** *A Quick Survey of Quantitative Options in the Study of African Borders and Politics*
- 🕒 **Prof. Boubacar Barry,** Chiekh Anta Diop University Dakar: *Boundaries and the challenges of regional integration in West Africa*

**Friday 11<sup>th</sup>**

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**08:45 – 10:45** Session 7 chaired by **Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala**

**Borders in Nigeria Relations with its Neighbours: Nigeria-Niger Republic.**

**Akinyemi Victoria Omolara**

Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria.

**Abstract**

Nigeria's borders with Niger Republic is the longest and plagued with noxious discomfiture. The border of contact not that of separatism is expected to be harmonious but this is not to be of Nigeria-Niger borders- as obtains in many countries that Nigeria share conterminous boundaries with. Spirited efforts of bilateral commission between the two countries such as the establishment of joint border patrol are yet to stem tide of terrorism, banditry and other infractions on the border areas. The foregoing is worsened by some dissident groups known as Boko Haram fighting the Nigerian government. Examples are not far-fetched from bombing here and there in which many lives were lost, such as the United Nations building in Nigeria, the Chief Security and many more. These are the manifestation of security challenges in Nigeria. There are speculations that the groups must have found their way through our porous

borders. This problem, in the light of the above, raises fundamental questions about our security policy especially Nigeria-Niger border which is central to this study. This study is relevant to address the lacuna or missing gap in Nigeria Security Policy, by accessing the policy of good neighbourliness and globalization trend resulting in the openness of borders. All efforts put in place has not yielded a positive result, it is not a hyperbolic statement to assert that a week can not pass in Nigeria without a security challenge in form of bombing attacks. Beyond this, the study contends that the insecurity at the border spread to the internal security of lives and property, there is need to embark on more protective measures in order for the borders to be adequately secured because openness without credible controls make it possible for threats including terrorism to be successful. The study concludes that Nigeria borders seem to be porous; hence the environment is not safe.

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## **Border-Crossing and Dynamics of Representations in Third-Generation Nigerian Fiction**

**Coker, Oluwole**

Obafemi Awolowo University,  
Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

### **Abstract**

Postcolonial African fiction is replete with tropes and tendencies which instantiate the peculiarities of the transitional and transnational colourations of the works. As a subset of African literature that has a consistent commitment to pervading socio-historical issues of the enabling milieu, postcolonial African literature displays artistic innovativeness in showcasing dominant developments. This paper is concerned with how the concept of border-crossing reflects in the preoccupations of the emerging canon of African literature at the geographical and epistemological levels. Knowledge production continues to be influenced by several factors like border contestations and influences, especially when trans-border economic activities and migration are considered. Given the diversities in backgrounds and the hybrid ideologies of the representative writers, the aesthetic and artistic productions exude multivalent tropes which are in tandem with the age of globalisation. This study interrogates the trope of border-crossing in third-generation Nigerian fiction using Shade Adeniran's *Imagine This* and Okey Ndibe's *Arrows of Rain* as textual exemplifications. This is a view to demonstrating that, the writers are not only physically crossing borders as Diaspora writers; they are also crossing epistemological borders through the multi/trans – disciplinary significance of the literary productions. The paper highlights features of transnational features and how this relates to the central issue of border crossing. The paper demonstrates that, borderlands' narratives are imperatives in the body of African literary and cultural productions, attributing this to the border-crossing temperaments of third generation fiction writers.

## **Nigerian Trans-borders and National Security: Examination of the Emerging Terrorist Networks**

**FALEYE, Olukayode Abiodun**

Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria

### **Abstract**

Nigeria's northern international hinterland borders, especially with Chad and Niger have in recent years attracted significant attention in the context of waves of migrants fleeing drought across the borders to Nigeria. These boundaries seem not to function as lines of division

between local societies as they appeared to be one of Africa's most 'porous' boundaries. More recently there have been proliferations of arms and ammunition across the Nigerian northern borders thereby fuelling terrorist operations in Nigeria. Security officials have reported incidences of arms proliferations through the Nigerian northern borders of Chad and Niger. For example, on the 30th July, 2012, security operatives seized 8 rocket propelled launchers, 10 rocket bombs, 10 rocket chargers and 12 AK-47 rifles from a group of smugglers in Daban Masara (a border town with Chad) in Munguno local Government Area of Borno State. These seized arms were meant for the deadly *Boko-Haram* terrorist group in Nigeria. Having long regarded the *Boko-Haram* Islamist sect as a localized issue, there has been ample evidence to show that the radical Islamist group has assumed a transnational outlook in terms of training and expertise received beyond the Nigerian borders. Security officials claimed that some of the militants, including bomb makers have been training alongside *Al Shabaab* and Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia. There are also pockets of mobile Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (*AQIM*) affiliates in Chad and Niger, suspected to be providing the training and materials, for bombings and guerrilla attacks by *Boko-Haram* in Nigeria. Facts are also beginning to emerge that *Boko-Haram* has extended its terrorist activities to Nigeria's neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The level of the sect's organization, sophistication of weaponry, casualty rate and transnational connections has clearly shown a linkage with other terrorist networks such as *Al Shabaab* and *AQIM*. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Sahel is now a refuge to a complex network of terrorist groups. These terrorist networks are already having a noticeable influence on the West Africa countries, especially, Nigeria with the attendant consequences for national security due to porous borders. While there is awareness of the threat posed by terrorist groups in Nigeria, there seems to be a research gap in the literature on the role of porous borders in understanding the emerging terrorist networks in Nigeria. It is against this background that this paper examines how Nigerian trans-borders, especially the northern borders have been providing the groundswell for terrorist networks. This will be done by analyzing data collected from the field study and also drawing both on recent studies and literature on trans-borders and terrorism in Africa.

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## **Livelihood, Crime and Cross-border Security in Africa: Nigeria/Benin Example**

**Muritala Monsuru Olalekan**  
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

### **Abstract**

Urban centers in Nigeria served as the sites of enchanting challenges and diverse spectacles. In this regard, the city of Lagos became the site of diverse experiments and strategies in urban livelihood. Though there is an assumption that livelihood is about the ways and means of "making a living", it also about creating and embracing new opportunities. While gaining livelihood, or attempting to do so, people may, at the same time have to cope with risks and uncertainties, such as a wide range of forces, social, economic, political, legal and environmental and institutional both within and outside the locality in which a household lives. It is within this conceptualization that this paper examines human smuggling and traffic-in persons, migration, sexual trade, currency trafficking, armed robbery and forced labour between Nigeria/Benin Republic. These are global problems, not limited to Nigeria and Benin, since the criminal networks cut across nations. Poverty, unemployment and corruption no doubt are known triggers, contributing to observed cross-border security challenges in both Nigeria and Benin Republic. This study interrogates the neglected aspects of cross-border security challenges, especially those connected to livelihood and survival. It raises posers as to why and how the criminalized livelihood means are sustained? What can be



done to transform or reverse this trend? The study relied on both primary and secondary sources. Primary data included oral interviews, newspaper and archival materials. Secondary sources were obtained from university libraries and research institutes spread across Nigeria. Data were historically analyzed. This study concludes that inequalities, deprivation, poverty and corruption in Nigeria and Benin Republic served as impetus to the emergence and development of cross-border security challenges. Thus, it proffers that good governance through human security approach, equitable distribution of income and social security, rather than the law enforcement is a preferred solution to the problems of unlawful migrations, cross-border prostitutions, currency trafficking, smuggling and armed robbery.

## **11:15 – 12:45 Session 8 chaired by Prof. Pierre Englebert**

### **SPILLING BLOOD OVER WATER: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS OF THE KENYA -ETHIOPIA BORDER: A SYNOPSIS**

**Kenneth O Nyangena**

#### **Abstract**

Although Kenya is considered to be peaceful unlike her neighbors, a closer scrutiny reveals an unprecedented wave of internal and cross-border conflicts. These conflicts - mainly manifesting as political, economic, environmental conflicts, conflicts over natural resources, land and tribal clashes and lately terrorism - are sending signals that all is not rosy as the outside world has been erroneously made to believe. Pastoralists in northern Kenya have borne much of the brunt of internal conflicts and considerable efforts have been directed at addressing their specific conflict environment by a number of stakeholders that include GOK, religious organizations and CBOs. The resource-based conflicts prevalent in ASALs have completely distorted development programmes and eroded civil administration of this vast and rugged countryside. However, for many years, nomadic herdsmen have roamed the harsh, semi-arid lowlands that stretch across 80 percent of Kenya and 60 percent of Ethiopia. These herdsmen have long been accustomed to adapting to a changing environment but in recent years, they have faced challenges such as dwindling water supplies forcing the pastoralists migrate in search of suitable water and land. The search has brought tribal groups in Ethiopia and Kenya in increasing conflict. The result has been cross-border raids in which members of both groups kill each other, raid livestock, and torch huts over grass and water. The main aim of this research is to provide an overview of current existing policies, institutions and other measures that impact on conflict management in Kenya. It also highlights the principles that act as the 'lens' through which the policy analysis is conducted to identify the policy interventions and lessons learnt that should be integrated into a holistic and cohesive peace building and conflict management policy.

### **Engaging the Right Security Actors in the Horn of Africa: The Case for CEWERU in CEWARN in the IGAD framework.**

**Mwangi J. Macharia**

Lecturer, Dept. Of Philosophy, History and Religion,  
Egerrton University, Kenya

#### **Abstract**

Over the years, the IGAD region has continuously experienced endemic insecurity that is manifested in violent cross-border conflicts, cattle rustling, human and drug trafficking, and illicit arms trade among others. This insecurity and its consequences have continuously

undermined the development of the region and threatened livelihoods. This paper argues that there is need to address various issues influencing inter-community conflicts along the countries' cross-border areas. If development and increased quality of life of the pastoralists is to be realised, it is imperative for security and peace to be fostered. The paper further argues that efforts to ensure security and conflict resolution must involve partnership between regional bodies, governments, politicians, local security agents, administration, civil society, NGOs, development partners and local community leadership. IGAD has introduced the CEWARN initiative under which the CEWERUs play significant role in ensuring the security of the Somali Cluster. IGAD's initiative is borne out of the need for peace building in the Cross-border areas, through community based peace and security initiative, identify progress achieved and strategically put in place mechanism to address any gaps and challenges that may hinder realisation of peace and security in these areas. The paper examines the use of CEWARN mechanism's work in conflict early warning and response, the role of CEWERU and their effective cooperation and partnership with Civil society, CBOs, FBOs, local administration and security field monitors, district peace committees, development partners including USAID, and international NGOs.

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## **RELATIONS BETWEEN TANZANIA AND MALAWI: A STUDY OF BORDER DISPUTES**

**James Zotto**

University of Dar es Salaam

### **Abstract**

Many contiguous African countries have experienced interstate conflicts over their shared international borders. Such conflicts suggest various historical processes which have shaped them over time. One example of the African countries which are still experiencing border disputes is Tanzania and Malawi. The two countries are at logger heads over the Lake Nyasa frontier. Basically, Tanzania-Malawi border dispute arises because of the conflicting interpretation of the Anglo-German (Heligoland) Treaty of 1890. This Treaty acts as a formal agreement between German and British colonial powers on the partition of the Lake Nyasa, which in legal terms can be viewed to exclude German East Africa (and today independent Tanzania) the rights of the Lake Nyasa waters. However, cartographic evidence leaves inaptness in terms of boundary delineation after the agreement was passed. Some maps indicate the shoreline boundary while others show the middle/water line boundary. The matter is heightened following German renunciation after WWI. After this event, former German East Africa (which later on was renamed Tanganyika by British administration) was placed under the Mandate of Great Britain from 1922 to 1961 when the former achieved her independence. During the period of Mandate, evidence of boundary delineation does not unequivocally point to one direction. Such inconsistencies laid the foundation of border claims after the countries attained their independence. Whereas Tanzania claims the boundary is on the middle of the Lake Nyasa, Malawi claims that the boundary is on the Eastern shores of the Lake Nyasa (Tanzania). The Tanzania-Malawi border dispute submits the dynamics of cross-border relations in terms of changes and continuities over time shaped by the various historical forces at work. However, there has been no permanent solution reached to resolve the Tanzania-Malawi border dispute, which is a puzzle that this study partly seeks to address. This paper is part of chapter I of my Ph.D. thesis, and it is therefore titled 'Chapter One'. It addresses issues such as problem statement, objectives, questions, significance, literature review, and methodology. Other chapters of my thesis include: Chapter Two: The Making of African Frontiers: A Reference to the Lake Nyasa Corridor; Chapter Three: States Administration on the Lake Nyasa Corridor; Chapter Four: Causes of Border Disputes

between Tanzania and Malawi; Chapter Five: Border Dispute Negotiations between Tanzania and Malawi; Chapter Six: The Dynamics of Relations between Tanzania and Malawi; and Chapter Seven: Conclusion.

**14:15 – 15:45** Session 9 chaired by **Prof. Samba Traoré**

**Approche dialogique de la gouvernance transfrontalière : une contribution à l'étude poste-moderne de la problématique des frontières**

**Papa Fara DIALLO**  
UGB Saint-Louis

**Résumé**

La gouvernance transfrontalière continue de poser problème aux Etats. De nouveaux enjeux et de nouveaux défis viennent complexifier davantage la gestion des flux transfrontaliers, invitant ainsi les chercheurs et les décideurs à renouveler respectivement leurs approches théoriques et leurs méthodes de gestion des nouvelles problématiques de la limologie. Les approches classiques, même quelques fois dépoussiérées, ont montré leurs limites heuristiques pour rendre compte de ces changements. Les approches sécuritaires, chères aux réalistes, se sont révélées elles aussi insuffisantes. C'est ainsi que les approches postmodernes de l'étude des frontières, dans leur diversité et leur complexité, ont introduit une réorientation théorique et conceptuelle en intégrant dans la réflexion d'autres variables explicatives – la globalisation, l'intégration régionale, la culture, le terrorisme, l'écologie, etc. – qui accentuent les logiques transnationales. Dans cet embarras théorique, l'approche dialogique se présente comme une alternative à l'approche sécuritaire classique et comme une méthode opératoire de gestion des nouveaux enjeux et des nouveaux défis transfrontaliers. Le mode opératoire : c'est le dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé, aussi bien au niveau supra (entre Etats contigus) qu'au niveau infra (entre villes frontalières). L'approche dialogique, présentée dans cet article, se veut une contribution aux approches postmodernes de l'étude des frontières.

**Mots clés** : dialogue – gouvernance – frontière – approches – postmodernes

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**Using professional biographies to understand border traders**

**Moustapha Koné**  
Université de Bordeaux et Université de Niamey

**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to present the methodology adopted in our PhD thesis '*West Africans traders in borders markets: Building a business community*'. In our work we use professional biographies to collect valuable qualitative information on large border traders in two border regions in West Africa located between Niger, Benin and Nigeria. Biographical information are used to document the factors that drive West African traders to leave their original areas and establish businesses in border areas, the patterns of these migrations, and the foundations of contemporary business communities in border areas. When studying large traders engaged in cross-border trade, we are particularly interested in their past, present and future activities. The paper also presents some of the difficulties that arose in the data collection, notably because most traders are reluctant to discuss their illegal or informal business activities. We

show how such difficulties have been partially overcome by interacting and building trust with our actors over a prolonged period of time.

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## **Citoyenneté et libre circulation des personnes : de quelques anachronismes du Protocole CEDEAO portant code de citoyenneté communautaire**

**ZAKI MOUSSA Halima,**

Université Le Havre (France) / Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar(Sénégal)

### **Abstract**

« Dans un monde qui privilégie la globalisation, ceux qui sont confinés au local sont sanctionnés ». L'intégration au sein d'organisations supranationales apparaît dès lors comme la seule voie de développement possible. Cette voie a été adoptée par la plupart des pays à travers le monde et particulièrement en Afrique avec, à côté d'une Organisation à vocation continentale (l'Union Africaine), des CER<sup>2</sup> à l'instar de la Communauté Economique des Etats De l'Afrique de l'Ouest<sup>3</sup>. Ces CER, et la CEDEAO en particulier, visent à terme le développement économique de leurs Etats membres ; afin de réaliser cet objectif, il a été notamment institué, à l'image de ce qui se fait en Europe, une citoyenneté communautaire. L'un des avantages de celle-ci est la liberté de circulation : cette liberté permet à son bénéficiaire de se déplacer librement à travers le territoire communautaire, de s'installer dans l'Etat membre de son choix afin d'y exercer ou non une activité professionnelle et de jouir de conditions de vie quasi similaires à celles des nationaux de cet Etat. C'est donc dire toute l'importance que revêt une telle liberté. Citoyenneté et libre circulation des personnes ont de ce fait un lien étroit, l'une dépendant de l'autre.

**16:15 – 17:15 Session 10 chaired by Prof. Georg Klute**

### **Border Crossings in Times of War**

**Lieneke Eloff de Visser**

PhD candidate, Free University of Amsterdam (VU)

### **Abstract**

The Eastern Caprivi in the north of Namibia forms the easternmost tip of the Caprivi Zipfel. At its widest, the area measures about 200 km east to west, and 80 km north to south. From the capital town Katima Mulilo it is an easy drive to any of four international borders with Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. These borders were drawn in the early twentieth century as a formal separation between German, British and Portuguese colonial possessions. For the next sixty years, the borders remained permeable and people and goods easily crossed between territories. This changed dramatically with the onset of the Namibian war for liberation. To the South African authorities, the Caprivi Zipfel became a line of defence that was meant to bar SWAPO insurgents from entering Namibia and potential recruits from leaving, and served as a base for cross-border operations. From 1966 onwards the Eastern Caprivi became a militarized region where physical control over the territory's boundaries was enforced by constant military patrols. Movement on and across the Zambezi and Chobe river borders was banned, while the Namibian - Zambian land border was denuded of all vegetation to allow ease of supervision. Moreover, even the internal Kwando river border between the Eastern and Western Caprivi was closed, so that to all intents and purposes the Eastern Caprivi was under full lockdown. This paper examines how the Eastern Caprivi population responded to these changes. Scholars in the field of borderland studies have

convincingly argued against the notion that colonial borders were imposed on hapless Africans. Similarly, conflict studies show that insurgencies are not merely fought out over the heads of a submissive population. Instead, local actors may find it expedient to collaborate with the dominant force, but simultaneously they may find ways to resist through acts of sabotage, subversion or avoidance. Moreover, within the space of the central conflict local actors may actively exploit opportunities to assert their supremacy over rivals, or to gain exclusive access to valuable resources like arable land or hunting and fishing grounds. In the Eastern Caprivi agency indeed resided with the people who sought and managed to circumvent or exploit restrictions on border crossings. They did so for a variety of reasons that rested on livelihood or security needs, or that were ideologically, politically or economically inspired. Thus, instead of being passive victims, local individuals and groups of the Eastern Caprivi creatively contested and escaped the confines of colonial hegemony and military occupation.

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## **On the Frontline of a Frontline State: The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela and the Liberation Struggle in South Africa 1948-1994**

**Louisa Cantwell**

### **Abstract**

In May 2012, Thabo Mbeki paid tribute to Botswana's role in the liberation struggle in South Africa, and in particular to the role played by Chief Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community in providing a safe haven for refugees and being a key part of the ANC's 'underground machinery'. The involvement of a traditional authority in Botswana in such clandestine activity in support of the liberation struggle in South Africa had, until this point, remained hidden from public view. Taking this revelation as a starting point, this paper examines the ways in which the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community had historically been involved in and affected by the struggle. Territorially located in both Botswana and South Africa, having been partitioned by the arbitrarily-drawn border decided upon by the colonial authorities, the Bakgatla were embedded within social and political networks in both countries. This paper draws on the central concerns of A.I. Asiwaju's *Partitioned Africans*, especially R.F. Morton's study of the Bakgatla within it,<sup>4</sup> and seeks to place this demonstration of post-independence international cooperation within the deeply-rooted historical experience of a people of a common culture or ethnicity divided by an externally-imposed colonial border. Since 1870, there had been the constant trans-boundary travel and communication necessitated by the imagining of a single 'homeland entity' across a boundary constructed out of external political conflict rather than internal historical or social divides. As a result, the Bakgatla have historically been one of the most politically dynamic societies in the region. Given the international nature of his 'country', it was inevitable that Linchwe and the Bakgatla in Botswana would be involved in by the liberation struggle. As a chief, however, his direct participation was controversial and dangerous. Chiefs had no official place in the multi-party democracy of post-independence Botswana, and though their traditional power remained hugely significant, they were prohibited from being politically active. Botswana, though a 'Frontline State' and a prime example of successful majority-rule in liberated Africa, remained at the mercy of South Africa both economically and militarily. Throughout this period, her foreign policy was inescapably influenced by economic dependence and military

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4 R.F. Morton, 'Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in two Colonial Worlds: the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela of the Bechuanaland and the Transvaal, 1872-1966', in A.I. Asiwaju, (ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's international boundaries 1884-1984*, (New York, 1985), pp. 127-153.

inferiority. Botswana was forced to walk the precarious tight-rope of official non-participation in the struggle, and the moral obligation to assist refugees. Based on a series of interviews and archival work carried out in Botswana in 2012, this paper will shed light on the social and political dynamics of a borderland community in the South African liberation struggle. It will examine the complexities the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela faced through involvement in a fundamentally national struggle, as a partitioned people whose lands and outlook straddled the international frontier at the centre of the geopolitical hostilities.