Drawing Africa's Map: The Decision to Uphold Colonial Boundaries

Cris Boonen
PhD Candidate, Leiden University
December 2012

ABSTRACT

How did the African statesmen come to agree upon maintaining the colonial map and how have alternatives to the inherited colonial boundaries been marginalised and forgotten? The decision to uphold the colonial boundaries was not straightforward, nor was it universally supported on the African continent around the time of decolonisation. Over the course of the negotiations, the formally expressed border demands of Africa's independence movements shifted from abolition in 1945, to adjustment at the All-African Peoples Conference in 1958, to stability at the OAU's founding summit in 1963. So although alternatives were available – and considered – at this critical junction, African statesmen dismissed them by subscribing to the prevailing norms on border stability. In this paper, I argue that this decision was based on a conceptualisation of the unknown, that is, on how uncertainties were presented as risks. Under the circumstances of serious *uncertainty* about future (inter)national security and the potential threats to it, the African statesmen deemed that the potential risks for the international order related to alternative boundary regimes would be grave while adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle would prevent major destabilisation. But I hold that this perception of the situation was not the only possible outcome. Rather, it was shaped by three sets of factors: 1) changes in the international environment, particularly in international representations of causes of conflict and legitimate statehood, 2) the development of institutional constraints during the process of decolonisation, and 3) evolution of domestic preferences on the basis of the negotiators' information on conflict potentials and ideological differences between themselves.

KEYWORDS: Boundary politics, *uti possidetis* principle, uncertainty, risk management.

Prior to independence, many African political parties advocated adjustment of boundaries to accord with local realities on the African continent. International borders here had been drawn by the colonial European leaders as part of the so-called 'Scramble for Africa' while unilateral boundaries were changed frequently, which meant that many of them were effected by ignorance of demographic and ethnographic factors and arguably a willingness to divide. Indeed, Barbour and Prothero (1961) calculated that approximately forty-four per cent of the modern African boundaries follow meridian and parallel lines, thirty per cent are mathematical lines (straight lines, arcs, curves, etc.) and only twenty-six per cent correspond to geographical features such as rivers and mountains (cited by Kapil, 1966: 660). So when the leaders of African liberation movements discussed the possibility of independence prior to the end of the Second World War, they raised the question of how to capture in a set of

international borders the complex social reality of overlapping authorities, populations, interactions and movements. At that point in time, all options were open to the African political leaders: they could have decided to abolish the borders and create a continent-wide state, they could have decided to redraw the colonial borders on the basis of historical possession, effective control or the principle of nationality, or they could even have rejected the state structure as we know it all together and have returned to pre-colonial forms of alliance or city states.

Yet as independence became a tangible reality, these divergent possibilities were delegitimised and slowly shut down. More and more statesmen supported adherence to colonial boundaries while alternative boundary regimes were discarded. At the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, the African nationalist leaders still adopted a resolution proclaiming that "the artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the West African peoples". Less than fifteen years later, at the 1959 Sanniquellie Conference and the 1960 Conference of Independent States, the balance had shifted from a communal to a territorial interpretation of state legitimacy. Contrary to the earlier belief that borders along communal lines would improve inter-state relations, opinions at the latter conference converged on the idea that attempts to redraw borders would results in conflict and outside interference. Ultimately, the African statesmen – under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity – subscribed to a policy accurately described by the president of Mali declared at the OAU's founding summit in 1963: "[W]e must take Africa as it is". They affirm their commitment to the territorial status quo in the 1964 Cairo Resolution.

The question is how the rising African leaders came to agree upon maintaining the colonial map, a decision that has been taken as the origin of many of Africa's contemporary problems related to state- and nation-building (e.g. Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011; Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeki, 2011; Atzili, 2012). As they were heading for independence, they could have opted to fundamentally revise the colonial boundaries. Yet they decided to maintain the boundaries drawn by their predecessors on the basis of the *uti possidetis* principle. How did the alternatives to boundary maintenance, based on alternative configurations of power, become no-goes? In other words, how did the African statesmen agree to impose uniformity and rigidity with regard to nation-statism and boundary maintenance on the complex social reality? This question will be addressed by first identifying that the 'strategic' character of the decision for the *uti possidetis* principle is not given. Rather, the decision is the outcome of a series of historical contingencies and a particular conceptualisation of reality in which the uncertainty of altering borders is associated with unrest. Border maintenance, on the contrary, is associated with limited interstate territorial disputes and international stability. This particular conceptualisation of reality was shaped by three factors: 1) changes in the international environment, 2) the development of institutional constraints during the process of decolonisation, and 3) evolution of domestic preferences on the basis of information available to the negotiators.

Boundary Maintenance upon Independence

Regardless of variations in material or economic strength between the African states and despite the various serious proposals to adopt an alternative boundary regime, the new African statesmen consented on the maintenance of the colonial map upon their independence. The many attempts to convince African nationalist leaders to either abolish borders altogether and

create a continental state or to adjust borders to conform to patterns on the ground have been unsuccessful. Border adjustment on the basis of historical possession, for example, was discarded by referring to pre-colonial forms of political organisation as 'tribalism' (Davidson, 1992: 74-75). It often lacked territorial parameters and thus certain and permanent spatial expressions.[1] Hence the leaders negotiating Africa's post-colonial borders found this political structure hard to absorb into their view of statehood, which was grounded in the concept of territorial sovereignty. The call for territorial changes on the basis of national self-determination was similarly rejected. It was deemed to create difficulties for the articulation of a uniformly applicable principle, which would subsequently make it subject of much criticism based on its alleged inconsistency, indeterminacy and resultant imbalance in state power. In this fashion, all alternatives to boundary maintenance became impossible for the African statesmen to agree upon.

The result is that although the nationalist leaders of states such as Morocco and Somalia have continued to oppose the adoption of the *uti possidetis* principle (with the Moroccans arguing in favour of redrawing borders to re-establish its past empire while the Somalis claimed neighbouring territories on the basis of their ethnic composition), all African states have in fact gained independence within their colonial boundaries. Morocco's unrecognised annexation of the Western Sahara and Somalia's failed attempts to occupy the Ogaden only strengthen the proof of the African leaders' commitment to permit no adjustments to their colonial boundaries. The colonial map has been fixed beyond independence. Explanations for the African commitment have varied from external (colonial) pressure to African leaders' desire to consolidate their power and the system of international norms on state recognition.

(Internalised) pressure by colonial powers

Some scholars argue that the African leaders have taken the decision to uphold the colonial boundaries under the influence and cooperation with the superpowers. Particularly the (ex-)colonial powers are theorised to have been of notable importance to the African choice of a boundary regime. Basil Davidson (1992), for example, argues that the French and British colonial officers have steered African politics towards boundary maintenance by consciously adopting policies that favoured the nation-state over other entities. In Britain, he holds, it was generally understood that nation-states had to be formed that developed constitutions framed on British lines. In order to achieve this aim, the British deemed it important that the post-colonial independent states were in the hands of "literate and civilised men who understood constitutional law and practice, and could move around at ease in the world of nation-statist sovereignties" (Davidson, 1992: 33-34). Concretely, this meant that the British colonial officers gradually transferred their powers to a Western-educated African elite, which would be replaced by elective people only after nation-states had been formed (Castellino and Allen, 2003: 113). As Davidson (1992: 34) explains it, the British held that these Western-oriented intellectuals "were the men who knew how to form [nation-states]".

In this process, scholars such as Davidson (1992) and Cooper (2002; 2008) hold, the European decolonisation policies forced lineage groups and clans to reshape their behaviour and embrace their existing boundaries because they formed the only available escape from colonial domination. Indeed, the British and the French would hear of nothing else. And those

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1 Nugent (1996: 39) identifies that pre-colonial African political spaces were scattered and decentralised, while borders were inherently fluid. The Africans established power in "a structure of concentric circles of diminishing control, radiating from the core" (Kopytoff, 1987: 29 as cited in Nugent, 1996: 40).

who argued for inter-territorial federalism or its equivalent, point out the obstacles to progress adhering in the colonial frontiers, were ignored or pushed aside. Such a fundamental adjustment of borders did not suit the interests of the colonial powers, which were eager to retain influence over their former colonies. But eventually, a reorganisation of borders did also not suit the African nationalist leaders, who became increasingly impatient for the fruits of power. They were aware that boundary adjustment would delay and perhaps threaten the process of their gaining control. Thus, eager to "assimilate the fruits of modernisation" (Davidson, 1992: 35-38), the African kings and chiefs took up the task to modernise the colonial institutions rather than to completely reshape them in favour of ethnic nationalist or other principles.

African desire to consolidate power

Others trace the decision to uphold the colonial map to the African leaders' weakness and consequential commitment to preventing territorial challenges. When the nationalist leaders gained independence, they were generally weak in the sense that their control over the territory defined by their borders was limited (Herbst, 2000). Under these circumstances, "the political problem for both the colonialists and the independent African leaders was to create a set of decision-making rules which would allow the continent to be demarcated in a manner that created the fewest possible conflicts between states (absolute external sovereignty) and also allowed for extremely low levels of domestic institutionalisation (minimal internal sovereignty)" (Herbst, 1989: 683). Demographic, ethnographic and topographic facts did not create clear solutions to this problem. A few decades earlier, the Europeans established the rule that once a colonising power had established any kind of administrative presence, that particular territory was off limits to others. The African leaders then decided to uphold this rule under the auspices of the OAU when they determined that an African government's control of the capital city equated its right to control the nation-state. This solution, Herbst (1989: 688) holds, was simple and rational because "[a]nother rule, such as one based on self-determination, would have been immensely complicated".

The neoliberal institutionalists thus argue that the African leaders have adopted *uti possidetis* as a simple, clear rule that minimises costs. They hold that the relevance of international borders' location is subordinate to their stabilising effect on territorial disputes. Indeed, Carter and Goemans (2011: 282) argue that the main function of borders is to "coordinate the expectations and behaviour of both international and domestic actors and thereby [to] produce joint gains". Borders must thus primarily constrain the emergence and (re-)escalation of territorial disputes. This is an interest that states and non-state actors share. Therefore, neoliberal institutionalists argue that all actors in the international system benefit from formulating "a simple, clear norm that offers an acceptable outcome in most situations" even though actors have conflicting interests in the precise location of the borders (Carter and Goemans, 2011: 287). It minimises political, jurisdictional and economic uncertainty and reduces transaction/negotiation costs. As such, the rule enables the leaders to invest in consolidating their power internally.

A prerequisite for recognised independence

A third group of scholars argues that the leaders of the African nationalist movements took the decision to respect their colonial boundaries to gain international recognition of their states' independence. In the post-1945 era, self-determination became the principle on the basis of which people inhabiting overseas territories could claim their right to independence. There

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was an increasing global consensus on the fact that such decolonisation should be rapid and that it should take place on the terms of equal sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters in order to ensure global order. In addition, territorial stability was to be ensured by organising decolonisation on the basis of existing territorial jurisdictions rather than nationality and by delegitimising violent or non-consensual boundary changes (Pomerance, 1982). This collection of international norms on state recognition implied, however, that some entities that lacked the prerequisites of empirical statehood could suddenly gain access to the rights and privileges associated with international recognition of statehood.[2] This access would subsequently give them an opportunity to benefit from resources, not least foreign aid, that are privileged for recognised states. These resources may be useful in leaders' attempts to consolidate power.

Indeed, Jackson (1990: 153) argues that the decision by African leaders to uphold their colonial borders disclosed "the mutual vulnerability of the African statesmen and their efforts to reduce it by means of international law". By subscribing to the established principle of *uti possidetis*, they aimed to ensure absolute sovereignty within their inherited borders. The prevailing international reasoning in Africa was that the ex-colonial state was the only practical basis for sovereignty (Jackson, 1990: 153). Indeed, most African leaders in the end felt that if they rejected that basis, it would result in chaos. Rather, subscribing to international norms on nation-statism allowed the African leaders to consolidate their power. For one, it helped the African state leaders to prevent aggression between themselves, to protect the weak against the strong, and to prevent outside (military) interference (Clapham, 1996: 17-18). Indeed, they were able to make alliances with other states, to attract resources such as weapons or development aid to enhance their domestic control, and to protect themselves against the possibility that intrastate dissident groups would gain international support (Clapham, 1996: 19).

But these theoretical accounts of the African leaders' decision to uphold the colonial map assume a certain linearity – or even, a pre-determination – in the decision-making process. It remains unquestioned that the final decision was the best and most 'strategic' outcome, effectuating the most sustainable post-independence (inter)national order. Yet at the time of the 1963 Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa, it was already apparent that the decision to uphold the colonial map would result in a number of violent intrastate and interstate territorial disputes. As has been mentioned, King Hassan of Morocco did not attend the meeting for reasons related to his territorial vision. Similarly, the Somali dispute intruded into the conference proceedings when the Somali president justified his position in the territorial dispute with Ethiopia and Kenya. This speech brought forth "a sharp reply" from the prime minister of Ethiopia, who argued the common interest in the preservation of the status quo (Touval, 1972: 84). Indeed, the boundary regime has been unable to address these and other interstate territorial disputes in Africa. Also, it was already clear that various intrastate liberation movements would aim for secession if the decision was taken to maintain the colonial boundaries. Most notably, the Congo crisis in Katanga was already discussed at the 1960 Leopoldville Conference, where the African leaders decided to uphold the territorial integrity of Congo and thus not to recognise the secessionist state.[3]

2 Jackson (1987: 529) has referred to this phenomenon as 'juridical statehood', which was based on "equal sovereignty rather than some kind of associate statehood". He argues that this international institution was invented to enable amongst others the African states to acquire independence in a short period of time, allowing them membership in the international society that otherwise would have been denied them.

3 For a list of all the territorial disputes, see Touval (1972: 279-290).

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So rather than being based on an internal logic in the *uti possidetis* principle, the decision to maintain the colonial map was in fact the outcome of a number of historical contingencies. It was by no means the only possible – and not necessarily even the most 'strategic' – outcome of the boundary negotiations. Instead, the eventual choice for the boundary regime of the *uti possidetis* principle was based on a shared understanding of (historical) stability and potential future destabilising risks. While most African statesmen perceived border adjustments as potentially destabilising the international order and threatening the security of their newborn states, they took adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle as bringing stability and peace. During the boundary negotiations, they increasingly argued that it could prevent a spiral of interstate conflicts and consequential balkanisation of the African continent. As such, boundary maintenance was the default precautionary response to the risks associated with border alteration.

Boundary Maintenance as a Precautionary Principle

The assessment of the future consequences and risks of a policy choice is socially constructed. It depends on cultural, subjective and social categories of what statesmen perceive as the 'strategic' response to the risks that they deem the most prominent. Inherently, boundary politics are shaped under circumstances of serious *uncertainty* about future (inter)national security and the potential threats to it. Information about actors and their motives is not easily available and is hard to assume because independence is often the prime moment at which new actors emerge, (new) ideas and interests are consolidated, and power relations are redefined. One could even argue that many of the potential threats are in fact impossible to predict because the events are unique and non-recurring. Yet it is clear that any severe threat to the post-independence stability would have hazardous effects. Indeed, the effects would likely be irreversible and their impact upon the modern state system potentially severe. After all, it could result in a questioning of one of the very foundations of this system: the stability of international borders.

Under these circumstances, the decision for the adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle is ultimately based on a conceptualisation of the unknown, that is, on how uncertainties are presented as risks. Kessler and Daase (2008: 214) hold that "risk names both the very boundary of the unknown and the known and the particular mode in which the unknown is translated into knowledge and policies". Thus the statesmen's perception of the (unknown) consequences of their policy choice and their 'securitisation' of these uncertainties essentially determines what they perceive as the most 'strategic' response to the boundary question. In the process of negotiating Africa's post-colonial boundaries, the consequences of boundary adjustment came to be perceived as more destabilising than those of border maintenance. In fact, boundary maintenance became associated with stability and order while the uncertainty of adjustment was seen as destabilising. The African statesmen deemed that the potential risks related to alternative boundary regimes for the international order were grave. They feared that once an adjustment would be allowed, the genie could not be put back in the bottle, leading to a continuous questioning of existing international borders. The result would be a serious increase in the number of interstate territorial disputes and a potential destabilisation of the entire territorial state system by a fundamental destabilisation of international borders. This meant that the new African statesmen were prone to opt for adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle, which, they held, could prevent such destabilisation.

This perception of the situation at hand was, however, not the only possible outcome. There is no concrete and identifiable threat or real insecurity. Rather, boundary politics are a discursive practice by which state leaders and intellectuals represent a 'world' characterised by particular types of places, peoples and dramas. For advocates of boundary maintenance at the time of Africa's decolonisation, international instability rather than domestic instability was the main fear. With regard to the domestic situation, they assumed that territorial disputes and ethnic divisions could be solved diplomatically and by means of institutional arrangements. The inalterability of the new international borders would convince those communities that held territorial claims against other states to abandon their claims or at least to not act upon them. Instead, the greatest concern to the African statesmen was the rise of *interstate* territorial disputes in the early days of their independence. And they assumed that the risk for post-independence interstate disorder would be greater if borders were redrawn then when the colonial map was upheld.

The question remains how such a representation of future risks and the most 'strategic' response to them is shaped. I argue that any representation of reality is influenced both by an actor's already-existing beliefs and his understanding of contemporary developments. The African statesmen's perception of the boundary question specifically was shaped by three sets of factors: 1) changes in the international environment, particularly in international representations of causes of conflict and legitimate statehood, 2) the development of institutional constraints during the process of decolonisation, and 3) evolution of domestic preferences on the basis of the negotiators' information on conflict potentials and ideological differences between themselves.

Changes in the international environment

Systemic changes in the perception of war causes and state legitimacy following the Second World War affected the will of the African leaders to change the colonial boundaries and their ability to do so. Before the end of the Second World War, "socialism, and particularly Bolshevism, was the feared ideology" (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 119). Since the end of the First World War and Woodrow Wilson's intervention, balance-of-power politics and the denial of self-determination and democracy to peoples had been perceived as the main causes of conflict. A legitimate state was thus one in which a defined national population was represented by a government that was accountable to its people. This had led the winning coalition to support the break-up of traditional empires based on the principle of nationality in the interwar years. But World War II delegitimised nationalism – and particularly the fascist desire of some people to dominate or dislocate others – as the basis of statehood. Peoples' dissatisfaction with post-1919 boundaries and unaddressed irredentist claims were commonly accepted as sources of the outbreak of the war (Fabry, 2010: 161). With this reference in mind, the founders of the United Nations conceptually separated 'the self-determination of peoples' from nationalism. Internal self-determination became the legitimate basis for the state in the 1950s.[4] Thus in the post-war boundary negotiations, good governance – rather

4 This shift in the source of state legitimacy is apparent, first of all, in the fact that the emphasis in the United Nations Charter lies on non-interference in states' domestic affairs. This is remarkably different from the focus on international justice and minority rights in the League of Nations Charter, which was understood to have nourished belligerent separatism (Fabry, 2010: 161). Second, it coincided with a shift in the dominant trend in international relations literature from idealism to realism. While idealists stress the value of international equity and justice in the long term and thus accept territorial changes for states to better reflect the ideal of state as nation, realists advocate the return of Realpolitik and thus hold that the role of the state was to act in the interest of itself and its population, whoever made up that population.

than nationality – was the essential criterion. Border adjustments were made emphasising juridical borders rather than populations.

In line with these shifts in the international environment, the emphasis on nationality decreased in African boundary negotiations in the late 1940s. In pre-independence boundary adjustments[5] and in the early negotiations on Africa's post-colonial borders, nationalist sentiments predominated. Notably at the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, pan-Africanism ruled in the discussion on the West African and Ethiopian boundary problems (Touval, 1972: 22). But less than two decades later at the 1958 All-African Peoples Conference in Accra, the call for the abolition of the colonial borders had already been altered to include the possibility of "adjustment of such frontiers at an early date". For the first time, the voice of status quo advocates had influenced a resolution's text.[6] In the following 1959 Sanniquellie Conference, the emphasis on juridical borders was confirmed by the choice to hold the conference in Sanniquellie. This provided international recognition of Liberia's claim to Nimba county and its wealth – a claim that was disputed by Guinea. So over time, the interpretation of 'self' in self-determination territorialised. This is particularly evident in the response of Kenya's delegation at the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference to the question whether applying self-determination to the Somalis would mean transfer of territory or merely transfer of population. The Kenya delegation said: "If they do not want to live with us in Kenya, they are perfectly free to leave us and our territory. […] This is the only way they can legally exercise their right to self-determination'" (Mazrui, 1967: 12).

The recognition among colonial powers that their empires were unsustainable reinforced this view. At that point in time, the number of entities eligible for independence was roughly equal to the number of already existing states and these new states' "demographic composition was on average no less complicated than that of Europe in 1919" (Fabry, 2010: 161). Fabry (2010) notes that this strengthened the widespread consensus on the idea that allowing any other than reciprocally agreed upon border changes would destabilise the regional and international order. This trend towards border maintenance similarly solidifies in the process of African border negotiations. The president of Mali, for example, declared at the OAU's founding summit in 1963:

> "[I]f we take certain parts of Africa in the pre-colonial period, history teaches us that there existed a myriad kingdoms and empires […] which today have transcended, in the case of certain states, tribal and ethnic differences to constitute a nation, a real nation […] if we desire that our nations should be ethnic entities, speaking the same language and having the same psychology, then we shall find no single veritable nation in Africa" (cited by Simmler, 1999: 84).

In the end, this influenced the African leaders – under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity – to accept the boundary lines existing at the date of independence.

Development of institutional constraints

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5 Nugent (1996: 46) even concludes that "the more often boundary questions were reopened" prior to independence, the more likely it was that indigenous lines of demarcation would be followed.

6 Nkrumah's call for continental unity was viewed with misgivings by some delegations that interpreted it as supporting Moroccan, Tunisian, Egyptian and Somali territorial aspirations (Touval, 1972: 60).

In addition to these systemic developments, the colonial powers' encouragement of particular practices has contributed to the exclusion of alternatives to boundary maintenance. Cooper (2002) finds that from the moment the French and British governments realised in the mid-1950s that the colonial era had come to an end, they defined a certain kind of decolonisation in line with their own propensity toward border stability. They aimed at ex-colonies becoming western-style nations (Cooper, 2002: 77). So the British developed a step-by-step process to self-government that increased the power of the elected legislature and, eventually, elected members of cabinet and a prime minister. The French government, on the other hand, decided to 'territorialise' the African colonies. This entailed that each territory was first given the power to set its budget (under French overview) and administer much of its domestic affairs, while France would maintain responsibility for foreign affairs and defence, before being offered a choice between autonomy within the French Union or immediate independence. These controlled processes of decolonisation stimulated the leaders of the African movements to uphold certain crucial elements of colonial policy while eliminating supra-national forms of organisation like regional political parties (Cooper, 2002). Indeed, Clapham (1996: 35) argues that for many institutional arrangements, "there was […] no alternative".

These practices by colonial powers did not uncommonly contribute to the commitment of African leaders to border maintenance while discouraging other possibilities, such as federations of more than one African state and Pan-Africanist imaginings. They fundamentally altered their risk assessment by increasing the uncertainty of changing existing institutional arrangements. Indeed, Clapham (1996: 35) notes that most African statesmen desired upon independence to "take over a machinery of government in working order, rather than seek to create one from scratch within the unimaginable confusion produced by a simultaneous achievement of independence and reordering of the entire political structure". Many of them had already been working in the colonial bureaucracies and thus had developed an interest in maintaining the existing structures. In addition, maintenance of the existing colonial structures also gave the new state leaders an internationally recognised foundation of statehood. Put simply, it provided them with "a 'nationalism' which was presented as authentically African" (Clapham, 1996: 35). As such, it allowed them to consolidate their power and to develop internal recognition of an identity and political structure that could replace the inherently divisive and illegitimate African 'tribalism'. Thus the option of refuging to a policy of adjusting borders, which could become unmanageable due to tribalism and confusion, became increasingly unpopular among the African state leaders as they got preoccupied with institutions that were giving them a stable measure of power.

Another institutional constraint that the African leaders faced when negotiating their post-independence borders was the international legal regime on border creation. Part of this "doctrine of stability" are established – and largely uncontested – principles such as the inviolability of frontiers, the intangibility of frontiers, territorial integrity, and the idea that boundaries established by treaty remain unaffected by state succession (Lalonde, 2002: 141-158).[7] As part of this doctrine, state leaders "have come to appreciate the importance of stable boundaries, the finality of frontier settlements and the general continuity of alignments" (Kaikobad, 1983: 119). International law being part of standard diplomatic training, the

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7 This leads some scholars (e.g. Lalonde, 2002; Touval, 1966) to argue exaggeratedly that the African leaders' decision to uphold their colonial boundaries was merely a subscription to their rights and obligations as defined by international law. According to the common law of successor states, they argue, states have the right of undisturbed possession of their inheritance and thus the duty to respect and preserve the territorial arrangement of other (newly) independent states.

African statesmen were likely aware and influenced by this regime in their calculations of risk and uncertainty. In fact, this regime was quite directly imposed upon the African leaders by the United Nations member states in the General Assembly. Resolution 1514 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960, reads that all peoples have a right to self-determination but that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". Thus stability was to be the purpose of independence.

Evolution of domestic preferences

The third and last category of factors that influenced the African leaders' risk assessment was the information they received on domestic political situations during the process of negotiation. For one, the African leaders developed associations with boundary maintenance made this policy increasingly appealing. Importantly, boundary maintenance was successfully connected to the principles territorial integrity and sovereignty. At the 1960 Conference of Independent States, for example, the Liberian Rudolph Grimes said: "If [the *uti possidetis* principle] is accepted generally, this would avoid the hostilities and antagonisms among African States which may create a natural attraction and breeding ground for outside influences to meddle in African affairs and for fostering their own ambitions and goals alien to ours" (Pankhurst, 1960: 298). And in the AOU Charter, the leaders pledge to respect their territorial integrity, not the *uti possidetis* principle, despite the attention that the question of boundaries received during the negotiations. In addition, many African leaders became convinced that territorial disputes and ethnic divisions could be solved diplomatically and domestically within the existing borders of states. They united in the idea that it was possible to create nations within their 'arbitrary' colonial borders. Particularly influential in this regard was the 1959 Sanniquellie Conference, where president William Tubman aimed to represent his unified Liberia[8] as "a rapidly modernising state" in which the problems of class and ethnic distinctions were attacked (Liebenow, 1966: 2). At this conference, for the first time, it was agreed that the Community of Independent African States would not have supranational characteristics.

At the same time, African leaders became increasingly aware of the conflict potential of border adjustment as they received information about territorial claims and interstate tensions on the continent. In the mid-1950s already, the first territorial claims were expressed. Therefore Touval (1972: 49) concludes that the conferences organised after 1957 "differed significantly from the Pan-African conferences" organised in the earlier decades. At the 1958 All-African People's Conference in Accra already, the leader of the Somali Democratic Party delegation, Mr. Ali Abbillahi, stated that "our Somaliland" was "heartlessly cut up" by the colonial powers (Gewald, 1989: 15). Another potential conflict was brought to the fore by Mr. Bendictus Apaloo of the Juvento delegation of Togoland. He expressed hope that "when the appropriate time comes the question of Togoland reunification and independence vis-à-vis union with Ghana shall be settled once and for all" (Gewald, 1989: 15-16). It turns out that as more states gained official recognition of their independence, they increasingly faced concrete problems related to state- and nation-building. For the boundary negotiations, this meant that real responses to these problems rather than ideological preferences became predominant.

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8 Through his Unification Policy, William Tubman had attempted since 1944 to create one nation from the Americo-Liberian aristocracy and the more than twenty subnational groups in Liberia.

Furthermore, the potential destabilising consequences of territorial claims became increasingly obvious to the African leaders as they entered the United Nations framework. From the late 1950s onwards, an increasing number of African leaders participated in United Nations meeting and negotiations. Outcomes of these negotiations have always had a strong presumption against border alteration. This was evident at the fifteenth (1960) and sixteenth (1961) session of the United Nations General Assembly, when Mauritania's admission to the UN was discussed. The African state was eventually allowed membership despite Morocco's ambitions for its territory. And particularly at the time of Africa's decolonisation, the violent consequences of adjusting borders to coincide with population characteristics were being discussed in the international platform as the conflicts that followed the 1947 British partition of India as well as the 1947 UN recommendation to divide Palestine remained unresolved and on the agenda of the United Nations (Fabry, 2010: 161). At the same time, the African statesmen learned in the international organisation that many independent Asian leaders were deciding to uphold their colonial boundaries at that very moment. Ultimately, this meant that independence within the existing borders was "internationally unproblematic" while attempts to alter then would create "virtually insuperable difficulties" (Clapham, 1996: 35).

Finally, the new statesmen gained increasing insight in their ideological differences and thus in the potential difficulties they would have with finding a uniformly accepted basis for boundary adjustment. Not only was there the ideological disagreement between the status quo advocates and the revisionists, the revisionists also agreed among themselves what would be a good alternative to the existing borders. At the 1958 All-African People's Conference in Accra, for example, Mr. C.A. Cassell of Liberia expressed fears with regard to Nkrumah's African Unity. He held that "each political entity should be left free to work out its own destiny" and that the other African leaders could only "render[…] friendly assistance" (Gewald, 1989: 30). Again others, such as the leader of the Juvento party of Togoland, held that "[n]o young African state could readily accept to maintain in force such evidently poisoned legacy without thereby making itself an accomplice of the crimes which we charge the imperialists" (Gewald, 1989: 32). These differences meant at times that none of the adopted resolutions referred explicitly to boundary problems. In other instances, such as the 1959 Sanniquellie Conference, the agenda was manipulated to ensure that "the conference would end with each faction represented having its share of victories" (Liebenow, 1966: 19). In any case, it seriously limited the statesmen's vision of a clear and unproblematic alternative to the *uti possidetis* principle.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I hold that the African statesmen's decision to maintain the colonial map was essentially based on their collective assessment of the future risks associated with boundary redrawing. Being in a situation of uncertainty about their (inter)national security and the future threats to it, they deemed it too risky to allow border adjustment for fear of being unable to agree upon any alternative border. The potential result would be an increase in the number of territorial conflicts and, ultimately, a threat to the very stability of the territorial foundation of the state system. Boundary maintenance, to the contrary, was held to bring stability. The new African statesmen generally believed that upholding the colonial map would prevent the spiral of interstate conflict and instead discourage communities from acting upon their territorial claims. The sheer impossibility of boundary adjustment would encourage the new African statesmen to deal with these territorial claims domestically and diplomatically rather than by means of interstate violence.

Yet this conception of the situation was not the only possibility. Rather, this is just one representation of the 'world'; one in which particular types of places, peoples and dramas are emphasised. The African statesmen emphasised international instability rather than domestic instability and they assumed that the risk for post-independence interstate disorder would be greater if borders were redrawn then when the colonial map was upheld. This representation of future risks and the most 'strategic' response to them was shaped by three sets of factors. First, international representations of causes of conflict and legitimate statehood changed after the Second World War, delegitimising nationality and self-determination as bases for boundary revision. A widespread fear of demographic splintering and balkanisation influenced the African statesmen's understanding of principal causes of (interstate) war. Second, the step-by-step process of decolonisation and the international legal regime on border creation introduced constraints on the African statesmen. As the existing institutional framework was being introduced in the African states, a fundamental departure from it became decreasingly desirable. Finally, domestic preferences changed as the negotiators gained information on conflict potentials and ideological differences between themselves. They became convinced that they could deal with territorial claims domestically while the consequences of border adjustment could be grave.

Ultimately, this means that the answer to the boundary question in Africa *could* have been different. Many contemporary legal and political practitioners and intellectuals assume adherence to the *uti possidetis* principle to be the only possible answer to a boundary question – that is, the only answer that leads to the establishment of stable and sustainable international borders. Yet an assessment of boundary politics during Africa's decolonisation reveals that this belief originated in a time when a particular conception of reality prevailed. The decision to uphold the colonial map on this continent was the outcome of a series of historical contingencies and a particular conceptualisation of reality in which the uncertainty of altering borders was associated with unrest.

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L. Cantwell

On the Frontline of a Frontline State: The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela and the Liberation Struggle in South Africa 1948-1994

Abstract:

In May 2012, Thabo Mbeki paid tribute to Botswana's role in the liberation struggle in South Africa, and in particular to the role played by Chief Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community in providing a safe haven for refugees and being a key part of the ANC's 'underground machinery'. The involvement of a traditional authority in Botswana in such clandestine activity in support of the liberation struggle in South Africa had, until this point, remained hidden from public view.

Taking this revelation as a starting point, this paper examines the ways in which the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community had historically been involved in and affected by the struggle. Territorially located in both Botswana and South Africa, having been partitioned by the arbitrarily-drawn border decided upon by the colonial authorities, the Bakgatla were embedded within social and political networks in both countries. This paper draws on the central concerns of A.I. Asiwaju's *Partitioned Africans*, especially R.F. Morton's study of the Bakgatla within it,[1] and seeks to place this demonstration of post-independence international cooperation within the deeply-rooted historical experience of a people of a common culture or ethnicity divided by an externally-imposed colonial border. Since 1870, there had been the constant trans-boundary travel and communication necessitated by the imagining of a single 'homeland entity' across a boundary constructed out of external political conflict rather than internal historical or social divides. As a result, the Bakgatla have historically been one the most politically dynamic societies in the region.

Given the international nature of his 'country', it was inevitable that Linchwe and the Bakgatla in Botswana would be involved in by the liberation struggle. As a chief, however, his direct participation was controversial and dangerous. Chiefs had no official place in the multi-party democracy of post-independence Botswana, and though their traditional power remained hugely significant, they were prohibited from being politically active. Botswana, though a 'Frontline State' and a prime example of successful majority-rule in liberated Africa, remained at the mercy of South Africa both economically and militarily. Throughout this period, her foreign policy was inescapably influenced by economic dependence and military inferiority. Botswana was forced to walk the precarious tight-rope of official non-participation in the struggle, and the moral obligation to assist refugees.

Based on a series of interviews and archival work carried out in Botswana in 2012, this paper will shed light on the social and political dynamics of a borderland community in the South African liberation struggle. It will examine the complexities the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela faced through involvement in a fundamentally national struggle, as a partitioned people whose lands and outlook straddled the international frontier at the centre of the geopolitical hostilities.

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1 R.F. Morton, 'Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in two Colonial Worlds: the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela of the Bechuananland and the Transvaal, 1872-1966', in A.I. Asiwaju, (ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's international boundaries 1884-1984*, (New York, 1985), pp. 127-153.

On the Frontline of a Frontline State: The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela of Botswana and South Africa and the Liberation Struggle 1948-1994

In May 2012 Thabo Mbeki gave a speech at a gala dinner held by the Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation in Gaborone. In his speech he paid tribute to Botswana's role in the liberation struggle in South Africa, and in particular to the role played by Kgosi [Chief] Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela. Though based in Mochudi, on the Botswana side of the border, Linchwe's Kgatleng [land of the Bakgatla] straddled the international frontier, and he was also the recognised chief of people living in South Africa. This irregular configuration, of an ideological 'country' intersected by an international border, had existed since 1870 when part of the Bakgatla fled northwards to avoid Boer harassment. The Kgatleng was inescapably involved with the liberation struggle, due to the ties and obligations of this geopolitical quirk. This paper will first examine the role of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, later Botswana, in the struggle, its foreign policy and its strategies of survival as an underdeveloped and dependent economic partner surround on all sides by hostile, minority-ruled regimes. It will then go on to look closer at events in the Kgatleng, taking as a starting point the involvement of Kgosi Linchwe, in order to shed light on the role a people on the very frontline of a Frontline state, within a complex and precarious international geopolitical situation.

The National Context

Botswana's geopolitical situation left the government in an impossible position. To the south lay the apartheid regime of South Africa, whose anti-majority rule influence extended into Southwest Africa (later Namibia) thanks to the continued insistence from Pretoria that the state remained a province of the Union of South Africa and its illegal occupation which lasted until 1990 in defiance of continued resistance from the international community. A geographical quirk characteristic of the early twentieth century land-grabbing of the European powers meant that the territory of South west Africa reached across the north of the country too – the Caprivi strip providing the German occupiers with a tactical corridor to the Zambezi. To the east lay Ian Smith's minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia, which left Botswana in the precarious position of being almost entirely landlocked by hostile, minority-ruled and increasingly defensive regimes. There was one geographical link to the outside world – a hundred yard long border across the Zambezi to Zambia, via the Kazungula ferry at the intersection of four nations at a single point in the middle of the river, some forty kilometres north of the Victoria Falls.

Botswana's unfortunate geography, or rather the fact that she suffered to such an extent from the machinations of the colonial powers in delineating the borders of southern Africa, was the crucial and underlying factor in the foreign policy decisions of both the British colonial government before 1966, and the post-independence governments of Seretse Khama and his successor Quett Masire with regards to the threat from South Africa and the struggle for liberation which unfolded in this period. At the same time, Botswana was being heralded internationally as a shining example of a successful liberal democracy developing under majority rule, despite its improbable location in the midst of hostile regimes. Liberation movements struggling towards independence in those surrounding states depended upon such democratically successful nations for both assistance and inspiration, as well as to prove to the world that majority rule could and did work. Botswana's stability, her human rights record, her economic growth and her democratic developmental goals

flew in the face of the justifications for the retention of minority rule and the ideology of the apartheid regime.

Botswana therefore was automatically embroiled in the struggle between liberation movements and the minority regimes – merely by virtue of her existence as a viable nation state. However, the precariousness of the geopolitical facts complicated and coloured the political options available to the government. Botswana was almost entirely dependent on South Africa, and was therefore completely at the mercy of the apartheid regime. Though territorially similar in size to France, Botswana's population was little over a million at independence, much smaller than any of the other countries in the region. At independence her economy was one of the least developed in the world, as a result of the lack of investment during colonial rule that stemmed from the British view of the Bechuanaland Protectorate as an economic backwater with no potential, whose significance was merely as a buffer to further South African expansion to the north that threatened the crucial trade and transport route from Cape Town to Cairo. A significant proportion of Botswana's workforce were employed on a contractual basis on the mines and farms in South Africa. Though the significance of this factor declined in the decades after independence, with urbanisation providing employment options at home for many Batswana, cross-border labour links were certainly a factor that forced the government to remain economically involved with South Africa. In terms of trade, Botswana was entirely dependent on rail links and port facilities in South Africa for both imports and exports, and also on the country as a market for her primary export, beef. Botswana used the rand as currency until 1976. She has been a part of the Southern African Customs Union since its establishment in 1910. Until the mid-1980s, the share of customs revenue received through this system provided a greater proportion of government income than anything else – close to fifty percent of the total income between 1970 and 1975.[2] The customs union was controlled by South Africa, so Botswana had no choice but to retain relations with the apartheid regime as international trade would have been impossible without the use of South African infrastructure which was only possible through remaining part of SACU. Even the exploitation of the vast reserves of copper and diamonds in the north of the country was locked into reliance on external investment from South Africa, namely through the De Beers Company. Militarily Botswana was extremely weak – the army, the Botswana Defence Force, was formed only in 1977, and until then the only armed defence came from the very small armed wing of the police. The age old fear of South African invasion remained as potent in this period as it had been for the three chiefs who travelled to England and petitioned Queen Victoria for British protection against Boer encroachment in 1885. Bechuanaland had been a dependent "labour supplying appendage" to South Africa even if it was nominally under British control as a High Commission Territory.[3] To a certain extent this characterisation continued into the early decades of independence and shaped her foreign policy and international relations. Botswana's colonial experience meant that she was locked into a dependent relationship through the "inherited economic and communication relations with South Africa".[4]

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2 Q. Masire, *Very Brave or Very Foolish*, (Gaborone, 2006), p.256.

3 R. J. Southall, 'Botswana as a host country for refugees', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 22:2, p. 154.

That was not to say that the government cowed to South African pressure in all respects without question. Before independence, the British authorities under Resident Commissioner Peter Fawcus devised a policy to give asylum to genuine refugees from South Africa. Fawcus recognised the need for strict neutrality if Botswana was to become a successful democratic and non-racial state, as well as the limitations imposed by economic dependence on South Africa. The clandestine movement of refugees northwards was facilitated by the colonial authorities, [5] despite frequent raids into Botswana territory by South African special branch police agents: "the Brits were very much on our side. We used that".[6] After independence the position Botswana took continued in the same vein. The approach that Botswana would take in trying to walk this delicate tightrope was set out in President Khama's speech to the First National Assembly on October 6th, 1966. Foreign policy was to "be dictated by reason and common sense", and would "not permit Botswana to be used as a base for the organisation or direction of violent activities directed towards other states".[7] He went on, however, to provide assurances that Botswana would "continue to offer genuine political refugees a safe haven". Botswana would cooperate with South Africa because it was necessary for survival, and would not allow the use of her territory for the planning or launching of violent acts against South Africa. She would however speak out against the denial of basic human rights, and welcome refugees fleeing the apartheid regime. This pragmatic approach to dealing with Botswana's precarious situation, termed the 'non-springboard approach' by J.H. Polhemus in 1985,[8] remained the mainstay of foreign policy throughout the period. President Masire carried the same principle through the 1980s: "we in Botswana always welcomed members of liberation movements because there were important interests in common, but we did not make a big song and dance about our relationship with them. If we had done so it would have given out common enemy an excuse to take action against us, since the SA government operated on the principle that 'whoever is not with us is against us'".[9]

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4 B.Z. Osei-Hwedie, 'The Role of Botswana in the liberation of Southern Africa since 1966' in W.A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe, *Botswana: Politics and Society*, (1998), p. 425.

5 F. Keitseng, J. Ramsay and B. Morton, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC underground*, (Gaborone, 1999), p. 53 – "Another District Commissioner called Steenkamp was very good. When refugees would come we would report to his house rather than at the office because it was safer. The enemy had many agents, and Steenkamp knew how to avoid them".

6 Ibid., p. 54.

7 Sir Seretse Khama quoted in SK quote in Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p.256.

8 J.H. Polhemus, 'Botswana's Role in the Liberation of Southern Africa', in L.A. Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana: Politics and Rural Development in Southern Africa*, (London, 1985), p. 264.

9 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p.267.

Botswana's stance was supported in this regard by the rising international anti-apartheid feeling and increasing reliance on foreign aid in the 1970s and 1980s which was often dependent on the demonstration of non-cooperation and verbal criticism of the Pretoria regime. Assisting refugees was after all an internationally recognised obligation since the United Nations' 1967 *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, regionally reinforced by the Organisation for African Unity's 1969 Convention. Increasingly fearful of the trade bans and embargoes that would later become reality, South Africa could hardly use Botswana's position as a host territory for refugees as public justification for reprisals. Though it was also the case that some in the liberation movements and their supporters felt that Botswana could be providing more explicit support to the freedom fighters,[10] notably one meeting with an angry Oliver Tambo in 1975 who demanded fuller cooperation from Botswana,[11] he and others understood the position Botswana was forced to take when faced with the very serious and real threat of military action from the SADF. Julius Nyerere, the Pan-Africanist first President of Tanzania, who provided large amounts of support to militant liberation movements in South Africa, understood completely the reasons for Botswana's cautious approach. Writing in 1980 he defended Botswana's lack of overt support for the ANC and the PAC: "President Seretse Khama has made clear on many occasions that Botswana will not provide any bases for the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe, Namibia or South Africa. He knows, and Africa knows, that to do any such thing would be equivalent to committing suicide... So in his usual way, the Botswana President has been straightforward with Africa; he has not made great revolutionary speeches which he is in no position to back up with action. But he has made it quite clear to the world, and to all his neighbours, that Botswana will accept refugees from political and racial persecution, and either give them somewhere to stay and land to live by, or help them to move on to better placed countries".[12]

South African newspapers dubbed Botswana a 'terror pipeline', and Botswana was faced with constant attempts to remove her access to the hundred yards of her riverfront border with Zambia that provided a gateway to liberated Africa. South Africa denied such a border even existed, and forcefully argued that such a link should not be allowed to exist claiming that it would "create a Ho Chi Minh trail for the ANC".[13] This was partly the reason why to this day there is no bridge across the

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10 Ibid., – "We were always in the middle. The South African government did not like us to receive refugees, and because we allowed them to pass through the country, South African authorities thought we were hobnobbing with the refugees. But, since we did not allow the refugees to stay in the country, some in the liberation movements thought we were hobnobbing with the South African government".

11 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p. 271.

12 J. Nyerere, 'Foreword' in G.M. Carter and E.P. Morgan, *From the Frontline- Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama*, (London, 1980), p.xiii.

13 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p. 253.

river, the crossing being made instead by the 'freedom ferry', as Pretoria argued that any bridge at this point would necessarily violate either Southwest African or Southern Rhodesian territory. In any case, nobody was really denying that Botswana was a route out of South Africa for refugees from the apartheid regime, or indeed that it was one of the main routes southwards for revolutionaries returning from Zambia, Tanzania or further afield: "We all knew that if the ANC folks could find a way to come back through Botswana, they would do so. For our part, we thought that would be OK, so long as we were not seen to be conniving with them or helping them to achieve their purpose".[14] Fish Keitseng, perhaps the most active Motswana ANC activist and a defendant at the 1956 Treason Trial alongside Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, helped thousands of South African refugees and members of the ANC, including a significant number of members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, escape from South Africa and travel north through Botswana. Because of the geography there was little the Botswana government could realistically have done to avoid being seen as a transit state, and given her open-door policy to refugees, and the overlapping definitions of 'refugee' and 'terrorist' from the Pretoria and Gaborone politicians, it was an inevitable consequence.

As R.J. Southall noted in 1984, "countries offering shelter to exiles have been somewhat indiscriminately labelled as providing a base for insurgency".[15] Botswana's miniscule military force, even if counted in addition to the numbers in the police force, was wholly inadequate for an effective system of patrols along her long borders. As a result, whilst the government loudly stressed the policy of not allowing Botswana's territory to be used for planning and executing attacks on her neighbours, because of the lack of defensive resources, such a policy was impossible to enforce. Both the South African and Rhodesian executives repeatedly complained about attacks emanating from Botswana, claiming that there were terrorist training camps that harboured dangerous criminals. The Botswana government always responded quickly and willingly to such complaints – asking for information upon which they could act, but this was rarely forthcoming. On regular occasions the government invited both officials and journalists from across the border to visit Botswana and to identify the training camps whose existence they so forcefully broadcasted as justification for their aggressive policies towards Botswana, but no such establishments were ever found.

Bolstered by the growing feeling that they held the moral high ground, if not the military superiority, Botswana made several key political and verbal moves to signal her opposition to the Pretoria regime and to counterbalance the hated but essential need for cooperation with South Africa for survival. In October 1960, the ANC held its conference in Botswana, which could not have been unknown to the authorities, as delegates came from all over South Africa and abroad. Both Presidents publicly denounced apartheid in speeches, and there was no formal diplomatic relationship between the two countries. In 1976, Oliver Tambo attended the tenth anniversary independence celebrations in Gaborone as a guest of Sir Seretse Khama.[16] In the context of being almost entirely surrounded by

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14 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p.268.

15 R. J. Southall, 'Botswana as a host country for refugees', p. 159.

16 *Mmegi: The Monitor*, 14/5/12.

white-ruled states, being a founder member of, and even coining the term the 'Front Line States', was a courageous move that signalled Botswana's political stance and her alliances with other independent states in Africa. The association developed slowly through the 1970s, starting with the need to provide some sort of infrastructural or communication links between the pools of refugees located in Zambia and Tanzania, having largely arrived via Botswana, and developing into the assistance of the liberation movements with training camps and sustenance, and facilitating their transit through the continent. As Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe gained their independence they joined, and the association grew in size, scope and significance. The coalition of Front Line States was the "driving force" behind the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 which excluded South Africa.[17] The government of Botswana formally recognised the ANC, and allowed it to open an office in Gaborone from 1974.[18] Both Khama and Masire refused repeated attempts from the South African government to sign a form of pact or non-aggression treaty similar to the Nkomati Accord they signed with Mozambique in 1984. Stressing mutual responsibilities for stopping the infiltration of the ANC into South Africa through that route, it in effect gave the SADF license to enter Mozambique and deal directly with their perceived threats on the basis that South Africa would stop supporting the anti-government movement RENAMO, which in fact never happened. Masire, like all the leaders of the other Front Line states refused to attend the ceremony, despite Machel's desperate invitations. Botswana refused to follow suit with any similar agreement, and endured increasing pressure from South Africa to overtly cooperate with the Pretoria regime.

In 1971, the Bophuthatswana Bantustan, the only 'homeland' designated for Tswana-speaking people in South Africa was given nominal self-rule. It consisted of seven isolated enclaves situated on or near to the border between Botswana and South Africa. The South African government made noises about Botswana becoming part of Bophuthatswana, which were refused, and Botswana always rejected persistent demands from Pretoria to recognise the bantustans. The South African response was to make threatening warnings that a security agreement was essential: "though it peaked like a heartbeat at times, the pressure to do their bidding was constantly on us".[19] In 1979 the South African government revealed a reincarnation their age-old aim of incorporating Botswana into a wider South Africa when the aim of achieving a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) was asserted. The formation of the SADCC soon after was an alternative model for Southern African development, diametrically opposed to CONSAS, and aimed to foster greater cooperation between independent African states in the hope that regional dependence on South Africa could be reduced. Just as in the formation of the Front Line States coalition, Botswana took the initiative and was very

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17 M. Evans, 'The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives', *Zambezia,* (1984/5), VII, p. 1.

18 T. Mbeki, 11/5/12, available at http://www.thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/FundRaising-DinnerGaborone.aspx.

19 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p. 270.

visibly involved in the organisation, providing the "lion's share of the leadership and staff".[20] Both Khama and Masire went as far as they could to demonstrate their opposition to the South African regime without being implicated explicitly in the work of the liberation movements. This cautious approach at not explicitly endorsing and facilitating violent action on or from home soil stemmed not only from economic dependence. The ultimate aims of the South African government were clear, and the fears of the Botswana government at armed action into their territory were very real.

The South African government made use of the fact that Botswana was forced to make use of the rail infrastructure in order to export beef in order to exert pressure. Whenever a Botswana official made a particularly outspoken comment against Pretoria at the UN, the OAU, or in the press, repercussions were felt at some level in Botswana. On one occasion the essential refrigerator cars necessary to transport Botswana beef for export were not sent, causing significant costs and wastage.[21] On other occasions embargoes were put on transport north into Botswana, causing significant shortages of oil over Christmas in 1980, and other essential goods throughout the early part of 1981.[22] With an increasing population, and a simultaneous decrease in food production at home, the dependence on South Africa for imported foodstuffs increased during this period. As a desert nation, the fear of severe hunger was very real. The potential for South Africa to cut off the inflow of food to Botswana cut close to the bone. Closely linked was the unfortunate geography of Botswana's water sources. Semi-permanently in a state of drought, virtually the entirety of Botswana's population relied upon the Notwane, Limpopo and Molopo rivers, all of which rise in South Africa. As if that was not threatening enough, in 1982 South Africa built dams on the headwaters of these three rivers within the territory of Bophuthatswana,[23] causing severe problems.

The threat of violent attack was a permanent undercurrent throughout this period. South African agents made their presence felt, especially after 1948 when there was an ANC resurgence in response to the victory of the National Party. Fish Keitseng recalled that "it was not always easy for exiles [members of the liberation movements and refugees alike] to make their way safely through the Protectorate for agents of the apartheid regime and their fellow travellers operated with impunity in the country, at times kidnapping exiles".[24] From 1978, South Africa embarked on a

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20 Q. Masire, *Very Brave,* p.276.

21 According to the UN, South African interference with trade routes and transport cost the SADCC countries over $18 billion between 1980 and 1986 – UN, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, (1987), p.164.

22 J. Hanlon and P. Spray, 'Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken' in J. Hanlon, *Beggar your neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, (London, 1986), p.220.

23 The South African government refused to engage in negotiations, insisting instead that Botswana must approach the government of Bophuthatswana in an underhand attempt to force the official recognition of the Bantustans as independent nation states.

24 F. Keitseng, J. Ramsay and B. Morton, *Comrade Fish,* p. 49.

conscious strategy of destabilisation of her non-sympathetic neighbours in the region.[25] There were frequent armed incursions on the border involving SADF forces, predominantly along the Caprivi strip and at Kazungula. South African troops fired on those of the BDF, and occasionally from helicopters. South African planes regularly flew illegally over Botswana territory. In 1974, a parcel bomb sent from South Africa killed the South African Students Organisation (SASO) leader Abraham Tiro when he was in Botswana.[26] After the 1976 Soweto Uprising, Botswana received an influx of refugees from South Africa, mostly young, who were given permission to remain in Gaborone. They were pursued by SADF, seemingly regardless of the fact that an international border existed, "who embarked on cross-border raids, bombing houses and killing innocent civilians in Gaborone under the pretext that they housed ANC guerrillas".[27] Later, Vernon Nkadimeng, an ANC member and son of the general secretary of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, was killed by a car bomb planted by South African agents in Gaborone.

In June 1985, fifty SADF soldiers in vans and cars fitted with fake Botswana number plates crossed the border near Gaborone in the early hours of the morning. They cut the phone lines to the barracks of the BDF, and spiked the road to hinder the progress of any pursuers. They launched a coordinated attack on several targets in the capital that had been identified as bases of ANC terrorist agents resident in Botswana. Twelve people were killed, several injured and houses completely destroyed. The South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, justified the attack the following day: "the SADF had no alternative but to protect South Africa and its people from the increasing number of terrorist attacks emanating from Botswana".[28] General Viljoen, chief of the SADF, insisted that the raid had hit "the nerve centre of the ANC machinery".[29] But among the dead were a six year old boy, a teacher in her early twenties, a white South African student in Botswana to avoid conscription, and a refugee farmer in his seventies.[30] Both Masire and the ANC individually refuted outright that those

25 C. Coker, 'South Africa: a new military role in Southern Africa 1969-82' in R. Jaster (ed.), *Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects*, (Aldershot, 1985), p. 145.

26 R. J. Southall, 'Botswana as a host country for refugees', p. 159.

27 M.G. Molomo, 'Civil and Military Relations in Botswana's Developmental State, *African Studies Quarterly*, available at http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i2a3.htm.

28 *The Star*, (Johannesburg), 14/6/85, p.3.

29 J. Hanlon and P. Spray, 'Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken' p.224.

30 L. Nyelele and E. Drake, *The Raid on Gaborone: June 14th 1985*, (1986), pp.9-25.

killed were ANC agents. Masire saw it as a "brutal and premeditated attack",[31] which was "widely being seen as a violation of Botswana's territorial integrity and sovereignty".[32] Gaborone, and Botswana, was shocked. Botswana had until then "remained economically intertwined with South Africa while becoming more outspokenly critical of the apartheid state – without serious retribution".[33] Up until the raid, South African reprisals had been single and isolated incidents, which appeared to target specific individuals. It now appeared that no one was safe. Public funerals for the victims were attended by thousands, as was a memorial service in the National Stadium. Botswana's Minister for External Affairs, Dr Gaositwe Chiepe, flew urgently to New York for an emergency meeting with the UN Security Council. The USA recalled its ambassador from Pretoria in protest, and Reagan signed off a package of anti-apartheid measures including trade embargoes. Diplomats in Gaborone reacted strongly to condemn the actions of South Africa,[34] and messages of condolence and condemnation were received from around the world.[35]

The UN's Resolution 572 (1985) expressed deep concern at the events of June 14th, but also commended the government of Botswana "for its steadfast opposition to apartheid and for the humanitarian policies it is following in regard to refugees".[36] Masire confirmed the following week that Botswana's open-door policy to refugees would continue unabated despite the attack.[37] However, the ANC offices in Gaborone were closed down, and the representatives who worked there deported. A second raid in 1986 killed four more people, whilst sporadic attacks continued. Botswana's precarious position as a result of her proximity to South Africa had received the reprisals that had been threatened, and the Pretoria regime was under ever-increasing international pressure, and consequently its actions were ones tinged with desperation.

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31 *Botswana Daily News,* 17/6/85, p.1.

32 *Botswana Daily News,* 14/6/85, p.1.

33 J. Hanlon and P. Spray, 'Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken' p.219.

34 *The Botswana Guardian*, 19/6/85, p. 6.

35 Ibid., p. 2.

36 UN Security Council, *Resolution 572 (1985) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2609th meeting, on 30 September 1985*, 30 September 1985, S/RES/572 (1985), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16c0.html (accessed 18 October 2012).

37 *Botswana Daily News,* 21/6/85, p.1.

L. Cantwell

Bakgatla involvement

Mbeki's recent speech hailed the late Kgosi Linchwe II of the Bakgatla as a crucial part of the 'underground ANC machinery' that had been established in Botswana prior to the opening of the office of the ANC's official representative in Gaborone in 1974.[38] Not only does it highlight the role of the Bakgatla capital Mochudi and the surrounding area in the relationship between Botswana and South Africa during this period, as a frontier district in the struggle, but it is also interesting for the very fact that Linchwe was a chief. In post-independence Botswana, the political influence of the chiefs went into decline. There could be no active role for the unelected historical elites in the newly-founded multi-party democracy of Botswana. The respect for the traditional institutions of authority led to the creation of the House of Chiefs as part of the new machinery of government, but their role was purely advisory, with no legislative power. With the government fearful of the influence most still held over their subjects, particularly in rural areas, chiefs were prohibited from taking part in party politics, and effectively became civil servants as they were 'employed' by the government. Having stood down from the chieftaincy of the Bamangwato during the crisis surrounding his marriage, the way was clear for Seretse Khama, as leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), to become the first President of the Republic. Kgosi Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse similarly gave up his role in order to become the leader of the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF).

Kgosi Linchwe steadfastly refused to give up the Bakgatla title. He remained, however, an outspoken critic of the government, and a man highly interested in the government of the new nation and the political issues that impacted upon the Bakgatla people. In the House of Chiefs, he actively participated in key debates, raising issues on the role of the chiefs – including notably challenging their civil servant role in 1973 – though he declined the initial chairmanship in 1965. He clashed with the government over his campaigns to reintroduce and endorse Bakgatla traditional practices, in particular the *bojale* and *bogwera* initiation schools. Though he made it well known that he disagreed with government when he thought it necessary, his drive and astuteness meant that he was enough of a trusted figure for the government to appoint him as ambassador to the USA between 1969 and 1972. Married to Catherine Motsepe, from a prominent Johannesburg family, and having been educated in South Africa and the UK, he had many international contacts. Among them was Lady Naomi Mitchison, the self-styled socialist campaigner who visited him in Mochudi for long periods and wrote prolifically on the subject.

The Bakgatla people Linchwe ruled lived in a 'country' intersected by the frontier between Botswana and South Africa, and essentially the apartheid regime and liberated Africa. The Kgatleng has, since Kgamanyane's move into the Protectorate in 1870, encompassed both the land and the people on either side of the border – a strongly-held notion throughout this period. Most of the men from the Botswana Kgatleng worked on a contractual basis in South Africa, usually living there for nine months in every year,[39] and many had relatives on either side of the border and frequent trips were made in

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38 T. Mbeki, 11/5/12.

39 Group interview with Kgosi Segale, Rra Madue Kgang, Rra Mmusi Mosate, Rra Tladi Bojelo, Rra Montshiwa Mabodise – Bakgatla Tribal Offices, Mochudi, 13/09/12.

either direction. Tradition dictated that the people within his jurisdiction were the Bakgatla people, whether in Botswana or South Africa, and the territorial distinction made little difference: "one person after another asked if the new chief meant it, about protecting his folk across the Frontier, and I said yes, yes he did".[40] Linchwe, in both his role as chief and for personal and social reasons, regularly travelled to the Republic, not least because the Protectorate administrative capital was actually located inside the borders of the Republic at Mafikeng until 1965. Well-dressed and with his own car, he regularly caught the attention of the authorities, whose harsh racial laws and regulations he detested. Mitchison recalls several occasions where "he had been bullied, frightened and insulted" in South Africa,[41] whilst trying to get a permit for a car, sitting with her on a white bench to eat a picnic lunch having been refused service at a restaurant,[42] or when attempting to go through a 'whites-only' door at Johannesburg airport.[43] Probably because of the self-confidence and pride afforded by his role as chief in the Kgatleng, he was known for taking an assertive stance when possible – prohibiting the local station master from entering Mochudi after an incident occurred when a Bakgatla lady sat on a white seat in 1965,[44] and responding to the derogatory Afrikaans comments of a white farmer in a Mahalapye bar which led to "a flaming row, glasses broken, chairs used as weapons, guns out and all that".[45] Linchwe's resistance to apartheid rule was not limited to spur of the moment reactions in everyday life, and he made his feelings known, as far as he could given the restraints put on his political role. He made several, 'semi-official' visits to Zambia. In 1977 he made a call for Bakgatla men to volunteer to help fight Ian Smith's army in Rhodesia, as the conflict had been spilling over the border around Francistown and further north.[46] In 1979 he helped to launch the Association for Relief Fund for Victims of External Aggression.[47]

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40 N. Mitchison, *Return to the Fairy Hill,* (New York, 1966), p. 61.

41 N. Mitchison, *Return to the Fairy Hill*, p. 47.

42 N. Mitchison, *Return to the Fairy Hill*, p. 34.

43 S. Grant, 'A Chronological Career Summary of Chief Linchwe II Kgafela', *Botswana Notes and Records*, Vol. 17, (1985), p.48.

44 Ibid.

45 N. Mitchison, *Return to the Fairy Hill*, p. 188.

46 *Botswana Daily News*, 12/1/77.

47 S. Grant, 'A Chronological Career Summary of Chief Linchwe II Kgafela', p50.

The Bakgatla in Mochudi had long standing links with the liberation movements despite their geographical location in Botswana. In the very early days of the ANC, Linchwe's great-grandfather and namesake had been appointed an 'honorary vice-president' of the ANC, and his brother acted as treasurer of the organisation.[48] Among the early leaders was a Mokgatla, Daniel Letanka, who was also the founder editor of the newspaper *Motsoalle*. Many Bakgatla working in South Africa, such as ANC organiser Stephen Segale, became involved in the liberation movements. Following the 1948 election victory for the National Party, the 1954 Native Resettlement Act which forced the movement of thousands of people, and Zambian independence in 1964 which created the safe-haven of liberated Africa to the north, the route into and through Bakgatla territory became one well-travelled by South Africans escaping from the apartheid regime.[49] Like the rest of Botswana, the Kgatleng really had no choice but to receive incoming refugees. The border with South Africa was sparsely policed on either side, so there was little to be done to stem the flow of those seeking to enter the country. Many people arrived in Mochudi because they had family or historical contacts there. Among the South Africans were given shelter in Mochudi were Ishamel Mathlaku and his wife Martha, both ANC members. Ishmael had known Linchwe in Johannesburg and had even introduced him to his future wife, Cathy,[50] and Martha was Nelson Mandela's personal secretary.[51]

The Mochudi Community Centre was founded in 1963, and was one of the only two visible development projects in the country in the period around independence. It was a joint initiative – instigated in London by Nana Mohomo, the PAC representative in the UK, and Martin Ennals, then General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties and later Amnesty International. Prompted by concerns that there would be a large influx of refugees after the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, the idea was to set up a transit centre for refugees heading north, which would also function as a centre for the promotion of local development. Despite what it must have looked like when looking at a map in London, Mochudi was not necessarily the most strategic place to have located the transit centre. It was close to the border, but due to the fact that that section was heavily populated with Boer farms, it was a far less practical crossing point for refugees than the areas further south, especially near to Lobatse. The real reason for the location of the Centre in Mochudi was down to the fact that Ennals exploited his previous connections with Naomi Mitchison in order to fulfil his aims. Mitchison's contact with Linchwe was a way to make the facilitation of such a

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48 C.J. Makgala, *A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela in Botswana and South Africa*, (Pretoria, 2009), p. 176-7.

49 Interview with Rra Mathlapeng Ray Molomo, Mochudi, 25/9/12, "there were more refugees here than anywhere else".

50 Ibid.

51 S. Grant, Personal Communication, 15/10/12.

project possible, and Linchwe was sympathetic to the cause. The Protectorate administration under Fawcus approved to the idea when petitioned by Linchwe, and "it is believed that the Bakgatla were the only tribal community to make such a public stand in support of oppressed people of South Africa".[52] In the event, the assistance provided to refugees was less than expected, though still significant. In any case, the wide range of development projects and community groups fostered by the centre, including a printing workshop, a night school, drought relief programmes and cooperative societies, were of huge benefit to Mochudi under the leadership of Sandy Grant. Linchwe's support for the project, guided no doubt by the influence of Mitchison, both signalled his position on the liberation struggle and made it known that Mochudi was a receptive place for refugees, even if there were occasional instances of resentment towards the arrival of, largely urban, South Africans, to the predominantly rural Mochudi, which erupted when the clash of lifestyles and aspirations came to the surface.

In this context it is therefore unsurprising that there were contemporaneous underground links with the liberation struggle in South Africa. Mbeki's speech this year, however, was the first time that the role of Linchwe, or that of any of the other chiefs in Botswana, in the struggle has been publicly acknowledged. Linchwe's role began with housing the many refugees who came to Mochudi, which included for several years hosting perhaps hundreds of men for a few days or weeks at a time in his own house as they made the journey northwards to Zambia, or back towards South Africa.[53] Linchwe was clearly highly-informed and respected in an advisory capacity by the revolutionaries who came into contact with him. Naomi MItchison recalled evenings talking politics in the early 1960s where she "had realised that there was a good deal going on and that there were doubtless tie-ups with various bodies which one might call the resistance".[54] Kwapeng Modikwe, a Mokgatla journalist who was close to Linchwe during this period recalled playing in Linchwe's football team alongside several refugee players from South Africa: "I used to sit with them and him together, off the pitch, and I used to hear him telling them how to go about in the struggle and everything – assisting them...advancing information".[55]As emphasised by Mbeki, Linchwe's main role in the 'struggle machinery' had to do with transporting and storing weapons. Sheds were built in the gardens of the chief's house on top of Phuthadikobo hill, and Linchwe's wife Cathy undertook dangerous gun-running trips to pick up and transport caches of weapons from the border to Mochudi.

Secrecy was imperative in this venture. Few people knew about Linchwe's involvement, which was kept hidden from all but those who need to be involved: even his children were unaware of the

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52 S. Grant, *Mochudi Around the Time of Independence*, (Gaborone, 2001), p.35.

53 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng, (Cathy Linchwe), Mochudi, 4/9/12.

54 N. Mitchison, *Return to the Fairy Hill*, p. 54.

55 Interview with Kwapeng Modikwe, Mochudi, 24/10/12.

weapons stored in their house, or the nature of the transient 'guests' sharing their living room.[56] What Linchwe was doing was incredibly dangerous. As a person in a leadership position in Botswana, he was aware of the precarious nature of his country's political situation, and also that as an authority figure he would have been watched by the South African authorities. His wife remembers South African helicopters flying over Mochudi and their house – "so close I could see their faces" – and going outside in skirts and shawls and waving to them as an 'innocent' person.[57] As the threatening SADF behaviour intensified, Linchwe took the decision to secretly move all of the weapons stored in Mochudi to one of his cattle-posts which he had converted for the purpose ("our wardrobes are still there")[58], thirty kilometres or so northwards into the bush.[59] Cathy did the driving with one of Linchwe's uncles – "he couldn't be seen to be involved as it was too dangerous ... I did some of the dangerous jobs rather than him".[60] The cause for secrecy was threefold. Primarily, silence was essential for all activity to do with the liberation struggle if it was to succeed amid high levels of South African surveillance. As a chief, and banned from political involvement, the government would likely have taken a harsh view of Linchwe's participation in the struggle, given the national non-springboard policy. But there was also a very real danger in being involved in such activity, which was brought sharply home by the Gaborone raid in 1985. Even before this, kidnappings and targeted attacks were common. The helicopter patrols over Mochudi would have driven home the proximity of the border. Linchwe's role as a leader in Mochudi was of huge personal and local significance: "At that time it was tense. We were really protecting Linchwe by doing the visible things. I did the dangerous things – we agreed, its better they take me not you. I have given you the children, but what will the people do without you?"[61]

Relations with the incoming refugees was not always easy, particularly with those who were only resident on a temporary basis. Linchwe and Cathy used their own resources to support those living in their home, feeding them with beef from their cattle, which was not always particularly gratefully received.[62] Linchwe acted as mediator on several occasions, solving issues as they arose and diffusing tension when it peaked "so that the struggle was not disturbed".[63] Mochudi did not escape the repercussions of involvement in the liberation struggle. During the 1980s the SADF made several

56 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng.

57 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng.

58 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng.

59 Interview with Kwapeng Modikwe.

60 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng.

61 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng.

raids into the small border village of Rathlokwa.[64] In October 1985 a bomb exploded in the car park of Mochudi's Deborah Retief Hospital killing four people, including two children, and destroying the outpatient department in what President Masire described as "an act of terror".[65] In 1990, several members of the Chand family were murdered at their home in Sikwane, near the South African border. Sam Chand had assisted members of the PAC to travel between Botswana and South Africa since the 1960s. During the Truth and Reconciliation hearings it was revealed that the killings had been ordered by the notorious Eugene de Kock, director of the *Vlakplaas* (death squad training farm).[66]

After the political dispensation in South Africa and the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC in 1990, Linchwe and Mbeki met surreptitiously behind the scenes of the first international soccer match after the lifting of the ban on South Africa, which was held in Gaborone National Stadium in 1992. Together they devised a plan that Linchwe would inform the Botswana Police that as a result of his position as a traditional leader he had been made aware of the existence of the arms caches that remained at his cattle-post, and that they should come a retrieve them.[67] The ANC had no further need for them, and it was in nobody's interests to put the public at risk by leaving them untouched, whilst it conveniently allowed Linchwe to find a way for the police to seize the weapons without him "getting into trouble with the government".[68]

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62 Interview with Mma Seingwaeng: "they were so demanding, though I understood where they had come from, that they had left their homes and left everything behind".

63 Interview with Kwapeng Modikwe.

64 C.J. Makgala, *A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela,* p.278.

65 *Botswana Daily News*, 18/11/85, p.1 – The motives for the bombing are still unclear, though there is some speculation that the bomb was being transported via Mochudi by an ANC agent and was accidentally detonated.

66 *Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Application No. AM: 0066/96, Murder of Chand Family, Day 5:* http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9905240623_pre_990531pt.htm.

67 T. Mbeki, 11/5/12.

68 Interview with Rra Mathlapeng Ray Molomo.

Conclusion

The ways in which the Bakgatla participated in and were affected by the liberation struggle in South Africa effectively demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of Botswana's involvement. It was a highly charged situation: trapped by the underdevelopment caused by "eighty years of diligent imperial disregard",[69] both the Fawcus colonial administration and the post-independence governments of Khama and Masire faced the dilemma of near total economic dependence on an apartheid South Africa which constantly threatened their territorial sovereignty and the security of its people. At the same time, out of both a sense of moral obligation and the simple fact that due to her proximity and under-policed borders there was little to stop the flow of refugees across the frontier, Botswana took on the role as a major receiver of refugees fleeing persecution from the minority-rule regime. It was inevitable that South Africa's fears would nonetheless be realised: if it was amongst the easiest border to cross for refugees, it would also be exploited by those directly engaged in the liberation struggle despite the essential, even if forced and detested, public statements of non-involvement of the government. That the Bakgatla region was significantly involved and affected is also unsurprising, given its particular history and geographical location. With his lands, people and outlook straddling the frontier which separated apartheid from liberated Africa, Linchwe could not but be essentially involved in the struggle in terms of receiving refugees and out of deep concern for those living and working south of the border. That he participated even further on an individual level was a dangerous decision – one made even more so by his position as Paramount chief, and one already known to be predisposed to criticism of the national government. Though his background, life experience and education, when coupled with a long-seated tradition of a wide, and international, outlook of the Bakgatla leaders particularly when it came to the issues in South Africa and the threat of further territorial encroachment, made it all the more likely that he would have had both the opportunity and the inclination to participate in and support the liberation movements. That he did participate so directly, as revealed by Thabo Mbeki in 2012, provides an example of direct and underground support for the liberation struggle of a more deep-seated and institutionalised nature than the operations of isolated agents, proving more accurate than ever Mbeki's assertion that Botswana, and as described here the Bakgatla, acted as "an historic bridge between an apartheid South Africa isolated from the rest of Africa, and a liberated South Africa fully integrated both within independent Africa and the rest of the world".[70]

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69 R. Segal, 'Foreword' in J. Halpern, *South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. xiii.

70 T. Mbeki, 11/5/12.

Border-Crossing and Dynamics of Representations in Third-Generation Nigerian Fiction

Coker, Oluwole
Wole4u@gmail.com, ocoker@oauife.edu.ng
Dept. of English
Obafemi Awolowo University,
Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

Postcolonial African fiction is replete with tropes and tendencies which instantiate the peculiarities of the transitional and transnational colourations of the works. As a subset of African literature that has a consistent commitment to pervading socio-historical issues of the enabling milieu, postcolonial African literature displays artistic innovativeness in showcasing dominant developments. This paper is concerned with how the concept of border-crossing reflects in the preoccupations of the emerging canon of African literature at the geographical and epistemological levels. Knowledge production continues to be influenced by several factors like border contestations and influences, especially when trans-border economic activities and migration are considered. Given the diversities in backgrounds and the hybrid ideologies of the representative writers, the aesthetic and artistic productions exude multivalent tropes which are in tandem with the age of globalisation. This study interrogates the trope of border-crossing in third-generation Nigerian fiction using Shade Adeniran's *Imagine This* and Okey Ndibe's *Arrows of Rain* as textual exemplifications. This is a view to demonstrating that, the writers are not only physically crossing borders as Diaspora writers; they are also crossing epistemological borders through the multi/trans – disciplinary significance of the literary productions. The paper highlights features of transnational features and how this relates to the central issue of border crossing. The paper demonstrates that, borderlands' narratives are imperatives in the body of African literary and cultural productions, attributing this to the border-crossing temperaments of third generation fiction writers.

Introduction

Issues of transnationalism, s like multiculturalism has become synonymous with globalization studies. This is because, the twenty-first century has developed in a fast pace through the aid of information technology and advances in internet penetration. One immediate fall-out of this is that, societies now appropriate the information gateway to engender multiple diversities while at the same time, mutual understanding have become natural imperatives. Hence, barriers of cultures have become virtually non-existent while there is constant flow of thoughts across peoples irrespective of geographical locations. As cultures transit from being monolithic to transcendence, physical boundaries have also become victims as epistemological forces, especially knowledge transfer continue to hit at natural demarcations. Added to this is the fact that, the emergent society has also advanced in diplomatic and economic aspirations, to the extent that, trade and bilateral agreements, continue to blossom. This implies that, as freer movement of people continue to be encouraged, migration and economic transnational activities have come to be an integral part of the recognizable tenets of the globalize age.

For third-world societies, the transition is more visible. In particular, African societies have become major global players as a result of educational, educational and economic purposes. These have been aided by the coexistence of migration tendencies in the African countries occasioned by years of association with former colonial powers on the one hand, and alignments with major world economic players, on the other. African societies, being major consumers of production efforts of the world, have therefore become strong partners of trade and international diplomacy. Africa therefore, has become stops of economic and political imperatives. As these developments continue on

the political and economic fronts, the effects become gradually cascaded to the cultural industries in terms of contents and dynamism of cultural productions, and even in the creative impulses that dominate the societies in question.

In the main, the ensuing paper engages the manifestations of realities of migration in postcolonial societies. This paper conceives of the experiences of borderlands- virtual and real as central to cultural productions in the mileus. The point to note is that, "The migrant is not on the margin of modern experience – he is absolutely central to it" (John Berger: A Seventh Man, 1975/2010). In this connection, one agrees to the notion of the migrant text, as response and agency, dictated by socio-economic and cultural imperatives. As individuals traverse diverse experiences, they alter the paths of cultures and identities, and evolve not just multiple cultures, but hybrid cultural practices. This however hardly truncate cultural essences, as factors of language crossings, admixtures of metaphysical and psychological contestations, readily become foregrounded. One contends therefore, that the proliferation of the migrant text in postcolonial literature and culture, is a natural occurrence which promotes cultural diffusion. To this end, this paper situates Shade Adeniran's *Imagine This* and Okey Ndibe's *Arrows of Rain* in the foregoing critical probing.

The Third-Generation Corpus: Delineation and Definition

As a corpus, African literature is categorized into three phases. Though the categorizations have continued to generate tensions and misconceptions among critics, it is indubitable that the phasing of African literary historiography has become fairly acceptable in critical circles. Arguments do exist as to the parameters of canonization,

yet these have not sufficiently dwarfed the fact that, the growth of African literature is closely related to the evolution of African states. The point is that with the emergence of democratic governance in Nigeria, literature started to gather momentum, and there was a major renaissance in the creative enterprise. With the increase in the number of Nigerians abroad also came voices from the Diaspora. These writers share the common quest of roots and soon formed a vibrant tradition. Notable among them are Chiamanda Adichie, Sefi Attah, Helon Habila, Chris Abani, Helen Oyeyemi, Diran Adebayo, all of whom seem fired by the encouragement that their links with the west provided.

The terms of engagement of Nigerian fiction change with these trends in the social milieu. The implication of this is not lost on the literary productions. This is because as the Nigerian body polity continues to grapple with varying developmental challenges, the novels adequately thematise these realities. These are actually realities engendered by the existential dynamics. The point, therefore, is that, in line with the observation of Kyore (2004), that, " in the post-independence era, African writers have drawn on recent history for their imagination and have mostly turned to concerns about governance in the post-colonial states" (8), the issues that attract third-generation Nigerian novelists are, therefore, directly related to the immediate challenges of the enabling milieu.

In portraying the contemporary dictates of the actual milieu, contemporary Nigerian prose fiction parades an array of dynamic and innovative routes which engender viable thematic thrusts, apt character portraitures and refreshing stylistic platforms which achieve the twin purpose of socio- historical relevance and aesthetic pungency. An understanding of the prevailing social conditions as well as the exigencies

of political economy, first –hand , puts the literary productions right at the centre of socio-political and historical dynamics.

The Nigerian literary landscape shares the angst of Nigeria's tortuous quest for development. Tracing Nigeria's history through literary production certainly manifests in the interrelationship between the literature and the country's political history. As a matter of fact, Nigerian literature reflects Nigeria's history and political manipulations in a manner which has encouraged critics to brand the corpus of Nigerian literature, faction, that is, a rare blend of history and fiction.

Given the fact that the heritage of African letters is firmly rooted in an abiding faith in socio-historical experience, the writers' role as society's conscience is a visible trademark that runs through Nigerian literature. To start with Achebe's (1958) classic, *Things Fall Apart,* the preoccupations of the prose fiction writers have been synonymous with the phases of socio-political evolution of the Nigerian nation state. Achebe has also, in the words of Gikandi, (1991), been "using the artistic form as a means of social reform" (2). This is a fact that has become a common thread through first to present generation of Nigerian writers. In other words, the search for a common good and the satirical force have come to be an inheritance of literary productions. This is understandable given the fact that "contemporary Nigerian writers are moulding the national consciousness as well as drawing sustenance from it" (Kirpal, 1988,53).

At every phase of African history, the writer continues to be a driving force in the humanistic quest for a better society. For the Achebe generation, comprising Wole Soyinka, J.P Clark-Bekedremo and Christopher Okigbo, the preoccupation was presenting an authentic identity for the African self. The transition to independence

however propelled an agenda for social reformation on literary works of the sixties. The post-independence Nigerian writer builds on a long established tradition of consistently exposing social ills and bad governance. This is because, as societies advance, so also do the militating factors which rear heads under different garbs. Examples of such menacing developmental challenges are ethnic uprisings, resource agitation, political injustice and incidences of economic migration to the West. In other words, the endeavour of the present crop of Nigerian novelists is to locate their thematic directions of their works within contemporary realities in the Nigerian milieu. The writer is therefore not only a chronicler or mirror of history, but an interpreter of same. The point is that the Nigerian writer, just like any African writer, has been faithful to the continent's phases of socio-political and historical revolution. To agree with Kehinde (2005):

> Historically, Africa has passed through the stages of the slave trade, colonialism, independence and neo-colonialism. These have provided immense possibilities of themes and visions for African writers. The themes range from the romantic temper of negritude to the critical pessimism and social realism of the present. African literature and African history are thus like Siamese twins. The historical phases of the African continent can also be described as representing the moods that African literature has undergone. The pre-colonial period typified a "paradise on earth," an idyllic stage. The colonial period was that of "paradise disturbed," that is, a period of optimism for a "better tomorrow." However, the postcolonial/neo-colonial phase suggests a mood of "paradise lost," a period when African writers have become more realistic than ever before. The writers now examine critically how Africans have been governing themselves and what they have made of their independence (224).

In essence, third- generation writers are dynamic in their approaches of literary mimesis but certainly united in their desire to use their works to change the Nigerian

milieu of production. Unlike the writers of the earlier generation, they are certainly strategically positioned as transnational agents to also champion the cause of a global order that would re-define the essence of the African self.

Post-independence African novels generally allow a broad perspective of the bizarre metamorphosis in the continents polity as manifested in the political landscape. Generally, in third-generation Nigerian novels, the authors attempt to illuminate the pain infested on the country's landscape by its defective brand of political governance thereby conditioning the novelists to evolve reasoning parameters towards pragmatic alternatives. This is in consonance with the realities underscored by Dipoko(1969) that:

> For the masses, happiness was, as it still is, a prospective dream. Better conditions of living, higher purchasing power, personal feeding, a share of all good things of modern like, from industrial products to learning: in short, a longing for better days to come . . . . (63

In other words, the novelists aspire to bail out the populace from the conundrum of underdevelopment .Hence, the dystopian fictions of the third generation Nigerian literary historiography would as a matter of necessity and ideological inclination, would reflect the prevailing chaos in the polity. This is validated in the contention of Kortenaar (2000) that, "Third world texts are national allegories where there is no room for private dramas' (228). Although this may sound rather generalising, it nonetheless affirms the natural demand for social responsibility on the Third World novelist. In other words, the literary productions evidence a commitment to this responsibility.

Transcending Borders in *Imagine This* and *Arrows of Rain*

The transnational configuration of third-generation Nigerian fiction naturally dictates representations that extend beyond the immediate environment of the writers. Actually, the upward mobility of twenty-first century Nigerian writers contributes immensely to the openness of their texts. This explains why, rather than confine their artistic engagements to the issues that are relevant to their locale; the writers externalize and situate same within a global bracket. This ultimately means that, there is a paradoxical relationship between borders in the literary productions. While globalization and transcendence dictate that issues to be addressed are common to humanity, the writers inadvertently admit the existence of the border "other". As a balancing act, the self existing on the other side of the border is shown to manifest tendencies that contribute to the demeaning of the humanistic ethos.

To begin with Shade Adeniran's *Imagine This*, one notices that the desire for a borderless aesthetic motivates the quest for roots in the character. The novelist demonstrates that, the border between United Kingdom and Nigeria is necessarily a wedge between the self and fulfillment:

> Why, why, why? I hate them all, I want to go home. I don't want to live with my Auntie. I don't want to live in Idogun. I want everything o go back to the way it was, with Daddy, Adebola and me living at number 4 Edgecombe House.
> (Adeniran, 3)

The above captures the frustrations and state of mind of the child protagonist, Lola Ogunwole, who found herself transported to Nigeria, but who unfortunately becomes a

psychological wreck on account of physical, economic and social encumbrances of the new home. The implication of this is that, the borders of her experiences still haunt her essence. This brings to question, the globalizing imperatives of Diaspora reckoning. Actually, the plight of Lola Ogunwole can be seen in a practical and positive light in the context of border sensibilities. This is because; the novel clearly celebrates the need to dismantle physical borders and only stick to consciousness of home. It is therefore in the re/definition of home that Lola is fully realized, as her fathers' dream turn out to be a disaster for her:

> Father had been so desperate to come back to Nigeria; he'd told us we will have a better life there. Now people are desperate to leave and will do anything to achieve that goal. America and England beckon… (Adeniraan, 230)

The foregoing relates to the quest in the Diaspora for an idyllic root as well as the migration tendencies prevalent in most postcolonial states. This brings to mind the prevalence of the theme of migration in third-generation Nigerian fiction. In fact, it is a direct fall-out of the experiences of the writers who, as global citizens, either reside in the west, or move freely between the two worlds. In short, they experience the migrating dexterity and angst of their generation. This explains the faithful representation of the disillusioned public at either side of the border: Lola captures a scene at the High Commission:

> I am not going back there. It was horrible. We got there really early this morning but there were hundreds of people already queued up. I think some may have spent the night, because the stench of unwashed bodies was mighty. When the doors finally opened, there was a mad rush to get in. I felt so suffocated that I almost fainted. (Adeniran, 230)

The foregoing is a clear demonstration of the blind ambitions and notions of migration which was prevalent in Nigeria, especially during the military period. In terms of expectations, it demarcates two border signpost- one flowing with milk and honey, and the other, a haven of pain. In other words, in evolving a borderless aesthetics, third-generation Nigerian novelists situate the transnational dimensions of the emerging corpus within a common humanity. The point from the foregoing is that, Shade Adeniran's *Imagine This* instantiates a clear commitment to a borderless artistic expression. Through the character portraiture of the central character, and the experiences captured in the novel, the novelist exposes the challenges of being in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, unifying negating features result in a devastated self; unable to fully realize the potentials in humanistic world:

> I felt lost and had no one to talk to, so I vented everything in your pages. I could pour out my thoughts, feelings and frustrations without fear. To you, I bear my soul and now that a new chapter in my life is no begin, I look back and ask myself who is Omolola Olufunke Olufunmilayo Ogunwole? I don't truly know…(Adeniran,266)

From the above, imaginative fiction as the canvass of self-transcendence is fore grounded. The implication is that, consciousness of borderless which motivates the movement back home for Omolola is a factor which ultimately generates a new reckoning for self-discovery.

The second textual exemplification further corroborates the significance of transnalism,it also attempts to associate with borderlessness. This is because, the central theme of Okey Ndibe's Arrows of Rain is the gloom that pervades the postcolonial milieu, using Nigeria as a template. This explains why developmental issues are generally

addressed in the novel. Actually, In *Arrows*, Okey Ndibe sets out to engage the vicissitudes of existence by playing up the travails of his characters. Through the use of multiple omniscient narrators, the novelist exposes the ills of the contemporary Nigerian society by touching on all facets of the society. It should be remarked that the question of identity is used to penetrate the overall thematic agenda of social lampoon. However, Ndibe does not exonerate his characters from the rot as the characters are held responsible for their (mis)deeds. This is clearly evident in the travails of Bukuru, the central character who admits:

> Whatever the complicated facts of biology might,I should
> have been that boys father that day. I should have tried to
> save him – you – as a father would. Or any decent human
> being. But I didn't. I was too afraid of involvement in
> others' intimate pain.(247)
>
> I know I am a man who ran away from duty and love…(248)

Though Bukuru pays for his (in) actions, he is the character through which the rot of the Nigerian society is adequately mirrored. Issues like the collapse of social mores, prostitution, corruption as well as the transnational dimensions of the decay of humanistic ethos are adequately foregrounded. Through the literary devices like flashback and occasional stream of consciousness for example, Ndibe uses the experiences of one of his characters, Dr. Jaja to lampoon the hypocrisy of globalization through western education and how the pursuit of knowledge has been counterproductive:

> I thought the truth lay in what the ancestors of Europe
> had to say. I searched for the matrix of Marx, the
> delusions of Descarte, the cant of Kant. I was drawn to
> Hegel's heresies, to the fraudulences of Freud. I
> dismissed my own patrimony as naïve, atavistic and
> inconsequential. I imagined all true wisdom existed in the
> tomes of Europe.I read them voraciously. Through them,
> I found eyes, but the key to seeing still eluded me.Yes,I

harvested knowledge from Europe's soil but I found little
wisdom in it(137)

Ndibe seems to suggest in the above that knowledge entails real globalize knowledge. This is the type that is transnational in scope and which appropriates resources from all fronts, irrespective of the sources of the direction and the author of the ideas. In other words, for the society to achieve the much sought and desired development, a new transnational orientation that recognizes the individuating capacities of all nationals is required. This will then mean, for example, that the question of Madian's political structure can take a cue from a character who is paradoxically a beneficiary of the corruption of the Madian society. This is what Pa Mathew Ileka Ata, father of Reuben, the corrupt Madian minister offers: The sage pontificates:

> 'Can anything be done?' I asked.
> He sighed. Yes. First, we must ask ourselves, what is the identity of this space called Madia? Why does our present bear no marks of our past? What is the meaning of our history? These questions can only lead us to one truth, namely that we live in a bastard nation. Then we must decide what to do with this illegitimate offspring. The first step is to turn it into a completely different nation. Not by means of violence but symbolically through our constitution. (123)

This recipe is a response to Nigeria's fragile federalism. The novelist offers an alternative to national dialogue with the foregoing. It should be noted that the fictitious Madia, undoubtedly Nigeria is shown as a country that has lost direction and in fact confused. Little wonder the replacement of "Niger" with "Mad" which derisively portrays the direction of things in Nigeria. The point is that, Ndibe's *Arrows* participates in the socio-political discourse by offering a recipe for socio-political engineering.

In addressing as well as engaging development issues in *Arrows*, Ndibe touches on every facet of the society as indicated earlier. This is to demonstrate the capacity of the novel in the twenty-first century Nigerian society to capture the realities of the milieu. This fact adequately positions *Arrows* at the centre of developmental aspiration on all fronts. For illustration, the novelist humorously touches on the scouge of AIDS and other health challenges prevalent in the contemporary society through Femi Adero's experience in a public bus:

> Then a rowdy contest for the passengers' attention developed between a traveling medicine salesman and an itinerant preacher. The salesman's wares included an antibiotic dubbed 'No more sufferhead' made by 'Indian Medical wizards' able to cure 'bad spirit and witchcraft, eczema, crawcraw, gonorrhoea, syphilis, AIDS, watery sperm and dead penis. It sold briskly. (14)

The simple sentence in the above excerpt, 'it sold briskly' clearly underscores the prevalence of the type of salesmen, the proliferation/infiltration of the 'Indian Medical wizards and the kind of patronage enjoyed. This seems to point at the varieties of issues plaguing society and the near absence of a viable solution which conditions people resorting to the obvious pseudo medical solution painted above for both heath and perceived metaphysical challenges. *Arrows* therefore narrates the pain of existence experienced by people in the lowest rung of the Madia society. This further positions the novelist as voice and conscience of his society. It also confirms the view expressed by Lewis *et al* (2008:11)that:

> Many of the fictional accounts of development-related issues which exist reveal different sides to the experience of development to more formal literature, and may sometimes actually do a 'better' job in conveying complex understandings of development in certain respects. While

> fiction may not always be 'reliable' data in the sense of constituting a set of replicable or stable research findings, it may nevertheless be 'valid' knowledge in that it may be seen 'to reflect an external reality'

In Okey Ndibe's *Arrows of Rain*, trans-border and transnational issues take the centre stage. For instance, the novelist participates actively in gender discourse, second only to the satire on corruption and economic downturn of the Madia society. The plight of women is central to the transnational agenda of the novel and this eminently positions the novel as a treatise of development. *Arrows* extensively delves into rape and prostitution. For both anti-social issues, Ndibe demonstrates the depth and extent at which both flourish. Not only this, the novelist, through Bukuru laments the culture of silence by rape victims: "My point is to show that women hardly report rapes cases to the police. The police cover up assaults on women. *I know*." (38). T o further demonstrate that the issue of rape is a common occurrence begging for immediate attention, the novelist draws attention to incessant rape experiences of Emilia (Iyese) in the hands of her "benefactor", Isa Bello. The rapist in Isa Bello is also bestial and murderous; which accounts to his dehumanizing treatment of the victim at each encounter before the Emilia's eventual murder. The victim narrates:

> He came with three men. They had daggers…
> The men pinned me to the bed.
> Then Isa stabbed my vagina with a dagger. I started bleeding. That's when he entered me with his penis… It was like the stab of the stab of the knife, but more painful.
> As soon as I opened the door one of them grabbed me and covered my mouth.They pushed me down on the bed and forced apart my legs. Isa brought out his dagger and said he wanted to teach my vagina a lesson (166)

What is instructive and thought provoking is the way the above scenario elicit pity by the portraiture of Isa's damnable and heinous act. What is more worrisome is the defeatism in the victims who refuse "to cry or beg" but who "silently begged death to come and take me away". The realty of this is that not only does rape exist in the Madian society; it is perpetrated by the high and mighty, under whatever guise. Throughout the novel, one notices that there is constant reference to the issues of rape and prostitution but the novelist, like his characters seem not to have a practical solution. In fact, the novelist confounds the mind further that: "There is a diplomatic dimension to the parties… 'The ambassadors you see here will never send home a negative report about Madia. I made sure of that by giving them the most beautiful girls." (117)

To appreciate the point above, it should not be seen as an indictment of the diplomatic corps. Rather, the transnational implication is significant. This means that the issue at stake is beyond borders and transcends nationalities. As a matter of fact, the fact that Bukuru "used to think prostitution helped tourism, and that many tourists actively seek a bit of exotic native sex" (35), clearly indicates the fact that the act of prostitution and its patronage is a matter of transnational concern. It follows therefore that in *Arrows*, the novel acknowledges prostitution as one of the many negative realities of the society, which though regarded as the worlds oldest profession, can only be tackled as part of a wider agenda to rid the society of all social ills. Ogogua's grandmother admonishes:

> You must always remember that you come from a line
> of speakers. Your grandfather was the town crier for all
> of Amawbia. Your own father could have succeeded
> him,but he grew up in the age of the Whiteman's rule.
> So he went to the Whiteman's country and learned to
> become a new kind of voice, one that was heard beyond
> Amawbia. Now you, a child of yesterday, have joined
> the line. You have begun to do what your father did and

his father before him. What you scratch on paper can go and give a headache to a big man. You make powerful men stay awake at night.

Don't fear any man, but fear lying. Remember this: a story that must be told never forgives silence. Speech is the mouth's debt to a story. (97)

Conclusion

The focus of this paper has been the character of third-generation Nigerian fiction in relation to the concept of borderlessness. It has been argued that, the corpus of writings in the twentieth century manifest transcendental and transnational sensibilities. The fact that, the pull of globalization has positively imparted the novelists is adequately expounded. As active members of the fast pace generation, the novelists demonstrate their commitment towards evolving a common humanity. In line with Stuart Hall's (1990) observation on Diaspora as leading to hybrid identity formation, transnationalism encompasses the processes, experiences and practices that result from displacements and cultural shifts. These are clearly evident in the selected texts for this study. The paper shows that, in the plights of the fictional characters in the selected texts, the angst of survival is a major force in the globalised world. The writers thus deploy the power of artistic imagination to underscore the fact that, borders are in fact, integral part of human life-cycle. Relations within and across borders is thus shown to dictate the tune of artistic expression in the third-generation corpus.

In other words, the outlooks of the novelist engagements bear true and worthy allegiance to the intertwining notions of transnationalism, interdisciplinarity and

multiple-consciousness. Hence, there is a fertile blend of multicultural experiences in the literatures generated within the ambit of migration-propelled movements across national and international borders. This goes to demonstrate the capacity of borderlands in generating hybrid aesthetics which reflect the nature of human exploits within the confines of the border regions. Thus, borderland narratives which are mainly oral in nature could be said to be gradually evolving through multiple experiences captured in *Imagine This* and *Arrows of Rain*.

It is therefore the contention of this paper that, the cultural and epistemological diffusions represented in third-generation Nigerian fiction is an indication of its transnational focus. This implies that, the works produced in the literary perceptions exude tendencies which promote a borderless world- that in which the challenge of self-transcendence and survival are fused and shown as a unifying humanity. This goes to confirm that, global knowledge production and utilization have become streamlined as a result of boom in information technology and access to same. What this portends for borderland studies is that, the creative muse is a vibrant conduit for capturing and reflecting multicultural experiences, and also for engaging same. Geography and epistemology thus find a location in narratives that exude a consciousness for borderland realities. The derives from the fact that ,

> in practice, transnationalism refers to increasing transborder relations of individuals, groups, firms and to mobilizations beyond state boundaries. Individuals, groups, institutions and states interact with each other in a new global space where cultural and political characteristic of national societies are combined with emerging multilevel and multinational activities.

Ultimately, what evolves from the borderless manifestations in third-generation fiction, is a corpus of works which exude transnational temperaments. This implies that, borderlands are made veritable sites of narratives which project the challenges of economic, cultural and social existence.

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SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION

REFLECTIONS ON STUDYING THE STATE AT SOUTH SUDAN'S BORDERS
WITH CONGO AND UGANDA

ABORNE WINTER SCHOOL SAINT LOUIS 9-13 JANUARY 2013

LOTJE DE VRIES
AFRICAN STUDIES CENTRE, LEIDEN, THE NETHERLANDS

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a reflexive analysis of the researcher's presence at the border as lens through which state performances can be studied. National borders are naturally scene to relatively large presence of state agents who have the task to protect the sovereign territory. The intentions of an outsider not to cross the border but to stay and investigate the manifestations of the state embodied by its agents at the border, mobilizes suspicion among those who claim representing the authority of the state, especially when investigated in a post-conflict situation. The paper will zoom in on the border triangle of South Sudan, Congo and Uganda, which is particularly interesting because, as will be shown, it allows insight in the arena in which the rudimentary foundations of today's independent South Sudan are rooted due to performance of agents claiming authority and enforcing state-like powers long before the South's secession in 2011. Based on fieldwork at South Sudan's borders with Congo and Uganda it is argued that on the one hand the researcher is conditioned in his/her investigation due to the suspicion raised by his/her presence. On the other hand, this mere fact also provides important insight into the process of state-building and the particular position of state-agents at the border in this process.

INTRODUCTION

This paper will provide an account of fieldwork in what was at the time still called Southern Sudan, a region that had semi-autonomy in the Republic of Sudan. The key question I sought to answer in my research was what are the ways in which the Southern Sudanese state was simultaneously being performed and shaped in the border triangle with Uganda and Congo against the backdrop of the transition of a guerrilla movement to the Government of Southern Sudan.[1] The region had gained semi-autonomy after decades of war and was heading towards a referendum in which the Southerners could vote for separation from the North. The 'liberation

[1] This paper is an adapted version of chapter 2 of my dissertation entitled "Facing Frontiers, Everyday practice of state-building in South Sudan" (2012).

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struggle' had been led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Upon the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, the SPLM/A was given the responsibility to form a government. The SPLM/A had liberated the border area where I did my research already in 1997. In practice this mean that quite a number of the SPLM/A soldiers who contributed to the liberation of the area stayed afterwards to take up one of the state-like tasks that the SPLM/A was also developing. Given that they were in control of the borders with both Uganda and Congo, they had an excellent opportunity to manifest their authority by means of the checkpoints they established and the taxes levied. The SPLM/A soldiers were given tasks in the civilian wing of the movement and started to perform 'stateness' thanks to the border under their control. When the 2005 peace agreement upgraded the status of their performance from one of a guerrilla army to the deconcentrated powers of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), very little changed in the everyday performance of their tasks. The research carried out illustrates the everyday performance of the state by its agents and explains the continuities in their practices from 1997 onwards despite the changing political-administrative status of the region.

National borders, whether under control of the national army or a guerrilla movement, are naturally scene to relatively large presence of state agents who have the task to protect the sovereign territory. I had the intention not to cross the border as most outsiders and travellers aim for, but to stay and investigate these manifestations of the state embodied by its agents. This raised a lot more suspicion than I had originally anticipated. I had expected some difficulties because borders are sensitive zones by default, and in addition to that Southern Sudan was emerging from a long period of war. But the relation that developed between the researcher and the field was certainly more complex than I had hoped and resulted in an interaction between the researcher and the researched that had consequences for the type of questions I asked, the answers I got and the understanding of the situation I developed. The question that arose eventually was had I been a subject of my own research while carrying it out? What are the academic repercussions of a partly chosen but also partly imposed path in which 'the field' orientates the researcher? This paper aims firstly to briefly shed light on the way fieldwork was carried out and on what the impact of this interaction was on the data gathered, and secondly, it aims to demonstrate how I gained parts of my insights on the process of state-building in South Sudan thanks to the ways state agents dealt with my presence.

The investigation fits in a tradition of social anthropology that is inspired by the Manchester School, which built its academic relevance around theorizing by looking at 'the social' (Evens and Handelman 2006). Indeed fieldwork was based on well-thought-out ideas while it was at the same time essentially intuitive in its execution. Following Max Gluckman's tradition, the Manchester School puts ethnographic detail at the heart of a reflexive analysis in which the researcher plays an integral role (Gluckman 1958, 2006; Burawoy 2009). Gluckman (2006: 17) argues that looking into (a series of) incidents that affect the same group of people or individuals, especially when this is extended over a period of time, allows insight in the changing system of their social relations. Mitchell makes a distinction between a social situation as a collection of connected events taking place over a short period of time on the one hand, and the extended case study in which 'the same actors are involved in a series of situations in which their structural positions must continually be re-specified and the flow of actors through different social positions specified' (Mitchell 2006: 28-29). In this study for instance, the same actors constantly renegotiate their position towards others in a rapidly changing socio-political environment. This amplifies the processual aspect of state-building, which is a process of negotiation, transformation and structuration in its essence. This paper describes what Burawoy calls the first out of four extensions of the extended case method, namely the intervention into the life of the participants in the study (Burawoy 2009: 45).[2]

The extension into the life of the participants requires reflexivity on the part of the observer on the role s/he potentially played in the very situations that were the subject of study. Seen from this perspective, the researcher is an integral part of the field of study, with a personal 'repertoire' (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) that potentially overlaps the repertoires and resources of his/her interlocutors. As with any repertoire, my 'Southern Sudan repertoire' developed over the years, combining locally acquired knowledge, experience, social interaction with values and symbolic claims. It evolved from individual and shared experiences and was constantly developing, based on practice, encounters and confrontations with myself, with others, with groups and with institutions. I became aware of my own 'resources'. As this paper will demonstrate, however, some of the things I thought to be a resource turned out, in fact, to be counterproductive. The ways in which I

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2 The other extensions he describes are over time and space, from micro to macro forces and finally the extension of theory.

could value my assets and resources thus developed alongside the maturing of my repertoire.

To analytically embed my own resources and repertoires in the constellation of forces at play in the everyday performance of the state, double reflexivity is needed. 'Extending into the life of the participant' is in a way only half of the story. The paper reflects on the impact of this researcher's presence on the behaviour of the state agents encountered and adds a layer of reflexivity to the inverse situation, namely the impact of the field on the researcher and the way it affected my research path and analysis. The arrival and departure from the field are 'seismic interventions' according to Burawoy (2009: 42), and 'even the most passive observer produces ripples worthy of examination' (Ibid.: 44). Before detailing some of the ripples produced, a few more words on the data gathered at the border.

I had a series of questions and topics in mind but as soon as I arrived in the border village I realized that these were only going to be of limited use. I had planned to adopt the skirmish between the Southern Sudanese and Congolese forces along the border in Bazi a year earlier as an entry point to starting discussions about the work of state agents, the challenges they were facing and their relations with neighbouring authorities and with other levels of government. My first interviews in Southern Sudan were with people in Juba, where not only there were many white people working for numerous NGOs or donors, also most of my interviewees in Juba were quite free to talk about their jobs and their positions in the hierarchy of their organizations. This was different at the border area turned where the local agents there were rather suspicious of a white woman. More importantly the agents I met on the border were also low in the hierarchy of their organisations. This had repercussions in their behaviour towards me as they did not want to take any risks of allowing me to work and ask my questions without an approval of people higher up in the command. In Bazi I thus quickly came to know about the sensitivity of the border but also about the dominance of the security forces over the civilian local authorities in the performance of the state.

EVERYDAY CHALLENGES OF ORGANISING FIELDWORK

Any anthropological study is likely to face difficulties in organization and conduct. Doing fieldwork in Southern Sudan, as it was then called, could be arguably more challenging because of its violent history and the volatile situation there at the time. The impact of the civil wars was felt at all levels and in all corners of society. As a researcher, one is responsible for three different tasks that are separately

demanding, extremely tiring and potentially risky in combination; data collection, logistics and security. First and foremost, one is responsible for collecting data, which has to be done in accordance with professional anthropological standards, such as transparency, including the informed consent of participants and without putting people in danger. Yet in Southern Sudan, as in many 'awkward spaces' (Hume and Mulcock 2004), the seemingly clear divide between good and bad, safe and dangerous, and manageable and irresponsible becomes blurred. Carrying out fieldwork outside the main towns where people are used to foreigners was particularly challenging because of the constant need to assess the level of risk and the volatility of the environment due to arms proliferation and the misconduct of individuals. Choices that seemed logical turn out to be irrelevant and people who seem useless become indispensable. It is difficult to keep track of the numerous implicit choices one has to make, often based on serendipity,[3] and to understand the implications. This is additionally challenging in combination with the two other key tasks of a field researcher: organizing logistics and keeping track of security.[4] The lines between these three tasks are blurred and part of the challenge faced in terms of logistics and security feeds into or becomes an integral part of data collection. Nevertheless it is important to be precise about the separate nature of these tasks and the complexity that may arise from mixing them. During fieldwork one combines these tasks and the repercussions deserve some explanation. I will therefore briefly explain how these two additional tasks influence what is supposed to be the core business of the researcher.

Logistics

Organising logistics in a territory like Southern Sudan is at times challenging and costly. Generally speaking, it is important to note that the system in place in Southern Sudan that facilitated the presence and activities of NGOs and donors who organized their own logistics and transport, including flights, was difficult to access for independent researchers like myself. There were hardly any individuals without the institutional backing of an NGO.[5] Outside the capital there were no *khawadjas* (white people) operating without an organization behind them.

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3 The concept of serendipity is based on the idea of the occurrence of unexpected events by chance, yet one that is beneficial to the person who values it. See van der Geest (2007) on the relevance and value of serendipity in medical anthropological fieldwork.
4 In 2008-2010 NGOs operating in Southern Sudan had staff employed to organize logistics and other staff members focusing exclusively on security.
5 There were a few independent journalists in Juba and the occasional consultant moving about under the cover of an organization with an office there.

Consequently, I relied on the willingness of organisations with an operating system in place to take me under their wing, drive me to the border and pick me up again, book me a flight or send me the UN security updates that were only allowed to be read by NGOs and the UN itself. In a place like Southern Sudan, most NGO staff and other agencies understood the difficulties I faced, including the high costs of travel and accommodation, and were therefore willing to help me. Without this generous support, I would not have been able to do fieldwork at all.

The element of serendipity turned out to be very important throughout fieldwork. One should develop a sense for opportunities that may arise, while at the same time do cannot always know or fully assess the consequences of a choice. Let me detail one element of serendipity that was important in terms of both logistics and security. Through connections, I was able to get a lift from Juba to Yei with the head of the Norwegian People's Aid Mine Action Programme (NPA) I was about to start fieldwork on the border in the village where the skirmish had taken place. The five-hour drive to Yei solved all my concerns about where to stay and how to get there. NPA apparently had the willingness and logistical means to drive me up and down to Bazi on a regular basis, but they more importantly they had a female demining team active in Bazi on the Southern Sudanese side of the village. I was given a tent in the demining camp if I wanted.[6] For a researcher, however, there is a risk involved in being associated with an NGO, even if they just provide transport. The question is how the image of the NGO reflects on the researcher. It is an element to take into consideration and yet one is not always in the luxurious position of being able to choose. Again I was lucky as NPA had a long history in Southern Sudan, and had openly taken the side of the SPLM/A. To date, this has given the organization an exceptional legitimacy not only in the eyes of SPLM/A leaders in Juba but also amongst the junior (ex)soldiers and security personnel on the border. Had I not arrived in an NPA vehicle and stayed in a tent at their camp, the people at the checkpoint in Bazi would have been even more suspicious of me than they were. And the mistrust only started when they found out I was not actually an NPA employee but a PhD student.

In addition to a place to stay and transport there was the need for an official authorization to be allowed to do fieldwork. There was no existing official procedure in place to arrange one and yet it would have been very difficult to arrive at the border without any official statement signed by an under-secretary on

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6 Throughout my fieldwork in 2009 and 2010, NPA Mine Action Programme based in Yei allowed their vehicles to drive me up and down the roads to Morobo and Kaya to drop me off and pick me up.

GoSS letterhead. On several occasions, I was told in encounters with different authorities that it was thanks to my letters that they had not arrested me. I had by chance managed to obtain letters from some authorities that were legitimate enough in the eyes of the local deconcentrated state agents that I was allowed to proceed. The University of Juba[7] had suggested the Ministry of Education but I decided to try the GoSS Ministry of Regional Cooperation as it had a desk for multilateral relations and international NGOs. Although the department was not relevant to the topic of my research or the types of authorities I would be confronted with in the field, the under-secretary signed a letter endorsing my research. Thanks to this first authorisation signed by an irrelevant office, others started to offer me help too. Important was that the Office of the Security Advisor to the Governor of Central Equatoria State offered to write a letter addressed directly to the commissioners of the counties I wanted to visit on fieldwork. This greatly facilitated access to these commissioners.

My encounters with the various deconcentrated GoSS security institutions on the border made me realize however that the letters allowed me to be tolerated but came with no guarantee that I would be trusted. It quickly became clear that the local security people in Kaya and Bazi did not consider the GoSS Ministry of Regional Cooperation to be in a position to judge security and thus my presence along the border. The letter from the security advisor to the CES Governor was more legitimate in their eyes because of the commissioner's handwritten approval but it did not represent permission from any of the security services that were relevant to them.[8] At the beginning of my second fieldwork period I therefore decided to make sure I had an additional letter from the Inspector General of Police (IGP) at the GoSS Ministry of Internal Affairs. This added significantly to my credibility in the field. The Public Security, the Criminal Investigation Department and others all fell under the responsibility of the IGP. They now had a letter from their highest boss in Juba that cleared them of their responsibility for judging potential threats. It was my first insight into the supremacy of military/security concerns over political-administrative judgements.

Both the example of the letters and the positive side-effect of one specific organisation that facilitated my research, suggest the unclear line between logistics

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7 The Deputy Principal of Juba University, for instance, could not tell me where I had to get research permission or any other form of authorization.

8 In a county, the commissioner is in charge of security. The GoSS agents consider themselves as local antennas of the central government in Juba, even though formally they are supposed t also work under the commissioner.

and security. In other words, by chance – or serendipity – the logistics strengthened my security. There is, however, a distinction to be made here between my personal safety and the security situation in Southern Sudan on the one hand, and the ways in which the state agents, my subject of study, considered me a 'security concern' on the other. The latter will be discussed in the next section as it is part of one of the levels of reflexivity mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Here, I explain the impact of constantly keeping an eye on my own safety and the risks that I encountered while trying to do so.

Security

The most essential difficulty of doing fieldwork in Southern Sudan was me being in a permanent state of alertness rooted in the realisation of the fact that if there were an emergency, nobody would be responsible for my safety or for evacuating me from the area. I never managed, however, to become completely used to the instant emotional fragility that occasionally hit me. Trivial encounters with suspicion, conflict or sometimes simply days when things went differently than planned could have a disproportionate resonance in the hours and days that followed. Losing one's balance might result not only in losing sight of real-time risks but could also jeopardize the most important research tool, i.e. yourself (Lecocq 2002). Ultimately the only person responsible for managing relations, weighing up risks and taking decisions (including the one to pull out if things became too difficult) was me. There was always the need to keep track on the 'frog in the water' principle where somebody loses sight of the risks being taking.[9] There is no need for something bad to actually happen for it to feel as though one is being confronted with risks and potential insecurity, a situation that is extremely tiring and at times very confusing too. In the end, the most important security risk is the researcher's emotional balance.

Alongside my emotional security, there were real risks to be assessed and the biggest I was taking was the fact that I was alone in an environment where people had little reason to trust me. As explained earlier, I was staying in a tent in the female demining camp a little outside the village of Bazi, I did not have a vehicle and the telephone connection was poor. The camp allowed me a relatively easy place to start finding my way in a village where relations between the

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9 If a frog is thrown into boiling water it will jump out again immediately, yet if a frog is put in cold water that is then brought to the boil, it will die without noticing what is happening to it. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog. Accessed 17 May 2011.

authorities were tense and my understanding of the complexity still limited. It took me some time to realize that suspicion is often the point of departure in social interaction in Southern Sudan, with occasionally the production of violence as its consequence. The violence I encountered in Bazi was not a physical violation of any kind, but the verbal and symbolic manifestation of the agents' claimed superiority had an impact on me and on occasions made me feel unsafe. According to Robben and Nordstrom following Gramsci (Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 7), 'Violence, force, and power are sublimated in social institutions and cultural conceptions of hierarchy'. Indeed, I had to find a way to cope with it. I learned to deal with the fact that my phone was being tapped, with the fact that I was followed and subject to their investigation. Alcohol was another factor I had to cope with. People drank heavily. In Bazi one Sunday afternoon, the whole village appeared to be drunk. Interviewing state agents in Jalé on the border with Uganda had to start by 14:00 at the latest otherwise many of them would be too drunk to be interviewed. Obviously these challenges, although I learned to deal with them, influenced my research. They impacted on the questions I dared to ask and there were confrontations I tried to avoid. Interestingly, my ignorance at the beginning helped me to start my fieldwork with an open frame of mind. Only later did some self-censorship emerge. This resulted in fieldwork that was carried out under constant reassessments of my emotional stability and ideas of vulnerability towards the state agents representing the powers of the Southern Sudanese state that I was studying in its every practice, including its practices towards me. This section has argued that although the key task of a fieldworker is to collect data through interviews, conversations and observations, much of my energy and effort were in fact put into its organization, logistics and my emotional security and safety.

Ripple in the pond

Data gathering mainly involved sitting, observing, spending time with and interviewing people. On the border life was rather boring, the number of state agents was high and I was also the only white person in the area. People were happy to have a ripple in their pond as little else was happening most days. At the end of my second day in Bazi, I was ordered into the tukul (straw hut in Juba Arabic) of the security and intelligence forces, some 100 metres from the checkpoint. There were four desks in the hut, each representing a different office.

Three desks were occupied and I was summoned to sit on the wooden bench.[10] Military Intelligence (MI), Public Security (PS) and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) started to question me about what I was doing in Bazi, the questions I intended to ask, the answers I was expecting and how was I going to organize my work. I tried to answer their questions as precisely as I could and took the opportunity to request interviews with these agents. I believed the skirmish between the Congolese and the Southern Sudanese a year earlier was a good way to introduce my research topic. Although they never refused to talk to me, they did not answer any of my questions. There was just silence, and blank pages in my notebook. What I thought to be a good topic to win their trust and explain my intentions was in fact an issue related to the power balance between the Southern Sudanese state agents and their Congolese counterparts, and was therefore highly sensitive.

Indeed I was a ripple in the pond but at the same time, many of them thought I was a spy. Such an allegation was ridiculous from my ignorant perspective then but later I understood that being a PhD student just didn't fit in any of the profiles they had in mind for outsiders. The men who were asking questions all seemed young and junior in rank. They were part of the liberation movement and now served in other functions, such as migration, customs, police or taxation. They were performing these tasks often without training except for the military training they had received when they joined the SPLM/A. 'Research' and 'student' were not part of their repertoires, which were dominated by the guerrilla logic on which they had been brought up. In support of their allegation, I was indeed openly requested to 'occasionally send an email with relevant information, numbers of troops, movements, locations, nothing special'.[11] But this understanding was lacking when I started out.[12] I naively thought that if I explained my intentions, the state agents would understand and I would then be able to start doing the things I had planned to do.

There is nothing exceptional about a researcher being asked about his/her work. In this situation however, the answers determined the extent to which I

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10 The empty desk represented the GoSS Criminal Investigation Department (CID). This officer had already stopped me the day before.

11 It goes without saying that I refused this request. Interview with a military attaché in an embassy, September 2009.

12 On my first few trips to Bazi I was accompanied by a research assistant from Yei. There was little need for translation though as most people spoke some English and, more importantly, his presence only made my relations with the state agents more difficult because of the different backgrounds of the state agents and the assistant. I quickly decided to not take him with me on future visits.

would be able to do the fieldwork. These young men were in a position to have me leave the village. All of a sudden I had to step into the reality of Southern Sudanese state performance: I became a subject of my own research. My carefully formulated explanation of intentions, research topic and motivations were listened to with attention, my letters carefully studied. It started to dawn to me that being the PhD student with genuine intentions was not going to be enough to calm their suspicions. But what was most significant in this situation, and similar ones I later experienced, was that I was being subjected to their investigation rather than the other way around.

Two elements contributed to my acceptance in the village and resulted in me feeling more comfortable. One taxation officer understood my ignorance and helped me to at least win some trust among his fellow representatives in the GoSS offices. A year later he told me to that he was also the CID officer at the time, something I had not realized. He explained that he understood that my intentions were genuine and apparently he had some authority over the other agents from the various GoSS offices at the checkpoint, including those involved in security and intelligence. Thanks to his trust, I was tolerated. He later told me also that in both Kaya and Bazi he constantly had to keep explaining to his fellow state agents what I was doing. His trust resulted in some sort of friendly relationship with the others as well, and after the initial interrogation we found a way of getting on with each other. After all, I had also provided them with a ripple in their pond.

The second ingredient that softened relations between me and the state agents was the chess board. Being tolerated did not mean that I really talked to, let alone interviewed them on the issues I was interested in. Playing chess at least provided a platform through which we exchanged ideas on the world around us, politics in Africa and the US, Arab dominance in the South and the ways to fight a war. The chess board became a vital and funny tool that allowed me to sit and chat with men who were also partly conditioning my research in Bazi, Kaya, Yei and Jalé. Chess made me 'one of them' and although irrelevant from an academic perspective, it should be mentioned, I never managed to beat any of them in any of the border villages except for one old Dinka soldier in Bazi.

The above descriptions are mainly from the first village where I did fieldwork. In the other villages too I was confronted with suspicion. Because my experience and network developed over time, I was able to perceive these questions and interrogations from a different angle; my emotional stability was less disturbed over the course of fieldwork. On several occasions when I arrived in an office or a

new place, the agent behind the desk would start by stating that he already knew all about me and that I had nothing to explain. I also heard reports of my presence in Kaya via officers in Juba who were told that 'that white lady who says that she's a student, she's very kind and open, pays US$ 45 for information and likes to eat Ethiopan enjara with lentils'.[13] The report was right on every count except for the US$ 45 and demonstrates not only the effective control of the intelligence services over oddities like myself, but also the constant communication between the centre and the border regions.

By doing fieldwork, the control of state powers could at time be felt demonstratively and sometimes silently. I did not feel threatened anymore towards the end. I developed a way of explaining what I was doing that made it easier for people to understand and yet I stayed conveniently naïve as well, for instance, I once went to visit the superior of the young CID agent who had defended me in Bazi. I thought he wanted me to meet his boss who he respected very much, but only later did I realize that it was probably his boss who had ordered him to bring me in so that he could assess me and my work for himself. Marcus (1998: 122) described the shifting power relations between the researcher and those who are the subject of study. He noted that the field worker may occupy 'a marked subordinate relationship to informants'. I might have found a way of coping with the situation but to what extent did it compromise my integrity as a researcher that I chose to accept their terms and my inevitable alignment?

CRITICAL ADJUSTMENTS

The 'extension into the life of the participant', which is Burawoy's (2009) first step in the extended case method, in this case also involved the extension of the participants in my research. It is only through physical and emotional distance that I came to realize the points explained above. My methodological coping strategy, linked to concerns about personal safety, was supposed to be fundamentally distinct from the analysis I subsequently developed. As in any anthropological study, this necessitates a process of dissociating personal relations from the field and its actors from the critical analyses of the observations of which one is part. What was the impact of my presence on the field I was studying? And to what extent did the field impact on me and subsequently steer my research? Clearly the answer to the first question here is fairly well demonstrated. My presence

13 Conversation with MI officer, Juba, 17 December 2009.

mobilized agents into action. They interrogated and followed me and by doing so I was able to see an aspect of state performance in Southern Sudan that derived from my presence and that would have been difficult to observe had I not been figuring in it.

The second question, the extent to which the field impacted on the research, is more challenging. Obviously the stress I felt while doing fieldwork, by being followed, having my phone tapped and being questioned about my movements had an impact on the choices I made. One example is the use of rumours in my data. I heard countless stories about cases of corruption, family connections between agents at the border and directors in Juba, hotels in Kaya owned by generals in the SPLA, etc. Only a few of these rumours have found their way into this account because I never dared to ask about the truth. I was afraid of putting my position in jeopardy if I was seen as being too critical. Much of what is described above is based on my initial encounters with my research topic and its protagonists. These influenced the ideas I developed but later I realized that my first views deserved to be adjusted and put into perspective. The steep learning curve I encountered in Bazi allowed me to fine-tune the way I did fieldwork in Kaya and Kajo Keji. Spending time with people instead of interviewing them and being a friend rather than a researcher were factors that resonated in building up other relationships. I learned to see suspicion as part of my research rather than as something threatening or as an obstacle to progress.

Encounters beyond Bazi's security agents

What is interesting in this respect is the relationship I developed with the Congolese authorities in Bazi. They formally had sovereign power over one side of the road that bisects the village. The Congolese did not see any threat in answering my questions. Quite the opposite, they seemed happy that somebody was showing an interest in their situation in this remote border region. Unlike the Southern Sudanese security personnel at the border checkpoint, it was easy to befriend and at the same time interview the Congolese and local Southern Sudanese authorities. However the dominant behaviour of the GoSS agents sometimes impacted on the answers of the local authorities who, for instance, lowered their voices or left out details of stories and rumours when talking to me. The deeply rooted distrust and often discordant relations between GoSS state agents and the other two groups were in fact not only a subject of investigation but also an obstacle to research. My good relations with everybody created added suspicion in the eyes of the GoSS security agents. One could wonder why the Southern Sudanese were so keen to

demonstrate only their power over me while the other authorities were more cooperative (de Vries 2011).

The Congolese authorities did in fact have their own ways of demonstrating their power over me. Their motivation was however primarily driven by the potential financial benefit I brought through violation of their law because I was officially on their territory without a visa. They invited me to sit in a bar and talk with a delegation that had especially come to visit Kingezi-Base, as they call it. In the course of a fairly friendly discussion they claimed, after about an hour, that I would have to pay a US$ 500 fine for being on Congolese territory illegally. We were, in fact, negotiating the price of their goodwill and willingness to provide me with a document they were imposing on me. They clearly did not see me as potential threat to Congolese security. They understood that I was doing research and were open to explaining their relationship with their Southern Sudanese counterparts. The difference between the way the Southern Sudanese and the Congolese authorities represented their respective governments is illustrative and indicates the differences in culture of rule and systems of government that were meeting in one little village that straddled the border of two countries.

Observations in Bazi were 'extending over time', but they also extended over space. This was Burawoy's (2009: 46) second step in the extended case method. My first visit to Kaya showed the relative ease of doing research in Kaya, related to the different character of this busy border town compared to the quiet, rather boring situation in Bazi. The activities related to the border procedures in Kaya fitted in the new dynamics characterizing state-building in Southern Sudan since the CPA. State agents had less time to focus on an outsider. When I started interviews in Jalé at another border checkpoint with Uganda, my fieldwork repertoire had developed in such way that I knew how to deal with the inevitable questions and suspicions that my presence generated. I only went there during my second fieldwork period and I felt much more confident in presenting my intentions and myself by that time. Furthermore, I had developed a network of people in the security agencies in Juba and Yei that would be willing and able to help me if necessary. Unlike in Bazi in the beginning, here I was able to interview the deconcentrated state agents that represented the GoSS.

Towards the end of my stay in 2010, I finally had the feeling that I was able to steer my fieldwork in the direction I wanted it to go. This was accentuated by two factors that deserve attention as they marked the final step in my understanding of the Southern Sudanese state agents' behaviour towards me, and

the extent to which I had integrated the Southern Sudanese perspective in my own thinking about my observations. By the time I was due to return home, my fieldwork repertoire was finally operational.

Confronting 'the North'

When I was interrogated by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) in Kajo Keji County, I realized how my discourse had become South Sudan oriented when explaining my research to others.[14] Without necessarily being aware of it, being confronted with suspicion and the subsequent inquiries by security agents in the South had resulted in the expression of my good intentions. This was more than lip service: I had developed a lot of sympathy for the Southern Sudanese, including their state agents and their efforts to perform their duties. This was the discourse I put forward when two young Southern boys working for the local NISS office came to my lodge[15] in the early evening to interrogate me for more than an hour. I explained what I was doing and heard that they had followed me throughout my two visits to Kajo Keji County. I thought my story convinced them of my intentions but they nevertheless ordered me to report to their office the following morning. I was questioned for another hour but this time the major who interviewed me was a Sudanese Arab from the North. He interrogated me in Arabic but my answers were in English so his Southern assistants translated them when necessary. While explaining what I was doing I realized the extent to which I had become used to expressing a Southern perspective. I felt unmasked by this man who in my view embodied the North and thus the regime that had fought against the SPLM/A for decades.

All of a sudden, I was thrown back to the first confrontation I had had with the security agents in Bazi when I did not have a story to present. The difference was that in Bazi my sympathy for the South was to an extent a conscious choice I had made, while here in Kajo Keji, I was being confronted with my internalization of this sympathy. I felt at risk again facing this man from the North who I thought was seeking a different explanation of my intentions than most of his Southern colleagues. Once again the researcher-subject relationship was being turned upside down.

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14 The NISS was one of the services that were still operating under the Government of National Unity, like Customs. In practice, this meant that the two were operating largely separately but officially they were one organization.
15 'Lodge' is the local reference to a small business renting very basic rooms.

The other interesting realization from this interrogation was that at some point he ordered some papers to be brought. His questioning continued based on information they had found on the Internet. They had googled me and had thus read my research presentation and an abstract I had prepared for an academic conference in 2009 that had been written before I had even started fieldwork. It was thoroughly studied and I had to account for my understanding of 'peripheral' since, according to this man, Kaya and Bazi were not peripheral at all. The mere fact that the security forces can hold researchers accountable based on whatever can be traced on the Internet is something that further blurs the lines between researcher, the subject and the research topic. In this particular case, Google helped me out as the interrogation finished with an open-ended remark; 'an intelligence agent can know from somebody's answers whether that person is telling the truth. I wish you good luck with your studies'.[16] I had done a good job apparently and had told the truth. The question is however whether the truth is all that matters in a situation like this. Could my story also have been seen as invalid? The interrogation was another confrontation with the limitations of my capacity to control all aspects of the research that I was carrying out.

The transition from PhD student to researcher

Another confrontation with the situation in which I found myself was when I suddenly saw myself through the eyes of the soldiers in front of me. After a few months in the field I understood that the profound suspicion that prevailed among people was as deeply rooted as my own profound confidence in the good intentions of the other. Both formed an opposite but equally valid logic behind the social interaction. Taking two opposite points of departure did not necessarily mean an obstacle to meeting at some point in the middle, at some sort of mutual understanding and acceptance. Once I realized that people's distrustful looks were not directed at me as a person, my interaction with the people around me felt more balanced. I accepted their suspicions of me as a given rather than trying to convince others how unnecessary their distrust was. It turned out to be a much more effective strategy.

The final step on this journey was when I heard myself explaining who I was to a group of SPLA soldiers in January 2010. I had learned to deal with people being suspicious of me and therefore I found it very convenient that I could

16 Interrogation, NISS office in Wudu, Kajo Kejo, 5 February 2009.

introduce myself with as low a profile as possible: I was 'just a student'. Even with the 'PhD' part of the student I was cautious, although I would often add it in the second sentence. Many in Southern Sudan know what a PhD was as some of the most prominent leaders have a PhD and are commonly referred to as 'Dr John' or 'Dr Riek'. This did not imply, however, that people understood what I was researching or the fact that I, at my age, was still a student. In fact I did not want to adopt a higher profile than (PhD) student as it only fed any existing suspicions about me.

After almost a year in Southern Sudan I finally understood why people, especially the security forces, saw me as a potential threat. People had few alternative pictures in mind for a khawadja (white person) than an NGO or UN aid worker being driven around in a four-wheel drive. On top of that, I claimed to be a student even though I had made it all the way to Southern Sudan and clearly had the means to buy a motorbike too. All of a sudden it dawned on me how ridiculous it must have sounded to people when I told them I was a student.

In January 2010 I made the transition from 'PhD student' to 'researcher', upgrading my own profile. It was during the CPA celebrations in Yambio that some SPLA soldiers came over to my table and asked if I was a journalist. After all I was writing notes in a hotel where senior SPLA officers were also staying. When I replied that I was a PhD student, I realized how absurd I must sound: being in that particular place at that time was inconsistent with the way I kept presenting myself. If I had been in the soldiers' position, I would not have believed my story either! It was a moment that, in retrospect, allowed me to better understand the way I was being approached. What I had thought was sensible and unobtrusive, namely adopting and keeping a low profile, had instead had the opposite effect.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper explained the ways in which I organized my fieldwork and how certain characteristics of the Southern Sudanese state-building process resonate in interactions with an outsider like me. I reflected on the crucial balance of combining three tasks: first, the logistical organization of the fieldwork process; second, making risk assessments and understanding security concerns; and third, collecting data, which, after all, is supposedly the key task of a researcher. The paper showed different levels of reflexivity, illustrating how one the one hand I felt conditioned in my research by the people I tried to investigate, while on the other hand, this allowed me exclusive insight in the functioning of the state in South Sudan.

My interest in the everyday practice of state-building implied that I had to build relationships with state agents that imposed dominant claims to power and authority in the localities where they were operating. As became clear the border provided an excellent site to study this process but I had underestimated the suspicion it would raise. My presence had an impact on their performance as they started to assess, follow and interrogate me, which is the first level of reflexivity. And my coping mechanism for dealing with suspicions about me and the intimidating ways in which I was occasionally approached impacted on the questions on the process of state-building in Southern Sudan that I asked others – and myself.

My anxiety started to condition the questions I asked, which is where double reflexivity comes in. What was the impact of the field of study on the researcher and therefore on the research and the data collected? The fact that I was being confronted with the suspicion of others also fascinated me. I wanted to understand where it came from and I began to find other ways of getting in touch with the GoSS, predominantly former SPLA, state agents. Methodologically, I moved towards making observations rather than interviewing people. I started to play chess and spend time with the individuals I felt nervous being with in attempt to understand them. My association with them embodied a paradox: I had decided that these agents were the ones that deserved to be at the centre of my analysis because of their role in the state-building process but part of this was motivated in my anxiety not to have them feel antagonistic towards me.

This reflection needs to be taken one step further. Was it maybe the other way around and were the state agents in power determining the limits of what I was able to research? Occasionally yes, as for instance when I was not allowed to start interviewing without permission. And in more subtle ways too, this might have been the case but more importantly, they were just telling me what they would allow me to know. Also, on occasion, this relationship was almost reversed; when they were interrogating me, I was being subjected to their investigation.

The type of state performance I encountered in at the border in Bazi was illustrative of elements in the everyday performance of statehood found in various localities. Part of my initial ignorance allowed me to observe the prevalence of a certain logic in behaviour, the degree of suspicion towards me, the territorial dimensions to this and the changes seen over time. As a consequence, the fieldwork conditions and my encounters with the authorities partly determined the direction of my research. The idea that the researcher masters his/her field of study as this

way they control the parameters of data collection is always debatable, but in the case of studying the everyday practice of state-building in Southern Sudan this was often an illusion. Although people opened up when I had managed to gain their trust, how valid were their answers? Were my observations conditioned by my stress? It did not compromise the validity of my interpretations. But trying to contextualize my findings and observations does, I believe, do justice to the transformations taking place in Southern Sudan's state-building effort and the individuals navigating this process, including my own navigation. The paper presented a discovery of everyday practices of power and authority in which the researcher played the role of observer, participant and subject.

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Clara Devlieger

clara.devlieger@gmail.com; cmjd3@cam.ac.uk

Cambridge University; affiliation with Université de Kinshasa (UNIKIN)

"Assainissement" on the Kinshasa-Brazzaville Border

Abstract

Written at a very early stage of research, this paper is a beginning in conceptualising the social construction of an African border area through bodily experiences. Much of the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, Congo-Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (RC, Congo-Brazzaville) is formed by the mighty Congo River. The river forms at once a rural and an urban boundary, notably between the capitals Kinshasa and Brazzaville. All along the border and at various times in history, it has been subject to various "assainissement", "cleansing" campaigns. Between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, the river's islands served as refuges for those who wished to stay out of sight of the state, and were often subject to state raids with the objective of "purging". Along the entire border, international sanitary conventions were supposed to "cleanse" the border and the state of contagious illnesses. "Cleansing" the urban border in Kinshasa of Ngobila Beach (Beach Ngobila, or the Beach), has been attempted many times in the past, mainly in the form of attempts to eradicate corruption and smuggling, and more subtly, the presence of those associated with it. Indeed, part of the Beach's negative image is due to the people associated with the area. One group often subject to "cleansing" are the disabled traders who have created a niche in border trade thanks to reductions in passage and import fees received in the 1970s. For them, the Beach has been described as a "court of miracles", considered as a rare place where such socially marginalised figures are able to thrive, although attempts are often made to eradicate their niche.

In this way, whatever the situation or time at the DRC-RC river boundary, the border is variously depicted and presented as "state-less", "chaotic", "orderless" or "wild". Beach Ngobila, which forms the main crossing point over the Congo River to Brazzaville, is located in the city centre and yet is constantly portrayed as separate from and peripheral to the rest of the city. The

state's preoccupation with "assainissement" on the border thus appears to show a body politics on the border, influencing the bodily experience of crossing and living on the border. In this regard, this paper draws attention to a vital characteristic of (African) border areas that has been undertheorised and is in need of further research: the border as a site that affects bodily experience, an element that influences the social construction and imagination associated with a border area.

In this paper, I use archive documents, newspaper articles, documentaries, and preliminary fieldwork with the disabled traders operating at the Beach as a basis on which to begin considering the social construction of a border zone located in a city centre and the experience of bodily borders. I start by considering the fluctuating historical relations between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, before considering three examples of "assainissement" on the border, and the implications of these examples for the understanding of bodily borders.

"Assainissement" on the Kinshasa-Brazzaville Border

Clara Devlieger, Aborne 2013

- This is a draft, please don't cite or circulate -

Flowing between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, Congo-Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (RC, Congo-Brazzaville), the Congo River forms much of the boundary between this Central African giant and its little brother. In colonial and post- colonial times, the river has formed an urban and a rural physical and political boundary. Whatever the time or place however, the border has often been subject to "assainissement", "cleansing" campaigns. In the following, we consider three examples of "assainissement" on the border, considering the implications of these campaigns for the social construction of the border as a "state-less" or "wild" place. In this way, these observations open to questions on the body politics of the state and bodily experiences of subjects on the border. Written at a very early stage of research, this paper is based on archive documentation and very preliminary fieldwork at Beach Ngobila. I intend to explore many of these themes throughout my fieldwork, in this paper I'll give a summary of preliminary observations in need of further research. First however, we must consider some of the background of this border.

The Kinshasa-Brazzaville Border

The Congo River forms much of the boundary of two countries with a long history of intense and fluctuating relationships. Often referred to as the Central African "highway", the river has been an indispensable resource for river populations since precolonial times; contacts, migration and trade between both shores have always been intense. In both countries, French is the official administrative language, while Lingala forms the lingua franca of Kinshasa and the major trade language along both banks of the Congo River and alongside Lari in Brazzaville.

"Villes mirroirs" with close ties, Kinshasa and Brazzaville form the closest capitals in the world, agreeing on a mutual status of "sisterhood" in the 1980s (Clausmeyer and van der Jeught

2006; Gondola 1997). Kinshasa, the third largest city on the African continent, is a megalopolis of about 8.4 million inhabitants known as *Kinois*, while Brazzaville forms a fraction of its size with around 1.3 million (CIA 2012). Contact between the cities across the border has been intense, forming a local and international centre of a vibrant informal economy.

As a boundary in rural and urban areas, the Congo forms a very diverse border. In terms of rural borders, the wavering and constantly changing fow of the Congo, perhaps surprisingly, can be similar to land border zones in rural, thinly populated areas, where the boundary is a line clearly represented on the map but difficult to discern in reality. Like other rural boundaries, these river boundaries are reputed to be policed lightly due to "the weakness of central authority, their considerable length, the inaccessibility of the terrain and the reality of official corruption" (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996: 11).

Where the river forms a border between cities of millions, however, these qualifications are altered: urban border areas such as Ngobila Beach, the main crossing point and the international border zone in Kinshasa, are heavily policed and heavily populated; the Congo River, a twenty-minute journey across, forms a clear physical boundary. Commerce and contact between the two cities is vital for the functioning of both. As such, the Beach is the site of busy traffic, where the ONATRA, *Office Nationale de Transport* on the Kinshasa side, and its sister organisation the ATC, *Agence de Transport Congolaise*, ensure transport between the cities. Located in the city centre, this border also forms at once a central and peripheral space.

Both rural and urban borders however appear to be similar to African border zones described in academic literature where official corruption and informal practices take place on both sides, and where the border cuts through a culturally homogenous space. Further, for many people in different positions, the border functions as a "theatre of opportunity" and an interstitial conduit rather than a barrier (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996: 11).

The diverse border and the government's attempt at managing it is directly related to diplomatic relationships, often directly impacting border populations living on both banks of the river, as well as the their respective capitals. The Congo as boundary was treated and managed differently depending on the political situation. In colonial times, relationships between the Belgian and French administration were convivial. After the independences in the 1960s, however, the states lost much of their political understanding (Gondola 1997: 373). Internal political stability and diplomatic relationships between the countries had a direct influence on

border traffic.

"Assainissement" of the Border

As the historian Didier Gondola writes, "[...] for the Congolese at the *Pool*, colonial boundaries were strategic spaces of liberty and action."[1] Whether speaking about the river boundary in rural or urban areas, the border between the Congos has always been depicted as a "wild" place, and as such, a place of possibility. In the following, we will consider three different border areas. While they are very different, they have one characteristic in common: the government's wish to "cleanse" them, in both rural and urban areas, in both colonial and post-colonial times. In their work on the literal and fgurative "margins" of the state, Veena Das and Deborah Poole note that "In this vision of political life [where the state has a monopoly over "legitimate" violence], the state is imagined as an always incomplete project that must constantly be spoken of - and imagined - through an invocation of wilderness, lawlessness, and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also threatens it from within" (Das and Poole 2004: 7). As the literal outskirts of the body of the state, the conception of "assainissement," "cleansing", has been used in various ways throughout the history of the Kinshasa-Brazzaville border, adding to the perception and invocation of the border as "wild", whether it is rural or urban.

We start with two colonial and rural examples, after which we focus on a contemporary and urban situation, which will form the subject of my doctorate. The examples offer preliminary glimpses into the social construction of the border zone and the manner in which past examples alter experiences and perceptions of the border at present. In each example, the term "assainissement" refers to the necessity for "cleansing" in terms of purging the border of criminals, smugglers, and/or people who have a contagious illness. A term consistently and repeatedly employed in state communications across the decades, the theme of "assainissement" as a rhetorical depiction of state power, its limits and its desired aims across a wide range of situations emerges as a surprisingly dominant means by which the two states did and do approach their most intimate frontier.

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1 "En défnitive, les frontières coloniales ont constitué pour les Congolais du *Pool* des espaces stratégiques de liberté et d'action." My translation. (Gondola 1997: 418). The *Pool* refers to Malebo Pool, where Kinshasa and Brazzaville are situated.

The Islands

During colonial times, the Belgian and French governments were on excellent terms. So much so, that they agreed to a situation of "modus vivendi" on certain islands that lay in the river between their colonies. In other words, certain islands between the French and Belgian colony were without sovereignty and administrative control, a unique case in colonial and world history (Gondola 1997). Villagers, mostly fishermen, permanently living on the islands were neither French nor Belgian subjects and as such paid no tax, the French and Belgian border police policed the islands on their side of the border. The most well known example of this case is the large Ile M'Bamou, currently part of Congo- Brazzaville.

While this may seem idyllic, the situation created problems for both administrations. The unclear delimitation between the colonies created continual incidents between seasonal fishermen supposedly fshing where they were not allowed to do so. Hostility in this case was common, and provided an administrative headache for colonial officials on both sides of the border who had to sort out and mediate in conflicts, for example when there was theft between fishermen.

Hostile fishermen, however, were the least of the administrators' worries. The literal "no-man's land" of the islands also attracted all sorts of people engaging in activities outside the law, such arms and spirits smugglers, thieves, marijuana farmers, and informal traders trading between both banks. The islands formed an easy refuge and escape for many of society's outcasts for several reasons, and became known as such.

Because of their stateless status, it was administratively difficult for the French and Belgian border police to patrol the islands: raids had to be carried out in collaboration with the police of the other colony, and while the colonies were on excellent terms, organising a partnered raid could take weeks and even months. Police on both sides were unable to collaborate directly, communication went via the "Gouverneur Générale" of both colonies, who often needed to contact their "Ministre des Colonies" in the home country. Post between Kinshasa and Brazzaville was reasonably quick, with Europe however time was much more lengthy. While French and Belgian authorities tried to get organised, life and activities on the islands continued.

Apart from administrative hassle however, practically carrying out raids also proved to be challenging. Once a date had been found and approval from all sides had been given, the French and Belgian police decided to carry out their raids very early in the morning. In reports on the

raids, policemen had many complaints about difficulties: the sand banks made it very difficult for them to land on the islands, and the natives heard the motors of the police boats, alerting them to take their pirogues and make their getaway without problem. Alerted well in time of the arrival of the police, the police arrived on nearly deserted islands, and were able to arrest very few indigenous people without documentation, most of whom were innocent fishermen. The criminals they were after abandoned their loot and were long gone by the time the police arrived.

Frustrated with the situation, in 1924, the Belgian administration proposed to the French to further delimit their mutual border. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, replied that they did not think it was a good time to go into a further delimitation of their border. The writer, representing the French government, remarked that border incidents had never changed their good relationship and that it didn't seem likely that a stronger delimitation of the border would put a stop to the "quarrels" between indigenous people on either bank. In addition, he pointed out that attributing certain islands to one or the other colony would have no influence on the relationship that the indigenous people in both colonies had always had with each other, adding that delimiting the border was further pointless because the Congo riverbed is never fixed, the islands they would want to attribute to one or the other country constantly appear and disappear.[2]

Because of this situation, the islands became known as "state-less" and "lawless" areas, a place where those in contest with the state could find refuge, and places in need of regular "assainissement" in the form of police raids.

International Sanitary Conventions

To take a different perspective, another case of "assainissement" on the Kinshasa- Brazzaville border in colonial times is of a different nature: managing the border also included monitoring and controlling health. A border post was often close to a medical dispensary or hospital, and the Belgian Congo had sanitary conventions with neighbouring countries. In the case of the convention between the Belgian and French colony, the earliest dates from 18 October 1930. The colonies agreed to coordinate their activities on control of spreading of contagious diseases and epidemics in several ways. Among others, they agreed to each man a string of medical

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2 Archives Africaines Bruxelles (AAB), AE II 2962, Herrot to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1924. Fontières fuviales entre le Congo Belge et l'A.E.F.

border posts, issue and require a medical passport from every indigenous person wishing to cross the border, send each other yearly reports with statistics and maps indicating medical posts and the percentage of diseases such as sleeping sickness, coordinate vaccination campaigns, and forbid anyone with certain infections of entering the other colony. The convention was signed in Paris and told to be put in place promptly.

In conceiving the convention however, French and Belgian medical authorities in the colonies already considered it to be unrealistic: Belgian medical authorities thought it was not possible to issue every indigenous person with a sanitary passport to keep them all under sanitary control, the French thought it would be impossible to organise a string of medical facilities on the border. As a result, the convention was not worded in absolute terms, the writers of the convention agreed to apply it in the measure that personnel and materials would permit.

These issues immediately caused problems when the convention was to be put in place. The French considered the convention impossible to apply, if only for the cost involved in examining and issuing every native with a medical passport. Writing the minister of Colonies on the 18th of November 1932, Gouverneur Générale of the Belgian Congo Tilkens expressed his annoyance at the fact that his administration had put much time and effort to write reports for the French, but that they had not received anything in return, they had no idea what the situation was across the border. He continued, complaining about the impossible situation and measures agreed on:

It is a fact that keeping a colonial border and blocking all irregular passage of indigenous people is a utopia. And we can ask ourselves if the measure of sending back indigenous people without a passport who voluntarily present themselves at our posts won't be more prejudicial than to accept them in treatment, because this will push the irregulars to systematically avoid medical posts. [...] A program of strict surveillance of borders can only be applied little by little, and, I think, without announcing inapplicable measures. It is better to leave the execution of measures to the appreciation of local personnel who know the possibilities at their disposal. It is as such that blocking passengers of the steam boats crossing the Pool will only augment clandestine passage in pirouges. [...] In sum, I think, Monsieur the Minister, that we cannot have much faith in international arrangements, nor in the assurance of their execution. [3]

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3 "Il est de fait que garder une frontière coloniale et y empêcher tout passage irrégulier d'indigène est plutôt une utopie. Et on peut se demander si la mesure du refoulement des indigènes non munis de passeport que se présentent volontairement à nos postes ne sera pas plus préjudiciable que de les accepter en traitement éventuel, car cela poussera tous les irréguliers à éviter systématiquement les postes médicaux. [...] Un programme de surveillance stricte des frontières ne peut s'appliquer que petit à petit, et, je pense, sans énoncer des règlements inapplicables. Il vaut mieux laisser l'exécution des mesures à l'appréciation du personnel local qui connaît les moyens dont il dispose. C'est ainsi que le refoulement des passagers des vapeurs traversant le Pool n'amènerait qu'une augmentation du passage clandestin en pirogues. [...] En résumé, j'estime Monsieur le Ministre, qu'on ne peut avoir une grande confance dans les arrangement internationaux, ni l'assurance de leur exécution." My translation. (AAB H A11, Tilkens to Minister of Colonies, 1932. Conventions sanitaires entre le Congo Belge et les pays limitrophes.)

Writing about the situation on the 21st of March, the Minster agreed with Tilkens, adding that the "settlement isn't nothing. What counts, is the execution of the settlement. In prescribing inapplicable laws, power finishes by persuading the public that they don't have to be applied."[4]

As Tilkens expressed, medical border officials had very little control over the large number of border crossers per day. Colonial administrators tried to "sanitize" their border in collaboration with the other colony, but often communication on the ground between authorities was lacking: in several sanitary reports, administrators deplored that doctors on both sides of the border had not been in contact, which was a problem for the coordination of their activities. As one border report noted, the colonial delimitation had given no consideration to local boundaries and ethnic groups. Indeed, for the indigenous people, the river boundary was, and still is, a centre for trade and a mode of transportation; in contrast to the colonial authorities, the populations on both sides were very mobile and had much contact across the river. While the colonial subjects were rather borderless, colonial authorities were more bound to their own territory.

While a river border may seem like a clear demarcation and boundary, it was thus at least as difficult to police as a land border, the "cordon sanitaire" officials tried to install and their their attempts at "assainissement" had mixed success. In border reports on the medical situation, people declared ill often had the word "enfuis", "fed", written next to their name. When medical checks were planned, entire villages crossed the river until medical surveillance had passed. The border medics responsible, as well as the border police mentioned above, were powerless to pursue indigenous people on foreign territory.

On the other hand however, over time the border came to be a resource for people in need of medical care and came to function as a form of social control. After several years, medical officials started writing that natives voluntarily submitted themselves to medical exams. Currently, locals in the Bas-Congo region and in Kinshasa still view the border and Congo-Brazzaville as a resource for medical treatment. During colonial times, the flow of medically-related temporary border crossings went mainly from Congo- Brazzaville to Congo-Kinshasa, currently this flow is more often in the other direction.

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4 "J'ajouterai encore que le règlement n'est rein. Ce qui compte, c'est l'exécution du règlement. A édicter des lois inapplicables, le pouvoir finit par persuader le public qu'elles ne doivent être appliquées." My translation. (AAB H A11, Minister of Colonies to Tilkens, 1932. Conventions sanitaires entre le Congo Belge et les pays limitrophes.)

In their work on Kinshasa, De Boeck and Plissart note that in the colonial system, those the modern nation state considered "deviants" were "othered", and medical intervention became a from of *moral* sanitation in the ideology of religion and the nation state (2004: 24). "As a result, many of the techniques of state control did not hesitate to penetrate deeply into the lives and daily sociocultural locales of citizens. Very often, these techniques centered on the body, and aimed at imposing new norms of hygiene [...}" (2004: 24, 26). Medicine was a form of social control and a "joint venture between the cure and the cross [...] [focussing] on issues such as disease control and, especially in the early mission medicine but also afterwards, on the regulation of the colonial subjects' unruly minds and bodies"; medical border posts, often manned by religious workers, were no exception. In the Minister's quote above, he also underlined the importance of making power credible in people's minds, which also applies to sanitary conventions and interventions. Part of controlling the border and "cleansing" it, thus also included a "body politics", literally managing people's bodies but simultaneously cleansing their minds and orienting them towards the ideology of the nation state.

During colonial times, the rural river border was a strategic place because colonisation was entirely focused on economic purposes. As such, colonial exploitation was concentrated around economically fruitful places, so that much of the river that colonisers used as political boundary benefitted from relatively lax attention (Gondola 1997: 418). As Gondola writes: "Apart from the porosity of borders that these two countries share with others, let us underline the fact that the large part of these waters and islands of the border stayed under the same colonial status quo: without sovereignty, without occupation and without de facto control, but theoretically claimed by the two shores."[5]

In addition, given the immense alimentary resources that the river offered for local populations, Europeans were relatively tolerant of traffic, even illicit traffic, so much so that that the zone never had a clear delimitation. As Gondola notes, during the colonial period, the Ile M'bamou was the site of intense traffic, a zone exempt of tax, visited by fishermen, traders and all those who had good reasons not to be seen in Brazzaville or Léopoldville.[6]

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5 "En dehors de la porosité des frontières que ces deux pays partagent avec tant d'autres, soulignons le fait que la grande partie des eaux et des îles de la frontière demeurait sous le même status quo colonial: sans souveraineté, sans occupation et sans contrôle de facto, mais revendiquée en théorie par les deux rives." (Gondola 1997: 402). My translation.

6 "La grande île M'bamou, pourtant française, constitua pendant toute la période coloniale une zone de trafc intense, une sorte de zone franche, où se côtoyaient les pêcheurs, les trafquants et tous ceux qui avaient des bonnes raisons

In this sense, Independences was a true rupture with the past: boundaries came to serve political purposes in addition to economic ones. Post-colonial relationships started well, but fuctuated. The border played an important role in this situation. Until reconciliation in 1970, several incidents happened on the different islands of the *Pool*, both governments blaming the other for army incursions, while both governments continued to avoid military conflict. The media was employed to discredit the other rather than use of military force, but control increased and trade and migratory fows became more restricted. As a result, an entire informal and illicit sector of transportation was created between Brazzaville and Kinshasa. While the space cannot be spared to explore these developments in detail, focussing on one particular section of the border permits the apprehension of the consistent recreation of the theme of "assainissement" on the border, up to its most prominent incarnations today.

Beach Ngobila & the Disabled Niche

While rural borders were thinly manned by governmental officials, the perception of the border as difficult to keep under control and in need of "assainissement" persists in current urban borders where authorities abound.

Beach Ngobila, the main crossing point over the Congo River between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, is located in the city centre and has always been the site of busy traffic. Steeped in history, the border zone has a special place in cultural memory, carrying reminiscences of traditional authority, European explorations and post-colonial events. As a major border site, the Beach is often the frst point of contact that foreigners have with the DRC. As one sees the *bac*, the ferry, coming closer from Brazzaville, people start to appear from all sides: among others, *shégués*, street children, looking for a way to climb aboard without paying, police officers trying to stop them and gain something from it in the process, foreign travellers and officials, and very visibly, hundreds of physically disabled traders lining up in preparation to board. In a matter of the half hour that the bac arrives and leaves, hundreds of people pass through. Commerce and contacts along the river and between the cities especially has always been intense; when a shortage of a product appears in one city, traders take advantage of the situation to import the product from the other city. While the urban border is well policed, it has also often been the site of reciprocal exoduses when there is a crisis in one or the other country.

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de ne pas se faire voir à Brazzaville où à Léopoldville" (Gondola 1997: 418–419). My translation.

Despite its central position, the Beach has always been portrayed as separate from and peripheral to the rest of the city. Throughout its existence, it has variously been described as "chaotic", "anarchic", a "place where there is no room for the middle-of-the- road, only for extremes", that "assault's one's senses" or even as a "cannibalistic space" which "swallows everyone" and "spits people out" yet as "a place of warm welcome and homecoming for some" and "a place of promise, the exit from a city they always dreamt of leaving behind" for others (De Boeck and Plissart 2004: 14).

In this spirit, the busy site has been subjected to innumerable "assainissement" campaigns throughout its existence. Creating "order" at this border site has ranged from pleas for a clear separation of races in colonial times to attempts to eradicate corruption and smuggling in modern times, while controlling the spread of disease remains a perennial issue.

In the 1920s, journalists and officials deplored the disorder of the Beach: the port was considered to be neglected, the landing–stage of the customs especially deemed to be in a deplorable state, where European ladies had to clamber on and off ships in an area that also accommodated natives. The indigenous people everywhere and the dilapidated state of the port made it to be described as "messy" and in desperate need of "cleansing". One journalist described the disorder during a stately visit of the Minster of Colonies:

Since the morning, a team of 47 men has been working under the supervision of a European at the beach. A ridiculous and unnecessary task that is done to these people. Nevertheless, the spectacle was still original. Look what they're doing: on the detritus of all kinds which have since long bloomed along the slopes of the "quay" of Kin, the natives, indolently, cut the corner of the pier and in descending, throw reddish humid clay down. This brigade gives the last brush stroke to the official camouflage: it's the "last strike" of our lazy and irresponsible Administration.[7]

In the 1950s, a European journalist describes travelling from the Beach as "tumultuous" and "picturesque", with a continually growing crowd of border-crossers, both native and European, wishing to proft from goods and services in the sister city, as well as the devaluating French

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[7] "Depuis le matin, une équipe de 47 hommes, sous la surveillance d'un Européen, travaille au beach. Besogne ridicule et inutile que l'on fait faire à ces gens.
     Mais le spectacle était malgré tout original.
     Voyez-les faire: sur les détritus de toutes sortes qui feurissent depuis longtemps les talus du "quai" de Kin, les indigènes, indolemment, rognent le haut de la jetée et jettent, en descendant, l'argile humide et rougeâtre.
     Cette brigade donne le dernier coup de pinceau au camoufage offciel: c'est le "coup de la dernière heure" de notre Administration indolente et irresponsable.
     Pourquoi ce bluff téméraire, cette poudre aux yeux qui veux aveugler notre Ministre des Colonies et empêcher ainsi de voir ce qu'il nous est donné à tous de voir tous les jours" (Anon 1920). My translation.

franc. (Anon 1950).

In the year 2000, a local journalist complained about hassle, corruption, and mafa- like practices at the Beach. In this case, two organised groups were working under the eyes of the ONATRA. The task of one group would be to create havoc at the ticket- window to give the impression that there was a very high demand for tickets, while other group would speak to waiting passengers, proposing to them that they would go to buy their tickets for them, at a price (Nitumfuidi 2000).

In deploring these situations and others, journalists over time often refer to morality and the need to purge the Beach of such practices, and here especially the government has often tried to put in place diverse "clean-up" campaigns.

The latest official attempt at "assainissement" and the creation of "order" at the Beach was in 2012, as part of a "clean-up" campaign in preparation for the international conference of francophone states, the Francophonie. "Cleaning up" the site was part of a city-wide campaign during which, among others measures, informal vendors were forbidden to sell along the large arteries of the city, the government attempted to ban the sale of plastic bags of water, informal settlements were broken down, and the border sites, as the frst point of contact foreigners have with DRC, were targeted as a prime locality in need of "cleansing". In the entire city, government advertising proclaimed to need to re- turn "Kin-la-poubelle" into the "Kin-la-belle" it was before Independence.[8] At the Beach, the campaign was also geared toward literal cleansing: as throughout the city, traders were accused of being unhygienic and disorderly. At the same time however, the campaign at the Beach was more, and sometimes less, subtly oriented towards eradicating corruption and smuggling and those associated with these activities.

One such group, among others, are the disabled traders who are active in trade between the capitals. Most of the disabled engaging in border trade are paraplegic because of sicknesses such as poliomyelitis, however there are also others who are deaf-dumb or blind. They have been able to create and sustain a trade niche here thanks to a law implemented in the 1970s under president Mobutu's failing state, which exempted the disabled from customs tax on imported goods and gave them the beneft of passing boundaries in DRC with passage fees discounts. Since then, many have turned their wheelchairs into tricycles that can transport goods between

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8 "Kinshasa the garbage dump", "Kinshasa the beautiful".

the capitals. Their bags are rarely searched, and it is only after all the disabled have boarded the *bac* that non-handicapped are allowed to board.

Over the years, the disabled have taken advantage of this privileged position, most often working for international merchants as *passeurs*, individuals who "pass" goods on, to transport products that are rare, preferred or prohibited in one city or the other; smuggling across this border has been marked since the early years of independence (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000: 97).[9] Their position has been strengthened by several circumstances, including the 1990s economic crisis which increased the demand and import of goods, increased reliance on river transport in the face of deteriorating road infrastructure (Tollens 2004), ever fluctuating currency and product values between currencies in both countries, and a ban on cheap Asian imitation textile in DRC, a measure taken in July 2002 by the Kinshasa government in order to protect local industry (Ayimpam 2010: 182). Since then, international merchants use disabled traders to smuggle textiles from Brazzaville to Kinshasa more than before.

Justified as attempts to curb corruption, the latest "assainissement" campaign at the Beach is one of many attempts to eradicate the rights of the disabled and extinguish their niche. In this case, the government attempted to raise boarding prices for disabled as well as the "helpers" or "guides" of disabled traders, force disabled to severely limit the number of "helpers" with them, and board at a different site than their usual site. The high tensions paralysed the Beach for several days, after which authorities agreed to reinstate original boarding prices for disabled, although keeping a raised price for their helpers. Due to their physical capacities, access to the other site was not practical.

From one day to the next, their work can be declared legal or illegal. As in the previous examples, for these traders, the border forms a resource and a refuge from a society that is not always accepting. In Kinshasa, disabled children are often neglected, not sent to school, and at worst, expelled from their family. Disability is often associated with witchcraft and diseases; at the Beach, their bags are often not searched because many officials, afraid of becoming bewitched or infected, are afraid of coming across la cicatrice, the original scar that created the disability (Wrong 2002: 152). Fear of disability is deeply embedded in the DRC's cultural memory; physical handicap is associated with the horrors of King Leopold II's regime, when

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9 Traffic here has been so intense that one area of Brazzaville, Kingabwa, is even known as 'Hong Kong' (Gondola 1997: 401).

colonial administrators cut off hands when indigenous people did not collect enough rubber (Nieme 2011; Roes 2010).Disabled thus often form a marginalised group subject to prejudice and stigma (cf. e.g. Cappelaere 2011; Wrong 2002); finding much difficulty to find work, many resort to begging. While local and international organisations help to readapt disabled to public life, intolerance and discrimination towards people with a disability can often be prominent; for example, the presence of mentally disabled who carry out "indecent" or "immoral" acts, such as undressing in public or eating off the street, has been described by local journalists as "polluting" (Anon 2000). As de Boeck and Plissart describe for the colonial era in Kinshasa, persons who deviate from the norm are often "othered" (De Boeck and Plissart 2004).

During a group interview with the "Unions des Personnes avec Handicap pour les Actions du Développement" (UPHAD), a representative urged that "We are here at the Beach and we work as passeurs because we refuse to beg and we wish to be independent." Members expressed that they wished to be taken seriously as an organisation and to be considered as legitimate, expressing that even at the Beach, where they are successful, they are often considered to be unlawful fgures. At the Beach, there is much lack of control of their merchandise due to unwillingness and sometimes even fear. Disabled involved in trade are often associated with smuggling. As journalists sometimes observe however, they can make for unconvincing victims (cf. e.g. Wrong 2001, 2002). In past instances when the state tried to curb the disabled niche and diminish smuggling, the disabled have always ended in winning their cause.

In this example, we thus see how a border located in the centre of the city is portrayed as peripheral. The border becomes a place that accommodates deviants , while the state continually tries to "clean them up".

Bodily Borders: a Subject in Need of Further Research

Bringing to mind Mary Douglas's (1966) classic text, the state's preoccupation with cleanliness and "cleaning up" on the border is interesting; the will for order extends itself to the edges of the state. As such, the term "assainissement" returns in different contexts throughout history and forms a central concept to the state's conception of rule, the preoccupation with cleanliness and orderliness is a preoccupation in the entire territory. On the border, however, we see a heightened version of this, especially with respect to the placement of society's deviants.

Likewise with Kopytoff's theory as well (1987), along the Kinshasa-Brazzaville border deviants and others have used the border as a resource and a refuge from the state. In various situations, the border is a resource for marginalised groups such as smugglers, criminals, (informal) traders, people with an illness, or people with a disability.

The issue of trying to create a "cordon sanitaire" or other attempts at "cleansing" the border have been raised in literature on epidemics and state formation (e.g. Gerard 1996; Lyons 1996; Scott 1996), linking the preoccupation with "assainissement" to body politics. As Das and Poole note, "sovereign power exercised by the state is not only about territories, it is also about bodies" (2004: 10) and control is often tied to management of contagion and regulating health. As this paper has demonstrated, controlling a border also means control of bodies, movement, and certain people. In this sense, a privileged site of biopower is "the growing power of medicine to defne the "normal"" (2004: 10), a subject in conjunction with the management of the border that needs further research. From the perspective of the colonies,

both public debates on these issues and the scientific rationales given for them constructed the inhabitants of the colonies as credulous, unhygienic, irrational, and in need of discipline. It was Foucault's great achievement to show not only that biopower was about pathologization of populations but also that what was applicable to margins could become generalized and normalized for whole populations (Das and Poole 2004: 27).

Such biopower emerges as the premise of state discourses surrounding the border between Kinshasa and Brazzaville throughout its history. Through the metaphor of "assainissement", the state claim to power and authority on the frontier is consistently expressed in terms of controlling bodies, even when applied to the control of trade, smuggling, and many other causes of movement between territories.

In this regard, a vital characteristic of (African) border areas that has been undertheorised is the body politics of the border making the site one that also affects bodily experience. "Cleansing" emphasises the bodily experience of crossing borders. Emerging work from the historian Jan-Bart Gewald (2010) posits that weak colonial states were frst given 'reality' for much of the African population by the physical control, the bodily inspections and manipulations exerted on the border. Donnan and Wilson (1999: 131) provided a description of the border in light of humanity and body politics: "border checkpoints and customs posts are liminal spaces, ones within which the usual western conventions of bodily contact cease to apply." Indeed, body checks in the name of security are often felt to be disrespectful and

dehumanising; the proposal of new machines showing an outline of the body have been controversial.

In this light, Donnan and Wilson also describe the "'animalizing' of the human body" where certain border crossers are compared to certain types of animal. Many of these fgures, like the "coyote who leads prospective migrants across the Rio Grande" on the Mexico-US border, have an ambiguous trickster-like position (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 134-135; cf. also De Boeck 2000). Similarly, when boarding the bac, traders can be seen to physically fight for a place on the ferry, going further than the ordinary conventions of bodily contact in Kinshasa, while policemen use a *chicote,* whip, to control the traffic, exceeding the ordinary conventions of bodily contact in Kinshasa. Yet, rather than animals, those involved in border affairs at Ngobila are denoted heroically and ironically as "Romains", the disabled as the "Rois du commerce" who dominate trade. The aggressive behaviour at the Beach is something that often creates surprise, especially for Westerners. The disabled traders in Kinshasa experience such dynamics in concert with the particular specificity of their disability on active display; subject to many stigmas that associate them with animality in a dehumanising way, they equally take advantage and gain ambiguous beneft from this crucial, bodily liminality of the border area. Interestingly, at this border and in the case of the disabled, the bodily aspect of trade is accentuated: disabled accentuate their disability in order to receive discounts in trading. The deaf for example, have to make a show of their disability to receive the same treatment (Timmerman 2010).

As the above examples have started to show as well, the body politics exerted on the border and the resulting bodily experiences are also linked to state ideology, morality, and citizenship, also themes for further research. As Das and Poole note, margins are often "peripheries seen to form natural containers for people considered insufficiently socialized into the law" (2004: 9). In this regard, they consider "specifc technologies of power through which states attempt to "manage" or "pacify" these populations through both force and a pedagogy of conversion intended to transform "unruly subjects" into lawful subjects of the state" (2004: 9).

Preliminary observations

With these points in mind, we can consider where these observations might take us. As has become clear, even a physical boundary such as a river can be ambiguous and difficult to manage. Further, international borders in very different situations such as rural or urban

locations are equally perceived as "wild", "unruly" and in need of "assainissement". In this case, "assainissement" on the border appears to be a heightened version of state rule, deeply associated with state ideology and morality. Depicting the border as "stateless" and in need of "cleansing" thus appears to show a coherent state "governmentality". As Das and Poole remark, "the practices and politics of life in [territorial and social margins have] shaped the political, regulatory, and disciplinary practices that constitute, somehow, that thing we call "the state"" (2004: 3). In other words, the margins of the state often offer insight into the "governmentality" that, in the examples explored here, finds its expression in bodily cleansing and control; yet simultaneously, it is the bodily experience of border- crossers that appears to dominate their conceptions of the frontier and of their own use of it as a resource, not least among the disabled of Ngobila Beach whose "marginalised" bodies play such an important role on the border. Shedding light on the self-perception and mutual regard of both people and state on the border, such themes of bodily conception and experience is an immensely promising vein of continuing research.

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« Approche dialogique de la gouvernance transfrontalière : une contribution à l'étude poste-moderne de la problématique des frontières »

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Papa Fara DIALLO

Doctorant en Science politique

UGB Saint-Louis

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Résumé

La gouvernance transfrontalière continue de poser problème aux Etats. De nouveaux enjeux et de nouveaux défis viennent complexifier davantage la gestion des flux transfrontaliers, invitant ainsi les chercheurs et les décideurs à renouveler respectivement leurs approches théoriques et leurs méthodes de gestion des nouvelles problématiques de la limologie. Les approches classiques, même quelques fois dépoussiérées, ont montré leurs limites heuristiques pour rendre compte de ces changements. Les approches sécuritaires, chères aux réalistes, se sont révélées elles aussi insuffisantes. C'est ainsi que les approches postmodernes de l'étude des frontières, dans leur diversité et leur complexité, ont introduit une réorientation théorique et conceptuelle en intégrant dans la réflexion d'autres variables explicatives – la globalisation, l'intégration régionale, la culture, le terrorisme, l'écologie, etc. – qui accentuent les logiques transnationales. Dans cet embarras théorique, l'approche dialogique se présente comme une alternative à l'approche sécuritaire classique et comme une méthode opératoire de gestion des nouveaux enjeux et des nouveaux défis transfrontaliers. Le mode opératoire : c'est le dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé, aussi bien au niveau supra (entre Etats contigus) qu'au niveau infra (entre villes frontalières). L'approche dialogique, présentée dans cet article, se veut une contribution aux approches postmodernes de l'étude des frontières.

Mots clés : dialogue – gouvernance – frontière – approches – postmodernes

Introduction

Plusieurs approches théoriques se proposent de rendre compte de la pluralité des problématiques de la gouvernance transfrontalière. Nous pouvons citer, entre autres, les approches traditionnelles telles la cartographie historique, typologique ou fonctionnelle qui s'inscrivaient plutôt dans une perspective descriptive ; les approches géopolitiques qui intègrent de nouvelles variables explicatives telles que la globalisation ou les processus d'intégration ; les approches culturelles quant à elles se proposent d'expliquer l'érection de barrières administratives pour séparer les autochtones des « autres », en intégrant les variables linguistiques, religieuses, etc., distinguant ainsi les frontières légales (*de jure*) des frontières culturelles (*de facto*) qui finissent en général par se formaliser. Mais l'approche la plus répandue – parce qu'ayant connu une plus grande matérialisation dans les politiques étrangères des Etats, jadis acteurs exclusifs des relations internationales – est celle de l'analyse des frontières du point de vue de la sécurité. Seulement, l'approche sécuritaire privilégie la militarisation des zones frontalières sans intégrer d'autres variables toutes aussi pertinentes qui découlent des nouveaux enjeux (terrorisme, flux migratoires) et des nouveaux défis (intégration économique, généralisation des menaces) auxquels les Etats font faces depuis les deux dernières décennies du siècle dernier. Les approches post-modernes de l'étude des frontières intègrent une nouvelle perspective d'analyse, rompant avec la rigidité de l'approche sécuritaire. En effet, les approches post-modernes insistent sur le fait que tout le territoire de l'Etat est impliqué dans les échanges économiques intenses avec l'étranger et que « les régions frontalières deviennent des locomotives de croissance économique et des centres d'innovation » ; d'où la mise en place progressive de systèmes transfrontaliers : agglomérations urbaines, zones industrielles, mariages inter-ethniques, etc. D'où la nécessité de moderniser les méthodes de contrôle aux frontières afin des les adapter à ces nouvelles logiques qui rendent la gouvernance transfrontalière beaucoup plus complexe, parce que les démarcations territoriales et même culturelles deviennent de plus en plus virtuelles.

Cette diversité des approches analytiques démontre la récurrence mais surtout la complexité de l'étude de la problématique des frontières, en tant que notion et champ de recherche. Les insuffisances de l'approche sécuritaire classique suggère à bien des égards que cette approche soit mise à jour. L'approche dialogique de la gouvernance transfrontalière se

présente comme une contribution aux approches post-modernes afin de combler les insuffisances de l'approche sécuritaire sans pour autant prétendre la ranger définitivement dans les tiroirs.

La frontière s'entend, dans une perspective fonctionnaliste, comme un moyen de séparer l'espace géographique contrôlé par les membres d'une communauté territoriale (Etat, province, municipalité) et de restreindre les « droits d'accès » à ce territoire à ceux qui ne sont pas membres de la communauté. Si le principe fondateur de la diplomatie – et de tout pacte social en général – est l'exclusion de la violence, le dialogue est dès lors pensé comme une simple manifestation polymorphe des mécanismes de domestication de la violence collective. Pour autant le dialogue n'exclut pas totalement le conflit; celui-ci reflète la « plasticité des systèmes sociaux complexes ». Le conflit peut valablement s'appréhender comme une autre forme de diplomatie, plus guerrière certes mais qui n'est jamais totalement à exclure. C'est ainsi que l'approche dialogique promeut la coopération en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière pour structurer, sinon encadrer les relations entre les Etats en général, et plus particulièrement entre les Etats frontaliers. Il semble cependant que cette forme « civilisée » de relation n'a pas toujours caractérisé le commerce des Etats. En effet, selon Henry Kissinger, « dans l'histoire, les nations ont recherché la satisfaction de leur intérêt égoïste plus souvent que l'application de leurs nobles principes, et se sont posées en rivales plus souvent qu'elles n'ont coopéré. Rien n'indique que ce comportement séculaire ait changé, aucun indice n'annonce sur ce point de transformation notable dans les prochaines décennies »[1].

Dès lors serait-il intéressant de voir dans quelles mesures et jusqu'où le dialogue politique peut contribuer à pacifier et/ou à dynamiser la gouvernance transfrontalière. La problématique de la gouvernance transfrontalière a été l'une des causes – parmi d'autres – de la crise diplomatique entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie, survenue en 1989 et qui a occasionné plusieurs dizaines de morts. Les populations des villes frontalières, comme celles que couvre notre zone d'étude, ont beaucoup souffert de ce conflit. Une attention particulière sera accordée aux villes frontalières telles que Dagana et Rosso, dans le Nord de la région de Saint-Louis, où de part et d'autre du fleuve Sénégal qui fait office de frontière naturelle entre la Mauritanie et le Sénégal, nous avons *Dagana Sénégal* et *Dagana Mauritanie* mais aussi *Rosso Sénégal* et *Rosso*

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1 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatie*, Paris, Fayard, 1996, p. 10-11

Mauritanie. Il n'est pas rare en effet que des problèmes découlent des interactions entre les populations vivant dans cette zone frontalière. Entre autres problèmes récurrents, il y a celui qui est lié à la traversée du fleuve et les enjeux multiples qui s'y greffent. Du côté du Sénégal, on privilégie les aspects sécuritaires sans vouloir compromettre la nécessité pour les populations locales de s'approvisionner en produits divers venant de l'autre rive du fleuve. Du côté mauritanien, on privilégie les aspects commerciaux relatifs à l'exportation de certains produits vers le Sénégal.

Dans cette étude, nous tenterons de vérifier l'hypothèse selon laquelle en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière, toute solution politique viable est fondée sur la négociation et le dialogue plutôt que sur la violence, le rapport de force, la militarisation à outrance ou le tout sécuritaire ; et ce type de solution négociée est le mieux à même de garantir un consensus durable sur les institutions mises en place – ou à inventer – entre des Etats contigus pour gérer la coopération entre les villes frontalières en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière. Ainsi, il s'agira de montrer, *d'une part*, que l'approche dialogique pourrait être une alternative à l'approche sécuritaire classique, et *d'autre part*, démontrer que cette approche par le dialogue diplomatique peu constituer une méthode opératoire à l'étude et à la gestion des nouvelles questions transfrontalières.

<p style="text-align:center">******</p>

I – L'approche dialogique : une alternative à l'approche sécuritaire classique

L'histoire diplomatique révèle à volonté que les enjeux transfrontaliers débouchent souvent sur des conflits ouverts s'ils ne sont pas bien gérés par les Etats protagonistes. Il n'est pas rare en effet de voir deux Etats contigus s'opposer sur des questions liées aux zones frontalières qu'ils partagent, ou sur un territoire dont l'un d'entre eux – ou les deux à la fois – estime avoir le droit d'y revendiquer une souveraineté exclusive. Si la géographie n'est pas à elle seule le moteur de l'histoire, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'elle a grandement contribué à façonner la trajectoire sinueuse de l'histoire diplomatique. La diplomatie de l'universalité[2] a certes perdu de sa superbe, mais l'enjeu territorial lui garde encore toute sa pertinence dans l'analyse des rapports entre Etats, surtout ceux qui partagent les mêmes frontières. Notre propos consistera d'abord à montrer que le dialogue politique, moteur de la coopération diplomatique, peut contribuer à combler les insuffisances de l'approche sécuritaire classique en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière.

A – Critique de l'approche sécuritaire classique

Globalement, les approches sécuritaires présentent les frontières comme quasiment synonymes à la notion de sécurité nationale et à l'utilisation de l'appareil policier de l'Etat pour assurer cette sécurité. Les zones frontalières sont en général considérées comme des frontières naturelles (exemple de la frontière sénégalo-mauritanienne séparée par le fleuve Sénégal) dont la sécurisation est confiée aux services de douanes, aux gardes-frontières ou à l'armée surtout dans les lieux perçus par l'opinion publique comme étant menacés. Seulement, cette approche sécuritaire de la gestion des frontières, quelle que puisse être sa pertinence dans le passé au regard la régularité des litiges frontaliers parmi les causes des grands conflits mondiaux du siècle

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2 Marquée par les guerres hégémoniques de certaines puissances (cf. Traités de Westphalie, 1648, qui mirent fin à la guerre de Trente Ans).

dernier – et même bien avant[3] – semble aujourd'hui dépassée du fait de l'acuité de nouvelles menaces qui transcendent les frontières étatiques, que celles-ci soient *de jure* ou *de facto*.

1 – Le tout sécuritaire : une approche limitée

Selon la définition proposée par Vladimir Kolossov[4], les approches sécuritaires pourraient se décliner en trois variantes : le rôle des frontières étatiques en matière de sécurité nationale était *d'abord* basé sur la prévention de la menace militaire. C'est ce qui expliquait sans doute la forte militarisation des zones frontalières, préparant ainsi les troupes à repousser d'éventuelles agressions d'un ennemi potentiel. La sécurisation d'une zone frontalière devrait *ensuite* permettre d'exercer le plus de contrôle possible sur les flux transfrontaliers. La frontière est dès lors perçue comme une ligne de front destinée à arrêter la pénétration (parfois supposée exagérément) du territoire par des individus, des marchandises ou des informations indésirables, etc. Cette approche est *enfin* basée sur la sécurisation de l'Etat, dans la mesure où l'on considère que cela fait partie de son rôle, et que les intérêts sécuritaires des régions frontalières sont les mêmes que ceux de l'Etat lui-même. La géoéconomie est dès lors subordonnée à la géopolitique.

Il découle de cette présentation sommaire que les approches sécuritaires s'appuient globalement sur la façon dont les *Etats* perçoivent les menaces qui les guettent aux frontières. La surestimation de la menace externe, parfois savamment entretenue par des dirigeants extrémistes ou populistes, incite les populations à vouloir rompre tous contacts avec un voisin jugé « indésirable » ou « dangereux », ou encore faisant partie du cercle des « Etats-voyous » qui composent « l'axe du mal ». Cette caution légitimatrice que certaines populations accordent à leurs dirigeants – qui activent à volonté des registres symboliques au gré des stratégies

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3 L'Organisation des Nations Unies adoptera même dans sa charte constitutive de 1945 le *principe de l'intangibilité des frontières (uti posseditis juris)* pour ainsi conjurer définitivement – apparemment sans succès au regard de l'actualité diplomatique entre la Chine et le Japon – le spectre des différends frontaliers qui ont souvent débouché sur des conflits de grande ampleur dépassant même l'espace géographique des belligérants directs.

4 Vladimir Kolossov, « Etude des frontières : approches post-modernes », *Diogène*, 2005/2 n° 210, pp. 13-27

politiques, des intérêts économiques ou au service d'une certaine idéologie, et instrumentalisent souvent la fibre culturelle, identitaire ou nationaliste chez les populations – leur donne carte blanche pour l'édification de barrières artificielles conçues comme des lignes de démarcations infranchissables[5]. L'histoire a montré cependant que les « grandes murailles » ne font qu'aggraver les conflits. Cette approche des frontières qui privilégie le tout sécuritaire semble ignorer l'accroissement irréversible des systèmes transfrontaliers en cours dans le monde, hâté par les processus d'intégration à l'échelle sous-régionale, régionale voire globale. Vu sous cet angle, il est clair que les Etats ne peuvent plus sécuriser leur espace géographique seulement en se barricadant ou en s'isolant. Ainsi, pour Kolossov, « l'isolation donne lieu à la montée de l'ignorance, l'ignorance à celle des peurs et des suspicions et de telles perceptions de son voisin deviennent les obstacles majeurs à la réconciliation et à une résolution véritable des conflits à long terme »[6]. La sécurité est aujourd'hui de plus en plus négociée. La multiplication des acteurs de la politique internationale et la nature hétéroclite des logiques transnationales introduisent de nouvelles sources d'insécurité transfrontalière. La gestion de ces nouvelles formes de menaces demande une coopération accentuée entre les Etats afin de mutualiser leurs efforts et leurs moyens pour systématiser les politiques de sécurité en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière.

2 – De nouvelles menaces, de nouvelles sources d'insécurité transfrontalière

Nous partons de l'hypothèse selon laquelle il est quasiment impossible de faire face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires par la seule force militaire. La perception des menaces à la sécurité nationale change, les méthodes de sécurisation des régions frontalières doivent changer également. « Même les armée les plus fortes du monde ne peuvent arrêter l'immigration illégale,

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5 Ce fut la stratégie des Etats qui ont adopté la solution du « séparez-nous d'eux » et qui construisirent les « grandes murailles » de Chine, d'Angleterre, de Berlin et aujourd'hui au Moyen-Orient (entre Israël et la Palestine). Cf. V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 14.

6 V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 15. Voir aussi Bertrand Badie, *L'impuissance de la puissance, essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales*, Paris, Fayard, 2004.

les trafics de drogues et d'armes, les risques d'épidémie, de pollution transfrontalière et de désastres environnementaux globaux »[7]. Ainsi, de nouvelles formes de menaces constituent de nouvelles sources d'insécurité transfrontalière qui demandent de nouvelles méthodes de gestion et d'analyse de la problématique des frontières. Cela n'est possible, semble-t-il, que si l'on respecte au moins deux conditions préalables : d'une part, il est nécessaire pour les chercheurs d'admettre que les frontières sont constamment remises en cause et en perpétuelle reconstitution. D'autre part, il faut repenser la notion de frontière afin de « déconstruire les représentations, les « lignes rouges » et les murs d'incompréhension qui les sous-tendent ou les entourent »[8].

Les pratiques sécuritaires réalistes débouchent le plus souvent sur des courses aux armements et la militarisation des zones frontalières qui ne font que produire des niveaux plus élevés de capacités destructrices sans pour autant augmenter la sécurité des Etats. Les approches post-modernes de l'étude des frontières mettent l'accent sur le fait que les discours sécuritaires réalistes oublient que pour la plupart des populations, les menaces quotidiennes ne proviennent pas des forces armées des Etats voisins mais de la récession économique, de l'oppression politique, de la rareté des ressources, des rivalités ethniques, du terrorisme, du crime et des maladies. Or, « dans la perspective réaliste du dilemme de sécurité, la sécurité nationale d'un Etat est par définition synonyme d'insécurité pour d'autres Etats ou acteurs collectifs ou individuel »[9]. Si la sécurité signifie l'absence de menace, l'on comprend aisément que les Etats pris isolément peinent à sécuriser efficacement leurs frontières. En effet, de nouvelles menaces de nature polymorphe et transnationale viennent remettre en question la pertinence des pratiques sécuritaires classiques et solitaires. Le constat qui s'impose c'est que l'Etat ne dispose pas de moyens adéquats pour faire face à ces nouvelles menaces. Seule une coopération politique

[7] V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 17

[8] Selon l'expression de William Ossipow dans *Israël et l'Autre*, Genève, Labor et Fides, 2005, citée par Riccardo Bocco et Daniel Meier, « Penser la notion de frontière au Moyen-Orient », *A contrario*, vol. 3, n° 2, 2005, pp. 3-10

[9] Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella et Pascal Vannesson, *Dictionnaire des relations internationales*, Paris, Dalloz, 2003, p. 453.

internationale, au-delà des Etats-nations souverains, est susceptible d'assurer la sécurité de tous et de chacun.

B – Opportunité de l'approche dialogique dans la gouvernance transfrontalière

Le dialogue est un type de négociation qui se caractérise par une souplesse dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement. N'exigeant que peu de formalisme, le dialogue a moins pour but de parvenir à un résultat précis qu'à une meilleure connaissance et une plus juste appréciation des partenaires, de leurs problèmes et des enjeux[10]. Vu, sous cet angle, le dialogue renvoie plus à la communication qu'à la simple information[11]. Le dialogue diplomatique se comprend dès lors comme toute forme de négociation engagée par les acteurs de la politique internationale dans un cadre bilatéral ou multilatéral. De ce point de vue, il serait opportun de voir *d'une part*, le rôle primordial que joue la négociation en matière de gestion ou de résolution des conflits frontaliers lorsqu'ils surviennent ; *d'autre part*, nous verrons que la communication entre Etats ou entre villes frontalières sur les différents enjeux de la gouvernance transfrontalière peut être un moyen efficace de prévention des conflits aux frontières.

1 – l'importance de la négociation dans la gestion des conflits frontaliers

Le dialogue diplomatique nous parait d'une nécessité inéluctable dans le contexte actuel des relations internationales. Hier comme aujourd'hui et même demain, le dialogue apparaît comme une pratique diplomatique qui permet de raffermir les liens politico-économiques, d'assurer la cohésion dans le cadre des processus d'intégration, de réduire les risques de querelles et de radicalisation des positions idéologiques ou autres. Seulement, la notion de *dialogue* est chargée, orientée et plutôt faible en politique internationale ; tant elle est « lénifiante

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10 *Lexique de politique,* 7ème édition, Paris, Dalloz, 2001, p. 140.

11 Voir Dominique Wolton, *Informer n'est pas communiquer*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2009.

sous son irénisme de la bonne volonté, bavarde par sa rhétorique intarissable, en l'absence de concept exigeant pour l'orienter », nous dit François Jullien[12]. Certes, il est vrai que dans l'abstrait, le terme « dialogue » est le masque d'un terme inverse : « choc »[13]. Toutefois, le pluralisme des allégeances idéologiques, culturelles et nationalistes est désigné comme la source constante des conflits mondiaux ; et cette vision réaliste est surtout valable pour les Etas frontaliers, en Afrique comme ailleurs.

La Mauritanie et le Sénégal ont connu eux aussi ce que Pierre Robert Baduel appelle « l'épreuve de la frontière ». Dans le tumulte des événements dramatiques au printemps 1989, la frontière politique de l'Etat mauritanien était entrain d'être remise en question officiellement par le Sénégal, propulsant alors ces deux Etats aux premiers rangs de l'actualité internationale[14]. Ce conflit diplomatique qui s'est vite transformé en violences intercommunautaires entre Maures et Sénégalais des deux côtés de la frontière a laissé le Sénégal avec plus de 200 000 réfugiés[15]. L'année 1989 était en réalité empreinte de « turbulences périphériques » pour le Sénégal. Elle consacrait également la dissolution des institutions de la Confédération sénégambienne, ainsi que la détérioration des relations avec la Guinée Bissau à cause d'un différend sur les frontières maritimes, mais aussi à cause de la sympathie que certains dirigeants de ce pays auraient envers le mouvement de rébellion en Casamance, au Sud du Sénégal. Christian Coulon résumait parfaitement l'engrenage géopolitique dans lequel se situe ce pays en ces termes : « sur son flanc

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12 Cf. François Jullien, *De l'universel, de l'uniforme, du commun et du dialogue entre les cultures*, Paris, Fayard, 2008, p. 243.

13 En référence à l'ouvrage de Samuel P. Huntington, *Le Choc des civilisations*, Paris, traduction Odile Jacob, 1997.

14 Voir Pierre Robert Baduel, « Un pays-frontière, la Mauritanie », *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 1989, vol. 54, n° 1, pp. 5-10.

15 Chiffre donné par Christian Coulon dans « La démocratie Sénégalaise : bilan d'une expérience », *Politique Africaine*, n° 45, mars 1992, p. 5.

nord comme sur son flanc sud, le Sénégal doit faire face à des conflits tenant à la géopolitique de régions transfrontalières rebelles à la logique territoriale des Etats qui les traversent »[16]. C'est ainsi que l'appareil diplomatique sénégalais a été mis en branle durant cette période pour engager d'intenses négociations avec ses voisins immédiats afin d'aboutir à une résolution durable des conflits frontaliers qui minaient cette sous-zone ouest-africaine. Cette option diplomatique semble plutôt payante puisque jusque là, une guerre ouverte mobilisant les forces armées de ces Etats voisins ne s'est pas encore déclarée dans cette zone transfrontalière. La résolution de ces conflits frontaliers par le dialogue diplomatique a conforté le choix du Sénégal d'inscrire parmi les grands axes de sa politique étrangère le principe de « la diplomatie du bon voisinage ».

2 – La communication comme moyen de prévention des conflits frontaliers

La communication est entendue ici au sens d'un *dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé* qui favorise des échanges d'informations multiples entre Etats ou villes frontalières relatives aux problèmes complexes de la gouvernance transfrontalière. La communication, vue sous l'angle du dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé, s'avère être un outil efficace de prévention des conflits frontaliers, comme le suggère du reste François Jullien dans cette citation : « que le dialogue ne soit jamais aussi égalitaire et neutre qu'on l'a benoîtement prétendu, qu'il reste biaisé par les rapports de forces et les stratégies obliques (…), n'empêche pas qu'il ne soit de lui-même (ou malgré nous) opératoire. Mais opératoire en quoi ? Non qu'on voudrait à tout prix s'accorder avec l'autre, ou qu'on trouverait déjà prescrites en lui des règles formelles, mais simplement parce que, pour dialoguer, chacun doit impérativement déclôturer sa position, la mettre en tension et l'instaurer en vis-à-vis. Non donc que chacun serait porté par une finalité d'entente, ou que la logique du dialogue révélerait un universel préétabli, mais parce que tout dialogue est une structure efficiente – opérante – qui oblige de facto à réélaborer ses propres conceptions, pour entrer en communication, et donc aussi à se réfléchir. »[17]

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16 C. Coulon, *Ibid.*

17 F. Jullien, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

La communication permet ainsi une meilleure connaissance des enjeux et des défis partagés entre acteurs, dès lors qu'elle ne se limite pas à une simple discussion pour régler un problème ponctuel. La communication vise à institutionnaliser le dialogue diplomatique entre Etats contigus pour relever de manière consensuelle les défis de la gouvernance transfrontalière. De la sorte, les suspicions et la méfiance vis-à-vis des voisins frontaliers diminuent considérablement et tendent à s'effacer. La *confiance* s'installe entre les acteurs. Dans de telles conditions, les Etats sont plus enclins à mettre en place des institutions communes et spécialisées pour une gestion concertée des questions liées à la gouvernance transfrontalière, ainsi que des enjeux et des problèmes qu'elle charrie. Ce faisant, les Etats anticipent sur les problèmes à venir, développent ensemble une vision prospective du management des frontières et conjuguent leurs efforts et leurs moyens au service des intérêts de tous et de chacun. Une seine ambiance de coopération s'instaure et ne demande qu'à être pérennisée et entretenue par les acteurs concernés, qui de toute façon, dans le contexte géopolitique ouest-africain, n'ont plus suffisamment de moyens encore moins de forces pour soutenir une guerre sous-régionale. Alors, ils ont tout intérêt à explorer la voie du dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé, si ce n'est pas encore fait, s'ils veulent conjurer définitivement le spectre de la conflictualité. Une « heureuse » méthode de prévention des conflits frontaliers !

II – L'approche dialogique : une méthode opératoire d'analyse et de gestion des nouvelles questions transfrontalières

La réflexion postmoderne sur la problématique des frontières est assez riche en perspectives d'analyse. Mais les aspects communicationnels qui rendent compte de l'importance voire la nécessité de la négociation entre les Etats frontaliers ne sont jamais suffisamment approfondis. D'où la pertinence de l'approche dialogique comme méthode d'analyse et de gestion des *nouveaux enjeux* et des *nouveaux défis* de la gouvernance transfrontalière.

A – Une méthode de gestion des nouveaux enjeux de la gouvernance transfrontalière

La gouvernance transfrontalière continue de poser problème malgré l'accentuation des processus d'harmonisation politique et économique en cous dans le monde. Les Etats font ainsi face à de nouveaux enjeux tels que la globalisation et l'intégration régionale ; mais ils sont également confrontés à l'enjeu écologique qui ignore totalement les frontières.

1 – L'impact de la globalisation et de l'intégration régionale

Dans le paradoxe ambivalent du contexte actuel dans lequel se déroule la politique internationale – marqué à la fois par le processus d'uniformisation que promeut la globalisation et les logiques fragmentaires qui se dévoilent à travers les processus d'intégration régionale –, se pose le problème de la redéfinition de la nature et du rôle des frontières. En fait, ce double processus d'uniformisation et de fragmentation s'accompagne de nouveaux concepts qui viennent enrichir la littérature sur la limologie. On parle ainsi de « dé-territorialisation » et de « re-territorialisation » pour tenter de rendre compte de l'irréversible complexification de la géopolitique mondiale. La globalisation et l'intégration régionale participent, en effet, à la complexification des identités sociopolitiques. Les approches géopolitiques de l'étude des frontières ont mis l'accent sur le mélange croissant des groupes qui est le corolaire de ces différents processus, ainsi que la transformation des identités. Cela explique sans doute le fait que « de plus en plus de gens ont des identités complexes associées à plusieurs groupes ethnoculturels »[18]. Dès lors, le danger qui peut guetter l'identité (politique) nationale c'est qu'elle risque de s'affaiblir progressivement au profit d'une identité réelle (*de facto*) qui se crée au niveau des zones transfrontalières au gré des brassages multiples entre populations, tant il est vrai que « les gens s'associent souvent à l'endroit concret où ils vivent ». Notre enquête a révélé que ces phénomènes sont observables dans les villes frontalières de Rosso et de Dagana, aussi bien du côté de la Mauritanie que du côté du Sénégal.

Dans de telles conditions, il est tout à fait envisageable voire nécessaire de simplifier autant que possible les contrôles de frontières traditionnels et d'utiliser des méthodes modernes de contrôle à distances par exemple. Pour ce faire, il ne fait aucun doute que le Sénégal et la

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18 V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 13.

Mauritanie, pris isolément, ne peuvent pas définir unilatéralement une politique de sécurisation de la frontière (qu'ils partagent pourtant) qui soit efficace. Ils n'en ont pas les moyens d'ailleurs ! Du moins si on en croit les autorités administratives et décentralisées que nous avons enquêtées de part et d'autre de la frontière. D'où la nécessité et l'importance de la coopération en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière afin de négocier une politique commune de gestion des enjeux multiples qui découlent de la porosité des frontières, sans pour autant bouleverser les compromis ethnoculturels nés des brassages entre populations vivant dans ces zones frontalières. Le dialogue diplomatique entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie n'a quasiment plus été rompu depuis la crise de 1989. C'est ce qui explique, semble-t-il, l'entente molle et précaire[19] entre ces deux pays en ce qui concerne la sécurisation de la frontière ; en plus de la coopération décentralisée – qui gagnerait cependant à être redynamisée – entre les villes frontalières de Rosso Sénégal et Rosso Mauritanie ainsi qu'entre Dagana Sénégal et Dagana Mauritanie. Mais, ce dialogue n'est pas institutionnalisé. Il n'a pas non plus permis de mettre en place des institutions solides et consensuelles destinées à la gestion des nouveaux enjeux de la gouvernance des frontières ; exception faite de la mise en place d'une organisation chargée de la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) que ces deux pays partagent avec le Mali et la Guinée. Ces nouveaux enjeux de la gouvernance transfrontalière découlent généralement des nouveaux processus en cours dans le monde et qui n'épargnent aucune région du globe.

2 – L'enjeu écologique

Dans le sillage de l'approche écopolitique de l'étude des frontières (une branche des approches post-modernes), la conscience partagée des problèmes environnementaux à l'échelle régionale et globale stimule à bien des égards la coopération internationale et avec elle la coopération transfrontalière. Etant donné que les processus naturels ne reconnaissent pas les frontières politiques (*de jure*) encore moins les frontières culturelles (*de facto*), il est plus que

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19 Il est assez fréquent, en effet, que des problèmes sporadiques liés à l'exploitation des ressources halieutiques – notamment la délivrance des licences de pêche ou l'immobilisation des pirogues de pêcheurs sénégalais par les gardes-côtes mauritaniens, ou encore la traversée du fleuve Sénégal – entament sensiblement la qualité des relations diplomatiques entre ces deux Etats.

opportun pour les Etats séparés par une frontière naturelle – comme le fleuve Sénégal qui sépare de part et d'autre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie – de promouvoir un système de gestion concertée des enjeux frontaliers des régions naturelles intégrées. En dehors des problèmes assez récurrents liés à la traversée du fleuve et aux multiples interactions entre les populations des villes frontalières, ces régions naturelles intégrées constituent un milieu propice pour la diffusion des polluants dans l'air et dans l'eau. La solution de nombreux conflits frontaliers est étroitement liée à l'élaboration de nouveaux principes de gestion de l'environnement et des bassins fluviaux en particulier. Ces derniers constituent des régions naturelles étroitement intégrées et représentent en même temps la base de systèmes d'habitation et de transport comme c'est le cas des villes frontalières de Rosso et de Dagana au niveau de la frontière sénégalo-mauritanienne. La gestion du bassin fluvial a souvent été source de conflit – problèmes d'utilisation de l'eau, des ressources biologiques et énergétiques – entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie. La volonté affirmée de l'ancien Chef de l'Etat sénégalais Abdoulaye Wade nouvellement élu en 2000 de revitaliser les vallées fossiles à partir du fleuve pour pallier à l'insuffisance chronique des eaux pluviales a failli déclencher une crise diplomatique entre les deux pays. Les autorités mauritaniennes y voyaient une manœuvre unilatérale pour tirer profit du fleuve en violation des règles édictées par l'OMVS. Le dialogue diplomatique et la coopération décentralisée transfrontalière adossés sur une politique de bon voisinage et de gestion concertée des enjeux écologiques ont souvent permis d'éviter, plus ou moins avec succès, un autre conflit entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie.

B – Du « tout frontière » au « sans frontière » : la magie opératoire du dialogue face aux nouveaux défis transfrontaliers

Il demeure certes indiscutable que les échanges commerciaux entre les régions d'un même Etat sont de loin plus importants que les échanges avec les régions qui se situent de l'autre côté de la frontière ; les migrations de populations entre les villes intérieures sont encore hautement plus importantes que vers les villes frontalières[20]. Le potentiel de conflits frontaliers

20 Ces phénomènes sont largement observables en Afrique, mais aussi dans les régions où les processus d'intégration sont assez avancés : Union européenne, ALENA, etc., démontrant ainsi que les frontières restent encore une barrière considérable et confortant la position des auteurs qui pensent qu'un monde sans frontières n'est que pur chimère. Pour Kolossov par exemple, op. cit., p. 23, le discours sur un monde sans frontières ne s'applique

est encore réel en Afrique, en Asie et au Moyen-Orient[21]. Cependant, il n'en demeure pas moins que des groupes privés revendiquent désormais avec succès l'identité d'acteur des relations internationales, se dotent de moyens d'action adaptés, voire se substituent à l'État dans l'accomplissement de fonctions relevant traditionnellement de la diplomatie. Les relations internationales, au sens le plus classique du terme, renvoyant aux interactions entre États, se doublent de plus en plus de relations transnationales qui se réalisent hors de ceux-ci, ignorent les frontières et bafouent les souverainetés[22]. Cette nouvelle configuration des relations internationales découle des logiques transnationales multiples consécutives aux processus contradictoires d'uniformisation, de déterritorialisation et de fragmentation en cours dans le monde. Dans ce contexte marqué par le glissement du tout frontière au sans frontière, les logiques de dialogue et de coopération se présentent comme une méthode opératoire de gestion (pour les décideurs) et d'analyse (pour les observateurs) de ces nouveaux défis que les Etats doivent relever en matière de gouvernance transfrontalière.

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qu'aux démarcations pacifiques, ouvertes, intégratrices, internationalement reconnues, qui peuvent être trouvées, pour la plupart, en Europe et en Amérique du Nord ; et elles ne représentent qu'à peu près 5% de la longueur totale des frontières au sol entre les Etats.

21 « A peu près 42% de la longueur totale des frontières terrestres en Afrique sont délimitées par des parallèles, des méridiens et des lignes équidistantes sans considération pour les réalités sociales. 37% des frontières terrestres ont été imposées aux pays africains par les pouvoirs coloniaux français et britanniques qui avaient pour seul intérêt le partage des territoires », in V. Kolossov, op. cit., p. 24. Voir aussi Riccardo Bocco et Daniel Meier, « Penser la notion de frontière au Moyen-Orient », *A contrario*, vol. 3, n° 2, 2005, pp. 3-10 ; ou Georges Corm, *Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 1956-2012*, II, Paris, Gallimard « Folio histoire », 2012 ; ou encore Jean-Paul Chagnollaud et Sid-Ahmed Souiah, *Les frontières au Moyen-Orient*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2005, leur étude rend compte des processus de production des frontières internationales au Moyen-Orient dans une perspective géopolitique.

22 Cf. Bertrand Badie et Marie-Claude Smouts, *Le retournement du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale*, Paris, PFNSP et Dalloz, 1992, p. 69.

1 – La coordination des politiques sécuritaires à l'échelle régionale : le défi de l'intégration politique

Dans la perspective des réalistes, les grandes puissances étatiques étaient considérées comme des unités fermées, imperméables et souveraines dont les interactions accaparent la scène internationale. Ces unités sont incarnées par le « soldat » et le « diplomate », selon l'expression de Raymond Aron[23]. Ce n'est qu'à partir des années 1960 que cette approche de « l'État comme acteur unique et unitaire », qui intégrait également « les organisations intergouvernementales comme des acteurs dérivés des États », a commencé à montrer ses limites. Désormais, en Relations internationales, on considère comme acteur « toute entité dont les actions transfrontalières affectent la distribution des ressources et la définition des valeurs à l'échelle planétaire »[24]. Ainsi, l'irruption sur la scène internationale de nouveaux acteurs ou « actants » vient « perturber »[25] le statu quo simpliste de la diplomatie classique marquée par le commerce des Etats. Ces derniers ne sont pas seulement menacés dans leur universalisme ou dans leur nature d'acteurs exclusifs des relations internationales. Ils sont aujourd'hui de plus en plus menacés dans l'aspect le plus physique, le plus matériel de leur existence juridique : leur souveraineté territoriale. « De nos jours sont considérés comme acteurs internationaux, au sens d'entités dont les décisions et actions affectent les activités transfrontalières, les États, les organisations interétatiques, les appareils infra-étatiques ou acteurs transgouvernementaux, ainsi que les acteurs non-étatiques ou sociétaux (entreprises multinationales, organisations non-gouvernementales, groupes identitaires, mafias, migrants, réfugiés, diasporas, individus) »[26].

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23 Dans *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, 8ème édition, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2004.

24 M.-C. Smouts, D. Battistella et P. Vannesson, op. cit., p. 1.

25 En référence à l'ouvrage de Zaki Laïdi, *La grande perturbation*, Paris, Flammarion, 2004.

26 M.-C. Smouts, D. Battistella et P. Vannesson, op. cit., p. 2.

Dans ce « monde multicentré »[27] où on assiste à la prolifération d'acteurs qui ne sont pas liés par la souveraineté, de nouveaux types de menaces pèsent sur les Etats, et leur gestion ou leur prévention nécessite la mise en application de politiques de sécurisation des frontières négociées à l'échelle régionale, voire globale. En effet, le terrorisme international ne connaît pas les frontières. L'acteur religieux symbolise aujourd'hui l'acteur transnational par excellence, refusant le plus souvent de s'inscrire dans la logique étatique et prenant en considération les communautés de croyants au-delà des frontières plutôt que les citoyennetés. Dans le discours médiatique, il prend souvent les traits de l'ennemi ou de la menace et se présente comme un rival pour l'Etat. Le terrorisme est l'une des voies les plus radicales des modes d'expression de la revendication politique, qui constitue des réseaux internationaux et devient une problématique centrale des relations internationales. Les ramifications du réseau terroriste Al-Qaïda introduisent ainsi une nouvelle réalité : l'abolition des frontières terrestres au profit d'un renforcement des frontières symboliques, « celles des religions, des cultures, mais aussi des laissés-pour-compte des pays en développement »[28] comme c'est le cas dans certains pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ou de la Corne de l'Afrique.

Aussi, l'exigence d'une sécurisation efficace des frontières face à l'activisme des narco trafiquants implique forcément une systématisation des politiques à l'échelle sous-régionale ou régionale. Surtout en Afrique de l'Ouest où un « narco-Etat » comme la Guinée Bissau constitue une plaque tournante du trafic international de toutes sortes de drogues. Ce pays frontalier avec le Sénégal, où l'Etat est chroniquement défaillant, est en effet un terrain propice au business des narco trafiquants et ouvre la brèche aux logiques de passage qui menacent la sécurité des Etats voisins.

Enfin, le dialogue diplomatique entre Etats frontaliers s'avère assez productif et plus opératoire pour une gestion concertée des flux migratoires, vu que la militarisation à outrance, le tout sécuritaire et les « grandes murailles » ont montré leurs limites. L'approche de la

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27 Selon le mot de James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics, A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990. Voir aussi Zaki Laïdi, *L'ordre mondial relâché, sens et puissance après la Guerre froide*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1993.

28 Riccardo Bocco et Daniel Meier, op. cit., p. 9.

problématique des flux migratoires « par le haut » et de manière unilatérale ne fait qu'accentuer la porosité des frontières. Les processus d'intégration politique à l'échelle sous-régionale ou régionale, qui encouragent les logiques coopératives entre populations des zones transfrontalières où se nouent des liens de solidarité réelle, permettraient une meilleure prise en charge des flux migratoires. Georges Simmel[29] affirmait en effet que « la frontière n'est pas un fait spatial avec des effets sociologiques mais un fait sociologique qui prend une forme spatiale ».

2 – La gestion des échanges commerciaux transfrontaliers : le défi de l'intégration économique

Le régionalisme est défini, selon Yann Echinard et Laetitia Guilhot dans « Le nouveau régionalisme », comme un processus institutionnel initié par les Etats en vue de favoriser la coopération et la coordination de leur politique dans certains domaines. Cette définition nous semble plus opératoire par rapport à notre problématique parce que moins restrictive que celle proposée par l'OMC par exemple, qui considère le régionalisme seulement sous son aspect commercial c'est-à-dire « les mesures prises par les gouvernements pour libéraliser ou faciliter le commerce à l'échelle régionale, parfois au moyen de zones de libre-échange ou d'unions douanières ». L'intégration régionale est ainsi considérée comme une méthode qui encourage fortement la coopération, y compris entre des Etats ou des peuples qui n'y étaient que peu enclins. En réalité, cette coopération dans le domaine des échanges commerciaux, qui se décline souvent en Afrique comme ailleurs sous forme de solidarités régionales ou sous-régionales (UEMOA, CEDEAO, CEMAC, etc.) semble aujourd'hui inéluctable. Dans ce contexte mondial – paradoxal certes mais de plus en plus accentuée – de globalisation et d'intégration régionale à la fois, seule l'institutionnalisation d'un dialogue diplomatique entre les Etats qui partagent des frontières devenues artificielles leur permettrait de tirer leur épingles du jeu de la politique internationale et de relever les défis économiques et commerciaux. Si cette tendance mondialisée favorise la réduction substantielle des obstacles tarifaires et non tarifaires, elle ne signifie aucunement disparition des frontières et de leurs logiques restrictionnistes que certaines nations

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29 Dans *Sociologie. Etudes sur les formes de socialisation*, Paris, PUF, 1999.

n'hésitent pas à instrumentaliser devant la phobie de l'altérité. Le paradoxe de l'intégration économique c'est de savoir comment concilier libre circulation des biens et des personnes et l'impérieuse nécessité de contrôler les flux transfrontaliers de toutes sortes. Est-il encore possible de s'insérer dans de grands ensembles sous-régionaux ou régionaux sans courir le risque de s'exposer aux flux économiques et migratoires, aux délocalisations des grandes multinationales ou à la percée de la menace terroriste ? Pourtant, à l'heure actuelle l'intégration économique semble être la seule voie de salut pour les économies fragiles des pays sub-sahariens. Car, c'est au niveau de ces organisations d'intégration régionale ou sous-régionale que doit se *négocier* la systématisation des politiques de sécurité commerciale, économique et transfrontalière ; c'est là que doit se *négocier*, entre les Etats membres de l'organisation, la sécurité tout cout. Il est plutôt rassurant de constater que l'ouverture économique que promeut le régionalisme s'accompagne, à juste titre, d'une certaine « intervention concertée » des Etats, visant à corriger les imperfections des marchés, et d'une institutionnalisation croissante au niveau régional afin de mieux gérer le « rapprochement des préférences collectives »[30].

<center>******</center>

Conclusion

En définitive, nous pouvons retenir que la frontière est une construction sociale. « Elle est constitutive des identités »[31]. Elle délimite et limite ; elle construit un dedans et un dehors ; elle ouvre et ferme, elle éloigne et rapproche. C'est le lieu qui marque et démarque. Cela ne doit pas pour autant occulter l'autre face du Janus. Les frontières sont également des « lieux carrefours » où se développent des relations économiques et sociales intenses et variées. Certains y voient un

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30 Cf. Yann Echinard et Laetitia Guilhot, op. cit., pp. 776-777. Voir aussi GEMDEV, *L'intégration régionale dans le monde : innovations et ruptures*, Paris, Karthala, 1994.

31 Riccardo Bocco et Daniel Meier, op. cit., p. 5.

lieu de passeurs ou de passage[32], d'autres y voient un lieu de fabrication des « logiques métisses »[33]. Ces nouvelles logiques intégratives observables et observées dans les régions frontalières fortement intégrées invitent les analystes à un renouvellement des approches et par conséquent des problématiques de la limologie moderne. Mais aussi, elles invitent les Etats à adapter leurs méthodes de gestion des nouveaux enjeux et des nouveaux défis de la gouvernance transfrontalière. L'approche dialogique que nous proposons ici, qui promeut le *dialogue diplomatique institutionnalisé* entre Etats frontaliers, se présente ainsi comme une alternative aux approches sécuritaires classiques et comme une contribution aux approches post-modernes de la gouvernance transfrontalière.

On peut reprocher à cette approche d'être plutôt harmoniste et volontariste, minimisant peut-être la part de réalisme et de cynisme dont les Etats peuvent faire preuve surtout quand leurs intérêts sont en jeu. Certes, est-il vrai, comme le pense Kissinger, que « dans l'histoire, les nations ont recherché la satisfaction de leur intérêt égoïste plus souvent que l'application de leurs nobles principes ». Soit ! Mais les temps changent. Les défis de la gouvernance transfrontalière se renouvellent régulièrement en se complexifiant. Les approches solitaires de la gestion des problèmes frontaliers ont montré leurs limites dans un contexte mondial marqué la généralisation des menaces, occasionnant de nouvelles sources d'insécurité transfrontalière.

D'autres problématiques toutes aussi intéressantes, liées à la gouvernance transfrontalière entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie[34], excèdent le cadre de cet article ; montrant ainsi que cette

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32 Voir Aboubakr Tandian, "Borders and Borderlands Identities : A comparative Perspectives of Cross-border Governance in the Neighbourhoods of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau", *African Nebula*, Issue 2, September 2010, pp. 18-42 ; ou Karine Bennafla et Michel Peraldi « Introduction. Frontières et logiques de passage : l'ordinaire des transgressions », *Cultures & Conflits*, 72, Hiver 2008, (en ligne) http://www.conflits.org/index17383.html. Consulté le 23 juillet 2009 ; ou encore Michel Warschawski, *Sur la frontière*, Paris, Stock, 2002.

33 Jean-Loup Amselle, *Logiques métisses. Anthropologie de l'identité en Afrique et ailleurs*, Paris, Payot et Rivages, 1999.

34 C'est le cas, entre autres, des enjeux de la mise en valeur de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal, de la nature et l'impact de la coopération décentralisée sur le développement socio-économique des villes frontalières, par exemple, qui

réflexion sur les enjeux de la gouvernance transfrontalière entre ces deux pays voisins est loin de prétendre à l'exhaustivité. Alors que la recherche sur les objets de la limologie semble s'intensifier paradoxalement à l'heure où l'on parle d'intégration, de globalisation, de dialogue des cultures et de rapprochement des peuples, un questionnement demeure comme un ferment fertilisant pour alimenter la réflexion : quel sens faut-il donner aujourd'hui à la notion de frontière ?

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n'ont pas reçus ici un développement suffisant.

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Eloff de Visser, Lieneke
l.a.eloff@gmail.com
PhD candidate, Free University of Amsterdam (VU)

Border Crossings in Times of War

Lieneke Eloff de Visser

Abstract

The Eastern Caprivi in the north of Namibia forms the easternmost tip of the Caprivi Zipfel. At its widest, the area measures about 200 km east to west, and 80 km north to south. From the capital town Katima Mulilo it is an easy drive to any of four international borders with Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. These borders were drawn in the early twentieth century as a formal separation between German, British and Portuguese colonial possessions. For the next sixty years, the borders remained permeable and people and goods easily crossed between territories. This changed dramatically with the onset of the Namibian war for liberation. To the South African authorities, the Caprivi Zipfel became a line of defence that was meant to bar SWAPO insurgents from entering Namibia and potential recruits from leaving, and served as a base for cross-border operations. From 1966 onwards the Eastern Caprivi became a militarized region where physical control over the territory's boundaries was enforced by constant military patrols. Movement on and across the Zambezi and Chobe river borders was banned, while the Namibian - Zambian land border was denuded of all vegetation to allow ease of supervision. Moreover, even the internal Kwando river border between the Eastern and Western Caprivi was closed, so that to all intents and purposes the Eastern Caprivi was under full lockdown. This paper examines how the Eastern Caprivi population responded to these changes.

Scholars in the field of borderland studies have convincingly argued against the notion that colonial borders were imposed on hapless Africans. Similarly, conflict studies show that insurgencies are not merely fought out over the heads of a submissive population. Instead, local actors may find it expedient to collaborate with the dominant force, but simultaneously they may find ways to resist through acts of sabotage, subversion or avoidance. Moreover, within the space of the central conflict local actors may actively exploit opportunities to assert their supremacy over rivals, or to gain exclusive access to valuable resources like arable land or hunting and fishing grounds. In the Eastern Caprivi agency indeed resided with the people who sought and managed to circumvent or exploit restrictions on border crossings. They did so for a variety of reasons that rested on livelihood or security needs, or that were ideologically, politically or economically inspired. Thus, instead of being passive victims, local individuals and groups of the Eastern Caprivi creatively contested and escaped the confines of colonial hegemony and military occupation.

Introduction

The Eastern Caprivi in the north of Namibia forms the easternmost tip of the Caprivi Zipfel. At its widest, the area measures about 200 km east to west, and 80 km north to south. From the capital town Katima Mulilo it is an easy drive to any of four international borders with Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana.

The Eastern Caprivi has a long history of foreign occupation. From the 17th century the area has been invaded, ruled or administered by the Lozi, the Makololo, Germany, Britain and South Africa.[1] The yoke of foreign rule was in some ways counter-balanced by the benefits of life at the periphery of the empire, allowing a certain freedom in interpreting the decrees emanating from the faraway centre of power. A case in point are the borders that enclose the Eastern Caprivi. Drawn in the early twentieth century as a formal separation between German and British colonial possessions, they remained permeable and people and goods freely crossed the international boundaries. However, the region's relative autonomy was interrupted during the Namibian war for liberation from 1966 to 1989, when the South African state asserted itself at its periphery by introducing extensive administrative and military control. As part of the counterinsurgency war against the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), cross-border movement was prohibited and compliance was enforced by military patrols. To the Eastern Caprivi people, borders became barriers and places of danger.

This paper examines how the Eastern Caprivi population were affected by and responded to these changes. When an occupying force successfully introduces security regulations such as the closing of borders, it implies a significant power disparity between the dominant force and the subordinate population. Indeed, in the face of the overwhelming South African military presence, open rebellion was not an option to the Eastern Caprivi people. In addition, the South African forces were well aware of the cardinal rule of counterinsurgency, that is to win the hearts and minds of the population upon whom insurgents rely for recruits, hiding places, food and other resources. The SADF[2] therefore put extensive effort into socio-economic development by bringing health and education benefits and food security to a region that had been a neglected backwater during most of South Africa's rule.[3] On the face of it, these measures seemed successful and from a military viewpoint the Eastern Caprivi was a pacified region by 1979.[4] Successive military commanders of the region perceived the attitude of the population toward the South African authorities as ranging from neutral to friendly and cooperative.[5] However, a lack of overt resistance does not equate a positive

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[1] Flint, 'State-Building in Central Southern Africa', 394.
[2] South African Defence Force.
[3] Eloff de Visser, *Winning the Hearts and Minds,* 18.
[4] Geldenhuys, *Die wat Gewen het*, 90.
[5] Interviews held with Gen Minnaar Fourie, Gen AK de Jager, Gen Gert Opperman and Gen Johan Saayman, former SADF commanders of the Eastern Caprivi, during March 2011, South Africa.

attitude. Moreover, imposed rules are seldom entirely water-tight. As explained by James Scott, outward compliance may conceal 'strategies of the weak', that is the ways in which subordinate people resist a dominant force through acts of sabotage, subversion and avoidance.[6] Similarly, Peter Skalnik argues that when people are unable to confront state power directly, they may develop coping strategies that rely on quiet resistance, adaptation, accommodation and, when it proves profitable, collaboration. Furthermore, a subdued population may 'select' elements from the foreign development packet, which may gradually be incorporated into their own political and social culture.[7]

Although colonial history provides ample evidence of 'strategies of the weak', many studies have privileged the manipulations of state and colonial rule over the agency of subordinates.[8] However, more recently researchers in Borderland Studies have argued against the notion that colonial borders were imposed on hapless Africans. In fact, as Paul Nugent points out, frequently the delineation of international boundaries irreversibly ended old hierarchies and created opportunities for politically aspiring new elites. Moreover, local authorities, rather than opposing colonial rule, attempted to maximize benefits by enlisting colonial institutions as arbitrator in local struggles for dominance over people and land.[9] Similarly, in the field of Conflict Studies, Stathys Kalyvas points to a danger of portraying violence in civil wars as being externally imposed on unsuspecting, and therefore innocent civilians. He argues that at the peripheries, or the local level, a conflict may be more about pre-existing local disputes than about issues that concern the central parties in the struggle. Thus, local actors are by no means passive or invisible, but may successfully pursue personal ambitions by manipulating the central actors to promote their attempts to assert supremacy over rivals, or to gain exclusive access to valuable resources like arable land or hunting and fishing grounds.[10]

This paper aims to elaborate on the theme of African agency. The focus of the first chapter is on the Eastern Caprivi region before its borders were closed during the Namibian war for liberation. The second chapter discusses the strategic function of the Eastern Caprivi in South African security considerations. It outlines the region's extensive militarisation leading to radically limited cross-border access. The third chapter deals with reasons and ways that people of the Caprivi circumvented or exploited such restrictions. The final chapter discusses the multiplicity of meanings that infused the border concept during the conflict.

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[6] Scott, *Domination and the arts of resistance,* 188.
[7] Skalník, *Outwitting the state,* 13.
[8] McClendon Thomas, 'Coercion and Conversation', 53.
[9] Nugent, 'Arbitrary Lines', 47-51.
[10] Kalyvas, 'The Ontology of 'Political Violence'', 480-482.

Early Boundaries

The rivers that enclose much of the Eastern Caprivi have functioned as natural boundaries since pre-colonial times, when the region fell under the rule of the Lozi kingdom that had its headquarters in what is now western Zambia. For instance, Sipopa, the Lozi ruler from 1864 to 1878, appointed and sent Mamili Simataa Kabende to take up residence at Linyanti in the Eastern Caprivi, where the like-named river formed the southern perimeter of the Lozi domain. More than a visible boundary marker to the Lozi territory, the river also provided an obstacle to potential invaders, and indeed the Mamili's responsibility was to guard the kingdom against invasion by the Matabele.[11] A story survives of a party of Matabele warriors coming up from the south who, because they could not swim, had to depend on local knowledge and cooperation to safely find their way through the maze of channels and islands. Having negotiated transport to the northern bank, the Matabele were tricked by the local boatman. He rowed them to an island from where he made his escape and left the Matabele to starve to death.[12]

In a similar manner the Zambezi river functioned as a safety barrier in the north-eastern part of the Eastern Caprivi. Having acquired the Eastern Caprivi as part of her colonial possessions, Germany sent Captain Streitwolf to take control of the region in 1908. The ruler of the Lozi, King Litia, having heard rumours of German atrocities against the Herero and Nama peoples, took the precaution of evacuating the people under his jurisdiction across the Zambezi to Barotseland, and all their cattle with them, so that Captain Streitwolf found the area almost deserted.[13] Streitwolf, hoping to convince the people to return, decreed that in the Eastern Caprivi they would be exempt from the hut tax that was imposed in Barotseland.[14] And so the river took on an added function: a demarcation line between two kingdoms where different rules applied.

As mentioned, the delineation of formal state boundaries by colonial powers did not impede the traffic of people and goods across the borders between the Eastern Caprivi and Zambia or Botswana. People crossed borders to visit family members and friends, and many Caprivian men found employment on the Zambian side. Trade goods such as maize, fish, cattle and animal skins were transported from the Caprivi across the borders to both Botswana and Zambia, and inhabitants of the Caprivi did their shopping in Zambia, where prices were cheaper and a greater variety of goods were on offer. Furthermore, Caprivian men hunted and fished on both sides of the borders, while Zambians came to cut reeds on

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[11] Pretorius, *The Fwe of the Eastern Caprivi*, 30.

[12] Interview with the Honorouble Ngambela James Kachana of the Mayeyi Tribal Authority at Sangwali on 4 June 2012; Trollope, 'Report on the Administration', 16.

[13] Budack, *Report of the Commission*, 83; Flint, 'State-Building in Central Southern Africa', 415.

[14] Flint, 'State-Building in Central Southern Africa', 415.

the Caprivian side.[15] In addition, as opportunity or necessity dictated, people migrated across international borders to avoid drought or floods.[16] Finally, even after having been separated by an international border for more than sixty years, pre-colonial political relations survived. A telling fact in this respect is that as late as 1961 the Mafwe and Masubiya, the dominant ethnic groups of the Eastern Caprivi, professed their allegiance to the King of Barotseland in Zambia, and in fact initiated attempts to secede from Namibia in order to join the former northern Rhodesia, now Zambia.[17]

During the lead-up to Namibia's war for liberation the beginnings of organized resistance in the Eastern Caprivi were inspired not from Windhoek, but from Zambia. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) aspired to attain self-determination for the Caprivi strip. It was modeled on UNIP, the United National Independence Party under leadership of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and adopted its constitution virtually unchanged. Caprivi inhabitants often signed up as members of both CANU and UNIP and crossed the border to attend UNIP meetings in Sesheke and Katima Mulilo (Zambia).[18] In 1964 CANU's founder and president, Brendan Simbwaye, was arrested at a CANU rally in Katima Mulilo on a number of charges, of which the main one was holding an unauthorized meeting. However, it was a lesser charge – leaving the Caprivi without proper travel documents – that anticipated the impending end to unrestricted border crossings. After Simbwaye's arrest almost the entire CANU leadership went into exile in Zambia, where later that year the party merged with SWAPO.[19] In 1966 SWAPO officially announced the start of its armed struggle against South Africa.[20]

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[15] Trollope, 'Report on the Administration', 20; AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, *Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang*, 1967, 6-8, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria.

[16] Interviews with David Lopa Mbeha on 3 June 2012 at Machita village; Siwile Job Muswabile on 24 June 2012 at Sangwali; Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo.

[17] AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, *Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang*, 9, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria

[18] Interview with Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Masubiya Khuta Headquarters, Bukalo.

[19] AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, *Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang*, 1967, 10-11, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria; Brown, Susan, 'Diplomacy by other Means', 21.

[20] Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance*, 59.

Borderland Changes

The main route from SWAPO's military headquarters in Dar es Salaam to central Namibia led through Zambia and subsequently the Caprivi Zipfel, and caused grave concern to the South African authorities. In 1967 an assessment was undertaken of the strategic importance of the Eastern Caprivi to the overall security of South Africa. It was considered that the Eastern Caprivi, together with Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique – then all still under colonial rule – formed an uninterrupted buffer that shielded the Republic of South Africa from hostile African states to the north. The Eastern Caprivi strip also drove a wedge between Botswana, a potentially antagonistic neighbour, and Zambia, an enemy state. It was furthermore speculated that the Eastern Caprivi posed an attractive military target to belligerent enemy states, not only from a strategic point of view, but also for the prestige and propaganda value such an attack would offer. The report advised that due to vast distances and difficult terrain it would require a substantial deployment of troops and materiel to adequately patrol and guard the Caprivi borders against infiltration by enemy guerillas on their way to either central Namibia or South Africa. In the event of a direct attack certainly no less than brigade strength was required to safeguard South Africa's "Achilles'heel".[21]

By the late sixties SWAPO incursions into the Eastern Caprivi became bolder and more frequent. SWAPO's strategy was based on classic guerilla doctrine, using Zambia as a base from which to infiltrate the local population and to conduct hit and run assaults.[22] Most took place in close proximity to the northern borders of the region, allowing for easy escape back into Zambia. In response, the South African Police introduced specialized units. The Security Police recruited informants on both sides of the border, while Counterinsurgency Units established forts and tent camps at strategic points along the border and at river crossings to Zambia and Botswana.[23] From these bases the borders were patrolled on foot and by vehicle. The South African army and air force were brought in to support with foot and aerial patrols, especially after SWAPO starting using land-mine tactics and launched a surprise assault on a border police base.[24] In 1974 the SADF formally took over responsibility for security in northern Namibia and built still more bases.[25] In addition, along the land border running westward from Katima Mulilo to the Kwando river, the so-called 'cutline' was established. This was a 100 metre wide strip of land, denuded of all vegetation by the use of herbicides and defoliants. Besides showing up tracks of passing SWAPO fighters, it was a visual demarcation of the exact border between Zambia and Namibia.[26]

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[21] AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, *Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang*, 12-13, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria

[22] Brown, 'Diplomacy by other Means', 21; Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance*, 84-5.

[23] Interview with Sakkie Bosman, former SAP-V, on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town.

[24] Interview with Deon Visser, former SADF, on 1 March 2011 at Saldanha; SGK Katima Mulilo, Box 3 Vol 4, *War Diary*, 1973, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria.

[25] Interviews with Deon Visser, former SADF, on 1 March 2011 at Saldanha; and with Minnaar Fourie, former SADF commander of the Eastern Caprivi, on 4 March 2011 at Chapman's Peak.

[26] Email correspondence with Anton Uys, former SAP-V, dated 30 October 2012.

With increased militarization the internal border between the Eastern and Western Caprivi was also closed in order to prevent the crossing of SWAPO members travelling between central Namibia and Zambia by way of the Caprivi strip. The area to the west of the Kwando river became a no-go zone for the Eastern Caprivi people when military camps like Fort Doppies and Fort St Michel were established and the territory was reserved for the sole use of Special Forces units.[27] A permit had to be obtained from the military authorities in order to travel through the Western Caprivi towards Namibia proper, and had to be produced at the checkpoint at Kongola bridge.[28] For all practical purposes, the Eastern Caprivi was therefore under full lockdown.

If the foremost function of the militarize border region was to keep SWAPO fighters out, a second objective was to keep those intent on joining SWAPO in. During early years of the conflict a large number of young people from the Caprivi left for SWAPO training camps up north, and the South African military were keenly aware of their critical importance to SWAPO infiltration attempts, since Caprivian recruits were familiar with hidden crossing places and safe routes through the territory. They also knew where to find sympathetic local inhabitants who could be counted on to provide shelter and food.[29] However, in spite of police and military patrols, a second wave of recruits left in 1976.[30]

At the north-eastern periphery of South African control, virtually a finger jutting into Africa, the Eastern Caprivi's third function was as a forward base for offensive action against enemy insurgent organizations and hostile states. Operation Brush (Bush Reconaissance Unit Signal HQ) was established as a secret listening post where radio networks across Africa were monitored, and if necessary, jammed.[31] In addition, the Eastern Caprivi served as a base for military operations into Zambia. For instance, after the SWAPO mortar and rocket attack on Katima Mulilo in August 1978, South Africa retaliated with Operation Safraan in March 1979, with the objective to destroy all SWAPO bases in south-west Zambia.[32]

The measures undertaken by the South African forces to maintain control of the border region were mostly directed at external enemies, and not explicitly at the indigenous population. However, they had an enormous effect on local people's lives, as the next chapter will show.

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[27] Breytenbach, *Eden's Exiles*, 57.

[28] Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Sector 70 Group 4 Box 33, *Oos/Wes Caprivi/Kwando rivier problem*, 1987, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria; 13 Subarea Box 220, *23 May 1974*, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria.

[29] Du Toit, *Oos Caprivi*, 10.

[30] Du Toit, *Oos Caprivi*, 10,16. Interview with Barend van der Westhuizen on 10 March 2011 at Alldays.

[31] Interviews with Minnaar Fourie, former SADF, on 4 March 2011 at Chapman's Peak; Jas Fourie, former SADF, on 11 March 2011 at Ellisras; Sakkie Bosman, former SAP-V, on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town.

[32] Sector 70, Group 3, Box 162, *Safraan – Rekstok*, 1979, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria.

Responses

Over time the local population's freedom to cross the borders became severely curtailed. It became a risky enterprise because of hidden landmines, or one might be mistaken for a SWAPO insurgent. It was safest to cross the border at night, but there was the danger of running into a patrol and at times people literally crawled across. At river borders one had to listen for patrol boats, and a makorro (dugout canoe) was needed to get across, although in a desperate situation bundles of reeds could be tied into a makeshift raft. In the dark there was the added risk of encounters with hippo or crocodiles. Even owning a makorro could cause problems; if the police suspected that it was used for secret transports they might decide to destroy it. Actually getting caught on the river brought enormous trouble. Interrogations involved beatings and threats of worse punishment, so that people gave up information on fellow villagers or were coerced into becoming police informers.[33]

Although borders had become danger zones, the people of the Caprivi continued to cross them for a variety of reasons. As mentioned, going into exile to join SWAPO was one. Recruitment took various forms. After SWAPO and CANU merged there were regular radio broadcasts from Zambia calling on the people of the Caprivi to join the struggle.[34] Visiting SWAPO activists, local teachers and senior students that were CANU or SWAPO members, mobilized young people at secret meetings and at schools. They requested support for their mission to end South African dominance, invited youngsters to join them, and sometimes promised that volunteers would be sent to study in Zambia or Tanzania.[35] In the late 60s SWAPO's appeal was further strengthened because repressive police action against CANU supporters contributed to a militant attitude among the population.[36]

Those who elected to join SWAPO received instructions on when and where to meet, and were then taken secretly across the border. Youngsters were forbidden to tell their parents about their plans. Parents that were consulted realized the dangers involved and did indeed attempt to stop their children from leaving. Undoubtedly their fears were justified, since many of those who left were never seen again.[37] For young recruits however, joining the struggle was also a rite of passage to adulthood. Some of those who stayed behind faced ridicule for lacking courage or not being a 'real man', and would feel impelled to offer justifications, for instance having the care for an elderly or sick family member.[38]

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[33] Interviews with with Beaven Munali on 16 May 2012 and Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo.

[34] Interview with Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi.

[35] Interviews with the Honourable Chief Boniface Shufu on 8 June 2012 at the Royal Palace, Sangwali; Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi; Tokkie Nienaber (former SAP-V) on 4 August at Pretoria.

[36] Interview with Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi.

[37] Interviews with Leonard Musutela and Jeremiah Munanzi on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Mrs Sarah Mweti Mukono and Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo; Samson Mbanga Ntonda and Anonymous at Bukalo on 13 June 2012; Francis Nombano Keleso on 18 July 2012 at Kongola.

[38] Interviews with Anonymous on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo; Elias Muzamai Samashazi on 24 June 2012 at Sangwali; Bagrey Mazungu on 25 June 2012 at Katima Mulilo.

Those people who knew the border landscape and river crossings well found that they were sought out by SWAPO and CANU to lend their valuable assistance. This sometimes came at very great personal cost, as was the case with Anderson Sisuka Munali, who transported SWAPO recruits up the Kwando river to Zambia, until he was caught and sent to Pretoria. The interrogation and torture he underwent left him a broken man.[39] Those who supported the struggle from inside the Eastern Caprivi through their special knowledge of the border zones became well respected in their communities. Knowledge of borders and safe crossing routes also offered a source of income since the South African Police paid informers to report on visitors that arrived from the other side.[40] Furthermore, both SWAPO and ANC insurgents needed escorts across borders and onward through the region, and had money to pay for their services. Sometimes local guides even benefited twice, as was the case when ANC cadres Flag Boshielo and three companions paid a boatman to bring them across the Zambezi and take them through to Botswana. After a dispute about payment, the local guide betrayed them to the South African Police, who paid him for his services.[41]

Having braved the crossing, new recruits presented themselves at the nearest Zambian police station. Unfortunately for them, radio operators of the Zambian National Defence Force (ZNDF) reported on their names and even ID numbers. These transmissions were intercepted by the BRUSH listening post, so that the South African police usually knew exactly who had crossed into Zambia.[42] From there on security police would keep an eye on the recruit's family, in case he returned and sought shelter with them. Parents and siblings were harassed and interrogated on a regular basis. A mother of two boys who had crossed to Zambia tells how her third son, who had no plans to join SWAPO at first, became so terrified of the interrogations and convinced that the police would someday kill him, that he saw no other option but to run away and join SWAPO too.[43] Others joined SWAPO because they were known CANU members, another guarantee of frequent visits and unwanted attention by the South African security forces.[44] Thus, people did not only join SWAPO for ideological reasons, but also because it seemed a safer option than staying in the Caprivi.

Although the main focus of South African patrols was the interception of passing SWAPO fighters, the next best thing was finding those who supported them. SWAPO insurgents frequented a crossing-point in the northwestern corner of the region, where Angola, Zambia and the Eastern and Western Caprivi meet. It was called Terr's Corner by South African policemen.[45] The insurgents received food and shelter in the villages, and were guided

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[39] Interview with Beaven Munali, the son of Anderson Sisuka Munali, on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo.
[40] Interview with Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo.
[41] Interview with Sakkie Bosman (former SAP-V) on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town.
[42] Interview with Sakkie Bosman (former SAP-V) on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town.
[43] Interview with Mrs Sarah Mweti Mukono on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo.
[44] Interview with Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo.
[45] Short for 'Terrorist's Corner'. Du Toit, *Oos-Caprivi*, 11.

across the borders by local sympathizers.[46] Consequently the area was heavily patrolled and the villages were subject to frequent searches, often on the basis of information supplied by local collaborators. The police would arrive at night, surround a village with their vehicles and switch on the headlights, while a helicopter hovered and shone a search light inside the kraal. Young and old were summoned from their beds while policemen and their dogs searched every hut, digging up floors and overturning pots and bags of food. Outside the villagers were interrogated about visitors and CANU sympathizers.[47] The more people professed to know nothing, the more the police would press them and accuse them of offering food and shelter to passing SWAPO fighters.[48] Before leaving, the police would warn villagers against joining SWAPO. They also took a head count and threatened to return periodically to check if everyone was accounted for.[49] Living in constant terror of police action took its toll and villagers started looking across the border to Zambia for safety.

During the late 1960s, groups of people and entire villages fled from the northwestern area of the Eastern Caprivi for Imusho, a Zambian village where SWAPO had established a base. It seems to have been the death of Maxwell Kulibabika that triggered the exodus. Kulibabika was a CANU member who worked as a driver for Wenela, an organization that contracted local men for work on the South African mines. Since Kulibabika's job included transporting the miners from Katima Mulilo to their rural villages, he was well placed to transport SWAPO insurgents through the region. The South African Police found out about his clandestine activities, possibly through an informer, and he was arrested. What happened next remains unclear, but eventually the police brought his body back to Kongola, where it was dumped unceremoniously in a shallow grave while the villagers looked on from a distance. It was probably due to this event that people living in the area became so afraid that they risked the crossing to Zambia.[50] It took a harrowing day and night of running. Babies were carried in arms and toddlers on the back, while small children had to run with their mothers. There are stories of babies born along the way, and of women subsequently having miscarriages or giving birth to a stillborn child.[51] Upon arrival in Imusho the danger was not over, especially if refugees arrived alone with no-one to vouch for them. SWAPO leaders had become suspicious about informers that worked for the South African side and the refugees could

[46] Group interview with the Mayeyi Kuta on 23 May 2012 at Mayeyi Headquarters, Sangwali. Interviews with Anonymous on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola.
[47] Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola. Interviews with Progress Liswaniso on 12 July 2012 at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Francis Nombano Keleso on 18 July 2012 at Masida.
[48] Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola.
[49] Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola.
[50] Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola. Interviews with Mrs Nashaho Sishwama on 9 July 2012 at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola, and Mrs Chibotu on 18 July 2012 at Masida.
[51] Interviews with Mrs Nashaho Sishwama on 9 July at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Mrs Chibotu on 18 July 2012 at Masida.

not always count on a friendly welcome. [52] Furthermore, life in exile was endangered by South African military raids into Zambia, usually follow-up operations after SWAPO attacks. On several occasions Imusho was bombed and because both SWAPO and the South Africans had mined the area, further civilian casualties occurred. Finally, with the influx of refugees at Imusho, famine threatened and people periodically had to risk border crossings in order to collect food from the Eastern Caprivi. [53]

For the people living on the Kwando river, hunting or fishing on its western side had always been a way of supplementing the diet in times of scarcity, and this did not change during the war. As mentioned earlier, this internal border was closed during the war, and the Western Caprivi became a no-go zone reserved for SADF Special Forces units. Initially, police and army patrols hardly bothered those who trespassed to hunt or fish, and even assisted the villagers by shooting problem animals, like elephants that destroyed crops. Many officers liked to hunt for trophies, and would give the meat to nearby villages. [54] However, relations deteriorated when Jan Breytenbach, an avid conservationist, became commander of Fort Doppies in the Western Caprivi. Whether people hunted for the pot, for trophies or for profit from ivory, they were all poachers to him. He single-mindedly pursued anyone caught hunting in the Western Caprivi, and when he found that legal proceedings against trespassers resulted in no more than a slap on the wrist, he took matters in his own hands. [55] Hunters from the Eastern Caprivi lived in fear of him, not just because of his explosive temper, but because he would wreck a hunter's financial prospects by destroying his weapon and makorro. Apart from having to contend with Jan Breytenbach, local hunters also ran the risk that their gunshots would alert passing patrols who would come to investigate and might mistake them for SWAPO insurgents. Crossing the maze of islands and reeds to the Western Caprivi thus had to be done in total silence and by secret routes. [56]

Although to most people borders represented unwarranted restrictions that needed to be circumvented, local Caprivi authorities also adopted border making as a strategy to promote their own political and economic interests. In the early eighties Mafwe leaders attempted to establish an official internal border that would give them control over a large part of the territory. They proposed to have the border running from north to south and, clearly inspired by the cutline the South Africans had created along the Zambian land border, called for a bulldozer to clear a wide strip of vegetation as visual demarcation line. [57] The plan was

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[52] Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola.

[53] Interviews with Fabian Kaka Mwanambwe on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Induna Musiya Edward Ngenda on 17 July 2012 at Mayuni headquarters, Choi; Murphy, *Information Sharing Workshop*, 14.

[54] Interview with Induna Likezo Mapulanga and Charles Kulumbana on 12 July 2012 at Mapulanga village.

[55] Breytenbach, *Eden's Exiles*, 204-222.

[56] Interviews with Leonard Musutela and Jeremiah Munanzi on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Induna Likezo Mapulanga and Charles Kulumbana on 12 July 2012 at Mapulanga village; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola.

[57] Letter from Chief R.M. Mamili to the Budack Commission, dated 23 February 1982, Katima Mulilo, Appendix 20 in Budack, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 119.

vigorously opposed by the Masubya people, the other dominant tribe of the region, who argued that there was no need for such a boundary, since by rights the Masubya were the rulers of the entire Eastern Caprivi. The Budack commission into the boundary dispute, after having heard testimony from both sides, as well as members of the South African administration, observed that the evidence implied that the real issue at stake was not the proposed boundary, but a longstanding rivalry between the Mafwe and Masubiya people, the legitimacy of their respective Chiefs, and a dispute over rights based on first occupancy.[58]

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[58] Budack, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, 10.

Discussion

Although the borders that circumvent the Eastern Caprivi were virtually closed off during the conflict between South Africa and SWAPO, local people nevertheless continued to cross. However, whereas before the war the border was an imaginary line that was crossed unthinkingly, during the conflict borders and border crossings took on new meaning and import. Indeed, borders had become dangerous places, and one needed good reasons to cross them. A number of these reasons were identified and they show that the border represented more than just a place of danger, while crossing the border represented more than a foolhardy and perilous enterprise.

People crossed the border to join SWAPO, because they wanted to be part of the struggle. To them crossing represented an act of resistance, of heroism even, since it was an act against the overwhelming power of the South African ruler. Closely related are those who supported the struggle by guiding SWAPO fighters or recruits across rivers and borders, and as we have seen, their resistance work earned them respect and stature in the community. Young men also joined SWAPO in a spirit of adventure, or because it was a way of proving one's courage, and the crossing thus represented a passage to adulthood. Others joined because they were promised an education, and for them crossing may have represented improved life chances. At the same time, to those parents who were left to fear for their children's lives, the border surely represented grief and loss.

People also crossed to go into exile. They were harassed by police for having relatives that had joined SWAPO, or for being a CANU member or sympathizer. Police security sweeps generated fear in rural villages, especially those located close to the borders, and many deemed it safer to become a refugee in a neighbouring country, especially Zambia, than to stay in the Eastern Caprivi. To them the border crossing, while dangerous in itself, represented a passage to safety.

People crossed borders to go hunting and fishing, especially in times of scarcity. They also used their specialized knowledge of the rivers to act as paid guides to those who needed to cross in secret. Others supplemented their income by working as paid informers who reported on border activity to the South African forces. In all these cases the borders represented economic opportunity through access to income and food.

Lastly, Mafwe leaders adopted the concept of borders or border making as a way of controlling people's freedom of movement that could be exploited to gain dominance in the region. Thus to them borders and border making represented political opportunity.

It seems reasonable to assume that the people of the Eastern Caprivi undertook the hazardous border crossings because their misgivings were overcome by more urgent considerations, such as deep-felt grievances against South African rule, fear for their lives, the need for food and such. At the same time we see evidence of opportunism and political maneuvering. Thus the borders of the Eastern Caprivi, previously unnoticed and

unremarkable, took on a multiplicity of meanings during the Namibian war for liberation. Not surprisingly, many of these meanings are not directly related to the conflict that gave rise to the changes in border access. At the same time those meanings were magnified by the context of war and its attendant dangers. After all, while clandestine border crossings in times of peace may result in a fine or even imprisonment, during times of war they may result in death. In this highly charged context the people of the region sought and managed to resist, subvert, avoid and exploit regulations that were imposed by the powerful South African forces. At the same time the South African authorities perceived them as being docile and cooperative. Borders and border crossings in war situations thus amplify manifestations of human agency at a time when, of necessity, there must appear to be none at all.

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Nigerian Trans-borders and National Security: Examination of the Emerging Terrorist Networks[1]

FALEYE, Olukayode Abiodun
Department of History and International Studies,
Kogi State University, Anyigba,
Kogi State, Nigeria
kayodefaleye@gmail.com
+2348034728908

Abstract
Nigeria's northern international hinterland borders, especially with Chad and Niger have in recent years attracted significant attention in the context of waves of migrants fleeing drought across the borders to Nigeria. These boundaries seem not to function as lines of division between local societies as they appeared to be one of Africa's most 'porous' boundaries. More recently there have been proliferations of arms and ammunition across the Nigerian northern borders thereby fuelling terrorist operations in Nigeria. Security officials have reported incidences of arms proliferations through the Nigerian northern borders of Chad and Niger. For example, on the 30th July, 2012, security operatives seized 8 rocket propelled launchers, 10 rocket bombs, 10 rocket chargers and 12 AK-47 rifles from a group of smugglers in Daban Masara (a border town with Chad) in Munguno local Government Area of Borno State. These seized arms were meant for the deadly *Boko-Haram* terrorist group in Nigeria. Having long regarded the *Boko-Haram* Islamist sect as a localized issue, there has been ample evidence to show that the radical Islamist group has assumed a transnational outlook in terms of training and expertise received beyond the Nigerian borders. Security officials claimed that some of the militants, including bomb makers have been training alongside *Al Shabaab* and Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia. There are also pockets of mobile Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (*AQIM*) affiliates in Chad and Niger, suspected to be providing the training and materials, for bombings and guerrilla attacks by *Boko-Haram* in Nigeria. Facts are also beginning to emerge that *Boko-Haram* has extended its terrorist activities to Nigeria's neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The level of the sect's organization, sophistication of weaponry, casualty rate and transnational connections has clearly shown a linkage with other terrorist networks such as *Al Shabaab* and *AQIM*. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Sahel is now a refuge to a complex network of terrorist groups. These terrorist networks are already having a noticeable influence on the West African countries, especially, Nigeria with the attendant consequences for national security due to porous borders. While there is awareness of the threat posed by terrorist groups in Nigeria, there seems to be a research gap in the literature on the role of porous borders in understanding the emerging terrorist networks in Nigeria. It is against this background that this paper examines how Nigerian trans-borders, especially the northern borders have been providing the groundswell for terrorist networks. This will be done by analyzing data collected from the field study and also drawing both on recent studies and literature on trans-borders and terrorism in Africa.

Introduction

This paper examines the nexus between the porous Nigerian northern borders and the emerging terrorist networks in the Sahel. The focus on the Nigerian border with Niger, Chad and Cameroon are due to the fact that the countries have experienced a shared history of inter-border migration and terrorism. It will be interesting to unravel the roles played by these porous international boundaries in undermining the security of the region. Data sets obtained from oral interviews conducted in Borno, Kano, Plateau, and Kaduna States in Nigeria and Mokolo, Maroua and Yagoua in northern Cameroon between December 2011 and December 2012, combined with information from personal observations and the existing literature on borders, national security and terrorism, were used in the analysis.

In the pre-colonial period, most of the tribes of the Maghreb moved southwards to their present locations in search of security and welfare. The apparent need to exchange products of the different ecological areas

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[1] Paper prepared for the 2013 African Borderlands Research Network (ABORNE) PhD Winter School, Gaston Berger University, Saint-Louis, Senegal 9 – 12 January 2013.

led to trade in commodities which crystallized into the trans-Saharan trade (Yaro, 2005). It should be noted that the integration between the peoples of West Africa transcend beyond trade commodities to include intermarriage between powerful kingdoms, exchange of slaves and military alliances. Thus, the dispersal of the Fulani across the Sahel is an example that involved considerable mobility. Despite the advent of colomialism and the incorporation of West Africa into the Westphalia international system, movement along the border lines continued on a regular basis (Asiwaju, 1985; Adepoju, 2006; 2008). According to Asiwaju (2011), historically, border relations between African states often make transition from barriers to bridges. The scale of migration in the post colonial era has increased tremendously; movement across national borders within West Africa has been facilitated by the ECOWAS protocol on free movement.

According to Adepoju (2006), intra-regional mobility in West Africa has been dominated by North-South movement from landlocked countries of the Sahel (Mali, Niger and Chad) to the most prosperous plantations, mines and cities of coastal West Africa (predominantly Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast). These movements raise new issues, and ultimately have consequences and challenges for security in the region. Nigeria's northern international borders, especially with Chad, Niger and Cameroon have in recent years attracted significant attention in the context of waves of migrants fleeing drought across the borders to northern Nigeria (Ammassari, 2006). These movements have been associated with proliferations of arms and ammunition across the Nigerian northern borders thereby fuelling terrorist operations in Nigeria (Attah, 2012; Ekoko, 2004). Evidence is also emerging, of cooperation between Boko-Haram, *Al Shabaab*, *AQIM* and South American Drug Cartels (Sage, 2011; Ros-Lehtinen et al. 2012). This emerging terrorist network poses a great threat to the national security of countries in West Africa, and especially to Nigeria due to its porous borders.

This study is organized into four important sections, followed by a conclusion. The first section is this introductory section. While the second section examines the conceptual framework of this study; the third attempts an overview of the Nigerian northern borders and national security. The fourth section critically appraises the emerging terrorist networks in the Sahel, and the concluding section summarizes the analysis and highlights its major contribution(s) to knowledge.

Conceptual Framework

State borders are significant in international relations. The features of each state border are unique and there are several types of borders (Paasi, 2005; Kolossov, 2005; Brunet-Jailly, 2005). According to Prescott (1987:5), the border is a political and geographical concept, referring to the separation of national territories within the international system. Borders are instruments of state policy. The policies of state authorities are determined by the degree of control they exercise over their borders. Indeed, borders represent the line of contact between states, and afford opportunities for both peace and conflict. Traditionally, security is often defined in terms of national peace and safety from foreign aggression. However, recent development suggests that greater threats to national security lie in the possible proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons into the hand of non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist networks. International border is connected to national security by three central aspects that is, state's political standing, governmental control, and the nature of threats. The factor of "failed state" makes porous international borders a national security problem due to its consequential spread of conflicts from one country to another (Starr, 2009:5). Failing states are characterized by an increased number of organized armed opposition groups which are challenging the central government such as, the *Boko-Haram* sect in Nigeria and al Shaabab in Somalia.

A state can only maintain absolute authority over its territory when its borders are impermeable. The border is one of the constituents of the state as a system, determining its territory and the scope of sovereignty. In the process of economic and political integration, states delegate part of their sovereignty to joint institutions. As a result of these actions, state border functions change (Moraczewska, 2010). An

example of this phenomenon is the ECOWAS protocol in West Africa. Along with the transition of borders the sovereignty of the state may transform.

The realistic, transnational, and global paradigms are the different ways of perceiving the major actors in international relations and their drivers. The realistic paradigm features the state as the most important player in the international system – forging alliances and engaging in conflicts (Knutsen, 1997). The transnational paradigm devotes considerable attention to the operations of non-state actors within international relations (Rosenau, 1997). The network framework is embedded in the model of transnational social spaces. The model acknowledges the presence of various migration related cross-border linkages between individuals and groups (Pries, 1999; Faist, 2000). Indeed, transnational social spaces consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties that can be found in multiple states. This tie represents a social capital that allows actors to cooperate in networks and organizations, serving as a mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities. The global paradigm argues that the rise and functioning of transnational networks' acts to connect the subjects of international relations. Taking into consideration the perception of state border according to each paradigm, one can see the transition of its porosity from a barrier to fictional line in international relations.

Borders are central to state security. While the borders are undergoing a re-closing process against transnational terrorist threats in some countries, border as a resource rather than a problem is still desired. Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) examined how people who were divided by the state borders have adjusted to the borderland situation, and the strategies they use in order to extract different types of resources of borders and borderlands. According to this study, borders in Africa have generally been conceived as barriers, whereas they also provide conduits and opportunities such as, currency arbitrage and the re-import business. These enable Border-Landers to earn more profits from cross-border business transactions. According to Dobler and Zeller (2009) borders provide opportunities which other places do not offer due to its proximity to different realms of political and economic regulations. This feature creates opportunities inform of different price regimes and tax evasions which combined to turn the borders into economic hot spots.

Internally determined boundaries are those that are consciously determined by the people themselves with their interests as the central determinants through treaties and negotiations, such boundaries are believed to be crisis free. On the other hand, externally determined boundaries are those superimposed by foreign powers and interests - they are believed to be conflict prone. African territorial borders are externally determined. The colonial regime dismantled African cultural boundaries (Griffiths, 1986). According to some scholars, territorial boundaries should be parallel with ethnic boundaries, in order to alleviate conflicts associated with artificial territorial boundaries (Soyinka, Mazrui, and wa Mutua, in Asiwaju, 2003; Zartman, 1965; Anene, 1970; Touval, 1972). Despite the partition of the Continent in principle, Africans continue to disregard the artificial borders emanating from colonialism thereby making the borders fictional lines (Asiwaju, 1984; Weigert, et al, 1957; Williams, 2006).

The concept of national security in terms of military defense began to be eroded in the post cold war era. The cold war bi-polar environment had narrowed the scope of security as one of action-reaction dynamics of rival powers. Thus, the analysis of security was based solely on the concepts of threats and power (Wyn, 1999). This called for a re-conceptualization of national security to encapsulate state and non-state factors. The Grand Strategy aims at the integration of military, political, and economic means to pursue states' ultimate objectives in the international system (Waltz, 1979; Kennedy 1991). Every country often designs its foreign policies with a focus on protecting herself interest within the international system (Ikenberry 2002; Nye 2002). For instance, many countries have formulated anti terrorism policies in the wake of transnational terrorism (Brzezinski 2004; Ferguson 2004).

The balance of power approach posits an equilibrium doctrine which is intended to prevent any one nation from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. The world is seen as made up of rational state actors who do what comes naturally from uniting in alliances or coalitions with one another to counter a threat. (Lansford et. al. 2006; Waltz, 1979). Today, multilateralism is the most

popular balance of power ideology (Ikenberry 2002; Nye 2002). It enforces policies to enhance cooperation with other states. Collective security proposes an ethical obligation toward mutual disarmament and renunciation of aggression. Collective security is an approach which sees national security as a side benefit of world order to be managed by some transcendent authority from above. It is the theoretical foundation upon which the organizations known as the League of Nations and the United Nations were built. A fundamental collective security principle is that violence in pursuit of change should be a last resort, and any demands for change should first have their perceptions of interests and claims of justice expressed peacefully in some kind of world forum.

The democratic peace approach argues that democracies almost never go to war with one another and they are good at achieving various peacetime goals such as protection of human rights, economic development, environmental protection, control of terrorism, transparency (Rummel, 2009).

Considering the existing literature, it is obvious that there is a research gap in understanding the concepts of borders and national security within a transitional global system. The popular standpoint in the literature is to perceive the agency of borders and national security narrowly within the context of state actors. The network framework which hoped for a utopian integrative and peaceful global system driven by non state actors, failed to address its inherent contradictions (such as the social capital fueling transnational terrorism in the Sahel). It is this gap in the literature that suggests the problem to the researcher for scholastic interrogation. Thus, this work advances this discussion by examining the intercourse between porous borders, state and non state actors and national security in historical perspective.

Overview of Nigerian Northern Borders and National Security

Nigeria, with a land area of about 923,768 sq. Km and a coastline of about 774km, shared its northern international boundaries with Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Figure 1). These boundaries based on the colonial structure have very few boundary markers making the borders a fictional line separating national territories in the region (Bonchuk, 2006). The Nigeria-Niger border is about 1600km and demarcated with 148 boundary markers on land with a water boundary along the Kumadugu Yobe River and ends on the Lake Chad for a distance of 26.7km. The Nigerian-Chad border is about 96km characterized by a straight line sector joining the Niger/Nigeria/Chad tri-point with the Nigeria/Cameroon/Chad tri-point. The Nigeria/Cameroon border extends from the Niger/Nigeria/Chad tri-point and extends southwards to the Benue River in Adamawa/North West Cameroon area (Figure 2) (Ikelegbe, 2009).

These borders are porous due to their high level permeability. These porous borders are characterized with commodity trading, smuggling, illegal migration and of recent arms proliferation by terrorists and bandits. The pace of arms proliferation across the Nigerian northern borders since the dawn of the *Boko-Haram* crisis is on the rise. Security officials have reported the confiscation of thousands of AK 47 assault rifles and Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) in many states in the north such as Borno, Yobe, Kaduna and Kano. For example, on the 30th July, 2012, security operatives seized 8 rocket propelled launchers, 10 rocket bombs, 10 rocket chargers and 12 AK-47 rifles from a group of smugglers in Daban Masara (a border town with Chad) in Munguno local Government Area of Borno State. These seized arms were meant for the deadly *Boko-Haram* terrorist group. According to Major General Shehu Abdulkabir, the Chief of Army Standards and Evaluation, about 7million illegal weapons are already in circulation in the country (Onabanjo, 2012; Olugbode, et al., 2012).

Historically, socioeconomic and political factors are the major pull agents encouraging cross border movement along porous international boundaries. Economic driver of conflict across borders are sustained by formal and informal trade, quest to secure access to seaports and mineral resources, drought, land rights and remittances, and the wider impact of localized conflicts (Roy, 2009). An important pull factor is the interpersonal migrant networks in the receiving country which comprised of people sharing kinship, friendship, religion and origin (Taylor, 1986; Massey et.al., 1993; Oberg, 1996; Bijak, 2006). Indeed, illegal migration between Nigeria and its northern neighbors is facilitated by the social capital in existence

since the pre-colonial period. This social capital; in the form of shared language, culture, religion and intergroup relations that is rooted in antiquity facilitates the assimilation of illegal migrants including terrorists in northern Nigeria. According to Asiwaju (1985), African traditional boundaries have been drawn across well-established lines of communication with strong kinship ties, shared political institutions and economic resources; common customs and practices. Asiwaju posited that the borders created by the colonial Masters were not absolute as cross-border activities such as migration and smuggling took place on a daily basis. In this perspective, the Nigeria-Niger-Chad-Cameroon frontiers are essentially legal limits which distinguish the jurisdiction of different political regimes.

Figure 1: A Map of Nigeria

Figure 2: Nigeria/Chad/Cameroon border

The 1973 global oil crisis caused a windfall of oil revenues in Nigeria. The associated economic boom turned Nigeria into a major migration destination within Africa. Rising incomes of the urban middle class and rapid industrialization attracted a substantial number of West African labour migrants. However, the post 1981 fall in oil prices heralded a long period of economic downturn alongside sustained political repression and violence. Consequently, between 1983 and 1985 Nigeria deported a large number of West-African migrants (Arthur 1991: 74). Despite past expulsions and the economic decline after 1980, substantial communities of West-African migrants still remained in Nigeria, and immigration has continued at modest levels. It is difficult to ascertain the actual numbers of foreigners in Nigeria, although according to recent UN estimates, over 971,000 immigrants live in Nigeria.

Economically, Nigeria's northern neighbors such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon relied heavily on cross border trade with Nigeria. For instance, food security in Niger depends largely on cross border trade in agricultural and livestock products with Nigeria (CEDEAO-ECOWAS Cross-border Initiative Report, 2007). Examining the impact of cross-border trade between Nigeria and her northern neighbors, Abdullahi Omaki, the Nigeria Ambassador to Chad, asserts:

> The volume of trade, largely unrecorded, is about 80 per cent in favour of Nigeria, he said. Most of the goods and services coming into Chad, 80 per cent come from Nigeria with less than 20 per cent coming from Cameroon. If the borders were not closed and you go through the Banki road, the Gambo road you will see the numbers of trailers that are plying that route on daily basis…Now that the border has been closed with effect from the end of last year, if you ask the Cameroonian authority, they will tell you how much they are losing in terms of revenue that they collect from these vehicles that pass through Banki and Gamboru ("Nigeria's border closure grounds economic activities in Chad and Cameroon". Transformation Watch. Retrieved on 18/12/2012from

According to Rotberg (2004), "Weak states" are states in which the government is not investing in public goods and services, and is facing an increased percentage of crime and corruption. Secondly, "Failing states" are characterized by an increased number of crimes and violence that is politically or communally motivated. Thirdly, "Failed states" have armed opposition groups challenging the central government in a civil war such as the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the Tuaregs in Mali and *Al Shabaab* in Somalia. An extreme form of state failure occurs when the central government collapsed entirely such as in Somalia and now Mali. The countries are ruled by competing militias without a central government. According to the Failed States Index 2011, published by the Fund for Peace; Chad, Nigeria and Niger were among the first 15 failing States in the world; while Chad was tagged a completely failed State, Nigeria and Niger were regarded as failing ("Failed State Index 2011" retrieved on 22/05/2012 from:http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi).

Terrorists often take advantage of States' weaknesses. According to scholars, there are some weak governments who came to power illegitimately and failed to maintain law and order, such governments lack legitimacy and effectiveness (Rotberg, 2004; Starr, 2009). In failing states such as Chad, Niger and Nigeria, the terrorist groups are taking advantage of the weak systems of law and security, which enabled them to organize freely and plan attacks. Thus, the inability of these "weak" states to meet the basic needs of their citizens and effectively assert political authority are stimulating insurrection and undermining national security. According to the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 'Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the (Nigerian) government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state" (Clinton, "Nigeria: Lack of Good Governance", The Nation, Friday, August 14, 2009, p.1).

The history of terrorism and religious fundamentalism in Nigeria could be traced from the Maitasine riots of the early eighties. The Maitasine religious sect was founded by late Malam Muhammadu Marwa alias Allah Ta-Tsine or Maitatsine (a Cameroonian). With an ideology that was opposed to most aspects of modernization and to all Western influence. The sect decried modern innovations such as radios, wrist watches, automobiles, motorcycles, and western education. Those who associated with these things or who read books other than the Qur'an were considered to be infidels. In the Maitatsine crisis, 4,177 people were murdered (Adebayo, 2010). However, in 2002, another group (Boko-Haram) with a similar ideology emerged from Northern Nigeria. The *Boko-Haram* sect has adopted tactics similar to al-Qaeda operations and often engages the services of suicide bombers against churches and other Western Institutions in Nigeria. Significant among these attacks are the August 2011 bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja, the 2011 Christmas Day attack on a Catholic church in Madalla near Abuja, the bombing of Abuja police barrack in June 2011 and the several kidnap for ransome operations. Latest statistics show that over 10,000 people have been murdered by the sect since its emergence in 2002 (Shwayder, 2012).

The impact of porous borders with its attendant transborder terrorism on national security includes the weakening of States' authority and creation of a graded effect. Since the social, economic, political and military powers of the State are mutually interwoven, an attack on any of them will naturally dislocate the others which may result in State collapse. For instance, evidence is emerging that the *Boko-Haram sect* has already infiltrated the oil rich South-South geopolitical region of Nigeria (Campbell, 2011). Considering the core role played by crude oil in the Nigerian economy, any coordinated terrorist attack on the Nigerian oil facilities may lead to the final collapse of the Nigerian State.

Contrary to the claim that the partition of Africa into artificial territories created the current national security problems on a continental scale, Ekoko (2004:3-4) argued:

> Africa and Africans were not the only or even the first continent or peoples to
> be partitioned. North America was partitioned by the British, the French and

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the Spaniards: Latin America and Central America were partitioned between Portugal and Spain, France and Britain; Asia was the victim of British, French, Chinese, Portugal, Germany and even Japan… how were other continents able to conduct and manage the realities of theirs partition?… Indeed the European partition of Africa was basically an extension of a long historical process.

Thus, Nigeria has a uniquely peculiar Geostrategic location which could translate her boundaries to bridges for regional cooperation and integration or a catalyst for dysfunctional international relations.

Nigerian Northern Borders and Terrorist Networks
Competing with the widening economic challenges of States is the expansion of non state actors such as *Boko-Haram, Al Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM)* whose behavior can have a significant impact beyond national boundaries. Indeed, the cumulative effects of their actions can have profound consequences for the international system. Thus, although states continue to be the most important international actors, they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies. The aggregate effect of actions by multitudes of non-state actors can have potent effects that transcend national boundaries. According to Adamson (2006), cross border movement has moved to the top of the international security agenda and much of the discussion has focused on migration flows as a conduit for international terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States, the *Al Qaeda* insurgencies in the Maghreb and Sahel, and the recent *Boko-Haram* crisis in Nigeria could not but raise concerns regarding the relationship between the cross-border mobility of people and international terrorism.

AQIM aspires to become a transnational movement across the Maghreb and Sahel areas, encompassing the militants and communities that were loyal to earlier generations of Islamist militant groups in the region including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF), Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ), and others. These groups were effectively suppressed by North African governments, forcing them to migrate across the borders to other areas of the Maghreb and Sahel (Bowser and Sanders, 2012; Sage, 2011; Hanson and Vriens, 2009). *AQIM* has already posed the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in West Africa, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand (Figure 3). The group has professed its loyalty to *Al Qaeda*'s senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the region. Their operations have been characterized by the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping operations, drug trafficking and assassinations. *AQIM*'s targets include African civilians, government officials, and security services; United Nations (UN) diplomats, Western embassies, tourists, aid workers, and private sector contractors (Meeham and Speier, 2011; Sage, 2011; Ros-Lehtinen et al. 2012). As a result, combating *AQIM* is the focus of substantial foreign security assistance provided by Western countries, including the United States and France, to their partner nations in the Maghreb and Sahel.

The emergence of *AQIM* spinster group – *Jamaal Taw hid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Ifrigiya* (The movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – MOJWA) in 2011, poses a great security risk to West African States. MOJWA had declared its mission to spread Jihad beyond North Africa to Sub-Saharan West Africa. A peculiar characteristic of this group is that it is dominated predominantly by young Black Africans under the leadership of Hamada Ould Mohammed Kheiro, a Mauritanian (Bowser and Sanders, 2012). This demonstrates the intension of factions within *AQIM* to incorporate Sub-Sahara West Africa into its area of influence.

Figure 3: A Map showing Terrorism Hot Spots in the Sahel (Source: International Centre for Terrorism Studies –ICTS: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies- January 2012)

While there is media hype on the operations of the Nigerian dreaded *Boko-Haram* group within Nigeria, there is the dearth of scholarly writing about the threat posed by *AQIM* and other terrorist groups in conjunction with Boko-Haram in the region. This work examines how the porous Nigerian northern borders are enhancing the seriousness of the threat posed by this emerging terrorist networks in the region. An examination of the *AQIM-Boko-Haram* relations suggests a cordial networking between the two movements. In a recent communiqué to Nigeria's Muslim community, *AQIM* emir Drukdal posits:

> We are ready to train your children to use weapons and will supply them with all we can, including support and men, weapons, ammunitions and equipment, in order to defend our people in Nigeria and respond against the aggression of the Christian minority. (Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, Emir of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (*AQIM*) "The Annihilation of the Muslims in Nigeria; A New Episode in the Continuous Crusade War" Released on: February 1, 2010. Retrieved on 15/08/12 from http:// https://flashpoint-intel.com/inteldocument/*AQIM*-the-annihilation-muslims-in-niigeria.pdf).

Security officials have reported communications, training, and weapons link between *AQIM*, *Boko-Haram* and *Al Shabaab* (Ros-Lehtinen et al. 2012; Sage 2011; Meeham and Speier, 2011). These may have strengthened Boko-Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. Efforts by the Nigerian security official to comb the northern borders of terrorist elements have been unsuccessful owing to the wide expanse of border area serving as escape route for the militants into Niger, Chad and Cameroon. In July, 2012, thirty six people including Chadians and Cameroonians were identified among those killed in a gun battle between the Nigeria military formation and members of the *Boko-Haram* sect. Examining the involvement of Cameroonians in the *Boko Haram* operations, Sheik Ibrahim Mbombo Mubarak (Imam of the Central Mosque in Douala and the President of the Association of Cameroonian Imams) asserts:

> Some prominent members of the group, including Mohammad Nour and Mohamed Kahirou are Cameroonians who actually grew up in Douala and have since returned following the ongoing crackdown against the sect in Nigeria ("*Boko-Haram* infiltrates Cameroon" Retrieved on 22/11/12

Buttressing the above, emerging evidence shows that Islamic militant groups in Nigeria have extended their influences to Nigeria's northern neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. For instance, a recent survey conducted in the Cameroonian towns of Mokolo, Maroua and Yagoua in northern Cameroon showed that 60% of those interviewed expressed sympathy for the *Boko-Haram* group (Personal Communication). This "sympathy" probably based on shared religion (Islam) and kinship may translate to an existing or evolving shield or refuge for the terrorist group. In Plateau state, Nigeria, some of the surviving victims of the Jos crisis have claimed that their assailants were militants from Chad and Niger Republic (personal communication). A series of attacks on Christian Berom communities in Plateau state in July, 2012 led to the death of hundreds of people including 2 lawmakers. According to security officials, no fewer than 300 Fulani mercenaries from Chad and Niger carried out the massacre (Shobayo et al., 2012). This illustrates the effect of porous borders vis-à-vis terrorist networks on Nigerian national security.

 A new trend among terrorist organizations in the Sahel involves symbiotic relationship between established "transnational" and emerging "local" terrorist groups (Figure 4). This is a system in which terrorist groups complement themselves based on their area of comparative advantage. An examination of the economics of terrorism suggests that a terrorist group need to recruit, train, equip, and sustain its forces. A major challenge confronting *AQIM* is manpower while the *Boko-Haram* is in possession of surplus manpower (*Almajiris*) but in need of weapons and funding to carry out its operations. *AQIM* has only managed to recruit a small number of militants from across northwest Africa. Other than Algerians, the largest number of *AQIM* recruits came from Mauritania (Bowser and Sanders, 2012; Sage, 2011). Between 2007 and 2009, some Nigerians associated with the Boko-Haram group were arrested for trafficking young Muslim youths from northern Nigeria to *AQIM* camps in Mauritania, among those arrested include Mallam Bello Damagun (the Director of Media Trust Limited) (Meeham and Speier, 2011; Akanji, 2009). Thus, it can be inferred that the *Boko-Haram* sect is complementing *AQIM* by providing the latter with recruits in exchange for weapons, funding and trained machineries.


Figure 4: Diagram showing the symbiotic relationship between Terrorist Groups

European hostages have been by far the most valuable source of revenue for *AQIM*. According to analysts, the estimate of ransoms paid for Western hostages between 2008 and 2010 amounted to $25 million (Sage, 2011; Bowser and Sanders, 2012). It can be deduced that other terrorist groups in the Sahel such as *Boko-Haram* also conduct kidnap for ransome operations and deliver their hostages back to *AQIM* leaders for a fee. On 19th December, 2012, a French expatriate was kidnapped by militants in Rimi, a border town with Niger Republic in Katsina State, Nigeria. In a reaction to the incident, French President, Hollande asserts that 'He was captured by a heavily armed group which killed two Nigerians and is probably linked to *AQIM* or the groups which are today in Mali' (RFI). This case and others, proposes a linkage between *AQIM* and earlier tagged "local terrorist" groups such as *Boko-Haram* in Nigeria. For instance, the level of the sect's organization, pattern of operation, type of weapons, casualty rate and targets suggests a linkage with other terrorist networks such as *AQIM* and *Al Shabaab*.

It seems that the porous borders of West Africa are creating new opportunities for the Drug Cartels of South America. An ongoing relationship with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and other drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Latin America to protect cocaine shipments into Europe would exponentially increase *AQIM*'s revenue stream and its operational capacity (Ros-Lehtinen et al., 2012). On July 1, 2010 the U.S attorney for the Southern District of New York uncovered a case that showcased an evolving connection between South American Drug Cartels and terrorist groups in the Sahel. The indictment showed drug trafficking organizations in Colombia and Venezuela (involving the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) with the mission to transport several multi-ton loads of cocaine through Liberia en route the Sahara to Europe. In exchange for trans-shipment rights the drug traffickers agreed to pay in both cash and product (Weiser and Rashbaum, 2010). This shows the emerging network between established designated Latin American drug cartels and West African terrorist groups that move the cocaine northward into lucrative markets in Europe. In this way, terrorist organizations continue to survive through an ever expanding network, signaled by the desire to complement each other based on their various areas of comparative advantage such as funding, weaponry, manpower, training, geography, raw materials and market.

Conclusion

The concept of 'border' in African philosophy has always been defined by lines of ethnological divisions not a physical barrier. It was discovered that the Nigerian northern borders have historically functioned as a fictional line of cultural division characterized by inter-regional wave of migrations. The State boundaries in West Africa were drawn without consideration of the ethnic composition of the region. Thus, some ethnic groups were divided between national boundaries. For instance, the Yoruba ethnic group is found in both Nigeria and Benin Republic and the Hausa ethnic group in both Nigeria and Niger. This circumstance creates both productive and destructive transnational solidarity across national boundaries.

This paper argues that the borders are bridges of opportunities or discord within the international system. Instead of serving as a bridge of economic integration, the proliferation of weapons and mercenaries across the Nigerian-Niger-Chad-Cameroon frontiers signaled the consequences of State failure now spreading across the Sahel. Factors such as extreme poverty, drought, insecurity and pandemic corruption, have attracted political pirates (terrorists) from the neighboring failing state, who are easily assimilated into the country through the social capital in existence since the pre-colonial period.

The new trend and pattern of the emerging terrorist networks involves a symbiotic relationship between pockets of terrorist organization in the Sahel and beyond. It was established that *AQIM* in conjunction with its spinster group - MOJWA are the nucleus of the emerging terrorist network in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan West Africa. While *AQIM* assist the South American Drug-Cartels to transport narcotics to Europe, it receives ammunition and financial compensation in return. Also, *AQIM* receives new recruits and captives from Boko-Haram in Nigeria and in return supports the organization with weapons, training,

funding and experienced mercenaries. In this purview, the role played by *Al Shabaab* is negligible due to lack of concrete evidence on its operations in the region.

Thus, this work asserts that in the absence of legitimate and effective government, the porous borders instead of fostering regional economic integration will continue to serve as a bridge of opportunities for non state actors such as terrorist groups.

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Fayomi, Oluyemi, Covenant University, Department of Political Science and Relations, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Topic: Is West Africa Borderless? : Non-State Actors in Intra-Regional Migration in West Africa

Abstract

The inter-state borders remain mini "iron curtains" and "narrow gates" through which migrants traverse with pain, stress and tears. Visa requirements have been removed but migrants continue to be confronted by customs and police harassment, resulting in considerable economic loss and humiliation. The barriers erected on the trans-boundary roads are done on the pretext of security, which impede traffic and are a major cog in the wheel of the ECOWAS dream of borderless West Africa. In January, 2007, the Heads of State of the member States of ECOWAS had reached an agreement in January 2007 that only two checkpoints should be maintained along common borders, but up till now, the agreement is yet to be implemented. The paper will utilise multi-methods which include ethnography and case study in analysing the intricacies surrounding the borders and ineffective Protocol on Free Movement in West Africa and the effects on the non-state actors. An empirical analysis show that some of the overzealous security personnels at the borders use touts as agents to extort illegal levies; these are not uniformed men, but they enjoy *de facto* recognition by frequent migrants or commuters and the implicit acceptance of (official) operatives who benefit from their illegal activities. These touts who act as fronts for the security officials are familiar with and have regarded West Africa as a sub-region of free movement. Independence has altered the traditionally borderless migration systems, while recent political and economic crises in formerly labour-importing countries of the sub-region have led to restricted regulations on migration and a series of threats of expulsions. The free movement of persons within the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) community is an enduring achievement of the organization. Targets are set for a community passport and a single monetary zone. The formation of ECOWAS was a legal seal on the interaction, cooperation and socio-economic symmetry and satisfied the yearnings of the States for closer collaboration, as shown by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Ghana and Nigeria have been playing pivotal roles in the formation and administration of ECOWAS; they have emerged as natural leaders of the region by virtue of their economic clout and relative political stability. The Ghanaian and Nigerian diasporas living in Nigerian and Ghana respectively are used as the case study of the non-state actors that move back and forth within the region. It is against this backdrop that this paper discusses the reasons for the formation of ECOWAS and the need to implement the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons ratified by the 15-member States. The implementation of the Protocol by the government of the member States and the officials at the borders will lead to borderless West Africa.

Keywords: ECOWAS, Borderless, Protocol

Introduction

The formation of Economic Community of West Africans States (ECOWAS) in 1975 opened the opportunities to formally migrate from one country to other member countries of ECOWAS. The phase one of the ECOWAS Protocol was signed in Dakar on May 28, 1979 and was ratified by member States on April 8, 1980. ECOWAS was established for the purpose of promoting cooperation, and sustainable development among the member states, and sub-regional integration. The ultimate aim is to raise the standard of living of the sub-region's diverse peoples. In order to achieve the stated goals, ECOWAS embarked on a program of economic integration to attain accelerated and sustained economic growth within the region through the enforcement of Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, goods and Services. This is the policy of complete elimination of all barriers to free movement of goods, capital and persons. This was undertaken through a structured regional programme of trade liberalisation which was hinged on the complete removal of all barriers to trade within the region, establishment of a customs union, establishment of a common external tariff and the elimination of customs duties and taxes of similar effect and liberalisation of migration barriers. The overall purpose is to ensure stability and economic growth throughout the region by opening up the door to greater gains for the member States of the community. In reality, while looking back at its 37th year of the existence of EOWAS, ECOWAS internal market programme remains largely incomplete due to the low commitment and lack of effective compliance on the part of member States in the implementation of regional decisions. Though the regional policy of trade liberalization offers a catalogue of rational conjoint utilities and benefits to be derived when completed, which otherwise member States cannot achieve alone, it is clear that those utilities and benefits lack rationality in the minds of member States actor's preferences. The missing gaps hinge on the poor implementation of the ECOWAS policies and Protocols, in which 16-member States of ECOWAS are signatories

and parties to the enforcement (Mauritania withdrew in December, 2000). When the ECOWAS Protocol on free Movement, Residence and Establishment was enacted in 1991, it held great promise for the earlier vision of the founding fathers for a borderless West African region. The Protocol indicated that West Africa was envisioned to become a region where national, boundaries would become "lines on water", as it were, for ECOWAS citizens, who could, traverse the entire region without any socio-economic and political obstacles. After the promulgation of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1975, the Protocol on Free Movement had to be enacted to layout the legal and administrative framework for the implementation of free movement and residence

Research Question

Are the formal institutional arrangements e.g. ECOWAS Protocol enhancing or obstructing the integrative roles of the Nigerian and Ghanaian diasporas in Ghana and Nigeria respectively?

Migration within West Africa in Retrospect: Pre-colonial to Post-colonial Eras.

Migration within the present day West African sub- region in the pre-colonial era existed over a long period of years. Adepoju (2006) is of the view that intra and inter-country movements continue to be a central feature of the people's life in the region and the general features of the migrants within West African sub-region include temporary cross-border workers, professionals, clandestine workers and refugees. Much of the movement has been from the northern zones to the coastal regions, short term, male dominated and over long distances.

While expatiating on the pre-colonial activities of the migrants in the sub-region, Adepoju (1998) opines that trade-related migration between Nigeria and Ghana (former Gold Coast) also featured the pre-colonial period and involved both males and females. Indeed, migrants have always considered West Africa as an economic unit within which people, trade in goods and services flowed freely. The distinction between internal and international migration is obscured: migration between neighbouring countries with similar social and ethno-cultural features took place on a routine basis; these factors also facilitated migrants' relocation at the destination.

Colonial Period in Retrospect

Amin (1974) asserts that the colonial period provoked large-scale labour migration required for plantations, mines and public administration beyond local supply. These resulted into a series of economic measures, including compulsory recruitment, contract and forced labour legislation and agreements to secure cheap labour, sparked clandestine internal and cross-border migration of unskilled adult males required for infrastructural work, especially transport networks in the north and plantation agriculture in the coastal countries .

According to Adepoju (1998) the colonialists paid little regard to the socio-cultural realities of countries, and many ethnic groups split by pencil sketches in adjacent countries regarded movements across artificial boundaries simply as an extension of internal migrations, in line with longstanding ethnic solidarity. Free movement across frontiers was facilitated by cultural affinity, especially where immigrants speak the same language, and share the same customs with the indigenous population of the host country.

Zachariah and Conde(1981) affirm that forced recruitment later gave way to free migration of individuals and families in search of better living conditions in cocoa farms, plantations

and forestry in Ghana and cote d'Ivoire, and groundnut fields in Senegal and Gambia. Circular savannah-coastal short-term and male- dominated migration now classified as international migration spanned wide areas especially from the north to coastal, prosperous agricultural regions.

Post-colonial

In the Post-colonial period, migration is heavy especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where almost 7 out of 10 people who had moved abroad were estimated to live in other sub-Saharan African countries in 2005. (Migration DRC) (2007). For example, almost 3 per cent of West Africans living in the region is not living in their country of origin . Between 1989 and 1991, the number of Malians in Côte d'Ivoire was estimated at somewhere over 1 million. Burkina Faso alone had about 3 millions of its nationals living in Côte d'Ivoire. ECOWAS Commission, 2007: 3)

According to report by ECA (2012) the studies confirm that at mid-2007, among non-citizens living elsewhere in ECOWAS there were no less than 270,000 refugees in the West African region, with most of them fleeing civil wars in Liberia (120,000) and Sierra Leone (19,000). In Guinea, it was estimated that some 15,800 refugees were living in the country, the majority from Liberia.

Oumar Ba and Choplin (2005) analyse that about 93 per cent of emigrants from Niger were living in Africa compared with 27 per cent and 33 per cent of emigrants from São Tomé and Príncipe and Cape Verde. According to official estimates, about 100,000, predominantly Senegalese and, to a lesser extent, Malians live in Mauritania

It should be emphasised also that migration activities in West African sub-region from pre-colonial through the post colonial have remained largely un-documented but the difference between pre-colonial and post colonial migration dynamics in the sub-region has been the

unhindered and un-policed borders which lacked physical landmarks that existed in the pre-colonial.

The Activities of Nigerian and Ghanaian Diasporas in Origin and Destination Countries in West Africa

Nigerian and Ghanaian diasporas and their associations operate in transnational settings by taking advantage of the opportunities that are available to them as a result of the Protocol on Free movement of Persons, and Rights of Residence and Establishment. The process enables the diasporas and their associations to operate transnational networks crisscrossing Ghana and Nigeria. They are able to build social, economic, and political bridges with valuable benefits across borders.

As succinctly expressed by Weiner (1985), the bilaterisation of migration may also become linked to other bilateral issues which are trade, investment, aid, water resources, and environments - involving a variety of diplomatic and bureaucratic agencies hitherto not related to migration issues. He further stipulates that any investigation on international migration issues should involve a close study of the changing intra-bureaucratic relationships within both sending and receiving countries.

The South-South migration involving different categories of migrants both skilled and unskilled workers remains the magnitude of migration streams. The migration takes place in diverse political, economic and ecological settings but remains essentially intra-regional. The bulk of the migrations with the resultant diasporic statuses play fundamental roles in the livelihood strategies of many families and communities in West Africa. The study of intra-African migration streams within West African sub-region is necessary for planning and

implementing holistic migration policies for the development of West Africa and Africa as a whole.

As a result of this development, the issues of migration and diasporas' activities in both Nigeria and Ghana have become a subject of bilateral and regional discussions. At the bilateral level, it raises the issue of socio-economic integration. This is reiterated by the Chairman of ECOWAs as emphasised by Onuorah and Obayuwana (2009:15) that the focus of ECOWAS discussions will remain on the imperatives of the socio-political and economic stability and meaningful integration' In this paper, the conditions of the diasporas in Ghana and Nigeria, especially with respect to their enterprises and contributions to the development of their countries and destination countries are examined in relation to the ECOWAS Protocols for the purpose of moving freely on all territories of Member States.

Therefore, within the context of ECOWAS integrative programmes, it is imperative to state that effective bilateral relations between Nigeria and Ghana, as a result of diasporas developmental activities, can be emulated by other Member States of ECOWAS within the region, culminating in the strengthening of socio-economic cum political integration of the sub region.

The Protocol of Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence and Establishment in West Africa in Perspectives

Migrations within the West Africa and Africa in general have been regular phenomena and have been on the increase over the years. In the current continuous integrated world, migration across borders will expand. One of the founding principles of the African Economic Community AEC (chapter VI of the Abuja Treaty) is the free movement of people and their right of residence and establishment across borders. According to the UNDP (2009), the People's freedom to move country is a basic human entitlement, recognized in the 1948

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as "freedom of movement". Movement of people is the ability of individuals, families or groups of people to choose their place of residence, and human movement or migration as the act of changing one's place of residence. Free movement of people in Africa consists in enabling REC nationals to move freely in all the REC member states (and thus to exempt them from needing a visitor's visa or residence permit), allowing them to reside in a member state other than their country of origin and eventually to establish in one country and exercise an employment there or undertake commercial and industrial activities.

Firstly, the personal experience of this research in 2009 along Nigeria-Seme-Togo – Ghana borders revealed that driving freely from Lagos to Ghana was impossible without harassment, extortion of money and unnecessary delays at the border checkpoints by the overzealous official and unofficial security operatives which made the sub-region full of restrictions and bottlenecks, in-fact some drivers revealed that they sometimes spend hours at borders where customs and immigration officials delay them. The journey that should have ordinarily taken them three hours may end up becoming ten hours. These have negative consequences on their turnover per day. At the borders and checkpoints where unofficial fees were demanded, they do not receive receipts to prove payment later to their clients. The use of "Kelebe" who are unofficial agents of the security operatives along the border is rampant. Like many other transport companies in the West African sub-region, they bear costs and lose income due to unpredictable expenses on West African roads and borders

Secondly, below is the analysis of the survey conducted by the Trade Hub on public and private sector representatives in eight countries in order to identify the gaps in the implementation of ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of people, goods and transport.

Source: USAID West Africa Trade Hub, 2010

The results indicate that in a group interview in September, 2010, 18 disgruntled truck drivers in Cotonou, Benin, vented their frustrations to two Trade Hub consultants: driving freely from Cotonou to Ouagadougou was impossible without harassment, they said. They sometimes spend three days at borders where customs officials hold up paper work when they refuse to pay bribes; meanwhile, their clients in importing countries wait impatiently to receive the goods.

At the borders and checkpoints where unofficial fees were demanded, they do not receive receipts to prove payment later to their clients. Like many other transport companies in the region, they bear costs and lose income due to unpredictable expenses on West African roads and borders. Even when you have all the paperwork, it is not always taken into account," one said. "There is not a lot of documentation required really, but there are too many unnecessary delays.

"Laws are different from country to country and the fees are exceptionally high. There is really no free movement across West Africa."

The truckers' experiences were echoed in interviews in eight countries conducted by the Trade Hub to determine how well West Africa is economically integrated. The

unfortunate answer is: not very well. The interviews are part of a study of the gaps between what regional policies say on paper and how they are actually implemented in ECOWAS Member States.

Two Trade Hub teams conducted the interviews from May to September. One interviewed public sector officials and agents who enforce policies on the movement of persons, goods and transport, which should be consistent with ECOWAS protocols. The other team interviewed company managers, transporters and others who see daily how those policies are actually enforced.

The team conducted hundreds of hours of interviews in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo, involving over 200 people. It learned that the gaps between what ECOWAS Member States have agreed to do and what actually happens in each member State are significant. None of the countries is fully implementing the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme – the set of protocols meant to achieve integration.

The Complexities of West African Sub-Region Integration

The ECOWAS community leaders aim at a borderless West Africa when they signed the ECOWAS treaty. Everyone seems to be ready for the integration but the officials entrusted with implementing the policy seem to be self-centered and not community-oriented. Everyone in West Africa which includes the West African diasporas, irregular migrants, traders, professionals, artisans, skilled and unskilled West Africans, etc. wants the Sub-regional integration but translating the dictates of the treaty into reality is the mirage.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in recent times, has shown some commitment to the need to facilitate better trade relations among West African States. This led to the adoption of the ECOWAS Strategic Vision, by ECOWAS Heads of States in June 2009, which seeks to convert West Africa into a borderless sub-region, where citizens can avail themselves of opportunities emanating from unrestricted movement of goods,

services and persons.   Freedom of movement in the ECOWAS region is more advanced than in any other sub-region, but only the first of the three phases of the relevant protocol (visa-free entry for up to 90 days) has been completely implemented in all ECOWAS countries

The integration schemes in West Africa are clearly suffering from the ambiguity and the difficulties of regional coordination, but the regional economic communities have ideas for strengthening it, but the implementation of the idea remains a farce. The absorption of the diasporas into their host countries make them homogeneous as they are not recognised as foreigners thus their contributions in a local community may be accounted for a general one which cannot be differentiated and quantified. This again is because we are all black, eat the same kind of food etc.

We cannot have a free community for a people without free movement of persons, goods and services, and the right to establish businesses and ventures within West Africa Sub-region. Free movement is what binds us together as people pass through countries with their goods and services, mixing with fellow ECOWAS citizens while meeting the demand and the needs of the people of the region. This integrates people and their economies. The effective operationalising of Protocol on free movement is one of the most important factors in binding/facilitating regional integration. We should not only look at only what the diaspora can do but also the contributions of the media/ press. Reporting false information/news or the right news communicates either safety/fear/ insecurity in the minds of those at home. Such reports are important in the decision making process of both home and origin countries of the West African diasporas living in the Sub-region. False reports hinder bilateral relations. This brings about reciprocation of either good or bad behaviours towards each other in the West Africa. The media should importantly send out news that promote integration and not ripple out negative effects of isolated cases on miscreants amongst migrants. We need to see each other in the West African Sub- region as strategic partners in progress and not as monsters

Making sub-regional integration a reality requires harmonisation of Protocol on Free movement of persons, Rights of Residence and Establishment, and other provisions in the revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty which include trade policies and practices to eliminate uncertainty for traders and security personnels at borders and the political will of the Member States of ECOWAS. "There is a price to pay when a region fails to come together following agreements, regardless of language or currency barriers."(Lori Brock, Trade Hub Business Environment Advisor).

An excerpt from the documented personal experience of Kadiatou Lah (Mali National Shea Foundation), who is also is a member of the Global Shea Alliance Executive Committee at the West Africa borders.

- I believe that Borderless is a very good initiative. I was leaving Accra last week travelling by local transport. Once we arrived at the Benin-Togo border, the police asked me for 1,000 CFA. I said, "I'm not paying – and if I have to pay, I would like a receipt." The officer got angry and said, "OK, so you will not cross the border." I made a scene and when the officer's chief arrived, he said I was right and let me pass.

  I arrived at the Togo-Ghana border, just as I was with you during the inauguration of the Border Information Center in August. They asked me for money and I told them the same thing. The officer threw passport on the ground and said, "You are not going to cross, you're just a simple trader with the nerve to ask for a receipt!" I went to see his boss and told him, "I work with the people from Borderless and your officer threw my passport on the ground because I asked for a receipt." The boss was obviously nervous and asked me to excuse him for the situation. He then himself went to stamp my passport and warned the officer.

  Arriving at the Ghana side, the same thing – "Madam, you must pay 1,000 CFA!" My response the same: "OK, no problem, just give me a receipt!" The officer was a

woman this time and she got angry and told me that if I want a receipt I will have to pay 10,000 CFA. I said, "No problem, if that's the legal fee, I will pay it." She became angrier and, when she saw that I did not have an exit stamp on my passport, she said, "Now you have a more serious problem, let's get the boss to see this!" Once we were at the chief's office, I said, "I was with the Borderless delegation for the launch of the new centers and as I was late to leave for the airport, I forgot to get the exit stamp – and when I told your officer I would not pay her 1,000 CFA, she became very angry." The officer tried to lie that she had stopped me because there was no exit stamp but the boss told her, "Don't let me ever hear that you are stealing from people – take her passport, stamp it with the exit and entry stamps quickly. Madam," he said to me, "please truly excuse us, we are going to be vigilant, please forget everything you've seen today."

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Discussion of the Findings: (Research Question)

The findings revealed the functions of formal institutional arrangements in supporting the developmental activities of the Nigerian and Ghanaian diasporas in Ghana and Nigeria towards the actualisation of the integration agenda of ECOWAS.

The finding examines the main elements and limitations of the Economic Community of West African States Protocols on free movement, rights of residence and establishment. It evaluates the degree to which the Protocols have been implemented in ECOWAS member States especially Nigeria and Ghana, identifies their utility to diasporas from ECOWAS countries residing in other ECOWAS countries especially Nigeria and Ghana. It queries whether the Protocols constitute a sound legal basis for member States to extend residence and work rights to diasporas with ECOWAS citizenship residing in their territories who are willing to seek and carry out employment. It also describes current efforts to assist especially Nigeria and Ghana diasporas to achieve the legal aspects of local integration through the utilisation of ECOWAS residence entitlements in West Africa.

The treaty creating the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975 between the following countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Mauritania (Pulled out of ECOWAS in 2000). Article 27 of the Treaty affirms a long-term objective to establish a community citizenship that could be acquired automatically by all Member States' nationals. A key objective of the preamble to the treaty is to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and *people* in the sub-region. Phase one of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment of May, 29 1979 guaranteeing free entry of Community citizens without visa for ninety days was ratified by Member States in 1980 and put into effect forthwith. This once again ushered in an era of free movements of ECOWAS citizens within member countries. The rights of entry, residence and establishment were to be progressively established within fifteen years after the protocol was in force.

During the first five years of the implementation of the first phase requirements for visas and entry permit would be abolished. Community citizens in possession of valid travel documents and international health certificate could enter member States without visa for up to ninety days. Member States can nevertheless refuse admission into their territory so-called inadmissible immigrants under its laws. In the case of expulsion, normally at the expense of the immigrants, States undertook to guarantee the security of the citizen concerned, his/her family and his/her property. The delayed second phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol came into force in July 1986, when all member States ratified it, but the Right of Establishment has not been implemented till now. In 1992, the revised Treaty of ECOWAS, among others, affirmed the right of citizens of the community to entry, residence and settlement and enjoined member States to recognize these rights in their respective territories.

It also called on member States to take all necessary steps at the national level to ensure that the provisions are duly implemented.

The findings revealed that there are challenges in implementing this protocol. The causes of some of these challenges are identified and presented below:

Member States of ECOWAS belong to multiple unions with different aims and objectives, different levels and patterns of development and political systems and ideologies. Countries with small population are juxtaposed within those with large population and land area; some are resource poor while others are endowed with human and natural resources. The smaller and economically less prosperous countries are often suspicious of the demographic and economic giants - Nigeria Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire – in the Community.

The wavering political support, political instability and inter-state border disputes and wars have retarded progress in ratification and implementation of protocols. The persistent economic downturn has crippled the ability of States to pursue consistent macro-economic policies and resulted in part in poor funding of economic unions. The non-convertibility of currencies hinders financial settlements and the harmonization of macro-economic policies and procedures. The ubiquitous roadblocks across frontiers, the lengthy and costly formalities at border posts, and the corruption of officials, have hindered free flow of persons and trade.

The coming to force of the protocol on free movement of persons coincided with a period of economic recession in most West Africa, especially those bordering Nigeria, whose economy was fuelled by huge oil sector earnings. The oil-led employment opportunities attracted migrants of all skills, but especially unskilled workers, in their droves from Ghana, Togo, Chad, Mali and Cameroon to work in the construction and services sectors.

The short-lived oil boom resulted in a rapid deterioration in living and working conditions and devaluation of the national currency, wage freeze and inflation. In early 1983 and in mid-1985, the Nigerian Government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Protocol to expel over 1 million illegal aliens mostly Ghanaians. The ratification of the second phase of ECOWAS Protocol on Right of Residence that came into force in July1986 coincided with the implementation of the structural adjustment programme in Nigeria. In June 1985, about 0.2 million illegal aliens were again expelled as the economic crisis deepened, a development that created a crisis of confidence in the Community. Aliens became scapegoats when governments were confronted with teething economic and political problems; migrants were targets of hostility from the native population and blamed for whatever economic, social and political problems arose in the country.

Most countries of the sub-region have enacted, or retained a series of laws, which in effect restrict 'foreigners', including nationals of ECOWAS, from participating in certain kinds of economic activities; the expulsion of aliens also negated the *raison d'être* for establishing the Community. So long as the economies of recipient countries accommodated clandestine labour migrants there was little sign of stress. As economic conditions worsened and unemployment among nationals deepened, immigrants become targets for reprisals through expulsion (Ojo, 1999). Illegal immigrants were expelled from virtually all West African countries before and even after the formation of ECOWAS.

Some political leaders are using of ethnicity and religion to reclassify long-standing residents as non-nationals as in Cote d'Ivoire and are weary of the presence of large numbers of immigrants on their shores during tightly contested elections, fearing that they may swing the vote in favour of the opposition along ethnic or religious alliances.

The situation in Cote d'Ivoire illustrates this: a major country of immigration in the sub-region with a vast natural resource endowment but a small domestic labour force, foreigners constituted about a quarter of its waged labour force. The country's first Post- independent President, ignoring the arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers, encouraged immigration from its poor neighbours.

Immigrants from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Ghana flooded the plantations clandestinely and did menial jobs that the local population despised. They brought their families and were allowed to marry cross-culturally, settle and vote. The recent shift in the country's liberal immigration policy and growing anti-immigrant sentiment took a violent turn. The introduction of the concept of *ivorite,* and the striping of immigrants of some of the rights they hitherto enjoyed sparked discontent and mistrust among immigrants. The chaos and war between elements of the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian South threaten the survival of the once stable country. Thousands of nationals of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Nigerian have returned home as anti-foreigner sentiments peaked.

Dislodged Liberian refugees sought solace in Mali and Guinea. The policy to register and issue special identity cards to foreigners is widely viewed as aimed at deporting (now classified) illegal immigrants (Adepoju, 2003).

The long-delayed National Identity Card scheme launched in Nigeria mid-February 2003 is designed in part to "effectively control" illegal immigrants and their nefarious activities. About the same time, Liberia introduced compulsory exit visa for all residents in the country – a move criticised as violating the fundamental right of its citizens to free movement in and out of the country. In March 1999, Ghana requested all aliens in the country to register and be

issued with identity cards. Immigrants are suspicious of this move, recalling the antecedents of the 1969 Alien Compliance Order that culminated in the expulsion of non-Ghanaians.

The refugee regime, for long localised in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region has spread swiftly to the sub-region as Liberia's contagious civil war soon spread to Sierra Leone, engulfing Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau and now Cote d'Ivoire in its trail and uprooting thousands of people internally and across national borders, as displaced persons and refugees. As soon as one refugee-generating crisis is resolved, new or renewed crisis emerges sequentially. Sporadic border disputes between Senegal and Mauritania, Ghana and Togo, Liberia and Guinea have also led to refugee flows and expulsion of Community citizens from these territories.

ECOWAS member citizens have been expelled by most member States, in spite of the protocol on free movement of persons. Sentiments against non-nationals have risen in recent years as a result of the economic downturn, increasing unemployment among young nationals, and political instability. The Protocol on Establishment and Residence has not been implemented, despite the close link to the right of free movement, integration of trade, tariff regimes and promotion of labour migration in the sub-region.

In spite of the constraints enumerated above, progress has been recorded on many fronts.

The free movement of persons without visa within the Sub-region is a major achievement of ECOWAS (though some certain amount of money will have to be dropped with the security personnels along the borders). Associated with this development is the progress made in the area of monetary policy, communication, trade and related matters. These include the introduction of ECOWAS travellers' cheques – the West African Unit of Account – to harmonise the Sub-region's monetary policy; the proposed adoption of a common currency

by 2004 (now postponed till 2012) to facilitate cross-border trade transactions and the introduction of the Brown Card travel certificates to be used as ECOWAS passports.

The abolition of the mandatory residency permit and the granting of the maximum 90 day period of stay to ECOWAS citizens by immigration officials at entry points took effect from April, 2000(although in reality, some persons may get 30days, 60 days or 90 days depending on the discretion of the immigration personnels on duty). Border posts and checkpoints on international highways which hitherto threatened free movement of persons and goods were scrapped and Nigerian government dismantled all checkpoints between Nigeria and Benin. Border patrols were set up by Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali to monitor and police national frontiers, in addition to closer collaboration and information sharing between the police and internal security agents. Elimination of rigid border formalities and modernisation of border procedures through the use of passport scanning machines were designed to facilitate free and easier movement of persons across borders, the ultimate goal being the creation of a borderless West Africa (Adepoju, 2002). But presently, the researcher observed rigid border formalities associated with delay and money collections along the Nigeria-Benin-Togo-Ghana borders and vice-versa.

The creation of a **borderless Sub-region** was the major agenda of the meeting of Heads of State and Government held in Abuja early 2000. During the Summit, the ECOWAS passport was adopted as a symbol of unity to progressively replace national passports in circulation over a transitional period of ten years. The sub-regional private airline (ECOAIR) was launched in Abuja to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the organisation to facilitate intra-regional travel.

Transport and telecommunication links between member States were boosted by transcoastal, trans-Sahelian and trans-coastal/Sahelian road networks. Regional infrastructure has been rehabilitated and expanded to foster economic integration with the proposed establishment of two rail links: a coastal route from Lagos to Cotonou, Lomé and Accra and a Sahelian route linking Lagos to Niamey and Ouagadougou. Border posts and all checkpoints on international airways are to be policed only by customs and immigration officials. Effective 1 January 2000, a zone for the circulation of goods, free of custom duties, was set up and the free movement of goods and persons across the borders of ECOWAS Member States was scheduled to begin by the end of April 2000. In addition, in December 1999, the Lome Protocol on the mechanism for the prevention, management, and control of conflicts, and maintenance of peace and security was signed.

Recommendations

 The bugging questions include: Is West Africa actually borderless? And could a borderless West Africa be sustained? The first phase of free movement has been achieved but less effective. The second and third phases, relating to establishment and residence, respectively, are still not fully implemented because of the issues arising from attempts at implementing the protocols at the national levels. The peace-meal implementation of the protocols highlights the need for member States' governments to harmonise national laws which conflict with regional and sub-regional treaties and address the issue of the right of residence and establishment of migrants and obligations of the host countries by amending national laws and investment codes that restrict "foreigners", including nationals of ECOWAS member States, from participating in certain kinds of economic activities. They should also identify areas of agreement which they can progressively implement, notably free movement

of persons, travel cards, traveller's cheques, tariff regime, customs and immigration formalities to enhance intra-regional labour mobility and cross-border trade, and then implement other agreements using the variable speed approach, whereby sets of common objectives are agreed upon but component countries move at different speeds towards implementation, some rapidly and others slowly.

In line with the recommendations put forward by ECA (2012), expanding the number of one-stop border posts should help to reinforce RECs' efforts to open borders and reduce delays and the red tape at customs. Member States also need to expedite their supply of identity documents, as   well as travel and health certificates to community citizens' resident on their territories. The border information centres between Ghana and Togo, and the planned centre between Mali and Senegal, are a welcome development in this regard. REC member States should also facilitate work and business permits for REC citizens to foster closer integration. This is also important for promoting intra-community trade and investment, which will boost employment. RECs should, as a matter of urgency, activate national protocol-monitoring committees and help to coordinate their activities with the secretariat of the REC. This should contribute to harmonizing regulations, implementation procedures and guidelines to boost free movement of people.

Presently, West African sub-region can be classified as border-full. The concept of borderless West Africa can be relevant if the Protocols are effectively operational with ECOWAS member citizens moving freely within, working and residing in any of the member States without any bottlenecks or restrictions.

Conclusion

This paper is of the opinion that migration is a long standing phenomenon in West Africa that cannot be wiped off by fiat relating to border issues, irrespective of the position of the national laws within its member States. The same is true of trans-border trade or exchange of goods within the sub-region and sub-regions in Africa, therefore, Africa must move more rapidly in the direction of faster integration to capture these transactions into a regional framework, in the overall interest of the Member States. The reality is that development planning within the narrow territorial framework of the individual nation states has been less effective and beneficial. Hence the task before Africans is how to confront those factors of fragmentation and a reconceptualise international boundaries and nation-state notion as factors of opportunity for co-operation and collective action. It should be noted that Africa, which is the prime representative of the third world is laden with border issues and ECOWAS itself, like other sub-regional integration project elsewhere in Africa has been in need of reconceptualisation and structural review predominantly after the adoption of the AEC Treaty in 1991. It is encouraging to see it on the way to becoming a supranational organization although instability, lack of political will and democratic credibility seem to be formidable obstacles to faster progress.

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Borderwork assemblages and the security-development nexus in Senegal and Mauritania
FROWD, Philippe Mamadou
frowdpm@mcmaster.ca
McMaster University

Abstract

Although the proliferation of borders and the intensification of security practices in the West have been well documented, similar trends in Africa's borderlands have largely been overlooked. This paper seeks to highlight the actors, practices and logics of a broad range of border management practices in Senegal and Mauritania. The paper is organized into three main lines of argument. The first section engages with border studies literature and introduces the concept of 'borderwork' as a way of capturing the material and discursive labour behind border control practices. I suggest that borderwork in West Africa is undertaken by transnational assemblage-like formations which transmit Western norms about how borders should be run. The second section of the paper engages with literature in critical security studies and on liberal interventions to develop the idea of borderwork as a form of security governance that is increasingly interweaved with development. This linkage is reflected empirically in the use of pedagogical and capacity-building practices as well as a turn to technological solutions to border issues. Although the paper provides a range of illustrative examples throughout, the final section presents an in-depth analysis of one case that is at once symptomatic and justificatory for the conceptual framework. This final section discusses the European Union's cooperation with Senegal and Mauritania on migration management, paying particular attention to FRONTEX patrols, Project West Sahel, and the International Organization for Migration's construction of border control posts. This paper is an early iteration of a broader research project, and will be supplemented by data obtained from semi-structured interviews and participant observation set to take place over the course of 2013-2014.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, border security has raced up the international agenda, largely driven by the fear of global terrorism and organized crime. In response, a variety of practices have been deployed or intensified: restrictive migration control, biometric personal identification, reinforced internal policing measures, and transnational security cooperation. All of these fall under the rubric of 'border management', and suggest that the border and its logics are increasingly permeating society well away from the cartographical border. These developments are well documented and debated in their European and North American iterations, but their deployment in Africa remains a relative blind spot. This is despite the fact that in many African countries, security practices around borders, migration and identification have seen a rapid yet unique proliferation. In the two countries this paper analyzes—Senegal and Mauritania—we can observe the turn towards biometric passports and ID cards, migration control cooperation with Europe, electronic gates and entry-exit systems at airports, and migration management agreements and capacity-building.

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What conceptual tools can we use to understand these practices and the actors that undertake them? What are the logics that drive these forms of security and surveillance in Africa? To answer these questions, the paper is organized into three main lines of argument. The first section engages with border studies literature and introduces the concept of 'borderwork' as a way of capturing the material and discursive labour behind border control practices. I suggest that borderwork in West Africa is undertaken by transnational assemblage-like formations which transmit Western norms about how borders should be run. The second section of the paper engages with literature in critical security studies and on liberal interventions to develop the idea of borderwork as a form of security governance that is increasingly interweaved with development. This linkage is reflected empirically in the use of pedagogical and capacity-building practices as well as a turn to technological solutions to border issues. Although the paper provides a range of illustrative examples throughout, the final section presents an in-depth analysis of one case that is at once symptomatic and justificatory for the conceptual framework. This final section discusses EU cooperation with Senegal and Mauritania on migration management.

BORDERWORK: PRACTICES, ACTORS, KNOWLEDGES

International borders, the focus of my present study, are no longer lines drawn in the sand (or on a map) but have become complex spaces of governance. However, there are a number of unresolved lacunae in the study of these borders. First of all, there is a solid range of work in critical border studies that speaks of the proliferation of borders, and various forms of bordering. However, there is correspondingly little work that explicitly unites the various practices that stretch the border—whether it is biometric ID or internal immigration controls—under a common conceptual banner. Secondly, there has only recently been concerted attention given to the global governance of borders and how the 'who' question of borders can be addressed. There is correspondingly little work on ways to understand the collective effects of border control actors' practices. Finally, the literature on borders has not tended to tackle the question of what border 'norms' or worldviews could be and how they proliferate, even though contemporary practices in the global south suggest that these norms are currently being assembled, diffused, and implanted in various ways.

I proceed in three moves. First, I introduce the concept of borderwork to account for the various *practices* around borders. Second, I analyze some of the *actors* involved in border control in West Africa, theorizing them as multiple 'assemblages' rather than a coherent regime or other rigid formation. Third, I turn to the question of *knowledges* by discussing some of the normativities that are inherent in contemporary transnational borderwork practices.

Four theses on borderwork

Migration management agreements between the EU and African countries, the IOM's construction of border posts in Mauritania, or the deployment of the biometric passport in

Senegal all relate to some degree to territorial borders, but they also call into play much broader phenomena and much more complex decisions about inclusion/exclusion and security/insecurity. The current pre-eminence of 'integrated border management' (IBM) approaches favours measures that occur well beyond the territorial border, such as identity verification, migration policy-making, or the use of databases by law enforcement. These actions don't occur 'at' the border, but involve a bordering logic and thicken the borderland. By thinking about these practices as *borderwork* activities, it becomes clearer how an ID card database system, or a national census project, can be border-related activities. In this section of the paper, I answer the 'what' question about the practices and policies with which this argument is concerned: can we identify a practice that is common to border control, migration management and national identification policies?

In using the term 'borderwork', I am drawing on Chris Rumford's use of the word, which originates in "a concern with the ways in which borders are becoming generalised throughout society" as opposed to sitting at the edge of territory (2008:1). Rumford's view of borders echoes an assumption that is central to recent work in critical border studies: that the border is socially constructed, multi-faceted, and not fixed either spatially or temporally. Borders are complex, networked spaces, in that their governance and effects are enacted and often felt far from the site of territorial demarcation. Below, I suggest four main points about borderwork, situating them in empirical and theoretical context.

Thesis #1: Borderwork is referential of geopolitical borders and exercised across territory

Thinking about borders in policy as well as academic circles has moved from a 'geopolitical' understanding to one that sees them as complex socially constructed spaces that are increasingly detached from the territorial line. When Lord Curzon discussed the theme of *frontiers* in 1907, he spoke of borders as a "razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations" (Curzon 1907). Curzon's view of the border typifies what William Walters (2002) calls the 'geopolitical trajectory' of thinking about borders, the hallmark of which is a focus on state power and its projection. This is essentially the Westphalian view of borders, with the territorial line acting as the limit of the national space and the rigid demarcation of inside (society) and outside (anarchy). This 'geopolitical' view is increasingly challenged by a view of borders as complex, socially constructed functions exercised across space. Early contributions by RBJ Walker (1993) and John Agnew (1994) contested the idea of the state as a container, and current debate, largely inheriting this challenge, turns on the proliferation, multiplication, hardening and displacement of borders. Work on the 'securitization of migration' (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002) has shown that the experience of borders is also abstracted from the territorial line, and the use of biometrics and other information technologies for citizenship and border control (Torpey 2000, Amoore 2006, Epstein 2007, Lyon 2009, Muller 2010) suggests that the actual border is digital, technical and operates temporally well before the moment of crossing into national territory. This has cemented views like Étienne Balibar's (1998), that the border is multiple and enacted throughout society.

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Activities such as delimiting a territorial border or registering citizens' biometric profiles are referential of a traditional geopolitical border, even though these do not always take place at or in the name of the territorial border, and even if it is not always clear *whose* border is being drawn or enforced. As William Walters suggests, "there is a whole apparatus connected with the geopolitical border—not just a police and military system, but cartographic, diplomatic, legal, geological, and geographical knowledges and practices" (2002: 563). For example, integrated border management (IBM) is explicitly about making the border mobile, flexible, multinational, cooperative, resilient but still refers to territorial border(s) of some form. The cooperation between the EU's external borders agency (FRONTEX) and Senegal highlights this spatial complexity: the borders being enforced are as much those of EU member states as they are those of the EU or its African partners. Biometric enrolment is similar, as one's successful enrolment into a database confers inclusion as a 'safe' citizen of the polity—and therefore connected to its territory—even though no border is being crossed. What these practices show is that the practices associated to an ostensibly fixed territorial boundary are largely independent of it in territorial terms.

Thesis #2: Control is networked and cultural

The second main characteristic of borderwork is that its practices are not discrete or isolated. Rather, they are focal points in diffuse networks that pull together myriad policy actors, territorial locations, forms of expertise, and institutional competition, all of which are focused on decisions about inclusion and exclusion. As Rumford suggests, "the agencies responsible for constructing and maintaining [borders] have also become more diverse" (Rumford 2008: 6), and argues that we must take into account the activities of citizens rather than states alone. I agree, and want to expand the focus further: the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) global biometric standards, EU bilateral assistance to West African gendarmes, and ID manufacturer Gemalto's promotional materials all make borderwork actors of these organizations. Actors also maintain extensive linkages between each other: the EU funds many IOM projects, which may have to comply with ICAO standards and other global best practices. There are linkages between actors of various degrees of formality, and coordination is never total. This echoes Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson's argument that surveillance is increasingly "driven by the desire to bring systems together, to combine practices and technologies and integrate them into a larger whole" (2000: 610). This is also visible in the turn to IBM methods, which encourage integration and interoperability. For example, ID system provider Morpho stresses the 'integrated' capabilities of the e-passport and national ID document system it has delivered for Mauritania. Of course, considering practices to be part of a larger whole does not always impute overarching strategic objectives to networks, but rather serves to situate them in broader context.

Finally, border control is always cultural—reflective of an ideological or cultural worldview—as is visible in the pedagogical undercurrents to the proliferation of best practices and standards about borders, often diffused through technical assistance. The desire to modernize through teaching and through development-style investment is an

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increasingly important aspect of transnational borderwork in West Africa. This normative content of borderwork is what I deem a 'borderwork culture', a concept I adapt from Ruben Zaiotti's (2011) idea of 'culture of border control'. This concept captures the ideas about how borders should be run, and how they gain institutional traction. I turn to my adaptation of it later.

Thesis #3: Borders are constructed but also performative

Third, borders are constructed as well as performative. That is to say that the 'stuff' of borders is both material and discursive, and that the associations formed by borderwork need to be continually enacted in order to retain their form. In material terms, the border is 'made' of tangible materials ranging from the most obvious—walls and barriers—to the less visible such as databases, binoculars, or ID cards. Most importantly, the infrastructure of the border, the tools of migration control, and the tangible nature of identity systems all *act* to shape the action and impact of the border. In discursive terms, borderwork is undertaken through the 'securitization' of migration, and through the identification and framing of particular policy problems such as 'unreliable paper documents' or 'the black peril'[1].

In addition to being constructed, borderwork needs to be performed and repeated. It is the performed nature of authority that counts—borderwork is a mode of reproduction for the *authority* to enact the border (or claims to it) and it is the way that the various networks of border actors are held together. Continual performance of the border is precisely what imbues the material and discursive aspects of borderwork with meaning. Borderwork necessitates actors to continually make decisions about inclusion and exclusion, whether this is interpreted territorially or in terms of citizenship or status. For example, Europe continues to focus on West Africa's western coast as a migration origin/transit zone even though interceptions and arrivals have been steadily decreasing for some years. It is the performance of borderwork that is essential to the maintenance of authority and credibility. In short, sovereignty must have a material and ideological basis but it is the performative action of whoever is exercising it (a state or other actor) that constitutes the borderwork.

Thesis #4: Borderwork is driven by a desire for security and order

Finally, borderwork practices are fundamentally understandable under a broader security rationale, in which the continual pursuit of order and stability and the management of contingency and risk are paramount. Scholars drawing on Foucault's work on biopolitics, such as William Walters (2002) and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009), have tended to consider the border not only as a function that is exercised throughout society, but as part of a broader strategy of sovereign power. Walters speaks of a 'biopolitical border' that is productive of a population governed with attention to the traits, risks and histories of its biological bodies. Vaughan-Williams (2009), for his part, argues that his concept of the

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[1] This appeared as the headline '*Le péril noir*' on the cover of *Maroc Hebdo*, a weekly newsmagazine in Morocco. With large numbers of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa residing in Morocco or in transit there, some xenophobic opinions have arisen.

generalized biopolitical border "points to the way in which bordering practices are rather more diffused throughout society than the modern geopolitical imaginary implies" (2009: 117). These suggest that borderwork serves to maintain sovereign power not just at the border but also the basic state capacity to ensure security.

An example of the linkage between border technology and security is the statement by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) president, in 2011, that "for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons" (Canada Newswire 2011). This suggests that the insecurity of document systems is linked to dangerous types of mobility, which in turn directly threatens—by transgressing borders—the norm of order expected within states. By aiming for order across space, borderwork suggests that an analysis of borders cannot be limited to the territorial site of the border but must account for the dispersed practices of border control aiming at stable order. The strong association between security and development—which forms the basis of the second part of this paper—is one of the major manifestations of how basic activities of state sovereignty are aligned towards the formation of secure political order.

Borderwork assemblages in West Africa

In a 2009 editorial in *Geopolitics*, Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams suggest that more attention should be paid to the question of 'who makes borders?', echoing Rumford's question "who performs the borderwork?" (Rumford 2008: 3). I respond to this concern with an emphasis on the *actors* involved in borderwork in West Africa. Highlighting the various agencies involved, I conclude that the complexity of their arrangement requires a theoretical lens attuned to this complexity. The empirical take here therefore segues into the more conceptual argument about assemblages that follows.

There are myriad agencies and organizations 'doing the borderwork' in West Africa, and they straddle the global/local and public/private dimensions. Some of the most important are transnational organizations such as the European Union (EU), the World Bank, International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, there are also regional actors like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or joint border commissions, and national actors such as gendarmeries and national police forces. Think tanks and semi-private actors, like the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and corporate actors (like Gemalto, or Morpho) also play a role in the production of norms as much as of equipment.

A heterogeneous field of actors can coalesce around a single policy problem but propose rather different solutions: the EU and World Bank both intervene in West Africa's border management, but the former prefers a control-oriented approach while the latter seeks easier mobility in the name of business development. Similarly, actors cut across lines of scale, as is the case with transnational actors like the ICAO setting standards built by multinational corporations like Morpho who make documents for national governments like Mauritania's. The dynamics of competition and cooperation are also visible: the EU's Project West Sahel brings gendarmeries of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Niger

together, but may also create institutional tensions between the various security forces of each country.

What these various dynamics suggest is that it is too simple to call the arrangement of borderwork actors a 'regime', as this would imply too strong a degree of convergence, coordination and institutionalization. It is best to speak of borderwork *assemblages*. Assemblages are heterogeneous and multiple formations that lack central guiding actors or principles, are made up of subjects as much as objects and discourses and which, by virtue of being multi-sited and multi-scalar, transcend hierarchies of scale. Actor-network theory (ANT) is particularly insightful in this regard as it assumes heterogeneity at the very basis of the 'social' and analyzes the origins and processes of attempts to create and maintain coherent objects or facts. ANT suggests that actors are always part of a network and are also networks themselves (Law 2007), stressing its most radical claim: that there is no essential difference between human and non-human capacity for agency; all are *actants* (Latour 2005). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of 'rhizome' is quite similar, in that it suggests the formation of dynamic non-hierarchical social entities from heterogeneous matter. This view of rhizome is related to the term *agencement*, which is a "common French word with the senses of either 'arrangement', 'fitting' or 'fixing'" (Phillips 2006: 108). In this way, a rhizome is a snapshot of an ever-evolving social organization. In similar vein, Foucault's concept of *dispositif*—or 'apparatus'—refers to a "thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid" (Foucault 1980: 194). Despite vast differences in focus and context too lengthy to discuss in this paper, the analytical ethos of these three approaches suggests five analytical payoffs.

First, using the figure of the assemblage allows us to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the social world and give analytical precedence to practices and performance. We can use practices and issues to trace the 'who' of borderwork, rather than proceeding in reverse by reifying a set of pre-determined actors. Second, we avoid imputing a strong organizing principle to social organization, even though social action may be organized around particular dominant normativities. We should therefore see agency not as a hierarchical and linear factor, but as a factor that is often indirect and overdetermined. Third, we can account for the role of unequal power relations and sites of resistance, through concepts such as the ANT idea of the 'obligatory passage point' (Callon 1986), which signifies that some points in networks are more influential than others. Fourth, we can account for the important role played by materiality and 'things' as important *agents* of the social world. The idea of non-human agency helps to pose certain questions differently: by emphasizing the agency of the material, we can consider a border post, a training manual, or a malfunctioning airport e-gate as objects with agency that shape the meaning and infrastructure of the border itself. Fifth and finally, we can account for spatial relations across scale and beyond hierarchy, and capture the multi-scalar and multi-sited nature of social action. Using assemblage theory is a way of avoiding the reification of topographical territorial space.

Borderwork knowledges and cultures of border control

Having discussed the actors involved in borderwork in West Africa, I now turn to the question of *knowledges*. Border control is not ahistorical or without context. These practices are reflections of societal experiences and priorities—which are mediated and put into practice by particular policy communities. Some border studies scholars have focused on broader changes in the ways borders are run, by looking at biometric technologies for example (Amoore 2006) or the turn to risk management (Muller 2010). These all imply broader 'normativities' behind border control, but they are not primarily concerned with *how* these border control norms come to be created, assembled, displaced and adopted.

The question I pose is: what kinds of knowledges are assumed or inherent in borderwork in West Africa? From what are they derived? How are these knowledges transmitted? Ruben Zaiotti's recent work on the evolution of Europe's approach to its border control (2011) is useful for answering precisely these questions. His concept of 'cultures of border control' helps to account for the policy background of bordering, and he defines such a culture as "a relatively stable constellation of background assumptions *and corresponding practices* shared by a border control policy community in a given period and geographical location" (2011: 23, emphasis in original). Zaiotti defines the background assumptions of a border control community as "intersubjective cognitive structures" that the actors in it use in order to highlight "problems to be addressed" (2011: 23) and suggest appropriate remedies. The main elements of a 'culture' of border control include (2011: 25-27): the "characteristics that a border should possess", the "proper approach to manage them", and the "identity of the relevant border control community" which are all reflected in relevant or symptomatic texts (2011: 25). While Zaiotti is largely concerned with the mechanisms and conditions of change between cultures of border control, I use the concept to refer to how they are formed and how they proliferate. My focus is on the synthesis of these border control normativities from across the Euro-American experience and their implantation elsewhere.

The north-south borderwork culture

It would be presumptuous to speak of a 'global borderwork culture', implying a single global policy community and imputing a tight organizing principle across the globe. However, there are elements of a hybrid normativity—and fragments of a single policy community— amongst the global and local actors involved in borderwork in West Africa. This normativity draws on experiences in Europe and North America but also on the particularities of the African context and is the product of policy pronouncements, documents and strategies but also of bilateral and multilateral forms of intervention. It is oriented around the spatial and temporal dislocation of borders, an emphasis on integration, the primacy of professional linkages, and a desire for modernization.

The externalization of borders is one of the hallmarks of the emerging north-south borderwork culture. The EU's border can be said to have shifted outward due to FRONTEX's activities in West Africa and the use of databases like the EU's Visa

Information System. The EU's *Schengen Borders Code*, which reflects its normative approach to borders, defines 'border control' as

> not only checks on persons at border crossing points and surveillance between these border crossing points, but also an analysis of the risks for internal security and analysis of the threats that may affect the security of external borders (European Union 2006: 1).

This suggests an extension of the border through space (into the EU space and well outside it) but also through time (future threats).

The north-south borderwork culture also stresses integration at the global, regional and national levels. Globally, this means integration into accepted standards for travel documents (like the ICAO's biometric standard) and into global databases (like Interpol's list of lost and stolen travel documents). The failure of a state (usually from the global south) to integrate is a source of insecurity, as "a state that has not yet implemented up to date MRTD standards presents a weakness to global security and a single failure can compromise the world-wide travel document and border security regime" (Tiedge 2012). This emphasis on integration suggests a desire for universality in the pursuit of convenience and global interoperability.

The north-south borderwork culture is built partly through formal measures, like bilateral migration agreements between EU member states and African countries, but also through informal governmental dialogues and *ad hoc* meetings sustain the policy communities it brings together. For instance, ICAO Technical Advisory Group (TAG) meetings on MRTDs provide an opportunity for corporate sponsors and government officials to come together and share best practices and exemplars and also set the global agenda. Similarly, regional law enforcement meetings (like Project West Sahel envisages in West Africa) and migration policy workshops (in most countries in which the IOM operates) play this role of bringing together diverse actors around particular policy problems. It is worth noting that this networking aspect of the north-south borderwork culture is a striking case of how borderwork is at once technocratic and informal.

The most significant part of the north-south culture of borderwork is that it has a built-in pedagogical approach aiming at modernization. States in the global south need to be helped—or taught—basic modernization through technical assistance. What is being taught is an approach to border control, migration management and identification practices that draws from Euro-American historical experience and 'best practices'. The normative assumption in capacity-building practices is that African states, hampered by colonial era borders and weak administrative efficiency, must first attain Westphalian statehood through better territorial control (at borders) and better visibility of population (through identification). Modernization is also bound up with the technologization of borderwork. Corporate actors' promotional materials, for example, provide a wealth of examples of how technology can help to bring a borderwork system 'up to scratch'. The proliferation of partnership and capacity-building schemes around borders, and the linkage between technologization, modernization and pedagogy they assume, suggests that borderwork has an increasingly strong link to development.

9

Theorizing policy diffusion

In a 2010 article on the IOM, Rutvica Andrijasevic and William Walters argue that the technicalization of migration control is a form of "normalisation" (2010: 984), which operates in part through the process of alignment of migration policies with Western technical norms. They speak of the desire to "generalise a particular model of statehood" (2010: 983) but do not provide a theorization of how these norms travel (or fail to travel), and also neglect the role of the *material* environment in this process.

I try to resolve these oversights here by using the concept of *immutable mobiles*, drawn from ANT. Immutable mobiles are sets of bundled practices that move over space and time. Gavin Kendall defines them as "convenient packages that hold together and maintain their coherence even when they are moved, enabling them to be effective in a variety of settings" (Kendall 2004: 65). Immutable mobiles can be objects but also practices, discourses and imaginaries. As Tony Porter (2012) suggests, global governance is

> seen as consisting of large forces without sufficient consideration of the specific humans, objects and networks that are needed if these forces are to be transmitted. Alone, humans have great difficulty in transmitting actions across the distances that global governance involves, and they therefore rely heavily on objects such as written texts, electronic networks, weapons systems, transportation systems, and meeting rooms and offices (Porter 2012: 553).

This indicates that the material context of borderwork practices should be better investigated. One of the main ways that cultures of border control are 'material' is through their mobility—whether this is of systems or of the infrastructure that transports ideas. Much of this is the central role of bricks and mortar facilities such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Border Management Staff College or the International Air Transport Association's (IATA) Training and Development Institute but also other tangible technologies. As John Law (1999) argues, to speak of immutable mobiles is also to assume the presence of *mutable* mobiles. The take-up and reception of objects and knowledges in different contexts can be rocky and uneven. After all, networks are composed of materials (say, a European border training manual) and humans (a Senegalese border guard) that may form precarious or unexpected networks of their own. This can be seen in the interaction between knowledge and infrastructure: a European border management approach reliant on always-on computerized databases may lack the mutability required to accommodate an unreliable electricity grid.

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

In the fourth thesis on borderwork above, I highlighted the fact that it is a set of practices oriented toward security and order. I also, when discussing the north-south borderwork culture, hinted at its pedagogical role and a linkage between security and development. Here, I would like to flesh out two main arguments: first, that the construction of security threats is discursive but also material and enacted through policy practices, and second,

that borderwork policies in West Africa aim at, highlighting a broader linkage between security and development.

The construction of security

For a long time, strategic and security studies largely tracked the ontological an epistemological commitments of neorealism and neoliberalism during the Cold War. Largely concerned with national or military (i.e. state-centric) security, this approach came under sustained criticism. The last two decades have seen work in 'critical security studies' (CSS) broaden and deepen the meaning of the term 'security' while fundamentally politicizing the concept (see Krause and Williams 1997). The meaning of security has evolved from a state-centric notion towards one emphasizing the constitutive role of identity (Campbell 1998, Hansen 2006) the discursive and performative construction of security issues (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998), and the importance of emancipation (Booth 2007). Although there is a multiplicity of views on 'security', CSS can be mapped along three axes: a philosophical variant emphasizing securitization and the naming of existential threats, a sociological approach that analyzes social contexts and actors that are involved in security practices, and its most explicitly political 'emancipatory' approach. Although this classification is neither nuanced nor comprehensive, it provides a clear guide to extant approaches to the question of security. The C.A.S.E. Collective (2006), while acknowledging the complex origins of each approach, neatly classify these three approaches into 'schools': Copenhagen, Paris and Aberystwyth, respectively.

The 'Copenhagen' and 'Paris' schools of security, despite their differences, both suggest that security is a *constructed* phenomenon rather than an objective condition. The Copenhagen school (CS) approach is oriented around 'securitization theory' (ST) which is an analytic approach for understanding how particular issues come to be seen in the frame of security, and what security (its invocation or otherwise) *does* to particular issues or settings. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde (1998) define the process of securitization as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (1998: 23). Securitization is therefore a discursive *process*—a 'securitizing move'—in which the performance of speech itself is the act (Waever 1995). A securitizing move is therefore a "discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object" (1998: 25). This schema, as instructive as it is to understand the creation of security threats, overlooks the role of images rather than just discourse (Williams 2003), the dispositions of the audience on whose success the move begins (Balzacq 2005), and the fact that some audiences may be more important than others (Salter 2008).

The existential focus of securitization theory, coupled with its emphasis on discourse, overlooks the nature of security as constructed through practices. The 'Paris school' of security studies retains the constructivist assumptions of securitization theory but with a focus on security as a routinized social, governmental, technological and professional practice. This approach focuses on the institutional settings of security professionals, the practices and technologies that create and determine the content of 'security', and

security as a governing strategy. Although the Paris school approach rejects the sole emphasis on discourse of the CS approach, it retains the emphasis on actors' roles in determining and prioritizing security threats. Didier Bigo refers to the 'professionals of (in)security' (Bigo 2001), highlighting their role in determining and prioritizing security threats as well as emphasizing the importance of their contexts, forms of competition, strategies, and expertise. In this respect, the 'Paris school' approach is attentive to security as a technique of governing, dovetailing with what Bigo calls the "Foucaultian approach to security, territory and population which places the emphasis on security as norm" (Bigo 2009: 113). Consistent with Foucault's understanding of power, Paris school scholars speak of the construction of security through *technologies*. Thierry Balzacq (2008) distinguishes tools used to 'tools of securitization' (which are used to deal with an existing threat) from 'securitization tools' (which operate like material forms of the 'speech act' in ST). These 'tools of securitization' are means of enacting policy which in addition to a normative basis are dependent on some kind of medium or "vehicle" (2008: 81), a recognition of the role of material intermediaries for security practices.

Security and development

In the section above, I argued that we should understand security as a form of governance enacted through various modes of securitization. Here, I argue that 'development' has become one of these central tools. My argument below is in two phases: First, I argue that we can understand the practices of borderwork in West Africa to be practices aiming at greater *legibility*, which means that they are intended for the state to better develop its tools of control. Many of these practices relate to the 'policy tools' of securitization developed above. Second, I suggest that these practices reflect a growing intertwining between security and development. This occurs at the discursive level—making the 'nexus' of security and development a strategic discourse—but also in material practices that aim not only at legibility but also at optimization and clear political order.

Legibility, visibility, calculability

Contemporary borderwork in Africa is inherently driven by the modernist impulse towards improving the state's ability to see and know its territory and population. This is reflected in a turn towards technologization, a reliance on systematization, the pursuit of integration and interoperability, and the promotion of a managerial approach to social change. We can say that the functioning of security in the global south is contingent on practices of what James C. Scott (1998) calls legibility—state projects aiming at better knowledge of nature and society, with the aim of control. This pursuit of legibility, which is associated with grand projects of state reform in developing countries, brings together the desire for modernization with practices of visibility that straddle a continuum of care and control.

David Lyon defines surveillance as "processes in which special note is taken of certain human behaviours that go well beyond idle curiosity" (2007: 13) and specifies further that it is the "focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of

influence, management, protection or direction" (2007: 14). Although this is not an all-encompassing definition, it does suggest that the central concept in surveillance is visibility, or more broadly knowability with a particular purpose. Michael Dillon's 1996 *Politics of Security* discusses the concept of 'security' in similar terms to both Scott and Lyon, and Dillon sees security as a form of knowledge itself ("certainty"), reliant upon knowledge ("surveillance"), producing knowledge ("calculability") and seeking to "render all aspects of life transparent" ("totality") (1996: 17). This desire for transparency is allied to the consolidation of state power and the taming of chance. This conclusion is reflected in James C. Scott's view of legibility, a concept that is borne out of the state's discernable drive to "arrange the population in ways that simplified […] classic state functions" (Scott 1998: 2). This pursuit of legibility, he explains, is visible in practices such as standardization of measures and naming and stems from an ideology that has"self-confidence about scientific and technical progress" (Scott 1998: 4). It necessarily relies, therefore, on visibility and surveillance and on a belief that this is a natural and rational course of human progress.

The ways that border control is deployed in West Africa involve a number of 'practices of legibility'. There is a growing emphasis on the *technologization* of borderwork, with a tendency to prefer (or impose) technological solutions for various problems. The use of an electronic entry-exit database at Dakar airport, for example, suggests the triumph of technology over other concerns, such as price. The emphasis on integration and interoperability, visible in the inter-linkage of Mauritania's nascent biometric ID and its visa issuance, hints at the emphasis on 'totality' that Dillon insisted was a key feature of security. Similarly, the diffusion of expert knowledge from Western agencies (like the IOM) to the gendarmeries and bureaucrats of Senegal and Mauritania is aimed at the implantation of global best practices, and the production of this security knowledge further strengthens global integration on security matters. Practices of partnership and capacity-building achieve similar objectives. Finally, the implantation of homogeneous security knowledge (about how to enrol populations, or how to keep migrants out, for example) is a means of implanting a certain way of assuring legibility that is intended to be *managerial and strategic* (migration 'management' is a good example of this) rather than contestable and political.

The security-development nexus

What these various practices of legibility suggest is that legibility is an important desire (and tool) of security, and the logics of security and development are increasingly interlinked and overlapping. Security and development are part of a complex interplay: security practices are framed in language traditionally reserved for development, while development practices are increasingly enacted in the service of security. In addition, security is increasingly a development practice itself, and the growth of 'surveillance as development'—in which the state's ability to surveil is a major catalyst for modernization—is testament to this. Although the linkage of security and development is nothing new and can even be traced to the discourse of liberal/democratic peace (Hettne 2010), more recent policy and academic interventions have explicitly tackled the supposed 'nexus' between security and development (Fitz-Gerald 2004, Buur, Jensen and

Stepputat 2007; Zoellick 2008, *Security Dialogue* 2010, Krogstad 2012) and yet the question of 'whose security' and 'whose development' are being promoted has not been fully explored. Stern and Öjendal (2010) provide a mapping of the 'nexus' that takes into account the remarkably similar conceptual evolutions of 'security' and 'development' over the last fifty years, recognizing that the two concepts share some sort of ontological terrain. This linkage of security and development occurs in a number of ways, discussed below.

The discursive linkage of security and development can be considered as a strategic discourse serving a legitimizing function. Research on the linkage of security and development has spoken of a 'blurring' of the two concepts (Bachmann and Hönke 2009) but has not largely considered the way that different actors—global and local—mobilize discourses of security-development in the pursuit of various payoffs. As discussed in the section above, the invocation of 'security' can bring additional attention or resources to an issue, and this is a common strategy when migration or biometric technologies are involved. However, the use of development rhetoric can be equally powerful in the prioritization of a particular issue: a key pillar of the EU's migration management strategy is a tighter linkage to development issues, which makes the security-oriented focus on control that accompanies it more palatable. For example, the use of biometrics as a pillar for better development of the national economy is a central justification for the ongoing Mauritanian enrolment exercise. This is seen in how the director general of the agency in charge of the biometric rollout sought to securitize the issue. Mrabih Ould El Hadrami, of the *Agence Nationale du Registre des Populations et des Titres Sécurisés* (ANRPTS), stated that "the strategic importance of securing civil registration and national documents transcends any petty political problems [and] a modern civil state is essential to the rule of law" (RIM 24 Heures 2011).

Another major way that is that security and surveillance are themselves forms of development, and the benefits of investments (financial or otherwise) in these areas are either financed through lines of funding from development programs, or seen as forms of development in themselves. The management of migration in Mauritania, for example, is funded through the 'Migration & Asylum' thematic program of the European Union, as would be expected, but also through the 'Instrument for Stability', which is the EU's mechanism for funding initiatives on security, crime and conflict. Part of 'surveillance as development' is also reflected in the use of aid money for the procurement of security technologies, often from corporations based in donor countries.

The security-development nexus is, fundamentally, a question of building and maintaining resilient order. Legibility should be seen as the buttressing of what Jackson and Rosberg (1982) would call 'empirical sovereignty'—the state's ability to maintain effective control over its territory. The materiality of security discussed above is a good example, and programs such as the IOM's construction of border posts for Mauritania are not only security moves but also development practices: it is an infrastructural program that provides a material representation of the state at the limits of national territory, and also integrates the periphery to the administrative core of the state through database linkages. The emphasis on 'totality' that Dillon (1996) stressed is visible here.

EU MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA

There are a multitude of borderwork practices in West Africa: the construction of border posts and the deployment of biometrics in Mauritania, the installation of an entry-exit system at Conakry airport, the geographical partition of Mali into zones of relative (in)security by Western travel advisories, EU capacity-building programs for Nigerien security forces, and many more. One of the most prominent cases is the increasingly multi-faceted set of EU migration control practices that intervene in 'origin' countries like Senegal and 'transit' countries like Mauritania.

The EU's migration control policies in West Africa are multi-sited and multi-scalar, guided by the 2005 Global Approach to Migration (GAM) as well as a range of agreements, dialogues and periodic meetings. It is a multi-scalar management approach with projects such as West Sahel formed in Brussels, coordinated by local European External Action Service (EEAS) offices, and put into action by member state security forces—in this case the Spanish *Guardia Civil*. This arrangement is also multi-sited, in that policies set up between European countries have profound external effects— reaffirming the idea that borderwork does not always happen at the site of the border itself. Reminiscent of the first 'thesis' on borderwork I discussed above, EU migration management is geographically complex. Although it is the 'European' border being policed, its external projection creates multiple borderlands: the external border of the EU is projected into the maritime and territorial space of African states, while in some cases, borders *between* these countries are hardened. The 1985 Schengen Agreement created a semblance of an 'external' border containing multiple sovereign states, while the 1993 Madrid Convention began a trend of consular cooperation that would stretch all the way to the use of the Visa Information System (VIS) database, established in 2004.

Various programs funded or promoted by the EU involve a wide range of actors, technologies, regulatory instruments and so on, highlighting the complexity and networked nature of borderwork. FRONTEX, the EU's external border control agency, has mounted operations along the Atlantic coast of Africa costing over €25million between 2006 and 2010 (Brachet, Choplin and Pliez 2012: 175). Although Spain carries out ongoing cooperation with Senegal and Mauritania, three operations—named Hera I, II and III—have been carried out under the FRONTEX banner. These have involved interviews of intercepted migrants as well as the use of vessels and aircraft from numerous European countries, with Spanish technical coordination and local equipment (FRONTEX 2006). Its creation smoothed by earlier cooperation through FRONTEX, Project West Sahel was inaugurated in 2011 as a capacity-building and modernization program aiming to train the gendarmeries of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Niger in border control and migration techniques. The project is funded to the tune of €2.44 million, with 80% coming from the EU and 20% from the Spanish *Guardia Civil*. The program promotes vertical (EU-Africa) coordination but also horizontal forms (between African project members). The assemblage-like nature of migration management in Mauritania is also characterized by the fact that it is impossible to draw clear lines of causality between agents and outcomes. In April 2012, Mauritanian security forces launched a 'security operation' against migrants from across the region transiting in the

city of Nouadhibou and placed them in a detention centre, citing an anti-terrorism rationale (OuestAf.com 2012). There is in all likelihood a domestic audience for this borderwork, or an internal security rationale, but such operations are also conducted under pressure from the European Union, which built the detention centre in question.

EU borderwork in West Africa is undertaken by systems best described as socio-technical. FRONTEX patrols and Project West Sahel both depend heavily on the material element provided by Spanish patrol ships (for training and patrols), as well as by donated equipment, both of which constitute 'policy vehicles' of securitization. Under Project West Sahel, the Senegalese gendarmes received 3 vehicles, two motorcycles, two laptops, and digital cameras (Rewmi.com 2012) and their Mauritanian counterparts were given "IT equipment, vehicles and off-road motorbikes, […] night vision goggles and cut-resistant gloves, and forged document detectors" (Magharebia 2012a). These material objects are *actants* in that they have agency to construct and perform the border: night vision goggles may lead to changes in training and in personnel shifts, digital cameras may facilitate the storage and dissemination of migrants' private information (face images) and the emphasis on terrain vehicles may lead to a shift in focus away from maritime patrols towards internal policing. The 'tools' in the socio-technical system are also ideational. The West Sahel project is a site for the diffusion of norms about how borders should be run, with Mauritanian gendarmes having conducted three months of joint patrols with the Spanish *Guardia Civil* (Magharebia 2012a). This repeated performance of border patrol is pedagogical as well as a reiteration of European authority over the creation of borderwork norms.

One example of the materiality of border control, which segues neatly into questions of security and development, is the IOM's construction of new border posts for Mauritania with EU funds. In 2010, a decree was signed by the Mauritanian government for the creation of 45 exclusive points of entry to the country's territory (Soninkara 2012), and the EU has provided €8million in financial assistance, partly through the IOM, for this project (Délégation de l'Union européenne en Mauritanie 2012). As of March 2012, 3 airport points were fitted with electronic passport readers, 8 border posts were built or under construction, 30 posts were fitted with solar powered computers and 280 border patrol agents trained. The IOM has also reiterated the importance of a *central* border management database, highlighting the importance of linking the edges of national territory to the administrative apparatus of the state.

This borderwork is intimately linked to the modernization and development of the state's capacity to 'see'. In such forms of 'technical' cooperation, we see what development theorist James Ferguson has described as the "entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object" (Ferguson 1990: 256). For example, the development implications for Project West Sahel, itself a spillover from FRONTEX cooperation between the Mauritanian gendarmerie and the EU, involved the Spanish *Guardia Civil* in 2011 delivering courses on maritime interception training the gendarmerie's canine unit (Points Chauds 2011), as a means of boosting the country's general policing apparatus. This building of capacity for self-policing suggests a long-term objective of creating

resilient, self-policing states in Europe's periphery. In turn, the presentation of these projects as purely technical obscures this political reality in which states are pushed to become 'buffers' around Europe.

Security programs are also financially dependent on development funding, and EU migration management in Senegal and Mauritania must be seen in the context of the EU's desire to link security and development in light of instability in the Sahel region. This brings an in-built security rationale to much migration policy, and the funding lines used for these projects are telling. Europe's attempts to 'stabilize' the Sahel region have been funded under the 10th European Development Fund (Magharebia 2012b) but also 6.7million from the Instrument for Stability (Rabat Process 2012), while Mauritania's migration policy is being drafted with EU help following the standards of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Rabat Process 2012). The guiding document for these activities in the region is the EEAS's *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*. We therefore see projects that have security outcomes being funded by development programs, and a discursive association between the two. We can even speak of a triad of migration-security-development, since one of the three major goals of EU migration policy under the GAM is "strengthening the synergies between migration and development" (European Commission 2012). Direct development aid is a central aspect of EU migration management in the region.

According to *Horizon sans frontières*, a Malian advocacy group, about 15,000 migrants from Africa died trying to gain access to Europe between 1989 and 2009 (MaliJet 2012). The linkage of security and development becomes perceptible in the way that EU migration policies associate these humanitarian concerns with migration control measures. Project West Sahel exists to "protect migrants' rights and to facilitate their readmission" (European Commission 2011), but this obscures any tension between the protection of an abstract international rights-bearing subject and the sovereign desire for deportation of 'others'. In addition, the expected results of the project are heavily focused on surveillance and control capacities of third countries, with no mention of any metric for measuring guarantees of migrants' rights. This is a long-standing aim of EU policy, given the 'securitization' of migration through discourse and policy tools, such as the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, which moved migration into the realm of security policy.

Conclusion

In this paper, I sought to make a number of main points. First, I attempted to show that there is some kind of loose transnational structure that *does* border-work which has in-built understandings of how border control—which is increasingly integrated and dispersed across space—should be undertaken. Second, I tried to show that borderwork practices in West Africa tend to operate in a similar semantic and practical field as 'development', suggesting that security is about control but also about care. Third, I sought to show that EU migration management in West Africa is a complex structure and relies on a complex interplay between security and development.

In the interest of brevity, I did not discuss the second major facet of my dissertation project's empirical foundations—the use of biometric ID. I provided some empirical examples to showcase the breadth of borderwork, but did not tackle the important questions biometrics raise about global standards, colonial legacies and citizenship rights. Finally, I have also set aside an important question: what are the effects of these various legibility practices on the nature and structure of the African state? Although the discussion of development in this paper began to tackle this question, an answer can only come in the next phase of this project: a close empirical analysis, buttressed with through fieldwork, of border control in Senegal and Mauritania.

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Hollstegge, Julian

E-Mail: julian.hollstegge@uni-bayreuth.de

Bayreuth University, Department of Geography

Narrating and Practising the state border between Uganda and South Sudan

Abstract

For the last decades the Sudan/Uganda borderland has been the arena of several interrelated violent conflicts in which successive governments and army forces supported rebel groups on the respective other side of the border. The border has been extensively studied with reference to these conflicts, the refugee movements they have created and related 'informal' cross-border flows. Following the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the subsequent (semi)autonomy of Southern Sudan and the demise of rebel activity in Northern Uganda, cross-border flows have taken on a new quantitative and qualitative dimension. This paper looks at current geopolitical, economical and social dynamics in the borderland based on fieldwork on both sides of a North-Western Uganda/Southern Sudan border crossing. It asks in detail how those who live at, work at and deal with the border 'story their border experience, and their relations with the other side. By examining border people's everyday narratives, practices and border management performances, this paper lays bare competing meanings and the symbolic functions of the border. It finally relates them to actual processes of state building, regional integration and identity formation.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the reconfigurations and dynamics around the state border between Uganda and today's independent Southern Sudan in the pre-referendum period. The border separates two regions which for much of their colonial and postcolonial history have been politically and economically marginalised within their respective national contexts and have for several decades experienced a considerable amount of conflict and civil war. Within the alleviation of conflict-related tensions instituted by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and a new dynamism in cross-border relations, it takes a look at the state border as both institution and social construct, based on empirical research at a border crossing between Uganda's West Nile and Southern Sudan's Equatoria region1. By looking at border people's everyday practices and narratives and border management performances it seeks to lay bare multiple meanings and the symbolic functions of the border.

In doing so, I will first sketch the conceptual and methodological approach, before briefly outlining the historical context of the border. In the main part of this paper, I will present empirical material by linking dominant views and attitudes towards the border - and the other side of it - to the practises of the border

1

management and border people.

Border studies and research on African borderlands: Studying border-related narratives and practices

Related to major questions posed in the panel abstract, in here I want to adopt a perspective on the border which focuses on the manyfold ways in which people (and the state, too) attribute meaning, make sense and use of the border.

African borders have for long adhered a „consistently poor reputation" , regarded by many border scholars as either severe obstacles to the African continent or as quasi non-existent in practice (Nugent 1996: 35). Recent work however goes well beyond the clichée of the artificiality of Africa's colonial and postcolonial boundaries, suggesting that there is actually some common ground to suggest that „African border are often now an accepted, even actively reproduced ground of social and economic life for borderlanders" as they use them, exploit them and interpret them in many various ways (Coplan 2010: 2; see also Ramutsindela 1999; Miles 2005). Particular attention is paid to borderlands as specific functional and social spaces, which are ‚typically distant' from the center (Engel&Nugent 2010; Coplan 2010). As regions of strong economic (both formal and informal), ethnic and cultural cross border linkages a major theme in this context are the various opportunities these frontiers offer for people in the borderlands (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996; Egg&Herrera 1998; Pederby 2000; Konings 2005; Feiyissa&Hoehne 2008).

In line with the growing amount of work on borders - rather than borderlands - in Africa (Brambilla 2007; Raeymaekers 2009; Doevenspeck 2011; Doevenspeck&Mwanabiningo forthcoming), I intend to study the Sudan/Uganda border as both institution and social construct. In doing so, I will draw on recent conceptual developments of border studies in Political Geography which, informed by notions of borders as discourse and practice (Paasi 1996;1999), foreground the dynamic and processual nature of borders. Rather than fixed and static political dividing lines demarcating sovereign state territories, the border is here understood „a site at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated" (Van Houtum 2005: 672).

In here, I will therefore focus on the ‚small discourses' of border people, their practices and the performative aspects of the border management operating at a ‚micro-level'. In this conception, the border is understood as part of the daily life of borderlanders, where its impact and effects - be they material or symbolic - might be most obviously visible. Following Newman in his suggestion that „[if] we really want to know what borders mean to people, we need to listen to their personal and group narratives, collecting border narratives and pooling together similar views and dominant attitudes towards the border might help revealing its different barrier and interaction functions and lay bare the lines of inclusion and exclusion that they inherit (Newman 2006: 154)

In detail, I will look at how those people who live at, work at, deal with, and cross or don't cross the border ‚story' their way of seeing and experiencing the border - and the other side of it. In doing so

empirically, I conducted 46 interviews with different kinds of individuals from both sides of the border 2, ranging from small-scale and mobile traders, businesspeople, local border residents from different generations, lorry drivers, clearing agents, shop owners, moneychangers and local commuters to border officials.

Most of the interviews and less formal conversations were conducted at or in close proximity to the border, sometimes even while crossing it. Spending a considerable amount of time at and in between the border crossing in search for talk on the border and frequently crossing the border back and fourth - whether alone or with borderlanders - were strategies employed to observe, find out and talk about the practices of border crossers, and the performance and constant negotiations of the border management. In order to situate the findings, I will first briefly outline the historical context of the border.

Placing the border in context: rebels, refugees and trade

Basically agreed upon between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the British Protectorate of Uganda in 1914, the border and the areas close to it have been of marginal interest to the colonial powers. While the negligibility of the border area in colonial times is in some way be illustrated by the frequent exchange of the ‚Lado enclave' (comprising today's West Nile in Uganda and adjacent territories in Congo and Sudan) between the Belgian Congo, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Protectorate of Uganda, of which it has been successively part, the marginalisation of the borderlands persisted in the postcolonial period (Leopold 2009).

With initial tensions erupting as early as at the dawn Sudan' independence, causing large scale migration from Sudan to Uganda began in the late 50's, and continuing as refugee movements during the first Sudanese Civil War, the borderland has been characterised by persistent conflict with the frequent crossing of rebels, large numbers refugees on either side and large-scale cross-border informal trade (Leopold 2009). Shortly after the return of many Sudanese refugees in the 70's, they were soon followed by nearly 80% of West Nile's total population when Ugandan dictator Idi Amin - a West Niler from Koboko - was ousted from power in 1979, and soldiers of former and later president Obote engaged in massive revenge killings, collectively holding guilty West Nilers for Amin's atrocities (Lomo&Hovil 2004). Regrouping under two different rebel movements, former Amin soldiers subsequently launched attacks on Obote's troops from bases in Sudan (Hovil&Okello 2007). Shortly afterwards the outbreak of the second Sudanese Civil War between the SPLA and the Khartoum government again caused major refugee streams into Uganda.

Alongside the intense refugee movements across the border also came an increasingly flourishing ‚informal' triangular trade between Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo from the 70s onwards. Commonly refered to as the ‚magendo' trade, which goes back to collapse of the Ugandan economy under Idi Amin and persisted during the war years, this trade consisted of „legal goods illegally

traded and illegal goods illegally traded" and included goods such as gold, coffee, minerals, diamonds, tropical timbers and petroleum products (Leopold 2009: 473; Meagher 1990).

Initially rooted in internal struggles and causing only minor interferences between Khartoum and Kampala governments, conflicts in the borderland became part of wider cross-border phenomena as both governments started to support rebel groups operating on the other side from the 90's onwards. Besides the Lord's Resistance Army, the Khartoum government helped the less well-known West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the the UNRF II (a reformed rebel group of former Amin soldiers) to form and launch attacks in West Nile, while the Ugandan government backed the SPLA. Having abandoned international relations between 1994 and 1999, Sudan and Uganda „were running an undeclared war on their common border" using the rebel groups as proxies to destablise each other (Prunier 2004: 359). At the border in Kaya, first captured by the SPLA in 1990, government armies started overtly fighting alongside each others enemies. While the Sudan army recaptured Kaya in 1995, the WNBF briefly occupied the border post in Oraba, before in 1997 the SPLA and the Uganda army launched a joint offensive from the border, soon taking over large parts of Sudan's Equatoria region. While the Kaya border has since then been controlled and administered - allegedly quite arbitrarily - by the SPLA, the situation in West Nile and Sudan's Equatoria regions slightly eased in 2002 due to commencing peace talks in Sudan and the final surrender of the WNBF (Johnson 2003; Ofcansky 2000; Lomo&Hovil 2004).

With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in 2005, international relations across the border suddenly changed. Building on mutual alliances during the war years, the government of Uganda and its ‚new' neighbour Southern Sudan were quick in establishing consulates and signing a memorandum of understanding to expand and strenghten their already close bilateral ties in the post-CPA era.

The cross-border trade has also taken on a new dimension, not least because, as Leopold observes, much of the current trade „seems to be legitimate business" (2009: 474). Though largely ‚informal' in nature3, major export goods include a wide range of general merchandise and basic commodities such as construction materials, clothes, diverse foodstuffs, and agricultural products, electric appliances and vehicle spareparts (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2009a). The volume of cross-border trade has increased more than tenfold since 2005 which suddenly made Sudan Uganda's major export destination and, due to ongoing LRA activity around the Bibia/Nimule border crossing on the most direct route between between Kampala and Juba, helped to turn the Kaya/Oraba border into a busy transport hub between the two countries (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2010).

Setting the Scene: the Kaya/Oraba border crossing

„After the total ceasefire, that's when i came. Otherwise there was

nothing here completely. It was a no-go area, just some local trade on a

very low scale, local people walking. The border trade was limited to

military convoys and those people were then handled from only Koboko.

This was rebel area, a real bush. In fact, in the past there wasn't even this

Kaya, there was nothing like those thatched houses, it was more like a

camp. When I came all these things were not here. I would work here, and

sleep in Koboko. This was just a bushy place" (Ugandan border official).

The above citation of a Ugandan border official who was the first to arrive in Oraba might be illustrative of the reconfigurations at the border crossing since the CPA. In Oraba, a newly constructed parking yard serves to accommodate vehicles of long-distance trade, and local commuter vehicles frequently shuttle between the town of Koboko, the final stopping point of regular bus transport in Uganda located around 25 kilometers from the border, and Kaya and Yei in Southern Sudan. Several old and new permanent houses lined up along the roadside host a number of shops serving daily needs, a few basic guesthouses and several bars. Few meters across the border, the Sudanese border village Kaya is slightly bigger in population size and accommodates a wider range of shopping and lodging facilities. According to several informants, the majority of the local population in the two border villages returned only gradually after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Besides local border residents, Ugandans and Southern Sudanese from different parts of the two countries have come to run some kind of business at the border and seem to dominate public life in the villages.

Alongside the return of much of the economic life also seems to come a heightened presence of state authority on either side. Recently constructed buildings of border agencies on both sides of the border point towards a renewed sense of state control and illustrate the relative ,newness' of the current regime. Being transferred to Koboko during the war, Ugandan authorities were gradually relocated to their present location just in front of the small bridge crossing the borderline of river Kaya into Southern Sudan. Across the border in Kaya, the independent Southern Sudan under SPLM rule takes on a concrete form as will be outlined below.

„This is our border" - the Kaya border in the wake of state building

„Well, in the past the border was controlled by the Arabs and the taxation was so high.

That's why there is also less development in Southern Sudan and that's one of the reasons why

we took arms and fought. Because we have been marginalised, we haven't been given the

same share. [...] So, at the time the peace agreement was signed, we said no. We are the

government, we're in charge of the border, we are in charge of everything. And that's why the

Southern Sudanese government decided to improve the situation in the border. Even in the past,

I am telling you, to take an iron sheet across the border as a black man is not easy. They have to doublecharge you. It was very difficult" (GoSS official)

Though at the time of fieldwork, the border was officially still part of a united Sudan under the Government of National Unity, this was hardly ever visible at first sight. Instead, a large signpost annoucing the entry to 'Southern Sudan' and several flags and symbols of the 'New Sudan' under the leadership of the SPLM and president Salva Kiir made eminently clear, who is really in control of the border.

There is, however, some irony in the above statement of the GoSS official, as the 'improvement of the situation' comes along with considerably complex border management instituted by the CPA and Southern Sudanese authorities. As the Daily Monitor (2008) reported, up to 16 different taxes and tolls needed to be paid upon entering Sudan, and customs tariffs have been constantly increased (especially for those goods now producable inside Southern Sudan).

While this may already illustrate the new state 'in the making', state building processes of an autonomous Southern Sudan are also felt in the everyday practice of the border management where former rebels are now acting as today's state officials. In the offices of the various border agencies, former soldiers of the SPLA are taking on their work as civil servants of the current political regime, and did in the afternoon hours attend UN-implemented advanced training in 'Administration', treating 'intercultural communication' at one of the days I have been there. in carrying out their bureaucratic tasks, there is still a way in which state power is largely understood as personalised power symbolising the ongoing transformation from military government into a civil administration. As the statement of a senior head of a border agency whose first words to me were 'I am the boss here, welcome to my area' makes once again clear, the border - as may be the case for the entire state - belongs to the personal hands of the SPLA/M.

This notion of 'our border' also resonates in the attitudes and views of many Southerners who frequently refered to the need of 'their' border as an inevitable necessity of any real state. As 'every state needs borders', Southern Sudan should definitely have them, too. Though revealing a strong identification with the idea of an autonomous Southern Sudan, here too, the border remains closely associated with the state. Rather than personal experiences on the border, they often foregrounded the importance of the border as an institution of the government, pointing towards a continuing state/society divide. Stressing the use of tax collection and state revenue as a potential resource for development, stories center around the hope (and also the exspectations) for development in Southern Sudan, related to its existence independently from the South. This may be provide a glimpse on what future legitimacy of SPLM rule in an autonomous Southern Sudan will rest on, since claims to power have so far been largely dominated by the aim of achieving independence from the north.

„We are here to protect" - Demonstrating strenghts and presence at the Ugandan border

Compared to the border in Sudan, the border post in Oraba is more modest both materially as well as in terms of state authorities present at the border. Ugandan border controls are however frequently refered to as quite tight and rigid. Peculiar to the border crossing is the presence of soldiers:

> „You know, at other borders you don't see soldiers, but this one is unique, because these ones [Sudanese] are still militant. So if you bring civilians here [to work at the border], you will never collect immigration. They will never go there inside [the immigration office] to stamp the passport. They are very agressive, they are very militant. In their culture they are pastoralists, nomadists, and now, with their hangover of bush war, that combination now, becomes very dangerous" (Ugandan border official).

As the citation indicates, security is an important concern for Ugandan authorities. As storied above, protection at the Ugandan border is seen in light of prevailing aggressions and violence of people from the other side, and are here seen as an unwanted threat. Stories of Sudanese trying to carry guns into Uganda are frequent, and a recent gunshooting at a Koboko nightclub might be evidence of this. There is a way in which behaviours of Southern Sudanese are perceived as dangers in Ugandan territory, and border control seems to be a means to impose and demonstrate ‚law and order' to those entering so that Southern Sudanese ‚internalise the Ugandan policies', as a Ugandan border official has formulated.

However, the ‚securitisation' of the border can not be fully understood as a mere response to real or perceived threats, but can be read as a medium of the Ugandan state to effectively communicate a sense of security and protection to the people in the borderland, which it has long failed to guarantee in this part of the country. This becomes especially apparent with respect to the way in which threats to security in Uganda are discursively externalised: from ordinary Sudanese carrying guns to a potential return of the LRA now operating in the areas of Sudan and Central African Republic and the fragile security situation in Sudan which now poses a major threat to long lasting stability in the region.

As such, the Oraba border may figuratively express the recurrent strenghts of the Ugandan central state in Northern Uganda, however spatially and temporarily limited this may in reality may be.

Performing sovereignty - border management at the Kaya/Oraba border crossing

The recourse to the particular manifestations of state power on both sides already points to the relevance and distinct symbolic functions of exercising their power through borders.

Though they are numerous strategies and tactics to reduce and dodge fees for both people and trade

„that serve to bend and escape boundaries" (Raeymaekers 2009: 63), the state border becomes quite manifest at the Kaya and Oraba posts, not least in the constant negotiations of exit and entry arrangements between border officials and those, whereas the latter are often involved quite unwillingly into face-to-face discussions with border officials.

Though very few people would need to show any identity document at the time of crossing, soldiers and officials in front of the immigration offices ‚verified‘ whether people were allowed to pass freely or if they were supposed to pay. What is interesting about these control measures is that they often depended on outer appearances such as the general look or skin colour as well as on categories such as language to decide if someone was Ugandan and Sudanese. One could observe that ‚tall‘ and ‚black‘ Dinka were especially targeted by the Ugandan regime, and Southern Sudanese officials setted their their primarily on ‚lighter‘ and less taller people which were then harsh and roughly made to pay, being reminded of their different nationality.

This notion of a ‚celebration of difference‘ in the border management performances may be further illustrated in an occasion when large numbers of Sudanese school children made their way into Uganda at the beginning of the school term.

Ugandan immigration authorities subsequently enforced their immigration controls asking a 50 dollar visa fee for everyone passing which triggered widespread incomprehension and caused major discussions among many Sudanese in Kaya. As a consequence, immigration officials from Kaya in turn rigidly controlled their border asking every Ugandan entering Kaya for his ‚waraga‘ (Juba Arabic for the necessary travel document).

This occasional ‚border tightening‘, to whatever extent real or perceived, is a vivid expression of how border management can be used by either state to demonstrate its sovereign and territorial powers to both in- and outsiders, promoting a sense of difference and (not) belonging. As such, the border may be seen as a stage for the performace of stateness and as such is a key site „where governments of newly independent states can assert identities as sovereign ‚players‘ in the post-colonial context" (Megoran et al. 2005: 723).

„There is the taste of money in Sudan" - border crossing as a resource and opportunity

One dominant narrative of the border refers to border crossing to Sudan as a resource and is prominent especially among Ugandans who engage in business and trading across. They foreground the attractiveness of business opportunities of the border and the other side of it, refering to the benefits they are drawing from the profitability of the Southern Sudanese market.

> *„I quit [my job] just because of a money thing, you know. There were*
>
> *stories going around that Sudan, it was vibrant. There was money there. So*
>
> *the only thing I knew, there was money in Sudan. So I went for the money*

8

and it is paying off. That business gave me more money than I've ever got

in my life" (Ugandan trader).

Stories of vasts amount of money in circulation, and brisk spending behaviors after the CPA underpin that the Southern Sudanese market turned out as a new „El Dorado" for traders and businesspeople of all kinds (Titeca 2009).

As post-conflict reconstruction had to start from the ground up (Denu 2009), high demand in all kinds of consumer goods, building materials and foodstuffs for the returning population and, as a consequence, high prices accounted for huge profit margins. For those people who storied the border in this way, the border acts as a doorway to the „virgin market" Southern Sudan (Titeca 2009) which offers a lucrative and viable option to increase personal economic benefits.

This is also the case for more localised forms of trade and business which was all mainly in one direction entering Southern Sudan. Everyday in the morning, mobile traders and local market women together with a number of Ugandans running shops or being employed on the other side, crossed the border to sell their products on the market and in the streets of Kaya.

Instead of seeing the trade as a simple consequence of price differentials, the border seems to seperate two very distinct economic settings. Many Ugandans point out the advantages of doing business the other side compared to several restrictions and challenges they face in Uganda.

„In Sudan, with the little money you have, you can start up a business.

Within one year, you can hit your target and go back, in Uganda you'll

never. You have to stick to what you've been trained. But in Sudan, you can

do many businesses, there are many opportunities. You just do what you're

doing, you try your luck, an opportunity you'll never do in Uganda"

(Ugandan businessman).

Refering to the greater economic and entrepreneurial freedom, the Sudan market is storied as open for the realisation of manyfold business concepts, of which a former school director who quit his job to buy a truck to sell water from river Nile for hundreds of dollars a day and a tourist agent working temporarily as a graphic designer and IT-specialist are only two examples.

The loose economic regulations in Southern Sudan also featured prominently in the narratives (though to the regret of many of the businesspeople, authorities started issuing licenses for shops in Kaya during the time of research), while the Ugandan market is often refered to as congested, saturated and restrictive. Despite the economic growth in terms of macroeconomic figures, this may point to the fact that Ugandans increasingly need this export market to secure their economic livelyhoods which is especially the case for mobile and petty traders, which is especially the case for small-scale and petty traders and local transporteurs.

Through their making use of the different opportunities across the border, Titeca has argued that the

traders and businesspeople „create a de facto regional integration" economically. That we might not speak of a fully integrated borderland, however, may become obvious in the following group of stories which were common among many and often the same people who storied the border as a resource.

„In Sudan there is no law" - insecurity and and the experience of violence

> „There are people who buy there [in Kaya]. But anyway, we have
> challenges, but we just endure. If you go to Sudan there, they [people at the
> border] arrest things, they want you to pay, you pay, you do what. Now if
> you reach there, there is a way they treat us, they don't sympathise us. You
> know, people of Sudan the majority they are hostile. So if you reach there, it
> is easy to kill you. Secondly it is easy to beat you. If you're a foreigner, they
> don't handle you in a good way" (Ugandan Mobile Trader)

Besides the business opportunities, another particularly strong narrative revolves around challenges and difficulties many Ugandans are experiencing across the border. These include stories of harassment by officials, soldiers and police personnel, personal insecurity and feelings of discomfort on the other side, and the attribution of negative stereotypes to Southern Sudanese more generally. Frequently, Ugandans crossing the border talked about the harsh and sometimes even violent treatment by Southern Sudanese officials in day to day situations, and they felt that they are especially targeted by Southern Sudan authorities. One taxi driver reported that he was beaten by a police officer for having parked wrongly in the parking yard of Kaya. Indeed, there are numerous reports of Ugandans being attacked, murdered or going missing in Southern Sudan pointing towards a severe lack of public security and law enforement in Southern Sudan where authorities are - in contrary to granting protection and justice - are themselves contributing to injusticepe and to „excerbate further violence" (Schomerus&Allen 2010: 7)

While stories about harassments are often closely tied to soldiers and officials, more general resentments against people from Sudan are also common.

> „I don't like Sudan, we don't like this place. I spent here four months, but
> I don't sleep here, I sleep in Uganda. I just go out for business, then I come
> back. When you tell someone in Western Uganda that you are going to
> work in Southern Sudan, they will say why? Why are you going there? That
> is not a good place. Mostly, what pains us, you know, they are still
> backwards. [...] So like that, like me, ever since I've been moving down this
> place, I don't like it. I better go back to Arua. We are more comfortable than
> here. But here people they are still backwards" (Ugandan businesswoman

and shop owner).

‚Backwardness' is one of the attributions often ascribed to Southern Sudanese generally, and Ugandans often stereotyped them as being ‚rude', ‚crude',and ‚agressive'. Constantly refering to their ‚uncivilised behaviours', some even equated them with being animal-like. This harsh and racist terminology illustrates well the construction of people from Sudan as a ‚threatening other'. It is within the first time crossing experience that difference between the two sides is initially experienced and perpetuated, and in which the border „becomes a place where the animosity and dislike for the other which, in the past, may have been based on invisibility and lack of knowledge, now takes on a concrete form" (Newman 2006: 152).

The personal and collective othering of those Ugandans who storied the border in this way becomes most obvious in the stories of the moment they return to Uganda. Many of those who stayed in Sudan or regularly go to Sudan refer to feelings of relief and coming home into certainty when reaching back to their own side of the border.

> *„The time you reach the border, you know you're home. You're relieved. And you're feeling the atmosphere. And some of them [people at the border], when you reach they say: ah, welcome back, welcome back. People at the border there, because they know us there, and they always sympathise with people going the other side" (Ugandan truck driver).*

„Lifeline Uganda" - the border as a gateway to survival

In contrast to many Ugandans, Southern Sudanese mainly talked in a positive way about their experiences with the other side of the border. Their stories stress the significance of bordering Uganda in several different regards.

> *„If the border closes, no food. The food I eat, the clothes I wear, is from Uganda. So that is the relation we have. Even the education we got, we got it in Uganda" (Sudanese youth working in Kaya)*

A first dominant narrative of the border refers to the border as a lifeline. It expresses the important role of the Ugandan neighbour to cater for existential needs of many Southern Sudanese. Besides all kinds of consumer goods which make their way across the border from Uganda, Sudanese frequently crossed the border to access basic services such as medical treatment and schooling which to date remain scarce in Southern Sudan.

Though in between the lines there is a sense in which they find themselves uncomfortable with the heavy dependency and reliance on support from the other side, there is a general affiliation to Uganda. This may be understood in the context of former reliance on Khartoum, to which the turn to Uganda offers an

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alternative way of orientation. In terms of trade, Uganda is not only spatially closer than the ‚distant‘ Khartoum, but the turn to goods from East Africa also entails a symbolical dimension.They prefer the ‚freely‘ chosen and fruitful reliance on its neighbour in the south rather than a forced dependence on Khartoum which never had a real interest the south. Rumours and beliefs of rotten and poisoned foodstuffs from Khartoum are quite common with many Southerners. In turn, goods from East Africa are highly valued, and are appreciated as a contribution to the process of developing an emancipated autonomous Southern Sudan. In this way, the border, used as a gateway to East Africa, can be seen as an instrument to enhance and turn into reality their autonomy.

Another common theme among many Sudanese was the other side of the border as an the opportunity of recreation and.

> „I usually go there [to Uganda] to wander and stroll around, just for fun.
> Why staying here in this naked place of ours? In Uganda, we can enjoy life!“
> (Sudanese shop owner in Kaya)

When the trade to Sudan severely lessened over evenings and weekends, cross-border movement seemed to reverse and one could regularly observe smartly dressed Sudanese coming across to have a couple of drinks and play a game of pool in one of the several bars in Oraba or going onwards to Koboko for a nightout.

Even if Kaya is more busy generally, especially in terms of shopping and employment options, paradoxically Oraba outstrips Kaya with regard to entertainment establishments. The frequent border crossing for leisure purposes may however not only be understood as a mere consequence of missing facilities. Using the border selectively for leisure activities offers an opportunity to temporarily escape the prevailing living conditions and take a break from strained life in Sudan where social life is still characterised by mutual mistrust and a fragile security situation. Many ‚ordinary‘ civilians find themselves in an uneasy relationship with its own government, especially with the soldiers of the SPLA (Schomerus 2008). Stories of former rebels and today‘s government soldiers and officials who easily turn to violent means when feeling provoked point towards continuing tense relations between state authorities and civil society. Crossing the border to Uganda as a safe haven is a possibility to leave aside for a while the uncertainties of everyday life they are facing at home.

„The border is a difficult place“ - West Nilers in between the wars

> „You know, the border is a difficult place. Being in the border, you‘re
> being affected. If war starts there [in Sudan], first of all it affects us here.
> When it again starts there [in Uganda], it affects us here. So the thing is we

to run" (Oraba resident)

Refering to the border as a difficult place is a peculiar narrative of older Oraba residents. These narratives foreground the experiences of conflict at the border and include stories of marginalisation, emphasising difficult relations with the Ugandan centre on one hand, and expressing mistrust in the current peace in Sudan on the other. For those who experienced the wars, living at the border does primarily mean to be caught in the middle of conflict from either side. In the citation above, the border is storied as an interface of the conflictous entanglements in the borderland and the border is being quite literally placed at the centre of the wars.

In the stories, the several conflicts are presented as ceaselessly accompanying and affecting life at the border where leaving the border forms a significant part of living at it.

The fact, that the current situation is not referred to as peaceful reveals the resignation of hope and the general disbelief in an enduring peace of Ugandan West Nilers. While the danger and threat to peace is now ascribed to come from Sudan, they lack confidence in the security provided by the Ugandan central government at the border. Despite the return of Ugandan state control at the border, they doubt being protected at all. Memories of absconding police personnel in previous times illustrate their view of being left alone and forgotten by the Ugandan government.

These narratives point to the persistent sense of marginality which shapes the view of many West Niler's whose relationships within the Ugandan central state „has [...] remained an uneasy one" (Leopold in Hovil&Okello 2007: 1; Leopold 2005).

„For me there is no difference" - a common borderland identity

„For me, there is no difference except that Kaya is more lively" (Oraba youth working as a clearing agent in Kaya)

A fifth narrative which was common on both sides of the border, most notably among borderland youth and people with a long experience in cross-border trade and business, abates distinctions between the two sides. They emphasise commonalities rather than differences across the border. For those who storied the border in this way, there is no sharp differentiation between the ‚us' and ‚them'. They rather refer to people across as „brothers and sisters" and „one people", emphasising intermarriages and family relations across the border.

Relations between people from both sides are rendered unproblematic at the local level, and they emphasise the mutual benefits Ugandans and Sudanese derive from each other, e.g. that Uganda is the „land of education", and Sudan the „land of business" mirroring dominant patterns of cross-border

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exchange phenomena.

Profiting from employment opportunities the border offers, working as moneychangers,engaging in small-scale smuggling of cigarettes, or doing some work across the border, they frequently cross the border and easily find their way on both sides of it. Most of the youth have had no or little problems with authorities of the other side, as they are well known to them, or as many of them were saying, they could easily mask themselves as either Ugandans or Sudanese, strategically using different languages on the two different sides of the border. The border as a usual fact of life without constituting any hindrance to cross-border activity may be expressive of a common borderland identity.

> „The border is a sign of love for me, really. Even I am married across. I have a Sudanese wife, I can even stay more safe on the other side. And when I cross there [in Kaya] I can take twenty minutes talking to people before I reach where I wanted some few hundred meters ahead" (Ugandan businessman).

Conclusion

Two contradictory processes may be emphasised with regard the above outlined observations in the post-CPA period. On one hand, we can see a border ‚opening' in the sense that the border is increasingly crossed and frequented for peaceful cross-border exchange, while at the same time cross-border flows are channeled through heightened border controls within the (re)building of Ugandan and Southern Sudanese state authority in the borderland.

By focusing on the everyday narratives and practices of borderlanders, we might reveal the multiple meanings borders have for different individuals and groups of people and better understand the patterns of how the border is being used selectively to navigate and manoever between two very distinct political and economic orders. As in the case of many Ugandans, for whom the border to Sudan provides an opportunity economically, but at the same time crossing the border remains a step into uncertainty and insecurity, and notions of difference are not only becoming apparent but perpetuated. The emerging post-CPA cross-border trade has created new tensions between Ugandans and Sudanese. Especially Ugandan traders who have recently crossed the border for the first time ascribe hostility to people from the other side, and in turn themselves show a latent hostility towards their neighbours.

However, perceptions of ‚the other' as not really different common among ‚experienced borderlanders' reveal the potential that these tensions may be overcome in the long-term. For many Sudanese, the border to Uganda in the context of an upcoming Southern Sudan remains of particular importance. Whether in terms of the provision of goods and services, or escaping the prevailing insecurity and incertainty which

characterises both the political situation and everyday life, the border as a gateway to Uganda remains of crucial importance for independent existince from the North, both in a material and a symbolic way.

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Ikanda, Fred Nyongesa

fni20@cam.ac.uk *Division of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge*

Note: This is work in progress. It forms the bulk of chapter one of my PhD and highlights locals' and refugees' interactions in the everyday rhythms. It comes after introduction which mainly deals with the history of cross border interactions and theoretical issues on hospitality. Chapter two deals with the anthropology of bureaucracy from the context of Somali sociality and chapter three focuses on gender issues. Two other chapters will follow at a later stage.

Exploring the shifting identities between refugees and locals at the Dagahaley refugee camp, Kenya

Abstract

Approximately 500, 000 Somali refugees crossed into neighbouring Kenya between 1991 and 1992 when Somalia became stateless following the overthrow of the then president Siad Barre. More than two decades later, Somalian refugees are still being hosted at Kenya's Dadaab Complex (comprised of Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo II, and Hagadera refugee camps which are within a 17km radius from Dadaab). Like refugees, the local residents are also Somalis who had previously been interacting with Somalians across the porous Kenya-Somalia border due to kinship and religious ties, nomadic pastoralism practiced by Somalis, and political factors rooted in the mismatch between Somali nation and nation-state. Although Somali refugees went into exile as persons already enmeshed in previous relationships, cross-border movements are usually circumscribed by the Kenyan government due to past insurgency activities that had been inspired by the wish of Kenyan Somalis to be incorporated into Somalia at its independence. Based on 12-months ethnographic research I recently conducted at the Dagahaley camp, I show that these political and historical circumstances have rendered local-refugee identities amorphous and shifty. Somali locals and refugees have therefore devised various categories to differentiate interactants and manage the complex linkages across the border, camps, local villages and herders in the surrounding bushes. Through highlighting the many complex ways in which "locals" and "refugees" are constructed as categories while they often have overlapping relationships and experiences, this paper describes how fluidity is used as a strategy to access opportunities. It then contrasts substantive bureaucratic categories against formative pragmatic categories within the context of the on-going negotiation of belonging to different categories at once.

**Figure 1: Map of Kenya Showing the Research Site**

Source: Google Maps, http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?hl=en&tab=wl

LEGEND

———— International boundary	⬤ National capital
– – – – Provincial boundary	◯ Regional capital/town
———— Road network	

Figure 2: Distribution of ethnic Somalis and Factions Controlling Somalia

Source: BBC News Africa, 21 February 2012.

Somalia political map

Legend:
- Islamist controlled
- Pro-govt administrations
- Local militias supported by Ethiopia
- Ethiopian troops and local militias
- Kenyan troops and local militias
- Ethnic Somali areas

ETHIOPIA

SOMALILAND (self-declared independence)

PUNTLAND (semi-autonomous)

Disputed area

Indian Ocean

El Bur (al-Shabab base)

SOMALIA

Baidoa

KENYA

Kismayo

Islamist controlled

Mogadishu

African Union/ govt-controlled

Colonial and post-colonial governments in Kenya were always apprehensive of cross-border movements by Somalis[1] on either side of the common border due to a history of pan-Somalism insurgency. Consequently, colonial and post-colonial governments formulated policies that marginalized Kenyan Somalis. When Somali refugees arrived in the early 1990s, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) government sought to curtail their movements and was always unwilling to pass legislation on refugee status. UNHCR had to intercede severally to prevent it from expelling refugees (CASA, 2001), notwithstanding the fact that Kenya is a signatory to international protocols on refugees. With time, however, locals and refugees began to take advantage of the fluidity that exists between them to acquire "dual status" (Hyndman, 1996; Horst, 2006) whereby refugee cards entitled locals to free food and resettlement opportunities while Kenyan IDs guaranteed unrestricted travel for refugees.

At the Dadaab Complex, the difficulty of delineating "refugees" from "locals" has always been complicated by close kinship ties and nomadic pastoralism that have problematized the idea of "home" since many families have members distributed across the camp, local villages, and among the herders in Kenya and Somalia. Cross-border interaction was particularly amplified by the longstanding marginalization history of Kenyan Somalis. A telling example is that of Aden Noor alias Gebio who gets largely glowing tribute from villagers and refugees alike as an icon of heroism and Somali nationalism. Having been born in an area near Dadaab, he gained prominence by defecting from a high ranking position in the Kenyan military to become defence minister in Somalia in the mid-1980s and later turned into an outspoken critic of Barre's high handedness. Sahat is another high profile individual with an amorphous local-refugee identity. He was born at Dadaab and was elected the area's councillor in the 2002 general election but when he secured a UNHCR resettlement opportunity in 2006, he simply resigned from his civic duties and went with his family to the United States as a refugee. During my fieldwork, he returned to found an NGO "to fight for locals' rights" but his family still stays in America.

Another example is Muse who became a close friend during my fieldwork. Eight of his older siblings were born in Somalia but he and his younger brother were born in Kenya. When war broke out in 1991, his family were on the Kenyan side of the border awaiting the first ever hospital delivery experience for the mother who had developed birth-related complications.

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[1] The word "Somali" may refer to either a nationality or an ethnic group which is dispersed in four different countries. I use the word "locals" to refer to Kenyan nationals who belong to the Somali ethnic group and refer to refugees from Somalia as Somalians.

They hoped to go to Somalia as soon as peace was restored but it was never to be and they now consider themselves Kenyans. Thus citizenship claims have largely depended on where majority of one's closet relatives are situated as well as where one happened to be at the time war broke out. The government's crackdown on *shifta*[2] rebels (who are believed to have metamorphosised into bandits when the war ended in 1969) also drove many Kenyan Somalis to Somalia before they returned when war broke out in Somalia. An example is Aden who was born at the neighbouring Korofani township but was forced to go into exile in Somalia in the mid-1980s due to what he described as "government's constant harassment of suspected *shifta* bandits". He came back as a refugee but soon afterwards used his old Kenyan ID and kinship claims to found the village in the late 1990s in collaboration with the chief though he still resides in the camp. His closeness to government and agency officials enables him to win most transport, firewood, and construction contracts set aside for locals. When some youth confronted the chief over allegations that he had swindled money meant for a women's group to purchase a Toyota land cruiser for instance, Aden came to his rescue by claiming he had loaned him Kshs1,000 000.

The early 2000s inaugurated a thaw in relations between Kenyan Somalis and the central government following KANU's defeat in the 2002 elections. This reversed the long-term marginalization policy of the camp areas and spurred a veritable development revolution in the region through Constituency Development Fund projects, youth and women funds, and various agricultural and water programmes. At around the same time, humanitarian agencies also started to give locals priority in contracts and job opportunities following simmering tensions that had turned the refugee presence into a political hotbed. Suddenly, the long held view that Kenyan Somalis were a disregarded minority with second rate citizenry status (cf. Laitin and Samatar, 1987) started to vanish. Many families started to pull out of the refugee camps to local villages that had gradually been springing up since the late 1990s in response to these changes. Thus, local villages emerged as symbols of localness that were reinforced and authenticated by a profusion of more of such symbols including schools, rubberstamps, and documents.

The village where I conducted fieldwork was founded in the late 1990s in this context. Throughout my fieldwork, it was teeming with massive aid projects and its inhabitants were

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[2] The term designates a pan-Somali war that was waged in the 1960s. It is used today to describe the area's unique banditry. Jennifer Hyndman (1996) suggests that the war was deliberately relegated to mere banditry-related activities to undermine the political legitimacy of Kenyan Somalis.

given priority in contracts and job opportunities to propitiate local and national leaders. It is adjacent to Dagahaley camp at Dadaab and is named Dafa after the current chief who is regarded as its founder. Dafa is inhabited by the Aulian sub-subclan of the Ogaden, which is part of the larger Darod clan confederacy (Lewis, 1998a; Cassanelli, 1982). The Aulian trace their origin to Ethiopia's Ogaden region where large numbers of their kinsmen still reside and have a big presence in Somalia as well. They are subdivided into nine lineages or "doors" as they themselves commonly proclaim following Aulian's two sons who are the founding ancestors of the nine Aulian lineages. The village has five of these lineages. They correspond with distinct homelands in Kenya that are within 100km radius: The Songat who traditionally inhabit Dadaab; the Haus from Kulan and the border town of Liboi, Afwar from Shantabaq and Korofani, Rer Ali from Modogashe, and Rer-adhankher from Kumahumato. The remaining four lineages coalesced under a different chief in a neighbouring village.

The village population has been increasing steadily. A seismic surge was witnessed throughout 2011 and early 2012 following the recent catalytic drought that drove close to 200 local households from neighbouring areas into the village. Upon arriving, many new comers are naturally welcomed by members of their respective lineage, which has fractionalized the village into lineage based clusters consisting of approximately 500 households. This process is accompanied by claims to hosting compensation, which is framed in "rights" terminology that is commonly expressed through calls for refugee repatriation. Because the village owes its existence to the refugee presence and its phenomenal population growth to government and humanitarian aid, such calls are merely a staple in signalling compensation demands to sustain the flourishing aid economy. Thus conceived, "local rights" with its aid connotations is the new catchphrase in the village.

The attractiveness of the local status, however, became an antidote to taming the fluidity between locals and refugees when the Refugee Bill was passed in 2006. Until then, UNHCR had been registering refugees due to lack of the necessary legal framework. When the bill became law, however, the UNHCR and the Kenyan registration systems were synchronized and the government took over the responsibility of screening and registering refugees in one fell swoop. Thus, the year 2006 was a watershed in the lives of refugees and locals – they were called upon to separate their future from their past which in essence created a second arbitrary border that has radically changed conditions for both groups in terms of accessing refugee rations, resettlement and obtaining Kenyan IDs. Consequently, stories of being

denied IDs and refugee resettlement opportunities now dominate formal and informal discussions as reflected in the sentiments of Abdi Abdullahi, a refugee youth leader:

> Of late, the refugee resettlement programme suffered a major relapse, apparently inflicted by the folly of the refugees acquiring the Kenyan IDs… A frustrated refugee seeking to access better working conditions and education in the interior of the host country would readily part with any amount of his hard earned resources to acquire this double-edged sword little do they know that it will eventually be the very stumbling block to their aspiration to make it to the promised land… People have now realized their mistakes and are ready to surrender the illegally acquired Kenyan documents … A holder of 1991 refugee ration card with all supporting evidence in the UNHCR data base cannot be branded Kenyan just because of a document he or she was compelled to acquire barely a year or so ago, or even acquired out of ignorance[3].

Thus, the need to exploit the opportunities offered by belonging to both categories has emerged as a source of social and moral ambivalence since success in assuming one identity often means a loss of the opposite identity. Yet the fluidity between refugees is more complicated than simply "returning documents". Furthermore, motivations for having dual status are based on evolving circumstances that force people to continuously improvise as they strive to fulfil bureaucratic demands. I explore these paradoxes by focussing on events surrounding two families I was closest to during my fieldwork: the village chairman's family (my host family) and my research assistant's family in the camp.

Mr Jama was born in 1955 at Kulan 100km away from the village, but later moved to Somalia in search of better economic opportunities when a drought wiped out most of his livestock in the early 1980s, leaving behind his first wife and children. At first he was hosted by Khadijo, his elder sister who had been married to a man from the Rahanwiin clan in Somalia's Jubba region. Later, he joined members of his lineage in Somalia after marrying Sofia, his brother-in-law's sister. He rarely visited his Kenyan family but when the war uprooted his Somalian family in the early 1990s they moved into Dagahaley camp where he married Fartun, a widow as his third wife. In 2007, he moved into the village with Sofia and their five children and became the village chairman in 2009. Malyun, Sofia's eldest daughter is 18 and attends a refugee primary school because the local school has lower primary classes, having been opened only recently. Like her mother and most of the villagers, they are poor Swahili speakers. Malyun often blames her weakness in Swahili and English on lack of

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[3] Identity crisis, *The Refugee Newsletter*. September – December, 2011, special edition: Refugee Youth.

seriousness at refugee schools: "*shule ni bure na rifuji ni rifuji tu*" (the school is useless, after all it is for refugees), she would say whenever I scolded her for her poor school performance.

Jama's first wife Salma stays at Dadaab (where she was born) with her eight children but he rarely visits them. He explained to me that she gave him "permission" based on Islamic law to stay with Sofia since she is beyond child bearing age. During my fieldwork, two of Jama's children from the first wife visited us on two different occasions to ask for school fees because they were about to join high school. Unlike Sofia's children, they are fluent in English and Swahili, Kenya's official languages. During the entire duration of my fieldwork Jama spend only one night at Fartun's home in the camp. She has adult children belonging to her late husband beside Jama's two children. The demands of his position (he was also a de-facto leader of his lineage in the village) entailed hosting daily meetings at night that revolved around the current Al-Shabaab[4] induced insecurity and sharing of aid resources that always generated endless lineage rivalries (when two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped and taken to lawless Somalia from Ifo Camp during my fieldwork, the Kenyan government blamed Al-Shabaab and declared war on the group. A length war ensued when Al-Shabaab started a guerrilla-type war using explosive devises at the camps).

I could sit in the group meetings up to midnight but most men would chew *miraa* (mild stimulant, also called *khat*) until early morning hours before going to sleep. In the discussions, many people would often opine that the solution to the insecurity problem was to repatriate refugees: "*Al-Shabaab shetani, kahooti shetani. Dini maya*! (Al-Shabaab and refugees are devils not Muslims), Jama would grouse whenever news about an explosion incident was reported. Some of those present would be his refugee relatives who never seemed to take offence at the outbursts. On one occasion when I had retired early, I heard jubilant "*Allah Akbar*" proclamations from Jama's group and went to investigate. The local Dadaab FM had just announced the capture of Afamadow town in Somalia by the Kenyan military. Jama recounted how his relatives had endured long suffering from Al-Shabaab's brutality in the "liberated" town hence the excitement:

> They detained my brother (cousin) in Afamadow for 30 days because he was fat. They then gave him a
> key to a mosque 15 kilometres away and ordered him to open the mosque daily for prayers. He had to
> walk to the mosque and back home 5 times daily to open it! If he arrived late, he would be whipped for

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[4] Al-Shabab means 'The Youth' in Arabic. It emerged as a radical youth wing of Somalia's now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts in 2006 to battle Ethiopian forces who had entered Somalia to back the interim government.

inconveniencing worshippers. 'Just think about religion whenever you feel hungry instead of food' the *shetani* would say to him.

Sofia's 90-year old father Awoo was staying with us in the village. Awoo's first wife still lives in Somalia but Sofia's mother stays at Wajir where she was born. Two of Sofia's sisters are married to Somalians and are staying in the camp with their families. During my fieldwork, Sofia's mother visited us and stayed for four days mostly nursing her sickly her husband and chatting with her grandchildren. She then proceeded to the camps where she spent two days at each of her daughters' households before returning to Wajir where she stays with her sons who identify themselves as Kenyans. Awoo has a brother at Ifo camp, a sister at Dagahaley camp and cousins in almost all Dadaab camps who visit him whenever he falls ill. The funeral of his first cousin at Dagahaley camp during my fieldwork brought together relatives from the village, the camps, Somalia and even the diaspora. All of his sons from the first wife are pastoralists in Somalia. Khadijo, Jama's sister is now a widow staying in the camp. According to Jama, she hopes to go for resettlement one day and has no intention of ever coming to stay in the village.

When one of Jama's brothers came to visit the family during my second month of fieldwork, he introduced him as Mohammed and added in Swahili: "*ni mtu wa msitu*" (he is a bush person). I had previously heard the District Commissioner (DC) caution people in a *baraza* (community meeting for disseminating government policy) against supporting *shifta* bandits whom he had similarly described as *watu wa msitu*. Jama explained that the brother is a herder who has "many animals" but also takes care of his 40 cattle and 15 camels in the bushes across the Kenya-Somalia border. In return, Jama stays with two of his brother's children who are attending the local primary school. I later learned that almost all villagers have livestock under the care of relatives in the bush. A young calf is paid periodically to the herders depending on the size of the herd.

In the middle of my fieldwork, Sofia gave birth and registered the baby as a refugee although she holds a Kenyan Identity card (ID). When she gave me her ration card to help in obtaining the child's birth certificate due to the long lines at the UNHCR, I noticed that it was in another person's name. She explained that she had purchased the card for Kshs5, 000 from a refugee who had returned to Somalia (a large family size ration card can go for as much as Kshs 20, 000). As she put it, "it is good to divide the family so that if things don't work well here and one of us has gone for resettlement, we shall all benefit". In addition, her ration card

also entitled her to material items provided to mothers and special baby food. By virtue of his position, Jama is among elders who participate in vetting but he opted to send Malyun to Kulan to apply for Kenyan citizenship (she had not yet succeeded by the time I left the village). Having an ID entitles locals to the lucrative agency jobs if they have some formal education (Refugee employees are paid only $50 monthly "incentive" by agencies).

Applying for IDs around is out of question for many villagers because of the rigorous vetting process. Villagers therefore prefer to send their children to original homelands in the belief that their children's fingerprints would not be "refused by the computer". Before the passage of the Refugee Bill, almost everybody in the village had both local and refugee documents that enabled them to get assistance from both sides. When the bill became law, however, the UNHCR and the Kenyan registration systems were synchronized and villagers found themselves in a dilemma because they were always denied refugee rations if they had Kenyan IDs and their children were denied IDs if they had ration cards. Remarkably, little has changed because many villagers have bought the ration cards. However, it is an issue that dominates most discussions in *barazas* where elders complain of discrimination in ID issuance (see Lochery [2012] for a discussion on the Kenyan state's historical discrimination of Somali pastoralists).

As the village chairman, Jama attends weekly development and security meetings convened by government and agency officials. The region's semi-arid conditions dominate discussions in such meetings where locals blame the high refugee population for environmental degradation that they claim resulted in the recent drought. Like all of his wives, Jama has a refugee ration card registered in another person's name. On one occasion when Sofia was admitted in hospital after giving birth, I accompanied him to the UNHCR distribution centre and was surprised to see him use his position as leverage to get quicker services: "I have to be in a meeting at the UNHCR so I can't stand in that long line" he told the distribution clerks. He then left his rice package with the watchman at the gate and we proceeded inside the compound for the meeting where he blamed the increasing insecurity to the refugee presence. Is it really a paradox if Jama can be a "refugee" in one situation and oppose refugee presence soon afterwards without seeing the contradiction?

Figure 3: Jama's social networks

Ahmed's case

The events before and after the wedding ceremony of Ahmed, a 28-year old refugee who was a close friend during my fieldwork are even more illuminative in showing the difficulty of disentangling refugee and local categories. Ahmed's grandfather was born in Kenya at Garissa but later moved to Wajir where his 85-year old father Abukar was born. Later, the family relocated to Kismayu in Somalia where all of his 8 siblings were born. When war broke out in Somalia, the family was first welcomed by relatives at Wajir. Abukar then attempt to apply for a Kenyan ID but failed on the basis of his old age. After losing most of their livestock to a drought, Ahmed moved into the camp with his parents and younger siblings while his older siblings opted to pursue pastoralism. Ahmed's wedding preparation took four months and was held towards the end of my fieldwork.

As the wedding drew close, family members started trickling in with their wedding gifts from various parts of Kenya and Somalia: His sister who is married to a Kenyan in a nearby town brought Kshs10, 000, while three of his elder brothers who work as herders in Somalia and around the Kenyan towns of Wajir and Mombasa brought cattle and money for bride price. Ahmed also received $100 from one of his cousins who is resettled at Minnesota in America while two of his aunties from Garissa contributed 10, 000 each. He then travelled to Somalia

where he mobilized more resources from his nomadic pastoralist uncles. The ceremony was attended by around 150 people drawn from the camps, the neighbouring towns and Somalia. A camel and goat were slaughtered to feed the guests and gifts were given to the bride's family in what Ahmed described as "purifying their hearts". Poignant memories of happier days were rekindled when Abukar recalled the good old days before the war.

The wedding's glow offered an informal group discussion opportunity for me to find out why Ahmed's elder brothers had opted to stay out of the camps. The eldest told me he hated the camps because they trapped people into a lifestyle of staying in one place and "thinking of eating all the time". He comes around with the regular animal caravans whenever he wishes to visit family members or sale any of his livestock and since he has a Kenyan ID, he also comes around during elections to "eat campaign money". Ahmed's brother from Mombasa explained that he felt more Kenyan than Somalian since he stayed far away from Somalia. Though he was employed as a herdsman, he was happy because he had managed to incorporate two of his cows in the employer's herd. Ahmed's third brother pointed out that he takes care of his uncle's camels at Wajir but he had as well started to accumulate a small herd of his own. Although he had a Kenyan ID, he emphasised that he would prefer to be buried in Somalia. A younger brother said that he stays "part-time" in the camp but is more comfortable with the Kenyan identity. He is a donkey cart driver who spends three days each week collecting firewood in the bush that he sells in the camp.

Ahmed is the only adult member of his family without a Kenyan ID. He was told that his fingerprints are in the "computer for refugees" when he applied for the document in 2008 and he feels his brothers were not "discovered" because unlike him, they didn't attend refugee schools. Consequently, the family has sent Ahmed's younger siblings to stay with relatives at Garissa to increase their chances of getting IDs when they attain the age of 18.

Soon after his honeymoon, Ahmed was faced with a deep moral dilemma. To supplement their normal food rations, the family had purchased a size 6 ration card for Kshs2000 in 1995. When the UNHCR conducted a verification exercise in 1998, Ahmed was registered as the head of the size 6 household since his father had a different ration card and his mother had died in 1996. Consequently, he was enrolled at school under a false surname name since having a ration card was a prerequisite for getting school admission. His moral dilemma revolved around what he would tell his children in future over the anomaly in real names and those on his school and marriage certificate. The deliberation gnawed him with guilt and he

eventually approached the Kadhi for a second marriage certificate bearing his father's name. He explained that UNHCR had given refugees opportunities in the past to rectify such anomalies but "no one was willing to accept a reduction on food rations". When I expressed surprise that the Kadhi had consented to such a proposal, Ahmed remarked it was a common occurrence: "that is the life of being a refugee. It's widespread and he (Kadhi) understands".

Ambiguous identities

These cases are insightful for the ambivalence portrayed in the daily rhythms of locals and refugees. Using kinship networks, Jama and Ahmed's family members opportunistically exploit the fluidity between the two groups to access opportunities that they would otherwise not have obtained. These fluid identities and alliances have historically been part and parcel of the Somali segmentary lineage system where context determines one's associates or as I.M. Lewis (1998b: 101) has succinctly remarked, individuals "belong to a series of groups mobilized, as the need arises, in opposition to each other and following the genealogical relationships of their eponymous ancestors". Hence, several structurally similar groups are capable of combining or dividing at various levels for self-defence or economic survival, which prompts clan members from widely scattered regions to see themselves as allies against rival clans (Lewis, 1998a; Cassanelli, 1982). The increasing value of bureaucratic structures in the lives of Somali nomads and the creativity of belonging to both refugee and local categories should, however, prompt us to interrogate the assumed naturalness of kinship behaviour in this framework. As Vikki Bell reminds us, identities and cultures are performative achievements inasmuch as subjectivities are constituted within the context of power relations. In this sense, "one has to comprehend the conditions of possibility within which people emerge as subjects in their contingent contexts, which is to consider the forms of subjectivity that are available, their attractions, constraints and risks" (2007: 6).

Thus understood, the shifty identities become illuminative arenas in which power relations are constituted and contested as people continuously strive to satisfy official requirements for accessing resources (cf. Van Vleet, 2008). Akhil Gupta's (2012) work on bureaucracy in India illustrates this rather well. Performativity processes in his context determined success or failure in accessing opportunities which consequently reinforced power and resource inequalities. Who wins and how to win was largely determined by specific cultural knowledge and information about dealing with bureaucratic officials. Similarly, the multiple Somali identities are performed in line with the styles that are demanded by government and

agency bureaucratic structures. But it is not just Somalis who are manipulating identities. A sentiment had taken hold in the village and camp that government and agencies were always seeking to benefit from the "Somali misery" as reflected in the chief's views during a *baraza*: "our children are told they can't get IDs because they are in the UNHCR system. UNHCR says it can't give them food and resettlement because their parents have Kenyan IDs. All that agencies care about is to increase their budget by inflating our numbers!" Identity manipulation is therefore a two-way process. As such, it is important to understand behaviour in its context as opposed to seeing it as always emanating from culture.

To unravel the complexity portrayed in Ahmed and Jama's cases, we have to be attentive to spatial and temporal contexts. In essence, Dafa village is connected to the larger world in a way that challenges a bounded sense of community or locality (cf. Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Malkki, 1992) since almost every family has invested in pastoralism, regularly gets food rations under the guise of being refugees, occasionally relies on remittances from relatives resettled in Western countries and is connected to original homelands through resource use and ID requirements. A better understanding of the Somali therefore requires a framework that captures the dynamic notion of place that is clearly portrayed in the way homes are distributed across different spaces.

The network approach situates these relations by putting kinship at the centre in the array of environments at villagers' disposal: original homelands, nomadic pastoralism, agency and government structures, and urbanization engendered by the huge refugee population (see figure 3). The Somali have historically relied on kinship networks and have increasingly started to use them for business as well (cf. Helander, 1998; Horst, 2006; Goldsmith, 1997). With kinship as its linchpin and the various environments acting as the networks' compass, morphological characteristics such as compartment (van Velsen, 1973) or cluster (Barnes, 1969) are of less value for the Somali context. However, I find Boissevain's (1968) reflection on network zones intriguing for how they seem to capture intimacy in Somali segmentary lineage. Because of the rapidly changing conditions encountered by refugees and locals, the circle of relatives seems to contract and expand almost endlessly as the various cases I have outlined above show. Thus for instance, refugee status was valued earlier for the resettlement opportunity it afforded to locals but the change in fortunes has shifted focus and localness is now being emphasised. In the same vein, the locals' definition of who a refugee is keeps shifting and sometimes the lenses are expanded to bring almost everybody on board

depending on the situation at hand. The figure of the "other" therefore depends on the various levels of kinship groupings – with closeness increasing as the kinship groupings contract.

The complexity of these cases is also related to the historical perspective of cross-border interactions, which mirrors Somali nationalism that began with Somalis in Kenya fighting to remove the Kenya-Somalia border and now establishing separate identities through local villages. The separation is a form of spatial exclusion that is analogous to affirming the colonial border's sacrosanctity. But it is clear from the cases outlined above that being Somali entails a broader spatial and temporal perspective than what is being situationally asserted. Hence, space and kinship appear to be working hand in hand in concretizing issues surrounding belonging and identity in the Somali equation, which is contrary to bureaucratic specifications for having specific thresholds for localness and refugeeness. Therein lies the conundrum for interactants who have always used space and kinship as structuring principles but are presently caught between space and kinship loyalties. The incompatibility of space and kinship realities therefore forces people to perform these loyalties in line with bureaucratic expectations.

Considering that network analysis is generally unsuitable for dealing with the social forces that underlie long-term processes (Boissevain, 1979), I use it alongside the Manchester school's extended-case method to follow specific incidents affecting the same persons and groups over a long time. The method's aim, according to Max Gluckman (2006: 17) is to show how the cases "are related to the development and change of social relations among these persons and groups, acting within the framework of their social system and culture". The various people Jama and Ahmed interact with are a community considering that they have adapted their behaviours to each other due to the shared historical interests that revolve around kinship networks (cf. Gluckman, 1940).

Until one imagines the villager's unique past, it is hard to understand how they lead coherent lives across multiple locations. As a result of the ambiguous identities there is an on-going debate revolving around kinship and the politics of inclusion and exclusion where Somalis draw on their long standing marginalization history to counter the pronouncements of government and agency officials' view that multiple identities are motivated by dishonesty. According to Abdi Abdullahi the youth leader cited above, for example, the "identity crisis" at Dagahaley is a form of mischief targeting only Somali refugees: "Why can't these

ridiculous policies apply to fellow refugees from Kakuma[5] camp? Could this be the fabrication of disgruntled individuals trying to settle some dubious goals by paralyzing the refugee resettlement programme mainly to the States[6]”? But the DC framed the issue differently during Madaraka (Independence Day) celebrations:

> You Somalis have refused to follow the world order. How can you complain about discrimination in ID issuance while still registering your children as refugees? The government is ready to assist you but you must stop your cleverness. As Kenyans, we should all be pulling in one direction but you have refused to follow the rest of *wananchi* (citizens). You don't go to school and yet you keep demanding for agency jobs. How can somebody who has kept camels all his life suddenly adapt to office work? Take your children to school if you want jobs!

In this context, Somalis were deemed to be operating outside the "world order" perhaps because their behaviour was at variance with the government's assumption of not only representing everyone but also rendering service to everyone in the same way (cf. Blommart, 2001). The DC's pronouncements resonate with the anthropological perspective that has tended to perceive kinship as a blue-print for organizing society. The reality, however, is that people perform kinship differently based on context (Van Vleet, 2008) and the dividing and merging of Somali lineages for economic or political reasons is one such example. In Jama's case, performance of kinship in village meetings was strikingly dissimilar to the way he performed it in agency meetings. Whereas the refugee figure seemed to imply only those considered distant in clan terms in the village, it encompassed all refugees in agency meetings to reinforce the harmful refugee effects. Thus, what it means to be related to somebody depends on different contexts (cf. Carsten, 2000; Edwards and Strathern, 2000) and it's what provides solid ground for rationalizing these multiple identities. Without these considerations, the multiple identities would seem like deceit as was demonstrated at the Madaraka party that evening when the DC expounded on the Somali imbroglio:

> The border is now closed but how do you tell the difference between Somali groups? A Somali will never say: yes this person is a criminal. They will always say that the person is a relative. The ID issue is a self-inflicted wound, not a historical injustice. They want to get jobs using IDs but they also want UNHCR food and resettlement by not having IDs. Even in the vetting exercise, elders will never admit that a person they are recommending might be a refugee. It is always a relative. *Kwani* (surely) everybody is a relative"?

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[5] Kakuma camp is situated in Turkana district, northwest Kenya. It is mostly inhabited by non-Somali refugees.
[6] Identity crisis, *The Refugee Newsletter*. September – December, 2011, special edition: Refugee Youth

He asked jokingly to the apparent amusement of all at the table. But when I informally mentioned Sahat's resettlement issue to Yusuf, a senior UNHCR field officer on another occasion, he didn't see the strangeness in UNHCR giving resettlement to a prominent elected official instead of a genuine refugee: "many of those on the interview panel knew him as an elected councillor but chose to turn a blind eye. Maybe people gave him the benefit of doubt because of his physical disability. Who was I to oppose a fellow Kenyan when God had decided that his lucky day had come"? The varying framing of the identity issue may be due to the fact that unlike the DC, Yusuf is a Somali Kenyan who identifies with the complex web of relatedness and the historical cross-border interactions. This became explicit when I asked the district peace chairman what he thought about the fluidity: "what you are seeing is a case of locals being called refugees. It is the fault of UNHCR because when locals who are affected by drought come, they are registered as refugees to inflate the numbers. The more the numbers the better it is for UNHCR to get money. I know there are less than 100, 000 Somali refugees, not the 630, 000 that they are talking about"! Thus, the point of entry in the web of relations is important in making sense of events since one's networks can expand but also collapse depending on the situation. In this sense, the network approach is more dynamic than segmentary lineage and changes depending on where one places himself/herself in the network.

The transactionalist connotations apparent in the network approach (Mitchell, 1974) have been criticized for assuming that people are always rationally maximizing from their networks "in the manner of the infamous 'Economic Man'" (Metcalf, 2001: 167). We should therefore resist the temptation to treat Somali networks as primarily economic driven. In Jama's case, the quintessential lineage interests seem to have provided the main motive for relocating to the village although there are obvious economic benefits associated with it. He himself asserted that he felt compelled to go to the village because many members of his "family" were there. However, his nephew Osman attributed the move to an attempt to whittle down the chief's immense powers. When the chief purchased a luxury vehicle mentioned earlier, Osman was among the people who vociferously confronted him with corruption claims. Surprisingly, the issue died down as suddenly as it had erupted and when I asked Osman what had transpired, he told me they had been bribed. The five of them had been invited to a lavish party at the chief's Dadaab home and were each given Kshs5000 and *kolombo*, the best quality *miraa*. The chief had also given Kshs10, 000 to be shared among women leaders and stated that he was just assisting them since the money was a loan from an

Islamic foundation that he would repay. "If you were the one in my position, you could not have resisted the offer", Osman concluded, then proceeded to contextualize the issue in terms of containing the chief in the wider rivalry between the two dominant village lineages:

> That is why we asked *mzee* (old man) to leave the camp in 2007. He is the most respected elder in our lineage and we wanted to fight through him. In 2009, we organized an election and *mzee* emerged victorious. The former chairman refused to hand over the files and his lineage has been fighting us ever since, assisted by the chief's lineage. You know agencies now require applicants for jobs, contracts and group funding to be locals. What I did was to make a rubber stamp which *mzee* now uses on everybody's application!

It is thus fair to conclude that the tactically executed move was in response to an obligation to his lineage even if it was somewhat inspired by economic and political calculation. The rubber stamp was revolutionary in the sense in which it emblematically imbued bureaucracy in the village. Henceforth, no one's application for jobs, contracts or projects would be considered authentic without this mark of localness. The chief is the only other person with a rubberstamp and Osman sees this as a major breakthrough in creating an alternative centre of power.

Emerging categories

Osman and Aden's cases demonstrate that staying in the camp does not diminish localness and the rights that go with it. As the cases I have sketched above show, the village is so inextricably linked to the camp and the bush that its understanding would be incomplete without considering extended cases across the various network locations. To manage these complex linkages in people's life courses that tend to seamlessly flow into each other, villagers have devised categories to differentiate the various interactants. The refugee-local category is the most obvious but not always straightforward to discern. As Jama's case shows, close relatives are not always perceived as being refugees. The second category is the *badia* (bush) group that includes people like Jama's brother who is a pastoral nomad or "*mtu wa msitu*" in the provincial administration parlance. These herders constantly move back and forth across the Kenya-Somalia border with their livestock. As mentioned earlier, almost each family in the village has close relatives taking care of their animals in the bushes. Herders transcend the refugee-local categories since animals under their care belong to both local and refugee relatives. However, they would be considered locals if they had Kenyan IDs. In return, many of those in the bush have brought children to stay with their relatives both in the camp and in the village where they can attend school.

In this context, locals and refugees are united not only in their various bush investments, but also in their awareness that their own prosperity demands reciprocal hospitality obligations. The power of communication has made contact between the camps, villages and the bushes ever closer. What happens in the camps and villages can easily have an impact on how herders treat each other in the bush. Mindful of their bush investments, villagers treat refugees well in the expectation of receiving similar treatment if their relatives and animals cross into Somalia. Creating animosity against refugees, even those who might not be related to them is counterproductive to locals' long-term goals. The herders are therefore important, albeit invisible actors in understanding Somali hospitality and shaping events in the camp and the village. My former neighbour Majjid is one of the village's point man in managing the cattle and camel caravans from Somalia. His close relatives and friends in Somalia coordinate the buying of animals from herders and call him whenever a particular caravan is dispatched. Two days later, he receives the caravans at the village borehole and coordinates the feeding and marketing exercise. Those in the caravan bringing their own animals for sale or for their relatives' wedding functions also depend on Majjid's hospitality and guidance. If he sells higher than the asking price, he keeps the profit, but if the prices are below the projected target, he has to notify the owners who either give him the go ahead or ask that the animals be taken to the bush until the prices improve.

Within the bush group, another sub-division exists – since the category is infused with ambivalent qualities that oscillate between nobleness and criminality. Thus apart from the herders *shifta* bandits also fall into the *watu wa msitu* category. In the context of the prevalent insecurity, this ambiguity can be unsettling if one of the categories is misconstrued for the other. But according to villagers, each lineage knows its herders and bandits for practical reasons. If *shifta* commit a crime, members of their lineage would be obligated to pay compensation to the injured party or else revenge would be exacted, which necessitates knowing those in the bush if conflict with neighbours is to be avoided or anticipated. Under Somali customs, one is obligated to immediately alert a close relative whenever he commits murder or a serious crime. However, villagers contend that *shifta* are nowadays perceived as criminals unlike in the past when they were considered as nationalists.

Two other subtle categories exist within the village and camp: old versus recent or new arrivals and cosmopolitans versus traditionalists. The old-new categorization came into sharp focus following a series of grenade and explosive attacks from suspected Al-Shabaab militants and warnings of a retaliatory military operation from government officials. By

reinforcing this difference, old refugees and locals succeeded in diverting police operations to camps that were housing new arrivals who believed to be the cause of the worsening insecurity. During *barazas* and in public holiday speeches, locals also use the new-old divide as leverage in canvassing for their clansmen to continue serving as refugee leaders "for security reasons".

The distinction between cosmopolitanism and non-cosmopolitanism was often highlighted through debates revolving around morality issues. Most lineage elders believe that Islam's sharia law should guide all facets of people's lives and contend that secularism propagated by formal education is to blame for the instability in Somalia, relief aid theft, and other related problems. As a sheikh once stated in an informal discussion, "people with secular learning and religious learning cannot meet since there is barrier between them". On the other hand, cosmopolitan Somalis (refugees and locals) associate formal education and cross-cultural interaction to modernity. They habitually boast that they are "Kenyans" because they can speak Swahili and mock those unable to communicate in Swahili as "refugees". Predictably, they were a minority and had a particularly tenuous relationship with the other villagers who exhibited a general sense of lethargy towards their opinions and leadership ambitions.

A case in point is Bashir, 67, whose previous occupation of selling clothes has taken him to numerous towns across Kenya and Somalia. He would often dismiss villagers as "refugees" with IDs and preferred the company of Robule, another sophisticated local who often insisted that he considered Kenyan non-Somalis as being "closer relatives" that refugees from his lineage. Bashir reserves special disdain for the chief whom he disparages often for "calling himself a chief when none of his relatives know Swahili". He was in the process of making a rubberstamp when I left the village, saying the chairman and chief had sanctimoniously refused to approve his proposal for group funding which they claimed had names of fictitious members. "There is enough agency money for each of us to develop tummies but they want to block some families from benefitting", he stated exasperatedly.

These categories were once merged towards the end of my fieldwork when fire gutted almost the entire town and some sections of the camp. That night, Osman and other locals as well as refugees evacuated their families and properties to the village. A business lady with multiple shops drove all the way from Somalia to Dagahaley in a bid to rescue some of her properties. Refugees from other camps arrived with Lorries to assist their relatives in transporting what had been salvaged to safety. And almost every villager rushed to the scene of the fire tragedy

to try and help their distressed relatives. The following day, the village was full of goats, cattle, beddings and other valuables that had been salvaged from the camp. Jama was among those who brought their camp families to the village for safety. Almost everybody I talked to in the village and camp had been personally affected by the fire: relatives had been displaced and property had been destroyed.

In conclusion, these locally constituted categories are not necessarily spatially determined and in hospitality's terms, they are not strictly organized around difference and the politics of inclusion and exclusion (cf. Barnett, 2005). They are inclined towards openness as opposed to closure in the process of subject formation to the extent that they cross-cut the standard bureaucratic constructions that tend to emphasize alterity. Importantly as I have demonstrated, these novel categorizations are circumstance-specific as opposed to emphasising agency and do not tie one permanently in fixed conditions, which is unlike other typical refugee situations. On the contrary, UNHCR's insistence on presenting refugees and hosts as prisoners of disparate and unchanging worlds is ill equipped in capturing such reality (cf. Englund, 2002). People seemed to define their refugee or local identities in terms of available opportunities at a specific point in time as long as they got the backing of relatives on the side they wished to identify with. It is a pragmatic and dynamic arrangement that is incommensurate with the agenda of officials and politicians at national level whose call for refugee repatriation is only informed by current insecurity concerns as opposed to the realities of kinship and livelihood issues.

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ABORNE PhD Winter School

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9 – 12 January 2013

By

NDILE, Wilman Kapenjama
E-mail: wilman.kapenjama@gmail.com

Institute of Development Studies
University of Dar es Salaam
Tanzania.

The Impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction on poverty reduction:
a case study of Tanzania

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that there is adequate Tanzanian economic policy analysis literature seeking to explain the extent to which cross-border food crops' trade restriction promotes or hinders the attainment of the goals of Tanzania's overall national poverty alleviation programme. However, there is inadequate literature on how cross-border food crops' trade restrictions impacts on poverty reduction efforts at the local level within the context of whatever may be considered overall national policy intervention successes or failures. There is therefore a need to investigate through empirical evidence on the impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction at the local level.

The evidence from the review of the literature and that derived from insights reconstructed from interviews with relevant individuals as well as from FGDs does support the general view that for a large extent does the cross-border food crops' trade restriction contribute to poverty reduction in a given border area in Tanzania, the relevant case being the Namanga border area, on the Tanzania- Kenya border. Specifically, interview, FGD and literature review evidence does confirm that in the last five years, normal trade transaction was observed to have continued to take place before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. It was also observed that the main actors in the cross border crop export trade at the Namanga border area would seem to have remained the same both before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. These tended to include large-scale traders as well as small and medium sized operators who were invariably driven into engaging in food smuggling trade practices by the official trade restrictions.

The conclusion and the derived recommendations ought to contribute to the continuing national and EAC regional discussion on the consequences of agricultural products export restriction. Indeed, the findings of the study do confirm the necessity of continuing to urge Tanzania government policy makers to adopt the stance of being ready to rethink the consequences of export restriction and other non-tariff barrier interventions. These measures may often be taken in the name of promoting food security but one should always be ready to review them in the light of emerging evidence-based analysis of opinions including those of cross border communities whose poverty ought to be at the centre of government development endeavours.

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

EAC   East African Community

ESRF   Economic and Social Research Foundation

ISS   Institute of Social Studies

NGO   Non Governmental Organisation

REPOA Research on Poverty Alleviation

UNDP   United Nations Development Program

WTO   World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 **Introduction and background of the study**

The restrictions on food export have been a common feature of the non-trade barriers (NTBs) that have often been imposed by the government of Tanzania for the past ten years. In mid October 2011, the government lifted the restrictions on food exports to its EAC neighbours. This brought to an end the official ban on food exports introduced in July 2011. The government's position has always been clear that it was for the national interest not to allow farmers and traders to export food until there was proof that such export would contribute to a Tanzanian citizen being threatened with a food shortage.

However, there has been alternative thinking on the matter positing that it may not be economically justifiable for the government of Tanzania to continue banning the export of food crops especially in circumstances   whereby there is surplus supply of food crops in some parts of the country on one hand and a serious food shortage in neighbouring EAC countries. The new government position on the matter would seem to be that food crop exports to a neighboring EAC member state, just as with trading within Tanzania, is meant to address this reflects the fact that incidents of food insecurity in ones country as well as in one's neighbourhood. It is acknowledged that food insecurity remains a daily challenge for most households in Tanzania-type economies since food purchases generally take a high percentage of income of the poor, hence the need for food trading policies that are not purely market driven but rather regulated in order to cushion the vulnerable in society from the risk of food insecurity. All the same, even with this concession to traditional restrictions on food crop exports, the issue of NTBs on food crop exports continues to attract a lot of debate and resistance from the farmers, NGOs, politicians, researchers, media as well as the business firms. Furthermore, it is being argued that the food crop export restrictions have resulted in an increase in smuggling practices.

The assumption is that the government of Tanzania has traditionally been restricting export of food crops with the good intention of making sure that there is enough food for its citizens. This in turn is a policy meant to promote the social, political and economic stability of the country. These good intentions notwithstanding, it has been argued, on the other hand, that this food exports restriction policy would seem be incompatible with the overall trade liberalisation policies advocated by the WTO and embraced enthusiastically by the Tanzanian government. This food exports restriction policy would also seem not to

be in harmony with the demands of the EAC common market protocol that Tanzania has signed and has just started to implement. The EAC common market protocol demands that there is free movement of goods and services among the EAC partner state.

1.2 Statement of the problem

There is adequate Tanzanian economic policy analysis literature seeking to explain the extent to which cross-border food crops' trade restriction promotes or hinders the attainment of the goals of Tanzania's overall national poverty alleviation programme. However, there is inadequate literature on how cross-border food crops' trade restrictions impacts on poverty reduction efforts at the local level within the context of whatever may be considered overall national policy intervention successes or failures. There is therefore a need to investigate through empirical evidence on the impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction at the local level.

1.3 Research Question and Objectives of the study

This Term Paper reports on the findings of study that was guided by the following research question : To What extent does the cross-border food crops' trade restriction contribute to poverty reduction in a given border area in Tanzania, the case under study being the Tanzania- Kenya border at the Namanga area. In order to address the question addressed above, the study sought responses to a sub-set of questions relating to the following specific issues:

❖ What has been the normal trade transaction before and after restriction on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya for the past five years?

❖ Who are the main actors been in cross border crop export trade at the Namanga border area?

❖ Is there evidence of an increase or decrease in terms of the incomes of the traders across the border because of the government imposition of export restriction for the past five years?

❖ To what extent were the income of traders at the cross border area affected after the food crops' trade restriction were imposed.

❖ Who had invariably benefited from the imposition of food export restrictions at the Namanga border area?

❖ What suggests itself or is suggested by others as what could be done to improve the incomes of cross border food crops' traders?

1.4 Significance of the study

This study sought to contribute to the existing body of knowledge (Masinjila,2009; EAC,2011; AIITA,2009; Little, 2007; Hella,2009; Mashindano and Kaino, 2009) on the impact of agriculture products export restrictions on the overall national economy of a given developing country. This study was meant to complement previous studies that did not focus on investigating the benefits and challenges that common people in the relevant border area faced after the imposition of the food crops export restrictions.

Conclusions derived from studying the facts on the grounds relating to a specific case of a border post (Namanga) were expected to contribute to the continuing national discussion on the consequences of agricultural products export restriction.

On the policy analysis side, this study was expected to contribute to literature of relevance to government policy makers interested in constantly ready to rethink the consequences of export restriction and always wishing to effect policy interventions on the basis of evidence-based analysis of opinions including those of cross border people whose poverty also needs to be alleviated.

1.5 Structure of the Document

This piece of work is organised in five chapters. Chapter one starts by presenting an introduction to the subject matter. It is briefly explaining an over view on what is on the ground as far as the impact of cross-border food crops' trade restrictions is concerned. Chapter two is about the study design and methodology. Coverage of the study is also dealt in this chapter.

Chapter three gives a detailed conceptual and theoretical background of the subjects of trade policy, Cross border trade and the linkage to poverty issues. Chapter four is discussing the research findings. In this chapter the impact of cross border trade restriction is clearly detailed. Chapter five gives conclusive remarks.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Research design and Methodology

2.1 Study Design

This was a case study of the local impact of the consequences of food crops export restriction the Namanga border area between Tanzania and Kenya, as the case in point. The research design allowed one to collect as much information as possible on border trade at Namanga, which is one of the most active border area in Tanzania as far as cross border trade is concerned. This is probably because it is an exit and entry point to trade between Tanzania and many neighbouring and other countries such as Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and others.

2.2 Methodology

2.2.1 Data Collection and Analysis

The study took a largely qualitative approach to the collection of data. In this case, the data was gathered by conducting an analytical review of existing literature and documentation on the subject matter and conducting in-depth interviews with crop traders, revenue officers, and immigration officers, clearing and forwarding officers, police, food and drug authority as well as officials of the national bureau of standards.

Data was subsequently grouped under relevant themes and analysed using the patterns-matching method. Narratives and testimonies from crop traders were also collected, analysed and used to support the conclusion.

2.2.2 Study Sample constituting Coverage of the study

The study interviewed 39 people; these were interviewed individually or as members of groups subjected to Focused Group Discussions (FGDs). Individuals subjected to in-depth interviews were purposively selected drawn from diverse backgrounds in order to obtain different people's experiences and options. One- to- one in depth interviews were conducted with 24 people. Three FGDs were conducted involving 15 people, consisting 5 people each group.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Conceptual and theoretical discussion on Cross border Trade, Agricultural crops and Poverty linkages

3.1 International Trade Policy in Tanzania, an overview

In the 1990s, Tanzania's international trade regime has markedly improved. The contribution of international trade to Tanzania's gross domestic product (GDP) has grown since the 1990s when the country substantially liberalized its business and trade environments. On average, the contribution of international trade to its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 7% between 1999 and 2005, and now accounts for nearly three-fifths of GDP (Hamilton (2009). The country seems poised to continue its liberal economic reforms, both with respect to its international trade regime generally and the facilitation of trade at its borders.

The country is endowed with an abundance of natural resources and is strategically located to engage in trade. It borders five landlocked countries and offers the port of choice for eastern Congo. As a Least Developed Country, Tanzania receives preferential treatment in all of the world's largest export markets, including the European Union, the United States, Japan, and China. Recently, Tanzania enhanced its trade potential by incorporating international and regional agreements into its legal and regulatory frameworks and by creating or strengthening a variety of institutions charged with implementing these agreements. The country is a founding member of the WTO, a member of the EAC, and a member of the Southern African Development Community. By adopting the EAC Common External Tariff, Tanzania replaced a four-band tariff structure with a simplified three-band tariff structure of 0, 10, and 25%. As noted above, Tanzania withdrew from COMESA in 2000, citing the practical costs of membership (Hamilton, 2009).

3.2. Trade and Poverty linkage

As discussed by Burcu Duygan and Jesse B. Bump (2007); trade-driven growth is a tempting prescription to reduce poverty. It would appear that a number of countries, specifically the so-called South East Asian Tigers, operating in a given international trade environment at a given period in the history of the world, did reduce poverty through foreign trade-driven growth. However, some analysts have pointed to plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggests that there is little evidence to support the view that export trade-driven growth is an option available to all countries in the world irrespective of specific

favourable overall global trade conditions. These factors have spurred a lively and ongoing debate that has yet to produce wide agreement among development economists.

The potential for trade to have an impact on poor people is usually classified under three mechanisms, as outlined by Winters (2000; 2002). First, trade can stimulate growth and lessen poverty. This effect has been heavily debated, using primarily cross-country evidence, as produced by Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2002). The consensus is that growth does lead to poverty reduction, but the causal link between trade and growth has been hard to demonstrate because of endogeneity problems between the two, as discussed by Rodrik (2005).

Second, trade reforms can have a negative impact on government revenue, the main source of redistribution. However, the evidence so far indicates that these reforms do not reduce revenues, because they lead to higher trade volumes and increased collection rates, as reviewed by Winters et al. (2004).

Third – and most directly – trade can affect the prices poor people pay for goods, the prices they receive for their products, and their employment prospects and wages. These links have been investigated in micro-data case studies, including Balat and Porto (2005), Attanasio et al. (2004), Nicita et al. (2003), and McCulloch and Ota (2002). A detailed and valuable review has been published by Winters et al. (2004), observing that the heterogeneity of poverty presents problems for large-scale, high-level analyses and thereby frustrates efforts to draw quick, general conclusions. Therefore, although investigating this third mechanism holds much promise for revealing the intricate relationship between trade and poverty, inquiries must be made at the country level and these must capture local variation in the conditions of poverty. To understand how poor households can benefit from trade-related economic growth, it is vital to know who the poor are, where they live, and in what sectors they work. The demographic characteristics of households and their economic activities generally go hand in hand with their income levels and, by obvious extension, the household's poverty status. Though it is hard to assess the direction of causality among these actors, it is useful to look at some descriptive statistics to understand better the nature of poverty in Tanzania.

3.3 Cross Border Trade Facilitation in Tanzania
According to Hamilton (2009); Tanzania has made important strides toward improving the facilitation of movement of goods at its borders. Under the World Bank's Doing Business

initiative, Tanzania scores the highest among the EAC countries in the category of "Trading Across Borders" (USAID, 2009). Initiatives are underway to ensure integrity, transparency, and consistency for the trade community. These initiatives, if continued in earnest, could improve the enabling environment for private-sector growth and investment over the next generation.

Tanzania's customs authority is moving from a "control" viewpoint, under which most import articles are checked, verified, scrutinized, and undergo a full documentation review, to a more modern system where most importers are trusted once customs has verified their knowledge, professionalism, and high compliance rates through random examinations and post-release audit. To illustrate this paradigm shift, in June 2007, customs inaugurated a new "gold card" program called the "compliant trade scheme" for the largest 50 importers in Tanzania. In exchange for a series of performance guarantees and internal compliance measures, firms that have a faultless record are given a high percentage of "green line" designations for their shipments. A green line indicates no physical examination and document check, which accelerates a firm's release time.

Tanzanian customs has an automated system that is not up to the level of other customs services' systems for import or export transactions. Customs has installed the ASYCUDA++ computerized customs management system but does not enjoy the full functionality of the system yet. Moreover, Tanzanian customs has yet to utilize the system to reconcile the carrier manifest bills of lading with importers' import declarations. Additionally, cleared bills of lading and released import declarations are not communicated electronically with trade stakeholders. As a result, the system constitutes another layer of bureaucracy over the existing manual systems. The other border agencies that exercise discretion over imports and exports are not integrated with the automated system.

Hamliton (2009) argues further that importer and other members of the trade community report that customs personnel in Tanzania routinely solicit and receive small bribes for facilitation of service. Some firms refuse to pay and suffer the consequences of delay, excessive document checks, and physical examinations of their cargo. However, observers praise the revenue authority's internal affairs unit, which investigates allegations of misconduct, and conducts lifestyle and financial checks on individual employees Tanzanian customs does not routinely look for counterfeit goods. Customs officers receive no training in detection methods or legal responsibilities. A substantial amount of contraband, including counterfeit goods, is moved around customs via the expansive Lake Tanganyika, as well as across remote and unofficial border crossings. Counterfeit

fertilizer, in particular, is said to hamper crop production, since it is inferior to legitimate offerings Erikisson, G. (1993).

3.4 Cross-border agricultural crops, and food security; a conceptual framework

In this section, we explore the linkages of cross border trade on agricultural crops, restrictions and food security. Central to the discussion are the consequences of crop export, impact on consumption and trade as well as implications for price and income variability and the overall economic performance. But first, we look at food security concepts followed by the discussion of determinants of trade. We then deal with restrictions on specific commodities and the implications of this trade to food security and income.

In broad terms, and as discussed by Ogutu (1998) food security is defined as "the access by all people at all times to adequate food for a healthy and productive life and where such access is stable over the years." This definition embraces three major elements. First, it refers to the availability of food which is a function of production, stockholding and trade (imports). Second, it refers to access to food by having the purchasing power to buy it from a market or the financial and other resources to grow it. Third, it refers to stability of access, which means that variability in physical and financial means of obtaining food does not expose consumers unduly to the risk of starvation. The fourth element that can be added to the concept of food security is the physical well being of consumers and their ability to convert food nutrients to energy needed for a healthy and productive life.

Household availability of food requires that food be available at local or regional markets, which is determined by market operations, infrastructure, and information flows. Access to food by households and individuals is usually conditioned by income: the poor commonly lack adequate means to secure access to food. Thus, food insecurity does not necessarily arise from inadequate food supplies, but from a lack of access by households, individuals, communities, regions or nations to food because of low incomes. This is at the micro-level. At the macro-level, merely increasing the production or supply of food will not necessarily result in an improvement in food security unless individual consumers can be assured of access to it as said by Ogutu (1998). Hence, macro level food security implies that the country is able to store or import enough food for its citizens and make sure that

consumers can have access to it when need arises. Food insecurity is either chronic or transitory.

Chronic food insecurity involves a continuously inadequate diet caused by the persistent inability to acquire food by whatever means—producing, buying, bartering, sharing, foraging, and so on. Transitory food insecurity is a temporary decline in a household's access to enough food, arising from instability of food prices, food production, or household incomes. Policies for reducing chronic food insecurity differ from those that aim at reducing transitory food insecurity. Policy options for reducing chronic food insecurity include increasing the food supply (through production, imports or improving market integration), subsidizing consumer prices and targeting income transfers.

Policy options for reducing transitory food insecurity may include stabilizing supplies and prices and assisting vulnerable groups directly. In any country, the food insecure comprises different subgroups and food security measures must be tailored to the needs and circumstances of each group. High on the agenda of food security issues are the following factors: food supply to meet the growing demand of a growing population, stability of food supply, and low food prices to make food affordable to more people. Also included would be the following factors: maintenance of the future production capacity of agriculture (sustainability), protection of the environment, provision of farmers with fair income and alleviation of rural poverty, and the development of the economy at large.

The large volume of informal cross-border trade shows that regional integration is already extensively practiced through informal trade and other unofficial exchanges. The growth in informal trade across borders partly re-establishes the extensive trade of goods and the migration of people that were a feature of economic and social life before colonization. The many benefits of greater economic integration are already visible in daily life through this informal exchange that keeps prices down by increasing competition, supplies products across borders that would otherwise be unavailable, provides opportunities for employment in neighbouring countries and encourages entrepreneurial activities. Informal trade also involves profiteering made possible by official barriers and discrepancies in incentives among countries.

Thus, informal trade plays an important food security role of moving food from surplus to deficit areas as well as providing an income to those involved in such activities. ICBT contributes to food stability by improving the supply through importation and increased

production through export. For consumers, ICBT offers great opportunities to access goods in small and affordable packages. It therefore provides markets for producers and avails foodstuffs to consumers thus leading to increased production through trade. However, the impact of this trade on price stability is not clear. Without trade, price variability is a function of domestic supply variability. Its amplitude is determined by elasticity's of domestic supply and demand, increasing the greater the inelasticity of either or both. Policies, of course, could attempt to moderate price variability through storage, subsidies or price guarantees but fundamentally market price variability is driven by the domestic weather.

With trade, the source of domestic price variability is the world price variability. The likely effect is that the amplitude of price variation in international markets would be less than the variation in domestic markets. Consumers thus experience access to a more diverse bundle of goods, paying lower prices for importable as well as for home goods, while prices of exportable rise. Overall, the real incomes of consumers, and real cost of intermediate producers, become far less dependent on domestic supply shocks which, together with diversification in consumption, should make their incomes more stable and on the average, higher. The implementation of structural adjustment programs in regional countries led to the retrenchment of many workers both in the public and private sectors (Dessus, 2008).

Study findings drawing on the situation observed at various Eastern African border areas that are reported in the work by Masinjila (2009) does indicate that most of those engaged in informal trade activities were those who had been retrenched and therefore lacked employment in the formal sector. Informal trade can therefore be said to be acting as a source of employment and income. The down side of ICBT is that it is accommodating to illegal trade and trade of sub-standard or condemned goods which could endanger consumers' health. These negative aspects notwithstanding, ICBT plays an important role in the welfare of the producers, consumers and the regional economies at large

From the above discussions it is possible to draw the conclusion that the question of food crop export restriction has not been addressed. It is was in the light of above discussion that it was decided to undertake the study reported in this Term Paper on the impact of food crops export restriction on the trading population that is served by the Namanga border post.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0. Study Findings

There is adequate Tanzanian economic policy analysis literature seeking to explain the extent to which cross-border food crops' trade restriction promotes or hinders the attainment of the goals of Tanzania's overall national poverty alleviation programme. However, there is inadequate literature on how cross-border food crops' trade restrictions impacts on poverty reduction efforts at the local level within the context of whatever may be considered overall national policy intervention successes or failures. There is therefore a need to investigate through empirical evidence on the impact of cross-border food crops' trade restriction at the local level.

The evidence from the review of the literature and that derived from insights reconstructed from interviews with relevant individuals as well as from FGDs does support the general view that for a large extent does the cross-border food crops' trade restriction contribute to poverty reduction in a given border area in Tanzania, the relevant case being the Namanga border area, on the Tanzania- Kenya border. Specifically, interview, FGD and literature review evidence does confirm that in the last five years, normal trade transaction was observed to have continued to take place before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. It was also observed that the main actors in the cross border crop export trade at the Namanga border area would seem to have remained the same both before and after restrictions on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. These tended to include large-scale traders as well as small and medium sized operators who were invariably driven into engaging in food smuggling trade practices by the official trade restrictions.

Interview and FGD evidence tended to support survey evidence reported in an earlier study of cross-border trade in the Eastern Africa region reported in the paper by C. Ackello-Ogutu P. N. Echessah (1998) that made the following insightful observations captured in the extended quote below:

> "Cross-border trade, especially in agricultural food commodities, is wide spread but largely unrecorded. These trade activities may be legal on one side of the border but illegal on the other. However, this form of trade plays an important food security role of moving foodstuffs from surplus to deficit areas. Informal cross-border trade thus stabilizes food availability by improving the supply through importation and increased production through export. It provides employment and hence income as most of the informal traders is not gainfully employed in the formal sector where opportunities continue to dwindle. Informal cross-border trade also complements formal trade in the agricultural marketing system and enhances efficiency in marketing by competing with official trade".

Interview and FGD evidence also tended to support survey evidence reported in a recent study of cross-boder trade in the East African Community region, reported in the paper Booz Allen Hamilton (2009), which suggested that the government imposition of export restriction was mostly likely to further aggravate the already precarious situation pertaining to across border trade in food items. Hamilton (2009) observes that:

> "*Opportunities for trade in agriculture fall far short of their potential, however, due to inadequate infrastructure, a dearth of cold-storage facilities, and other factors that make it difficult to trade in fresh fruit, meat, horticulture, and other local products. The fact that non-perishable or less perishable products dominate agriculture exports in these countries—coffee, tea, cotton, seeds, and dry beans, for example —is a tangible outcome of an environment where food and other agricultural products cannot be moved fast enough or stay fresh long enough to be viable for regional and overseas trade*".

Interview and FGD evidence further indicated that the said imposition of food export restrictions was likely to contribute to the decrease   in the size of the officially acknowledged incomes that traders engaged in cross border trade declared for taxation purposes. This was said to be possible while still having little effect on the volume of trade in the food crops upon which the government would have imposed the export restriction presumably on order to safeguard overall food security in the given country.

In addition, interview and FGD evidence tended to suggest that incomes of traders at the relevant cross border area tended to be negatively affected to a significant extent after the food crops' trade restriction were imposed. Interview and FGD evidence also tended to suggest that government officials entrusted with the administration of non-trade barriers were the ones who invariably benefited most from the imposition of food export restrictions at the relevant border area. Indeed, interview and FGD evidence supported the observation contained in the observation made by Hamilton (2009) quoted below:

> "*Governments, donors, and investors alike have been paying attention to building better roads and bridges, improving customs and other border processes, and otherwise strengthening the facilitation of transport in East Africa. Yet smooth passage along domestic roads is generally neglected as a trade policy issue. In fact, outsiders in a position to influence the practice may not appreciate the extent of the problem, as diplomatic license plates and tourist vehicles are more likely to be waved through roadblocks. For the remaining road users, however, the intimidation level is high when vehicles are stopped by armed officers*".

Respondents in the interviews and FDGs took the view that a number of measures could be taken by the authorities concerned that would improve the incomes of cross border food crops' traders. The measures mentioned by the interviewees and participants in the FGDs echoed those contained in the following observations made in the paper by C. Ackello-Ogutu and P. N. Echessah (1998):

"Formal cross-border trading is still constrained by high tariffs and nontariff barriers, such as long and cumbersome documentation procedures, instability of the foreign exchange rates, and harassment of the traders by the agents of economic police, high transportation costs and lack of working capital and credit facilities. These bottlenecks have to be reduced, and, if possible, completely removed, in order for the regional markets to integrate and operate more efficiently. Besides the above-mentioned issues relating to trade liberalization and policy harmonization, there are infrastructural and marketing challenges to increasing regional trade and assuring a food secure region. Even in cases where price and other policy distortions do not exist, large proportions of non-tradable production still exists due to high transactions costs. Lowering of these costs through investment in improved transportation and storage infrastructure and marketing facilities may be as important in lowering food prices to consumers as increasing agricultural productivity"

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

In this Term Paper, the findings of a case study of the impact on Tanzania's Namanga border post trading community caused by food crops export restrictions. The study, as pointed out earlier, sought to contribute to the existing body of knowledge (Masinjila, 2009; EAC, 2011; AIITA, 2009; Little, 2007; Hella, 2009; Mashindano and Kaino, 2009) on the impact of agriculture products export restrictions on the overall national economy of a given developing country, in this case, Tanzania. The study findings do provide complementary support to the findings of previous studies on the subject. The findings tended to agree with the findings of related studies much as those did not focus on investigating the benefits and challenges that common people in the relevant border area faced after the imposition of the food crops export restrictions. By way of a conclusion to this Term Paper, the observations by Hamilton (2009) quoted at length below seem to summarize the conclusion to the current study and the main recommendations derived from that conclusion:

> "Customs uses paper controls, although the EAC countries are planning a common automated solution. Indeed, a great number of trade facilitation reforms have yet to take place in Tanzania. With respect to trade in goods, a number of taxing schemes, bureaucratic delays, and other regulatory constraints continue to limit the competitiveness of Tanzanian exports. Trade in services is similarly not reaching its potential, due in part to restrictions on the free movement of labor. In addition, Tanzania has not committed to important international standards in trade facilitation. It has not signed the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (the Revised Kyoto convention) and does not yet observe core international transit procedures".

The implementation of the recommendations contained in the quotation above will go a long way in addressing the issue of the extent to which normal trade transactions continued to be facilitated before and after restriction on crop export at the boarder of Tanzania and Kenya. The implementation of the recommendations contained in above quotation would also determine the extent to which the incomes of the traders across the border such as at Namanga would increase or decrease due to the imposition or lifting of government restrictions on food crops export.

The above conclusion and the derived recommendations ought to contribute to the continuing national and EAC regional discussion on the consequences of agricultural products export restriction. Indeed, the findings of the study do confirm the necessity of continuing to urge Tanzania government policy makers to adopt the stance of being

ready to rethink the consequences of export restriction and other non-tariff barrier interventions. These measures may often be taken in the name of promoting food security but one should always be ready to review them in the light of emerging evidence-based analysis of opinions including those of cross border communities whose poverty ought to be at the centre of government development endeavours.

One observed striking similarities in the opinions of Namanga food trading communities and the observations contained in the paper by C. Ackello-Ogutu and P. N. Echessah (1998) when paper points out that:

"The poor state of infrastructure, particularly the poor road networks in Tanzania, hampers producers' opportunities to expand and diversify their production by exploiting the neighboring countries' export markets. Although the required investments on infrastructural development are admittedly colossal, stakeholders consulted during our survey were of the strong opinion that Tanzania ought to explore more vigorously, the alternative strategies that target infrastructure as a means of exploiting the existing comparative advantages, particularly in the area of food production and export. The current food self-sufficiency strategies, which are also the pillars of food security in the neighboring countries such as Kenya and Uganda, are shortsighted and must be seriously reassessed in a regional rather than domestic context"

Indeed, the interview and FGD evidence based on the opinions of Namanga food traders and other relevant government officials involved Namanga post food trade endeavor over the years does support the conclusions on what need to be done contained in the study by C. Ackello-Ogutu and P. N. Echessah (1998) referred to earlier. Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah (1998) argue that:

"Given the right incentives, the private sector can play a very significant role in moving food from producers to consumers (even to drought-stricken lands and areas of civil strife), the political boundaries and bureaucratic constraints notwithstanding. The mistrust that appears to exist between policy makers (government) and the private sector practitioners, as well as the hindrances to trade that are persistently imposed by the latter, sometimes gives the impression that these two parties have self-neutralizing views regarding economic development and social welfare."

Namanga food crops traders, and relevant government asked to give an honest opinion on the matter, also did take the view, similar to one expressed by Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah (1998), that:

"The goals of national food security are indeed not incompatible with this notion, even when there are threats of domestic market failure arising from natural disasters such as droughts. Strong governments as well as consistency and predictability of policy are critical ingredients that the region's entrepreneurs need so desperately in order to function efficiently and for the food insecurity problem to be eradicated comprehensively".

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Contemporary African State and Trans-border Ethnic Identity: The Case of *Chewa* Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

Happy Mickson Kayuni

Political Studies Department, University of the Western Cape,
Private Bag X17,
Bellville 7535,
Cape Town, South Africa.
Mobile: (+27)719197478
Fax: (+27)21 - 959 3621
Email: hkayuni@yahoo.com

And

Political and Administrative Studies Department,
University of Malawi,
P.O. Box 280,
Zomba, Malawi.

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Abstract

In International Relations (IR), the Westphalian model provides the assumption that states are independent actors with a political authority based on territory and autonomy. Despite a large number of critics against the model, it has not completely been dismissed in explaining some elements of the international system. This is evident by the underlying assumptions and perspectives that still persist in IR literature as well as the growing contemporary debates on the model (especially on its related elements of state, sovereignty and citizenship). It is generally agreed that due to globalisation and other related forces, the concepts of state, sovereignty and citizenship are taking a new meaning which is a further departure from the classic understanding of Westphalian model. In Africa, available literature analysing this new meaning normally focuses on the formal structures and ignores the role of informal *trans-border* traditional political entities (Specifically, how trans-border traditional political entities affect the re-definition of state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa). Such ignorance has led to a scholarship vacuum in African IR of the potentiality of the informal to complement on the formal intra-regional state entities. This paper focuses on the *Chewa* Kingdom as a possible case study to further understand the re-definition of Westphalian model's state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa. This is within the context of the recent emerging body of literature which is re-opening the debate on the meaning, experience and relevance of state, sovereignty and citizenship in Africa. The *Chewa* Kingdom (formerly Maravi Kingdom) cuts across three modern African states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and its paramount King Gawa Undi is based in Zambia. Using focus group discussions, key informant interviews and wider review of relevant literature, the paper interrogates whether the *Chewa* Kingdom (of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) is challenging, contradicting, compromising, complementing, confirming or calling for a reconstruction of the contemporary Westphalian Model. The major proposed argument offered is that the recent revival of the informal trans-border traditional political entities such as the *Chewa* of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique offers a new, exciting and unexplored debate on the Westphalian model that is unique to the African set up.

Keywords: Westphalia, *Chewa*, State, Sovereignty, Ethnic Identity, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, International Relations.

1.0 Introduction

This paper focuses on the Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and examines the extent to which it can be argued that this trans-border arrangement is a threat to state sovereignty of the said three countries. At the center of the *Chewa* tradition is what is known as *Kulamba* annual ceremony held at the headquarters of Paramount Chief, Gawa Undi, in Katete, Zambia. The *Chewa* word *Kulamba* literally means 'to pay homage'. This annual ceremony attracts approximately 150 thousand *Chewa* chiefs and sub-chiefs from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. In this context, the *Kulamba* ceremony is probably one of the major annual events for the *Chewa*. It is both a Thanksgiving ceremony as well as a New Year celebration. The ceremony is at the end of on Agricultural year (August-September) therefore, the people led by their Chiefs give thanks to *Chiuta* (God) for the harvest etc. They also give thanks to the Kalonga Undi for his stewardship over the year and re-commit themselves to the Kalonga in paying homage and offering gifts. The ceremony had arguably been held annually since the creation of the kingdom until 1934 when the British colonial government banned it. The subsequent post-colonial authorities extended the ban in the pretext of enhancing nationalism. In 1980s, the process or restoring the ceremony was pursued and by 1994 the ceremony itself got revived. The restoration of the ceremony has also witnessed high-profile visits of the King to visit his 'subjects' in Malawi and Mozambique. For instance, for the first time in history, three heads of states (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique) attended the ceremony in 2007. The President of Malawi, whilst attending the *Kulamba* ceremony, said that "Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia look up to you, chief, for the social and economic prosperity of their countries" (Mana, 2007). Irrespective of how the situation might be defined, the presence of the three heads of states, as well as what transpired at the ceremony puts into question the link between state sovereignty and informal trans-border institutions which this paper is examining. The paper is built on empirical and secondary data collected from selected areas and individuals in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Specifically data collection tools included focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews, and wider review of relevant literature and newspapers. The first part of the paper lays down the conceptual framework by among other things examining the various dimensions of the concepts of Westphalia, sovereignty, traditional authorities and ethnic identity. The second part provides background to the *Chewa* trans-border ethnic group and also goes on to analyze its effect on state sovereignty.

2.0 Notions of Westphalia and sovereignty

The Westphalian model is an international relations discipline concept whereby there is recognition of states as sovereign entities with fundamental right of self-determination (territorial inviolability, freedom to conduct foreign relations and negotiate treaties with other states, establish their own form of government and rule its people without outside interference) (Brown 1992; Boucher 1998). Although some scholars have argued that using the model for analysis of state sovereignty is not appropriate, Engel and Olsen (2010:10) argue that using sovereignty in the Westphalian sense as an analytical tool is still important because "it provides important material and symbolic resources" in the African context. According to Clapham (1999), Third World countries, which include Africa, had the Westphalian form of sovereignty imposed on them but after their independence, especially after the Second World War, they became the strongest supporter of the Westphalian sovereignty in the international state system. In other words, just like Engel and Olsen (2010) this paper interprets Westphalia as the contemporary formal state institution.

The concept of sovereignty implies supremacy or superiority. Vincent (1987:34) argues that the first person to systematically use the concept of sovereignty was a French philosopher Jean Bodin and he associated the concept with the idea of state. In this case, the concept of sovereignty represented by the monarchy, implied superiority above the citizens and the law. This supremacy has over the years been interpreted differently to imply the constitution/law of the land, the people/citizenry or office of rulership and not necessarily the person in office. Sovereignty is generally regarded as a critical element of the Westphalian model (Croxton 1999). In this case Beaulac (2004:181) rightly suggests that Westphalia put to the fore the notion of 'state sovereignty' and became a "cornerstone" in the actual treaty of Westphalia. Sindjoun (2001:222) adds that "the concept of sovereignty is a pillar of international relations" and it is also in realist perspective "the organizing principle of international life." That is why whenever the model is debated, sovereignty is always highlighted. According to Osiander (2001:251) you cannot differentiate a debate concerning Westphalian system from the concept of sovereignty. Consequently, from a Westphalian perspective, Axtmann (2004:260) points out that state sovereignty meant that legally and politically the state had absolute authority "not accountable to anyone but itself". Sovereignty also had the connotation of possession and occupation of a geographical area and resources within it. In other words, sovereignty "aimed to bring about the artful combination of space, people, and resources in territorialized containments" (Axtmann 2004:260). In relation to trans-border control, Krasner (2001:28) states that sovereignty implies the capacity to control refers to both practices, such as the ability to regulate trans-border movements as well as those within the boundary of the state.

Olasupo (2009) argues that the Westphalian model of the state was imposed on African communities and has since remained as part and parcel of what we now refer to as the formal state[1]. The application of the concept of state in Africa has raised a number of debates. Authors such as Dunn, and Shaw (2001), Dunn (2001), Neuman (1998), Swatuk (2001), Ofuho (2000), Ayoob (1998), Malaquias (2001), Davidson (1992), Walker (2007) and Grovogui (2011) have all argued (though not in an identical manner) that the western concept of state does not apply in the African context. One of the arguments is the said artificiality of borders. This paper agrees with *inter alia* the counter arguments raised by Brown (2006) and Herbst (1989). In relation to artificiality of the African state, Brown (1996: 123) argues that the African state is neither an imposition nor artificial. He points out that "decolonisation and the foundation of independent states was a process in which Africans were actors, not simply acted upon" (Brown (2006: 128). In line with Brown's argument, Herbst (1989) contends that to argue that the borders of African states are artificial is wrong because all political borders are merely constructs and not natural. The question to be asked is for whose purposes they were created. If this criterion is used, we may conclude that "the current African boundaries are not arbitrary" because they are a product of a rational response to the political needs of the colonialists at that time. Just as the borders served their interests to the colonialists, the same boarders have been serving the interest of post-colonial leaders hence they have been maintained (Herbst 1989: 692).

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1 This paper acknowledges that Africa is so diverse hence using the term to represent all countries in the region is contentious. However, according to Smith (2009), despite several variations it is possible to use the term to represent the region due to several overarching commonalities.

3.0 Interrogating the African state sovereignty from selected trans-border studies

Apart from the applicability of the notion of African state, several debates have raged concerning whether the African state possesses sovereignty or not; below is a discussion concerning this debate based on selected trans-border studies[2]:

3.1 Argument for loss of state sovereignty
Some of the authors who have conducted trans-border as well as multiple country studies and argued that African states lack a bona fide sovereignty include Englebert (2009) and Kehinde (2010). Although Englebert's work does not specifically focus on trans-border per se, his findings have a bearing on trans-boarders especially when he terms as 'artificial' African boarders created by colonialists. Englebert builds on several other previous scholars such as Herbst (1996 and 2001) and is very critical of African sovereignty. He argues that most African countries still exist because of the international recognition bestowed on them by the international community. Specifically he argues that the legal sovereignty rendered to African states by the international community has allowed the oppressive ruling elites to translate that into internal legitimacy. In this case, his suggestion is that the international legal sovereignty bestowed upon African states should be withdrawn; the colonial boundaries should also be discarded and re-drawn. In other words, African states should have their "sovereignty revoked." (Englebert 2009:252). According to Englebert (2009), only states that have proved through efficient address of people's concerns should be re-admitted into the international community. Accordingly, African states need to demonstrate internal legitimacy before seeking international sovereignty which in some cases might lead to a breakup of the colonially imposed boundaries to reflect the bottom-up approach to state formation. In this case, his argument is that the artificiality of African states will be overcome and a truly African state that responds to the needs of its citizenry will emerge. The shortfall with Englebert's work is that he is providing a one-source-directional-analysis of the problems of Africa by excessively lumping blame on the colonization process and its aftermath (i.e. state sovereignty). Various works have clearly demonstrated that Africa's social political challenges emerge from diverse sources. Consequently, this paper rejects Englebert's perspective.

The second author, Kehinde (2010) focused his study on the geo-cultural space of the Yoruba ethnic identity along the Benin-Nigeria international border. Specifically, he was examining the impact of state boundary partitioning on the Yoruba ethnic identity and group relations. Benin is a former French colony while Nigeria is a former British colony. The colonial powers used different approaches in order to govern these territories. Using a multidisciplinary approach based on a historicised case-study of the Yoruba border communities, Kehinde finds that contrary from the findings of wider literature, the colonial boundaries (and later consolidated through the post-colonial state) have not affected the Yoruba ethnic identity and its related socialization processes. He argues that the governments of Nigeria and Benin actively pursued different national policies and the border was one of the instruments used to

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2 The paper has deliberately avoided the failed state debate. John (2010:10) argues that the measurements of state failure are misleading because they do not appropriately take into consideration "wide variations of capacity across state functions within a polity".

re-assert their control of over the territory. Despite the efforts, these states had failed to effectively assert their control over the areas. Specifically, Kehinde (2010:271) argues that "state weakness, characterized by defective structures, bad governance, corruption and poor geography, is essentially responsible for the failure of these states to assert their authorities over territory". This state failure according to Kehinde was fully taken advantage by the Yoruba to have unrestrained cross-border movements which ultimately sustained and enhanced the cross-border Yoruba identity and solidarity. The major weakness of Kehinde's work is that although he used the structuralism and functionalism perspectives as frames of analysis, however, his conclusion is mainly drawn from structuralism and in the process he almost completely ignores the value of the functionalism. In other words his interpretation of state weakness could also be seen in another perspective: it could reflect on the state's flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of its citizens- the sovereign- and not necessarily a demonstration of its weakness.

3.2 Argument for preservation of state sovereignty

Several trans-border and multiple country studies have also demonstrated that the African state has actually not lost its sovereignty. In this regard, some of the studies include those conducted by Boone (2003), KCK (2005) and Maclean (2010). Boone's (2003) work is essential for understanding variations in African state formation and sustenance especially at local rural level. Her work is based on a comprehensive empirical research conducted in West African states of Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana. She ably demonstrates that contrary from the view that the state is weak and not influential (especially in the rural areas) state power is actually far much entrenched in rural societies. In other words, her work focuses on power and political capacity in rural sub-Saharan Africa or the variations in distribution of power between center and rural local areas.

In 2005, Kituo Cha Katiba (KCK) conducted research in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in order to document citizen's experiences when confronted with challenges related to threats and constraints in addressing citizenship and identity. Whilst acknowledging several challenges towards meaningful achievement of a common political citizenship, the KCK report mentions that informally the cross boarder communities have already started the process. Specifically the report states that:

> the ordinary people are ahead of the politicians and are already federated without the formal legal process. This is demonstrated through their ability to visit relatives across the borders, without a hassle, organized around the principle of *Good Neighbourliness or Ujirani Mwema*… All border communities are basically integrated and speak one language and have been described as true "East Africans."… In fact for the Nyamwanga, one chief rules in both countries and is expected to have a wife in both countries (KCK 2005: 33-34).

Based on their findings, KCK does not argue that the informal trans-border movement is a threat to the formal state but it is actually strengthening the state by making it more relevant. Taking such kind of a perspective may lead to an agreement with Nkiwane's (2001: 287) observation that "the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration". This is the perspective that this paper is interested to investigate.

The third perspective is drawn from Maclean (2010). In this case Maclean (2010) explores the Akan tribe which stretches across the contemporary Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire boarder. In pre-colonial period, the Akan were under one kingdom but was split due to the colonial

demarcation of the community. The Akan in Ghana were under the British administration while the Akan of Cote d'Ivoire were under the French administration. According to Maclean, the Akan villages on both sides of the boarder claim that they are one family because they had one common pre-colonial culture, history and politics. However, contrary from these claims, Maclean noted significant differences between the Akan in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire in relation to informal institutions of social reciprocity and local understanding of citizenship. Specifically in relation to reciprocity, she claims that in Ghana, reciprocity was much lower amongst the Akan as compared to the Akan of Cote d'Ivoire. In relation to citizenship, the Ghanaian pattern of citizenship led to a community-oriented notion while in the Ivoirian villagers tended to pursue an "individualised, entitlement-based sense of citizenship". Based on her findings, Maclean (2010:32) audaciously claims that:

> I reject the notion that the African state is uniformly weak or failed, and that informal institutions are the only rules that matter on the ground. I also reject the idea that the colonial state barely touched African societies or is no longer relevant to African cultures today.

4.0 Traditional authorities, Ethnic identity and African state sovereignty

Eriksen (2002:7) argues that "the term ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and these groups may be ranked hierarchically within society". Ethnic[3] identity is therefore a process whereby this perceived distinct group mobilizes itself to achieve social, political or economic goals within a specific locality or entity. Traditional authorities are informal institutions that govern ethnic groups on the basis of generally perceived hereditary procedures, norms and customs passed on from generation to generation. Ethnic identity is normally guided and symbolized by traditional authorities.

The debate on traditional authorities in Africa has mainly focused on whether they are compatible to democratic system of state governance or not. Several authors have argued for (Logan 2008, 2009 and 2011, Williams 2011) or against (Ntsebeza 2006, Mamdani 1996, and Englebert 2002) the role traditional authorities in African state governance. Building on the work of Mamdani (1996), Ntsebeza (2006) uses the political-economic argument of globalisation and argues that the contemporary African state is weak at local level (due to the neo-liberal capitalist approach) but strong at national level (as it possesses instruments of coercion). This weakness is defined as the inability of the state to deliver services and development at local level. It is in this context that traditional authorities have found an opportunity to reassert themselves and reclaim the past authority by continuing to work as an extension of the state for rural development at the expense of elected local councilors. In this he alludes to the argument that traditional authorities are undermining state sovereignty.

Using Afrobarometer survey data drawn from 19 African countries, Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011) takes a much critical view of Ntsebeza (2006) and Mamdani (1996) and ably points out that there is an overwhelming positive attitude among Africans towards traditional leaders and these traditional leaders are actually not only compatible with democratic institutions of state governance but both institutions rely on each other. Although these two institutions seem incompatible, she argues that African societies seem to have found their own way of integrating these in order to address their concerns. This paper takes the perspective of Logan

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3 In most contemporary writings, the term 'tribes' is now not popular but 'ethnic groups' because the former has the connotation of primitive societies.

that traditional authorities do not necessarily undermine state sovereignty but actually reinforce each other.

5.0 Background to the *Chewa* ethnic group

Based on several historical accounts, the *Chewa*, who are also known as *Nyanja*, came from the Congo basin and migrated to southern Africa to form what was later known as the Maravi Empire which extended from Luangwa River in present-day Zambia to the West and just across to Lake Malawi to the East and near Zambezi River to the South and Kalonga to the north (Langworthy 1971; Ntara 1973; Pachai 1972; Phiri 1975). In this regard, the Maravi Kingdom transcended parts of the contemporary states of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. The King of the Maravi was known as Kalonga (or King) and his headquarters shifted until it was based in present central region of Malawi. After some succession disputes, Gawa Undi emerged as leader and his headquarters was finally based at present day Mkaika in Katete, Zambia. UNESCO estimates that there are about 15 million *Chewa* people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia[4]. The highest population share of the *Chewa* is found in Malawi (about 47%) while Zambia and Mozambique have a 7% and 3% respectively (Kayuni 2012). According to *Chewa* Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) records, there are 42, 33 and 137 Principal *Chewa* chiefs in Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi respectively. CHEFO was recently created by *Chewa* King, Kalonga Gawa Undi X1 to act as a Secretarial to him and the chiefs in the three countries. It is headquartered in Malawi and the current Chairperson of the Foundation is the former Vice President of Malawi, Dr Justine Malewezi. According to Article 3.1, the mandate of CHEFO "shall be to protect, promote and preserve the *Chewa* culture under the guidance of His Majesty Kalonga Gawa Undi through his recognized bodies and organizations".

6.0 Factors leading to a trans-border ethnic movement

Before analyzing the nature of the *Chewa* identity, it would be worth-while to briefly discuss some of the factors that may have led to emergence of this trans-border movement. The factors leading towards the emergence of the *Chewa* ethnic movement are *inter alia* as follows:

6.1 A way of the Chewa asserting themselves as a great ethnic group
Taking into consideration that the largest population of the *Chewa* is found in Malawi, the development of the *Chewa* ethnic movement might also be understood from complex ethnic related political dynamics within Malawi itself. Kamuzu Banda, a *Chewa*, is said to have created *Chewa* hegemony during his thirty year dictatorship which contributed in part to the legitimization of his regime (Forster 1994; Moyo 2002; Chirambo 2005; and Chirambo 2009). While claiming that he was against tribalism, Dr Banda clearly promoted his own ethnic identity, *Chewa*, and even imposed it (chichewa) as the official local language for the country. His emphasis on African tradition almost always focused on the *Chewa* values (Forster 1994). The *Chewa* ethnic identity therefore became the politically dominant group in the country for many years. The departure of Dr Banda from the political scene, with his

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4 This also tallies with Posner's (2009) calculations based on the *Joshua Project*

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successor Bakili Muluzi (a Yao) taking over the leadership, Malawi witnessed the decline of *Chewa* cultural hegemony. The new president encouraged the teaching and learning of other languages and did not rely on culture to consolidate his reign.

According to the views of political and governance experts, the *Chewa* ethnic movement is coming in at a time when the *Chewa* as an ethnic group is losing influence in the nation of Malawi. Taking into consideration that they are in majority, and this mobilization somehow compensates on the felt marginalization of the community. By taking a cultural mobilization platform, the *Chewa* ethnic mobilization is avoiding the highly politicized tensions and divisions associated with political movement but still retain the ability to assert itself as a great nation. As one key informant argued "the reorganization of the *Chewa* could be attributed to some kind of a protest message that: 'we are influential and have our own hierarchy of authority of which we are willing to commit ourselves more than the formal authority'" (Key informant interview, Zomba, 12th June 2012).

6.2 New leadership in the post-liberation period

This trans-border movement is emerging now due to a 'new breed' of political leaders in the region which is inclined towards a closer working relationship. Africa is now in the post-liberation period hence the mistrust and misunderstanding amongst political leaders has almost disappeared. During the liberation period, Zambia and Mozambique used to host some individuals who were sworn enemies of Dr Banda's regimes such as Yatuta Chisiza and Dr Mpakati respectively. It is also alleged that Malawi used to provide logistical support to the Mozambican RENAMO rebels. These situations were somehow responsible for strained relations, especially between Malawi and Mozambique. Several potential crises between Malawi and Mozambique had emerged in the past. For instance in the on 6th November 1987, the Malawi plane was shot down by the Mozambique government killing eight key Malawian individuals who were in the plane. The Mozambique government claimed that the plane had strayed into their territory and was suspected of being a rebel plane. Malawi-Mozambique relations were also on the spotlight when President Samora Machel's plane crashed in October 1986 killing all the passengers on board. The South African government, which is alleged to have shot down the plane, said that they had found documents in the plane which showed that the Mozambican president was planning for an invasion on Malawi (Sagawa 2011). The reason for the invasion according to the South African government was Malawi's alleged support of RENAMO rebels. The crisis in the Zambia-Malawi relations occurred when Dr Banda emphasized that part of Zambia belongs to Malawi (Chiume 1982). Dr Banda's argument was that the Eastern part of Zambia comprises of several Malawian-based ethnic groups especially the *Chewa* and *Ngoni*. Specifically he argued that contemporary Malawi is part of the former Maravi Kingdom which extended as far as the Eastern part of Zambia hence the boundary of Malawi should be extended to include this area. This claim by Dr Banda raised a lot of criticism and strained relations between Malawi and Zambia. Although the situation improved over the years, the suspicion and mistrust never diminished completely (Sagawa 2011).

More damaging to the relations between Malawi with its neighbors especially Zambia and Mozambique was its foreign policies (Chiume 1982 and Sagawa 2011). After independence, Malawi established diplomatic relations with Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and apartheid South Africa. According to Dr Banda, these relations were established so as to ensure that the country should be able to sustain economic development. The Malawi government did this despite strong opposition from OAU. This led to Dr Banda alienating the country from all liberation movements and other African countries. In his epic speech

delivered at an OAU conference in Cairo in July 1964, he refused to support a resolution to cut off economic and diplomatic links with Portuguese East Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Republic of South Africa by arguing that:

> In my own state of Malawi, for example, the colonial geography make it impossible for me to cut off all relations with Portugal, diplomatic, commercial, cultural and otherwise, because colonial history and colonial geography have denied it a port of its own…I do not want to be a hypocrite, I do not want anyone to accuse me of hypocrisy after I leave this room, because it is impossible for me to accept any such resolutions (GoM 1964).

Malawi established trade and labour relations with South Africa and also received massive aid from the same. Dr Banda also amazed other African leaders by establishing diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa in October 1967. Malawi benefited from South Africa's loan to the tune of 8 million Rands for the construction of the new Capital City in Lilongwe (Potts 1985: 188). Zambia hosted the African National Congress and other Mozambican and Zimbabwean liberation movements hence looked at Malawi with suspicion. Similarly, when Mozambique got its independence in 1975, Malawi's lack of support for the liberation movement was not completely forgotten.

The departure of Dr Banda from political leadership in 1994 created an atmosphere of renewed hope and trust. More importantly, the new government of Malawi led by Bakili Muluzi was keen to move Malawi out of the three decade isolation hence earnestly pursued policies that would bring the country closer to the international community. In this regard, amending relations with Malawi's neighbors became one of the government's priorities.

7.0 *Chewa* identity/mobilization, state boarders and sovereignty

The problem of border control is well known by the state officials of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. This problem is two-fold: firstly, more often than not border immigration officers do not follow the official requirements that would control the wanton crossing of boarders and secondly the actual boarders themselves are in some cases in determinant or unclear to the extent that communities living within these boarders do not take them seriously. This is further explained below:

7.1 Status of state borders: Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia

7.1.1 The case of porous borders
Cases of evidence of porous borders have largely been expressed by Zambian, Malawian and Mozambican state officials through their country's' media. Their concerns are that the borders are porous hence allowing any individuals to pass through without a problem. This scenario is creating a problem of the potentiality of criminals to pass through and destabilize the peace in the said countries. For instance Malawian official's concern was captured by *Malawi News* (11-17 September 2010: 3) as follows:

> Inspector General of Police Peter Mukhito has said he is shocked with laxity by the policemen at Mtukwa border post who let a *Malawi News* undercover pass through into Zambia without any search or show of passport or documents to prove their identities. When told that the Mobile Police Service officer at the boarder did not even ask for names or purpose for crossing the border before 5am in the morning, Mukhito said that was "abnormal". "The officers should have searched you and ask you several questions, including your names and purpose for travelling at that time. I am

really surprised that they just let you pass like that", said Mukhito (*Malawi News*, 11-17 September 2010: 3).

From the Zambian side related concerns were also expressed by officials:

> For some time now, Zambia has continued to experience an influx of illegal immigrants and smuggled goods because of its porous borders with neighbouring countries. Zambia shares its borders with eight countries but because of lack of natural barriers such as rivers, these borders have largely remained porous and people have continued using bush paths to entering the country without proper documentation…We know that free movement of people and goods is good as it shows good neighbourliness and promotes trade but there is need to ensure that such movements are monitored (*Daily Mail*, 13th November 2012)

According to the Immigration Officer in Zambia, he said: "It is a challenge and impossible to control these people because they are basically one ethnic group who culturally know each other better hence they don't understand the rationale of official boundaries" (Key informant interview, Chipata, 17th May 2012). The same point was also highlighted by the Malawian and Mozambican Immigration Officers (Malawi-Mozambique boarder) who added that normally they know that there is no real problem when there is a cross-border cultural interaction because it doesn't pose as a security risk (Key informant interview, Angonia, 25th May 2012). This scenario may at face value be said to be creating a situation whereby state sovereignty is being compromised.

7.1.2 Upsurge of border demarcation and reaffirmation exercises

It is thought-provoking to learn that many years after the end of colonial rule in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, the boarders themselves are in some areas not yet officially clear to the extent that these countries had recently embarked on the demarcation and reaffirmation exercise. For instance, as recent as October 2012, the government of Malawi, through the Surveyor General, stated that *it had just completed* the process of demarcating its border with Zambia and Mozambique (*Nation* 23rd October 2012). In relation to Malawi and Mozambique Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation the <u>*Daily Times* of</u> 8th November 2012 mentioned that:

> Malawi and Mozambique are yet to reaffirm their common borders and that is an item at on-going three-day Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation JPCC underway in Lilongwe…"This meeting will also look into issues of our common border. Of course, the border is already demarcated. We are only to reaffirm those borders"

The same exercise of border demarcation was also taking place between Zambia and Mozambique which was captured by the Mozambican media as follows:

> The Mozambican government said the conclusion of border demarcation with Zambia will prevent conflicts between the two nations and in the region as a whole. The Mozambican Television (TVM) said Thursday that the two sides have just ended their project to check their common borders, the work started at the end of last year…The decision to review the border question was taken after the Mozambican government discovered that many Zambians were invading Mozambique to have farms, as well as building homes, thus abandoning their home country. This also happens with Malawians, who are accused of having fields inside Mozambique (*Sousle Manguier* 9th August 2012).

It can be deduced that, except in cases of criminal activities such as robbery, the porous and indeterminate boarder problems seems not to be the concern of local communities as well as local immigration officers. The problem seems to be the concern of top level state officials who perceive this as loss of sovereignty and security. What is puzzling is why the sudden interest in border demarcation and reaffirmation when most countries in southern Africa are now less suspicious of each other and globalisation is enhancing movement of the people? More importantly, with the trans-border cultural movements such as the *Chewa* taking prominence, politicians from all these countries have consistently declared that ethnic communities in these countries are one and the boarders are artificial. The sudden interest to

move towards reaffirmation and demarcation of boarders seems to be the opposite of what is publicly declared.

7.2 Chewa identity and the state borders

This paper findings shows that the formal borders were not a hindrance towards expression of *Chewa* identity in several ways:

Firstly, when there the *Chewa* are organizing their Kulamba ceremony in Zambia, the state borders of these three countries, according to CHEFO Chairperson, they are "relaxed" to allow people to attend the ceremony (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). Based on an agreement reached between CHEFO and government officials Malawians and Mozambicans travelling to the ceremony in Zambia do not need a passport but they have to be registered and appear on the list of names which is stamped by Malawi or Mozambican government officials. This list of names has neither personal identification nor photos of the said individuals but merely their names and the vehicle registration number plate in which they are travelling. According to CHEFO Chairperson, the masked Gulewamkulu dancers (*Chewa* traditional dance members) are not even required to show anything (do not need to appear on the list of registered members) because in the *Chewa* tradition, the masked dancers are believed to represent their "ancestral spirits". Specifically, the CHEFO chairperson said: Kodi chilombo chiwonesa bwanji passport kapena chikalata pa border? Ndi chilombo chimenecho. [How can a spirit produce a passport or official document at the border? It is simply a spirit] (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012).

One individual who had attended the ceremony aptly captures the atmosphere as well as the insignificance of the state borders by explaining that:

> Kulamba is indeed a great traditional ceremony. It pulls together the traditional dancers from three countries who entertain people. And the attending people can't be distinguished as Chewas from Zambia, Mozambique or Malawi. During the period of the ceremony the Chewas from Malawi and Mozambique *literally walk into Zambia without visas. They don't need them*. It's reminiscent of the bygone era before British colonization. But all end up at the capital of the Chewa, Mkaika, to join in praising their ruler with the common 'Yooh! Gawa!' (Zambia African Safari-Biweekly, Issue No. 19, 04 October 2006, emphasis added).

Secondly, when the *Chewa* King, Gawa Undi visits the region, he is not required to produce a passport. According to CHEFO chairperson, there is no need for him to produce a passport because "Dziko ndilake ndiye passport yachani?" [The land belongs to him, why should he produce a passport?] (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). Actually, he is given VIP treatment as a government official even though he is merely a traditional leader. Specifically, according to the Ministry of Local Government official in Malawi, Gawa Undi is provided with a convoy and official security when in the country (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 18th May 2012). This phenomenon should be understood in the context that traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have their own country specific Laws and regulations which do not cover traditional authorities outside their domains. In this case the authority of Gawa Undi is not stipulated in the laws of Malawi and Mozambique but he is under the domain of Zambia. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs official in Malawi, all foreign government dignitaries visiting the country normally have to produce an official diplomatic passport and they do not merely enter the country without one (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). This special treatment given to Gawa Undi is not necessarily imposed by the *Chewa* on the countries of Malawi and Mozambique but it is something that the said governments have done at their own volition.

Thirdly, based on FGDs conducted amongst selected Chewa villages in the three countries, their perceived 'common descent' was regarded as more important than the existing boundaries hence their identities are not constrained by the borders due to this 'common descent' perception (Various focus group discussion interviews in Malawi, Mozambique and

Zambia, April-June 2012). Although the *Chewa* identity can be regarded as the work of elitist who are keen at pursuing their own interests, this paper also agrees with the observation of Smith (1998) who argues that sometimes the role of the elite in such kind of movements is overemphasized. Smith (1998:130) point out that for the elite to be successful, their base for mobilization must be "on pre-existing social and cultural networks. This makes them resonate with the masses". From all the FGDs, which represented the views of the *Chewas* at grassroots level, the participants emphasized that their common descent as *Chewas* was critical for their trans-border identity and it also explains their motive for integration. In other words, based on the interviews conducted, it emerged that the history of origin of the *Chewa* strongly emphasizes a common origin of the ethnic group. Almost all Chewa key informants and FGDs in all the three countries took time to explain in detail how they migrated from Uluba in present Zaire to their current place of settlement. Although their stories were not always consistent, and in some cases contradicting the well-established historical facts, what normally stood out was their pride in articulating their identity as *bele limodzi* [one family].

Due to historical inconsistencies provided, the findings also agree to some extent, with the observation of some scholars such as Brown (1999) who dispute the objectivity of most ethnic groups' historical accounts. Brown (1999) argues that even those who are pro-traditionalism do not dispute the argument that the common descent claims is not realistic. In this regard, he states that:

> the claims to common kinship are not based solely on the objective cultural traits and the real facts of common ancestry, but rather on the power of the myths and symbols of kinship articulated by the modern poets, historians and politicians who seek to mobilise the people around the nationalist ideology. Some cultural nationalisms claiming ethnic roots are more invented than others, but all refer to the belief, rather than the fact, of common kinship (Brown 1999:289).

In this regard, cultural symbols and history can be deliberately manipulated so as to create ethnic identity and organization thus producing a *consciously constructed* ethnic identity. However, in the context of the *Chewa* ethnic group, this paper goes further and argues that this may not always be a problem because "discussion of history relates not to the past but to the present" or more precisely "history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present" (Eriksen 2002:73). Taking into consideration that historical record capture only a small part of the full account, the process of selecting what is to be recorded encompasses interpretation, reinterpretation and creativity. Consequently, what we normally call historical facts are not necessarily the past but merely "present-day constructions of the past" (Erksen 2002: 73). This doesn't imply that historical accounts are inventions hence not to be taken seriously, but if we take into consideration the process of developing these accounts as highlighted above, we will appreciate that historical accounts are and should be contested. What is paramount is *culture innovativeness* and *creation* which may simply be defined as choosing what is relevant and discarding the irrelevant. It is in this holistic context of development of *Chewa* history, just like other ethnic groups, that its potent must be understood. Through interviews held, pride in common descent, was consistently manifesting as one of the core underlying factor driving the trans-border integration.

7.3 Chewa identity leading towards loss of state sovereignty of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia?

The above observations of porous borders and the ability of *Chewa* identity to express itself without regard to official borders might give the impression that state sovereignty is being undermined. The argument of this paper is that contrary from Kehinde's (2010) perspective,

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the failure of the state to inhibit ethnic identity is not a sign of state weakness but a sign of flexibility on the part of the state by responding to the needs of the communities who are constantly crossing borders to interact on matters which are not a threat to its existence. According to Demirovi´c (2011:38), the question of whether the nation-state has lost power to transnational organisations or not "depends on the concept of the state used to analyses these processes". According to Demirovi´c (2011:38), it is wrong to argue that the state is losing or gaining power but "the way the state exercises its power is changing, meaning it is taking a new form".

Barkey and Parikh (1991:524) argue that earlier research on state was conceptualized in a dichotomized manner: state-centered and society-centered approaches. Barkey and Parikh (1991:524) continue to argue that "Even if this dichotomy was applicable in the past, it seems less relevant today." The state-centered approach takes the Westphalian perspective of the strong state which is absolutely autonomous and acts as it wills. The state-society approach on the other hand takes an empirically-driven perspective that "articulates a more moderate vision of the state's role by embedding it in its societal context" (Barkey and Parikh 1991:525). Barkey and Parikh offer "a third avenue of research" which according to their observation does not deny the central role for the state but contend that status of the relationship between the state on one hand and society on the other is not straight forward but contested. Barkey and Parikh (1991: 526) aptly explain this scenario by arguing that "state-society relations are constantly interacting with each other; these interactions in turn reshape the nature of state autonomy and capacity."

In the case of the *Chewa* trans-border identity, at national level state officials express the Westphalian model rhetoric but at local level, immigration officers take into consideration the state-society relations. Consequently, at top level there is a move towards re-affirmation and demarcation of borders to curb the excesses of local integration. This seemingly contradictory approach to state boarders is actually reinforcing the relevance of the state at international and local level. This is why Nkiwane's (2001: 287) observation that "the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration" becomes valid here.

The unique trans-border arrangement is also a possible limiting factor to threatening state sovereignty of the three countries because the domestic national competition for resources and political power is somehow factored out. The *Chewa* of Malawi does not have the same interests as those of Zambia and Mozambique. If the movement was not trans-border the consciousness towards ethnic identity would supersede the national identity. King Gawa Undi may not be so significant in Zambia due to the relative low number of *Chewa* in that country but he is significant across the boarders because their numbers is higher at that level. The leader of the *Chewa* in Malawi or Mozambique may not be so significant because he has to operate under the authority of King Gawa Undi who is based in Zambia. All in all the way the movement is structured renders itself less politically powerful in the contemporary nation-state context hence does not pose as a threat to sovereignty of the said countries.

8.0 Conclusion

The paper has analyzed the *Chewa* ethnic identity of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in relation to its effect on state sovereignty. The paper argues that contrary from other studies, the trans-border movement does not threaten the sovereignty of the said three countries but the way the state responds to these movements clearly shows its flexibility and responsiveness. Focusing solely on the Westphalian model of the state, it may be concluded that the states are losing sovereignty but going beyond the Westphalian centralist perspective, it may be concluded that the state is seemingly 'weakening' its boarders towards the *Chewa*

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movement while simultaneously re-asserting its boarders in a strategic manner. In other words, contrary from losing sovereignty, the dynamics in these three countries is the reflection of the state flexibility in exercising its power to achieve its own goals. The state therefore lures trans-border ethnic movements such as the *Chewa* by selectively disregarding the Westphalian precepts so as to ensure that they operate according to its preferences or guidance- this should not be regarded as loss of state sovereignty.

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Paper Title: "They'll Burn in Hell." Cross-Border Trade, Transportation and Social Justice from the Margins of the State to Urban Spaces in West Africa

Mariama Khan

12/28/2012

ABSTRACT

Micro-level interactions at the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Niorro border areas of The Gambia and Senegal affect the outcome of macro-level trans-boundary policy and political relations. Using the two border areas as a case study, this paper identifies dynamics of cross-border trade and transportation mediated through notions of social justice as well as the links between what happens at the borders and urban spaces in the Senegambia. By this approach, the paper answers the question "how are micro-level cross-border dynamics linked to macro-level political relations between The Gambia and Senegal from 1960 to date? As new cross-border processes are reconfigured by new trade and transport realities, so too, are cross-border power and political relations. The need to understand how micro-level interactions shape macro-level happenings between the two countries is paramount as discussed in this paper.

The Karang-Amdallai border area continues to be an important cross-border circulation point for goods that have both commercial distinction and strategic value such as cement and cooking gas. The Farafenni-Niorro border constitutes a vibrant hub for the exchange of agricultural goods, which respond to trans-boundary price differentials. As farmers tap into their cross-border social networks to get better bargains for their produce, little attention is paid to cross-border control mechanisms that renders the cross-border exchange of some produce like groundnut subject to state's notions of smuggling. The organic interface between trade and transportation means that as non-state actors subject transportation to disruption through interference, trade is hindered. The consequences of a breakdown in trade flows, as a resulted of border blockages and other

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restrictions, is a stall in market linkages, the business of trading networks, communities in the border area and urban spaces and government. In contrast, the smooth running of the transport corridor facilitates cross-border circulation and the benefits derived from it.

As a conduit of cross-border exchange, micro-level interactions in these border areas create a hybrid political complex that instigates double reactions from the state as a sovereign entity. For example, The Gambia's liberal trade regime is contradicted by "artificial" protectionism that is practiced at the backstage of its national economic policy. Traders, who want monopoly as local "producers" of cement and cooking gas, use un-official channels to protect their trading interests by blocking competition. On the other hand, Senegal's state protectionism of its trading corridor thrives with covert encouragement of slippages that account for "smuggling." The ways in which trade and transport unfold to shape the political temperaments between the two countries as well as mediate notions of social justice between the border and urban space is what this paper investigates. Cross-border trade and transport merge with urban consumption, policy-making, politics and information flow, to reinforce how the borders and urban space constitute spatial continuities that are mutually interdependent and reinforce both local and trans-boundary relations in the Senegambia region.

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1.0: INTRODUCTION

Map showing the location of some of the case study sites between The Gambia and Senegal

The changing importance of borders is emphasized by the dynamic language border studies benefits from. Even in contemporary multi-disciplinary studies, notions of borders assail social and political theory, articulating disciplinary borders but also, political, economic and socio-spatial boundaries. While political geographers are obsessed with state boundaries, postmodernists' engagement with territory and territoriality evaluate the shifts in the importance of boundaries and how these, through narratives and interpretations, influence ideas of socio-spatial identities in a contemporary context (Newman and Paasi, 1998: 188-189). The meanings of borders are changing, so too, are their importance. In trying to engage with the political uncertainties, the sovereignty challenges of the post-colonial African state and the forces of integration and disintegration confronting it, I focus on "boundary narratives and discourses" as one of the four key themes identified in the literature, (Newman and Pasay, 1998: 191) . The future of the nation-state is threatened according to Globalization theorists, (Newman and Passi, 1998). Postmodernist celebrate the end of borders, but the truth is borders in post-colonial Africa continue to proliferate and hold vast significance (Wilson and Donnan, 2012). What happens in borders is critical to nations and states. To cite Nugent (2012)"… border towns provide an excellent insight into how states seek to promote their agenda and how their advances are received, appropriated and very often thwarted," (557-558). What matters in the state derives from the borders and what passes through borders end somewhere that matters. These inform the necessity of borders as subjects of study in especially contemporary Africa where the state is a subject of different kinds of interpretations. "Border studies have become significant themselves because scholars and policy-makers alike have recognized that most things that are

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important to the changing conditions of national and international political economy take place in borderlands…" (Wilson and Donnan, 2012: 1). It is out of these crucial roles of borders as sites for the "new," be it of "new liberties, new movements, new nobilities, new citizenships and new forms of capital, labour and consumption," (Wilson and Donnan, 2012:1), that I investigate cross-border trade, transportation and their links to narratives of social justice from the margins of the state to urban spaces in West Africa. This paper argues that micro-level interactions at the Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Nioro border areas of the Senegambia affect the outcome of macro-level political relations between the The Gambia and Senegal. Cross-border trade and transportation are used as important proxies for political power. This emerges out of the reality that both provided contentious outcomes in higher-level politics between the two countries in different times and for various reasons. Border crossing in the Senegambia region takes place within certain social parameters at the center of which are social narratives that embody local idioms of relation, compromise and exchange. Social justice forms an important ingredient in this Senegambian interpretation of borders. Additionally, in the Senegambia region, the borders have been significant in shaping the political temperaments between The Gambia and Senegal from independence to date (Hughes and Perfect, 2006; Nugent, 2007; Senghor, 2008).

The Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Nioro borders are important conduits of trade and significant corridors for solidifying kinship relations. As border-urban bridges, they link the margins to urban spaces including the centers of power and politics, Banjul and Dakar. The borders relate to urban space in terms of consumption, policy, politics and

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information flows. Thus, the significant contribution this work makes to the literature is re-imagining the borders as contours of continuity with urban space, citing the urban inspiration of border administration as proceeds are funneled through the national accounts that build the economic capacity of the state. In this re-imagination of the borders, their function as a bridge to public celebrations notably religious functions in the Senegambia is outstanding. I make three generalizations here of the Senegambia borders: First, the Senegambian borders are sites of production that facilitate consumption in urban spaces. Commodities that passed through the borders are not all consumed in border towns and villages. Urban spaces become the final destination of some of these commodities. Where consumption is differentiated between legal and illicit goods, urban spaces still dominate as significant consumers of what passed through the borders. In terms of illicit goods, among them drugs, cannabis, stolen cattle, etc., border people hardly have the economic wherewithal needed for the purchase and consumption of such illegal goods. The majority of the clientele for the consumption of such goods are urban resident. Secondly, patterns of border-crossing and border appropriation force creative responses from the urban-based Headquarters of border administration agencies. For example, new Custom posts are set up to follow the trails of alternative routes border crossers devise. Through discoveries like this, border experiences direct policy from urban headquarters as well as the politics of government. Both The Gambia and Senegal have economies that are heavily depended on tax. So they are forced to follow the money wherever it tries to escape national coffers. Thirdly, Commercial networks in spite of their "informality" are ahead of government in the game, as such they have some monopoly of information. This becomes a political tool which government is forced to

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recognize as well as borrows in negotiating trans-boundary relations. Here, informality is both efficient and political.

This paper presents narratives of border experiences derived from ongoing research on the Senegambian borders. It highlights how such border narratives shape policy as well as political processes at urban spaces, which represent the spirit and the inner circle of political power in the state. In the Senegambia, social and political borders shape trans-boundary relations. A bottom-up diagonal flow of border experiences generates responses from the state as it follows development in border appropriation. This is the opposite of the relationship between the post-colonial African state and the International market and supply chain systems, to which the state in Africa becomes a weakened recipient of events. Information flows top-down from the world trade systems to the developing country. In contrast to cross-border trade and transportation regimes where information flows bottom-up, leading to responses from the state as a sovereign to control border appropriation. An untoward parallel of the International trade systems relating to the state and the borders relating to the state is that, while the state appeal to fair trade within world market structures, the borders call for social justice from the state. I make the above comparison between the world market structures and the state vis-à-vis the state and borders, just as a passing mention, with no intention to dwell on it further in this paper. I rather concentrate on the borders, and the state, which are the focus of the discussion here. I will show how concepts of social justice and border experiences shape national policy as well as trans-boundary policies of The Gambia and Senegal, in relation to each other.

The interviews that will be discussed here, as sources of the narratives explored here, were collected between November and December, 2012. I sent questions to a research assistant in The Gambia, who administered them through structured and semi-structured interviews. He sent me the responses and later upon my request, made follow-up visits with the interviewees to clarify issues where necessary. Through skype voice calls and by telephone, I conducted the rest of the interviews. Given that the data collection is ongoing, the narratives here are critical but patchy as the sample size I am drawing my data from is very limited. Hence, a reader can sense the gap in the narrative structure of the paper. However, I tried as best as possible to fill that gap with a description as well as an explanation of border phenomena in these sites, pending the collection of complete data that will give the full picture of this research findings.

The structure of the paper is based on first the Introduction, which discusses the relations between the borders, urban space and the state. The second part of the paper deals with a survey of the trade and transport corridors in the Amadallia-Karang and Farafenni-Niorro borders areas. I describe and explain border phenomena, lacing literature to connect the happenings in these sites to key themes in contemporary borderland studies. The fourth part deals with field findings relating to cross-border trade, transportation and the notions of social justice that play into national policy and moderate or negatively affect cross-border political relations between the two countries. As part of this, the way these reflect on urban spaces is also explored. The final part of the paper is the conclusion. Now, I proceed with the survey of the two border areas.

1.1: A SURVEY OF THE AMDALLAI-KARANG AND FARRAFENNI-NIORRO BORDER AREAS OF THE SENEGAMBIA

Amdallai, which like Farrfenni is in North Bank Region of The Gambia, borders Karang, which is Senegalese territory. The Amdallai- Karang border provides direct link to the two capital cities, Banjul and Dakar. The Amdallai-Karang border has been the main trade route for the re-export trade in Banjul. Re-export trade has been a major contributor to The Gambia's GDP. Even though The Gambia still gains significant amounts in re-export trade, the volumes of trade has deteriorated as a result of Senegalese capture and the Chinese manufacturing presence in Dakar. State agencies are present on both sides of the border, like at the Farrafenni-Niorro border. Private transports, public private transports, government vehicles and lorries carrying goods are a constant presence in the border area. Informal economic actors are also visible at the borders.

Farafenni is the regional capital of The Gambia's north bank region. Its last border village to Senegal is Ker Aly village, whose founder was a brother to the founder of Ker Ayib village, which is located on the Senegalese side of the border, Niorro. Sharing of resources such as a cemetery and health facilities prevail in this location, (Tandia, 2010). This border leads to the Bamba Tenda-Yeli- Tenda ferry crossing, which is frequently utilized by both commercial and private transport owners and other travelers as they travel from Senegal to The Gambia or, from north Senegal to the Casamance. In recent years, road networks around the Farefenni area have improved. Its role as an important trading hub had multiplied. With frequent *lumos (weekly markets)* all over its vicinities, trade is an important aspect of life along the border. Senegalese merchants come into

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Farafenni to buy goods and agricultural produces, to transport them to Senegal. These produces can come as far as Kaur in the Central River Region of The Gambia. With two ferry services running the Bantenda-YelliTenda crossing, delays or breakdowns in the ferry service leads to lot of inconvenience to users. The high transaction cost that is associated with delays in traffic flows has been the advocacy base for the Trans-Gambia /ECOWAS Super Highway Bridge project[1].

Elements of "integration from below" "occurring on the margins of official institutions, through sociocultural solidarities and interstate commercial networks," (Mbembe, 2012:262) are observable in the high traffic flows at both the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Niorro border areas. In the latter, farmers across the borders help one another to market their produce especially groundnut, depending on which side of the border pays more for the produce. The exchange of marketing information and other cross-border contacts are routine. Through the agency of commercial networks in these areas, collaboration for the pursuit of better pay for produces becomes a tool of social justice. Reward for their labour is increased in the bargain options that they can tap through their networks. The process of selling produce across the borders has its own legal limits. For the farmer with cross-border ties, what becomes a matter of social justice is on the other hand, an infringement of border control laws, in this case smuggling. Smuggling exemplifies border subversion, but also aspects of *social citizenship* (Basavapatna, 2012) whereby people depend on their trans-boundary kinship and associational networks. Englund (2002) depicts how refugees on the Mozambique-

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[1] The African Development Bank is funding the Trans-Gambia Highway Bridge Project. Work on it is expected to start in 2012.

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Malawi border comfortably interacted with their kin on both sides of the border. The border is a link, a line of continuity and inclusion, instead of a barrier. This can be typical of many contemporary border settings in Africa. Where price differentials and tariff polices are distinct, smuggling across the border is an easy alternative. Husken and Klute (2010:109) note "…borderlands can be regarded as spheres where historical and contemporary forms of non-state politics and networks are hardly regulated or controlled by national or international regimes, and where opportunities for non-state political actors are manifold." Thus, given that borders represent the contestations of material and conceptual boundaries where state, nation and local identities need to converge (McGregor, 2009), different forces of power and interests shape relations along them. However, state control of non-state actors and networks at the borders, like border surveillance, remains tenuous in post-colonial Africa.

In the Senegambia, the *psychological existence* of the social groups projected in the community and social narratives of the population (Risse, 2010) give rise to uncomplicated identities that are imagined but also come from close blood ties, history of migration and dispersion of groups in the region. Based on this psychological existence, border crossing is termed as a matter of obligation because both people across the borders are *mboka*[2], which means kinsmen, partitioned by a colonial history, (Asiawju, 1985). Hence the high prevalence of social citizenship ensures spatial socialization (Paasi quoted in Zeller, 2010), which contradicts the bordering processes of the two states (Coplan, 2012) through social spatialization and territorialization represented by the enforcement

2 Mboka is a wollof word can be also written as mbokh, with the pronunciation of the a at the end as used by Gambian wollof speakers. It means kinsman.

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of the border controls. While integration from below persists, so too are the challenges to national acts of border administration.   While the ordinary people see justice in being able to pass across with whatever is legal without any harassment from state authorities, the state is adamant with ensuring that border crossers in the Senegambia follow rules and regulations in place. But as Coplan (2012) notes, border crossing has its own performance highlights, so too, is the enforcement in the Senegambia region, where border administrators can be influenced by social notions that accord special privileges for border crossing. Below, I examine how such idioms of belonging, relations, exchange and notions of social justice get played out in the context of the borders.

1.2: SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND TRANSPORT IN THE SENEGAMBIA

In the Senegambia region, experiences of border crossing like in transactions at urban centers never fail to project local idioms of compromise, belonging and relations and exchange.   A Senegalese douane told me in 2011 along the Karang- Dakar route that, "In our work, we are careful about apprehending three people: the diplomat, intellectual and the mara…' a shortened form for the word marabout. This was after I resolved a small impasse with him, when he insisted that he was not convinced that my personal professional video camera, which I had with me, was not going to be put on sale in Dakar. He asked me to leave the camera with him, because it is an expensive item, I cannot carry along with me. After showing him evidence that it was not for sale, showing him the receipt, which I stumbled across in my search for evidence from my hand back. I told him as a documentary filmmaker, I need the camera; hence I recently bought it from the USA. But he was adamant. People in the seven passenger public transport called me

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aside and told me,"*Sohnasi*[3], give him some money and let him not waste our time. Night

fall will find us on the way." I insisted to them I was not going to give him money. And I

was prepared to stay with my camera as long as he wants to keep us. But in the end, a

friend from Dakar intervened and he let me leave with my camera, which I still have.

Apart from the possibility to links to power, his statement echoes sociological idioms

for *khelifa*[4] and *teranga*[5], two concepts with strong social significance in the Senegambia.

The intellectual is trusted, the diplomat respected and honoured like the marabout.

Regarded as khelifa, persons of good standing, they should be shown teranga, which

means welcome and honour and therefore deserve smooth passage. In a very basic form,

it is like the smooth passage a diplomatic passport can facilitate for you in even Western

airports. On the same journey, a distraught passenger, a man well-traveled in Africa and

other parts of the world, narrated his encounters with Customs officials in West Africa,

concluding that, "the douanes of Senegal, the Customs of the Gambie and the ones of

Bissau are same, same. They'll all burn in hell!" The conversation in the car bashed

Customs workers especially the ones from a certain region of Senegal who are believed

to be well fortified by the occult and therefore aggressively pursue self-accumulation

along the borders. The conversation highlighted a certain social myth, in Senegambia,

that at the end of the month when government pays customs people their

Salaries, it puts a box of matches on top of their pays, a symbolic token of their

profession, meaning when they die they will go to hell. This social myth flavoured in

3 A wollof word which means lady

4 A wollof word which stands for an elder, a person of honour

5 A wollof word that could mean respect, honour, or welcome

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religious beliefs projects ideas of retribution for an ungodly work represented by the work of Customs or the Douane. A rather common whining of passengers along the Gambia-Senegal borders is that "…now the route is sour, full of exhaustion and wickedness. The douane take everything from you. And they want your money too." This implies that there are people in these case border control agents who are bent on making what is supposed to be a simple, easy journey across the borders, a tough, heartless affair. Since God is always on the side of the people, the others will be punished for their wrong against the people. Social justice becomes a solace to the perceived difficulties in border crossing. Another spectrum of the retribution is that the "Customs or Duane man never ends well. In old age, they are *futeh*[6]*."* God degrades them when they retire. Their former wealth is lost and they die in penury. A sense of "…the collective hostilities to Customs men…" (Nugent, 2002: 99) is evident in the different border crossing experiences people share about the Senegambia borders.   The people in the Chad Basin use the language of rights to assert their economic claims or repudiate their fiscal relation to the state (Roitman, 2005). In contrast, in the Senegambia region, the language of social justice predominates in border settings and urban centers too.   In this social justice milieu, the role of the duty bearer has many faces: the state, civil society, or non-state actors and the individual. Notion of social justice pervades the social psyche that even if individuals fail to abide by its inclinations, its sense still lurks behind their subconscious.

In the public transport sector, social justice motivations are discernible, even where

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6 A wollof word that means not to end well or to be decrepitated

transporters are self-interest oriented. A cross-border transporter, talking about cross-border transportation challenges in the Senegambia said,

> The Gambia and Senegal have different laws….Our union decided that we stop at the Senegalese border… Gambian transporters too will disembark passengers at their side of the border….because of the different charges in the two countries and the unfair treatment. Before, we paid for the ECOWAS permit, which gives us equal access to both borders, but this was not fair to the Senegalese transporters who pay another permit in Senegal costing about D4000. Gambian transporters only pay D1000 for the same permit in The Gambia. Why should both of us enjoy the same free movement when we pay different rates?[7]

References to social justice are reflected in words like "unfair treatment", "different rates", "equal; access" and even the terminal points for the respective Gambian and Senegalese transports. A more formal approach to concerns of cross-border transporters leans on the merits of ECOWAS policies in terms of the rationalization for the harmonization of policies whether in the form of terminal management in this case what the transporters tried to do,   logistics and access to market systems, currency exposures and non-tariff barriers which include perceptions of social justice in cross-border trade and transportation. Formal approaches predicated on rules that are almost always well written with strong neo-liberal flavours, but hardly ever fully-enforced, are desirable to norm setting and International business lobbies. However, because they lack relevant

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7 Interview conducted in November, 2012 at the Giboroh-Seleti border

cultural nuances, the policy reform agendas of border administration in West Africa fail to tackle what it considers anomalies such as "informality" in cross-border transactions. Ethos of social justice is camouflaged in different shades as one transporter highlighted…

In the beginning, we dropped passengers at the borders and they walked the distance to the other garage. We realized that some passengers, especially nursing mothers, suffered to make the distance. We later negotiated and agreed among ourselves that Gambian transporters can now go up to the other side to drop passengers but they return empty. Senegalese drivers can also drive up to the Gambian side to drop passengers, they too will return empty. The communities suffered in the initial plan….

The justice for the communities becomes to alleviate their suffering by making certain concessions among themselves as transporters. The expectant woman, the old, the sick and children become the considerations for the bequeathing of such justice. A conciliatory treatment to these categories of people derives from a cultural sanction that is not unique to the Senegambia region, but has a strong currency in socialization processes in the region. *Cheral magg, nyerem gigeehen ak guneyeh.* Honour the aged, and protect the women and children. The cultural sensitivities lacking in formal rules and regulations, get validated in informal processes as this. The political geography of the transnational landscape is forced to mimic the social geography of the region. If good fences make good neighbours, kinship ties circumvent and permeate the thickest of walls and strongest of fences. Kinship ties considerations get to the heart of this struggle for

fair play in border-crossing and border appropriation vis-à-vis transporters and the general population. The history of different colonial rule has not dis-stabilised the Senegambia region's tradition of proximate community vibes which despite various forms of social transition in the region, endures, It can be argued that it reflects a personal society that has levels of actor embeddedness which negotiates social and community interactions, business and politics in the region. The possibility of crossing unrestricted is a social justice issue for the people who have to reach across the borders for family ties and other reasons. While politicians pursue their interests, ordinary people's cries emphasise familial relations between the two countries. This forces the politicians to work on softening the border, by making ordinary crossing possible for the masses. Social justice from the margins has its way in urban space. For example in the transport sector, passengers decry exploitative transporters who seem to love fare hikes. In return, the transporters social justice claim is on the state, as they query its exploitative tax, duty and other financial regulatory regimes, which transporters in urban space have to face, too. Since someone has to pay for the cost in the business logic, urban commuters become the victim. In public transports and other ordinary public spheres, these conversations are routine. Benefits of a social mores obtained from strong traditions of orality, what happens at the borders whether in transport or trade is a miniature of the links between production, exchange and state systems in West Africa. Another driver highlights another aspect of social justice that, "I don't know of any major problems as a cross-border transporter, once you possess valid papers and gives the border officials the respect that is due to them." Respect is something you as a border crosser owe to border agents, but not just that, as another driver revealed, "…since countries differ, in each

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check point, whether The Gambia, Senegal or Guinea, we stop and the security agents check our transport and the transporter gives then D50 or D100 at check points. This is between the transporters and the security agents…." In this version of social justice, the transporter owes something to the border agent after confirming the correctness of his papers. This becomes the realm where business is between the driver and the state agent, yet the act is legitimized by the two actors based on their views of what is just in that transaction between them, even if it contravenes the rules in the book. A retired driver who has been in cross-border transportation since 1950 noted, "We transport passengers and their luggage but not goods. When goods reach the borders, customs officials take them. Goods are carried by Trucks." Here too, a sense of the expectation comes out. But at the bottom of all these are culturally nuanced interpretations that get twisted here and there, from sociological   metaphors of *maslaha*[8] and j*apaleh*[9]., which are terms that are fairly common in border crossing narratives. In the transport sector, references to social justice are commonplace in the same way they are in contacts with border administrative agents.   But where does political economy stand in this spectrum of sociological reinterpretations of values based on certain social norms? This is what I will explore in the next section.

1.3: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS

In the 80s and early 90s, the competitiveness of The Gambia's re-export trade was heartwarming to advocates of neoliberalism and free market policies. The World Bank

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8 Maslaha means compromise

9 Japaleh is a wollof word which means help, support or giving a hand

identified the country as a pilot gateway project at the height of government reforms that saw the initiation of The Banjul Ports Gateway Project, broad-based divestiture through The Gambia Divestiture Agency (GDA) and investment friendly climate totted under The Gambia Investment Promotion and Free Zone Agency (GIPZA). The 1994 military coup derailed such and many other government projects as the country faced sanctions for what donors and multi-lateral partners termed digression from democracy. World Bank funds allocated to the Gateway Project were diverted to Ghana, which became the pilot site for the Trade Gateway Project. Meanwhile, the Senegalese government which has been relentless for the capture of The Gambia's re-export trade continued with its intelligence gathering through the deployment of its economic intelligence agents who invaded the Banjul Ports studying the Gambia's booming import and re-export industry. Senegalese counter measures against the efficiency at the Banjul Ports included boosting the Dakar-Bamako trade route, since even Malian importers were using Banjul as the entry points for their goods or coming to buy goods from Banjul. Senegal constructed warehouses along the borders with Mali. With good transport facilities provided, it worked on ensuring a quick turnaround time for the clearance system for goods imported into the country or goods designed for re-export to Mali. In a bid to overtake The Gambia in the re-export business, non-tariff barriers such as delaying trucks and other transports carrying goods from The Gambia to other trading partners including Mali, Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry became unusual as Senegal tried to frustrate Gambian re-export trade. Under The Gambia's re-export regime, licensing processes for import and export were less cumbersome than Senegal. Goods designed for re-export trade were transported by Gambian transporters, to their final destination. Processing

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times for these were very quick and predictable. They were given Customs escorts to the final destination, after clearing the Port Charges and the token transit levies that were due to Government.

It is in the context of this attempt to capture the re-export trade that the political relations between the two countries grew more and more dis-affective, especially following the end of the Senegambia confederation in 1989. Disaffective political relations manifested in the borders as well as trans-boundary political "hard talks" as the governments of both countries struggle with balancing the aged old social ties between the two countries with their political interests. I explore a few incidences of the political difficulties between the two countries, which to a large extent have some links to the borders.

In 2008, The Gambia played Senegal in Dakar as part of the CAF under 17-football tournament. Fans of The Gambia's national team, the Scorpions, were after the match, attacked by Senegalese football hooligans. Others took refuge in Senegalese homes while some Senegalese people cared for the beaten and wounded. Gambian youth in Banjul and other places retaliated by destroying some properties belonging to Senegalese traders in The Gambia. The police and ordinary Gambians restrained the youth, with some Gambian families protecting Senegalese traders and their properties during the crisis.

In 2005, members of the Senegalese transport association closed the border between Giboro (western Gambia) and Seleti (southern Senegal) on grounds that Gambian authorities constantly harass Senegalese drivers who ply the Giboro-Seleti road. Around 2009, the Amdallai (north Gambia) -Karang (north- west Senegal) border was closed

because of political disagreements between the two countries. In 2010, there was a rare verbal confrontation between the two countries when an arms shipment from Iran was intercepted in Nigeria. The Senegalese government believed the arms shipment which was allegedly destined to The Gambia, was for Casamance rebels. The Senegalese government nurtures suspicions that The Gambia supports rebels in its southern border in their secession struggle. The Gambia also alleges that Senegal harbours and supports Gambian dissidents who plan to unseat the Jammeh government.

For reasons like the above, border blockages between the two countries reoccurred between 1960-2012. In crisis moments, relations are very tense; however, efforts follow to de-escalate tensions. The incidences noted above are examples of manifestations of difficult cross-border political relations between the two countries. After establishing how what happens at the borders links to the macro-level political situation, we now explore the other aspect of my argument, which is the link between the borders and urban space, zooming tighter on trade and non-state actors.

1.4: THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS AND URBAN SPACE

The Trans-Gambia Bridge project, which is a long courted project that will see the Farafenni-Niorro ferry crossing, bridged as part of a major ECOWAS/ADB and partner governments Infrastructural project . It is expected to improve inter-African cross-border trade and mobility in the Senegambia. The Trans-Gambia Bridge will be a major change changer in trans-boundary relations between The Gambia and Senegal and it will set new dynamics to the border-urban space links. Though, what will be different between the two countries in the nearest future, following the completion of the bridge, can only be

speculated now. But what is certain is the bridge will come with changes. At present, 90 of the access in the transport corridor at the Farrafenni-Niorro ferry crossing comprise of Senegalese fleets. Currently, there are 87 security points between the borders. But the Bridge will change this through the institution of joint Police, Customs and Immigration checkpoints and there is the possibility for other shared border administration technologies. An important commitment of the parties in Article 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding notes Parties undertake to,

☞ Refrain from taking any unilateral actions under exigent circumstances likely to obstruct the free flow of goods and persons on the regional corridors and ensure that only competent Government authorities take such action and as provided for under relevant ECOWAS regulations.

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☞ Enhance cooperation between road transport carriers of the Parties and Government departments responsible for regulating road transportation with a view to achieving the objectives of this Memorandum of Understanding

☞ Inform ECOWAS of any impediments to the smooth movement of persons and goods across the regional corridors

Article 13 notes ECOWAS responsibilities among other things as

☞ Enhance border transit procedures impacting on the functioning of the Joint Border Posts, such as "interconnection of national customs databases",

"international guarantee", "sealing road vehicles," and "tracking of road vehicles"
to enable the ISRT[10] to be effectively implemented…

Evidently, transport is an issue of social justice and therefore the movement of people and goods must not be hindered. It is perceivable that The Gambia stresses as a key policy concern, non-interference by non-state actors given the history of the Senegalese Transporters Association's disruption of cross-border flows through unilateral, surprising border blockages. The concern arises from practical realities arising from a border blockage such as the disruption of many urban processes in both The Gambia and Senegal. The Amdallai-Karang border sees significant cement and gas imports into The Gambia. Between November 22nd, 2011 to October 4th, 2012, 2, 384, 518.95 kilograms of gas featured in the Border import statistics database for only that side of the border. For cement imports from Senegal, the Amdallai border registered 1, 536, 000.00 kilograms of cement from December 12th, 2011 to March 30th, 2012. Again, this reflects on imports through Amdallai only, and not Farrafenni, Basse, and other border areas. Cement as both an input and strategic good finds its way to urban centers to bolster the Gambia's booming urban construction industry. GAMCEM, a local cement "producing" company competes with Senegalese imported cement, yet the government given the importance of cement has no policy restrictions on cement imports. However, my interviewee from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, noted local producers can potentially do non-tariff manipulations, through deals with some customs agents to frustrate arriving cement imports from Senegal by pressuring their clearance procedures.

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10 ISRT means Inter-States Road Transit

Gas as an essential commodity faces zero taxation like clothing, whereas fuel benefits from import subsidies as an important input and output good. The links between gas and environment protection partly informs Gambia government policy as fossil gas helps to protect the environment because "every gas used is a tree saved." Majority users of gas for cooking purposes are resident in urban centers of The Gambia. In respect of Senegal, the importation of fruits and other vegetables from The Gambia especially from the lumos of Farrafenni and also from Cassamance through the Gambia to Northern Senegal end up being consumed by urban dwellers. Groundnut imports from The Gambia also end up in urban centers and through urban spaces to overseas if they are destined for re-export. While patterns of urban consumption of goods arriving through the borders may differ given the nature of the good involve, the economic benefits national treasuries of both countries derive from the flows across the borders are fairly the same. Customs duties where applicable are collected on goods and are channeled to the account systems of the urban based Government Revenue headquarters. For even transportation, payable fees and duties are mostly paid in Banjul or Dakar, with possibilities to pay these in sub-posts in regions under a decentralized mechanism. Wherever the place of payments, the end of funds accrued from cross-border administration and control activities end up in the national treasuries, safe where graft has its hands.

How patterns of border crossing and appropriation do forced policy responses from National Border Administrative headquarters in the Senegambia? Official border entry and exit roads in the Senegambia have unofficial back-roads which traders and border crossers can use to either dodge official presence or control or to minimize costs of

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border crossing. Practices of border crossers nurture informality, which has social succor in the Senegambia region. The practices of using back-roads, which are normally short cuts too, have been an important part of social mobility. For example, there is always a "straight" road to the farms and the back-road, which is the quickest but normally passes through offside paths, or forested pathways that lead to several mazes before getting to the final destination. Cross-border traders not only tend to have perfect knowledge of the market, but also knowledge of back-roads ahead of border administration. In effect, traders are the repositories of the knowledge on market operations. What the informal knows may elude the formal; hence the formal depends on the informal to be at breast with operational and other practices in the market. Partly, out of this reality, border administration tend to shadow the workings of transnational networks, gathering intelligence on the "new" happening beyond their know. Border administration may be a seriously paralysed function if not for the dependence on informality for knowledge on market operations and other cross-border flows, (Nugent, 2002; Roitman, 2005; Chalfin, 2010). The recent setting up of new customs posts in some off-path areas by the Gambia Revenue authority's customs unit as well as some new local outputs for the National Drug Enforcement Agency are attempts to follow dynamism in border crossing and appropriation. About 4o back-roads exists in one border location according to a driver interviewee. The same can be said of the Senegalese douane posts that can sometimes rear up their heads unexpectedly along the borders, as they battle with smugglers. Information gathering becomes an important part of policy formulation. The commercial networks control exchange and to some extent production. As economic beings, the lives of the officials are tied to that space of production and exchange. As

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Simone and Abouhani (2005:7) "The national economy thus becomes increasingly a patchwork of highly informalized and disconnected activities that provide an important underpinning- not only of ordinary livelihoods, … Critical transactions- and thus intersections –among social classes, domestic and transnational private entrepreneurial networks , and public officials-increasingly take place out of view." With difficult state oversight on activities along the borders, border enforcement agencies have to negotiate with commercial networks that mediate the exchange and production through the borders. As negotiation and mediation work together informality is entrenched as a by-product of the human influences that permeate this space of relations. This becomes the bases of new norms that way contradict other norms of the state, but are indispensable in the smooth carrying out of the duties of border administration especially in controlling contrabands. Border control processes therefore exhibit a human face, a human logic and a human safe guard. Therefore to be effective, border administration has to be a dynamic function that depends on creativity and constant policy review or adjustment to have more effective control processes. Now, after highlighting the arguments of the paper, I proceed to the conclusion.

1.5: CONCLUSION

In the Senegambia region, cross-border trade and transportation are mediated through border crossing narratives that communicate idioms of relation, compromise and exchange within local notions of social justice. Borders are not isolated peripheries in trans-boundary relations, but are connected to urban spaces through the different flows that pass through them and end up in urban space. Consumption, policy, politics and information flows merge the borders with urban space. Whereas mobility is crucial to

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processes of outreach between borders and urban space, the transport sector becomes not only a vehicle literally that facilitates mobility and access between these two spatial settings, but it also acts as a metaphorical conduit for the socialization and practicing of local norms of social justice under different shades and guises. Trade becomes a heartthrob for commercial networks and border enforcement agencies as stakeholders are forced to negotiate and mediate relations to ensure that actors are able to move across and carry out their duties. Politicians get dragged into these necessary compromises to ensure working borders and crossable borders. In short, social forces can mediate trans-boundary relations, pulling politicians along, to the extent that a shared common goal for working borders is enacted in the national vision.

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L'apport de l'approche biographique dans l'étude des commerçants frontaliers ouest-africains

Moustapha Koné
Doctorant

Université de Bordeaux et Université de Niamey
moustapha.kone@ceps.lu

ABORNE Winter School, 2013

Abstract

Using professional biographies to understand border traders

The aim of this paper is to present the methodology adopted in our PhD thesis '*West Africans traders in borders markets: Building a business community'*. In our work we use professional biographies to collect valuable qualitative information on large border traders in two border regions in West Africa located between Niger, Benin and Nigeria. Biographical information are used to document the factors that drive West African traders to leave their original areas and establish businesses in border areas, the patterns of these migrations, and the foundations of contemporary business communities in border areas. When studying large traders engaged in cross-border trade we are particularly interested in their past, present and future activities. The paper also presents some of the difficulties that arose in the data collection, notably because most traders are reluctant to discuss their illegal or informal business activities. We show how such difficulties have been partially overcome by interacting and building trust with our actors over a prolonged period of time.

1. Introduction

Depuis les années 1980, une littérature croissante a montré l'importance du commerce informel dans les économies des Etats ouest-africains notamment dans les villes secondaires de l'Afrique au sud du Sahara (Grégoire 1986, Meagher 2003, Nassa 2005, Boluvi 2004, Walther 2006). Il a été démontré que les villes frontalières sont des espaces de concentration des productions agricoles régionales (céréales notamment le mais, le sorgho, les tubercules comme la patate douce, l'igname) ainsi que des marchés de transit des flux en provenance des marchés mondiaux (Walther 2006). Cette situation donne une importance particulière aux villes frontalières et favorise le développement des réseaux économiques transfrontaliers. Ainsi la ville frontalière apparaît comme le lieu par excellence où le rôle de l'informel particulièrement important en Afrique de l'Ouest est le mieux perçu car mettant en liaison deux modes d'exploitation de l'espace : production et circulation (Retaillé, Walther 2008).

Ces dynamiques précédemment exposées sont particulièrement visibles dans les deux cas d'étude retenus dans ce travail: Kamba-Gaya-Malanville et Birni'Konni-Illéla situées entre le Niger, le Bénin et le Nigeria, où se côtoient les deux modes d'exploitation de l'espace sahélien, et qui font face aujourd'hui à un accroissement de l'importance du flux et à l'émergence d'une classe de riches commerçants porteuse de profonds changements. En effet, depuis quelques années, ces villes connaissent une certaine vitalité économique observable à travers l'importance des activités commerciales, le flux des marchandises en transit, la construction de villas et de magasins, l'ouverture de succursales de banques ou de compagnies de transport. Les commerçants de la zone frontalière tirent profit de cette situation et font transiter de grandes quantités de produits au Nigeria. Le Nigeria, soucieux de protéger son tissu industriel, contrairement aux autres pays comme le Niger, le Bénin, le Burkina réglemente l'accès à son marché pour certains produits comme les voitures d'occasion et les textiles, la friperie, ou la farine de blé (Galtier et Tassou 1998, Boluvi 2004).

Ce travail vise à présenter la méthode adaptée pour réaliser une thèse de doctorat, s'insérant dans un projet de recherche intitulé CROSSTRADE : Informal Trade and Cross-Border Intégration in West Africa. L'utilisation de cette méthode qualitative vise à compléter les méthodes quantitatives de CROSSTRADE en fournissant des éléments permettant d'approfondir les connaissances sur les grands commerçants. Il s'agit de renseigner le parcours biographique de grands commerçants des zones frontalières.

Cette communication s'est largement inspirée des travaux sur le récit biographique d'auteurs comme Yves (2005), Demazière (2003), Bertaux (1980), Tichit (2000),

Kaufmann(2007). Elle aborde l'introduction, la revue de la littérature, les objectifs de cette étude, puis expose la méthode de la thèse objet de cette communication et enfin donne un aperçu sur l'identité des grands commerçants des zones frontalières.

2. Revue de la littérature

2.1. Le débat autour de la frontière

La circulation transfrontalière a été diversement interprétée dans la littérature, les auteurs alternent entre deux positions bien opposées : celle qui considère le commerce transfrontalier comme une opportunité et envisage la frontière comme une ressource aussi bien pour les populations que pour les Etats, à l'image des'' Etats entrepôts[1]'' comme le Bénin où le Togo (Igué et Soulé 1992) ou des pays sahéliens comme le Niger. Dans ces pays les recettes douanières engendrées par les échanges transfrontaliers constituent une part importante des budgets nationaux. Ainsi, selon Grégoire (1992 :158), *« cette frontière, par les contraintes et les disparités qu'elle instaure, apparaît davantage comme un adjuvant aux échanges qu'un obstacle et reste encore aux yeux des populations, notamment en pays haoussa, bien artificielle »*. Utilisant une approche géographique et anthropologique, l'auteur analyse la logique et les stratégies commerciales des groupes ethniques notamment celles des commerçants haoussa (Grégoire 1986) ou encore des communautés marchandes d'Agadez (Grégoire 2009).

L'autre approche considère le commerce transfrontalier comme un élément perturbateur de l'intégration régionale voir (Meagher 2010). Certains auteurs ne partagent pas cette vision et mettent l'accent sur le caractère plutôt déstructurant de la frontière. (Bach 1994, 2008) par exemple, a montré les limites des échanges transfrontaliers en mettant l'accent sur principalement deux points : d'une part, il pense que les échanges transfrontaliers contrairement à une opinion répandue sont moins l'expression d'une ignorance des frontières héritées de la colonisation que la conscience d'opportunités crées par cette frontière. D'autre part les flux sont moins liés à des complémentarités écologiques ou entre système de production qu'aux disparités fiscales, douanières, monétaires, ou de politiques économiques fruits de l'héritage colonial. Sur la base de ce constat, l'auteur pense que le régionalisme

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[1] Pour profiter au mieux de leur position géographique, littoraux ,voisins de pays sahéliens enclavés, le Bénin et le Togo ont adapté une politique qui vise à importer de grandes quantités de produits très largement au dessus de leurs besoins pour les réexporter vers les pays voisins d'où l'appellation de d'Etats entrepôts. A cette situation avantageuse, s'ajoute pour le Bénin, la proximité du Nigeria avec son imposant marché de plus de cent millions.

transétatique ne peut pas permettre l'émergence de nouveaux ensembles par conséquent, il a un effet déstructurant sur le processus d'intégration régionale. Dans la même ligne, certains travaux de Meagher (1996) remettent en cause l'idée selon laquelle ce commerce permet aux populations de s'affranchir de la frontière et prend ses distances avec l'approche empirico-historique du commerce transfrontalier. Ce faisant, elle montre que le commerce parallèle est entretenu par de puissants lobbies qui s'opposent à toute idée d'intégration qui risquerait de nuire à leurs intérêts. Ainsi à l'opposé des auteurs qui s'attachent à mettre en valeur les effets positifs des frontières, elle met plutôt l'accent sur le caractère déstructurant du commerce transfrontalier et pense qu'il est impossible de construire l'intégration régionale en s'appuyant sur les acteurs du commerce transfrontalier (Meagher 1996: 15). Certains travaux d'économistes mettent l'accent plutôt sur les effets négatifs des échanges transfrontaliers pour les Etats : manque à gagner fiscal, une concurrence déloyale pour les entreprises nationales, le renforcement de la nature rentière de l'Etat, l'accélération de la désintégration étatique, la routinisation du contournement des règles, une faible marge de manœuvre etc. (Bennefla 1999 :26). Selon le même auteur, l'Etat, dépassé par l'ampleur des échanges, subit plus qu'il ne contrôle le commerce transfrontalier. Ce foisonnement d'activités constaté au niveau de certains postes frontaliers menacerait l'Etat dans une des ses fonctions de base notamment le contrôle territorial.

Aujourd'hui la question sur les frontières est orientée vers leurs apports dans le développement économique des villes frontalières et au-delà leur rôle dans le processus régional d'intégration Walther (2008: 34). La frontière est perçue comme un espace d'opportunités multiples, pour tous les acteurs.

2.2. Attractivité des espaces frontaliers et rôles des diasporas

Les espaces frontaliers sont donc des espaces partagés entre plusieurs constructions nationales et revêtent un sens particulier pour les pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Ils constituent des marchés où des lieux de rencontre qui offrent la possibilité aux marchands de constituer des regroupements qui évoluent vers des communautés d'affaires (où diasporas urbaines). Le rôle des grands commerçants, qui disposent d'informations stratégiques et sont en mesure d'exploiter ces différentiels de façon optimale, est alors déterminant dans la circulation des productions, des intrants et des produits d'où l'intérêt de les étudier.

Jusqu'ici, la littérature a considéré le commerce transfrontalier, les marchés frontaliers et la construction de communautés marchandes frontalières de manière disjointe. Il n'existe pas d'études sur le commerce transfrontalier qui s'intéressent spécifiquement aux diasporas commerçantes installées aux frontières. La plupart des études se sont focalisées sur les communautés commerçantes installées dans des pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et non sur les frontières. Ces études ont largement renseigné la façon dont elles se comportent dans la pratique des affaires. Ainsi, on peut citer les travaux sur la communauté mandé établie à Bouna en Côte d'Ivoire (Boutillier 1971), les commerçants installés à Bagomba dans le royaume ashanti (Wilks 1971), les communautés commerçantes gonja, mossi, haoussas établis dans le nord du Ghana (Akrin 1971), les commerçants haoussa à Abeché et Ndjamena au Tchad (Works 1976), la communauté commerçante kooroko établie à Bamako (Amselle 1971), et les commerçants yarse établis à Koumassi (Schildkrout 1978). Les diasporas urbaines constituent souvent des quartiers appelés zongo, que l'on retrouve dans la plupart des grandes villes de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Lomé, Cotonou, Lagos, Accra, Kumassi, Abidjan) pour ne citer que celles-ci.

Contrairement aux travaux qui appréhendent le commerce transfrontalier par le biais des flux : le suivi des flux des produits agricoles et alimentaires au niveau de plusieurs postes frontaliers LARES[2] (Galtier, Tassou 1998), l'analyse du comportement des prix sur un ensemble de marchés (Egg et Herrera 1998 :14), le dynamisme du commerce transfrontalier et le caractère fonctionnel des marchés frontaliers (Igué 1976, 1989, N Bessa 1980, Soulé 2000, 2011) la présente thèse s'intéresse particulièrement aux acteurs sociaux qui font le commerce et reste attentive à leur comportement. En recentrant le propos la biographie de ces commerçants, elle cherche à mettre en lumière le rôle des ces acteurs économiques dans le développement des villes frontalières. Cela donnera l'occasion de réexaminer le rôle des marchés frontaliers, leur importance pour le processus d'intégration régional qui demeure un défi pour les pays ouest africains dans un contexte de mondialisation. Ce faisant, notre travail s'inscrit dans le mouvement actuel de reconnaissance d'une intégration « par le bas » et d'une prise en compte de la spatialité africaine (Engel et Nugent 2010).

Il s'agit également de montrer le rôle important que joue le commerce transfrontalier dans le développement local et régional par une approche diachronique et longitudinale du parcours des commerçants des marchés frontaliers. Comparativement aux travaux existants

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[2] LARES : laboratoire d'analyse régionale et d'expertise sociale est une institution de recherche de droit béninois à but non lucratif crée en 1989.Son objectif est d'étudier la dynamique régionale à travers quatre axes : marchés et politique agricole, la dimension spatiale du développement, le genre et le développement enfin le foncier et l'environnement.

menés sur les grands commerçants ouest-africains comme (Grégoire 1986, 2001, 2002, Grégoire Labazzée 1994, Fauré, Labazée 2000, Ellis 1996).

A la lumière de ce qui précède, on constate qu'il n'existe pas d'études sur le commerce transfrontalier qui s'intéressent spécifiquement aux diasporas commerçantes installées aux frontières. La présente thèse vise à palier à cette insuffisance. Son objectif est d'étudier la construction historique et géographique des diasporas urbaines frontalières ouest-africaines. La thèse s'attache à retracer leur parcours, puis à renseigner le processus de construction de leur richesse, et enfin s'interroge sur leur ancrage territorial dans le milieu frontalier au regard des différentes contraintes qui affectent ces zones.

L'intérêt principal de ces communautés d'affaires est bien connu depuis les études pionnières de Cohen (1969). Il s'agit principalement de permettre aux marchands de minimiser les coûts de transactions et de réduire l'incertitude propre au contexte marchand, en particulier en situation sahélienne. Ainsi pour ces marchands les différentiels monétaires, les variations des taux de change, les différences de politiques économiques nationales jouent un rôle considérable, et leur permettent de circuler entre les Etats et de relier le continent aux marchés internationaux (Terpend 2006). Ils importent ainsi librement et à des prix compétitifs les produits du monde entier. Cet extraordinaire développement des activités commerciales au niveau des zones frontalières s'est traduit par des transformations socio-économiques importantes dans les villes frontalières. Cette situation résulte du dynamisme de marchands venus s'installer dans les zones frontalières pour profiter d'une rente de situation.

Ce travail s'intéresse à la construction historique et géographique des diasporas urbaines frontalières ouest-africaines en se focalisant principalement sur les dynamiques économiques qui animent ces communautés d'affaires. Il met l'accent sur les motivations qui ont poussé les grands commerçants actifs à l'échelle internationale à quitter leurs régions d'origine pour s'implanter dans les zones frontalières du Niger, du Bénin et du Nigeria.

Pour répondre à cet objectif, la thèse soulève trois questions de recherche, auxquelles correspondent des hypothèses de travail. Ces trois questions d'ordre temporel interrogent le parcours biographique des commerçants : l'origine et les motivations du départ, l'itinéraire dans un premier temps (construction de la diaspora). Il pose comme hypothèse : Les commerçants des deux zones frontalières ont pour la plupart quitté leurs régions d'origine pour des multiples raisons, ils ont exercé divers activités en divers lieux et tout au long du parcours ils ont réussi à se faire un capital relationnel, un capital d'expérience et enfin un capital financier. Pourvus de ses acquis, ils se sont s'installés dans les zones frontalières pour profiter d'une rente de situation en s'adonnant au commerce. Mais ils gardent des liens solides

avec les communautés de même origine dispersées constituant ainsi progressivement des diasporas.

Dans un second temps ce travail interroge le processus de construction et de constitution des réseaux (construction de la communauté d'affaire). Nous souhaitons connaître la manière dont les marchands s'organisent entre eux, comment ils utilisent l'ethnie et la religion ou d'autres liens pour promouvoir leurs affaires (Grégoire 1986, Bach 1994, Grégoire et Labazée 1994). L'étude de la construction de la diaspora marchande doit permettre de montrer aussi bien les relations internes au sein de la diaspora commerçante que ses relations externes avec la société hôte. Nous voulons vérifier si l'idée d'embeddedness 3(Granovetter 1985) qui suppose de faire des affaires avec des gens qui nous ressemblent s'applique au cas des marchés frontaliers ou si les acteurs du commerce transfrontalier sont aujourd'hui plutôt unis par une pure relation commerciale sans attache particulière.

Nous formulons l'hypothèse que les différentes diasporas en présence évoluent vers une communauté d'affaire plus unie par la relation d'affaire que par des liens sociaux.

Enfin, nous considérons les perspectives d'avenir dans un troisième temps (dépassement de la frontière condition de l'intégrateur régionale). Dans cette dernière partie nous cherchons à savoir s'ils considèrent leur installation dans les marchés frontaliers comme définitive. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que l'ancrage territorial des commerçants dans la zone frontalière est fortement lié à un environnement économique propice et précisément à la possibilité de jouir d'une rente de situation. Afin de vérifier ces hypothèses, nous avons choisi d'utiliser la méthode biographique et l'objectif de cette communication est justement de présenter cette méthode[2]. L'utilisation de la méthode biographique se justifie par le fait qu'elle rend possible l'exploration du passé des commerçants.

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[3]La notion d'embededdeness a été élaborée par Granovotter pour montrer que les actions économiques sont toujours enchâssées dans les réseaux de relation.

Organigramme de la thèse.

ORGANIGRAMME DE LA THESE

PORTS DE COTONOU

- Villages
- Hameaux
- Campement

> Convergence des acteurs : commerçants

Ville frontalière

Malan ville : marché régional de céréales

Produits issus des marchés mondiaux

- Villages
- Hameaux
- Campem

Ville frontalière
Gaya : ville de transit : friperie, véhicule, ciments
Ville : entrepôt touristiques, ciments

> Convergence des acteurs : commerçants

Passé	présent	futur
D'où viennent-ils ? Origine Géographique : ⇨ spatialisation **Qui sont-ils ? :** ⇨ Motivation	**Comment font- ils ?** ⇨ Structuration de leur réseau : ⇨ constitution d'une Communauté d'affaire	**Comment envisagent –ils** **l'avenir** face aux : 1. boycotts du port 2. ports secs, 3. des politiques restrictives

Organigramme de la thèse.

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3. Méthode et cadre institutionnel

3.1. Le projet CROSSTRADE

Le projet CROSSTRADE a pour ambition d'étudier le commerce informel transfrontalier et son impact dans le processus d'intégration régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest. Sur le plan institutionnel, ce projet est dirigé par le CEPS/INSTEAD, en partenariat avec le Département de Géographie de l'Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey (DGUAM) et le laboratoire ADES de l'Université de Bordeaux III-CNRS. Le projet approfondit l'analyse de l'organisation sociale des réseaux afin d'évaluer dans quelle mesure ces réseaux ont été affectés par les récentes transformations du contexte régional sous l'effet de la globalisation et des politiques de développement. Il étudie l'organisation spatiale des réseaux transfrontaliers en privilégiant l'analyse des réseaux. Ces réseaux œuvrent-ils à l'intégration économique ou se contentent-ils d'exploiter les faiblesses des Etats dans le contrôle de leurs frontières ? Pour ce faire trois dimensions vont être abordées par cette étude. Il s'agit respectivement de : l'analyse des réseaux sociaux (*Social Network Analysis*) ; l'économétrie et les études biographiques (parcours de vie des marchands) qui fait l'objet de la présente thèse.

Pour pallier les obstacles comme la non fiabilité des données, leur rareté et souvent leur imprécisions, le projet va combiner à la fois des approches géographiques, anthropologiques, économiques éprouvées pour appréhender la complexité du commerce transfrontalier africain.

Ce projet s'articule autour de trois études : deux études quantitatives dont l'analyse des réseaux sociaux, qui forme un ensemble conceptuel et méthodologique basé sur l'étude des liens entretenus entre les acteurs sociaux et la manière dont ces relations influencent leurs actions, l'économétrie, et une étude qualitative qui est l'objet de cette thèse, essentiellement basée sur les études biographiques.

3.1. Identification des acteurs, anonymat et taux de réponse

Les mêmes acteurs vont être questionnés durant toute l'enquête. Ils sont identifiés sur la base de trois critères : les produits, le poids économique, l'implantation effective dans la zone frontalière. Pour ce faire il a été procédé à :

- L' identification des produits les plus significatifs pour les régions concernées sur la base des flux d'import-export nigériens, des enquêtes réalisées précédemment dans la région et des produits interdits à l'importation au Nigeria. En combinant ces différentes sources, on obtient

un éventail de 4 produits considérés comme prioritaires : céréales et farine, matériaux de construction, textiles, friperie (éventuellement transport).

- Identification des acteurs les plus importants du commerce transfrontalier dans les cinq villes. Ainsi les commerçants dont le chiffre d'affaire annuel moyen est estimé à plus de 100 millions de FCFA ont été retenus. Ces derniers ont été identifiés par les transitaires, validés et complétés par d'autres commerçants exerçants dans les cinq marchés.

- L'implantation effective des commerçants dans la zone transfrontalière. Il faut donc que le commerçant exerce pleinement ses activités dans les cinq villes ou, au moins qu'il ait comme base pour ses activités une au moins de ces villes.

Sur la base de ses critères, 40 grands commerçants ont été identifiés pour l'ensemble des villes de Malanville, Kamba, Birni N'Konni et Illela pour la première phase. Les grands commerçants sont enquêtés sur la base des listes préétablies. Une première enquête sur la base de questionnaires élaborés par les chercheurs du CEPS a été administrée. Les acteurs ont donc à plus de 80% été enquêté.

Les noms générés sur la base d'une technique du *snowballing*[4], en « *boule de neige* » ont fait l'objet d'une seconde enquête (Bertaux 2010). Au cours des entretiens, les grands commerçants nomment d'autres marchands, qui constituent la seconde vague d'acteurs à enquêter. Une troisième vague est parfois nécessaire pour saturer le réseau, c'est-à-dire parvenir à rassembler tous les acteurs concernés par la communauté d'affaires transfrontalière. Dans la mesure où ces marchés ont des tailles et des niveaux d'activités relativement différents et qu'il sera certainement plus difficile de travailler au Nigeria qu'au Niger, le nombre de marchands interrogés n'est pas nécessairement identique pour tous les marchés.

Les noms des acteurs identifiés ont été anonymisés et agrégés à d'autres réponses avant l'analyse. Tous les enquêtés ont reçu un code numérique, comme GA_01_05 par exemple. Leur nombre varie en fonction des marchés. Le code de chaque grand commerçant est indiqué. Il prend la forme suivante : Nom de la ville, le numéro suivant désigne le statut du commerçant (1 signifie grand commerçant) suivi du numéro attribué au commerçant. Exemple d'un grand commerçant de Birni N'Konni : BI_1_01. Le nom du grand commerçant ne figure pas sur le questionnaire. Seul figure son code.

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[4]La méthode de *snowballing* où boule de neige permet de générer une liste complémentaire à partir des noms donnés par les enquêtés lors de la première phase d'enquêtes du projet CROSSTRADE. On doit continuer jusqu'à saturation complète du réseau à l'image de la boule de neige qu'on roule.

L'obtention d'un taux de réponse proche de 80% constitue un impératif des méthodes relationnelles utilisées avec les grands commerçants. Si près de 80% des grands commerçants identifiés ne peuvent être interrogés, il est prévu de réorienter l'enquête à partir d'informateurs.

3.2. Les méthodes de la thèse

Ce travail est construit autour de trois méthodes : observation des activités commerciales dans les cinq marchés des deux régions frontalières ; récolte d'informations biographiques à travers l'administration d'un questionnaire et enregistrement de l'entretien ; la cartographie des lieux de provenances, des itinéraires migratoires etc. L'approche qualitative adaptée complète les deux autres approches quantitatives du projet CROSSTRADE.

3.2.1. L'observation

Nous nous inspirons des travaux de Blundo et Sardan (1999). Cette observation participante repose sur deux modes de productions de données: les entretiens transformés en données par la transcription et les observations transformées en données par la description. Il y'a donc un lien entre l'observation comme moyen de production de donnée et la description comme trace écrite de cette observation dans les données et le produit final.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous ferons recours à l'observation participante donc aux entretiens et à l'observation pour expliquer des phénomènes précisément la métamorphose des ces villes. La description a permis de prendre la mesure des transformations qu'ont connu les cinq villes frontalières au cours des trente dernières années, l'apparition des magasins, des banques, des centaines de camions chargeant ou déchargeant quotidiennement des marchandises dans la multitude de magasins sont autant de signes d'embellie.

3.2.2. La méthode biographique

La méthode biographique a été utilisée pour la première à Chicago aux Etats Unis en 1892. Elle puise ses origines dans deux disciplines : l'histoire et la sociologie. En histoire elle permet de découvrir ou d'apporter un sens à des événements particuliers achevés ou vécus par des acteurs (Sanséau 2005.34-35). Elle se base sur reconstitution du parcours de vie selon une structure diachronique du récit de vie s'appuyant sur des analyses comparées de différentes

biographies et sur une approche par acteur pour dresser le profil type ou l'archétype du ou des acteurs du commerce transfrontalier.

L'étude sera dynamique et longitudinale, adaptant une approche rétrospective dans la première partie ce qui donnera lieu à une spatialisation des informations relatives aux zones de provenance et itinéraires des commerçants. L'approche spatio-temporelle adaptée permettra de comprendre les relations entre le passé des acteurs et leurs pratiques commerciales actuelles et de mieux appréhender les stratégies développées permettant l'accumulation de richesse. Ainsi donc l'étude s'intéresse aussi bien aux pratiques des commerçants aujourd'hui qu'à leur passé. Ces acteurs, exercent leurs activités économiques de part et d'autre des frontières qu'ils utilisent pour tirer profit des différentiels monétaires, de l'écart des prix d'un pays à un autre et des différences de production. Pour ce faire, le travail s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux trois temps de l'itinéraire des marchands aujourd'hui établis dans les zones frontalières.

Cette présente thèse devrait d'une part alimenter l'analyse relationnelle conduite dans le cadre plus général du projet en éléments qualitatifs sur le profil spécifique des grands marchands d'autre part parvenir à la reconstitution d'un portrait du « marchand idéal » actif sur les marchés frontaliers à partir de la synthèse des profils particuliers. La biographie des acteurs du commerce frontalier va permettre d'identifier les différentes localités d'origine, de comprendre les motivations de leur départ, de spatialiser cette information, de suivre les itinéraires, de comprendre leur mode d'ascension dans le monde des affaires et sur quoi repose leurs stratégies.

3.2.2. Les entretiens de la thèse

L'enquête sur les grands commerçants pour la thèse a débuté après la première phase d'enquêtes CROSSTRADE. Les entretiens ont été réalisés sur la base de questionnaires semi-directifs spécifiquement conçus pour appréhender les différentes dimensions temporelles, spatiales et sociales du projet de thèse avec enregistrement des interviews réalisés avec les commerçants toute les fois où cela est possible.

3.2.3. Le questionnaire de la thèse

Le questionnaire de la thèse est structuré autour des hypothèses de la thèse et tient compte des données existantes dans le questionnaire grand commerçant du projet CROSSTRADE. Il se décline en cinq parties : la première partie reprend les questions sur les

généralités concernant l'acteur interviewé et qui sont déjà dans le questionnaire de CROSSTRADE.

La deuxième partie du questionnaire concerne le parcours migratoire et professionnel du commerçant de la date de l'enquête aux quinze ans d'âge de ce dernier. Le choix de cet âge se justifie par le fait que c'est l'âge à partir duquel des jeunes non scolarisés commencent à apprendre un métier. Il vise à saisir, annuellement, les différentes évolutions que les enquêtés ont connu dans leur vie professionnelle. On prendra en compte toutes les professions et activités exercées par les individus depuis l'âge de 15 ans jusqu'à la date de l'enquête. Le métier exercé est renseigné avec les lieux d'exercice, les raisons du changement d'activité. S'ajoutent à ces informations d'une part les soutiens dont a pu bénéficier l'acteur et d'autre part les soutiens et autres appuis qu'il a donné pour aider d'autres commerçants. Toutes ces informations sont recueillies de manière chronologique ce qui permet de rendre visible l'évolution chronologique des activités de chaque acteur.

On fait l'hypothèse que même s'ils sont aujourd'hui tous commerçants, ces individus ont pu exercer d'autres activités. Les questionnaires devront servir à retracer ou à identifier l'origine géographique des commerçants ; les motifs de leur départ, les trajectoires résidentielles et migratoires. La fiche biographique renseigne également le capital social, qui renseigne sur les personnes qui ont aidé le marchand à un moment donné et réciproquement ceux qu'il a pu aider. Toutes ces questions devraient permettre de mieux cerner les motivations des principaux acteurs, de comprendre pourquoi ils font preuve d'une telle détermination à s'établir dans les marchés frontaliers. Ainsi, comme le montre (Tichit 2001), le recours à la fiche biographique permet de mieux saisir des objets mal connus. Elle précise que cette méthode a été développée dans le cadre de l'analyse longitudinale dont elle permet de dépasser les limites. Ainsi, le recours à la fiche biographique devrait permettre de reconstituer fidèlement l'itinéraire de quarante commerçants. La biographie est assortie d'une grille chronologique qui permet de dater les événements liés par exemple à l'évolution professionnelle du commerçant. Le recours au calendrier chronologique vise aussi à réduire les erreurs de mémoire en imposant un cadre temporel strict et contraignant.

Chaque acteur enquêté constitue un témoin et, est partie prenante du mouvement auquel il appartient. A partir des trajectoires individuelles de ces derniers, le recoupement des récits permet de reconstituer la dynamique du changement social (Blanchet et Gothman 1992).

La troisième partie de ce questionnaire reprend la question relative aux domaines d'activités déjà abordé dans le questionnaire CROSSTRADE afin de lier les différentes

activités avec les villes où s'exercent ces activités. Il s'agit également de renseigner les stratégies d'implantation des commerçants dans les zones frontalières au travers du dispositif familial. La famille est-elle partagée dans plusieurs villes où habite-t-elle dans une seule ville. Cette partie renseigne également le nombre de personnes qui travaillent avec le commerçant.

Dans la quatrième partie est abordé la question des réseaux, des perspectives des acteurs dans la zone frontalière, et des conditions d'existence de la diaspora.

Enfin la cinquième et dernière partie de cette thèse concerne les perspectives d'implantation définitive dans la zone frontalière compte tenu des événements qui s'y déroulent.

3.2.4. L'enregistrement

Comme précisé plus haut l'administration du questionnaire est systématiquement enregistrée sauf en cas d'opposition de la part de l'interviewé. De cette façon, nous pourrons avoir plus d'informations en plus l'enregistrement permet de récupérer tout le discours en réécoutant aussi souvent que de besoin l'entretien.

Il est prévu un dernier passage si de besoin, afin de laisser parler l'acteur de son itinéraire. Dans cette ultime phase qui sera soigneusement enregistrée l'acteur pourra s'exprimer plus librement avec le moins d'interruptions possible. L'enregistrement présente plusieurs avantages : il permet de pallier les insuffisances éventuelles du questionnaire en permettant de mieux suivre l'acteur et de pouvoir revenir autant de fois que nécessaire afin de mieux décortiquer l'entretien ; il permet de suivre la dynamique de l'entretien et de s'assurer que le récit s'accorde bien avec la personnalité sociale de l'acteur interviewé. Il permet de faire des analyses plus poussées de l'entretien en revivant les moments de cet entretien.

Il est également prévu de faire recours à la quarantaine d'entretiens réalisés dans le cadre plus global du projet CROSSTRADE concernant les acteurs politiques et les agences de développement si nécessaire pour mieux analyser où illustrer certaines parties de cette thèse. Tous les entretiens seront retranscrits dans le détail ensuite il est prévu de procéder à une hiérarchisation de ces données. Cette hiérarchisation permettra d'identifier les enregistrements qui méritent d'être davantage décryptés et approfondir.

3.2.5. Le dépouillement

La prosoprographie permet une fois les questionnaires bien remplis, les entretiens entièrement retranscrits, de lister les caractéristiques ou traits partagés par un certain nombre

de commerçants en vue de les distinguer des autres et former ainsi des profils spécifiques. Cette science de plus en plus utilisée permet à partir de morceaux de vie d'un certain nombre de commerçants de reconstituer un profil où des profils capables de renseigner fidèlement ou du moins de manière satisfaisante l'identité des acteurs de cette thèse.

Pour pouvoir généraliser les résultats il faut « *de multiplier les études de cas individuel en faisant varier le plus possible les caractéristiques de cas observés pour prétendre saisir la réalité dans sa généralité »* Bertaux (2010).

C'est en découvrant le général au cœur des formes particulières que l'on peut avancer, cela passe par la comparaison, la recherche de récurrence et par ce qu'on appelle la saturation progressive du model.

Les résultats apparaîtront sous forme de graphes biographiques correspondant à des périodes présentant une certaine constance biographique et devrait aboutir à reconstituer : le ou les prototypes de commerçants idéal.

3.2.6. La cartographie

Plusieurs cartes vont être produites dans le cadre de cette thèse. L'objectif à ce niveau est de cartographier les itinéraires de ces commerçants, de leurs villages d'origine jusqu'à la zone frontalière sans oublier les zones de migration temporaire puis de cartographier le réseau qu'ils ont su tisser et entretenir. Nous utilisons le logiciel Qgis, et Adobe Illustrator. Nous envisageons d'élaborer une carte de localisation et une carte des lieux de provenance. Il s'agit à travers une spatialisation de l'information relative aux différents villages ou régions d'origine de ressortir spatialement les zones d'origines des acteurs du commerce transfrontaliers et de répondre à une des questions de recherche. La cartographie des itinéraires permettra de retracer les itinéraires des acteurs de cette thèse de leurs zones d'origine jusqu'à la zone frontalière. En passant par des zones intermédiaires qui sont les différents lieux qui ont accueilli les acteurs pendant une durée plus ou longue mais qui dépasserait les douze mois. Ces zones d'accueil localisées en plusieurs lieux dans les trois pays où dans la sous région Afrique de l'Ouest ou ailleurs.

Nous ambitionnons également de mettre en lumière à travers des cartes, les spécificités de chaque ville. Pour ce faire, nous nous appuyons sur la base des produits identifiés comme prioritaires. Ainsi donc sur la base des observations participatives on peut faire les hypothèses suivantes sur la base de nos observations et la littérature : à Gaya c'est le commerce de la friperie qui domine Walther 2008, ce qui nous autorise à procéder à une spatialisation des

magasins de fripes , à Malanville la commercialisation des produits céréaliers qui est la principale activité (Boluvi 2004) ; à Kamba ce sont les hydrocarbures comme le montre une forte prolifération des lieux de vente des produits pétroliers fortement concentrées tout au long de la principale voie, il s'agit notamment les stations de vente d'hydrocarbure dont la construction manifestement ne semble pas obéir à des normes standardisées connues et respectées partout. Cette situation est observable à Illéla mais cette ville joue un rôle de premier plan dans l'approvisionnement du Niger en produits céréaliers notamment le mil, pour cette raison nous envisageons de cartographier prioritairement le marché de céréale.

3.3. Une stratégie d'approche

Compte tenu de la nature des informations collectées, une stratégie d'approche a été mise en place. Elle consiste à faire preuve de souplesse dans l'administration du questionnaire, à consacrer au besoin du temps pour expliquer aux commerçants les tenants et aboutissants de cette étude, a revenir vers eux autant de fois que nécessaire. A utiliser tous les liens de parentés et des amis pour nous faire accepter les commerçants. De ce fait, nous nous efforcerons de toujours prendre le temps qu'il faut pour expliquer aux enquêtés pour les rassurer sur le fait que les données seront traitées de manière confidentielle et aucune des relations d'affaires ou des domaines d'activités des enquêtés ne seront jamais publiés ou accessible à d'autres personnes en insistant sur le fait que cette enquête ne vise aucun objectif réglementaire ou fiscal. Des séjours prolongés et répétés s'imposent, le recours aux relations personnelles et à tout ce qui peut permettre de rassurer et d'établir la confiance s'est imposé. Nonobstant ces précautions nous avions fait face aux difficultés suivantes : la non disponibilité des commerçants du fait d'une forte mobilité ou d'un refus, le non respect des rendez vous, la forte méfiance des commerçants qui nous considère comme des agents déguisés des services des impôts ou pire des espions envoyés par leurs concurrents. A tous ces obstacles il faut ajouter en ce qui concerne le Nigeria, les difficultés pour mener des enquêtes du fait des tensions religieuses.

4. Les régions frontalières

Deux ensembles de marchés frontaliers sont considérés dans cette étude : le carrefour Gaya-Malanville-Kamba situé entre Niger, Bénin et Nigeria d'une part, et l'ensemble Birni

N'Konni-Illela situé entre Niger et Nigeria. Toutes ces cinq villes appartiennent à la catégorie de la petite et moyenne ville d'Afrique Occidentale.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous adoptons une approche « relationnelle » relativement à la délimitation des espaces économiques considérés. Nous considérons les deux zones frontalières de Gaya-Malanville-Kamba et Birni'N Konni-Illéla comme des espaces économiques structurés par des réseaux marchands s'étendant sur plusieurs pays, plutôt que comme des territoires strictement bornés par des limites administratives ou ethnoculturelles (Walther 2006 :12-13).

Le choix de ces deux terrains d'étude, a été motivé par le fait qu'ils permettent de comparer deux communautés d'affaires aux origines différentes. Les deux cas d'étude présentent des caractéristiques qui rendent leur étude comparative intéressante.

4.1. La zone frontalière de Gaya-Malanville-Kamba

Gaya-Malanville-Kamba est considéré comme un exemple de marché frontalier dans lequel l'essentiel des activités est liée à l'établissement d'une diaspora commerçante venue s'établir pour bénéficier des flux d'import-export, notamment les importations du Niger et les réexportations vers le Nigeria. On s'attend à trouver des formes de structuration des réseaux marchands originales dans la mesure où la communauté d'affaires y est pratiquement totalement allochtone. En comparaison, les marchés de Birni N'Konni-Illéla s'inscrivent plutôt dans le cadre, plus documenté dans la littérature, des réseaux marchands haoussa, qui dans ce cas précis vivent principalement de la réexportation vers le Nigeria. On s'attend à y trouver des réseaux structurés sur des bases religieuses et ethniques « traditionnelles » (Grégoire 1986, Nicolas 1986).

Carte : Localisation des villes frontalières cibles

Source : Ouest african markets Walther 2011, conception et réalisation Moustapha Koné.juin 2012.

- Ville cible
  Marchés frontaliers cibles
  Limite de pays

La position géographique de la zone frontalière du Dendi (regroupant les villes de Gaya au Niger, de Malanville au Bénin et de Kamba au Nigeria) fait d'elle un centre de transit important où passe quotidiennement une grande quantité de produits à destination des autres villes du Niger et du Nigeria mais aussi des pays limitrophes comme le Mali ou le Tchad. Cette situation très propice au développement du commerce a attiré un grand nombre de commerçants venus des différentes régions du Niger. Ces derniers, en moins d'une trentaine d'années d'installation ont pour certains réussi à bâtir des grosses fortunes et à établir des relations solides à l'échelle régionale, voire au-delà. Ils ont, en outre réussi à tisser entre eux des relations solides, empruntes de complicité et de complémentarité. L'espace du Dendi est principalement structuré par les trois marchés frontaliers de Gaya-Malanville-Kamba situés respectivement au Niger, au Bénin et au Nigeria.

La commune urbaine de Malanville a fait l'objet d'étude par des auteurs qui ont pour la plupart documenté le rôle important que joue la ville de Malanville dans les échanges commerciaux en Afrique de l'ouest (Bako 2002, Igué, Boluvi 2004, Walther 2008, Soulé 2011). Selon les estimations de l'INSAE la population de Malanville serait de 129 567 habitants en 2007 se basant sur un taux d'accroissement de 4,86 %. Le marché de Malanville a un caractère

régional, avec une superficie de 2,3 km^2 c'est un centre de redistribution des denrées pour les marchés intérieurs et d'exportation vers le Niger et le Nigeria bref une porte de sortie des produits côtiers en provenance du Bénin, du Togo, du Ghana vers les pays sahéliens le Niger, le Mali, mais aussi le Nigeria, le Cameroun et des pays situés plus loin comme l'Algérie et la Lybie pour une catégorie restreinte de produits (Boluvi 2004).

La ville de Kamba appartient au dendi local government, entité de l'Etat de Kebbi. Kebbi state est l'un des 36 Etats qui forment la république fédérale du Nigeria. Cette entité a été érigée en Etat en 1989. Kebbi avec une superficie de 36.800 Km^2 compte une vingtaine d'entités appelées *Local Government* La capital de ce Etat est le chef lieu de Kebbi state. Selon le recensement 2006 de la population et de l'habitat le total de la population de Kamba s'élève à 144.273 habitants dont 72.199 femmes et 72074 hommes. Elle est peuplée de : Haoussa 42%, Zarma 28%, Peuls 16%, Yoruba 14% et Igbo 10% (Sunsus 2006). Cette ville du nord du Nigeria fut pendant des années une plaque tournante du commerce des hydrocarbures, mais aussi un grand marché où s'approvisionnent les populations du Niger et du Bénin. Elle a perdu de son importance pour des raisons politiques, religieuses, économiques et en raison de la forte dégradation de la route (Walther 2008: 334).

4.2. La zone frontalière de Birni N'Konni-Illela

La zone réunit les espaces économiques situés de part et d'autre des deux frontières de la république du Niger et de la République Fédérale du Nigeria. Cet espace est occupé par le groupe ethnique majoritaire haoussa suivi par les Peul. Les populations des deux villes partagent la langue, la religion, la culture et ont souvent la même histoire et des liens de parenté. Historiquement Birni'N Konni est restée longtemps liée au Gobir (Salifou 1989). Ces populations ont en outre une longue tradition de commerce. La ville de Birni'N Konni abrite une population estimée à 139 142 habitants. (RGPH 2001 INS).

Le Local Government d'Illela est localisée dans l'Etat de Sokoto dans le nord du Nigeria. Il est habité par une population en majorité haoussa suivie par les peuls et une minorité de yoruba et igbo. C'est une ville commerçante tournée vers l'importation des produits divers en provenance du marché mondial passant par le Niger par le canal de la ville de Birni N Konni. Elle se particularise aussi par la l'exportation des produits céréaliers vers le Niger notamment le mil. Elle est limitée au nord par la République du Niger, et s'étend sur une superficie de 1.246 Km2 avec une population estimée à 150.489 habitants (Recensement de 2006).

5. Qui sont les acteurs du commerce transfrontalier ?

Sur la base des résultats préliminaires on peut distinguer les catégories où groupes suivants :

1. Commerçants expulsés du Ghana et installés dans la zone frontalière notamment à Malanville puis à la faveur d'un climat économique favorable, ils ont progressivement transférer l'essentiel de leurs activités économique à Gaya. Ces commerçants ayant construit des maisons à Malanville préfèrent continuer à vivre dans cette ville où ils y ont installés leurs familles respectives. Chaque soir, ils y retournent pour passer la nuit est revenir le lendemain. C'est comme-ci, ils ont fait le choix des affaires à Gaya et le domicile à Malanville. De l'avis de ces commerçants Gaya offre de meilleures conditions de sécurité.

D'autres par contre choisissent d'être sur deux villes, une femme à Gaya, une autre à Malanville. Une femme ou deux à Illela la plus petite à Konni, de cette façon ces derniers ont, comme ils aiment bien le répété un pied à Illela et un autre à Konni. Ce faisant, ils peuvent mieux suivre leurs activités dans les deux villes et se mettent momentanément à l'abri des coupures d'électricité intempestives du Nigeria.

2. Le deuxième groupe est constitué des commerçants venus de la cote d'ivoire. En effet, suite à la crise postélectorale ivoirienne dont les débuts remonterait en 1999 et aux événements politiques qui ont amenés la plupart des étrangers à quitter la côte d'ivoire, des nigériens parmi lesquels des commerçants de Gaya et Malanville se sont installés dans la zone frontalière afin de continuer leur activités commerciales. Il s'agit des commerçants versés dans le négoce de la friperie. Forts de leur expérience, pourvue d'un capital, ils se sont installés dans la zone frontalière du dendi afin de profiter de la rente de situation pour y exercer leurs activités commerciales.

3. Le troisième groupe est constitué de commerçants venus du Ghana suite à expulsion des étrangers qui a eu lieu au Ghana et qui est connu sous le nom de *Koranghana* intervenu dans les années 1970 où des expulsions du Nigeria des ressortissant de l'Afrique de l'Ouest par pendant le régime de Shéhu Chagari. Ces commerçants se sont installés surtout à Malanville où ils pensaient pouvoir reprendre et réussir leurs activités commerciales initiales. Dans cette catégorie de commerçant on trouve surtout des sonrai et des kourté versés surtout dans le commerce de friperie, de ventes de piles et de chaussures.

4. Une catégorie de commerçants qu'on retrouve au Nigeria est constituée de commerçants des grandes villes comme Sokoto et Birni-Kebbi du Nigeria qui reviennent dans les moyennes villes, riches d'expérience, de capital relationnel et de capital financier pour jouer le rôle d'intermédiaire entre les métropoles et les moyennes villes.

5. Une autre catégorie de commerçants est constituée d'acteurs économiques venus de l'Europe, ayant choisi de revenir s'installer dans la zone frontalière pour y exercer des activités commerciales comme le commerce de friperie. Le fait d'avoir séjourné en Europe et surtout d'y avoir noué des relations, constitue un véritable atout pour ces derniers pour le ravitaillement par exemple en friperie et pour éventuellement bénéficier d'appuis ou de crédits conséquents.

6. Conclusion

Au stade actuel de cette étude, le choix d'utiliser la méthode biographique basée sur l'analyse du parcours professionnels des grands commerçants se révèle déjà un choix judicieux et fécond. Cependant la qualité de ce travail repose sur l'acceptation des grands commerçants des deux zones frontalières de raconter une partie de leur parcours professionnel, précisément la période comprise entre leur quinzième anniversaire et la date de l'entretien. Pour certains, cela revient à faire juste un grand effort de mémoire, mais pour d'autres, cela revient à fouiller et à divulguer des parties souvent peu glorieuses ou opaques de leur parcours d'où des refus répétés et autres omissions volontaires ou involontaires. Le recours au calendrier chronologique vise à réduire ces erreurs de mémoire en imposant un cadre temporel strict et contraignant.

Ces enquêtes biographiques qui interrogent les acteurs sur leur passé soulèvent la question de la qualité des informations recueillies et les limites d'une telle approche. Mais la généralisation permet de dépasser de tels obstacles, car ce n'est pas des cas individuels qui nous intéressent, mais la ressemblance des parcours, les similitudes, la répétition de cas identiques afin de catégoriser, d'homogénéiser et de dresser des modèles. Aussi identifier les régularités de comportement et les groupes qui présentent ces régularités de façon inductive, en analysant les relations entre individus permet de dégager les groupes pertinents à posteriori. Ainsi dans le traitement des données recueillies, une place de choix est réservée aux carrefours, aux événements ou catastrophes.

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Insulating the Borderland: Security and Securitisation along Rwanda's Western Frontier.

Hugh Lamarque[*]

London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

- Draft paper, please do not cite or circulate -

Abstract:

The Rwanda-DR.Congo border functions to separate one of Africa's most internally secure territories from one of its least. This is most apparent in the borderland conurbations of Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu, where despite extensive local cross-border interaction, violent criminality is confined predominantly to urban districts on the Congolese side of the international boundary. This paper is concerned with the tensions and interactions between - as well as the relative capacity of - state and borderland modes of governance when it comes to sustaining cross-border imbalances in internal security.

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[*]What follows requires a brief foreword. I enrolled on a doctoral course at the London School of Oriental and African Studies in October 2012. After just one term, I should state up front that my work remains in its earliest stages. What I have are ideas, loosely grounded in several brief fieldwork projects conducted along the Rwanda-DR.Congo border (five months in total, investigating themes related though not identical to the one discussed here). These ideas are flexible, and the purpose of this paper is to have them challenged and changed. From the bare-bones of my hypotheses to the proposed theoretical tools and frameworks, everything is up for discussion and, potentially, disposal.

1

Introduction

This research is driven by one central problematic: how is it that the Rwanda-DR.Congo border can function to separate one of Africa's most internally secure[1] territories from one of its least? There are stark cross-border discrepancies in physical security along the length of the international boundary. These are most apparent in the densely populated corridors of land immediately to the North and South of Lake Kivu, where the border makes four cities of two urban spaces: two that exhibit high levels of internal security, and two that are highly insecure. Put most simply, this research aims to investigate what gave rise to such an imbalanced security environment, and what forces sustain it.

The inherent assumption – that the Rwandan towns of Gisenyi and Cyangugu exhibit a markedly more secure living environment than their Congolese counterparts of Goma and Bukavu – emerges almost ubiquitously from local accounts, and is born out in a growing body of academic ethnography (Doevenspeck, 2011; Buscher, 2012; Jackson, 2008) as well as national statistics (see Mairie de Goma, 2011). It is relatively uncontroversial. Perhaps a more problematic assumption is that this degree of discrepancy in cross-border security is atypical. In other words, that residual insecurity has a tendency to spill over international divides, and that state authorities have elsewhere struggled to prevent this from happening. Nevertheless, as the body of literature on African borderlands grows, the Rwanda-DR.Congo case appears increasingly exceptional. For over fifteen years, Rwandan territory has been effectively insulated against the cycles of civil conflict and violent criminality that have plagued eastern DR.Congo (Prunier, 2011; Tull, 2005; Jackson, 2008). This stands out as one enduring element of an otherwise highly volatile security environment. There is a clear imperative to determine the mechanisms that have brought it about.

At this very early stage of my research, I cannot do much more than indicate my angle of approach to the topic. Taking contemporary borderland theory as a framework, my chief concern relates to the tension between – and the relative capacity of – state and borderland modes of governance[2] when it comes to sustaining an imbalanced cross-border security environment. What follows is an

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[1] By security, I refer to the mitigation of violent threats to local residents. The term is essentially contested in common usage, and establishing a precise, functional definition is a significant challenge entering into this project. Ideally, such a definition would capture a generalised sense of safety, both in person and in property, from the risks associated with criminality and politically motivated violence.

[2] The concept of a borderland mode of governance stems from a view of borders as sources of power in themselves (see Zartman, 2010). Certain constituent features of the borderland environment give rise to structures of authority that exist outside of, and frequently in conflict with, the state hierarchy. This will be discussed in greater detail further on.

attempt to unpack relevant theoretical tools and to explore a number of hypotheses. This is a paper-for-discussion, and the ideas presented are still very formative and unpolished in places. In terms of structure, I begin with a conceptual framework covering themes of governance, political economy and security in the borderland context. This is followed by an outline of the Rwanda-DR.Congo case and what it may contribute, several hypotheses relating to imbalances in cross-border security, some preliminary details of a comparative approach, and a brief summary.

Conceptual Framework

Recent analysis of territorial state boundaries has been shaped above all by their paradoxical capacity to both divide and unite (Kopytoff, 1987; Nugent & Asiwaju, 1996). Cultural and institutional differences develop over time and combine with regulatory discrepancies in a manner that produces significant cross-border imbalances. For the most part, the greater these imbalances (be they social, economic or geographic), the greater the opportunities they provide. Stephen Jackson likens cross-border discrepancies to potential difference in a battery, as they produce a 'charged environment' in which people and goods are induced to flow (Jackson, 2006). The result is that neighbouring populations living in proximity to an international divide are often brought closer together by their privileged access to the 'best of both worlds' (see Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010).

In as much as the border is a site of opportunity, it is also a source of power[3] (see Das & Poole, 2004; Kopytoff, 1987). It has been well established that a state's controlling influence very rarely extends evenly to its territorial limits (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Bierschenk & Sardan, 1997). Rather, in the state's margins exist borderlands: inhabited territories that hold relatively loose union with state power centres. The existence of a border necessitates a variety of roles, and produces unique relationships that define local power structures in the surrounding area. Such boundaries, as Zartman (2010:4) writes, are not 'passive agents', but actively inform the development of different identities. Analysis to this effect challenges an international relations model in which the ideal-type border would form a clean break between two political 'like units' (cf. Waltz, 1979:96). Instead, modes of governance completely divorced from state control are often seen to flourish around borders, and frequently emerge in contestation with powers at the centre. In extreme cases, the state in the borderland comes to act as just one political institution among many, and can be harnessed, or

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[3] In this context, power is understood in the "civilisational" as well as the coercive, political and economic sense (Zartman, 2010:3). It is external to actors and emerges from their interrelation (see Foucault, [1976] 1998).

"colonised", to serve the interests of non-state actors (Das & Poole, 2004).

The state's margins are not simply territorial. They represent an institutional borderland in which the state / non-state relationship becomes blurred (Asad, 2004). It has been shown that deals between trans-national trading networks and armed groups (both state and non-state) are capable of shaping and redefining the political order in borderlands (Raeymaekers, 2010:564; see also Tilly, 1985:169-171). The result is a 'polyform scenario' of local governance that, as Roitman (1990:695) argues: "articulates itself via the intersection of various agents". It is only through examining in detail the specific points of contact and the exchanges that occur between the different political spheres that a localised interpretation of broader power-relations can be established.

The existence of a multiplicity of political spheres in African borderlands challenges the applicability of Weber's notion of sovereignty as characterised by the monopoly over legitimate use of force (cf. Weber, [1922] 1978:54). Focusing on contexts of state incapacity, Englebert (2009) contends that sovereignty across much of the African continent offers no indication of the domestic legitimacy or basic capacity of the states that harness it. Instead, he argues that it stems solely from the international recognition of the statehood of particular institutions. According to Englebert, domestic sovereignty, and with it legal command, are then reproduced throughout society, where they can be exploited for the acquisition of resources (ibid: 62). State representatives share in the power to exclude other social actors altogether from the legal sphere, outside of which they can be subjected to any form of brutality (Englebert, 2009; see also Agamben, 1998). They are, as a result, better equipped to exert control over a population than non-state groups that lack their law-making capacity.

In cases of state weakness, sovereignty proliferates, undergoing a form of 'commodification' (Vlassenroot, 2008). It acts as an adhesive, holding together otherwise unwieldy institutions by allowing more individuals to share in the benefits of a sovereign role (Englebert, 2009:99). Alluding to a similar process that produces a multiplicity of institutions which share in the exercise of public authority, Lund argues:

> […] [N]ot only are multiple layers and branches of public institutions present and active, […] but so called
> traditional institutions bolstered by government recognition also vie for public authority, and new emerging

institutions also enter the field. (Lund 2006:685)

Public authority emerges from this plethora of political actors only as: "… the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of […] [institutions] conjugated with the idea of the state" (ibid. 686, author's emphasis). Lying between state and society, such contesting political authorities have been labelled 'twilight institutions' (ibid.). The sovereign authority of the state relies on its ability to define the margins these groups inhabit, and failure to do so can prove destabilising (Zeller, 2009:140). Since the idea of the state is subjected to constant reinterpretation in borderlands (see Chalfin, 2001), it is here that the schisms between included and excluded are often especially blurred.

Commerce, driven by the interaction that borders promote, is a defining feature of life in borderlands (see Chalfin, 2001; Little, 2007). It is important that trading activities be regarded as intrinsically social acts that cannot ever be divorced from their historical and political contexts (Roitman 1990:676). Such contexts tend to be both complex and dynamic. Due to their constant motion and fluidity, borderlands have been said to resemble: "… the sea at the edge of the land (and the reverse)" and need to be understood, "not as places or as events, but as social processes" (Zartman, 2010:3).

A number of theoretical concepts have proven useful in demystifying the political economy of borderlands. The first is that of the commercial node, which has been identified at sites where well-trodden international trading routes intersect with state boundaries. Such nodes punctuate the chains of commerce that connect Central Africa to the global market. They have been shown to produce highly dynamic sites, exposing the local setting to processes taking place much further a field (see Zeller, 2010). In any analysis of cross-border trade, it is crucial to recognise the role played by these longer chains. They result in a form of localised globalisation in which border towns that lie on trading routes become sites of 'trans-national governmentality', manifesting very different characteristics from the surrounding hinterlands (Zeller, 2009; Jackson, Crang & Dwyer, 2004). Often, what emerges is a bourgeois class comprised of trans-national, informal traders capable of exerting significant political influence (see Raeymaekers, 2010:581).

Borderland processes constitute much more than just minor setbacks in the otherwise teleological

expansion of centralised state control. Indeed it is often the case that, as Mathys and Büscher (2010:2) argue: "… new constellations result from the nature of the border, not of the central state". There are countless examples of the sophisticated rationality behind the way things operate around borders. Considering this, a second practical concept is that of the *terroir*, defined by Roitman as:

> […] [A] means of understanding regional variations in terms of demographic, ecological and/or migratory regimes, as well as social categories posited against one another in socio-economic struggles. […] [B]ecause the persistence [and] transformation of indigenous systems is considered in terms of la longue durée, variations are not understood as aberrations, but rather as specific histories which have experienced moments of upheaval and sedimentation. (Roitman, 1990:690)

Adopting this framework, specific borderlands come to be regarded as geographical solidarities, with a view to the long-term strategies of contesting groups and organisations (Roitman 1990:960; see also Bayart 1989). The *terroir* concept highlights the tensions that emerge between what Nugent (2002:233) terms the "spatial singularity" of the borderland, and the "national typicality" of the territory in which it lies. At the same time, the concept brings into focus the temporal element of processes at play, and helps to circumvent superficial analysis in which borderland phenomena are labelled as short-term "pathologies" (Roitman 1990:959).

Economic activities in borderlands are often labelled 'informal' in opposition to state-sanctioned operations. However, the notion of the 'informal trading network' suffers from overuse, and has become somewhat amorphous. This is particularly evident in borderland contexts where the distinction between formal and informal is blurred by overlapping political authorities. Here, Roitman's (1990) concept of 'straddling' is particularly informative. In her words: "…straddling describes the way in which agents are implicated in production processes that lie both within and outside of state control" (Roitman 1990:677). Formal and informal spheres are not taken as separate, but are instead seen to constitute a single system of "production, distribution and exchange" (ibid. 679). 'Informal' activities need not be illegal – and indeed state representatives are often themselves complicit – but are defined by the manner in which they deprive the central authority of revenue it would otherwise accumulate (ibid.). As a result, in borderlands it is quite often the case that individual state representatives find themselves performing seemingly contradictory roles. As Mathys and Büscher observe: "State officials guard the border, but they also maintain informal trade and fraud" (Mathys & Büscher, 2010). This is one example among many that illustrates how activities in borderlands that openly subvert the state can simultaneously uphold

it through recognition of its functions and a constant interaction with its agents (see also Chalfin, 2001; Rothschild & Chazan, 1988).

To sum up, borderlands represent zones that facilitate the interaction between trading networks (both local and trans-national), between neighbouring states, and between state and non-state modes of governance. Perhaps their most defining feature is their dynamism, as these relationships are shaped and reshaped by the constant interaction between inhabitants (see Paasi, 1996). Various social actors in borderlands come to "imagine and instantiate" state sovereignty in ways that do not always align with the unitary, territorial logic of the central state (Chalfin, 2001:202). Others make direct use of the legal command that sovereignty confers in order to accumulate wealth and resources (Englebert, 2009:80). Analysis of power-relations in these regions must take account of both the plurality of different political spheres and of the blurred distinction between formal and informal economic activities.

In recent years, borderlands have provided an informative laboratory for studies relating to national identity, smuggling, migration, state fragmentation and a range of other topics. Borderland policing has received less direct attention, at least in the African context (see Korf and Raeymaekers, forthcoming; Ackleson, 2011). Nevertheless, notions of insecurity have become embedded in popular conceptions of the borderland. As zones where both authority and identity are frequently contested, these regions are politically unpredictable. Physical security is often found to be continually negotiated between a variety of actors operating in a complex political arena (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004; Raeymaekers, 2007; Lecoutere and Titeca, 2007).

The Rwanda – DR.Congo Border

Recent studies have rightly challenged the conventional wisdom that Africa's borders are wholly arbitrary constructs bearing little or no relation to local demographics. The bulk of Africa's 50,000 km border network is now well into its second century. Even in cases where the imposition of artificial boundaries initially split otherwise unified groups, over time they have come to demarcate certain very real differences in institutions and mentalities (Nugent, 2002:9; Zeller, 2009:138; Katzenellenbogen, 2002:22). The DRC-Rwanda border is a case in point. Arbitrary (in relation to the social context) at its inception, it has accumulated significance over time.

Due to the natural bottlenecks in which they sit, Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu have for over a century been at the very centre of both conflict and commerce between the neighbouring states (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010:258). Economic and demographic asymmetries between both Rwandan and Congolese cities have resulted in a degree of economic interdependence that complicates their integration into the national economies on either side. Accounts of local residents exploiting the border as a regular source of income (as well as an exit strategy to evade taxation) date back to its early history (Mathys & Büscher, 2011). Today, small scale trading, amounting to earnings of under 100 USD per day, provides a survival economy for over 22,000 individuals in the two cities of Goma and Gisenyi alone (Lange & Kimanuka, 2010:2). Rwanda's chief imports consist of palm oil, cloths, sorghum, sugar, cheese, coffee, clothes, cassiterite, coltan, wood, tyres, and spare parts. It exports predominantly foodstuffs, including tomatoes, aubergines, onions, bananas, beans, maze, fresh milk, beers and livestock, as well as kerosene, bricks and sand (Ould-Boilil & Ntagungira, 2004:37). Individuals transporting these goods (as well as others in other less visible cross-border smuggling activities) are known locally as '*Chorachora*'. They form the backbone of the local economy, and are wholly reliant on the ease of passage back and forth across the border.

Corruption is endemic amongst the Congolese border police, and between 30 and 40 per cent of all import revenue collected is pocketed by officials rather than registered with the authorities in Kinshasa (Tegera & Johnson 2007:33).[4] In what amounts to "fraud amongst consenting adults" (Tegera & Johnson 2007:33), demands for unofficial payments by border police on the Congolese side are rarely met with resentment, since often they amount to less than the import tax that would be paid otherwise. The practice generates significant profits for individuals involved in the collection process. At any one time, a multitude of customs agencies can be found operating just across the Congolese border (Doevenspeck, 2011:5). Passing into Gisenyi, imports are handled in official Rwandan customs offices, where procedures are significantly more rigid and formalised (Ould-Boilil & Ntagungira, 2004). The result is an imbalance of economic regulation that goes hand in hand with the imbalance in security.

Despite the relative ease of passage across the border (for local residents), and the high rate of daily

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4   At the *Grand Barrière*, a similar contest is in process between local holders of domestic sovereignty and state institutions in Kinshasa. The visa system has changed repeatedly in recent years in attempts to prevent border officials simply pocketing the charge and not registering passage into the country.

migration between both Bukavu and Cyangugu as well as Goma and Gisenyi, the border represents a divide between radically different political environments. The Rwandan political system, although decentralised in terms of its structure, remains tightly controlled by the central authorities in Kigali. Under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party, Rwanda has undergone what has been termed 'imposed modernity' across almost all sectors (Ansoms, 2009:304). The process has been top-down, and often unresponsive to the voices of those whose lives it impacts. Many of the changes have constituted little more than what Ansoms calls 'cosmetic upgrading', aimed at developing an attractive environment for international investors rather than addressing the basic needs of the population (Ansoms, 2009; see also Human Rights Watch, 2011). Nevertheless, positive developments have been made, especially regarding the control of corruption, regulatory quality and improvements in the rule of law, all areas in which the Rwandan state outperforms regional neighbours (see Kaufmann et al. 2010). The political situation in the DRC (and North Kivu province in particular) is considerably less stable. The territory suffers from limited state capacity, the legacy of a series of recent and ongoing destructive conflicts, as well as corruption that permeates the highest tiers of state authority.

In his recent article '*Constructing the Border from Below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan State Boundary*' (2011), Doevenspeck identifies a plurality of different narratives used to describe the border in Goma and Gisenyi. Among different groups, the state boundary is identified as (i) a source of threats, either in the form of Rwandan aggressors entering the DRC, or else of Congolese instability spilling over into Rwanda (ii) an exit point for poor Rwandans seeking money across the border, (iii) "a site of recreation" that allows the mobile elite of North Kivu to sleep in the security of Gisenyi while working in Goma (iv) the source of the social and political exclusion of the Congolese Tutsi – manifested in both countries and (v) an "irrevocable fact" of the nation state arena, offering a territorial separation of the Rwandan and Congolese political spheres (Doevenspeck, 2011:7-11). Doevenspeck summarises the essential difference between the cities as one of "[…] food security and freedom of expression but pronounced criminality in Goma versus personal security but political oppression in Gisenyi" (Doevenspeck 2011:11). This raises two questions that are central to my research. First, what mechanisms have been deployed by the Rwandan state to maintain the high degree of physical security along its western border, despite the proximity of endemic insecurity in DR.Congo's Kivu Provinces? Second, to what degree is the imbalanced cross-border environment the result of state intervention?

Accounting for Imbalance

Perhaps the most intuitive hypothesis would be that direct state enforcement accounts for the cross-border imbalance in security between Rwanda and the DR.Congo. The contrasting security environments of Goma and Gisenyi (as well as Cyangugu and Bukavu) might well result from significant discrepancies found in the unity, efficiency, societal integration or raw number of Rwandan and Congolese state officials charged with policing the border. Such 'hard security' explanations are, however, problematic. In its current form, the border functions more as a conduit than a barrier. Indeed, Rwandan authorities responsible for policing the frontier are confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, the border is central to a state agenda that aims to insulate Rwanda from security threats – as well as economic practices deemed threatening – emanating from the DR.Congo's Kivu provinces (see Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2010; Doevenspeck, 2011). On the other, the relative ease of cross-border mobility facilitates a survival economy for upwards of 20,000 Rwandan borderland residents (Kimanuka & Lange, 2010). The creation of a physical barrier has been discussed but never implemented, and even brief closures of the border have proved highly destabilising (see Buscher, 2012).

If state security enforcement proves an insufficient explanation, a series of questions are raised regarding the contribution of non-state modes of governance to the unbalanced security environment: (i) has cross-border trade between between Rwanda and DR.Congo become structurally dependent on a secure operating environment being coupled with a less regulated business environment? (ii) what elements of borderland society are empowered by cross-border imbalances? (iii) what capacity and interest do these groups have in contributing to an imbalance in cross-border security? (iv) to what degree has the Rwandan state been able to manipulate (through legislation, economic regulation and neo-patrimonial networking) those elements of cross-border imbalance and opportunity that give rise to borderland structures of power?

Overall, the Rwanda-DR.Congo case lends itself to the investigation of two under-researched themes relating to the complex relationship between state and society with regard to borderland security. These I identify as (i) the incidence of strong state security capacity in African borderlands, and (ii) the perspectives and motivations of the authorities charged with policing borderland regions. The two are clearly intertwined, and Rwanda's border towns of Gisenyi and Cyangugu provide an excellent environment in which to investigate both.

Numerous borderland studies have seen the state either sidelined or 'brought back in' depending on the author's inclination and the case in question. One common theme, however, has been the reduced capacity of states in the borderland context. They have been termed, among other things, weak, fractured, fragmented and failed, and are forced to negotiate their authority with non-state groups empowered by the border itself (see Zartman, 2010; Lund, 2006). In contrast, the Rwandan state maintains tight control over cross-border commerce and domestic activities in its two major border towns of Gisenyi and Cyangugu. Indeed, the state-society relationship in Rwanda's western borderland appears unlike almost any other across the continent. The Rwandan state powerfully projects its authority into the region. In doing so, it magnifies the very kinds of cross-border discrepancies that have been shown to empower non-state actors at other sites. Local residents frequently contrast austere and strictly monitored conditions in Gisenyi and Cyangugu with the profitable disorder (locally "Kavuyo") prevalent just across the border in Goma and Bukavu (see Ansoms, 2009). Where possible, they exploit the advantages of both.

Regarding borderland policing, the prevalent academic consensus suggests that political analysis in borderlands is best achieved through ethnographic methods – "a view from below" – rather than remote sensing from afar (Doevenspeck, 2011:2, also Paasi, 1996). This tendency to contrast ethnographic analysis with macro international relations models has obscured a view "from within". The perspectives and motivations of state representatives operating in borderlands are most often inferred from the accounts of local residents, or else taken from official state doctrine. In either case, they are too often presumed to be uniformly held by the institutions and individuals that represent the "state".

Throughout the Rwanda-DR.Congo borderland, there exist an array of internal, external and natural threats to state security. By analysing the processes involved in identifying and mitigating these threats, this research would aim to provide an empirical insight into the practices of the Rwandan state representatives that has elsewhere been absent. To this end, I propose undertaking a comparative analysis of borderland policing in Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu. This would allow for a number of secondary questions to be addressed, in particular (i) are there significant differences in the Rwandan security practices in Goma/Gisenyi as opposed to Bukavu/Cyangugu? (ii) is anecdotal evidence that greater security 'leakage' occurs at Cyangugu is born out empirically? (iii) what are the security implications of bordering DR.Congo's North Kivu province as opposed to South Kivu, (iv) what are the implications of Goma's status as a larger node than Bukavu in an

international chain of commerce? and (v) what are the security implications of the physical barrier (the Rusizi river) separating Cyangugu and Bukavu?

Summary

This discussion paper has outlined a research project in its earliest stages. My central problematic is the significant cross-border imbalance in internal security between western Rwanda and eastern DR.Congo. I approach this issue through the lens of borderland theory, and in particular analysis treating these regions as generative of structures of power detached from state hierarchies, and as arenas in which competing spheres of authority overlap (see Das & Poole, 2004; Feyissa and Hoehne, 2010; Roitman, 2004).

At the heart of this research are the questions of how, and to what degree, cross-border security imbalances at the site are sustained by discrepancies in state policy and border policing. I suggest that Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu lend themselves to a comparative analysis aimed at investigating the tension between state and non-state modes of governance when it comes to sustaining these imbalances.

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Engaging the Right Security Actors in the Horn of Africa: The Case for CEWERU in CEWARN in the IGAD framework.

By
Mwangi J. Macharia

Email: mwangijm2003@yahoo.com

Lecturer, Dept. Of Philosophy, History and Religion, Egerrton University, Kenya.

ABSTRACT

Over the years, the IGAD region has continuously experienced endemic insecurity that is manifested in violent cross-border conflicts, cattle rustling, human and drug trafficking, and illicit arms trade among others. This insecurity and its consequences have continuously undermined the development of the region and threatened livelihoods. This paper argues that there is need to address various issues influencing inter-community conflicts along the countries' cross-border areas. If development and increased quality of life of the pastoralists is to be realised, it is imperative for security and peace to be fostered.

The paper further argues that efforts to ensure security and conflict resolution must involve partnership between regional bodies, governments, politicians, local security agents, administration, civil society, NGOs, development partners and local community leadership. IGAD has introduced the CEWARN initiative under which the CEWERUs play significant role in ensuring the security of the Somali Cluster. IGAD's initiative is borne out of the need for peace building in the Cross-border areas, through community based peace and security initiative, identify progress achieved and strategically put in place mechanism to address any gaps and challenges that may hinder realisation of peace and security in these areas. The paper examines the use of CEWARN mechanism's work in conflict early warning and response, the role of CEWERU and their effective cooperation and partnership with Civil society, CBOs, FBOs, local administration and security field monitors, district peace committees, development partners including USAID, and international NGOs.

1

ABBREVIATIONS

APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF: African Standby Force

AU: African Union,

CBOs: Community Based Organisations

CEWS: Continental Early Warning system

CEWARN: Conflict Early warning Network

CEWERUs: Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units

COMESA: Common Market for East and Southern Africa

CPMR: Conflict prevention, management and resolution

CPS: Committee of Permanent Secretaries

CSO: Civil Society Organisations

EAC: East African Community

FAU Financial and Administrative Unit (attached to /of CEWERU)

ICPAT: The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism

IGAD: Inter-governmental Authority on Development.

LPC: Local Peace Committee

NRI: National Research Institute (CEWARN)

PEACE: Peace in East and Central Africa

RRF: Rapid Response Fund

TSU: Technical Support Unit (attached to / of CEWERU)

Introduction

The borders between Kenya and her neighbours are faced with a myriad of multi-dimensional security and developmental challenges of the marginalized areas. The problems range from extreme poverty, cross-border conflicts, insecurity, cattle rustling, ethnic clashes and other social economic and political problems that communities in these regions encounter in the course of their activities as Cross-border pastoralists or cross-border traders. The most significant of these problems is that of insecurity since it negatively affects all the other aspects of the lives of the communities. This paper aims to discuss the nature and dynamics of these problems which is often manifested in cross-border conflicts in the Eastern and the Horn of Africa.

The paper argues that these issues impact negatively on the inter-state relationships in the regions

and have a negative bearing on the implementation of regional integration initiatives such as the East African cooperation. This has led to interventions from regional organizations specifically the IGAD, in the trying to eradicate these problems. The key challenge is to find ways to attain safe and secure borders that will also contribute to sustaining and enhancing regional integration efforts. Further, the paper discusses these issues, vis-à-vis opportunities and challenges associated with the regions' governments' approaches and initiatives to these perennial problems and examine the options for developing more far reaching and sustainable solutions to the problem.

Background Information

There is no country without borders. However it is not possible to create a seamless region whose peoples and ways of life merge imperceptibily into one another. The Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands constitute a dynamic livestock trading zone that supports the livelihoods of thousands of people.

Insecurity is an endemic, holistic and crosscutting phenomenon with varying characteristics across contexts. Although there are important distinctions between insecurity, violence, conflict, and crime, definitions often overlap. For instance, violence is usually classified as the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others, however it may also include cultural and structural aspects, such as exclusion, marginalisation, inequality, and injustice within social or economic structures (Galtung, 1996; Moser and Holland, 2004; Rodgers, 2003

Country borders and their peripheries often contain unsafe spaces in which robbery, banditry, cattle rustling; violent crime and general insecurity are more likely to occur. The spatial factors contributing to (in/security) and violence are therefore critical, in particular where there is little confidence in the state's security provision (Moser and Rodgers, 2005).

The measurement of insecurity and armed violence is both difficult and contested: reliable information is often absent and different cultural definitions of crime and violence make comparisons problematic. Moreover, governments, especially in developing countries, are sometimes reluctant to accurately record data regarding insecurity and general crime rates because they may deter tourism or development efforts, may uncover their lack of capacity or the insufficiency of their efforts to take remedial action, or may reveal the involvement of state actors in the violence. As a consequence, mortality statistics, in particular the homicide rate, are commonly used as a proxy for the incidence of armed violence.(ibid)

This paper is based on the assumption that the atrocious suffering that happens on the border every day is neither an accident nor a mistake. It is also not the result of a misunderstanding. Most of it is the predictable and intentional result of policies implemented at various levels of government on both sides of the border. These policies have rational objectives and directly benefit identifiable sectors of the population of both countries. This creates the necessity to initiate and develop deliberate and urgent programmes aimed at steming the problems.

Methodology and significance of the study

In order to collect the requisite data for this paper, we combined a number of methods from different disciplines including history, ethnography, sociology, anthropology and political science. We conducted interviews in the field with communities living on both sides of the borders, their families and traders. We used micro-level perspective to carry out case studies in which we examined cross-border activities, trade and agency of borderlands and to acknowledge the permeability of the borders. We also employed systematic content analysis of some of the published works on security/insecurity on borders and borderlands, especially those focusing on East Africa and the Horn of Africa. In these we realized that majority of the studies carried out have not focused on the CEWARN, an IGAD initiative, deliberately formulated to address the (in)security problems in the Northern and North Eastern frontiers of Kenya and the Horn of Africa.

Location of the Conflict

The states that make up The Horn of Africa are: Burundi, Djibouti, DRC Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The borders between these countries experience persistent and sporadic conflicts within and between communities living across the boarders. However, most of the conflict in this region takes place along the Ethiopian and Kenyan border as well as the disputed area known as the Ilemi triangle (bordering Ethiopia to the south, Kenya to the northwest, and Sudan; today the piece of land is also claimed by South Sudan). The area consists of arid and semi-arid land where ground cover makes up less than 5% and vegetation is known to be very poor. Rainfall occurs in two peaks; one occurring between the months of March to May and the other between October to December. These two peaks in rainfall support the growing seasons in this area and are important for the growth of crops, natural vegetation, and livestock.

The main water sources in this area are The Omo River that runs throughout Ethiopia and into Kenya, and Lake Turkana. The Lake receives more than 90% of its water from the Omo River upstream.

In 2009, these two countries ranked among some of the poorest countries in the world as measured by their per capita gross national income. Both Kenya and Ethiopia's economies are highly dependent on their agricultural sectors that make up a large portion of both countries GDP. Other issues that are prevalent to both of these countries are their high population growths, low literacy rates, low life expectancy, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.

Actors

The Turkana: The Turkana people have historically occupied the area in northwest Kenya located west of Lake Turkana. They are nomadic pastoralists who are believed to have migrated from Uganda to Kenya due to severe drought. Today the Turkana are primarily cattle herders and number around 100,000. The area that they occupy is for the most part unsuitable for growing crops, thus explaining their high dependence on cattle. Most of their population lives in the Lake Turkana area in Kenya but others are known to live west of the Omo River in Ethiopia as well as the Ilemi triangle in Sudan. The survival of this community depends upon their ability to acquire land and to raise and gain more livestock.

The Turkana raise livestock such as sheep, camel, cattle and goats and their diet consists of the milk and meat that they acquire from these animals. This group is also known to trade with other ethnic groups in order to supplement their diets but these interactions often result in disputes over whether these trades are equitable or not.

The Merille: Majority of the Merille people live in southern Ethiopia. A minority of the Merille are to be found in northwest Kenya along Lake Turkana. They are also known as the Dassanach and number around 50,000.

Merille livelihood depends on pastoralism, flood-plain cultivation, and fishing in and around the Omo River. They basically depend on annual flooding of the Omo river in order to grow crops and for vegetation for their livestock to graze on. Given their location close to the floodplains of the Omo River, in the past Merille people have been able to enjoy relatively stable supplies of crops and pasture. However, during the past 50 years or so the Merille have suffered massive losses in their number of cattle, goats, and sheep as a result of land scarcity. The impact of these losses have caused larger numbers of Merille people to migrate to areas closer to the Omo river in an attempt to grow more crops as a way to survive.

Location and Geography.

Kenya is located in East Africa and borders Somalia to the northeast, Ethiopia to the north, Sudan to the northwest, Uganda to the west, Tanzania to the south, and the Indian Ocean to the east. The country straddles the equator, covering a total of 224,961 square miles (582,600 square kilometers. Kenya has wide white-sand beaches on the coast. Inland plains cover three-quarters of the country; they are mostly bush, covered in underbrush. In the west are the highlands where the altitude rises from three thousand to ten thousand feet. Nairobi, Kenya's

largest city and capital, is located in the central highlands. The highest point, at 17,058 feet (5,200 meters), is Mount Kenya. Kenya shares Lake Victoria, the largest lake in Africa and the main source of the Nile River, with Tanzania and Uganda. Another significant feature of Kenyan geography is the Great Rift Valley, the wide, steep canyon that cuts through the highlands. Kenya is also home to some of the world's most spectacular wildlife, including elephants, lions, giraffes, zebras, antelope, wildebeests, and many rare and beautiful species of birds. Unfortunately, the animal population is threatened by both hunting and an expanding human population; wildlife numbers fell drastically through the twentieth century. The government has introduced strict legislation regulating hunting, and has established a system of national parks to protect the wildlife.

Pastoralism and Livestock Trade in the Horn

Gregory Akall, a Turkana pastoralist from northwest Kenya, who specializes in pastoralist and climate change issues in the Horn and East Africa, told IRIN on 5 October that livestock production was central to pastoralists' livelihood and food security. "Livestock trade enables pastoralists to diversify their income and reduce risk or losses during drought by having 'bankable' savings in the form of money, which cannot be wiped out by the drought but they can use it to restock after the drought."

The trade injects money into the local economy and gives pastoralists power and influence to pay for basic services such as food, education and health. "In addition, it reduces their vulnerability during droughts and natural disasters," Akall said.

Choice Okoro, advocacy and outreach officer with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kenya, told IRIN: "Cross-border livestock trade represents perhaps the highest growth area for regional trade in the Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia border areas. But this can only be realized with more robust support. Well facilitated cross-border livestock trade serves as a critical strategy for poverty alleviation for the majority of pastoralists who are the predominant livelihood group in these border areas."

Okoro said the annual profit from livestock trade was estimated by the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa at more than $60 million, including along the border between western Ethiopia and eastern Sudan.

Abdiladif Haji, who heads a committee of traders charged with security and conflict resolution, told IRIN that despite the civil war in Somalia, the trade in livestock never stopped. "There was not a single day when the trade stopped because of problems on the

Somali side," he said, adding, "traders face difficulties and have their share of problems, but we always manage to resolve them. We are faced daily with problems ranging from stolen animals to money disputes. Not once in my 20 years have we involved authorities. We resolve it."

Trade - a common denominator

Communities in the region have developed home-grown conflict resolution mechanism to address in/security issues in order to safeguard trade. "No one wants to spoil the trade," Haji said. "It is a thriving business and we want to keep it that way. We have people across the border; for example, if someone took livestock from Kenya and crossed into Somalia, our members there will make sure that the problem is resolved," Haji said. "The same is true for the Ethiopian side and the Kenyan side. We have developed very close links between traders from all three countries. The members all have clans and sub-clans but we have a common denominator - trade - and we don't want to see it destroyed."

Hussein A Mahmoud said despite political and security problems in Somalia over the past 20 years, "the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands constitute a dynamic livestock trading zone that supports the livelihoods of thousands of people".

He said the trade also had social and political benefits. "The cross-border clan relationships that always underpinned the trade are increasingly giving way to multiple clan business enterprises," Mahmoud said, adding that this helped to build trust and integration.

However, Mahmoud said the cross-border livestock trade also posed some challenges to authorities, in terms of "development and revenue collection and for border security management. The key challenge is to find ways to attain safe and secure borders that will also contribute to sustaining and enhancing this valuable trade and its benefits."

It is this challenge that IGAD and other regional organisations endeavour to address and complement the efforts of the local communitie.

From IGADD to IGAD

The Inter-Govermental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was formed in 1986 in an attempt to address drought, famine and desertification on the Horn of Africa. IGADD also became the forum for political discussions concerning peace and security between its member states. However, increasing threats to human security in the area and member states' inability or unwillingness to deal with this problem undermined the organization and these responsibilities were taken over by international humanitarian organizations.(Khadiagala 2008.p11)

Banditry

Wars in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia have all had their effect on the stability and safety of northern and north-eastern Kenya and the whole region. AK-47s have been flowing into the countries for many years and the newspapers are filled with stories of hold-ups, shoot-outs, cattle rustling and general lawlessness. Bandits and poachers infiltrating from Somalia have made the region particularly dangerous, and with the American 'War on Terror' shutting down the funding for many warring factions within Somalia, these problems can only get worse.

In the northwest, the main problem is armed tribal wars and cattle rustling across the Sudanese border. There are Kenyan shifta (bandits) too, but cross-border problems seem to account for most of the trouble in the north of the country.

During the 1990s, regionalism grew stronger in world politics and the IGADD member states realized that they needed to increase their cooperation to be able to cope with region's problems. Food security was, and had been significant issue for all member-states. As the organization grew, over-all development was increasingly considered a more appropriate framework to address this issue rather than merely looking to drought and desertification. In 1995, it was decided to revitalize and expand the cooperation under the new name of IGAD. The organization was formerly launched in 1996(Francis 2006. P222). Today IGAD member countries are: Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya. Eritrea has suspended its membership due to regional disagreements (Hull 2011. P31)

IGAD interventions

Igad has three overreaching aims;

- ☻ Food security and environmental protection;

- ☻ Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and

- ☻ Economic cooperation and integration (Hull, Ibid)

Although all these areas are of great importance, the focus of this paper is on the area of Peace and Security in accordance with the theme of the conference.

The IGAD secretariat, headed by the Executive secretary, is the executive body of the organization and is divided into four divisions: economic Cooperation and Social Development; Agriculture and Environment; Administration and Finance; Peace and Security. (Hull 2011. P33) The division of Peace and security is itself divided into three '

programmes':

- Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR);

- Political Affairs;

- Humanitarian affairs(Hull 2011 P. 33)

The CPMR is charged with:

- assessment of the capacities of CPMR in the region;

- capacity building training in CPMR for the Secretariat and IGAD focal ministries;

- Control of illicit trafficking of small arms;

- The development of CEWARN;

- The Sudan Peace Process;

- The Somalia Peace Process; and

- The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism(ICPAT)

On peace and security

With regard to Peace and Security within and between the member countries IGAD's vision is to be the '...premier regional organisation for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region' (IGAD 2003. P 5) and to 'promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create a mechanism...for the prevention, management and resolution of intra-state conflicts through dialogue (IGAD 1986).

IGAD has a comprehensive Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was agreed upon by member states in 2003.This is their priority area. An IGAD Peace and security strategy was to be developed by the Peace and Security Division of the IGAD secretariat. The objective of the strategy is to 'develop, implement and sustain a mechanism in order to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the IGAD region (IGAD 2005). The objectives included:

- Facilitation of the development of appropriate nation-level mechanisms to promote national peace and security within the context of common core values;
- Appraisal of structures and mechanism for conflict early warning management

and resolution within the region and across its boundaries;

- ☝ Achievement of consensus on aims, principles and benchmarks for the promotion of regional peace and security; and
- ☝ Monitoring and supporting post-conflict transition.(Ibid)

IGAD is currently considering a new peace and security strategy, expanding and reinforcing the organisations mandate.(Hull Ibid P. 34)

The Conflict Early Warning Strategy-CEWARN

IGAD's CEWARN is one of the regional organisations that have been officially recognised as part of the continental early warning system. It forms part of the central supporting structure of APSA.

CEWARN was established in 2002and is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as part of the IGAD directorate on political and humanitarian affairs. (Francis 2006, p223). CEWARN feeds into APSA and the AU and was originally established as a tool to monitor cross-border pastoral conflicts within IGAD region (Khadiagala 2008, p12)

The pastoral lifestyle in the region had become more mobile due to resource depletion and the increased movement of livestock and people had become a source of comnflict. The movement of livestock to new places was also resulting in the increased spread of diseases, causing concerns in the IGAD region. The pastoral system was therefore considered an important focal point for issues regarding CEWARN119.

Another reason why CEWARN came to be limited to pastoral movement was the member states being apprehensive to sign protocols to surrender national intelligence. Thus, the CEWARN protocols needed to be toned down and focused on specific issues. (120)

Discussions have been on-going since its inception, on the need and possibility to expand the role of CEWARN to not only cover the pastoralist conflicts (Francis 2006, p225).

Three geographical clusters were chosen as pilot project areas for the CEWARN focus:

1. The **Karamoja Region** in the cross-border area of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and

Sudan and

2. The **Somali Cluster**, including the cross-border area of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. These have now been expanded to include a third region:

3. **Afar-Issa** in the cross-border regions of Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, but is planned to extend to all member states (IGAD. CEWARN strategy 2007-2011)

Due to the already developed CEWARN structures, IGAD was naturally identified as the region to help implement the Eastern African part of CEWS even though COMESA and the EAC are constructing similar systems. In addition to IGAD, ECOWAS in West Africa and SADC in the Sothern Africa have similar system.

CEWARN is externally funded. (Francis 2006, p224) The European Union is the main partner to the entire continental conflict early warning mechanism.
The CEWARN's mandate is to:

- ☺ Receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region;
- ☺ Undertake and share analyses of that information;
- ☺ Develop case scenarios and formulate options for response ;
- ☺ Share and communicate information, analyses and response options; and
- ☺ Carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the IGAD region (IGAD protocol on the establishment of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD member states, annex: operating Guidelines for CEWARN.)

The mechanism is both an early warning instrument and an early response unit and operates at three levels: local, national and regional (IGAD. www. Cewarn.org).

At the local level, an information collection network composed of several Field Monitors is supposed to gather and sort out relevant information. Local Committees should also be established to encourage response activities within member states (Ibid).

At the national level, National Research Institutes (NRIs) have been contracted to assist in

the management of the information collection networks. Together with a Country Coordinator, the NRIs coordinate and analyse the data collected by the Field Monitors.

At the national level there are also the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) that are to work as coordinating units and have responsibility for response activities at national level.(Ibid.)

At the regional level, the 'CEWARN unit' is the centre for collecting data, conducting conflict analyses, sharing information and communicating response options. This unit supports CEWARN stakeholders in capacity –building and options. It also coordinates the different CEWARN organs, assists in developing regional cooperation structures and is the driving force for the political process behind the mechanism. It acts as a clearing house and quality controller.

How the mechanism works

The CEWARN Protocol lays down a wide range of areas on which CEWARN can collect information. These include livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry. CEWARN has, however , been mandated by member states to commence with the monitoring of cross-border pastoral and related conflicts, providing information to member states concerning potential violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. Incidentally, the Horn is home to the largest pastoralist population in the world and cattle rustling are one of the violent practices among the pastoral communities.

The mechanism has been operationalised in the clusters named above. These areas only represent a portion of pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa.

CEWARN operates an indicator-based early warning system focused on cross border and interstate pastoral and related conflicts, monitoring specific factors in so far as any aspect relating to them could be a peace-promoting or conflict generating. Collection and analysis of information received from the field is done through National Research Institute (NRIs), independent bodies contracted directly by CEWARN.

Part of the strength of the mechanism is its ability to link up with the formal government

structures at the national and local levels as well as with the civil society. At the national level, CEWERUs have been established in all member states except in Somalia. The composition of CEWERUs includes representatives from government, security agencies, Members of Parliament and civil society. The value of the CEWERU lies in its capacity to generate or cause a response as a result of information or alerts received from CEWARN.

The data analysed reports (which include country and regional updates as well as alerts and situation briefs) generated by CEWARN are shared with the CEWERUs at the national level and with coordinating structures of the mechanism like the Technical Committee on Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) at the regional level.

CEWARN currently produces three periodic reports and two early warning briefs:

- ☉ **Baseline Reports**: provide analyses of the structural influences and causes of conflicts in a historical and socio-economic context. It also provides an overview of the impact of conflict and vulnerability of these communities. These reports are updated after every five years.

- ☉ **Country and Cluster Updates**: These are national and cluster based reports, documenting and analysing the conflict and peace situation of the Areas of Reporting. Both reports are produced after every four months.

- ☉ **Alerts and Situation Briefs**: these are warnings that are issued as the situation demands. Alerts are real time warnings on impeding violent conflicts that need urgent interventions. Situation Briefs report on occurrences (natural or manmade) that could threaten the existing peace or worsen already tense situation and lead to violent conflicts.

All the above reports provide short, intermediate and long term response recommendations to stakeholders at all levels-Local, National and international.

Conclusion.

Overall, IGAD seems to have contributed significantly to addressing the complex issues of in/security in the horn of Africa.The CEWARN however is still hampered by the the restriction to apstoralist conflicts as well as the fact that it is so far only operating in three areas (Hull 2011. P43). In addition, whereas CEWARN has been developed into a primary

source for early warning, IGAD has so far not managed to effectively link early warning to any prevention or early response activities and has thus not managed to avert or mitigate any conflict (Ibid).

The organisation also lacks the teeth to bite, for instance it has no ability to force member states to take appropriate action to address the outbreak of violent conflict or humanitarian emergency, essentially undermining the effectiveness of (CEWERUS and) CEWARN (Francis 2006.P224). It might have to invite otherstakeholders at local, national and regional level both in terms of information-sharing and implementation of responses.(Ibid)

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Marzagora Sara

sara.marzagora@soas.ac.uk

SOAS, University of London

ABORNE Winter School 2013

Ethiopian historiography and the conceptualization of the country's "internal" and "external" boundaries

Abstract

Historians like John Markakis have argued that Ethiopian history can be read through a centre/periphery dynamic. The Amharic- and Tigrinya-speaking highlands always constituted the hegemonic centre, progressively pushing towards, and then incorporating, the lowlands periphery. Ethiopian history can thus be interpreted through the shifting of its internal borders, and the processes of negotiation and struggle linked to them.

Following Markakis' suggestion, my paper will explore how Ethiopian political philosophers and historians answered to two questions: What is Ethiopia? And where does it belong? The first part of the paper will address the definition of Ethiopia national borders during the process of imperial expansion that took place from the 1880s to the 1900s. The historiography of the period is still highly politicized on a central issue: did Emperor Menelik reunite under his rule a nation that already existed? Or were Menelik's campaigns a process of colonization of peoples that had never been part of the Ethiopian nation? The debate is thus focused on the perceived borders of the Ethiopian polity throughout history. Menelik's expansion marks the transition from the porous and fluid conception of borders typical of pre-colonial African polities, to a Weberian-like conception of territorial fixity. The Ethiopian case study is particularly interesting when it comes to analyse this transition, as the new conception of borders was not externally imposed by European colonial conquest, but autonomously pursued by Ethiopian rulers themselves – either as a defence against encroaching European colonialism (the first historical interpretation) or for the opportunistic desire to take part to the Scramble for Africa alongside European powers (the second interpretation).

The conceptualization of the country's borders has another, external dimension: where does Ethiopia belong? For decades, Ethiopian intellectuals and politicians assumed the existence of a cultural, social, religious and political border separating Ethiopia from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopian emperors like Tewodros and Yohannes wrote letters to Queen Victoria, asking Britain's help in annexing territories deemed to rightfully belong to Ethiopia: regions as far away as Egypt and the Holy Land. The sense of belonging to the Middle East starkly contrasted with the Pan-African vision of Ethiopia as the symbolic centre of the whole of Subsaharan Africa. Black nationalists and Pan-Africanist thinkers "dragged" Ethiopia towards the African continent, pushing the continent's boundary towards the Red Sea. Indeed, the feeling of an Ethiopian exceptionalism gradually lost its strength, and, starting from the 1960s, Ethiopian thinkers began conceptualizing their country more as African rather than Middle Eastern. The discussion over the continental position of Ethiopia has always been prominent in scholarship about Ethiopia, showing the arbitrariness of the continental boundaries "invented" (in V. Y. Mudimbe's sense) and imposed by the European colonizers.

1. The Grand Tradition of Ethiopian historiography

Up to the 1980s, Ethiopian historiography was by large dominated by what is now generally referred to as a historiographical "Great Narrative". The central focus of this historiographical tradition is the Ethiopian state, and the "ups and downs of what is assumed to be a broadly continuous political organisation, over the space of some two thousand years" (Clapham 2002:38). These thousand years of "uninterrupted" history stretch back to the Aksumite kingdom in the first centuries B.C. – if not altogether to biblical times. According to the *Kebra Nagast* ("The Glory of Kings"), it was the son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, Menelik I, who carried the Ark of the Covenant to Ethiopia and founded a new dynastic line. Menelik I was hence the true heir of Christianity, and Ethiopians were God's new chosen people. The *Kebra Nagast* was put together in the 14th century, probably to legitimize the coming to power in 1270 of a new dynastic line. The new rulers who ousted the Zagwe dynasty justified their newly acquired power by claiming Solomonic descent. The overthrowing of the Zagwe dynasty was framed, in the new official discourse, as the "restoration" of Ethiopia's legitimate Semitic rulers over the Cushitic Agaw usurpers. Every Ethiopian emperor up to the 20th century claimed Solomonic descent – thus validating the role of

FIG. 3.6. TIGREAN CIRCLE MAP AND WIND ROSE COLLECTED BY ANTOINE THOMAS D'ABBADIE. Paper and ink from the Kebrä Nägäst. The cardinal and intermediate directions are shown in both maps. The sacred city of Aksum lies in the middle of the top map, and the names of the outlying provinces make up the outer circle.
Size of the original: 22.3 × 14 cm. Photograph courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale du France, Paris, Collection Antoine d'Abbadie, 1859 (no. 225, fol. 3).

the Kebra Nagast as Ethiopia's national epic. Haile Selassie inscribed the principle in the 1955 Ethiopian constitution, whose second article recognized a direct line of descent from Salomon to Haile Selassie himself (Sorenson 1993:23). The *Kebra Nagast* produced an ideological reorientation of the whole Ethiopian geography. The heritage of Aksum became a sought-after cultural prize for successive Ethiopian rulers – the biblical legend offering a narrative of prestige and glory and a very effective means of political legitimation.

The map above[1] shows precisely how the geography of the region was seen as deeply imbued with symbolic meanings. The map is a 19th century reproduction of an original contained in a manuscript of the *Kebra Nagast*. Its upper part represents Aksum (in the square) surrounded by two concentric circles, the inner one with the names of cardinal points, the outer one with names of Tigray provinces. Its lower part represents a wind rose with cardinal points around. The symbolic, rather than realistic, value of the map is evident when one analyses the arbitrary orientation of the circles: the two upper ones are oriented northwards and westwards, the lower one is oriented eastwards. Space here reminds of Islamic cosmological maps, with twelve astral sectors (corresponding to the twelve signs of the zodiac) rotating around a centre of gravity. At the time the map was first drawn, the Askumite empire had long disappeared – but without losing its religious significance as a second Jerusalem enshrining the Ark of the Covenant. Aksum here is the centre of the Ethiopian political and religious universe – the holy core of Ethiopian Christianity and a divinely ordained empire, projecting its power farther away towards the periphery. Besides following "a honoured ethnocentric tradition", then, the form of the map "lends itself to distinguishing center from periphery, believers from nonbelievers, and the known from the unknown in a hierarchical and orderly framework" (Bassett 1998:29). The fact that the map was reproduced exactly in the same way in 1859, centuries after it was first drawn, shows the remarkable persistence of a philosophy conflating history, geography (terrestrial and celestial), religion and politics. The main characteristic of such hybrid philosophy is its conceptualization of a centre/periphery hierarchy, which shaped a significant part of Ethiopian intellectual history.

In particular, the *Kebra Nagast* marks two borders that would define Ethiopian history up to the present day. The first one is an internal border, dividing Semitic-speaking peoples and non-Semitic speaking peoples, Christians and non-Christians. In Edward Ullendorff's words,

> "the historical fiction of uninterrupted line of kings descended from Menelik I, the son of King Solomon and Queen Sheba, has very deep roots in Ethiopia […]. The historical kernel of this legend no doubt derives from the identification of the Ethiopia dynasty with Hebraic-Jewish elements in the Abyssinian past and their insistence on the Semitic, or semitized ethnic relationship" (1966:24-25).

This border took up a geographical dimension as well, as Semitic-speaking Christians settled into the northern highland plateau of the Horn, while the lowlands to the south-west and south-east were inhabited by non-Semitic groups, often Muslim or followers of traditional religions. In Menelik's own definition, Ethiopia is "a Christian island surrounded by a sea of pagans" – a statement that vividly

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[1] Taken from Bassett 1998:29.

pictures the idea of highland fortress constantly threatened by the encroachment of hostile people around. Finally, this internal border was also framed from the racial point of view. *Habesha* (Amharic and Tigrayan) people saw themselves as looking different from the "sea of pagans" around them. Slave-raiding expeditions to lowland areas were common – and physical features commonly associated with lowlands people started being associated with low social status. In the second part of this paper we shall analyse the historical evolution of this internal border, and how the border was constructed from a discursive point of view.

The second border separated for centuries Ethiopia from the rest of the continent. It firmly placed the country within the Middle Eastern cultural area, in the cultural basin where Abrahamic religions were born and developed. The Great Narrative was deeply imbued with a sense of Ethiopian exceptionalism: a deep cultural, historical and even racial border was thought to exist between Ethiopia and the rest of the African continent. The boundary was also disciplinary – in Wendy James's words, the line between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

> "would make a large circular detour southwards to exclude Ethiopia. This line is an inherited boundary of the colonial imagination, and it unfortunately inhibits communication not only between those who study Ethiopia on the one hand and those concerned with the rest of Africa on the other, but also between historians and anthropologists" (1986:246-247).

The disciplinary separation persists up to the present day, with few anthropologists concerned about highland Ethiopia and few historians interested in peripheral histories.

The Grand Narrative of Ethiopian historiography tended to take these two boundaries as certain. After the "Solomonic restoration" in 1270, Ethiopia went through periods of external intrusion (the jihad of Ahmed Gragn, the Portuguese influence, the Oromo migration), and arrived almost at a stage of disintegration during the Zemene Mesafint[2] (1769-1855). The tables turned in the middle of the 19th century, with the rise of Tewodros, who initiated the process of modernization and centralization of the country. Yohannes followed suit, and Menelik finally completed the state-building project: under his reign, so the Great Tradition goes, Ethiopia reconquered all of its lost lands, establishing its present-day borders, and defeated European imperialism at Adwa, confirming its "separate destiny".

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[2] The "Age of the Princes", characterized by the collapse of central state authority and by continuous infighting between different provincial landlords.

The Ethiopian state-building process was not different from that followed by all the other precolonial African states (see paragraph 2.3) – an original core expanding in the surrounding territory. In the case of the Ethiopian state this original core, the northern highland region, maintained up to the present day a cultural and economic hegemony over its hinterland. Because this centre-periphery disparity of power seems to have characterized a good part of Ethiopian history, an interpretative paradigm developed looking at Ethiopian history from the point of view of this relationship. In this paradigm, the terms "centre" and "periphery" are neither geographical nor cultural (despite having a strong geographical component), but rather indicate those who detain power and those who are excluded by it. The Great Narrative, with its exclusive theleological focus on the glories of the Ethiopian state, missed out a good deal on this power relation.

This essay points at the 1960s and, more prominently, at the 1970s as the period in which the two borders underpinning the Great Tradition started being contested or blurred. The Derg regime[3] was built at the same time on the dramatic tightening of mechanisms of state control over the peripheries, and on the "first glimmerings of a representative structure in which various localized 'nationalities' were accorded a distinct identity" (Clapham 2002a:21). Ironically, this form of ethnic representation would provide the basis for the EPRDF[4]'s ethnofederalism in the 1990s. However, historians are pessimist regarding whether these forms of contestation effectively overcame the country's centre-periphery dynamics. John Markakis, for example, argues that none of the successive policies of the empire, socialist regime and federalist democracy addressed "the fundamental political issue that continues to galvanise resistance: the assumed exclusive right of the Abyssinian elite to rule the state and plot the course leading to national integration" (Markakis 2011:5).

Nevertheless, new historiographies emerged from the 1970s onwards – this time the peripheries 'talking back' to the centre. This paper shall trace the history of the Great Narrative, and of the counter-historiographies emerging from the 1970s onwards. The focus shall remain on Ethiopia's internal and external border, and the way they were variously conceptualized in time. Two questions will frame our investigation – the first about the idea of 'Ethiopia' itself: how can 'Ethiopia' and 'Ethiopianness' be defined? What does 'Ethiopia' mean? The second investigation is about Ethiopia's placement on the world map: is Ethiopian really African? And is Ethiopia really unique within the African continent?

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3 Socialist-inspired military regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. It ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991.
4 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, an alliance of independentist movements that toppled Mengistu in 1991, promulgated a new constitution based on ethnic federalism in 1994 and has been ruling the country ever since.

2. What is Ethiopia?

2.1 The internal borders: Ethio-centric discourse

Menelik engaged in a process of military conquest that eventually doubled the size of the Ethiopian empire. When Menelik was enthroned king of Shoa[5] the empire was mostly confined to the highlands regions of Ethiopia; by the time of his death in 1913 it incorporated vast territories of the lowlands regions of the Horn, southwards, westwards and eastwards of the traditional highland core of the Abyssinian empire. Such newly-annexed territories were, for the most part, inhabited by non-*Habesha*, non-Semitic people: Oromo, Gurage, Afar, Somali, Gurage, Kaffa, Nuer, Sidama, Konso, and many more. As a consequence of Menelik's conquest, these people lost their independence and have been subjected to the rule of Addis Ababa ever since.   From the perspective of the Grand Narrative, the expansion, as it is invariably described (Markakis 2011:93), was the final stage in the struggle for the reunification of Ethiopia. Menelik's newly conquered borders were projected back in time as the ancient borders of the country – and thus were naturalized in a process of historical authentication: Menelik had just restored what had always been the geographical identity of Ethiopia. Historians of the Great Tradition uniformly celebrated Menelik's expansion as the moment in which Ethiopia finally re-gained its territorial unity (Markakis 2011:6). In the words of Teferra Haile Selassie: "Menelik, during his long years reign, restored and united most of the medieval territories of Ethiopia" (1997:36). Similarly, Getachew Haile similarly observes that: "this region [the Horn of Africa] had been under the control of the Emperors of Ethiopia from about the beginning of the Christian era until the revolt of the vassal king of Adal, Grany [Ahmed Gragn], in the sixteenth century, and the subsequent invasion of the Horn by the Oromo and the Somali" (1986:465).

The Great Narrative puts forward a peculiar idea of national borders: projected into the past and based on symbols of antiquity. Ethiopia, so this narrative goes, was born out of divine will in a biblical past, and has always existed as a nation ever since. This nationalistic interpretation stresses the cultural and territorial unity of the country, its continuity and "uninterrupted" history (which had made some historians wonder which history is *not* "uninterrupted"). Sorenson summarizes this ideological attitude in the following terms: "those who see themselves as Ethiopians, particularly those identifying with the Amhara culture […] typically subscribe to a narrative of history that projects a unified territory and identity into a distant past" (1993:39). Such "antimaterialist paradigm" (Sorenson 1993:72) tends to flatten the present onto the past, and the past onto the present: the past is used to justify present-day ideologies and policies, and present-day ideologies

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[5] Region situated in the middle of Ethiopia's highland plateau, where present-day Addis Ababa is situated. It used to be an independent kingdom within the Ethiopian Empire.

and policies modify the interpretation of the past. It is "history written backwards" (Reid 2011:110), underpinned by the assumption that, if something was in a certain way in the past, then it must remain in that way in the present, or be "restored" to its original authenticity. Not dissimilarly, contemporary debates and ideas are projected back into the past – first and foremost that of "Ethiopia", a concept that for centuries hardly existed in the consciousness of historical actors. This narrow focus ends up emphasizing, in Ethiopia's history, only those episodes that can be used to glorify the Ethiopian state (Clapham 2002b:41).

Western scholars also reinforced the idea of Ethiopia as a single cultural area with a unified identity, privileging Semitic contributions and largely overlooking the Cushitic ones. Albert Gérard, one of the major scholars of Literatures in African languages, remarks that "no imaginative literature seems to have been produced in any of the Non-Amharic vernaculars of Ethiopia" so that "the phrase Amharic literature can legitimately be used nowadays as a synonym for Ethiopian literature" (1971:287). Edward Ullendorff similarly denies the cultural relevance of two thirds of Ethiopian population, claiming that "Amharic and Tigrai are the virtually exclusive carriers of Ethiopian civilization, literature and intellectual prestige" (1966:31).

The border between the Semitic and Cushitic element was reinforced by the suggestion of some Western scholars that the Aksumite kingdom was initiated by Semitic migrants from South Arabia. The prejudice that native African people could not have created such an advanced civilization seems to have informed some early supporters of the "whitening explanation" (Messay 2003:7). The result is the confirmation of the internal hierarchy perceived to exist between *Habesha* and the other Ethiopian peoples – and a fossilization of racial and ethnic labels. Even an apparently minor historical issue, such as the exact location of the Queen of Sheba's reign (present-day Ethiopia or present-day Yemen?), becomes then a polemical debate about the internal Semitic/Cushitic border. The South Arabian hypothesis was taken up by some Ethiopian scholars themselves, and became a central component of the Great Narrative. Taddesse Tamrat, for example, remarks that

> "it is most likely that at the time of their earliest contact with the south Arabians the native people were in a primitive stage of material culture, and lived in small isolated clans or groups of clans with no state or political organizations. This must have given the immigrants an excellent opportunity to assert themselves and easily reduce the local population to a position of political vassalage" (1972:8).

Messay reacts very strongly against the idea of a minority rule of Semitic people from the Arabic peninsula dominating over an indigenous majority – for him, it is on the grounds of this Eurocentric scholarship that the "internal colonialism" thesis developed:

> "the Semitic thesis is to enlarge the disparity between the north and the south. It crowns the already existing cultural gap with a racial connotation to the point of construing the southern expansion of Ethiopia as nothing less than a colonial conquest". (2003:11)

He goes on to argue that the Aksumite civilization was by all means an indigenous one, much more advanced than South Arabian societies. The Semitic and Cushitic component were thus "two component parts [of the Aksumite kingdom] that went separately as a result of a divergent evolution" (2003:17). Both "are part of the same original unity" and need to be "reunited" (2003:17).

This essay agrees that Western scholarship at times reinforced the marginalization of non-*Habesha* heritage in the history of the country. Nevertheless, we are going to challenge Messay's position from a number of points of view. First of all, the paper will show that a centre/periphery hierarchy was far from being a Western invention: it was in fact widespread even among the so-called progressive intellectuals of the first part of the 20th century. Secondly, the conception of only one internal border differentiating "Semitic" and "Cushitic" Ethiopia appears overwhelmingly simplistic. Many Ethiopian wars have been waged within these areas: the distinction between Tigray/Tigrayan people and Shoa/Amhara people being no less pivotal in Ethiopian history than the Semitic vs. Cushitic one. Messay's distinction completely excludes the Omotic and Nilo-Saharan communities living in the country's Western borders. This is no minor analytical imprecision, as it shows that Omotic and Nilo-Saharan communities are the very periphery of Ethiopianness, to the point of not even being worth mentioning in a discussion on the country's ethnic makeup. Furthermore, Messay's "call for a new and richer Ethiopianism" (2003:17) completely ignores the violence that peripheral groups suffered as a consequence of highland domination (Markakis 2011:89). The economic exploitation and cultural oppression is a historical fact that cannot be overlooked (Reid 2011:87). Its memory is well and alive amongst peripheral people, and it greatly contributed to the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements. Messay thinks that supporters of the internal colonialism thesis are all culturally alienated, and passively adopt Western historical theories. Yet, there is also a socio-political aspect to the equation, and, regardless of the "original ethnic unity" of the country, Addis Ababa's centralizing and assimilationist policies did produce the marginalization of the country's peripheries. It is true that many Oromo nationalist historians simply reversed the Great Tradition's idea of an original unity and authenticity, and challenged its assumptions with

equally problematic theories. But Messay does not step out of the Great Tradition either, in his search for an "authentic" Ethiopian past that validates or disproves contemporary events – since the Aksumite Kingdom in 300 B.C. was not based on Semitic domination over the Cushitic majority, so his reasoning goes, Menelik II could not have implemented internal colonialism in the 1890s. Ethiopian identity is fixed once for all in history, and needs to be "restored", "reunified" back to its original unity. This is why for him it is important to reject the idea that Aksum was founded by Semitic people from the Arabic peninsula: Messay proposes a rigid territorial and cultural identity, in which you are either out forever or in forever. If Aksum was founded by immigrants, then it is un-Ethiopian and needs to be claimed back into Ethiopian heritage. But was there any idea of "Ethiopianness" at the time? Was the Red Sea conceived as a border between "Africa" and "Asia"? Was it conceived as a border, between, as Messay says, "us", the advanced Aksumite civilization, versus "them", the underdeveloped Arabic peninsula? Why does a non-indigenous origin detract from the glory of Aksum?

This paper rejects Messay's narrow conception of cultural and territorial identity, showing that cultural and geographical borders were conceived in a much more fluid and dynamic manner throughout the country's history.

2.2 The challenge to Ethio-centric discourse

From the 1970s onwards, the Great Tradition has received much criticism, as the legitimation tool of a centralist regime that was at its most oppressive at the time. Counter-narratives soon emerged in the form of Somali Studies, Eritrean Studies and Oromo studies, addressing the histories of peoples usually ignored by the Great Tradition[6]. The question was asked by David Levine whether Menelik's imperial expansion was "a subjugation of alien people or an ingathering of peoples with deep historical affinities" (1974:26), and although Levine opted for the second explanation, after his *Greater Ethiopia* was published in 1974 the historiography of the region increasingly answered in the first way. Menelik's expansion was interpreted as internal colonialism, just like Haile Selassie's annexation of Eritrea was interpreted as a colonialist move.

Whether this new counter-historiography managed to overcome Ethiopia's internal border, this is more dubious. It constructed rival identities, legitimizing their existence with the same tools used by the Great Tradition: antiquity, unity, authenticity. In Clapham's words, it is significant "that the Ethiopian great tradition has become so entrenched in the construction of legitimating state

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[6] As of today, there is unfortunately no established counter-historiography of other ethnic groups. Especially lacking appears to be a historiography of the people of the very lowlands of the Ethiopian state.

ideologies in the region that the devotees of a new state should feel impelled to create a counter-tradition to accompany it" (2002b:59).

2.2.1 - The Eritrean response.

The possibility of Eritrean independence was seen by many Ethiopians at the time as an amputation of Ethiopia's core. One of the best expressions of this feeling is a letter that Tigrayan intellectual Gebre-Egzabhér Gila-Maryam sent to Emperor Menelik in 1899, in which he criticizes Menelik's decision not to have continued his military campaign against the Italians after the victory of Adwa. For Gebre-Egzabhér, Menelik decided to abandon into the grip of the Europeans an integral part of Ethiopian territory, being more interested in consolidating his rule in the southern provinces. Here is an extract from what Bahru Zewde defines "one of the most scathing letters that had ever been addressed to any Ethiopian ruler" (2002:156-157):

> "King Teodoros and King Yohannes […] preserved their mother country with great veneration. But You, Your Majesty, have severed its integral parts completely. […] Even though Your Majesty had power to do otherwise, You are proceeding to tear to pieces Your Mother Ethiopia's womb. […] Either because of incapacity of because of stupidity, You are disposing of Ethiopia as a person disposes of his urine"

And then the final blow:

> "Call your reign Menelik the Second, King of Kings of Galla and of half of Ethiopia" (quoted in Bahru 2002:157).

Or in other words: what kind of Emperor are you, who preferred to rule over the pagan and uncivilized Galla, allowing your motherland (in Gebre-Egzabhér's view, this is clearly highland Abyssinia) to be split in two by foreigners? Never had Ethiopia's internal border been reaffirmed with such passionate and uncompromising sharpness.

Ethiopian writers celebrated Haile Selassie's 1962 annexation of Eritrea with jubilation – for example, in plays like Eshete Damesse's *Ertra kuri, edme laTeferi* ("Be proud Eritrea, long live Teferi"), in which the character playing Mother Ethiopia welcomes back Eritrea, in a happy reunion after years of tribulation (Kane 1975:180). Yet, there was an intrinsic ambiguity in the way Eritrea was historically represented. Although Ethiopian historians claimed that Eritrea had always been part of Ethiopia, at the same time they imply that with the 1962 annexation, Ethiopia finally gained the long-cherished access to the sea. But if Ethiopia had never had access to the sea, how could it include Eritrea in its domains? It appears evident that labels like "Ethiopia" and "Eritrea" are here

used in a non-historical way, trying to legitimize, Grand Narrative-style, a contemporary configuration of power on the grounds of its antiquity. More importantly, they projected present-day conception of state borders to a past where a very different conception was in place. Pre-modern borders were porous, flexible, and no map existed demarcating an 'Eritrean province' within 'mother Abyssinia'. No map existed marking the border, except for Italian ones much later on in time; and the Italians inflated their territorial conquests in their cartography, including in their colonial territories stretches of land that at the time were not under their control. This caused a good number of disputes, when, in an era in which the international system of sovereign states was based above all on clearly demarcated territories. Eritrean scholars opposed the Great Narrative by rejecting the antiquity argument and pointing at the transformative effect of Italian colonialism in their country. The Italian rule from 1890 to 1941 was a decisive break with the past, and created a new national identity. In stark contrast to

> "the Ethiopian narrative construction of history, with its rhetorical emphasis on continuity, essence, and the use of the remote past as validation of the present, a key theme of Eritrean nationalist discourse is the idea of a decisive rupture that created a new identity, authentic, legitimate and fundamentally different from that of other peoples in the region" (Sorenson 1993:44).

Two different conceptions of national borders clash in the debate. For Ethiopians, the nation is fixed, transhistorical, unchanging. The independence of Eritrea, Oromia or the Ogaden are a threat to the Ethiopian national self: identity must be maintained at all costs (Sorenson 1993:75). Eritrean discourse proposes a very different conception of national borders: identity is constantly invented and reinvented, constantly modified and negotiated in time.

2.2.2. The Oromo response

Whereas Eritrean nationalism is a territorial type of nationalism, Oromo nationalism is distinctively ethnic in character. While the Great Narrative stressed the 'sameness' of Eritreans and Ethiopians to undermine Eritrean claims to independence, the Oromos, on the contrary, had always been conceived as 'radically other'. The same idea of antiquity was used to undermine the 'Ethiopianness' of the Oromos: because they migrated to present-day Ethiopian territory only in the 16th century, they are intruders in a land that is not theirs. From the point of view of Ethiopian nationalists, since an Oromo state never existed in the past it cannot exist in the future (Sorenson 1993:62). Since their migration, the Oromos have adopted a huge variety of lifestyles, some becoming agriculturalists, some remaining pastoralists; some converted to Christianity, some to Islam and some retained their

traditional religions; some founded states, some lived in loose social structures – and in all this, they mixed with other cultures and mediated between them. Clapham defines the Oromos as an interstitial people, blurring cultural boundaries, interacting with all of the other ethnic groups in Ethiopia – and thus veritably acting as the glue of Ethiopian multiculturalism (2002b:49). This history of diversity could provide a great way to overcome Ethiopia's internal border, promoting the country's rich, varied and hybrid cultural heritage.

Ethno-nationalism, though, led Oromo historians to search for an authentic source of Oromonness, for a single definition of Oromo identity that could provide the basis for anti-Amhara ethnic solidarity. Against the focus on national unity of the Great Narrative, Oromo historians like Mohammed Hassen (1990) and Asafa Jalata (1993) chose to emphasize the unity of the Oromos: different Oromo kingdoms were, too, in a process of uniting in a single, centralized Oromo state, but this process of state formation was interrupted by Abyssinian colonialism. Oromo historians struggled to create new unified national identity (Sorenson 1993:62) rather than celebrating the diversity, adaptability, tolerance and cultural openness typical of Oromo history. Despite Oromo people were the ones that more vividly contributed to blurring Ethiopia's internal border, Oromo historians construct a unique and separate identity for them. In so doing, they ended up reinforcing such internal boundary – quite ironically, the same boundary that caused the discrimination and cultural oppression Oromo historians declare to fight against.

2.3 Mutability vs. fixity of borders

The first reaction to the Great Narrative was thus to stress the power relation existing between the core of the Empire and its politically and scholarly marginalized outskirts. However, both the Great Tradition and the nationalist reactions to it are based on a distorted vision of pre-colonial borders. Herbst (2000) argued that power in pre-colonial Africa was nonterritorial. Population density remained very low throughout Africa's pre-colonial history, and therefore land was plentiful. Agriculture was extensive and rain-fed, with low levels of investments in any particular piece of land and low levels of productivity – a circumstance that also made the land not particularly valuable (Herbst 2000:38). This led African rulers to accept a "far more nuanced understanding of control of territory", and to tolerate a high level of "ambiguity in demarcating control over territory" (Herbst 2000:41). African states invariably derived from core zones until they were stopped by the "progressive weakening of the force that can be projected from the core, into poorer and less densely settled peripheries" (Clapham 2002b:10). The abundance of land and low population density made it difficult to project power, especially in peripheral areas, as it was very easy for discontented people to split off, move out and settle down further away. Thus African states "seldom possessed

fixed boundaries (which arise when the power of one state is checked by that of neighbouring states), but spread out from the core into hinterlands of tributary rule and mere raiding, which expanded or contracted with the strength of the ruler" (Clapham 2002b:10). The conception of "control" was structured over a gradient of power rather than an absolute of power, in a concentric pattern from central areas of direct control, to "assimilated and politically integrated dependencies", to "vassal polities", "tribute-paying polities" and areas in which tribute could be extracted only sporadically through raids or pillage (Kopytoff 1987:29). This was possible especially because of the conceptual separation between control of the land and control of the people – the latter being possible even if the former was lacking (Herbst 2000:40). Overall, African polities were incredibly dynamic entities, both in terms of permeability of boundaries and in cultural terms: "because the broadcasting of power was constrained, there was much more cultural diversity even within pre-colonial empires than in later European empires" (Herbst 2000:44).

Precolonial African cartography confirms such conception of power. Unconcerned with realism and topography, maps represented the symbolic contents of power and the political significance of territory. The map of Aksum in paragraph 1 is a case in point, as it perfectly conforms to an African cartographical tradition that "used landscape references to express ideas about identity, migration histories, mythology, and relationships with spiritual forces" (Austen 2001). In the map of Aksum, just like in other precolonial maps, power is represented as radiating from a well-defined centre. The peripheries are often much more compressed and represented inattentively with much less detail. And often, there are no political borders at all – the map of Ethiopia on the left[7], drawn at the end of the 19th century from an official in Ras Makonnen's camp, appears completely unconcerned with territorial boundaries, and once again places the centre of power (Entotto) in the middle of the map.

FIG. 3.22. MAP OF ETHIOPIA ATTRIBUTED TO "THE CAMP OF RAS MAKONNEN," 1899. Entotto (Intotto), an early location of Ethiopia's capital, lies at the center of the map. North is at the top.
Size of the original: unknown. From Carlo Conti Rossini, "Geographica," *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici* 3 (1943): 167–99, esp. 174 (fig. 9).

Recent Ethiopian scholarship has contested the existence of a rigid hierarchy between a well-defined centre and a well-defined periphery. John Markakis (2011) conceives power in Ethiopia in the

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[7] Taken from Bassett 1998:47.

concentric way theorized by Herbst for pre-colonial states, with gradients of integration radiating from the seat of political power. Markakis thus differentiates a 'highland periphery', to which the Oromos mostly belong, and a 'lowland periphery', such as Gambella. The internal border separating highland centre and highland periphery is, according to Markakis, "one of the last frontiers Ethiopia's rulers have to cross to redress the imbalance of power that marginalizes the majority of its people and is the cause of endless strife" (2011:15). The persistence of this internal border is detrimental to the consolidation of Ethiopia as a politically integrated state. The failure to cross this internal highland frontier makes it impossible, for Markakis, to "forge a system of government based on consensus and legitimacy, and to complete the process of nation-state building" (Markakis 2011:15). But there is a second frontier Ethiopia needs to overcome in its road to nation-building: the lowlands periphery. Here, "the integration process has barely begun", and "no real effort was made to bridge the chasm until the coming of the 21st century" (2011:16). This border divides radically different geographies and lifestyles: cultivation vs. pastoralism, peasants vs. nomads and, often, Christianity vs. Islam or traditional religions. Lying all over the outskirts of the Ethiopian states, these areas are often mired in conflict (and poverty as a consequence) – and the manifestation of the central government lowlands inhabitants see more often is the military. Other than the military, the government is remarkably absent: local pastoralist people do not pay taxes and they rely on themselves for security and on their traditional leaders for laws and justice. The challenge, here, is integrating this periphery without destroying its cultures (Markakis 2011:17, see also Clapham 2002a:22). The power imbalance between centre and periphery led to a recurrent pattern in Ethiopian history: pressures from the periphery caused the centre to split in two, and then to collapse. Only by addressing the deep power imbalance, reasons Markakis, can Ethiopia become a stable polity.

The 'centre' itself is at times hard to define, with power residing alternatively in the hands of Shoa and Tigray – a power struggle that dominated the region's history, from the Aksumite Empire to the present day. The definition of Tigrayan identity itself was contested due to the separate historical process taking place across the Mareb river – producing a split between two different Tigrayan cores, an Ethiopian one and an Eritrean one. The region can be best understood as comprising a multifaceted network of centre-periphery relations, having no single direction. Reid moves radically beyond a centre-periphery framework when he proposes to conceptualize the Horn "in terms of tectonics – a mosaic of fault lines and frontier zones, shifting borderlands which are not peripheries but which have defined the very nature of the states and societies themselves" (2011:20). Secondly, his analysis reveals how the peripheries do have a strong political agency as well. In Ethiopia power not only moves from Addis Ababa to marginalized peripheries – peripheries do, in turn, shape the

centre, both in terms of economic transformation, demographic changes and cultural influence. Reid concludes that "states are ultimately defined by their turbulent borderlands, which are thus not 'peripheral' but are seedbeds, zones of interaction which are constructive, creative and fertile as they are destructive and violent" (2011:21). Is it thanks to this dynamics, Markakis agrees, that "Ethiopian culture today is very different from the Abyssinian prototype. […] The contribution of the periphery to the emerging national culture is undeniable" (2011:10).

Just like borders, ethnic relations were much more fluid in pre-colonial times – and remained so until the 1960s, when movements of ethnic nationalism emerged in protest against the centralizing policies of Addis Ababa. In Ethiopian history, ethnic boundaries shifted together with frontiers, new collective identities being constantly created and reinvented every time the borderlands changed. Confirming once more the creative role of margins, Reid remarks that in Ethiopia "sometimes the communities pre-date the frontiers, which are thus formed by expanding polities, at other times the frontiers have emerged first, and serve to forge the communities" (2011:21). In Ethiopian history up to the 1960s, a strong assimilationist model was in place. The dominant culture was the Amhara one, based on Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity. The idea of ethnicity was mostly linguistic and religious, and any imperial subject who converted to Christianity and spoke Amharic fluently could be incorporated in the ruling elite. From this point of view Amhara identity was open and accommodating, based on a mobile rather than essentialist view of cultural identity. However, it was based at the same time on the systematic denigration of other cultural heritages and other religions. As a consequence, "those whose cultures have been devalued by Amhara hegemony emphasise the power relations inherent in such a national identity, the necessity to commit cultural suicide, and the inability for non-Amhara to ever fully succeed" (Sorenson 1993:69). Tedla Hailé's 1930 MA thesis is revealing of how the Ethiopian intelligentsia was planning to tackle ethnic boundaries in the first half of the 20th century. From Tedla's point of view, the only two ethnic groups that play a relevant role in the country are Amharas and Oromos, and it is auspicable that there be an harmonious relationship between them. There are three solutions with regard to the Oromo: enslavement and expropriation, assimilation and indirect rule (Bahru 2002:132). After having ruled out the first and the third, Tedla decidedly opts for assimilation: "it is for the Galla[8] to become Amhara and not the other way round, for the latter possess a written language, a superior religion and superior customs and mores" (quoted in Bahru 2002:132). After all, the Oromos, given their lack of 'racial pride' and their willingness to intermarry with other ethnic groups, are easily to assimilate (Bahru 2002:132).

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[8] Name by which the Amhara used to call the Oromos, now considered denigratory.

The supporters of such assimilationist policy are motivated by a desire to preserve 'national unity' – which to them means mostly Amhara cultural and political control. It is homogeneity that they seek to achieve, modelling all imperial subjects in the image of their rulers and civilizers. A very good example of this attitude is a memo prepared in 1933 by Sahle Tsedaky, the minister of education at the time:

> "The strength of a country lies in its unity, and unity is born of common language, customs and religion. Thus, to safeguard the ancient sovereignty of Ethiopia and to reinforce its unity, out language and out religion should be proclaimed over the whole of Ethiopia. Otherwise, unity will never be attained. Amharic and Ge'ez should be decreed official languages for secular as well as religious affairs and all pagan languages should be banned" (quoted in Bahru 2002:140).

Lij Iyasu, emperor between 1913 and 1916, seems to have preferred a different ethnic conception of 'Ethiopia'. Since he came to power, he proved tolerant towards Islam, and willing to rehabilitate Muslims in Ethiopian society. He built mosques, married into prominent Muslim families and often travelled to the Somali-inhabited Ogaden – in addition, his father was a former Muslim (later Christian convert). To Ethiopia's establishment at the time this could not be accepted. Inaccurate rumours about the imminence of Iyasus's own conversion prompted the Shoan Christian elite to depose him, and the Orthodox Church to excommunicate him. His military forces were defeated at Sagale in October 1916 – a battle that, for Reid, marks "a decisive moment in modern Ethiopian history" in what would prove to be "a victory for the forces of conservatism" (Reid 2011:131). Iyasus was advocating a blurring of Ethiopia's internal cultural border; a nuancing of Amhara linguistic and religious chauvinism. After his deposition, the border remained. And it was fought upon, in the armed struggles of the 1970s and 1980s. We have to wait until the federalist constitution of 1994 for freedom of religion and freedom of language to be inscribed in Ethiopian law – together with new administrative and political autonomy for the nine newly-designed ethnic provinces. The principles of ethnic federalism had a double effect: on one side, it finally affirmed cultural and linguistic freedom for all Ethiopian people. On the other, though, it fossilized ethnic borders into distinct ethnic provinces. The reform was underpinned by the principle of "separate but equal" which at times created artificial administrative barriers and imposed ethnic labels to porous social contexts, forcing the people to choose, once for all, to which one label swear their alliance to. The result is that from a context of fluid ethnicity and cultural assimilationism Ethiopia moved to rigid ethnic demarcation and cultural devolution. The reinforcement of ethnic boundaries, albeit producing some positive effects, shows the reticence of Ethiopian society in building a truly multicultural

cohabitation, valuing hybridity and finding a common ground for a shared, inclusive 'Ethiopianness'. The internal border, albeit more nuanced, is still in place.

3. Where does Ethiopia belong?

3.1. Ethiopia's external border: conceptualizing Ethiopian exceptionalism

Ethiopia's internal border still seems to play a decisive role in the consciousness of various Ethiopian peoples – but how about its external one? As we shall see in the next paragraphs, the Great Narrative was largely based on this sense of exceptionalism – of being God's chosen people, and thus having a 'separate destiny' from neighbouring countries. The idea of Ethiopian exceptionalism rested on an historical paradigm that saw Ethiopia as isolated from the surrounding areas, and indeed from the world – a paradigm best encapsulated by the often-quoted words of Edward Gibson that "encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom they were forgotten". This sense of isolation appears to have been shared by a good part of Ethiopian intellectuals in the first half of the 20th century – but came to be increasingly contested from the 1960s onwards. Ethiopian and Western scholars alike demonstrated that Ethiopia has always played a central role in a regional network of trade, cultural exchanges, ideological borrowings, religious interactions (Clapham 2002b:51-52; Teshale 1995).

Nowadays, the idea of Ethiopian exceptionalism has been rejected by almost all contemporary historians. Clapham, for example, rejects the 'isolationist' historical paradigm by saying that it only

> help[ed] divorce Ethiopia from its African past. The 'great tradition' is explicitly non-African, even anti-African: its emphasis is on connecting Ethiopia with the Christian and Semitic worlds - with the Red Sea, Arabia, and even the Mediterranean. It is no cause for surprise that many of its most distinguished exponents have been Jewish. Not only Ethiopia but the Horn as a whole are, in their narrative, in Africa but not of it. Eritrean history, of necessity, is still more markedly slanted towards linkages with Arabia, Egypt and the Mediterranean (2002b:51).

He consequently advocates a new historiographical attention to Omotic and Nilo-Saharan people, components of the Ethiopian state that could bridge the epistemological gap between the idea of 'Ethiopia' and that of 'Africa':

> The peoples of the south and west provide - even more than the pastoralists or the Oromo - the human links between the Horn and sub-Saharan Africa; and not until

their histories have been written will we be in a position to assess the exceptionalism of the Horn (2002b:51).

What Ethiopian historiography has already achieved is to demonstrate, first of all, that Ethiopian state formation follows a very common African pattern. Similarly, Donald Donham has convincingly argued that the label "feudalism" can hardly apply to the Ethiopian past, as, just like in other African states and in contrast with European feudalism, there was no significant cultural difference between lower and upper classes (Donham 1986:8-17). But when was this exceptionalist conception of Ethiopian identity undermined? At what stage in history did the Ethiopians rethink their continental belonging? In the following paragraphs, we point at the role of the battle of Adwa as a determinant factor in reconfirming the idea that Ethiopia had a 'separate destiny' from its neighbours. The nationalism inspired by Adwa was later deluded by the lack of progress in the country – especially when compared to European colonies everywhere else in Africa. The 1936-1941 Italian occupation seemed to prove that Ethiopia, too, was suffering the same weaknesses than other African countries – and triggered a slow process of 're-Africanization' of the country's consciousness.

3.2 The 1896 battle of Adwa: Ethiopia's separate destiny

The distinctiveness of the Ethiopian case stems precisely from Adwa: the first encounter with colonialism was a victory for Ethiopia, which retained its independence while all other African regions were falling under the control of European powers. Adwa then, became the founding myth of modern Ethiopia's nationalism: "in terms of national psychology […] the Adwa victory has continued to instil in successive generations of Ethiopians a deep sense of national pride and spirited national independence" (Bahru 1991:84). The victory was seen to confirm Ethiopian exceptionalism – the idea that Christian Ethiopians were God's chosen people, and thus that their country had a "separate destiny" from the rest of the world (Bahru 1991:84). Although such religious ideology had been feeding patriotic feelings throughout the country's history, Adwa signalled the rise of a different kind of nationalism. Pre-1896 patriotism preceded Menelik's imperial expansion southwards, and thus preceded the establishment of the present-day borders of Ethiopia. Menelik's call to arms in 1895 led to an immediate mobilization in most of the Empire's provinces: "at the crucial moment", Sven Rubenson notes, "Menelik commanded the loyalty of every important chief in the country" (1976:107). The political cohesion with which Ethiopia responded to the Italian invasion was interpreted as the proof of the existence of a shared sense of 'Ethiopianness' – giving credit to the idea that Menelik had simply politically reunified an already-existing nation. The victory at Adwa gave Menelik the diplomatic authority to sanction the newly-delineated borders, and was thus perceived as the birth of an Ethiopian nation-state. In the eyes of the cultural and political elite

in Addis Ababa, then, Adwa firmly placed Ethiopia among the world's independent and sovereign nation-states, starkly differentiating it from the rest of Africa.

Although the anniversary of Adwa is still widely celebrated throughout Ethiopia every year –and although the victory keeps inspiring national pride–, historians have begun to question its practical results. The general feeling in historiography is that the state ruling elite did not manage to capitalize on the victory. Adwa opened great possibilities for Ethiopia, but these were wasted because of the very same nationalism the battle inspired. Self-assured and poised, the country's leaders "did not consider it necessary to build up an arm industry, with all the modernization and reorganization of society that such an effort would involve", especially because "the ease with which Menelik had obtained weapons led Ethiopians to conclude that the nation would always be able to purchase war supplies from eager salesmen" (Marcus, 1975:5). Donald Levine also agrees that

> "Adwa may have served to give Ethiopians a false sense of confidence about their position in the modern world. In showing themselves and the world that they could defeat a European invader with their own resources, the 1896 campaign may have led them to think that their traditional resources could be adequate in an era in which war would be waged with tanks and airplanes" (1996:2).

Such overconfidence led to the "softening of the reformist determination" and to the consequent "deferment of necessary reforms" (Messay 1999:274-275). Only minor, cosmetic changes were implemented. The same sense of self-sufficiency allowed intellectuals to air modernizing views without ever concretizing them in an organic set of practical measures. Although advocating change on paper, this ideological commitment never turned into political activism. Proposals could remain vague and idealistic since Adwa allowed seeing Ethiopia, after all, as already successful and self-reliant. Molvaer effectively summarizes the contradiction by observing that "if one seeks specific indications of the direction Ethiopian authors want their country to take in future, what sort of change and what kind of society they want, one will find that few of them commit themselves to any programme or to any precise answers" (1980:231).

Yet, the more time went on, the more a distance grew between the expected glory of the country and the reality of its perceived underdevelopment. Bahru reflects that "in the end, the balance-sheet may not have been in Ethiopia's favour. Radicals ranging from Gabra-Heyway Baykadagn in the early twentieth century to the unsuccessful coup makers of 1960 bemoaned the backwardness of independent Ethiopia, compared with colonial Africa" (1991:84). Ethiopia's 'separate destiny' started to be seen as a burden rather than a privilege. Adwa became then a broken promise, and the

patriotism it kept inspiring became infused with a sense of unfulfillment. The 'separate destiny' was perceived as a 'separate decline' by some intellectuals, creating a mixed-feeling nationalism based on pride but also on frustration. Referring to the reformist thinkers of the early 20th century, Bahru notices that "in their critique of the backward state of their country, the intellectuals represented a counter-current to the smug confidence that has ensued after the Adwa victory. They advocated a series of reforms in order to give socio-economic content to the political independence that Adwa had guaranteed" (1991:110). These contrasting feelings of pride and frustration characterized Ethiopian nationalism ever since, infusing it with an essential ambiguity. In the early 20th century, then "the imagination of the nation that was replete with exceptionalism reduced sentiments of alterity just as it exacerbated its sensitivity" (Wolde Giorgis 2010:92): Ethiopian philosophy became grounded in an idea of nation approached both with patriotism and disappointment. This constitutive contradiction shaped the Ethiopian conception of modernity ever since. Ethiopian intellectuals came to be driven

> by the cognitive dissonance between an inherited sense of cultural superiority and acute awareness of Ethiopian 'backwardness', by contrast not only with the European states […] but even with colonized African people whom they were accustomed to treat with scorn. (Clapham 2006:141).

This necessarily led to an equally ambiguous relation with the 'Western other' and the modernity it was seen to embody. As the next paragraph shows, the 1935-1936 Italian invasion and occupation inflicted to Ethiopian exceptionalism a decisive blow, and, years later, the Marxist revolution marked a moment of no return, the end of the illusion of a 'separate destiny' for the country.

3.3 The relation with Pan-Africanism

Interestingly, black nationalist leaders extolling Ethiopian centrality in the continent were inspired by, and in turn reinforced, the same narrative of Ethiopian exceptionalism. On one side, Ethiopia was "taken as a signifier for all of Africa" (Sorenson 1993:25), and thus dragged towards the African continent, claiming its leading role in it. At the same time, though, its difference and superiority was reaffirmed: Ethiopia is an African country, becomes Africa itself, Zion, but precisely on the grounds of its historical peculiarities: an ancient tradition of Christianity, the claim of a biblical and divine origin of the state, and the only African state to have defeated European colonialism.

The centrality of Ethiopia for Pan-Africanist thinkers, liberation movements and black nationalists is widely documented (Fikru 2005, Paulos & Getachew 2005). Quite surprisingly, though, few studies document what was the Ethiopian intellectual response to all these attentions.

If one looks at the content of literary (Kane 1975, Molvaer 1980, Gérard 1971) and philosophical (Maimire 2005-2006, Wolde Giorgis 2010, Clapham 2006) production in Ethiopia in the first half on the 20th century, Pan-African themes are consistently absent. In fact, Amharic intellectual production demonstrates a remarkable centripetal tendency. Amharic writers appear eminently interested in discussing internal affairs, such as family life, Orthodox moral values, or relations between different social classes. If they were concerned about what was happening in the rest of the continent, this does not show in their writings. Japan is an object of historical and political enquiry (Calvitt Clarke 2004) – with the ultimate purpose, though, to propose it as a model Ethiopia and suggest what measures Ethiopian leaders ought to implement. Similarly, Europe is often mentioned in Amharic novels, but is never an object of interest *per se*. It is rather probed with the objective of Ethiopian development in mind, so that only those European traits that could prove useful for a discussion on Ethiopian modernization are emphasized. The impression is that of a small cultural elite entirely concentrated on the country's domestic issues. Fikru confirms such 'isolationist' tendency by stating that

> without the backdrop of colonialism, from which Ethiopia was spared for the most part, the pre-war Ethiopian intelligentsia remained inward-looking and provincial. Despite some discursive writings on Japan, […] Ethiopians perhaps knew more about France or Italy than their nearest neighbours on the continent (2005:116).

Ethiopia, after all, exhibited a number of peculiarities that made it stand out from the rest of the continent: an ancient Christian tradition, a seven-centuries-long imperial history of self-rule, the monumental remains of an even earlier imperial civilization, a Semitic language with a native and long-established writing system, a mythical status as 'God's chosen' linking it to the Holy Land in the Middle East, the defeat inflicted to European colonialism at Adwa. All of these elements fed the idea of Ethiopian 'exceptionalism' (in fact mostly referring to the civilization of the highlands area of Ethiopia only) – additionally strengthened by European scholars themselves (Girmai 1999:34). Abyssinian people are described as traditionally seeing themselves as part of the Middle Eastern, and even at times European, cultural area – their history looks north-east rather than south-west towards the rest of the continent. Mazrui argues that "until the 1950s the official policy of the government of Emperor Haile Selassie was to emphasize that Ethiopia was part of the Middle East rather than part of Africa" (2002:84). This became a harsh matter of contention within the black nationalist movements in the 1930s, leading Marcus Garvey to controversially affirm that Ethiopians "regarded themselves as dark-skinned Caucasians and looked down upon blacks as inferiors"

(quoted Fikru 2005:102)[9]. Although scholars and historians have refuted Garvey's accusation, nevertheless "for quite a while, neither modern Egypt nor Ethiopia reciprocated [the] identification with black nationalists" (Mazrui 2004:120).

The Italian occupation marks a watershed in the relations of Ethiopia with the rest of the continent. While the battle of Adwa reinforced Ethiopia nationalism, the post-war debate about the causes of the occupation made apparent that Ethiopia suffered some of the same weaknesses of other African states. This can be one of the causes of the slow spreading of a continental-wide empathy in Ethiopia in the post-war era. Fikru considers the "evolution of racial awareness in Ethiopia in the thirties and forties as a byproduct of the Italo-Ethiopian War" (2005:97). In the post-liberation era "Haile Selassie and the young intellectuals worked jointly to undermine Ethiopia's psychology of insularity" (Fikru 2005:231). "It was the Emperor himself", agrees Mazrui, "who reinitiated the policy of re-Africanizing Ethiopia as the rest of Africa approached independence. Ethiopian self-perceptions have been slowly Africanized ever since" (2002:84). A first step in this direction was acknowledging the efforts black nationalists had made in Ethiopia's defence during the Italy's invasion – an acknowledgment that prompted a gradual identification of Ethiopia with the black cause: "the wartime mobilization [of black activists in the USA and the Caribbean] had lasting effects on the Ethiopian national psyche. The Ethiopians, who hitherto took pride in their insulated national identity, began to see themselves in a global racial context in the aftermath of the fascist invasion" (Fikru 2005:231).

But the shift was not a cultural one, as the war with Italy also prompted a foreign policy realignment. Ethiopians were forced to re-think their political role in Africa, and to search for new diplomatic alliances throughout the continent: "Haile Selassie's strong belief in collective security complemented this newly awakened continental consciousness. […] Tefari well understood the precariousness of Ethiopian independence as long as the entire continent was not free, hence his embrace of the African freedom struggle" (Fikru 2005: 132). Fikru's observation do not fully dispel the doubt put forwards by some historians, who believe that Haile Selassie's move was motivated by opportunistic reasons rather than by a genuine cultural conversion. Peter Schwab (1979), for example, thinks the new foreign policy was based on the Emperor's "fixation on personal glory", i.e. on his willingness to impose his authority over the newly-independent African countries[10]. The fact

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[9] For a refutation of such position, see Fikru (2005) and Teshale (1995). They both argue that race was not an important dimension of Ethiopian politics. The aspect of cultural assimilation was much more prominent, so that people from non-Amhara background could have access to the ruling circles as long as they could speak Amharic and were Christians: the discrimination was mostly cultural, and not racial.

[10] Schwab's interpretation might be vitiated, though, by his positive judgment of Mengistu, which might have led him to diminish Haile Selassie's political figure in retrospect.

that most of Haile Selassie's Pan-African measures were not implemented until the decolonization period in the 1960s might lead to think that they were motivated by a desire to extend Ethiopia's hegemony to the newly independent states and to prevent the emergence of possible regional adversaries. The ascendency of Kwame Nkrumah as a political star in the continent might have worried Haile Selassie, who hastened to reinforce his leadership in the OAU by capitalizing on his political seniority and by presenting himself as a benevolent mediator in the OAU (side-lining, as an effect, Nkrumah's idea of the United States of Africa). Some passages in Fikru's own account might endorse this view, for example when the scholar admits that "national prestige had been the unspoken rationale for providing the scholarships" to African students for studying in Ethiopia (2005:142). Ethiopia greatly benefited from Haile Selassie's Pan-African policies, above all the establishment of the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (later African Union) in Addis Ababa, which gave successive Ethiopian rulers great leverage in the Organization.

Whilst the creation of a continental awareness was initiated by the Italo-Ethiopian war, Pan-African themes do not appear in Amharic literature until twenty years after the liberation[11], when "the Africanization of Ethiopian political consciousness has reached full maturity" (Fikru 2005:140). Admittedly, some of the writers might have adopted a more decisive Pan-African stance in their political than in their fictional writing. At any rate, this consciousness twist surfaced in Amharic literature well after the early theorizations on modernity. In the early 20th century Amharic writers appear overall unconcerned about what was going on in the rest of the continent, and unsympathetic towards the other Africans oppressed by colonialism. This may ultimately explain the contradiction of their 'acolonial modernity': they did not see any incongruity between the modernity they praised in other European countries, and the condemnation of the colonial attempt they suffered. First of all, their idea of a self-sufficient Ethiopia (idea, as we have seen, born at Adwa) made them assume a difference between their country and the rest of the continent. Secondly, before the 1960s Ethiopia had not yet developed a continental-wide empathy: the interest of the intellectuals was almost exclusively for domestic affairs in the Amharic-speaking area of Ethiopia, and what was happening in the rest of Africa was not a matter of urgent concern. Thirdly, the imperialist drive that inspired Menelik II's expansionist campaigns remained alive in Ethiopia's political ideology, leading to Haile Selassie's obstinate reluctance, in the 1941-1954 negotiations, to allow the unification of the Ogaden region to Somalia, and later to his annexation of Eritrea in 1962. Being imperialist ambitions so strong within Ethiopian ruling circles, it seems unlikely that

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[11] For instance, Berhanu Zerihun's *Dïll kämot bähwala* (1962-1963), Abbe Gubeňňa's *Yäpatris Lumumba asazzaň ammwamwat* (1961-1962) and some of Kebbede Mikael's poems from the same period; for full list se Kane 1975:183.

European/Japanese imperialism could have appeared strange, misguided or outright unethical – as long as it did not question, of course, Ethiopia's own imperial borders.

4. Conclusions

The paper has tried to show how the nation-building process in Ethiopia was conceptualized by successive generations of Ethiopian intellectuals. The process of state formation, in our analysis, was theorized and implemented around two borders – an internal border marking a centre-periphery dynamic in the country, and an external border marking a centre-periphery relation within the wider African continent. While Ethiopia's internal border seems to be still in place, although weakened by policies of cultural devolution and administrative federalism, the country's external border appears to have been considerably blurred. Historians and scholars of Ethiopia have welcomed the 're-Africanization' of the country, and the theoretical undermining of the idea of an Ethiopian exceptionalism. Ultimately, though, what is "Africa"? African philosophers like V. Y. Mudimbe have long denounced the arbitrariness of this conception, an invention of the West that did not exist in the consciousness of people living throughout the African continent. In particular, just like the Mediterranean cultural area has been split in two different continents, the Red Sea cultural area has also been split by European map-makers according to territorial land masses. Just like colonialism imposed around the world a model of state based on clear-cut boundaries, it also imposed a continental categorization that simplified the rich interconnection of borderland areas – flattening diversity and building administrative and political boundaries that ended up separating peoples with deep historical affinities. Ethiopia had a history of fruitful economic and cultural exchange both with what was later categorized as 'Middle East' and what was later categorized as 'Africa' – and, once a continental border was drawn in the Red Sea, Ethiopians were forced to conceptualize their culture as either 'Middle Eastern' or 'African'. In Ali Mazrui's words,

> Cultural similarities between Ethiopia and the rest of black Africa are not any greater than cultural similarities between North Africa and the Arabic Peninsula. Nevertheless, a European decision to make Africa end at the Red Sea has decidedly dis-Africanized the Arabic Peninsula. […] In any case, the tyranny of the sea is in part a tyranny of European geographical prejudices. Just as European map-makers could decree that on the map Europe was above Africa rather than below (an arbitrary decision in relation to the cosmos), those mapmakers could also dictate that Africa ended at the red Sea instead of at the Persian Gulf. Is it not time that this dual tyranny of the sea and Eurocentric geography was forced to sink to the bottom? (2002:84-85).

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Matshanda, Namhla Thando

N.T.Matshanda@sms.ed.ac.uk

Centre of African Studies

The University of Edinburgh

A political and social narrative of population movement on the Togochale border of eastern Ethiopia[1]

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[1] This paper is not to be cited or circulated beyond the winter school meeting. The paper forms the basis of a chapter [six] in a thesis that is provisionally titled "The Ethiopian state at the margins: the politics of administration on the eastern borderlands". The thesis explores the continuous processes of state making in Ethiopia by focusing on the eastern border and surrounding borderlands with northern Somalia [Somaliland].

Abstract:

This paper traces the political and social history of population movement on the eastern Ethiopia and northern Somalia border. The focus is on what the paper deems as key indicators of the political and social nature of an international boundary: cross-border trade, refugee movement and immigration practices. These, and the influence they have on the surrounding borderlands reveal the breaks and continuities in the nature of the state in Ethiopia . The policies of three successive states - the imperial, socialist and federal states are explored and are found to be reflected in the changing social and political dynamics of this border. Contrary to popular understanding, this border has been implicitly central to domestic and regional policies of the state in Ethiopia. In addition, the paper demonstrates the extent to which the regional political context often shapes and influences the state's attitude towards this border area. The neighbouring Republic of Somalia emerges as the perpetual thorn on the side of the Ethiopian state. However, a distinction is made on this northern sector of the long boundary between the two countries. This distinction is important as it reveals a specific characteristic of the borderlands, one largely characterised by the population found on either side of the boundary and their movement across the border.

Introduction:

This paper aims to develop the argument that the state in Ethiopia has often used the eastern border and borderlands as a political instrument to advance and support its domestic policy as well as its policy towards the neighbouring Republic of Somalia. The borderlands in and of themselves tend not to be the focus of the state, but rather what they can do to benefit the state. This has resulted in the borderlands being perceived as a peripheral region. However, being peripheral does not adequately explain this borderland region. As much as the borderlands are often neglected and are geographically and politically peripheral, they are often implicitly central to state policy- both domestic and foreign. The argument will be advanced by demonstrating the nature of relations between three successive states in Ethiopia and the eastern borderlands region. The focus area is the northern section of the Ethiopia-northern Somalia [Somaliland] border, where we find the Harar-Jijiga-Togochale expanse. This area is significant and unique for reasons that have been discussed in previous chapters. One of these is that this area is part of an ancient trade route and continues to play that role today.

The period to be discussed is subsequent to the restoration of the imperial state in 1941. The Togochale border with northern Somalia has a long but less troubled history than its southern counterpart, on the eastern Ethiopia and southern/central Somalia border at Belet Weyne. Its historical and socio-political features will be presented through an examination of three types of population movement most common at the border: immigration, refugee movement and cross-border trade. These have been selected because they are highly susceptible to the prevailing political contexts, both national and regional. The movement of people on this border pre-dates the 1897 Treaty that established the Ethiopia-British Somaliland boundary. It is also likely that the movement will post-date any future developments in the respective states.

In addition to examining official state policy in Ethiopia, the chapter will endeavour to establish the extent to which external factors have contributed and continue to influence the movement of people on this border. The adopted line of argument and discussion allows us to arrive at a broader comprehension of the borderlands as they

have been discussed in previous chapters, i.e. as a central feature of the state in Ethiopia since the late 19th century, a state largely defined in territorial terms. In addition, border activities have been known to contradict the official narrative of the state, and vice versa. This then compels us to look more closely to the border, and the activities taking place there, to better understand the state.

The chapter will proceed by first introducing the three state configurations. The key features of each will be discussed, particularly in relation to their policies on the movement of people at the border, and the influence this has on the surrounding borderlands. Following this is a discussion on how immigration, trade and the periodical refugee crises affected the movement of people during the aforementioned periods. Throughout the discussion references will be made to some of the major events during each of the eras under discussion. These include the 1964 Ethio-Somali border conflict, the 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war, the Somali civil war beginning in the early 1980s, and the events of 1991 that catapulted the Horn into the most active region in contemporary state formation in Africa.

The chapter relies on a combination of primary and secondary sources, the former comprising archival material as well as interviews and observations.

The Imperial State:

The modernising conquering Lion of Judah

The imperial state has been largely characterised by the central figure of Haile Sellasie, the longest serving modern monarch of Ethiopia. He was the first and most important actor in all matters of the state, his power an omnipresent reality. Indeed, his reign dominated all facets of life in Ethiopia for the better part of a century, and inevitably left behind an enduring administrative legacy[2]. It is not only the administrative legacy that still pervades Ethiopian bureaucracy; the enigma of the

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[2] This is noted by Bahru Zewde, "Hayla- Sellase: From Progressive to Reactionary" in *Ethiopia in Change, Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*, eds. Abebe Zegaye and Siegfried Pausewang (London: British Academy Press, 1994),31.

man also remains in people's imaginations. It seems, therefore, that a discussion of the imperial state inevitably becomes a discussion of Haile Sellassie the emperor as well.

One of the most defining features of the imperial period was its modernising agenda. Ironically it was this same agenda that led to the demise of the imperial state in 1974. Attempts at modernisation began in the pre-Italian Occupation period[3] but were derailed for five years during which the Italians instituted their own modernisation agenda. The momentum was not lost, on his return from exile the emperor embarked on several 'modernising' initiatives. The most evident and celebrated was the development of a central government[4]. This is when Ethiopia was seen as a progressive polity in a sea of colonised African countries.

Regardless of the emperor's modernising impulses, the foundations of the modern state he was weaving were founded on the historical foundations of the traditional state. This contradictory situation was maintained for a number of years.

A plausible explanation for the astonishing longevity of the imperial state in spite of the contradictions that characterised the modernisation agenda is the successful perpetuation of these contradictions. Regardless of a shift in the emperor's disposition to a reactionary one in the 1950s[5], modernisation remained a 'national' policy. This innately carried with it hope for 'national' advancement. With modernisation as the key word that characterised post-Occupation Ethiopia, the population was hopeful for change wherein the distribution of power would be altered. However, the imperial state adopted modernisation and implemented it within the contours of the established political structures.

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[3] The establishment of the first Constitution in 1931 is often seen as one of the initial signals for a turn to modernisation; see Margery Perham, *The Government of Ethiopia* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1969), 423.

[4] Christopher Clapham, "The Development of the central government, 1946-1968" in *The Government of Ethiopia*, Margery Perham (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1969), 404.

[5] Zewde, 30.

This is evident in the manner that public appointments were made.

Leadership positions for the new central institutions were established through the Decree of 1942 on "Administrative Regulations"[6]. These ranged from ministerial posts to provincial governors. These were almost entirely staffed by family, relations and distant relations of the nobility. This nobility was of course, narrowly defined, both politically and ethnically. This is noted by Keller when he writes that Selassie's idea of modernisation revolved around the Amhara and Tigre educated elite[7]. It is within this context that the conditions that would eventually lead to revolution were created.

What should have occurred in Ethiopia in the 1950s and early 1960s as part of political change in a traditional polity is noted by Huntington:

> To cope successfully with modernization, a political system must be able, first, to innovate policy, that is, to promote social and economic reform by state action. Reform in this context usually means the changing of traditional values and behaviour patterns, the expansion of communications and education, the broadening of loyalties from family, village, and tribe to nation, the secularization of public life, the rationalization of authority structures, the promotion of functionally specific organizations, the substitution of achievement criteria for ascriptive ones, and the furthering of a more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources[8].

Consequently, aspects of the contradictory nature of the modernisation process, its embededness in the traditional political structures and eventually its demise can be found in one of its flagship projects- education. There is evidence to suggest that education was one of the key sectors of state the emperor paid special attention to. From the establishment of Tafari Makonnen School in 1925 to the founding of the Haile Sellassie 1 University in 1961, the emperor gave close and personal attention to

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[6], Decree No. 1 Administrative Regulations, *Negarit Gazeta*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1942)
[7] Edmond Keller, "Ethiopia: Revolution, Class and the National Question", *African Affairs* 80, no. 321, (October1981): 531
[8] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 140.

the expansion of education[9]. Between 1925 and 1961 a number of educational institutions opened, particularly in and around the capital, Addis Ababa, many for boys[10]. This expansion is supported by a document entitled 'Harar- Progress and Development'[11] produced by the Ministry of Information in 1963. In a pictorial presentation, the emperor is pictured presiding over the opening ceremonies of schools and academies in Hararghe province.

Indeed, if looked at critically, the document resembles what Zewde calls the "pageantry that comes before decay"[12]. The pageantry can be seen as an attempt to conceal the very beginnings of this decay-which can be found in the perpetuation and manipulation of the contradictions between modernity and tradition. The document also resembles the paternal and familial metaphors and imagery that characterised political life in Schatzberg's middle Africa[13]. The figure of Haile Sellassie was in many ways portrayed as a father of the nation, if not more, as "Elect of God"[14], and thus invoking a rather powerful veneration from his subjects. His image was pervasive, and the state, as Schatzberg suggests, has been the major purveyor of these paternal and familial metaphors[15]. To an extent, this, together with the perpetuation of the contradictions inherent in the modernisation agenda enabled the emperor to cement his legitimacy and thus sustain his position that much longer.

However, as mentioned in the introduction, events taking place within the state are hardly sufficient to explain the state in Ethiopia. The regional dynamics are usually equally influential.

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[9] Zewde, 35.
[10] Perham, 250-251.
[11] The Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government. *Harar- Progress and Development*, , Addis Ababa, 1963, from the collections of Dejazmach Gabre Selassie at the National Archive and Library of Ethiopia (NALE), September 2011.
[12] Zewde, 33.
[13] Michael Schatzberg, *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 8.
[14] For example, in the Revised Constitution of 1955, found in the collections of Dejazmach Gabre Selassie at the National Archive and Library of Ethiopia (NALE), September 2011.
[15] Schatzberg, 16.

Mounting pressure from a newly independent neighbour

The formation of the Republic of Somalia in 1960 became the most decisive indication of potential challenges to Ethiopian territory. The Agreement also known as the 'Haud Agreement' between Ethiopia and Great Britain was signed on 29 November 1954[16]. The content of this document is vital to explaining the border-related troubles arising between Somalia and Ethiopia after 1960. It was through this Agreement that the Ethiopian state formally re-gained sovereignty over the Reserved Areas (particularly the Ogaden), including the contested Haud grazing lands.

Three of the six articles of the Agreement are particularly relevant for our purposes. Article I formally acknowledges the return to Ethiopian sovereignty of the said territories. Article II contains the crux of the document. It is in this article where the movement of people across the boundary for grazing is re-affirmed as previously established in the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. The emphasis is on the movement of the British Somaliland population into Ethiopian territory. Article III lays out the conditions for the execution of the Agreement. Of importance in this article is that although under Ethiopian jurisdiction once they cross the border, the Somaliland populace would be regulated using their own traditional organisational mechanisms. These are the courts (*Akils*), traditional police (*Illaloes*) and Elders, and would be under the supervision of a British Liaison Officer residing on Ethiopian territory. The grazing rights of the nomads are further safeguarded in Article V. Here it is noted that should the Agreement be terminated, the grazing rights will not be affected. This is precisely because the overriding agreement is the 1897 Treaty.

The Agreement produced an assortment of reactions from various quarters. The Ethiopians were not pleased with the Agreement, mainly because of the presence of a British Officer in the Haud. Almost immediately, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Aklilu Habte Wold raised questions to the British authorities on the actual role of the liaison officer[17]. On the other hand, the British Government was inundated with petitions and letters from various Somali quarters in protest of the relinquishing of the areas back to

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[16] TNA: PRO FO 93/2/19 "Withdrawal of British Military Administration from 'Reserved Area'-Agreement and Exchange of Notes" London and Addis Ababa (29 November 1954).
[17] TNA: PRO FO 93 919 Letter to Sir Anthony Eden from Ato Aklilu Habte Wold, (29 November 1954).

Ethiopia[18]. It is noteworthy that the most vociferous protest came from the Italian Trusteeship territory, with most letters and petitions emanating from Mogadishu[19]. Therefore it is worth considering why it was not the Ethiopians or the British Somaliland population that protested the most, since they are the ones directly affected by the Haud grazing areas.

In the late 1950s Somali needs can be classified into two related yet distinct categories. One is the much publicised and often overstated ambition of the unification of Somali territories [Pan-Somalism]. The other is the basic and often understated desire for access to natural resources- the Haud grazing lands being one of them. This distinction of Somali desires was regional in nature. The Somalis of the Italian Trust Territory were more politicised. The Somali Youth League was first established there in 1943. In addition, the portion of the Reserved Area that was being handed back to Ethiopia was the Ogaden that shares a boundary as well as more ethnic/clan affinities with the Italian Trust territory population.
On the other hand, the northern section of the Reserved Area which includes Jijiga was handed back to Ethiopia much earlier, eliciting reactions that have been dealt with in chapter four. Secondly, it can be argued that the British Somaliland population had very little ground for protest as the Agreement was in their favour. The Agreement continued to grant them access to the much desired grazing lands which fall overwhelmingly on the Ethiopian side. In addition, they were used to this movement since prior and subsequent to the 1897 Treaty that formalised their movement.

For the purposes of the border under consideration, the most notable effects of the 1954 Agreement were felt after 1960. This is after the former Italian Trust territory and the British Somaliland Protectorate were granted independence and decided to merge to form the Republic of Somalia. Ethiopian apprehension began almost immediately. This is reflected in a document produced by the Ministry of Information wherein the Somali government is accused of unbecoming behaviour. The latter is accused of, among other things, spreading "vicious propaganda… from Mogadishu, presumably to create animosity between the people of Ethiopia and the Somali

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[18] TNA: PRO FO 371/113457 "Somali Reaction to the Haud Agreement" (1955)
[19] Ibid.

Republic, and to create an atmosphere conducive to public unrest, incitement, and subversion inside Ethiopia"[20]. The tensions that emerged from hereon would erupt in the 1964 border conflict, which of course was only the beginning of a protracted border conflict.

Fierce contestation of the border was not a necessarily prominent feature of the imperial state. Policy and laws related to the use of the borders of the empire were largely vague and served a specific purpose. These policies were not necessarily in reaction to neighbouring Somalia. They were part and parcel of the internal process of modernisation. Some of the most important ones appear in the Negarit Gazeta, such as the Immigration Proclamation of 1943[21]; this was followed by the Customs and Export duties Proclamation of 1943[22]. In the 1970s a legal notice on visa and residence permits, and port of entry regulations[23] also appears in the Gazeta.

The façade of modernisation began to diminish, slowly. It was university students that had benefited from state education that eventually led the forces of discontent. It was them who created the political space for revolution. The decline of the imperial state was not directly linked to border-related issues. Although from 1960 the state began to experience increasing pressure on its eastern borderlands with the newly established Republic of Somalia. The mounting pressure could be seen in Ethiopian newspapers where the state voiced its contempt over what it termed "foreign-inspired developments in the Horn of Africa and the resolute determination of Ethiopia firmly to oppose all designs upon her territorial integrity"[24]. The 1964 border conflict with Somalia was, however, a harbinger to the 1977 war. But that would be an undertaking dealt with by the revolutionary forces.

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[20] The Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government. *Ethio-Somalia Relations*, Addis Ababa, 1962, from the collections of Dejazmach Gabre Selassie at the National Archive and Library of Ethiopia (NALE), September 2011.
[21] Order No. 36, Immigration Proclamation, *Negarit Gazeta*, Volume No.1 1942-1951
[22] Order No. 39, Customs and Export Duties Proclamation1943, *Negarit Gazeta*, Volume No.1 1942-1951
[23] Legal Notice No. 394 , Visa and Residence Permits , *Negarit Gazeta*, Vol. 5 1971-1974
[24] Cover page communiqué appearing in the *Ethiopian Herald*, Thursday 12 May, 1960

Revolutionary Ethiopia:

In the early 1970s it became apparent that the contradictions of the imperial state's modernisation agenda could no longer hold. But it was drought that brought the contradictions to the fore, exposing the imperial state's ambiguities. Schwab notes that "drought and famine was an economic catastrophe that became Haile Selassie's political coffin"[25]. Reconciling competing interests became an insurmountable task for the emperor mainly because the much needed reforms appeared to be at variance with the persistent traditional state[26]. Civil unrest in early 1974 began sweeping through the urban centres. It was led by university students who joined forces with other alliances such as taxi drivers and religious groups. However, it was the military dissidents in their barracks that were the decisive factor when they turned their backs on the head of state.

By September 1974, the 120-man Dergue (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and the Territorial Army) dissolved parliament and formally toppled the emperor[27]. The Dergue then moved swiftly to create a Provisional Military Committee (PMAC) to administer the state[28].

Radical change, but how much?

The overthrow of the *ancien régime* in 1974 is perhaps the most unambiguous case of revolution in its classic definition in contemporary African history. Indeed, what transpired in Ethiopia in 1974 fits the following description by Huntington:

> A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies[29].

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[25] Peter Schwab, *Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 14.
[26] Ibid.,15
[27] Ibid.,20
[28] Ibid., 21
[29] Huntington, 264.

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Revolutions are not commonplace. Consequently when they do occur they become a matter of great interest. It was no different in Ethiopia where the revolutionaries toppled a political and social system dating back to antiquity. The greatest interest perhaps lay in the direction the new leadership would steer the country. In this case, initial indications did not inspire hope, at least from the perspective of outside observers. Huntington notes that revolution is a feature of modernisation[30]. If we apply this to the Ethiopian case, then we can see how a large section of the population may have been highly anticipating such a change. Having become more aware and no longer able to tolerate the contradictions of the imperial modernisation agenda, popular support for the revolution was almost inevitable.

Problems emerged almost simultaneously with the seizure of power by the revolutionaries. There ensued a violent and bloody ideological and class struggle on the appropriate course for the country. The left was divided, and so it was those who were indifferent to the use of violence as a means to their ends that eventually triumphed. The Ethiopian revolution was complex; hence it is problematic to brand the Dergue as either a killing machine or a truly revolutionary force that changed Ethiopia forever. Because of the revolution, both class relations and the form of the state were transformed in 1974[31]. The change was undeniably fundamental.

The highly charged context that characterised the first few years of the revolution are important for understanding the events that followed, most of which threatened the disintegration of the state. To say that the Dergue inherited a highly fractured state is an understatement. Mengisteab notes that when the revolutionaries came into power they were confronted by the reality of at least six ethnic based 'Liberation Fronts'[32]. The Dergue inherited more than internal dissent, but also the difficult relations with neighbours, particularly the Republic of Somalia. It was only a matter of three years before the Dergue was forced to deal with neighbouring Somalia in a violent and costly war between 1977 and 1978.

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[30] Ibid., 265
[31] Donald Donham, "Introduction", in *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After*, eds. Wendy James, Donald Donham et al (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), 3.
[32] Kidane Mengisteab, "Ethiopia: State Building or Imperial Revival?" in *The African State, Reconsiderations,* eds. Ahmed Samatar, and Abdi Samatar, (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002),182.

By July of 1977 signs of provocation from Somalia were already evident. Because of the numerous internal problems the Dergue was faced with, the provocations were coming from the other side. A newspaper editorial expressed distress at the "cowardly provocations…of the renegade ruling class in Mogadisho…"[33]. What followed are reports of incidents such as the infiltration of Somali troops in the eastern borderlands, heightened propaganda against the Somali Republic and President Siad Barre personally, and the galvanising of peasants to fight the aggressors[34]. It is widely accepted that Siad Barre took advantage of the disorder in Ethiopia to advance his mission of seizing the Ogaden region. He was in a good position to do this as by the middle of the 1970s Somalia boasted the most powerful army in sub-Saharan Africa[35].

Siad Barre gravely miscalculated the context. He underestimated the changeable nature of super powers in the Cold War, as well as the willpower of the Ethiopians. The Soviet Union that had hitherto offered the most substantial military assistance to the Republic of Somalia switched sides in the most dramatic fashion and threw its weight firmly behind Ethiopia. For the Ethiopians, the stakes were high. Tareke aptly notes that a military defeat "would have cost the Ethiopians about a third of their territory, a possible defeat of the Ethiopian revolution and the dismemberment of their country"[36]. Tareke meticulously traces the anatomy of this conflict in two separate yet related publications[37], where he asserts that the Ethiopian victory was, more than anything else, serendipitous.

The war had major and enduring consequences for both countries. For the Somali, the defeat has been noted as a turning point for the worse, from which they are still recovering[38]. For the Ethiopians it led to increased centralisation, unprecedented militarization of the state, and a militant populace. It is no surprise that by the end of

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[33] Editorial, *Ethiopian Herald*, July 17,1977
[34] Editorials and Opinion pieces in the *Ethiopian Herald*, between 17-29 July 1977
[35] Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland; Understanding Somalia and Somaliland* (London: Progressio, 2008), 38.
[36] Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press,2009)
[37] Ibid., 182 and in Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 Revisited", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000).
[38] Bradbury, 39; Tareke, The Ethiopia-Somalia war, 662.

1978, Mengistu Hailemariam, Chairman of the Dergue and Head of state had "defeated the Somalis, the Eritreans, civilian dissidents and opposition within the Dergue"[39], even if momentarily. Momentarily because the Dergue could not sustain the status quo, and soon enough the centre began to crumble.

Dividing and ruling the country:

The Dergue's militant hold on power could not be sustained for long. The Eritrean freedom fighters and Tigrayan rebels in the north joined forces in 1983 and presented a formidable challenge to the military junta. Between 1982 and 1984 Ethiopia once again caught the world's attention when another famine ravaged the country. The combination of the famine and the insurgency raging in the north impelled the junta to alter their socialist agenda. In November of 1987 the Dergue was dissolved and a new parliament instated alongside the adoption of a new constitution that established the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE)[40]. However, these changes proved to be too late. Foreign backing was diminishing, the famine was not being addressed and the insurgency was gaining momentum. The Constitution unfortunately did not change the minds of the advancing Eritreans and Tigrayans. Beyond giving the country a new name, the 1987 Constitution achieved very little else.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) had joined forces with other Ethiopian political entities (liberation fronts) and formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in a coalition. In May of 1991 the joint forces entered Addis Ababa. Prior to their dramatic entry it had become apparent that the national army could not stop their advance as it was crippled by low morale and insufficient weapons[41]. The socialist experiment was brought to a decisive end. The TPLF rebels came with an agenda and moved swiftly to implement it, in the process once again reconfiguring the Ethiopian state. The TPLF emerged as the main actor within the EPRDF coalition, and have remained in that position since. The boldest policy proposals that were discussed and adopted by the EPRDF's Transitional Government

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[39] Harold Marcus, *History of Ethiopia,* 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 195.
[40] Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, September 1987, Addis Ababa, located at the NALE, accessed September 2011
[41] Marcus, 216.

of Ethiopia (TGE) were those on the form of the state. It was decided that the best way to keep the state as a unit was to divide it.

The revolution continues

Donham argues that the events of 1991 rather than a reversal of the revolution, in some ways represent its continuation[42]. The TGE adopted ethnic federalism and Ethiopia became an ethnic federal state. In a way this is a continuation of confronting the perennial 'ethnic question' as it was first initiated in the 1980s[43]. Some view ethnic federalism as a radical but necessary step that had to be taken to avoid bloodshed and to prevent the total disintegration of the state[44]. This was undoubtedly a sharp break with the past, and certainly a novelty on the African continent. This was both extraordinary and paradoxical. It was the Eritrean struggle for independence that crystallised and brought to the fore the ethnic nature of the Ethiopian state as well as the cultural suppression practiced by the state[45]. This was then advanced by the Tigrayan rebels who granted Eritrea its independence and divided the Ethiopian state into ethnic federal regions.

The ethnic federal system has, as would be expected, generated a vigorous debate in academic circles in and outside Ethiopia. For the current discussion the focus will be on the eastern borderlands, and how they fared within the new state structure. The former Hararghe province, the largest in the country was divided into two federal regions, Oromiya and Somali. This internal division was not without problems, in fact, it was highly contentious, threatening to undermine the entire federal exercise[46]. Consequently, the eastern borderlands regions-Somali and to a lesser extent Oromiya, have become the testing ground for the decentralisation project. The Somali region has hitherto been characterised by internal disorder, accompanied by what appears to

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[42] Donham, 5.

[43] A Proclamation on the establishment of an "Institute of the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities", the objectives of which were to study the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of Ethiopian nationalities, *Negarit Gazeta*, Vol. 8, No. 236, 1983

[44] Mengisteab, 184.

[45] John Young, "Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia," *Review of African Political Economy* 23, no.70 (April 1996): 534.

[46] For a detailed account see Asnake Kefale, "Federal Restructuring in Ethiopia: Renegotiating Identity and Borders along the Oromo-Somali Ethnic Frontiers", *Development and Change* 41, no.4 (December 2010).

be a federal government that is not certain about the meaning of regional autonomy[47]. The extent of federal influence in the region's politics is extensive. Samatar notes that it was a disorganised Somali leadership that initially enabled federal authorities to determine who rules the region[48].

These issues notwithstanding, the Somali region has enjoyed considerable state presence for the first time, perhaps since it became Ethiopian territory at the end of the 19th century. A compelling argument can be made regarding the extent of integration with the centre since 1991; conversely, a different argument can also be made on the nature of this integration. Since federation, the Somali region has never felt more Ethiopian, mainly because it is first and foremost allowed to feel Somali. This is evident as one visits the region, observing and listening to the way people conduct their daily lives. However, the federal state has over the years continued to tighten its grip on the politics of the region, particularly the election of leaders[49]; in this way further ensuring integration with the centre, although adversely.

The state's shifting attitude towards the Somali region has been a consequence of changes in the regional context. The year 1991 brought about immense changes to the Horn of Africa, most notably the defeat of the socialists in Ethiopia and the disintegration of the Somali Republic. The latter led to the secession of the northern region of Somalia, Somaliland. This presented both opportunities and challenges for the Ethiopian state.

The coming into power of the EPRDF in 1991 ushered in a new era of economic renewal in Ethiopia. For that reason Somaliland presented opportunities, the challenges notwithstanding. Political changes made it necessary for the Ethiopians to view the emergence of the unrecognised state of Somaliland as a potential key to its economic needs. A case in point is that in 1993 Ethiopia became a landlocked country following Eritrean secession and independence, making it the largest land locked

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[47] For an alternative explanation of the disorder in the Somali Region of Ethiopia see Tobias Hagmann, "Beyond clannishness and colonialism: understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no.4 (2005).
[48] Ahmed Samatar, "Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism and Regional Autonomy: The Somali Test", *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 5, Article 9 (2005): 51 http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol5/iss1/9/.html (accessed November 14, 2012)
[49] Ibid., 69

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country in Africa. Ethiopia needs access to the sea, which, according to Clapham in principle can be attained through any of its six neighbours[50]. However, political realities do not offer six options. It is what Healy calls "security interdependence"[51] that determines the nature of relations between states in the Horn.

In addition to the Djibouti (closest and most overused), and Mombasa ports (much further away), Addis is increasingly compelled to consider the opportunities presented by its neighbour, Somaliland. By the Somaliland authorities' own admission, the Berbera port lacks the adequate infrastructure to be a serious competitor to Djibouti or Mombassa ports[52]. Regardless, Somaliland has made several economic bilateral arrangements with Ethiopia. However, its lack of international recognition makes formal arrangements much more challenging. Even then, Ethiopia was the first to have permanent representation in Hargeisa, and Ethiopian Airlines is one of few airlines that fly into the country. Yet, to the frustration of officials in Hargeisa, Ethiopia has not issued formal recognition[53]. This is mainly because Ethiopia "rides several horses in the Somali regional calculus"…[54]. With Ethiopia currently in a hegemonic position, the future of the region is far from certain.

The extent of the cordial relations between the Ethiopian state and Somaliland is currently reflected at their mutual border and surrounding borderlands.
The next section looks at the practice of immigration on this border during the political periods discussed above.

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[50] Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopia" in *Big African States*, eds. Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006), 2.

[51] Sally Healy, "Hostage to Conflict, Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa", Chatham House Report (November 2011).
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/179951 (accessed May 20 2012).
[52] Interview with the Director of the commercial branch in the Trade Ministry, Hargeisa, Somaliland 10 January 2012.
[53] Expressed by several state officials in Hargeisa, including the foreign affairs minister Dr. Mohammed-Rashid Hassan, January 2012.
[54] Iqbal Jazhbay, "Somaliland: Post-War Nation-Building and International Relations, 1991-2006" (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2007), 259.

Immigration:

The boundary that separates Ethiopia and Somaliland (northern Somalia) lies on the banks of a dry river. The name of the river and consequently the border town is Togochale[55] - 'Tog' means river in the Somali language, and Wajaale is the name of the river in the same language.

According to archival material and interviews, there is little evidence to suggest that the border was busy or even a major preoccupation of the imperial state. A number of reasons can account for this. One is the ambiguous definitions of citizenship that have been discussed in the previous chapter. During the period of the British Military Administration (BMA) up to 1954, a number of British Somaliland inhabitants began to settle in the Haud and Reserved Areas. They became involved in cultivation activities in these areas[56]. It has been noted that they could do this with relative ease as "the eastern part of Ethiopia and British Somaliland were one country"[57]. Given that the 1954 Agreement ensured the continued use of the Haud grazing lands by the British Somaliland population, they continued to come in their numbers.

The imperial state developed a rather simple way of dealing with this. The Ethiopian officials' response was to declare that any northern Somali subject who stayed for more than six months would be considered an Ethiopian subject[58].

Needless to say that during the BMA immigration was flexible in character. The only issue with crossing the border was "poor transport, nothing else"[59]. This was radically altered by the 1954 Agreement. In fact from as early as 1948 when large parts of the Reserved Areas, including Jijiga were returned to Ethiopian sovereignty, difficulties emerged. Most of the elders that were interviewed in Jijiga, even though they were very young at the time, note that the biggest change according to what they heard was the need to use a passport to cross the border[60]. From then onwards immigration

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[55] Togochale is the standard spelling, whereas Wajaale is the Somali spelling of the river's name.

[56] Samuel Negash, "Colonial Legacy, State Intervention and Secessionism: Paradoxical National Identities of the Ogaden and Ishaq clans in Ethiopia" in *Society, State and Identity in African History*, ed. Bahru Zewde (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2008), 282.
[57] Interview with Elder Mohammed in Jijiga town, 27 October 2012
[58] Negash, 283
[59] Elder Mohammed
[60] Interview with Elders Mohammed, Ahmed, and Hawa in Jijiga, October 2012

became very strict. The border at Togochale became highly regulated for immigration purposes and people could not cross the border without valid documents[61].

When the Dergue came into power in 1974, the border skirmishes increased. What followed was increased security at the border at Togochale. This is noted by a female elder who was interviewed at Jijiga. Hawa noted that shortly after the Dergue came into power she had to travel to Hargeisa in northern Somalia, and was detained at the Togochale border[62]. By her own admission she was crossing illegally with no documents. She spent a night in prison, and was released the following day after her brother in Hargeisa received news of her arrest. It is worthy that she was going to live in Hargeisa, regardless of the fact that she was without documents. Indeed, she spent several years in Hargeisa.

A recurring theme is that everyone needed a passport to cross the border, but that at the same time not everyone had or could get a passport. All the informants being of Somali ethnicity, except for one man, noted that only the rich Ethiopian Somalis had passports. One elder explained that "you had to be rich or a government person to get a passport"[63]. What this means is that, the rich Somalis found it relatively easy to cross the border, whereas poor ones did not. The rich ones also needed and were able to receive passports because they were often travelling overseas to Hajj. It was also mentioned that the Saudi government used to sponsor 10000 Ethiopian Muslims [annually] with passports for Hajj, but that the Ethiopian government would only issue 1000[64]. From this we can deduce that non-Somali Ethiopians were not crossing over to Somalia that often. A reason for this is that in the 1960s, Oromifaa and Amharic speakers who crossed the border were suspected to be spies[65].

Between 1974 and 1978 when the Dergue came into power, immigration policies and practices remained the same at Togochale. The only period that is worth discussing is after the war with Somalia. The elders at Jijiga note that in fact, the Dergue became even stricter with documentation at the border. This can be attributed to the escalating

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[61] In a series of interviews conducted in Jijiga, October 2012
[62] Elder Hawa, Jijiga, 19 October 2012
[63] Elder Ahmed, Jijiga, 20 October 2012
[64] Ibid
[65] Interview with Bobe Yusuf Duale, Hargeisa, Somaliland 9 January 2012

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border tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia during this time, the same tensions that eventually led to the outbreak of the war in 1977.

Following the war with Ethiopia, Somalia as a state never recovered as Siad Barre's regime began to cave in as soon as the Ethiopian victory was certain. Barre's insistence on suppressing clan-based associations in the country while at the centre of a clan-based coalition himself, proved untenable in the long term. There emerged an array of 'fronts and movements' opposing his regime. Lewis attributes this emergence of internal dissent and resurgence of clan-based politics to the failure of Scientific Socialism[66]. Of significance was the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981 in London. The Movement is largely perceived as an Isaaq clan initiative. However, on its formation the movement drew support from central and northern Somalia[67], the latter an area that is predominantly, though not entirely Isaaq inhabited.

The insurgencies inside Somalia proved quite potent and the civil war between north and south Somalia broke out in February of 1982[68]. The SNM immediately found a willing host and supporter in the Ethiopian Dergue. The SNM made eastern Ethiopia its operational base[69]. With this move the dynamics of the border changed. What followed is a classic example of the 'security interdependence' noted earlier that exists in the region. Cliffe has alternatively called this phenomenon "mutual intervention", one that leads to…"conflict between states or across borders fuelling and amplifying others, and to conflicts at local, national and inter-state levels interacting with each other"[70]. At the Togochale border this development meant that people from northern Somalia could cross the border with relative ease. This was exacerbated by the most tragic consequence of the Somali civil war- the influx of refugees coming into Ethiopia beginning in 1988.

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[66] Ioan Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland-Culture, History and Society* (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), 67.
[67] Ibid
[68] Bradbury, 58.
[69] Lewis, 68.
[70] For a detailed explanation see Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa", *Third World Quarterly* 20, no.2 (February 1999) and in Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Implications of the Eritrea-Ethiopia War" in *Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War*, eds. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara and Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2004), 152.

This unintentional 'opening' of the border assisted in the relative ease of population movement that currently exists today at Togochale. Currently, the situation at the border crossing can be described as one of great permeability, where the boundary is crossed often by large numbers and with great frequency, especially by the borderlands people[71]. At this crossing officials do not attempt to interfere with the passage of local people on foot or on bicycles, whereas foreigners are subjected to a bureaucratic process. The procedure is relatively easy for foreigners as well, and very few foreigners cross here. The important point is that the borderlands people at Togochale on either side of the boundary cross frequently without being subjected to any bureaucratic scrutiny.

The relaxed mood at Togochale can be attributed to the amicable relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, less political reasons also account for the situation, and might have to do with Togochale cutting across a particular "culture area"[72]. This is certainly not atypical in African borderlands as "every international boundary in Africa cuts across at least one culture area"[73]. But at Togochale this is selective. On crossing the border with a companion of Somali ethnicity and Ethiopian citizenship, his immigration procedure was fairly straightforward. He was conversing with the officials in their mutual language and there was a lot of camaraderie. He explained that when crossing alone they do not require a passport from him even if going to Hargeisa. This is not the case for all Somalis. This is a predominantly Isaaq Somali area on either side of the boundary.

But it gets more complicated. People from Somaliland are required to produce documentation when coming into Ethiopia and travelling beyond the border town. I noted this while on a minibus travelling from the border town to Jijiga, the capital of the Somali region. We were stopped at a customs checkpoint about six kilometres from the border. Our luggage was checked including identification and travel documents. A family of a mother, two daughters and a son travelling from Somaliland encountered difficulties. They all had the required documentation except for one daughter and the Ethiopians would not let her through. After about fifteen minutes of negotiation they all had to get off and return to the border town. The more important

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[71] Ieuan Griffiths, "Permeable Boundaries in Africa" in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and Anthony Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 74.

[72] Anthony Asiwaju, 1985 cited in Griffiths, 1996, 74.
[73] Griffiths, 74.

question is how they managed to clear immigration at the Ethiopian border post in the first place.

Despite the somewhat ambiguous application of rules at the border, there is substantial movement. The Somalilanders, especially women, whose main reason for travel to Ethiopia is medical services[74] continuously cross back and forth. In Harar- about 150 kilometres from the border I visited a hotel that almost exclusively caters for Somaliland visitors. I met women who told me they come to Ethiopia mainly for medical reasons and not commerce. They also told me that they require a passport that gets stamped at the border, but no visa.

There are no set and rigid immigration rules for Ethiopians going into Somaliland; however, there appears to be consistency in the rules that apply to Somalilanders coming into Ethiopia. The constant going back and forth at the border within the Togochale vicinity does not necessitate any documentation. However, as we have seen, there are cases where cultural affinities are invoked at the moment of crossing the boundary. The Ethiopians also appear stricter in their reception of the Somalilanders particularly beyond the border town. This could be a case of how a sovereign state elects to exercise its immigration policies, and has little to do with Somaliland's unrecognised status, or it maybe a case of a *de jure* state being weary of its *de facto* neighbour. Regardless of the logic that dictates immigration today; the border has clearly gone through stages of restriction and openness. One of the greatest contributors has been the influx of refugees.

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[74] Conversation with an Ethiopian immigration official at the Togochale border post, 29 November 2011.

Refugees:

The movement of large numbers of refugees across state borders has become a defining characteristic of cross border movement in this region. Not only has this movement come to define the borderlands, but has had an effect on the states concerned. At the centre of it all is Somalia.

The refugee problem has affected virtually all neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia[75]. On this particular border the plight of refugees became a significant socio-political phenomenon after the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1978. A number of Ogadeni Somalis began to flee from Ethiopia into Somalia. It is worthy to remember, that the reasons for refugee flows in this region are not always political, but also environmental. The human tragedy is often compounded by drought and famine[76], however, the political tend to be overriding. A refugee camp coordinator in Jijiga aptly notes:

> Environmental issues are additional, but it is political issues that are the major factors contributing to refugee inflows. If there was political stability, environmental issues like drought would not force people to flee and become refugees[77].

Many of the Ogadeni began their flight into Somalia for fear of being accused to have collaborated with the Somali regime in the 1977-78 war. Indeed, the war has been inaccurately called the Ogaden war[78]. This is inaccurate because such a conceptualisation does not tell us much about the war per se. Ogaden is the name of the largest Somali clan that resides in south-eastern Ethiopia; however, the entire eastern borderlands tend to be referred to by this name. This is erroneous because the Somali region of Ethiopia is not exclusively inhabited by the Ogadeni; in fact, the

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[75] See for instance, Awa Abdi, "In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity amongst Somali Refugees in Dadaab Camps", *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 5, Article 7, Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol5/iss1/7.html (accessed November 12, 2012).
[76] Richard Hogg, "Changing Mandates in the Ethiopian Ogaden", in *In Search of Cool Ground, War Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa*, ed. Tim Allen (London: James Currey, 1996), 153.
[77] Interview with Mr Bekele Mugoro, eastern Refugee camps coordinator at the Administration for Refugee Returnee Affairs in Jijiga town, 1 December 2011
[78] Tareke, The Ethiopia-Somalia war, 662, 637.

area under discussion at Togochale is devoid of a substantial Ogadeni population. Also, the war has invariably been referred to as the secession of the Ogaden as well as a case of the Somali Republic's irredentism. This ambiguity has often resulted in ill-conceived perceptions and conclusions about the people of this region and about the region itself[79].

However, it was not until the 1980s that the greatest number of refuges crossed this border. In an ironic twist, the movement was a reversal of the previous exodus. This time it was the northern Somali population, largely but not entirely Isaaq who were fleeing Siyad Barre's bombardments during the civil war. With the SNM operating from eastern Ethiopia and Barre's forces focused on the north, this border became a focal point. According to Lewis, northern Somalia looked more like a colony under foreign military tyranny than a region of the same state[80].

People in Hargeisa [then a major town in northern Somalia, today the capital of Somaliland] remember this period vividly. The city was completely destroyed, and the majority of women and children sought refuge in eastern Ethiopia[81].
One of the informants mentioned earlier who was arrested at the border en route to Hargeisa returned to Ethiopia as a refugee, having left in the 1970s. Hawa found herself in Hartishek, one of the largest refugee camps operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Ethiopia in the 1980s. She spent three years at the camp, where she also reunited with other family members, only returning to Jijiga town after 1991[82]. Many, like Hawa have since re-integrated into Ethiopian society following the changes after 1991. The repatriation of the refugees back to [now] Somaliland took place between 1997 up to 2005, now only one camp remains of the original nine[83].

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[79] For instance under the federal system this region is still regarded with suspicion as a peripheral region that still has its loyalties elsewhere-across the border in Somalia.
[80] Lewis, 576.
[81] Bradbury, 73 notes that this flight of civilians was one of the fastest and largest forced movements of people recorded in Africa. A monument of a fighter plane that was used to bombard the city stands imposingly in the centre of Hargeisa today, and in casual conversations many people in their thirties remember being in refugee camps in Ethiopia in the late 1980s.
[82] Interview with Elder, Jijiga town, 19 October 2012
[83] Interview with Mr Bekele Mugoro, eastern Refugee camps coordinator at the Administration for Refugee Returnee Affairs in Jijiga town, 1 December 2011

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A new wave of refugees from Southern Somalia also came through the Somaliland border, avoiding the blocked areas by Al-Shabaab[84]. More recently in 2011, the drought and famine once again led to vast numbers of refugees into neighbouring countries, this time more to Kenya than Ethiopia. The active back and forth movement of refugees across the north eastern sector of the east Ethiopia-Somaliland border has contributed to the ease of movement. This is reinforced by the fact that it is not always easy to determine who is Ethiopian or Somali when the host populations sometimes pass themselves off as refugees in order to receive services[85]. It is difficult for the camp coordinators to be precise in how they organise the refugees. Officially integration is not allowed, however, this is contradicted by the fact that host populations and refugees intermarry, and refugee camps are strategically placed in areas where the refugees and the hosts belong to the same clan[86]. Here, the border and notions of nationality become distorted.

Presently it is economic rather than political factors that drive this movement. There is also a change in the direction of the movements. People from Somaliland barely come into Ethiopia as refugees, whereas streams of refugees from southern Somalia continue to trickle into Ethiopia. On the other hand, more Ethiopians- of all ethnicities are making their way to Somaliland, some as refugees[87] [due to the presence of international NGOs in Somaliland] others as economic migrants [due to the vast economic opportunities in Somaliland] with the hope of making their way across the Red sea[88].

Trade:

Today, the Ethiopian state exists first and foremost at the Togochale border to monitor and regulate cross-border trade than any other cross-border activity. All dimensions of cross-border trade exist here- formal/informal, legal/illegal, large/small scale. It is

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[84] Ibid
[85] Ibid
[86] Ibid
[87] The extent of their status as refugees is often indeterminate
[88] From interview with Elder, Ahmed, Jijiga town, 20 October 2012; also from Observations in Hargeisa city centre where a number of non-Somali Ethiopians are working in hotels or as domestic workers

difficult, however, to speak of cross-border trade during the imperial state and the Dergue. The border was closed to trade, and the key activity was smuggling, mainly by the borderlands population[89].

The level of formal cross border trade at Togochale has changed significantly since 1991. The formal trade that takes place on this border is less than the informal, and it is on the informal trade that this section will focus on. This encompasses legal and illegal as well as the large and small activities of cross-border trade. Healy notes, that informal trade largely takes place outside of state control, but is not necessarily illegal[90].

Informal trade is said to cover, among other things, re-export activities, cross-border trade, and the portion of official trade that goes unrecorded or under-recorded[91]. Informal cross-border trade therefore falls within this category. According to a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) report, informal cross-border trade occurs where business activities cross borders based on supply and demand imperatives, whether registered or unregistered[92]. Trade activities have led to remarkable developments on the borderlands. The distance from Harar, Jijiga and Togochale combined is over 600 kilometres to Addis Ababa, but only about 250 kilometres to Berbera port in Somaliland. This is evident at the various markets in these towns, most notably in Jijiga.

Two major factors contribute to the new character of the borderlands surrounding the Togochale border. The first is the expansive trade in livestock- mainly cattle, goats and camels and the large volume of trade in khat "the amphetamine-like leaf"[93] that is chewed recreationally throughout the region. Second are the extensive Somali trade networks that control the trade of these commodities.

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[89] All the informants in Jijiga agreed on this.
[90] Healy, 23.

[91] "Informal Trade in Africa", a report by the *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*-UNECA, p.145, available at www.uneca.org/aria4/chap5.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012)
[92] Ibid.
[93] Christopher Clapham et al., 2011. *African Game Changer? The Consequences of Somaliland's (Non) Recognition*, Discussion Paper, The Brenthurst Foundation. (June). http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/BD-1105_Consequences-of-Somalilands-International-Recognition.pdf.html (accessed June 26, 2012).

The large-scale trade in livestock originating from this region dominates not only the eastern Ethiopia borderlands but the entire Horn sub-region. It is argued that Ethiopia is "a major cross-border livestock exporting country, unparalleled anywhere in Africa"[94]. In the eastern borderlands, one needs only to visit the Babile camel and cattle market. Babile is located on what Majid calls the "Harar-Jijiga-Hargeisa-Berbera corridor"[95]. This village town lies on the road between Harar and Jijiga. Babile has the dubious distinction of having a dual administration, under both the Oromiya and Somali regions, a casualty of intra-federal boundary making. The market is, however, one of the biggest in the east of the country, and is strategically located on the bustling trade route.

At the market one gets a clear sense of the centrality of livestock breeding to people's livelihoods. In informal conversations I was told that the livestock comes from all over the Oromiya and Somali regions, particularly the latter. Babile has become a popular choice for some faraway places mainly because it offers better market opportunities than the much closer regions of southern Somalia[96]. This level of informal trade is regulated; the state has become increasingly involved in the livestock trade, following years of non-engagement[97].

Khat also dominates cross-border trade at Togochale. It is more apparent than the livestock because of the trade volume. From observations and informal and formal conversations at the border it became evident that trade in khat is a lucrative business. It has become legal and formal since the state become heavily involved, making khat the biggest Ethiopian export[98]. Formally and informally, khat passes at Togochale to Somaliland, Puntland and across the Red sea. The informal trade is both large and small scale, legal and illegal. Numerous trucks coming from the khat plantations around Harar speed on the Harar-Jijiga road to the border on a daily basis. Khat has a

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[94] Yacob Aklilu and Andy Catley, (2010) *Mind the Gap, Commercialization, Livelihoods and Wealth Disparity in Pastoralist Areas of Ethiopia,* Research Report by the Feinstein International Centre and UKDID. (December). http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/2010/mind-the-gap.html. (accessed June 20, 2012).

[95] Nasir Majid, "Livestock Trade in the Djibouti, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands", Chatham House Report (September 2010) http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/179951 (accessed May 20 2012).

[96] Aklilu and Catley, Mind the Gap, 7.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Majid, 8.

short shelf life, and it is best consumed fresh. The further one moves away from Harar towards the border, the more expensive it becomes. By all means, the khat has to reach its destinations [as far as the United Kingdom] hence the reality of trucks moving under the cover of darkness away from the main road and customs checks, heading for the border[99]. In addition, on public buses women smuggle bunches of khat on a daily basis, evading the inattentive eyes of the customs officials.

The reality is that it is the Somali that are heavily involved in informal cross-border trade, particularly that of livestock, on either side of the border. When it comes to khat, they are the biggest consumers of the leaf. The livestock networks are significant, and speak much to the nature and extent of cross-border trade in the region. According to Majid, the networks penetrate deep into Ethiopia's Somali Region where many of the animals are raised[100]. A 2004 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) map of the region reveals key livestock trade routes in the Horn, many of which are regulated by some Somali clans. The key routes traverse at least three countries, finding their way to the Mombassa, Bossaso, Berbera and Djibouti ports.

Some change and much continuity on the movement of people:

In the period between imperial restoration in 1941 and now, much has changed and much has stayed the same at the Togochale border. The border has been shaped by and has equally shaped the three consecutive states. In addition, the regional environment has contributed to the interactions the state has had with the borderlands. The state may have purported and encouraged an image of the borderlands as peripheral and ungovernable; however, the borderlands tended to and continue to serve the state in other ways. Neighbouring Somalia, a country that elected a post-colonial identity based on irredentist policies on its neighbours provided the imperial state with an opportunity for habitually oppressing borderland communities. The region's proximity to Somalia was used by the state as a reason not to trust this region

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[99] Interview with customs officials outside on the Togochale-Jijiga road, 28 November 2011
[100] Majid, 2.

and its population based on their ethnic/ cultural affinities with those across the border.

In the period following the revolution and the coming into power of the Dergue, there was much continuity in the state's relations with the borderlands. This changed significantly with the advent of the 1977-78 war, with the Ethiopian state becoming actively hostile. The attitude towards borderlands populations became more interactive compared to the passive one displayed by the imperial state. Suspicion increased and was intensified by the emergence of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The Dergue responded with a typical and violent response. This affected the entire eastern borderlands, even though the ONLF was primarily based in the southern sections of the Ogaden. Even here, the source of the emergence of the ONLF as well as its raison d'etre was believed to come from across the border. The Somali Republic and its activities became all-important. This is made apparent by the Dergue's support of the SNM and thus facilitating free movement on the border with northern Somalia.

The Somali civil war that began in the middle of the 1980s led to an influx of refuges into eastern Ethiopia. The refugee problem was compounded by environmental factors and unfortunately came to characterise the region for many years to come.   In many ways, the refugee problem became a consequence of the de facto policy of mutual destabilisation adopted by the Somali and Ethiopian states. The short-term outcomes of this policy may have been rewarding, however, the long-term consequences have been disastrous. It has led to mutual suspicion between the two neighbours, a barrier that has hitherto been difficult to overcome.

By the time the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace accord in 1988 the extent of unrest and the unravelling of the Somali state was widespread. The two leaders agreed not to support each others' dissidents[101]. However, the tide of violence and destruction could not be stopped in Somalia. In fact, the Accord led to the further unravelling of the Somali state, as many saw it as a formal renunciation of the Pan-Somali ideal.

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[101] Lewis, 576.

This border has experienced a continuous movement of people during different historical periods for various purposes. What distinguishes it, however, is that it has not been a focal point of the animosity between the two states. One reason for this is that it is far removed from the capital of the Somali Republic, and is on the fringes of the contested Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The northern Somali influence is also evident. Similar clans occupy either side of the boundary. Ordinary people more often than not, tend to transcend their respective state policies. In fact, economic and social activity appears to persist unhindered, even flourishing in the post-1991 period. This is certainly assisted by the dynamic nature of Somali culture[102]. This, however, should not be interpreted as the existence of an unambiguously cohesive culture.

As experience has showed us, the very 'nature of Somali culture' "can be either a source of cooperation or conflict at any given time, depending on circumstances"[103].

Conclusion:

The current usage of the border at Togochale reflects the political contexts in which the Ethiopian state has found itself operating in since the restoration of the imperial state in 1941. Much of this has been influenced by political developments, both domestic and regional. There is much continuity in the sense that the northern Somalia populace have always had the right to free movement across this border. This was first guaranteed in the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty that established the boundary, and later reaffirmed in the 1954 Agreement between the same countries. What has changed, however, is how the people cross and for what purposes. The above mentioned contracts refer specifically to crossing the boundary for access to pasture in the Haud grazing lands. As we have seen, however, these contracts have led to the further 'opening' of the border for various other purposes. The consequences of this are still emerging, but have certainly led to the fluidity of identities and flexibility of regulations at the border, and a dynamic borderland region.

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[102] The centrality of trust in Somali trade transactions has been acknowledged, particularly in the area of cross-border trade, see for example Majid, 8 and Peter Little, *Somalia: Economy Without State* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 10.
[103] Majid, 8.

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Livelihood, Crime and Cross-border Security in Africa: Nigeria/Benin Example

Muritala Monsuru Olalekan
Department of History
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
E-mail: murimonsour@gmail.com

Abstract

Urban centers in Nigeria served as the sites of enchanting challenges and diverse spectacles. In this regard, the city of Lagos became the site of diverse experiments and strategies in urban livelihood. Though there is an assumption that livelihood is about the ways and means of "making a living", it also about creating and embracing new opportunities. While gaining livelihood, or attempting to do so, people may, at the same time have to cope with risks and uncertainties, such as a wide range of forces, social , economic, political, legal and environmental and institutional both within and outside the locality in which a household lives. It is within this conceptualization that this paper examines human smuggling and traffic-in persons, migration, sexual trade, currency trafficking, armed robbery and forced labour between Nigeria/Benin Republic. These are global problems, not limited to Nigeria and Benin, since the criminal networks cut across nations. Poverty, unemployment and corruption no doubt are known triggers, contributing to observed cross-border security challenges in both Nigeria and Benin Republic.This study interrogates the neglected aspects of cross-border security challenges, especially those connected to livelihood and survival. It raises posers as to why and how the criminalized livelihood means are sustained? What can be done to transform or reverse this trend? The study relied on both primary and secondary sources. Primary data included oral interviews, newspaper and archival materials. Secondary sources were obtained from university libraries and research institutes spread across Nigeria. Data were historically analyzed.This study concludes that inequalities, deprivation, poverty and corruption in Nigeria and Benin Republic served as impetus to the emergence and development of cross-border security challenges. Thus, it proffers that good governance through human security approach, equitable distribution of income and social security, rather than the law enforcement is a preferred solution to the problems of unlawful migrations, cross-border prostitutions, currency trafficking, smuggling and armed robbery.

Introduction

Historically, cities have developed and evolved as vehicles for socio-economic interaction, growth and social change. The lives and livelihoods of millions of people are constructed, affected and modified by what is done in the cities. Urbanization or city creation predates colonialism in many African countries.[1] Apart from Egypt, where urban civilization dates back 5,000 years, several cities in other African regions have centuries old histories.[2]

By the early 20th century, a second generation of cities started to emerge in Africa. These were urban formations that can be characterized or categorized as colonial cities. Such cities either began as pre-colonial formations before being transformed into colonial cities or were established by colonial officials. Either way, the character and the contexts of such cities became defined by western parameters. In fact, the current international border between Nigeria and Benin was first established as an inter-colonial border between British and French territories in 1889.[3] Besides, the construction of railways and roads, coupled with new economic activities and improvements in agricultural methodologies introduced by colonial administrations helped create many new urban centers that served as administrative, commercial, industrial, and mining and transport nodes.[4] Examples of these second generation cities include colonial Lagos, Jos, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, Jebba, Lokoja, Dakar, Conakry, Accra, Niamey, Cotonou and Monrovia. The European objectives of using them as administrative and economic hubs, expanding export production and distribution of their manufactured goods facilitated the urbanization process in such cities.

In the post-independent era, regional economic integration had been canvassed as a major tool of change and development.[5] The infrastructure of trade and the improvement in the

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1 United Nations Human Settlement (UN-HABITAT). The State of African Cities 2008:*A Framework for Addressing Urban Challenges in Africa*. Nairobi. p.81.

2 *Ibid.*

3 D.K.Flynn, 1997, "We are the Border": Identity, Exchange, and the State along the Benin-Nigeria Border. *American Ethnologist*, Vol.24, no.2, p.314.

4 United Nations Human Settlement (UN-HABITAT). The State of African Cities 2008:*A Framework for Addressing Urban Challenges in Africa*. Nairobi. p.81

5 A.Adedeji, 1970, "Prospects of Regional Economic Cooperation in West Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.8 no.2.

capacities of these cities served as impetus for the promotion of economic regional integration in West Africa. This inevitably led to the establishment in the mid 1970s of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The treaty, which established ECOWAS, was signed in Lagos, Nigeria on 28 May, 1975. It was an economic union designed to promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activities; integrate the sub-region into big market and serve as a veritable tool to create better conditions for development.[6] It also envisaged a greater economic integration by harmonizing the markets of the various countries and pooling their resources in ultimately establishing an economic and monetary union. But as it has been affirmed elsewhere, the economic imperatives of integration notwithstanding, the outcomes have fallen short of the lofty intentions and ambitions of the founding fathers.[7] One of the shortcomings of the liberalization of trade along the West Africa region has been cross-border security challenges.

It is within this framework that this work seeks to understand urban livelihood in the city of Lagos, with special focus on how the seek for livelihood means has promoted cross border crime and security challenges between Nigeria and Republic of Benin. Nigeria shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the West, Chad and Cameroon in the East, and Niger in the North. Its coast in the South lies on the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean.[8] In the West, there are two central border towns with utmost proximity to Republic of Benin. Idi-Iroko in Ogun state of Nigeria, and Seme border in the Badagry axis of Lagos state. One of the main objectives of this paper is to articulate the specific characters of cross border security challenges between Nigeria and Benin, especially those connected to livelihood and survival. In this study, Seme border in the Badagry axis of Lagos shall be the focus. However, the key concepts germane to this discourse are livelihood, border, crime and security. It is important to attempt a brief conceptual clarification of these concepts in order to enhance our understanding of the focus of this paper.

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6 O.C. Adesina. 2008, Rethinking West African Economic Integration:Francophone Gendermes and Nigeria's Cross-Border Trade, in Akinyeye.Y (ed) *That they may be one: Essays in honour of Professor Anthony.I.Asiwaju,* Imeko: African Regional Institute, p.146.

7 P.S. Mistry. 2000, Africa's Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration. *African Affairs* 99, p.553-573.

8 T.Onyima. 2012 (ed) *Nigeria's Golden Book: Celebrating a Rich Past and a Bright Future*, Nigeria: Sun Publishing Ltd, p.19.

Livelihood: Conceptual Clarification

The concept of livelihood is dynamic, recognising that the conditions and compositions of people's livelihoods changes, sometimes rapidly and also overtime. Livelihood are complex with households in the developing world undertaking a wide range of activities, as they are not just farmers, or labourers, or factory workers, or fisher folk but engage in self- sustaining activities formally and informally.[9] Livelihood has been discussed extensively among scholars and development practitioners, but there is an assumption that livelihood is about the ways and means of 'making a living'. However, the most widely accepted definition of livelihood stems from the work of Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway. They affirmed that, "a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living"[10] To Wallman, an anthropologist, livelihood is an umbrella concept, which suggests that social life is layered and that these layers overlap (both in the way people talk about them and the way they should be analysed). Thus, livelihood is more than just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting money, and preparing food to put on the table or exchange in the market place.[11] He opines further that it is a matter of the ownership and circulation of information, the management of social relationships, the affirmation of personal significance and group identity, and the inter relation of each of these task to the other.

Livelihood is also about creating and embracing new opportunities. While gaining livelihood, or attempting to do so, people may, at the same time, have to cope with risks and uncertainties, such as a wide range of forces, social, economic, political, legal, environmental and institutional both within and outside the locality in which a household lives, that are beyond the family control.[12] Meanwhile, the binding feature of these definitions and interpretations is

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9 F.Ellis. 1998. Household Strategies and Rural Livelihood Diversification. *Journal of Development Studies.* Vol.35. No.1. pp.1-38.

10 R.Chambers, and G. Conway, 1992 *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century.*Brighton:Institute of Development Studies, P.9.

11 S. Wallman.1984. *Eight London Households*. London: Tavistock. P.6.

12 A.Ademola 2010. Factors Affecting Livelihood Activities in Ileogbo Commuity of Aiyedire Local Government Area, Osun State, Nigeria. Unpublished MSc Dissertation, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan. P.13

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that 'livelihood' deals with people, their resources and what they do with these. Therefore, livelihoods, essentially, revolve around resources, but these resources cannot be disconnected from the issues and problems of access and changing political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances. It is therefore, within this context, that this study historicizes livelihood in Lagos by analyzing the nexus between coping strategies of survival adopted by the people (natives and immigrants) in connection with cross border crime and security challenges. Thus, the main argument of this paper is that poverty, unemployment and corruption are known triggers that has been contributing to persistent cross-border security challenges in both Nigeria and Benin Republic.

Concept of Border

Borders are political membranes through which people, goods, wealth and information must pass through in order to be deemed legitimate or illegitimate by a nation. Thus, borders are agents of a nation's security and sovereignty, and physical record of a nation's past and present relations with its neighbours.[13] Nations and states establish borders to secure territories which are valuable to them because of their human and natural resources, or because these places have strategic or symbolic importance to them. Borders are therefore signs of the eminent domain of a nation.[14] Border by its very nature performs various political and social functions, a greater dimension of which are the formation of legal, economic, ideological, psychological identities and the security of a nation.[15] Though extant literature exists on borderlands in Africa, Anthony Asiwaju for instance, has been one of the leading scholars of borderlands in Africa (1976, 1985; 1983). In fact, much of the available research on borders in Africa focuses on Nigeria's borders and Nigeria-Benin border in particular (e.g Dioka 1988, Gonsallo 1988; Igue 1976, 1989; Igue and Soule 1992). Meanwhile, these studies were concerned with official and international cooperation between states, but neglected the important aspect of livelihood and cross-border crime. Therefore, this study argues that inequalities, deprivation, poverty and corruption have

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13 O. Ogunsakin. 2011, Border Control Challenges and their Attendant Effects on National Security, in Abolurin. A (ed) *Issues and Challenges: Nigeria's National Security,* Ibadan : John Archers, p.37.

14 Ibid

15 Ibid.

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served as impetus to the emergence and development of cross-border security challenges in West Africa. Thus, unlawful migrations, cross-border prostitutions, currency and human trafficking, smuggling and armed robbery are notable features of Lagos-Seme border located within Nigeria and Benin.

Crime is conceptualised as something that threatens serious harm to the community, or something generally believed to do so or something committed with evil intent, or something forbidden in the interest of the most powerful sections of the society.[16] Further, this study defines crime as an action prohibited by law or a failure to act as requested by law. It is within this purview that this study would classify and analyse the changing trends in crime and criminality along the Nigeria-Benin border, but with special focus on Lagos –Seme border within the larger context of livelihood and coping strategies of survival of both immigrants and the citizens.

Concept of Security

The meaning of the concept of security is still evolving and so historians cannot just talk about security whimsically. What constituted "security" in the pre-colonial Nigerian states would definitely be different from what constitutes security today.[17] The pre-colonial nations were formed by the people across ages; Nigeria was imposed on the people by the colonial masters. Hence in the pre-colonial Nigerian state, security would mean the protection of the state against external aggression or anything that could injure the unity of the people.[18] But security in the present Nigerian state is more than a task of keeping the people together under same political umbrella. The point being emphasis here is that the problem of inequality in terms of size of population, land resources, and the like must be dealt with in a manner that assures all of justice.

Meanwhile, it has been argued that the new thinking is that any intellectual discourse on security should accord priority to human beings since without reference to individual humans,

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16 W.Kornblum, Joseph.J and Smith.C, 1985, *Social Problems*, 8th Edition, New Jersey:Prentice Hall/Eaglewood Cliffs, p.199.

17 I.Albert, 2012, Keynote address at the Golden Jubilee Conference organized by the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, in collaboration with the Network of Nigerian Historians (NNH) from 28-31, October, 2012, p.4

18 ibid

security makes no sense.[19] It is within this framework that the concept of human security emerged. The concept was popularized by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report (HDR). It has two elements: "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear". Calling attention to the uniqueness of the concept, Mahbub ul Haq argues that: 'the world is entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change and change dramatically. Security will be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory, security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere, in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment.'[20]

Speaking in the same vein, Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations once observed that, "Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment-these are the interrelated building blocks of human- and therefore national security."[21] However, it is very important to delineate which particular security is germane to this discourse out of the seven key dimensions of the concept that have so far been established. These are (a) *Economic security* (an assured basic livelihood derived from work, public and environment resources, or reliable social safety nets); (b) *Food security* (ready physical and economic access to basic food); (c) *health security* (access to personal healthcare and protective public health regiments); (d) *environmental security* (safety from natural disasters and resource scarcity attendant upon degradation); (e) *personal security* (physical safety from violent conflict, human rights abuses, domestic violence, crime, child abuse, and self-inflicted violence as in drug abuse); (f) *Community security* (safety from

19 B.McSweeney, 1999, *Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of international Relations*, London:Cambridge University press, p.127

20 Mahbub ul Haq, 1995*, Reflections on human development*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.115

21 K.Annan, 2000, "Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia." Two-Day Session in Ulaanbaatar, May 8-10. Press Release SG/SM/7382.

oppressive community practices and from ethnic conflict); (g) *political security* (freedom from state oppression and abuses of human rights).[22]

In view of the above positions, I argue along the populist school of thought on security that livelihood and resource flows cannot be adequately secured unless citizens, and more specifically the poor and marginalized peoples of the globe, have a voice in the matter. To ensure their security the world needs to be governed in different ways than the way we have been used to in the past. In fact, the populist school calls for ways of linking analysis of livelihood, security, and governance in new ways.[23] It is thus within this argument that this paper analyse the nexus between livelihood and security challenges with special focus on Seme border located between Nigeria and Benin Republic.

Poverty, Unemployment and Trans-border Crime in Nigeria

In Nigeria, poverty has been on the increase in the last few decades. The World Bank Reports show that Nigeria has a significant number of her populations categorized as poor people. For example, the World development Report, 1999 shows that Nigeria ranks 40th among the world's poorest countries, while the World development, 2001 indicates that the share of Nigerian population below the poverty line increased from 42.8 per cent in 1992 to 65.6 per cent in 1996.[24] Poverty is pain. Poor people experience physical pain that comes with two little food and long hours of work; emotional pain stemming from the daily humiliations of dependency and lack of power; and the moral pain of being forced to make choices.[25] When poverty is coupled with high levels of economic and social aspirations, the stage is set for criminal activities-particularly official corruption, robbery and dealing in illegal goods and services. People, who

22 S.Fukuda-Parr and C.Messineo, 2012, *Human Security: A critical review of the literature*, Leuven, Belgium: Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), p.6.

23 A.Abolurin 2011, Nigeria's National Security as a Participatory Project, in (ed) A.Abolurin, *Issues and Challenges: Nigeria National Security,* Ibadan: John Archers, p.292.

24 World Bank, 2000. *Attacking Poverty. World Development Report 200/2001*.

25 Odumosu et al, 2003, Social Perspective of Poverty in Nigeria, in (eds) Ajakaiye.D.O and Olomola.A.S, *Poverty in Nigeria: A Multidimensional Perspective.* NISER, p.346.

are thwarted in attaining desired social and economic goals legally, may seek to obtain them illegally.[26] Growing crime and violence, especially in the urban areas, where there is a good concentration of the poor, is a concern as it affects economic growth. A survey of poverty incidence in Nigeria between 1980 and 2010 illuminates on the connection between population increase, low income, deprivation and inadequate livelihood means in the urban centers. Thus, it made inevitable seeking livelihood illegally by engaging in cross-border crime as a panacea to sufferings. Below is the summary of the poverty incidence within the aforementioned period.

Table 1: Poverty incidence in Nigeria, 1980-2010

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Estimated Population (million)	Population in Poverty (million)
1980	27.2	65	17.1
1985	46.3	75	34.7
1992	42.7	91.5	39.2
1996	65.6	102.3	67.1
2004	54.4	126.3	68.7
2010	69.0	163	112.47

Source: National Bureau of Statistics HNLSS, 2010

Apart from the above survey of poverty by the National Bureau of statistics, the Central Bank of Nigeria(CBN) views poverty as "a state where an individual is not able to cater adequately for his or her basic needs of food , clothing and shelter; is unable to meet social and economic obligations, lacks gainful employment, skills, assets and self esteem; and has limited access to social and economic infrastructure such as education, health, portable water, sanitation; and consequently, has limited chance of advancing his or her welfare to the limit of his or her capabilities."[27] Besides, the World Bank defining poverty inductively states that: poverty is "the lack of what is necessary for material well being, especially food, but also housing, land, and other assets. In other words, poverty is the lack of multiple resources that leads to hunger and physical deprivation."[28] In fact, statistical data from the federal Office of Statistics indicate that by 1960, poverty covered about 15 percent of the population of Nigeria and by 1980 it grew to

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26 Odumosu et al, 2003, Social Perspective of Poverty in Nigeria, in (eds) Ajakaiye.D.O and Olomola.A.S, *Poverty in Nigeria: A Multidimensional Perspective.* NISER, p.346.

27 Central Bank of Nigeria(1999). *Nigeria's Development Prospects:poverty Assesment and Alleviation study*, Central Bank of Nigeria in Collaboration with the World Bank. P.1

28 percent. By 1985 the extent of poverty was about 46 percent and then dropped to 43 percent by 1992. By 1996, poverty incidence in Nigeria was estimated to be about 66 percent in a total population of about 110 million. Presently with over 150 million populations, poverty incidence in Nigeria is estimated to be around 70 percent.[29] Though there have been many attempts aimed at measuring poverty in Nigeria but poverty line in the view of the CBN represents the value of basic food and non-food needs considered essential for meeting the minimum socially-acceptable standard of living within a given society. Thus, any individual whose income or consumption falls below the poverty line is regarded as poor.[30] Meanwhile, the most common poverty lines for international comparisons are US$1 a day for low-income countries, US$2 for middle income, and US$4 for transition economies. In this regard, Nigeria indeed, ranked 151 out of 173 on the Human Development Index, with over 70% of the population living below the income poverty line on less than $1 per day.[31]

In Nigeria, unemployment is one of the major features of poverty; which is assuming a crisis level. Though there are no reliable data for ascertaining the exact number of unemployed Nigerians, it is however; evident that unemployment rate is growing at geometric progression based on the number of graduates and secondary school leavers without job.[32] The first evidence of unemployment came not from statistical data but from reports about the appearance in various towns of people who have had no jobs. They came in increasing numbers, and lived in shanty towns in desperation and poverty. Street children as beggars who simply work on the streets but are without families or homes are increasing in number in Sub Sahara Africa's major cities-Addis Ababa, Dakar, Lagos , and Nairobi (Moore, 1994). These cities no doubt have witnessed

28 World Bank (2002). *Poverty Reduction and the World Bank Progress in Operationalising the WDR* 2000/2001, World Bank, Washington, D.C. p.1

29 Federal Office of Statistics (1996). *Socio-Economic Profile of Nigeria, Lagos*.

30World Bank (2002). *Poverty Reduction and the World Bank Progress in Operationalising the WDR 2000/2001*, World Bank, Washington, D.C. p.10.

31 Figures cited in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Strategic framework project partnership against crime and drugs in Nigeria, October, 2003.

32 A.S. Olasupo. 2011, Poverty Reduction as a Strategy for Enhancement of National Security, in (ed) Abolurin .A, *Issues and Challenges:Nigeria's National Security*. Ibadan: John Archers, p.269.

increasing rural-urban migration of people in search of livelihood means. For instance, in the city of Lagos, there were 7,937,932 inhabitants in 2006, according to the 2006 census, making it the 14th most populous city in the world.[33] It would be recalled that after the 1970s Nigerian oil boom, Lagos underwent a population explosion, untamed economic growth, and unmitigated rural-urban migration as well as transnational migration from neighbouring countries. These caused the outlying towns and settlements to develop rapidly, thus forming the greater Lagos metropolis seen today.[34] Thus, Lagos has been a home to the very wealthy and the very poor, and has attracted numerous young entrepreneurs and families seeking a better life.

Against this background of high rural-urban migration, unemployment and poverty, appreciable number of Lagos inhabitants and Nigerians found succor in the informal sector of the economy. An extension of this sector is the trans-border trading platforms created by the regional economic integration in West Africa. The need to accelerate the process of economic integration proceeded apace with the recognition that ECOWAS should institute a trade liberalization scheme in four phases as from 1979.[35] The highlight of the liberalization scheme is as follows:

- ☺ Immediate and full liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts;
- ☺ Consolidation of customs and charges of equivalent effect and non-tariff barriers;
- ☺ Liberalisation of trade in industrial products originating in member states; and
- ☺ Establishment of a common external tariff (CET) as ECOWAS finally transforms itself from a free trade area into a custom union.

In July 1993, a revised ECOWAS treaty, designed to accelerate economic integration and to increase political cooperation, was signed.[36] In spite of the fact that West African states were interested in forging development using regional trade as a vital tool, the implementation of the above highlighted objectives are confronted with so many challenges, of which cross border

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33 See www.lagoscity_php.mht

34 Ibid

35 T.A. Oyejide. 2004, *Nigeria in the World trading System: The Challenge of Multidiscilinary Research and Policy Analysis,* Ibadan, Postgraduate School Interdiscplinary Research Discourse, p.26

36 Ibid.

security remains an important one. The evolution of the colonially-induced boundaries ultimately led to the development of two distinct market conditions.[37] The variety of goods and services available on different sides of the borders and differences in price as one moves from one side to the other made trans-border trade in the colonial and post-colonial periods an irresistible proposition.[38] Not only that, Nigeria has one of the most uncertain business environments in the sub-region. From Cotonou, Nigeria has become the greatest destination for goods such as rice, wheat flour, textiles, second-hand clothing, second hand cars and tyres, sugar, spirits, tomatoes (tinned and paste), second hand fridge and air conditioning units, sorghum, vegetable oil, and frozen turkey and chicken. Others are footwear, cosmetics, and medical equipment, computer and telecommunication products.[39] In fact, Adesina argued that in spite of the fact that Nigeria had slapped a ban on a variety of these goods; the items are still imported and shipped to the Nigerian border. Besides, Cotonou ports have been identified to handle some 350,000 second-hand vehicles imported from Europe into Nigeria every year.[40]

It is on this premise that I argue further, that the attempts by Nigerian businessmen to evade tariff on the imported goods facilitated the emergence of smuggling as a mode of bringing goods into the readymade Nigerian markets. Meanwhile, trans-border crime has transcended smuggling goods into Nigeria, it has extended to trafficking in human beings, illegal importation of arms and ammunition, trans-border prostitution, currency trafficking, money laundering, transportation of stolen vehicles across borders, illegal immigration and armed robbery. It must however, be said that the border communities are not exempted from this carnival of illegalities.[41] Owning to the porosity of our borders as a result of the greed and corrupt nature of border security agents, as well as their poor state of preparedness, criminals utilizing them as

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37 O.C.Adesina. 2008, Rethinking West African Economic Integration…, p.149

38 T.A.Oyejide. 2004, Nigeria in the World trading System…p.26.

39 O.C.Adesina. 2008, Rethinking West African Economic Integration…,p.150.

40 Ibid.

41 O. Ogunsakin. 2011. Border Control Challenges and their Attendant Effects on National Security, in (ed) Abolurin .A, *Issues and Challenges: Nigeria's National Security*, Ibadan:John Archers., p.41.

transit points or staging posts for their criminal activities constantly invade communities in the vicinity of these borders. It is within this purview that this paper examines the security challenges at Seme border, a border community in the Badagry axis of Lagos State in Nigeria, with utmost proximity to Cotonou in Benin Republic.

Seme Border and Security Challenges

Seme border in the Badagry axis of Lagos state, which link the country to Benin Republic has been one of the busiest borders in the country in terms of the volume of cross border trade and movement of persons, as well as vehicular movement. In the Seme border, the major items traded across border include textile, second-hand clothes, and shoes, rice, frozen chicken and turkey, vehicle spare parts, alcoholic drinks, vegetable oil and other consumables. A visit to Seme border reveals beehive of activities of both locals and immigrants. Traders abound at the border such that it is difficult to distinguish foreign from locals, because there is always free movement of locals across borders. Agbara, Okokomaiko and Badagry are the closest towns to Seme border. It is important to state that there are many families in Nigerian border communities that have relations in the neighbouring countries through inter-marriages, which is very common among the border communities. In fact, borders are no barriers to socio-economic relationship with their counterparts at the other side of the border. Because Nigeria is an import dependent nation, many importers over the years have formed the habit of bringing into the country all manner of goods through the Cotonou seaport in Benin Republic without payment of appropriate tariff. This marked the beginning of smuggling across the border. Smuggling of goods has become the most lucrative business across West Africa. Nigeria for instance, has a very unstable list of goods banned or allowed. Despite this, individual drivers are not averse to devising coping strategies based on prevailing circumstances; rather they augment their incomes by carrying 'cargo'-illegal goods smuggled in or out of Nigeria in the underbelly of their cars or where extra tyres are normally kept.[42] This illegal trade across the border has been sustained over the years by the cooperation and participation of different parties namely: transporter, border residents, custom officials, immigration officials, licensed and unlicensed clearing agents, the physically challenges i.e cripple, and the police force as well as other security agents.

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42 O.C.Adesina. Rethinking West African Economic Integration…, p.156

At Seme border, research findings reveals that, in the case of smuggling, between 12 midnight and 3am, rickety cars with raised shock absorbers, stuffed with smuggled goods, move in convoys into different parts of the South-West including Lagos and Oyo.[43] In their attempts to evade customs and duties on transported goods, they often times result in hot chase and exchange of gun fire; which has resulted to loss of lives in most cases. This of course, has constituted a serious security challenges to Nigeria border, especially the Seme border. Besides, these transporters over the years have established relationships with customs, majority of who out of greed have devised the strategy of collecting money from smugglers, and by so doing turning their back to trailers of cargo bringing into the country contraband goods. Over the years, the Nigerian Customs Service has been accused of taking bribes from cross-border traders, including market women. The cash and carry approach of the service has been responsible for the inability of the country to stop smuggling in the axis or achieve reasonable trade efficiency. For instance, an interview with Patric Onyekwachi- a second hand clothes trader reveals that he has been doing the business of bringing into the country contraband goods for over ten years because of the cooperation from the custom officials. He explained that between the Seme border and Mile 2, he normally spends between 2500 and 5000 naira to settle custom officials.[44] Corroborating this, Chibuzor- another Trans border trader also recalls that:

> Much of the profit I make goes to them referring to the Nigerian customs Service (NCS). On a particular night- about two weeks ago, we had to gather 50,000 naira to "settle" those (custom officials) in a week.[45]

Meanwhile, while Chibuzor might be trading in contraband, those who convey pineapples, apple and other agricultural produce originating from Benin, Togo and ECOWAS countries also pay through their nose to secure a "pass" whereas the regional economic body's protocols says such items should be duty free.[46] In the case of second hand vehicles, illegality and smuggling has provided livelihood means for both the young and old in both Benin Republic

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43Helen Eni, Life at the Nigerian borders, an online report on Nigerian borders. Helen Eni is an Associate Editor with TELL magazine, Lagos.

44 Oral interview, Patrick Onyekwachi, 36 years, Amuwo Odofin, 22 April, 2011.

45G.Iyatse, 2012. Seme border-colony of official greed, graft… , in The Guardian Newspaper, 18 November, p.D5

46 Ibid.

and Nigeria. It has been observed that youths in border communities abandon classroom for smuggling. In Badagry, for instance, some of them specialize in helping to bring into the country vehicles purchased in Cotonou, the commercial city of Benin Republic without the payment of custom duties. Their mode of operation has been in two categories. Firstly, there are those who had entered into agreement with customs officials operating on the coded platform known as COD-meaning Customs on Duty. In this situation these border middlemen charges between 25 and 30 thousand naira to cross vehicles across to Seme border. The implication of these is that for the 7 customs post between Cotonou and Seme border, the middleman would drop at least 2000 naira per duty post before crossing the vehicle to Lagos.[47] On the average the middleman would have paid 14000 Naira to custom officials for a car that would have attracted about 80,000 naira duties. If the middleman collected 30,000 Naira from the car owner or dealer, he would have made a profit of 16000 Naira on a vehicle.

Similarly, in the "crossing" business, a smuggler who claimed anonymity explained how his group usually raises one million Naira every night they are on the road to "settle" customs. The money according to him is usually from the car owners on charges of between 50,000 and 100, 000 Naira depending on the value of each car. Also, a car dealer gave an insight to a syndicate in Agbara –a border town near Seme, which specializes in forgery of different number plates, including customized ones to smuggle cars. This according to him usually cost between 5,000 and 10,000 naira. They usually patronize this syndicate to enable them move the vehicles freely within Lagos.[48] This is also in addition to car crossers who have devised the strategy of co-opting officers of the armed forces-the Nigerian army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air force in this illegal business. Another version of the double dealing of the customs has to do with undervaluation. This is an arrangement that favours all parties in the government, customs, and vehicle importers. The rule of the game is that a car age is reduced in the course of processing the duty. An example of this method is explained thus:

> A Honda CRV 1999 model, which was supposed to attract 146,000 Naira duty value was to be reduced to 1997 model, with the owner asked to pay 100,000 to a designated account. He would pay extra 55,000 unreceipted amount that would be shared between the agent and his principal (customs). While he paid total

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47 Oral interview with Rasheed Salami, 43 years, second hand car dealer, 22 April, 2011 at Okokomaiko , Lagos.

48 Oral Interview, AbdulKareem Okanlawon, 38 years, second car dealer, Ilasamaja, Lagos, 15 August, 2012

of 155,000, the clearing according to a custom agent would have cost him about 200,000 Naira if he opted to pay the stipulated fee.[49]

Secondly, there are those middlemen that comprised border community residents and those from outside Lagos, who would not engage the customs in any negotiation or settlements but would prefer to smuggle into the country vehicles and goods through illegal routes. This category engages customs in shoot out in their bid to forcefully and illegally bring into the country contraband goods and vehicles. Most times, the contraband goods are textile materials, tin tomatoes and occasionally light weapons. The customs, it has been alleged encourages smuggling by engaging in illicit deals with the importers and drivers of trailers loading contraband goods. According to one of the transporters, on many occasions the customs would allow trailers, trucks and other vehicles with different sizes of containers being loaded from different warehouses on both sides of Nigeria-Benin border.[50] These trailers, trucks and other vehicles would pass through all the security agents without any stress into the country. In other words, there would be no problem with the importers, agents, drivers or owners of the goods if he had done the booking of the security agents, especially the customs.

The customs however, have refuted all the allegations of colluding with smugglers to deprive the nation revenue, as well as encouraging insecurity through the porosity of the borders. This was hinged on their performance analysis in terms of revenue generated within a certain period and the number of seizures made by their Seme border command. The Customs Area Controller, Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Seme Command, Comptroller Abdul Saleh, has told smugglers and fraudulent importers to steer clear of the command or be summarily dealt with. The controller revealed that the command has recorded cumulative revenue of ₦6,585,859,656.05 out of the ₦8.4 billion set as the command's 2012 revenue target.[51] He warned that his command would not tolerate smuggling in any disguise, falsification, fraud, dishonest, or under declaration, and all forms of anti-social activities. It is however, important to state that security challenges in the Seme border transcends smuggling of goods and vehicles but

49 G.Iyatse, 2012. Seme border-colony of official greed, graft… , in The Guardian Newspaper, 18 November, p.D5.

50 Oral interview, kolade Ogunseye, 53 years, driver, Iwo road motor park, Ibadan, 20 October, 2012.

51 Seme Customs reads riot act to smugglers, Daily Sun, 23 November, 2012, p.59.

also includes light weapons proliferation, human trafficking, currency counterfeiting, cross-border prostitution and armed banditry.

According to the United Nations, it is estimated that about eight million illegal light weapons are in circulation in West Africa and a substantial percentage somehow finds its way into Nigeria.[52] Nigeria's illicit light weapons trade can be traced back to the failure to execute a comprehensive arms collection programme after the 1967-70 civil war. It has subsequently become fuelled by growing crime, endemic corruption and ethno religious conflicts. There have also been widespread leakages from government armouries.[53] It has been observed that the various laws and acts, internally and externally formulated are not well implemented in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigerian firearms acts (1959) were the main legal instrument addressing the production, import and export of light weapons. This law was reviewed in 2001, partly because, of the 12,000 people arrested in relation to arms trafficking or illegal possession of weapons between 1990 and 1999, fewer than 50 were successfully prosecuted.[54] In spite of these, transnational criminal groups have thrived in West Africa, and neither the ECOWAS moratorium nor UN sanctions have had much impact on arms proliferation.

In 2002 the Nigerian customs service reported that it had intercepted in the first six months of that year small arms and ammunition worth more than 4.3 billion naira (US$34.1 million). Much of this material was intercepted at the land border crossing into Benin, but some was taken from boats and smaller amounts were also coming from Niger, Chad and Cameroon.[55] Although, some of these weapons were earmarked for political intimidation, many were destined for regular crime. Thus, the weapons are used by armed robbers, in communal conflicts,

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52 See UNDP's ECOWAS small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP), "Programe to tackle the illicit proliferation of small Arms and light weapons in ECOWAS states, programme documents, sept.2004, p.3.

53 A.Vines, 2005, Combating light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa. *International Affairs*, Vol.81 no 2, p.353.

54 A. Musah, 1999, "Small arms and conflicts transformation in West Africa", in A.Musah and N. Thompson, *Over a barrel: light weapons and human rights in the commonwealth* (London: Institute of Comonwealth studies, p.132.

55A.Vines, 2005, Combating light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa. *International Affairs*, Vol.81 no 2, p.356.

kidnapping, militancy activities, assassinations by cult members and a host of other usages that contributes to daily lives and fear of becoming a victim of crime in Nigeria.[56]

Human trafficking and other trans-border security challenges

The United Nations "Trafficking Protocol" defines human trafficking as, "A transnational and internal recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth (above) shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth (above) have been used.[57]

The majority of West African states, despite their huge and enviable natural resources, have failed to develop their economies. Empirical evidence demonstrates West Africa's peripheral role in the world economy.[58] For example, West African countries have in common the lowest standards of living in the world. Eleven out of the fifteen members of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) are among the bottom thirty countries in the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Programme.[59] Though the causes of transnational human trafficking in West Africa are multiple, the fast growth of West African populations, the uncontrolled urbanization in the region, poor security, and economic hardships associated with wide inequalities in the distribution of wealth contribute to an increased salience of human trafficking as an available option to break out of

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56 O. Ogunsakin, 2011, Border Control Challenges and their Attendant Effects on National Security, in A.Abolurin (ed) Issues and Challenges: Nigeria's National Security, Ibadan: John Archers, p.44.

57 United Nations Conventions Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto. New York: United Nations, p.42.

58 W.R. Sawadogo. 2012, The Challenges of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa. *The African Studies Quarterly*, Volume 1&2, Spring 2012, p.95.

59 For further details, see UNDP 2011, Human Development Report, 2011.

poverty.[60] Besides poverty, West African cultural patterns fertilize the expansion of human smuggling. For example in the context of the extended family, tribal, and religious affiliation, children are often placed outside their biological family with the objective of securing better education and working opportunities for them.[61] Parent's ignorance of the risk involved in entrusting their children to other persons in this era of a greedy race for economic achievement associated with the desire of young people for emancipative adventure contribute inexorably to the growth of transnational trafficking in persons.[62] For instance, in Nigeria and Benin Republic, family solidarity is sometimes over-valued that parents usually do not pay much attention on inquiring on the morality of the relatives to whom they entrust their children.

According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), backing the statistics of the international Labour Organisation (ILO), around 200,000 to 300,000 children are trafficked each year for forced labour and sexual exploitation in West and Central Africa.[63] In addition, a 2001 survey on child labour in West and Central Africa reveals that about 330,000 children were employed in the cocoa agricultural industry in Cameroon, Cote'd'ivoire, Ghana , and Nigeria. Out of the 230,000 children working in Cote'd'ivoire, around 12,000 had no family connection to the cocoa farmer or any local farm in the country, and 2,500 were recruited by intermediaries in Nigeria and Cote'd'ivoire.[64] The alarming rate however, is that girls are more frequently the victims of child trafficking than boys.

Nigeria over the years has been serving as a source, transit and destination country in the human trafficking phenomenon. As a source country in cross-border trafficking, West African

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60 Africa is registering the fastest population growth in the world. See, for instance, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-overcrowded-planet.html?_r=1

61 Sawadogo.W.R, 2012, The Challenges of Transnational Human Trafficking in West Africa. *The African Studies Quarterly,* Volume 1&2, Spring 2012, p.95

62 The shift is always from more economically disadvantaged areas (low countries) to those more economically secured (urban areas and more developed countries, but also rural areas offering seasonal job opportunities).

63 UNICEF 2001, "Child Trafficking in West and Central Africa." UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Office, Abidjan, Cote'd'ivoire

64 International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 2002. Summary of findings from the child labour surveys in the cocoa sector of West Africa: Cameroon, Cote d'ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. Ibadan.

destination countries for Nigerian trafficked women and children are Republic of Benin, Togo, Cote d'ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon and Guinea where trafficked persons are destined to work mostly as domestic servants and on farm plantations.[65] In fact, it has been discovered that Nigerian women and young girls were also trafficked to Benin for prostitution, and that most of these trafficked persons found themselves deceived into believing that their destinations would be Europe.[66] Also, as a transit country, Nigeria is the centre for distribution of trafficked persons to West Africa, Gabon and Cameroon. Importantly, Nigeria also serves as point of transit for trafficked persons from Republic of Benin to Europe and the Middle East.[67] Meanwhile, as a destination, Nigeria receives Togolese women, young girls and children from Benin, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana.[68] Either as a source, transit or destination country, human trafficking between Nigeria and Benin and other African countries has been made possible due to the porosity of the borders. The maps below illuminate on the transnational human trafficking routes in West Africa.

The case of Nigeria

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65 Policy Paper No.14.2(E), 2006, (Paris) "Human Trafficking in Nigeria:Root Causes and Recommendation". Organised by UNESCO and WOCON in Lagos, Nigeria on 26-28 Sept. 2005, p.22.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid, p.24.

68 Ibid.

The case of Benin

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006

A careful study of the trafficking routes in the two countries indicates that there is some indication of a link between sending and receiving countries. These links are influenced by a number of factors, such as the ease in crossing borders[69], the traffickers use the local customs, key locations or weaknesses in border or migration control[70] or expatriate population in the country of destination. Besides, on both sides of the Nigeria-Benin border, the long, unguarded border and the rural setting of these states facilitated the trafficking in children into quarry mines. For instance, child trafficking in the region gained international attention with the discovery and rescue of more than 200 Beninese children forced into slavery in seven granite mines in the Western states of Ogun, Oyo and Osun in the fall of 2003.[71] The children (all male) rescued from

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69 L.Kelly and L. Reagan, 2000, Stopping Traffic: Exploring the extent of, and responses to, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK. Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Home office, London.

70 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2001, Trafficking in Migrants. Quarterly Bulletin no.23, April.

71 S.Olukoya, 2003. "Tales of woe from Nigeria's child 'slaves,' BBC News, Published November. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pv/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3264959.stm

the quarry were between the ages of 4 and 17. The children were forced to work under slave like conditions, were often beaten and were refused food.[72] Apart from porosity of the borders, recruitment practices of the traffickers also reveal why and how this ignoble livelihood means is sustained. Children are either recruited through their parent's consent or adult intermediaries or individually. Promises to these children vary from educational or training opportunities for children, to good paying jobs for both children and adult victims. Children who are recruited without parental consent are often promised material goods such as bicycles, radios or handset.[73] For instance, empirical evidence reveals that in Cotonou young boys and girls were recruited by traffickers a time in collaboration with vehicle importers into Nigeria for domestic use. There was a case of a woman who willingly gave her daughter out to stranger from Nigeria on the mere promise of mobile phone gift in Cotonou.[74] This, however, raise a poser to the efficiency of the border personnel i.e immigration officers, Gendarmes in Benin and the Nigerian policemen at the border? A comparison between the patterns of trafficking in both Nigeria and Benin would illuminate on the extent of poverty, deprivation, and the endemic nature of corruption among the border officials in the two countries.

In a study of 400 trafficked children, 147 children (37%) were recruited by a family member, in the case of 190 children (48%), a person unknown to the family was involved in the recruitment. Also, in Nigeria, there are also cases of family members bringing the traffickers into contact with the parents of the child (7 of the 19 child victims).[75] A similar pattern can be found in the data presented in the Benin study. In a study involving 167 trafficked child victims discussed in the Benin interim report, 25% of the children departed their village with one or both parents, while 31% of the children departed with a friend (of the family). A smaller percentage

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72 Ibid.

73 *Measures to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in Benin, Nigeria and Togo,* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2006, p.51.

74 Evidence from a trip to Cotonou in August 2010.

75 *Measures to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in Benin, Nigeria and Togo*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2006, p.52

(9%) departed alone, while 21% of the children departed with a stranger.[76] Clearly, over half of the children departed with someone known to them and whom they would have trusted.

Conclusion

Regional economic integration no doubt has provided livelihood means for Nigerians and immigrants in the West African region, but the criminalization of this opportunity has been a daunting challenge for African leaders. In the case of Nigeria and Benin, particularly Seme border, endemic corruption, systemic failures, inadequate networking among security agencies, lack of central data base, shortage of personnel, ineffective implementation of border control laws and poor equipment have all contributed to the porosity of the border. This is in addition to the pervasive poverty in both Nigeria and Benin has made the trans-border criminals to see themselves as seeking livelihood means. Therefore, majority of these trans-border offenders considers their option of survival as coping strategies, and not as committing crimes.

However, the implication for Nigeria has been enormous. In the case of smuggling of contraband goods, illegal drugs and light weapons, the country has been exposed to consumption of counterfeit goods, the weapons are also used by armed robbers, in communal conflicts, kidnapping, militancy activities, assassinations, and has promoted general insecurity of lives and property. On the hand, human trafficking has made Nigeria a base for transnational crime syndicates for their operation and collection point. The consequence of this has been increase in murder rates, violence and destabilizing effect on the national economy and security. In fact, international image has been dragged in the mud.

This study concludes that inequitable distribution of income, unemployment, deprivation, poverty and corruption in Nigeria and Benin Republic served as impetus to the emergence and development of cross-border security challenges. Thus, it proffers that good governance through human security approach, equitable distribution of income and social security, rather than the law enforcement is a preferred solution to the problems of unlawful migrations, human trafficking, and currency trafficking, smuggling and armed robbery across the borders.

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SPILLING BLOOD OVER WATER: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNO-TERITORIAL CONFLICTS OF THE KENYA -ETHIOPIA BORDER

A SYNOPSIS

*Kenneth O Nyangena[1]

ABSTRACT
Although Kenya is considered to be peaceful unlike her neighbors, a closer scrutiny reveals an unprecedented wave of internal and cross-border conflicts. These conflicts - mainly manifesting as political, economic, environmental conflicts, conflicts over natural resources, land and tribal clashes and lately terrorism - are sending signals that all is not rosy as the outside world has been erroneously been made to believe. Pastoralists in northern Kenya have borne much of the brunt of internal conflicts and considerable efforts have been directed at addressing their specific conflict environment by a number of stakeholders that include GOK, religious organizations and CBOs. The resource-based conflicts prevalent in ASALs have completely distorted development programmes and eroded civil administration of this vast and rugged countryside. However, for many years, nomadic herdsmen have roamed the harsh, semi-arid lowlands that stretch across 80 percent of Kenya and 60 percent of Ethiopia. These herdsmen have long been accustomed to adapting to a changing environment but in recent years, they have faced challenges such as dwindling water supplies forcing the pastoralists migrate in search of suitable water and land. The search has brought tribal groups in Ethiopia and Kenya in increasing conflict. The result has been cross-border raids in which members of both groups kill each other, raid livestock, and torch huts over grass and water. The main aim of this research is to provide an overview of current existing policies, institutions and other measures that impact on conflict management in Kenya. It also highlights the principles that act as the 'lens' through which the policy analysis is conducted to identify the policy interventions and lessons learnt that should be integrated into a holistic and cohesive peace building and conflict management policy.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

At the end of cold war, most parts of the Africa continent continued to experience political changes of monumental proportion. Monumental, not only, because of the drastic restructuring of social and economic and political spaces, but also of the introduction of new forms of politics and political actors. These changes were driven a great deal, by the developments in the global system, in particular, the demise of the Soviet Union as a nation and super power, the triumph of the market, and more importantly, the end of the cold war. The latter eliminated (or in some cases, reduced) the traditional cold war inspired support by the West and

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[1] Lecturer, Department of Public Affairs and Environmental Studies, Laikipia University College
Email: kenyangena@yahoo.com

Soviet Block, of the authoritarian leaders whose excesses were accommodated at the expense of the populace.

In relation to these changes, the African continent was equally characterized by a succession of large-scale refugee movements, internal population displacements and mass repatriation movements. In a number of countries - Angola, Burundi, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia, for example, large proportion of the population have been uprooted, forced to abandon their homes by communal and ethnic conflict, persecution and violence. Most of these refugees have ended up into Kenya with a number of arms or religious fundamental ideologies. The process has witnessed a profound and influx of arms into Kenya and further these arms have fueled intra-ethnic and inter-border conflicts and furthered terrorist aggression into the country particularly from the Republic of Somalia.

No wonder, Kenya has witnessed massive and devastating terrorist attacks beginning with the bombings of the US Embassy and now the country has become an easy prey and target for the terrorist activities. Reasons for this trend has been a concern for the academics around the globe. Still yet no studies have been done to establish and address this issue. However, with a close look at intra state conflicts in East Africa, there is a major pattern and subdivisions-all showing and directed to Kenya for example: rebellion against central authority; inter communal ethnic or religious conflicts; sporadic short lived conflicts related to resource around livestock; and generalized violence which is banditry-related.

Viewed in contrast to many of its neighbors, Kenya is often seen as a bastion of stability. The country has several strengths that militate against the outbreak of mass violence, but it also exhibits many of the factors that have been markers of civil strife elsewhere in Africa: This includes strong ethnic divisions, polarized political issues, political manipulation, rampant violence, socio-economic disparities and a lack of economic opportunity, and endemic corruption. When combined with the increased availability of firearms, this dangerous mix becomes all the more volatile. The easy availability of such weapons within the country contributes to the growing culture of violence that is taking root inside Kenya. In addition to rising crime and generalized insecurity in recent years, the country has experienced repeated flashes of politically inspired ethnic violence, especially during election periods. Those instigating this deadly violence have not been held to account. This continuing pattern of violence and impunity, together with the spread of small arms, threatens Kenyan society and greatly endangers human rights. As Chacha writes:

> For a second time now Kenya has become an easy prey and target for the terrorist activities. This has either been seen as political label and hence for its controversialism. Reasons for this trend has been a concern for the academics around the globe. Still yet no studies have been done to establish and address this issue. Yet there is a clear manifestation that with a close look at intra- state conflicts in East Africa, show major pattern and subdivisions-all being directed to Kenya these are: rebellion against central authority; inter communal ethnic or religious conflicts; sporadic short lived conflicts related to resource around livestock; and generalized violence which is banditry-related .

Consequently, the region has suffered from all these types of conflicts for a long period. While at the local level, Kenya is today leading in sporadic violent banditry, which includes carjacking, bank and house robberies and murders. Since there is a global picture of that, the focus of this research is explored whether there are any inter-linkages between and within these conflicts. To start with, it is very clear that as far as cattle rustling is concerned, this is a phenomenon which

cuts across ethnic lines and national borders. The illegal circulation of small arms has created strong inter-linkage of conflicts in the region. Arms once used for cattle rustlings, become available for carjacking, highway and bank robberies.

Coming to rebellion against the state, there is a strong threat linking up the countries of the region. The conflict in the Sudan is perhaps a classical example, and there have been inter-linkages since the flare up of the present conflicts. Most of the local authorities and the region as a whole are under the control of Islamic fundamentalism. There is in all these conflicts, an Islamic factor, which links the Oromos, the Somalis and the Kenya Somalis and the Sudan. Arms people and religious fundamental ideologies are moving freely within a conflict system. Whenever a major conflict is resolved there is often a large surplus of arms, which become available to enlarge a smoldering conflict. With such a picture, it is important to approach the problem globally as a conflict system.[2]

Scholars define a territorial dispute as disagreement over the possession/control of land between two or more territorial entities or over the possession or control of land by a new state. These disputes are often related to the possession of natural resources such as rivers, fertile farmland, mineral or oil resources although the disputes can also be driven by culture, religion and ethnic nationalism. Conflicts in Kenya are many and complex but the most common is cross border conflict. The conflict in most cases manifest as livestock raiding or rustling, violent disputes over scarce watering points, land clashes between pastoralists and agriculturalists, clan-based violence, conflicts over pasture and highway banditry. The root causes of these conflicts are principally competition for shrinking pasture and water resources. They revolve around livestock and involve the use of arms, which make the conflicts more violent that result in indiscriminate killing.

For thousands of years, nomadic herdsmen have roamed the harsh, semi-arid lowlands that stretch across 80 percent of Kenya and 60 percent of Ethiopia. These herdsmen have long been accustomed to adapting to a changing environment. But in recent years, they have faced challenges unlike any in living memory: As temperatures in the region have risen and water supplies have dwindled, the pastoralists have had to range more widely in search of suitable water and land. That search has brought tribal groups in Ethiopia and Kenya in increasing conflict, as pastoral communities kill each other over water and grass. The pastoralists such as the Turkana of Kenya and the Dassanech, Nyangatom, and Mursi of Ethiopia — who are among the more than two dozen tribes whose lives and culture depend on the waters of the Omo River and the body of water into which it flows, Lake Turkana.[3]

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[2] Cattle are the predominant livestock species produced and marketed in southern Somalia and the adjacent Garissa District in northeastern Kenya. A relatively smaller number of camels, sheep and goats are also traded in the Garissa market.

[3] See for example, P. Little, Somalia: Economy without State (Oxford and Bloomington, IN: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003); P. Little, 'Conflictive Trade, Contested Identity: The Effects of Export Markets on Pastoralists of Southern Somalia', African Studies Review 39 (1), 1996: 25–53; H. Mahmoud, 'Risky Trade, Resilient Traders: Trust and Livestock Marketing in Northern Kenya', Africa 78 (4), 2008: 561–81; H. Mahmoud, 'Innovations in Pastoral Livestock Marketing: The Emergence and the Role of "Somali Cattle Traders-cum-ranchers" in Kenya', in J. G. McPeak and P. D. Little (eds), Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges (Rugby, Warwickshire: Intermediate Technology Publications Limited, 2006), pp. 129–44.

In particular, Lake Turkana has steadily shrunk in the past 40 years because of increased evaporation from higher temperatures and a steady reduction in the flow of the Omo due to less rainfall, increased diversion of water for irrigation, and upstream dam projects. As the lake has diminished, it has disappeared altogether from Ethiopian territory and retreated south into Kenya. This has made the Dassanech people to follow the water, and in doing so have come into direct conflict with the Turkana of Kenya. The result has been cross-border raids in which members of both groups kill each other, raid livestock, and torch houses. The cross border conflicts in Kenya and Ethiopia therefore need lasting solutions that include creation of an institution for peace where an obligated person in government has to be answerable on issues pertaining to conflict and peace, mainstream of issues of peace and development, ensure equitable development and enhance the role of traditional institutions and involvement of the youth in peace processes.

2.0 APPROACH

This study is intended to identify and analyze key conflict actors in the cross border of Kenya and Ethiopia; Examine the causes and dynamics of cross border conflict and Propose interventions to address the problem. The main justification of this study is due to the fact that: Deaths as a result of cross border conflict are now alarming. People have lost loved ones while others displaced. In the process, governments loose young energetic people who participate in development of a nation. It is therefore paramount that lasting solutions to cross border conflict be found if the Kenya Ethiopia governments have to develop and improve the lives and living standards of the pastoralists that border each other. The study therefore seeks to establish mechanisms of finding lasting solutions through collaboration from governments and non-governmental organizations among other stakeholders. The methodologies to be employed in this study include multiple tools designed to triangulate with one another for maximum data reliability. In particular, key informant interviews will be conducted among the tribes of Kenya Ethiopia border. The interview questions mostly open-ended will seek to allow respondents to give anecdotal evidence to support their opinions. The researcher will conduct with a variety of stakeholders including government and military officials, CBO representatives, chiefs, and elders.

Literature review has been used as one of the methods of data collection. The main purpose is to summarize or comment on what is already known about cross border conflicts. Sampled respondents from communities known as opinion leaders, provincial administration mainly chiefs and Assistant chiefs and officials from non-governmental organizations operating in the areas are to be interviewed in a group of 10-12 each using a check list. The purpose of employing this method is to engage participants in a debate in order to provoke their thinking.

Key ethnic communities in the Kenya Ethiopia border to be interviewed include the Oromo of Ethiopia and the Boran tribes of Kenya. The other tribes of interest are Turkana who live in northwestern Kenya, making up 2.5 percent of the national population, or close to a million people, according to the 2009 Kenyan census. The Daasanach who reside in southern Ethiopia and make up less than 1 percent of the national population, or around 50,000. More recently, the Daasanach have lost significant portions of their lands and animals in part due to climate change

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of borders is a mechanism that was employed by Europeans to mark a distinct division between those who could have access to the rights and benefits of the state and

those who could not. Therefore cross border conflict in the history of mankind is not new. The cross-border areas with Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda have been characterized by conflict since time immemorial. Conflict in these cross-border localities is associated with cattle rustling, whose key drivers are water and pastoral land.

2.2 Evolving rationales for cattle raiding

Cattle raiding is defined as a group invasion or forceful attack by an outside pastoralist group with an aim of stealing cattle rather than seeking territorial expansion. Increasing violent and destructive instances of raiding among East African herders have been recorded in the past two decades (Mkutu 2001) and are often, but wrongly so, associated with resource scarcity in the region's semi-arid lowlands (Bogale & Korf 2007).

Classical anthropological works on the subject as pointed out by Fleisher (2002) point to the ritual importance of acquiring enemy livestock as a proof of masculine warrior hood (Bollig 1990), and the human-ecological herd management and redistribution functions of cattle raids (Sweet 1965).

Recent studies in the horn of Africa's pastoral peripheries show that cattle raids have been intertwined with strongly militarized conflicts such as civil wars and cross-border disputes. These often involved rebel movements with a nomadic background (Fukui & Markakis 1994). Cattle raiders are driven by symbolic, pecuniary, and economic motives. Raids occur in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re-)acquire stolen stock and to replenish decimated herds or they are simply deployed to intimidate enemy groups.

Historically, cattle raids were carried out by groups of young male warriors who form closely knit raiding parties (Almagor 1979). In the same breath I agree with scholars who have rejected the idea that present-day cattle raiding continues to serve the purpose of maintaining group solidarity or accumulating prestige (Blench 1996). A reference case study is that of the Kuria pastoralist people who inhabit the Tanzanian-Kenyan border. Fleisher (1999:238) describes their evolving livestock raiding practices as follows:

> *Kuria cattle raiding is by no means a new phenomenon, but it has undergone a profound transformation in the course of this century – from its pre-colonial roles of demonstrating the mettle of new warriors and enlarging the community cattle herd to an illicit, often-times quite violent, cash-market oriented enterprise'.*

Similar interpretations are provided for the following ethnic communities; the Pokot and Turkana (Hendrickson *et al.* 1996, 1998), the Datoga (Ndagala 1991) or the Karamoja (Ocan 1994) pastoralists of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda respectively. Hendrickson *et al.* (1996) while trying to differentiate redistributive and predatory livestock raiding argues that redistributive raiding occurs among groups predominantly involved in subsistence animal husbandry and does not pose a threat to their livelihoods. As Oba (1992) demonstrates in his account of Turkana land use conflicts, raiding livestock of one's traditional enemies is a means to expand rangelands, restock herds and improve social status. Raiding campaigns by the young warriors are therefore sanctioned by elders and have evolved 'according to strict rules governing preparation, engagement, disengagement and conflict resolution' (Hendrickson *et al.* 1996:21).

More recently, cattle raids along borders have become more predatory in form in most cases implicating external actors such as businessmen, warlords, security personnel or government officials. That is why Ocan (1994: 128-129) concludes that cattle raiding in the volatile Sudanese-Ugandan-Kenyan Karamojong cluster mutated from herd restocking and

accumulation to 'selling livestock for money or for more weapons'. The sophisticated weapons and military tactics employed by raiders, widespread looting and indiscriminate killings during cattle rustling in Northwest Kenya justifies Osamba's (2000:8) identification of cattle warlordism' as the new phenomenon of the 1980s.

It is arguable that cattle raids have been transformed from an adaptive into a maladaptive and violent strategy, thereby increasing male adult mortality, famines and epidemics among pastoralist groups like the Karamojong (Gray *et al.* 2003). On the other hand, the social and economic costs of conflict have increased considerably, making some scholars to conclude that 'large-scale raids seem to be a major cause of chronic poverty among pastoralists' (Krätli & Swift 2001:13). As much as it is debatable whether use of weapons can act as a 'change agent' there is reason to believe (Knighton 2006), that the availability of small and light arms in the pastoralist lowlands is partly to blame for this trend (Mkutu 2007).

Among the Ethiopian pastoral communities, the rapid escalation of pastoralist conflicts since 1991 is interwoven with attempts to control territory more permanently and to claim political representation on ethnic grounds (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). However, violent confrontations involving the Toposa of Southern Sudan and Turkana of Northern Kenya are reported weekly. For instance, in 2004, just a few kilometers from Narus, Sudan, a group of over one hundred Turkana warriors from Kenya crossed the border to attack a Toposa kraal on the outskirts of Narus. In the clash, over thirty people were reported killed, and more than one hundred cattle, worth over US$22,000, stolen. While the between 2004 and 2008, local peace deals reduced the frequency and intensity of tribal raids, in May 2008, however, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division of northern Kenya and killed over forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

Of concern to scholars is that the attacks are normally well-coordinated and involve heavy and general-purpose machine guns, RPGs, 60mm mortars, and AKM assault rifles. In addition to the killings, the attackers make away with animals worth millions of dollars. The question the is who funds the attacks and for what benefit.

2.3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT

It is important to brain storm possible reasons behind border. First, unfavorable climatic conditions often force pastoralists to migrate in search of grass and water. It is during the dry season that young pastoralists leave their villages with livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is possible that in such situations that pastoralist engages in conflict over herding territory and even seeks to replenish the lost cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent. The Turkana for example have been faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. They call this event "Kichutanak," which means "it has swept away everything, even animals." It is not surprisingly then, that prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating levels of violence in the region.

In March 2006, over 600 Turkana families from Oropoi village, Kenya, left their homes and crossed the border into Uganda with their livestock in search of water. This became their only option when the sole water pump within a radius of 50 km dried up (*Africa News*, March 28, 2006). Inevitably, the neighboring Dodoth tribe in northern Uganda attacked the fleeing Turkana.

2.3.1 COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL POLICIES

Traditionally, cattle rustling that involved some violence was redistributive and only involved stealing cattle in order to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride price. Whenever a member of a tribe was killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical government, the councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups who were at the center of authority, governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out of control and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle them (Mkutu 2003).

However, the emergence of the colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from one generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom (Kandagor 2005). According to Mkutu:

> …., *pastoral communities were isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development (Mburu 1999). The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists' authority and ability to settle disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment* (Mkutu 2003).

Today with the colonial attitude having persisted in the post-colonial era, the question of land privatization and government policies that favor large-scale agricultural groups over nomadic livelihoods has made competition over grazing areas to grow increasingly fierce. Furthermore, other scholars such Duffield argue that neo-liberal policies that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and banditry (1997). The local business and political elites use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.

2.3.2 COMMERCIALIZATION OF CATTLE RAIDING

As Mkutu writes, commercialization in cattle rustling has led to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border lands/areas (2003). The local businessmen and in particular politicians are strongly suspected to fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia (Mkutu 2003). For instance in Kenya, majority of politicians from pastoralists are reportedly exporters of meat

While small-scale raiding may not clear the entire stock, commercialized raids with proper and elaborate planning can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) suggest that the large infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents in southern Turkana create an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the pastoralist economy. In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. In Baragoi region of Kenya over forty two (42) security officers were killed by cattle rustlers in the month November 2012. The security officers were ambushed by the rustlers on their way to Baragoi to recover the stolen animals. I agree with Mkutu's assertion that there is evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids (2003).

The lack of state control in the pastoralist region has made way for what Osamba calls "the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia" (2000). Without proper security provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great number of people.

2.3.3 LACK OF STATE SECURITY PROVISION

As part of a political campaign that favors agricultural communities over pastoralist, most governments in the Sub-Saharan Africa have not invested a great deal in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist border areas. This scenario aggravates the lack of state security in such regions. There is no doubt that insufficient roads, schools, proper health care, inaccessible lines of communication, and lack of qualified security personnel, pastoralists are left with no choice but to arm themselves in order to protect their families and livestock. Further, cross-border raiders cannot be prosecuted easily because governments lack the infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in cattle raids. The Small Arms Survey reports that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provisions in their communities (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

In Kenya and Uganda where the military's role is normally restricted to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programs, governments have armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These are identified civilians who are given a registered firearm and ammunition with limited training. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to local crime and disputes. Acording to Bevan:

> *While the KPR are sometimes effective in defending communities against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding purposes, thus undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008 ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured; revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials (Bevan 2008a).*

2.3.4 PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS
Pastoralists who live along borders are suspected to provide a large market for small arms. In the past, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47 has led the conflict to uncontrollable levels with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids. Whereas it is not easy to estimate the exact numbers of small arms that are in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well over 300,000 (Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security 2006). The pastoralist communities argue that they arm themselves to either protect their families and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits or to raid livestock from other communities. They also use guns as an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods.

3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on conflict and contact theories. Conflict theory emphasizes the role of coercion and power in producing social order. This perspective is derived from the works of

Karl Marx, who saw society as fragmented into groups that compete for social and economic resources. According to the theory, inequality exists because those in control of a disproportionate share of society's resources actively defend their advantages. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources.

Contact theory proponents usually think of intergroup contact as having an effect on prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behavior because of its effects on stereotyping. They think that hostile stereotypes are born of social isolation and broken by personal acquaintance (e.g., Allport, 1954, chap. 16). They recognize that the cognitive and emotional mechanisms involved in the development and modification of intergroup attitudes are very complex and can be affected by many variables. It is therefore possible to explain and predict different relations between contact and conflict (prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, hostility, etc.) by taking these conditioning variables into account. It should be possible to specify the kinds and situations of contact that will have desirable effects and those that will have negative effects. When contact is the right kind of contact, in a favorable setting, it should tend to reduce prejudice and discrimination.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

This section tries to propose interventions that can address the cross border conflict. First there is need for governments to install adequate qualified security personnel pastoralist regions. In particular, the governments should strive to offer sizeable incentives so that security forces do not resort to corruption as a way of supplementing their income. Security posts should be positioned on borders and at violence hotspots where tribes are known to clash.

Secondly, governments and international organizations should support and build the capacity of local community based organizations that work in the pastoralist regions to mitigate conflict and sensitize communities with workshops and peace building campaigns. This includes supplying vehicles and community based radios so that community based organizations can effectively contact authorities for early response.

There is need to improve infrastructure especially build feeder roads connecting main roads to small villages so that authorities can quickly reach affected areas. Provision of access roads to villages would act as a deterrent to raiding warriors. Equally, improved road transport would also enable pastoralists to partake in local commerce.

Having identified water as a source of conflict, governments and donors need to build more water wells so that villages can sustain their livestock during the dry season. This is likely to make the young warriors be confined to their areas as opposed to migration in search of water in other areas outside their jurisdiction

There is also need to establish cooperatives and inter-tribal commerce of local goods and livestock in order to build partnerships and economic development through trade. This would, in the long-term, undermine the illicit commercial practices of livestock traders in the area.

Once proper security provisions have been established, traditional disarmament practices should be reformed. Coordinated voluntary disarmament programs should be implemented that disarm neighboring tribes simultaneously. For those surrendering weapons, some kind of compensation should be offered. In order to avoid solely rewarding those with weapons, "weapons for development" programs should be implemented where villages are rewarded with improved infrastructure and social services after a certain number of weapons have been collected. Before and during the disarmament exercises, community members should play an active role in the process in order to give them ownership over the security of their communities. Particular attention should be given to the reintegration phase that trains ex-combatants for employment, so that they do not return to a life of violence.

5.0 Conclusion and discussions

The factors contributing to the pastoralist conflict are multidimensional, and have ramifications that affect livelihoods within and across borders. There is need for governments to invest sufficient human and financial capital in addressing conflict and the underlying underdevelopment in the pastoral regions. Given the poor disarmament record of governments and the fact that they lack the capacity to conduct simultaneous cross-border disarmament programs, disarmament does not appear to be a palatable option until there is a full overhaul of the security sector supported by policies to address the demand for small arms.

The efforts of local conflict mitigation organizations have proved to be an effective alternative to the recent destabilizing disarmament initiatives. As a result, a culture of pastoralism is emerging that relies more heavily on local instruments of conflict response, and their respective consequences, as opposed to confidence-eroding disarmament programs that prematurely disarm insecure communities. When communities no longer face threats from neighboring tribes and inadequate security providers, it is possible that weapons can lose their utility and worth and voluntary disarmament will be an appropriate answer to the small arms dilemma in this pastoralist region. Of paramount importance is coherent and well coordinated cross border peace initiatives and linkages which have the potential to reduce cross border conflicts. The study proposes that strengthening cross border linkages and relations may be the first step towards securing the borders.

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LOCAL STATE AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES: GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS IN A BORDERLAND AREA

Patrício, Marta

amepatricio@gmail.com

CEA-IUL (Centre of African Studies)

ISCTE-IUL – University Institute of Lisbon

Abstract

In the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border there are two chieftaincies called Mapunguana – one in each of the countries. However, the territory of the Mozambique's Mapunguana spreads along the international border and includes parts of Zimbabwe's territory. Both chiefaincies are *ndau* and, according to this ethnic group traditional political order, the chief from the Mozambican side owes obedience to the Zimbabwe's Mapunguana, who is considered the 'land owner' (his chieftaincy was established previously) and therefore is seen as wiser and more powerful.

Both Mapunguana chiefs meet each other in a certain regular basis in order to solve political, juridical and ceremonial questions concerning their populations. However, these meetings have the local state approval and the chiefs' dislocations for that purpose are in the local state cars.

Some questions can be raised out from this scenario. Firstly, it has to be analyzed the principle of the national state territorial integrity (in this case, Mozambique) in apparent collision with the conservation of a traditional political territory that is ultimately important for its chief's legitimacy. Then there is the need to incorporate legal pluralism in the picture as a possible response or way for understanding this relationship between both states and their respective traditional authorities. And finally there are the works about African international borders' artificiality or arbitrariness and the borderland communities' daily practices that must be analyzed and considered in order to understand such *status quo*.

This article will try to approach all the raised questions and, since it intends to be an insight of the author's PhD thesis first chapter, it will also include literature review on the named subjects. This PhD thesis is a research about the articulation between state and traditional authorities, with a focus on land and border governance, in Mossurize – an inland district in central-western Mozambique and in the border with Zimbabwe. It draws on original fieldwork and will articulate the author's preliminary empirical findings with some of the works already produced by scholars about this issue in the same region (for example Alexander (1997), Florêncio (2005) and Kyed (2007)).

Introduction

In the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border there are two chieftaincies called Mapunguana – one in each of the countries – and the territory of the Mozambique's Mapunguana spreads along the international border and includes parts of Zimbabwe's territory. Both chieftaincies belong to *ndau* ethnic group and have a long deeply rooted history of interrelations and political interdependencies since they were founded around Espungabera's mountains. With the establishment of the international border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, these relations are now 'transnational' and can't go on (at least formally) without consent of their respective local governments.

In this dynamic set there are many issues at stake. On the one hand there is the national state territorial integrity, and on the other hand there is legal pluralism between recognized 'traditional authorities' and the state. To culminate, all this happens in an international borderland, which also raises questions about how African borders are divisive or incorporated in borderland communities' daily lives.

This article starts with some considerations on African borders, followed by a focus on the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. It then analyses the concept of 'traditional authority' in relation with the political evolution of Mozambique since colonialism and in the framework of legal pluralism. Altogether this represents an attempt to outline how different political and juridical practices have coexisted in Mozambique history since the Portuguese colonial administration.

There will be made reference to some Laws that have settled the institutional recognition of 'traditional authorities'. However I will not enter in much discussion on what each Law intended, because that is matter for another article. The objective here is only to illustrate broadly the different landscapes, their evolution and what substantially motivated the changes introduced by FRELIMO concerning 'traditional authorities'.

This is essentially a theoretical article, despite fieldwork has already been made in the region in 2011. However, at that time I was enrolled in another research project and I wasn't looking specifically at chiefs' roles and activities. I didn't conduct any interview in the local administration regarding the issue of governance articulations as well. That's the reason why I decided to keep this article more theoretical then empirical. The main ideas here presented will be part of my PhD dissertation, namely the chapter destined to the conceptual framework. My PhD thesis is a research about the articulation between Mozambican state and 'traditional authorities' in Mossurize – an inland district in central-western Mozambique and in the borderland with Zimbabwe.

African borders

As David Newman says, it's not possible 'to construct a single theory of borders'[1], neither is that the objective of this paper. But in this initial section it's relevant to start by clarifying some ideas about borders in general, and Africa borders in particular, since the case study that I'm working (Mapunguana chieftaincy) is in a borderland (Espungabera, Mossurize district, Mozambique).

The borders of Africa, their drawing by the colonial powers, how they divided (or not) ethnic groups or the consequences of keeping these borders after decolonization are no original or recent issues in the Social Sciences. In fact, African borders have been highlighted in academic debates during the last decades and the first studies about these issues are as old as the OAU's decision that the new independent African states should keep and respect the colonial borders (1963). However, some misconceptions inhabit such debates, starting with the Berlin Conference.

This Conference is seen as the place where Europeans arbitrarily draw the borders of Africa with a 'ruler and a square'. But the 1884-1885 Conference was summoned because Germany wanted to create a consensus about international 'land grabbing' in Africa and limit further British expansion; it didn't set the principle of effective occupation (which was being developed from the sixteenth century onwards and was used at different times to justify claims) nor was the set where all African borders were decided (actually most of them depended on treaties signed afterwards whenever two or more European powers had disputes over a territory). The only results of the Conference were that the participants agreed in sharing Africa's economic exploitation, recognize the Free State of Congo and secure free trade in the Niger and Congo rivers[2].

The tracing of African borders is seen as politically and intra-ethnically divisive, but 'partitioned Africans have nevertheless tended in their normal activities to ignore the boundaries as dividing lines and to carry on social relations across them more or less as in the days before the partition'[3].

The idea that African borders are porous seems to be correct because they have open spaces along the lines and they're not equally controlled by checkpoints in all their

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[1] Newman, 2006: 144
[2] Katzenellenbogen, 1996: 21-23
[3] Asiwaju, 1985:3

extent. So they become 'portals' for the passage of goods, people and ideas and opportunity zones 'for the ambitious and intrepid'[4].

But the 'artificiality' of African borders is another misconception since what is common to all the borders of the world is exactly their artificiality: borders are not natural creations, they are 'man-made', and so every border is artificial. Along with the idea of 'artificiality' comes the one of 'arbitrariness' because African borders weren't decided by Africans, and so they are seen as arbitrary. As Mbembe (2002) sustains though, African borders are not arbitrary – despite the borders were inherited from colonization and not defined by African themselves, this doesn't make them necessarily arbitrary since (to a large extent) every boundary depends on a convention or is based on natural limits (mountains, rivers or oceans)[5]; also the borders drawn in Africa were products of military, religious and commercial events prior to colonialism and not simple its reflections[6].

In pre-colonial years, borders were defined according to the distance over which a political unit could extend all its power, and this distance fluctuated over time when territories were conquered or lost.[7] The main change that colonialism brought to this *status quo* was a new system of fixed territorial boundaries, which the post-colonial African states decided to keep. The maintenance of the borders after 1963 can be understood in the light of the self-preservation of the state, because it was feared that granting any group or region the right to secede would increase demands from others to do the same and then foster the state's disintegration[8].

In fact, international borders and boundaries are used by the state in pursuit of their own aims since they are the limits of their jurisdiction areas. But being such 'limits' gives the borders a sense of marginality and distance – in almost every African state all the 'modernization processes seem to dwindle as they approach the boundaries'[9] and the state seems to get weakened or less fully articulated along its territorial or social margins[10]. Nevertheless there are studies who deny these perspectives, such as Nugent (2002) who claims that 'border communities have been active participants in the

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[4] Allina-Pisano, 2003:60
[5] Mbembe, 2002: 58
[6] *Idem*: 59
[7] Kopytoff, 1989
[8] Touval, 1985: 225
[9] Asiwaju, *op. cit.*, 11
[10] Herbst, 2000

shaping of national cultures and indeed the contours of the state itself' [11], and Das and Poole (2004) who argue that the borders (or margins) are the places where 'practices and politics of life shape the political, regulatory, and disciplinary practices that constitute, somehow, that thing we call "the state" '[12].

As 'special areas of socio-political ambivalence'[13], borderlands are fascinating objects of study because they're the place, by nature, 'where ambiguities of identity are mostly highlighted as people move through interactions based on citizenship, nationhood or local community membership'[14]. Thus non-state actors take advantage of the special conditions prevailing there[15] and as Hughes (2003) claims, the issue of borders' porosity is 'neither surprising nor interesting' because the more pertinent questions are those involving 'the social standing of border-crossers'[16].

To conclude, there are more important and interesting dynamics on Africa borders then buzzwords like porous, arbitrary or artificial. As Flynn (1997) brightly wrote, 'whether originally 'arbitrary' or not, and intra-ethnically or politically divisive or not, African borders are often now an accepted, even actively reproduced ground of social and economic life for borderlanders'[17].

Mozambique-Zimbabwe border

The Mozambique-Zimbabwe border is one of longests in Southern Africa. Running for about 1,231 km., it divides eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique. It has been the place of some research focusing on refugees (Hughes 1999), on labour and migration (Neves 1998, Allina-Pisano 2003, Tornimbeni 2005, Newitt & Tornimbeni 2008), on agriculture and environmental conservation (Tornimbeni 2007, Hughes 2009), and on land politics and traditional authorities (Hammar 2010, Tornimbeni 2010), just to name a few.

The border between Mozambique and the then Southern Rhodesia was established after a series of disputes over the control of Manica's gold mines in the late nineteenth century and which had its climax in the *Ultimatum* of 11th January 1890[18]. The alignment of the border resulted from the Anglo-Portuguese agreements of 1891 and

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[11] Nugent, 2002: 5
[12] Das and Poole, 2004: 3
[13] Asiwaju, *op. cit.*: 12
[14] Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 13
[15] Zeller, 2010: 8
[16] Hughes, 2003: 4
[17] Flynn, 1997: 313
[18] Newitt, 1995: 306-316

1893, together with the Arbitral Award of 1897 concerning the Manica Boundary, and gave rise to a prolonged sequel of demarcations and modifications that only ended in 1940[19].

This border is particularly porous from the point of view of the physical movements of migrants, and people living in borderland communities easily maintained transnational cultural and social networks[20]. Along more than 1,000 km., guards staff only seven check points in which vehicles must pass, whereas for pedestrians the border is 'unsupervised, unfenced, and mostly unmarked'[21].

This border has a long history of border-crossings. Since colonial times people from Mozambique regularly crossed the border to work in Southern Rhodesia farms or to go to South Africa mines. The proximity to Southern Rhodesia was also used to escape taxes payment and forced labour recruitment during the Portuguese administration. In the independence war (1964-1974) and the civil war (1977-1992) this border represented the route to survival for people seeking refugee camps or going to their families houses. During FRELIMO's harsh socialist policies, many ran away through it as well. And nowadays people and goods are still flowing there.

In this long borderland we can find Mossurize – a Mozambican district in the southern part of the border with Zimbabwe. Mossurize's borderline is about 140 km. This district belongs to Manica province and, along with Machaze district, they gather the *ndau* ethnic group people who live in this province. The *ndau* are an African ethnic group straddling along that part of the border and also in Sofala province. Before the border was established, eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique belonged to the Zimbabwe Plateau. The *ndau* are therefore an example of a 'partitioned' group that has been sharing common social and cultural traits for several centuries, despite the border. This is the set where we can find Mapunguana chieftaincy, which will be analyzed in detail more ahead.

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[19] Brownlie, 1979: 1219-1221
[20] Tornimbeni, 2010: 39
[21] Hughes, *op. cit.*: 4

Map 1: Manica Province, Mozambique
(Source: Wikipedia)

Chiefs, Mozambique and Chiefs in Mozambique

Since this article focus on how the local state interacts with 'traditional authorities' in governance issues, this section will look at legal pluralism as a possible response or way for understanding this relationship.

Legal pluralism can be defined as the interrelation between the diversity of legal orders and dispute resolution forums in a given place. It seems to be present in every society, although with some specificities. In Mozambique we can find manifold legal orders and mechanisms of dispute resolution, which have interrelations between them. Since colonial times until nowadays the Mozambican state has been integrating and excluding this pluralism, according to different reasons.

Between the colonial period and the present day, Mozambique has experienced different political models – the colonial model, the socialist state and multiparty democracy with neoliberal economy[22]. All this western-produced models clashed with the 'traditional' African models, creating some kind of 'heterogeneity'. Thus it is important to analyze how the western rule of law first interacted with customary law and how that interaction has endured ever since, despite FRELIMO's attempts to overcome 'tradition'. I'll start

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[22] This last one at least formally

with an attempt to briefly clarify the meaning of 'traditional authority' and then trace the evolution it has been through in Mozambique in the last century, according to the different political models that have been settled in the country and how they have been articulating with each other. Whenever relevant, it will be made reference to Manica province and Mossurize district. This is an attempt to explain the framework on which legal pluralism has emerged and how has it been dealt with.

'Traditional authority' refers to figures that derive influence and/or power from positions held within institutions built upon the organizing principles of kinship. The titles, geographical dimensions, functions and individual identities have been continuously transformed in the midst of a tremendous variety of local scenarios[23]. Another definition sustains that the concept of 'traditional authorities' designates both the persons and the political power institutions which regulate the organization of the social reproduction model of 'traditional societies'. In the case of the African 'traditional' societies, these institutions existed before colonialism and have lasted during the colonial period and after the independences – mostly due to how their respective communities still seem them as legitimate, despite all the social transformation processes they have been through during these times[24].

The present day chief in Africa has become a 'syncretic leader' because he forces a synthesis between antagonistic forces stemming from different state models, bureaucracies and world views[25]. He is not just a subordinate local administrator controlled by bureaucratic exercise of power – in many cases he is also a figure who aims to protect the welfare of his land and people through a widely divergent system of possibilities[26].

Colonial Period

In pre-colonial times, African governed themselves according to their customs. When European colonial powers started the 'effective occupation' of their African territories and had to care about justice and administration, they acted twofold and choose to have a system for the Europeans settlers and another system for the Africans. Hence every colony had two legal systems: one 'modern', the other customary. Customary law 'was

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[23] West and Kloeck-Jenson, 1999: 457
[24] Florêncio, 2005: 43
[25] Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1999:21
[26] *Idem*: 22-23

defined in the plural, as the law of the tribe, and not in the singular, as a law for all natives. Thus, there was not one customary law for all natives, but roughly as many sets of customary laws as there were said to be tribes'[27].

The Portuguese presence in Mozambique dates back to the sixteenth century but its effective occupation and administration has started only in the last years of the nineteenth century, following the model of *indirect rule*.

The administration of the African population took the name of *regime do indigenato*[28] and was introduced in the 1920's. It separated the citizens from the *indígenas* and was based in two administrations and two laws: the settlers' areas followed the metropolitan administration model and the indigenous areas were organized in chieftaincies and managed by 'traditional' chiefs (*régulos*). The colonial administration created the 'administrative districts' and made them coincide with the chiefs' territories. Some took the name of *regedorias*. When the Portuguese thought that the territories were too big, they cut and shrinked them, or even joined two small territories in a new one. The biggest chieftaincies were divided to be less threatening to colonial rule and the *régulos* unwilling to collaborate were removed or killed and replaced by others[29].

From this moment on, the 'traditional' authorities struggled to balance the colonial government demands with the need to keep their legitimacy in their communities. Among these demands, and to fulfill the rules of the *Código do Indigenato*[30] of 1928, which embodied the principles of the *Lei do Trabalho*[31] of 1899, the *régulos* had to control the population and recruit people for forced labour[32].

In the 1960's, following international pressures against forced labour and in the aftermath of the first African independences, Portugal has changed the name of its colonies to "overseas provinces" and has formally abolished the *regime do indigenato*; but in practice, the differences between rules for settlers and rules for non-settler's forced workers were kept.[33]

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[27] Mamdani, 1996: 22
[28] Indigenous rule
[29] Araújo, 2008: 6
[30] Indigenous Code
[31] Labour Law
[32] Araújo, *idem*
[33] *Idem*: 7-8

FRELIMO State and 'traditional authorities' dismissal

After the independence war, FRELIMO became Mozambique's ruling party in 1975 and started a project of nation and state building of socialist inspiration, which was based in a modern democratic and popular system – in fierce opposition with the colonial administration. Because it called itself 'modern', there was no space for 'traditional authorities' in it. These latter were seen as remnants of a 'tribalist' rule that FRELIMO wanted to eradicate, and also as collaborators of the colonial administration as tax collectors and forced labor recruiters. Hence 'FRELIMO prohibited chiefs from participation in the new structures of state and party and condemned beliefs and practices deemed' traditional' or, in the parlance of FRELIMO, 'obscurantist' or 'feudal'. This exclusion and condemnation took little note of the wide variations in authority and popularity of chiefs or other holders of ritual power'[34].

In 1978 it was approved the *Lei Orgânica dos Tribunais Populares*[35] to establish a new model of popular justice to replace the customary law of the chiefs and some of the administration tasks of the chiefs were transferred to a FRELIMO organization called *grupos dinamizadores*[36].

However, and despite the creation of these new mechanisms, traditional authorities didn't disappear. On the one hand, they developed some strategies to keep in charge; on the other hand, the local state needed the chiefs' help because they were the only ones who could reach the population in remote rural areas and be mediators between the government and the communities, who were also suspicious of the new FRELIMO rule. At the same time, the government didn't have the means to build new political and administrative structures and lacked the experience of organizing and managing the rural population in peaceful times; also those new structures were often unaccepted by the population. There was the conviction among party-state officials that they had neither the capacity nor the knowledge to confront a range of problems from unexplained outbreaks of disease to witchcraft and drought[37]. FRELIMO's new community leaders were also unprepared for governing rural communities because they couldn't administer other matters that were fundamental to rural life such as marriage, divorce, property inheritance, initiation rites, rain-making and control of witchcraft[38].

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[34] Alexander, 1997: 2
[35] Organic Law of the Popular Courts
[36] Dynamizing groups
[37] Alexander, *op. cit*: 5
[38] West and Kloeck-Jenson, *op. cit*: 458-459

That was when the attitude towards chiefs became less strong. So the 'traditional authorities' preserved their legitimacy, working together with popular courts and *grupos dinamizadores*[39].

In 1976-1977, almost two years after independence, Mozambique faced a new war – this time between the FRELIMO party-state and its opposition movement RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*[40]). The civil war lasted until 1992 and in RENAMO controlled areas, some chiefs who weren't killed nor escaped went to RENAMO camps, reinstated as authorities and helped in the control and organization of the population. It is important to mention that FRELIMO's previous banning of the chieftaincy was one of the main reasons for RENAMO's rural support during this war.

Post-1992 State

The 1992 Peace Agreement put an end to the civil war and has started a new age for the local and national state building process in Mozambique, namely for the consolidation of political power throughout the territory and for the arrival of FRELIMO to the areas controlled by RENAMO.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's has already grown the idea that the independent African states have 'failed' their task of creating an equal and sustainable development for their whole population, and in the 1990's the international community demanded the fostering of democratization and political decentralization in Africa in order to repair that 'fail'[41]. Therefore, it urged to find whose social actors would respond efficiently to local needs and the 'traditional authorities' seemed suitable. However, FRELIMO had formally abolished them before the war, so a new legal framework and institutionalization was needed. This didn't happened before 1994, so while the central state couldn't define a concrete model of integration for the 'traditional authorities' or how the relationship between them and the local state should be, life went on in the districts and 'traditional authorities' had no option but interact with local state by their own means whenever was needed. Likewise each district administrator acted as it seemed "right" and thus a plurality of interrelations between the state and the chiefs emerged[42].

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[39] Araújo, *op.cit.*: 12
[40] Mozambique National Resistance
[41] Florêncio, *op. cit*: 44-45
[42] *Idem*:71

Meanwhile FRELIMO's officials recognized that figures who claimed authority over kin-based could powerfully influence voter behavior in the forthcoming first elections. Thus President Chissano met with these groups in several of the ten Mozambican provinces in the months before the elections.[43] Chissano's declaration in June 1995 that 'traditional authority' would be once more constituted and/or recognized set the turning point. A series of studies were then conducted nationwide to assess if 'traditional authorities' should really have a part in the decentralization process[44]. The conclusions were that 'traditional authorities' had a legacy that justified the attribution of this new task. Thus the new legal framework came out in 1997 in the Municipalities Law (Law 2 of 1997)[45]. This Law stated that 'municipal governments would listen to the opinions and suggestions of 'traditional authorities recognized as such by the communities' even if it left unspecified how such figures would be identified and how their counsel would be given force[46]. Anyway chiefs would play only an advisory role in local affairs and district administrators continued to have the final say in the rural areas of the country[47]. Among chiefs' duties were management of land, tax collection, census taking, opening and maintaining secondary roads, preventing epidemics and infectious diseases, hunting and fishing control[48], and also to title land collectively and consultation on applications for land concessions in their respective areas. This law also established a framework for the creation of democratically-elected local governments (*autarquias*[49]) only in cities, towns and areas of urban concentration in rural districts. This insured that these processes would not reach into the rural areas where 'traditional authority' was a salient political force.

But Municipalities Law drew heavily on colonial precedent and contained many gaps and such as sources of finance, central government level of support, and the relationship between new municipalities and Ministries[50].

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[43] West and Kloeck-Jenson, *op. cit.*: 462

[44] Project 'Decentralization and Traditional Authority' (DAT) was a donor funding project (Ford Foundation) carried by the Ministry of State Administration/Administrative Development Core that toured the country between September 1995 and October 1996 staging workshops to facilitate discussion on how 'traditional authorities' could be clearly identified within their communities and by government officials, on what functions they might serve and on how their mandate could be made more certain. West and Kloeck-Jenson, *op. cit.*: 463

[45] Which revoked a first version promulgated in 1994

[46] West and Kloeck-Jenson, *op. cit.*: 462

[47] *Idem*: 480

[48] Alexander, *op. cit.*: 17

[49] autarchies

[50] Alexander, *op. cit.*: 15

The debate continued due to the *Lei das Terras*[51] (Law 19 of 1997). Here it can be read that all land is the property of the state and that 'local leaders' should work in the management of natural resources, conflict resolution, signaling unoccupied land and identifying occupied lands[52]. But it doesn't clarify who or what is a 'local leader' – only refers vaguely that are those respected by all as such, which generated confusion at local level between all the social actors.

Despite these achievements, some officials still regarded chiefs with reservations and at the same time chiefs reclaimed for a colonial model that granted them houses, uniforms, police and salaries[53].

In June of 2000 it was finally promulgated the Decree 15/2000, the last and most important law in the institutionalization process of the 'traditional authorities'.

This law somehow restored the social status and the prestige that chiefs were claiming since 1994. The 'local leaders' of the 1997 Law are now called 'community authorities', but again is not clearly defined who is considered a community authority – chiefs, *secretários de bairro*[54], or other community legitimized leaders. Different social groups have now identical institutional legitimacy, which confuses the population that doesn't see them as equally legitimized Also this law leaves these 'community authorities' in a place of mere consultancy of the local state, which unsatisfied them.

The recognition of 'traditional authorities' in 15/2000 Decree as community representatives can be seen as yet another attempt to extend the grid to spaces and populations that so far have not been reached or incorporated into the dominant spatial ordering of the nation-state[55] . But the focus of Decree 15/2000 is predominantly on what community authorities can do for the state in their execution of administrative tasks and mobilizing of rural communities for participation in government projects. Only scant attention is given to the role of community representation[56].

The weight of 'traditional authorities' in local administration is variable according to the regions of the country. Anyway 'traditional authorities' now have to directly dispute power at local level with the FRELIMO party structures (*grupos dinamizadores* and *secretários de bairro*) because all of them act upon the same political and social spaces

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[51] Land Law
[52] Araújo, *op.cit.*: 13
[53] Alexander, *op. cit.*: 18
[54] Secretaries of suburban quarters or villages
[55] Buur and Kyed, 2005: 22
[56] Kyed, 2008: 171

that the central or local government never separated – despite the separation between party and state was consecrated in the 1990 Constitution[57].

At local level, political struggles are between 'traditional authorities', state authorities and organizations, national and foreign NGO's, FRELIMO and its organizations, RENAMO and its organizations. They struggle in the subjects of health, agriculture and justice[58]. Yet another important issue is how to organize *de facto* the shared tasks of policing and justice enforcement laid down in Decree 15/2000, since chiefs were obliged by the local tiers of the police to inspect and locate criminals or suspects and to forward this information to the PRM (*Polícia da República de Moçambique*[59]). In this case the boundary-marking in legal orders and domains of authority is set in three parts: state (law/crime), chiefs (tradition/traditional and social cases), community courts and *secretários* (community rules and social cases)[60].

All this evolution shows, as Alexander (1997) sustains, that Mozambique was experiencing a 'profound crisis of authority' rooted in 'practices and pressures of previous years' that didn't prepare the way for democratic demands, or for and independent 'civil society'[61].

Due to civil war alliances, FRELIMO still looks to 'traditional authorities' with suspicion and is afraid that RENAMO might manipulate chiefs again and influence their votes. And nowadays FRELIMO admits that still cannot control certain regions in the inland districts – the same is to say that these are the places where the rule of 'traditional authorities' prevail[62]. Mossurize can be considered one of these places since it remained at the periphery of the colonial economic system (considered as only labour-supply area) and post-colonial development plans and investments in market infrastructure has systematically excluded this area[63].

As pointed by Das and Poole (2004), what is at stake in the ''margins of the state' is formed through the experiences of local worlds, even though state and local worlds are enmeshed in one another; thus, on the one hand, law is seen as a sign of a distant but overwhelming power, and on the other hand, it is also seen as close at hand[64].

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[57] Florêncio, *op.cit.*: 253
[58] *Idem*:239
[59] Mozambique's Republic Police
[60] Kyed, 2007: 254
[61] Alexander, *op. cit.*: 20
[62] Florêncio, *op. cit.*:198
[63] Newitt and Tornimbeni, 2008: 720
[64] Das and Poole, *op. cit.*:22

Mapunguana

After analyzing some theories about African borders, explaining the origin and the dynamics of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe borderland and tracing the evolution of the 'traditional authority' in Mozambique, this section will now combine all the ideas addressed before and describe some features of the Mapunguana chieftaincy.

The origins and history of the Mapunguana chieftaincy are related to the Zimbabwe plateau, to the fragmentation of the Monomotapa Empire and the Mbire kingdom and to the expansionary cycles of the Rozvi. The Rozvi were a Shona-Caranga lineage group who moved from the Zimbabwe hinterland highlands around the fifteenth century and successively occupied the central strip between the Búzi and Save rivers, dominating the Tonga populations that lived there and settling in small political units (chieftaincies) that were relatively autonomous but related by kinship[65].

In this expansion towards east, several kingdoms were founded. Among them it was Sanga kingdom, which aroused through successive occupation of the Espungabera mountain region, in today's Mussorize district, and which derived from three different lineages of the Mutema chieftaincy in Mount Mbire: Nhacuímba-Musicanho, Garágua and Mapunguana[66].

When the nguni invaders from the south arrived at Mossurize in the nineteenth century and settled their rule, Mapunguana was one of the main chieftaincies in the region, together with Chaíva, Gogói and Macuo[67]. The nguni were later defeated and in the end of the nineteenth century and the *Companhia de Moçambique*[68] started to rule over the region. In 1942 the Company's concession ended and the Portuguese direct administration took control. As mentioned above, the colonial rule began with territorial arrangements, most of them taking the chiefs' land (called *nyika* in the local language of this region) as reference for the new districts (*regedorias*). Some chiefs lost their lands, other chiefs were incorporated in a different *regedoria* and some chiefs were even replaced by others chosen by the Portuguese. All this interfered with 'traditional' political hierarchies but not at the same level everywhere and Mapunguana is an example of resilience.

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[65] Florêncio, *op. cit.*: 79
[66] Florêncio, *op. cit.*:82
[67] *Idem.*:88
[68] Mozambique Company (chartered company)

In a 1966 top-secret report of the Portuguese colonial government (*Prospecção das Forças Tradicionais – Manica e Sofala*[69]), there were mapped all the 'traditional authorities' of the then district of Manica and Sofala (now two different provinces), as well as were identified the political and symbolic hierarchies between them. With it became clear that there were much interdependence between the chiefs of Mossurize (Mozambique) and the chiefs of Chipinge (then Southern Rhodesia)[70]. Mapunguana is clearly referred as being dependent of chief Mapunguana in Southern Rhodesia and both of them to chief Moribane of Southern Rhodesia too[71].

According to the *ndau* political organization, which developed through expansion from the Zimbabwe plateau towards the Indian Ocean, any new chieftaincy that was founded in this process, although conquering a certain degree of autonomy, still depended on the chieftaincy from which it has emerged[72] – and this is the reason why even today there are strong relations between *ndau* chieftaincies in the Mozambique-Zimbabwe borderland: the ones in the Mozambican side are traditionally subordinated to those in Zimbabwe.

The establishment of the international border in 1891 was not enough to break the ties between the *ndau* that were now living in two different colonies. In fact, that separation was never effective. For instance, the political relations between *ndau* chieftaincies in Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia remained strong, as they had an important symbolic and religious aspect and a complex chain of political hierarchies and subordinations. These subordinations are based in three areas: political, juridical and religious. Political subordination implies that every new chief (*mambo*) in the Mozambican side must be confirmed by the Zimbabwe *mambo*, who sometimes is also the performer of the enthronement ceremony. Juridical subordination implies that Zimbabwe chiefs are considered superior to solve certain conflicts (*milandos*) and Mozambican chiefs can't decide without consult them. Religious subordination implies that certain collective ceremonies, such as rain-making, which are crucial for collective social reproduction, can only be performed by the dominant Zimbabwe *mambos*[73].

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[69] Traditional Forces Prospection – Manica and Sofala
[70] Branquinho, 1966:13-14
[71] *Idem*: 14
[72] Florêncio, *op.cit.:* 87
[73] *Idem*:131

During civil war, from 1976-77 onwards, the Mossurize and Machaze borderland districts were the stage for several armed conflicts and so *mambo* Mapunguana and his family escaped to Zimbabwe.

Thus despite the Portuguese colonial authorities' and the post-colonial state efforts to sever them, these ties have been maintained and, even nowadays, Mozambique *ndau* chiefs are subordinated to *ndau* chiefs of Zimbabwe when it comes to symbolic and religious issues[74]. Both Mapunguana chiefs meet each other in a certain regular basis in order to solve political, juridical and ceremonial questions concerning their populations. However, these meetings have the local state approval and the chiefs' dislocations for that purpose are in the local state cars, which seem to represent a certain heterogeneity in the political and legal order.

In fact, the opposition between local state and *ndau* 'traditional authorities' is based in two different models of government and social control, both with different legitimacies. Local state is based in 'universal plebiscite' and consolidates its power in urban and semi-urban areas, mainly the provinces' capital cities. On the other hand, 'traditional authorities' legitimacy is based in a local cultural identity that people wish to preserve as a social reproduction model, and consolidates its power in deep rural zones, commonly named 'the bush' – the place where they are truly the only respected and accepted authority[75].

Adding to this, Mapunguana is a chieftaincy located in a borderland, which territory spreads across the border. However, both chiefs meet whenever they have administrative, juridical or ceremonial matters to deal with. In their meetings, can they be acting as representatives of the state since they are transported in local government cars and, as such, they have to pass through border checkpoints? It remains for further analysis if the chiefs always dislocate like this and if they tend to ignore the border (at least psychologically) in their normal activities.

From what was mentioned above, it seems that Mapuguana chiefs and their respective local states are mutually dependent. The chiefs rely on the state's support to consolidate their own political control over the communities and, on the other hand, the state depends on chiefs to administer and control the populations that can't be 'captured' by the state. And so this interrelation and heterogeneity of legal and political orders go on,

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[74] *Idem*:129
[75] *Idem*:262

since it's seen as the best way yet to accomplish the process of state's democratization and decentralization.

Conclusion

In this article I tried to argue that the legal pluralism in Mozambique is strongly related with the history of the country and is a result of the combination of local and national laws, legal or customary, that have endured through time, originating a dynamic reality that created a heterogeneous state.

As Alexander (1997) states, Manica 'was one of the most contested provinces in Mozambique's lengthy post-independence war', therefore presenting 'difficult challenges both to the exercise of state authority and to democratization in the post war era'[76]. In this sense, I believe that chief Mapunguana case clearly illustrates this, since the local state in Espungabera (headquarters of Mossurize district administration) has to rely on the chief's administration in the inland areas (where most of the population, as fieldwork in 2011 has shown, can't even speak Portuguese).

Jeffrey Herbst claims that states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders and if they're highly populated[77]. The question of to what extent is Mossurize's territory truly controlled by the state and how this threatens (or not) the viability of Mozambique as a national state remains to be answered, maybe with the help of further fieldwork.

Further research will try to analyze more profoundly some political decision-making processes in the chieftaincy and explore power struggles in this matter, also with the help of interviews with Government officials, namely District and Provincial Administrators.

With the design of the new 'Mossurize Development Corridor', the 'marginality' of this district might well disappear. The building of new roads is on the move since January 2012 and new agricultural and tourist projects in the region are said to be in preparation. Whether chiefs' role in this zone, that is still one of the most remote in Mozambique, will remain the same in the future seems to be also of interest to follow.

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[76] Alexander, *op. cit.*: 1
[77] Herbst, *op. cit.*

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Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
PLEASE NOTE: This is a draft working paper. Please do not cite.

Mobility and Borders: The Integration of Self-Settled Casamance Refugees in The Gambia.

1. Abstract

The Gambia has hosted Casamance refugees fleeing from a low-level civil conflict in the southern region of Senegal for nearly 30 years. It is West Africa's longest running civil conflict. Official registration figures (although ambiguous) estimate 11,000 Casamance refugees are permanently located within rural Gambian communities. In this context, international legalities are clearly set out as in any other refugee situation. Casamance refugees have taken flight across an international border and until they are able to return they have been granted refugee status and protection in The Gambia under the 1951 Geneva Convention.

However, the parameters of refugee terminology are confused as refugees are self-settled in host communities rather than formally settled within refugee camps. Refugee literature tends to investigate the impact of camp-based refugees on local communities. Rarely does this literature investigate local integration through the process of self-settlement. Self-settlement as a concept has been emerging over the past decade. Academic literature has varied on its definition and has often caused confusion. This case study applies the concept of self-settlement to refugees who have been externally displaced as a result of conflict and settle outside refugee camps and formal settlements. Refugees negotiate the terms of their settlement directly with host communities who dictate the rate of integration and concomitant access to resources.

In the case study presented, the historical, cultural and socio-economic ties between The Gambia and Senegal have encouraged mobility across the porous international border, and this is heightened (in both directions) as the conflict escalates and subsides. As a result of increased demographic pressures within host communities, there are additional difficulties for refugees in accessing natural resources, securing sustainable livelihoods and receiving basic legal rights, challenging the process of self-settlement.

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
PLEASE NOTE: This is a draft working paper. Please do not cite.

This paper addresses how Casamance refugees integrate into local communities presenting results from socio-economic and environmental assessments conducted. At the same time, it addresses how the Casamance conflict has affected the movement of both host and refugees across the Gambian border. It argues that access to resources, especially natural resources, on both sides of the international border encourages greater interaction between host and refugee populations and enables the engagement of existing livelihood strategies with few tensions, facilitating integration and self-settlement. Results show that factors such as livelihoods, ethnicity and caste are influential in refugee integration but have also problematised the concept of a refugee especially with continuous utilisation of the international border.

2. An Introduction to Self-Settlement.

The definition of self-settlement has varied in the literature and as a result has caused confusion. It has sometimes been referred to as spontaneous settlement (Connor 1989; Schmidt 2003), confused with literature regarding undocumented migrants, as seen in many Caribbean case studies, IDP literature or even confused with the vast literature surrounding local integration. Self-settlement in the context of this paper applies to refugees who have been displaced (in this instance externally and as a result of conflict) and settle outside of refugee camps or formal settlements set up by humanitarian agencies and national governments. Refugees in these circumstances have negotiated the terms of their settlement directly with host communities and it is these host communities that dictate the rate of integration and subsequent access to resources. Self-settled groups may or may not be officially registered with national governments or humanitarian agencies but the majority are not because they are not necessarily recognised by international or State law. Therefore, many are not entitled to state or humanitarian protection.

This paper concurs with later academic literature, such as research conducted by Hansen (1982, 1990) and Bakewell on self-settled refugees in Zambia (2000,2002,2008), which allows for the greater freedom of movement for self-settled refugees, outside State control

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
PLEASE NOTE: This is a draft working paper. Please do not cite.

and who directly negotiate the terms of their settlement with host communities. Much of the varying literature is in agreement that there are large proportions of refugees and displaced persons living outside of formal settlements and who have integrated with local communities (Harrell-Bond 2000, 2002; Schmidt 2003; Meyer 2008). This further adds to the complexity of self-settlement because, as Bakewell (2008) reiterates, those outside camps or formal settlements are usually outside of formal support networks and many do not receive protection they are in need of.

There has been little empirical research carried out on the impacts of refugees who reside outside of formal settlements and are supported by local host communities with limited resources and international attention. Self-settlement in this respect can apply to an alternative to refugee camps but also as a durable solution if repatriation or third country resettlement is not desirable. However, self-settlement has to an extent been neglected by policy makers and wider research (Bakewell 2008) given that it is sometimes considered the same as local integration and there is little literature on self-settlement which has impacted on the number of successful cases it can record. At the same time, there have been even fewer case studies investigating self-settlement where both sides of an international border are utilised to enhance integration and facilitate sustainable rural livelihoods.

The definition of self-settlement may be blurred but, similar to literature on local integration (Porter et al 2008; Jacobsen 2002; Orach and de Brouwere 2005; and Whitaker 2002), the impacts can be positive. Bakewell's (2002) research on self-settled Angolan refugees in Zambia found that factors such as shared ethnicity and similar livelihoods enhanced integration of self-settled refugees. Similarly, Hovil (2007) has identified that self-settled Sudanese refugees in Uganda have been able to effectively integrate and by-pass local politics by paying local taxes and Polzer (2009) explains that in cases where refugees share ethnic origin with their hosts, they have been able to obtain resources such as citizenship documentation. There are limitations to self-settlement and it is not always applicable in situations of mass displacement. However, there is a strong argument in the current

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

literature for the case of self-settlement in preference to camp-based integration and as a durable solution.

2.1. The 1951 Geneva Convention and its application to Self-Settlement.

In addition to outlining the concept of self-settlement, it is important to understand it within the international parameters it lies within. This is to understand how (and if) self-settled refugees are protected within these international parameters and how the regular use of the porous international border impacts on international protection. In regard to the rights of refugees, these parameters are set out within the 1951 Geneva Convention (and the subsequent 1967 Protocol). It was formulated in order to regulate the legal status of refugees and underpin their basic rights at an international level (UNHCR 2007). Within this mandate, a refugee is defined as:

> "A person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for a fear of persecution"
> (UNHCR 1951).

This and the 1967 Protocol (which removed temporal and geographical restrictions), marked an important shift within International Refugee Law and was considered "a child of its time" (Goodwin-Gill 2004: 6) as greater numbers of people would be able to seek international protection. Although there were fewer legal restrictions, the definition sparked debate on the nature of its foundations. Hathaway (1990: 133) argues that the Convention was simply a triumph of state interest and its purpose was not specifically to meet the needs of the refugees but to solve the challenges a State faced when accepting refugees into their country. This is increasingly apparent with many states questioning the Convention in the context of present migration challenges (Gonzaga 2003: 233) within domestic law. Due to

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

emerging global circumstances and additional refugee situations, the Convention is now argued to be somewhat out-dated with many states and organisations expressing concern that the conceptual definition is too narrow as it does not necessarily sufficiently protect other categories of people that are in need of international protection (Gonzaga 2003: 233). Although the 1967 Protocol formally extended the scope of the 1951 Convention, its failure to alter or extend the definition as a result of emerging contexts signifies that it is those who flee due to reasons of 'fear of persecution' who are still entitled to international protection and can exclude those who flee due to civil strife, political instability and natural disasters (Shoyele 2004: 549).

As a result, the understanding of self-settlement becomes further blurred. As the 1951 Geneva Convention states, a refugee has fled as a result of a "well- founded fear of persecution" and has crossed an international border. UNHCR in this respect were given the task of "promoting international instruments for the protection of refugees, and supervising their application "(UNHCR 2007: 7). However, it is important to understand that these tasks need to be handled carefully as not to infringe on the national sovereignty of states and dictate how the Convention should be implemented. It is host governments who are primarily responsible for protecting refugees (International Debates 2008: 16) and UNHCR maintains a "watching brief" (ibid: 17). As a result, many host states do not formally recognise groups such as self-settled refugees given that they are not explicitly explained within the Convention and therefore fall outside of protection guidelines. The limited nature of the Convention prevents international, regional and national actors effectively resolving displacement situations and as a result there are varying interpretations between these actors which has led to confusion when implementing the Convention guidelines. This is equally applicable to self-settled refugee groups who become blurred within international legal regulations, UNHCR recognition and host state protection. Self-settled refugees should be entitled to refugee benefits as stated within the Geneva Convention, however many are not because national governments do not recognise them and there is no specific mandate from UNHCR on self-settlement. Therefore many self-settled refugees are unable to register

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

and therefore not entitled to legal benefits and rights (as in the case of self-settled refugees in Uganda and Zambia).

However, it needs to be remembered that the 1951 Geneva Convention will always be valid as it is the only basic and universal instrument regarding refugee law (Carlier and Sztucki 1999) and is still the only refugee Convention that is universally ratified. The boundaries of self-settlement become blurred within these parameters however, as Fitzpatrick (1996) suggests, although the Convention definition is incomplete, it does not mean that it should be abandoned altogether.

3. The Casamance Conflict

The Casamance conflict is West Africa's longest running civil conflict. 2012 marks its 30th anniversary still rooted within a separatist rebellion and no closer to an end date. It is stemmed from an original plight of independence from the MFDC but is now embroiled in sporadic skirmishes, despite previous peace accords signed by both the MFDC and the Senegalese Government. As Foucher (2007) has previously explained, this conflict and the plight of the MFDC "provides a fascinating and somewhat counterintuitive case study". This section aims to provide brief context[1] of the conflict in relation to displacement and the self-settlement of Casamance refugees in The Gambia.

As Marut (2010), Foucher (2002) and Evans (2003, 2004) have previously noted, there are deep historical roots surrounding the political, social and economic causes of the conflict. The MFDC however, was originally founded in 1947 by Émile Badiene and was not originally a separatist party as it is known today but did stand for Casamance interests (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 1999). Post-independence, the political movement saw a vast amount of organised support for the MFDC from local populations. Local communities showed support by purchasing MFDC membership cards which were at first very successful. As Paul

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[1] For more detailed and critical accounts of the conflict and the MFDC please refer to the plethora of works published by Evans, M (2000, 2002, 2003 2004) Foucher, V(2002, 2004, 2007) Marut, J.C (1995, 1999, 2010) and de Jong, F (1998, 2007).

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

Nugent (2007) has identified, there is a direct link between the current, newer foundations of the Casamance conflict regarding separatism and the historical ethnic violence that occurred in the region of West Africa. Similar to the Islamization of the ethnic Jola tribe in the early 20th century, the active 'Wolofization' in northern Senegal in the early 1980s created marginality between the Casamance region and the rest of the Senegalese nation (ibid)[2]. Mobilised protest marches in 1982 and 1983 became increasingly violent and more notably, 'Red Sunday' in which estimates of those killed vary between 50 and 200 (although official statistics state 24 deaths) essentially drove the movement underground and prompted the military operation[3] of the MFDC (Evans 2004; Evans and Ray 2012).

There are two main factions within the MFDC, the Front Nord and Front Sud and, as the names suggest, are geographically located North and South of the Casamance River. In terms of unity, the MFDC have continued to fracture due to conflicting reasons on the outcome of the conflict, mainly in relation to the peace process and the laying down of arms. The Front Sud, with its bases situated along the Guinea Bissau border were continually in active combat, and the militarised wing of the MFDC. It has previously refused any involvement in the peace process. The Front Nord however, have previously reached an informal agreement with the Senegalese government whereby they retired from active combat in exchange for Senegalese forces leaving and having de-facto control of the majority of Bignona Department (ibid). Consequently, these factions have continued to split within themselves and are divided on a clear, unified mandate which has made peace negotiations stagnant, credibility for their plight and the need for international response limited. The main factions provide an interesting insight to how porous international boundaries are utilised during conflict. The use of the porous international border with Guinea Bissau meant that the Front Sud were able to take advantage of a weak Bissau-Guinean state to control its military operations and continue with the violence that persisted in the 1990's and early 2000s. Similarly, the MFDC have been accused of hiding key figures and rebels in border

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[2] This also very much relates to the historical resistance movement in Casamance which existed under Portuguese colonial rule in 1645 until the French took power (Gehrold and Neu 2010).

[3] The military wing has been commonly referred to as the Maquis or Attika which is the Jola translation for 'fighters'.

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

villages along the Gambian border and in recent years the border has become focus for the emerging war economy as a result of the conflict.

Lack of investment, collapsed infrastructure and market availability are just a few of the reasons why a war economy has developed in the region (Evans 2004). Foucher (2002, 2007, 2010) has analysed the war economy as weak and the goods are mainly low value which are exploited by rebel groups and refugees. Timber is the largest commodity and is heavily exploited on both sides of the international border. Extraction has been known to occur in areas surrounding the Gambian border and much of it is transported to mills and urban markets in The Gambia. It has been alleged that some of these enterprises are run by associates of The Gambian President but this has never been confirmed (Evans 2003). At the same time, there is also greater demand for timber given its key uses for furniture and fittings and may explain the increased demand across the Gambian border. Given the insecurity and mass displacement along the Guinea-Bissau border, however, it is difficult to analyse timber exploitation (ibid).

Cannabis or 'yamba' is another of Casamance's main export crops and The Gambia is probably the largest market for it (and can be justifiably argued to be part of an extensive network in the region). Marut (1999) concludes that the cultivation of cannabis pre-dates the conflict but the conflict has fuelled the supply with a large market in The Gambia. This is not necessarily confined to rebels but also to local rural and urban communities (refugee populations included) as well tourist markets in Casamance, Gambian coastal resorts and also Dakar. The Gambia has been described as an 'entrepôt state' because it has provided buying power, access to national and international markets and has processing facilities that are, due to the conflict, limited in Casamance(Evans 2003). Additional items such as charcoal and cashew nuts also fuel the war economy, but as Foucher (2007) suggests they are low value and not necessarily sustainable.

In comparison to other conflicts, the Casamance conflict is small-scale but it has been resilient (de Jong and Gasser 2005: 218) and caused heavy military activity with an estimated

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

700,000 people affected since the start of the conflict (ibid). Geographically, heaviest military activity occurred during the 1990s and was predominantly situated along the Casamance/Guinea-Bissau border where key rebel bases were situated. The destruction of land, shelter, livelihoods (fieldwork mainly conducted by Evans 2001/2002) and the migration (Evans 2003; Foucher 2002; Lambert 2002) of thousands of people both internally and across international borders made this the bloodiest time in the conflict. Even at the height of violence in the 1990s, the MFDC were never strong or unified and lacked coordination between its political and military wings. Attempts to re-unite the different factions of the organisation have proved impossible and in both the past and present, differences have been highlighted through violence (Evans 2004). Political changes in leadership in Guinea-Bissau in the early 2000s (notably 2002 and 2005) geographically shifted the military activity of the conflict which headed North across the Casamance river along the Gambian border where the conflict now remains. This change of military activity is also in line with a shift in displacement patterns where self-settlement was no longer temporal but on a long-term basis.

3.1. Casamance Refugees in The Gambia

The conflict has ultimately caused a three-wave displacement pattern that has been both temporary and long-term. Firstly, the majority of displacement has been internal displacement. IDP estimates have ranged between 10,000 and 40,000 (IDMC 2011). The last comprehensive survey completed which included IDP figures was completed by the NGO Caritas in 1998 estimating 50,000 IDPs near the end of the twentieth century (Evans 2007). Official UN figures estimate around 24,000 and unsurprisingly, in a potential attempt to down play the conflict, the figure of 10,000 has been estimated by the Senegalese Government (ibid). Official UN figures estimate around 24,000 and unsurprisingly, in a potential attempt to previously down play the conflict, the figure of 10,000 has previously been estimated by the Senegalese Government (ibid). Secondly, around 7,000 refugees are believed to have fled across the Guinea Bissau border. Similar to the plight of IDPs, there has been mass displacement along this southern border area, but there are few reliable sources to confirm refugee numbers. Figures have varied and are at best inconsistent. Thirdly, and in

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

relation to this case study, there are an estimated 7,546[4] refugees who have crossed the border and have self-settled into rural Gambian communities in Western Region. These refugees are believed to originate from areas such as Dioloulou and Sindian, north of the Casamance River.

Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 represents official UNHCR statistics on registered Senegalese refugee populations in both The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau from 1998-2009. Although these figures give an indication of numbers within each country and fully support the nature of conflict at respective periods, there are a few anomalies that needed to be addressed. Firstly, these numbers do not include those refugees who have not officially registered or give any indication of numbers prior to 1998. Questions then need to be asked whether these figures still include those who are not necessarily in need of refugee status and have created long-term self-sufficiency in either The Gambia or Guinea-Bissau. More importantly, statistically there are many years where the numbers of refugees have stayed the same and these need to be viewed with caution as it is very possible that no registration took place in those years and figures from previous registrations had been used as a proxy. For example, it was confirmed in-country that a re-registration took place in 2007 but nothing has been conducted in subsequent years confirming why 2008 and 2009 statistics have remained the same. Also, figures from 2003/ 4/ 5 in The Gambia have recorded extremely low numbers which would mainly be due to the repatriation or return of Casamance refugees from the previous influx in 2002. No confirmation could be given by UN authorities during data collection, to verify these figures. This adds to the complexity of the Casamance conflict, given that additional factors are in place to facilitate integration without the need for humanitarian support. It also confirms the complexities and confusion of self-settlement. Although there is a support mechanism, this confirms the literature that self-settled groups mainly lay outside of humanitarian norms and interventions (Bakewell 2002; Crisp 2003, 2004).

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[4] A recent 2012 UNHCR/ WFP report have estimated approximately 11,000 refugees in The Gambia but these figures have not been verified and include both rural and urban refugee groups.

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
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	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Gambia	3,567	5,071	4,230	889	4,230	548	548	548	6,946	7,546	7,546	7,546
Guinea-Bissau	5,921	6,243	6,554	7,332	7,322	7,317	7,317	7,320	7,454	7,488	7,492	7,492

Table 3.1: Casamance Refugee Registrations 1998-2009 **Source:** UNHCR 2010

Figure 3.1: Graph of Refugee Registration 1998-2009

The type of displacement that occurs along the Gambian border is in contrast to that along the Guinea-Bissau border. The area in and around Lower Casamance is an area where people have suffered longer-term displacement, living in a different environment where ethnicity, culture, tradition and history are not shared by comparison to refugees in The Gambia. The loss of, and inability to access shelter and land were defining impacts of displacement for refugees in Guinea-Bissau and show two contrasting impacts of the conflict. At the same time, the return process for refugees in The Gambia has been much more difficult to

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK

determine (Evans 2007). When fighting has erupted and refugees have flooded across the Gambian border, they have resided with neighbours, friends or extended family and have temporarily been hosted until it was deemed safe enough to return back across the border. This was the temporary refugee pattern up until 2006 when intense fighting in Northern Casamance drove refugees back across the border into The Gambia and this has been where they have remained. There have been previous initiatives to put refugees into refugee camps but given the sporadic nature of the conflict, shared ethnic and cultural heritage and access to natural resources across both sides of the border have facilitated self-settlement.

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a shift in the conflict, in which the influx of Casamance refugees to The Gambia steadily increased as highlighted in table 3.1. Figure 3.2 highlights the main direction of movement into The Gambia in 2002 and indicates the mass influx into the Foni Districts across the porous international border. There were also earlier influxes into Kombo districts but were temporary relocations. At this time, a retreat in fighting and a plan by the Gambian authorities to relocate refugees to a refugee camp at Bambali caused most of these refugees to return (some testimonies conclude refugees returned days after violence occurred) (Baker 2002) with sporadic influxes until 2006.

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
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Figure 3.2: Casamance refugee movements in The Gambia 2002 Source: Adapted from Concern Universal (2006), GBoS, Bing Maps and MapLibrary.org

Ray, Charlotte
rayc@uni.coventry.ac.uk
Coventry University UK
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Given the severity of fighting in 2006, approximately 7,000[5] refugees crossed the border into The Gambia, into the same villages and compounds they had previously been hosted in and have relocated permanently with only a few crossing the border to tend to farms, pursue livelihoods and for social occasions Figure 3.3 highlights the five Foni districts that refugees entered as a result of the 2006 influx. Most refugees arrived from the Ziguinchor region of Casamance. The fighting in 2006 was different to previous skirmishes as hard-line rebel factions are in control of bases around the Sindian area and armed military clashes with the Senegalese army caused this current wave of mass displacement. As a result, fifty-six communities were identified by local and international agencies as hosting Casamance refugees and have remained (Figure 3.4). Prior to 2006, the registration of Casamance refugees was ambiguous and rarely conducted due to the relatively low numbers crossing the border. When more than 4,500 refugees crossed the border in August 2006 (to follow the previous 1,000 refugees that had entered The Gambia at the beginning of the year) UNHCR became concerned about the impact this was having on local food security (UNHCR 2009) and have since conducted two mass registrations; in 2006-07 and a recent registration in early 2010. Although temporary self-settlement had been standard practice prior to 2006, the larger influx meant a shift from temporary to long-term self-settlement putting greater pressures on resources for both host and refugee populations.

In relation to international law, this is an unusual scenario where self-settled refugees have, to an extent, been recognised by official policy which has advocated its success as a durable solution. However, although many self-settled refugees within this research have been legally recognised, the effectiveness of that protection is questionable, given that they are ultimately outside of formal protection boundaries.

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[5] The official UNHCR figure of 2006 was 6,946 but figures from UNHCR field office, The Gambia have varied between 6-8,000 on 2006/7 registrations.

Phd Student: Caroline Roussy, CEMAf, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Phd Title: The making of the Senegalo-Gambian boundary from mid nineteenth century to 1989: territories, territorialities, identities.

Title of the presentation for Aborne winter school: The process of national identities on the north Senegalo-Gambian boundary (1970-1990)

Abstract

Currently, many researchers support that African people, contrary to their governments, do not feel concerned with the « artificial » borders inherited from colonization. Since the same ethnic groups may be found equally on both sides of a border, they pretend that relationships between the people have not been affected by the European border imposed on them. In short, African people would have lived for many decades as if the borders had not been in existence. These specialists use the expression « bottom-up integration » to designate this phenomenon. This "bottom-up integration" would, actually, contrast with the inability of African States to create conditions for Panafrican integration. Contrary to this thesis, I will demonstrate through an analysis of their spatial practices, that Senegalo-Gambian people have not only integrated the usefulness of the border, but also that they have taken part in its establishment. Based on a ground investigation, I will analyze the modifications of fields ruling on the north part of the Senegalo-Gambian boundary. In the aftermaths of lands' penury, that appeared in the 1970s, particularly in the peanut basin, border people asked locally and punctually for state intervention. The enclosure of landlords' horizon on a line tends to prove that the process from a zone to a line is on its way and may confirm the administrative and political role of the boundary. Regarding identities, the intermediation of states can be considered as a sign of nationalism in the sense that people have integrated that states protect their interests. As a matter of fact, one may consider with Peter Sahlins that states did not simply impose their values and boundaries on local society, rather, local society was also a motive force in the

formation of nationhood and the territorial state. But the integration of the border (both mentally and physically) was not incompatible with remaining transborder practices. For daily purchase, visiting family, or for contingent advantages identities may be renegociated by the people. I define this as dialectical allegiance both to local and national identity. These permanent renegotiations of identities do not contradict the emergence of a national territory or a national identity although they tend to attenuate and weaken those two projects.

I.   Global environnement of my work

My study in few words:

Le Sénégal indépendant
carte de situation in « Le Sénégal », *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens*, Hors série, avril 1999, p. 1

"How bizarre!" might certainly be the first reaction when one throws a glance at a map of West Africa. The Gambia is a tiny state included in Senegal. Unless its water shadow on the Atlantic side, the Gambia is a semi-enclave in Senegal. To have kind of an idea Senegal superficies is seventeen time as bigger as the Gambia (Senegal: 196700 km², Gambia: 11300km²). This very strange repartition of territories inherited from the colonial period almost cut the Senegal into two parts. One of the shortest and cheapest ways to join north or south of Senegal involves crossing the Gambia. Although it could not be considered as the only factor of explanation, this territorial division might have been an argument for Casamance leaders who, since the beginning of the 1980, have been claiming for their independence from Senegal. To finish with the two economic systems are schematically opposed, whereas the Gambia - functioning as a state-entrepôt defined by John Igué[1]- imports more goods than its market can absorb, Senegal has chosen to embrace the voice of protectionism to protect her own nascent industries. The distortion of prices benefits contraband. Powerless Senegal observes a constant smuggling organized from the Gambia which deprives her of legitimate resources. For political, economical and military reasons the Gambia is a constant scourge of anxiety that polarizes the organization of the Senegalese territory.

Since the independence proclaimed the 20th august 1961, Senegalese presidents have always denounced this situation with a common will to create the condition for a bigger state that could eventually be renamed Senegambia. During a UNO conference held in New York, in 1961, President Senghor compared Gambia to a gun on the Senegal belly. In 1981 while the Gambia had avoided a coup d'état thanks to the intervention of Senegalese military President Abdou Diouf - who imposed on Jawara the creation of the Senegambian confederation, sustained that the disposition of territories was an accident of history[2]. More recently President Wade denounced the French and the English who came and divided the people of the Senegambia[3].

On the Senegalese side pejorative metaphors to qualify the Gambia are plural: the country is frequently presented as a snake in the mouth of Senegal[4]... Conversely to this negative image

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[1] IGUE John O. et SOULE Bio G., *L'Etat- entrepôt au Bénin. Commerce informel ou solution à la crise ?,* Paris, Karthala, 1992, 207 p.

[2] « Abdou Diouf : Notre action est légitime, elle était nécessaire », *Le Soleil,* 4 août 1981, n°3384.

[3] "la France et l'Angleterre sont responsables de cette situation puisqu'ils ont divisé notre pays comme ça après ils nous ont laissé en pays divisé" cité par COUMA Tidiani "Le Sénégal et la Gambie règlent le différend relatif au transport sur le fleuve Gambie", *Sentinelle du 30 octobre 2005*, http:// sentinelle-droit-interntaional.fr:bulletins/a2005/20051030_bull_39/sentinelle_39.htm#senegambie

[4] En français, la Gambie est selon présentée comme un doigt de gant enfoncé dans la gueule du Sénégal ou un serpent de mer...

the Gambian people consider their country as a smile in West Africa. In 1985 President Jawara answered to Abdou Diouf: considering the Gambia as an error is an injure made to the Gambian people[5]. These poles apart discursive strategies show two orientations, whereas Senegalese leaders consider Gambia as an obstacle contradicting any unifying project, the Gambian plead for a status quo. Hence one may ask why does the situation carry on? Is the Gambian state the only responsible for the maintaining of the boundary? Do Senegalese and Gambians constitute one people? Did a Senegambian people pre-exist the drawing of the boundary?

The aims of this PhD is to answer those questions and consider different levels of analysis that is say to consider the establishment of this border from a state (colonial and independent) and a local viewpoint. The logics and rhythm from the top and the bottom might be slightly different. They may have competed each other but in a way tended to create a same reality: the rooting of the boundary.

What about my problematic?

For quite a long time, I used to look for coincidence between the Senegalo-gambian boundary and pre-colonial boundaries. Following the results of other French-speaking colleagues I was pretty sure I could find such resurgences of the past[6]. I used to think after Lucy Colvin that: "It was no accident that the colonial boundaries which emerged from Senegal and the Gambia were drawn as they were. The modern state of Senegal, with its little enclave, corresponds very closely to the pre-existing inter-state system, its already established communications and commercial network"[7]. I used to be convinced of the evidence of an African reality of this boundary. But these researches remain vain. First, a thorough analysis of the archives show that the French negotiator Jean Marie Bayol when drawing the boundary on an English map (n°684) in 1889 did not take into account nor the African organization of territories nor the European occupation of the African space. Unless diplomatic logics nothing can explain the choice to draw the boundary parallel and ten kilometers away from the river bank of the Gambia from the Atlantic seaside till Yarbutenda. Secondly, one may be convinced that the

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[5] " Considéré la Gambie comme une erreur historique est une insulte au peuple de Gambie" cité par SALL Ebrima, "La Gambie, un Etat exigu et enclavé", in MEDARD Jean-François (dir.), *Etats d'Afriques noires. Formations, mécanismes et crises.* Paris, Karthala, 1991.

[6] I was influenced by work such as BOILLEY Pierre, "Du royaume au territoire, des terroirs à la patrie, ou la lente construction formelle et mentale de l'espace malien", *in* C. Dubois, M. Michel, P. Soumille, *Frontières plurielles, frontières conflictuelles en Afrique subsaharienne* (actes du colloque IHCC - Institut d'Histoire Comparée des Civilisations, Université de Provence, 7-9 mai 1998), Paris, L'Harmattan-IHCC, 2000 : 27-48

[7] COLVIN Gallistel Lucy(ed.),*The Uprooted of the Western Sahel: migrants' quest for cash in the Senegambia.* New York: Praeger, 1981, 385 pp.

organization of colonial territories could have been far others. It was more the French decision to create a colony of Senegal rounding the British colony of the Gambia which created the apparent truncation of Senegal rather than the creation of the Gambia in itself.

Hence the main question: why this absurd boundary which had no correspondence with the local organization of the African space is still in existence till nowadays? Between absurdity and rooting what are the rhythms and logics that allow understanding the remaining of this absurd boundary? I may note here that there is not strictly an historic evolution from absurdity to rooting. On the contrary the two aspects may be found at any given moment of the history of this boundary. Although the general trend is They are two sides of a same reality and may equally be considered regarding the context although the general trend

To better understand the transformation of African territories in correlation with the establishment of the European boundary of the Gambia, I chose quite a long chronology from the mid-nineteenth to 1989. The mid-nineteenth century allow me to consider the evolution of the African map which was progressively transformed by the marabouts /Soninke wars and by the European penetration hence, at that time, a renegotiation of African powers that were no more relying on a territorial basis. At the end of my work I chose the year 1989 which correspond with the collapse of the Senegambian confederation experience started after the attempt coup d'état in the Gambia which occurred in 1981. This year appeared to me the most pertinent one because it showed that the two independent states could not favor the emergence of an alternative territory to the Senegalese and Gambian ones. This inability, partly, justifies the remaining of the boundary inherited from the colonial period, but still remains to understand why the populations of the two countries –frequently presented as being the same- did not fight for this Senegambia to become a reality. Did a bottom-up integration exist where the states failed? Or more surely wasn't it the best proof that the peoples of the two countries had integrated so deeply the function of the boundary that they did not see the opportunity of this Senegambian confederation?

What about my subtitle: territories, territorialities, identities?

The territory corresponds more or less to the objective space under the control of the colonial and the independent states. The territoriality which is a geographical term is useful to understand transborder practices or the subjective apprehension of space. The negotiation of these two realities territory and territoriality equally allow questioning the building of nationhood and of territorial state. Through those different concepts I try to understand the process of powers re (territorialisation) in relation with the boundary, to understand the

building of the colonial territory and its transmission to independent states, two processes that can't be dissociated from a thorough analysis of territoriality I define here as transfrontier spaces. At the junction between territory and territoriality I may analyze the building of nation-state and of a possible coincidence between state territory and identity. The concept of territoriality in itself seems a priori to contradict any project of nation-state whereas as we will see paradoxically weakens as well as confirms it.

Key words: boundary, state, territory, territoriality, identity

The place of the results I want to present in Aborne in my global study

My work is divided into three parts each divided in three chapters. The name of each big party has been thought as follows:

<u>**Part I:**</u> **Invent.** "Inventer" in French. I prefer here to give the translation in French because I'm not really sure of the translation and of the very impact in English. Through this first part I demonstrate that the Franco-British boundary of the Gambia had no coincidence with pre-existing inter-state system. I show why European commission of delimitation could cut all territories bordering the river Gambia into two parts and why any renegotiations of this boundary abort.

<u>**Part II:**</u> **Handle.** "Gérer" in French, I show how the administration and the people, in a colonial situation, dealt with this boundary and the implication for each scale in the management of their space. I make a particular focus on the Second World War during which the French and the English tried to close the border and analyze the impact of this closure.

<u>**Part III:**</u> **Relay** "transmettre". In this party, I analyze the transformation of a colonial boundary in a national one, keeping in mind to understand why the Senegalese and Gambian leaders could not invent another territory or negotiate the integration of the Gambia in the Senegal?

The presentation that follows belongs to the third part of this study.

II. Presentation for Aborne : ''The process of national identities on the north Senegalo-Gambian boundary (1970-1990)''

Currently, many researchers support that African people, contrary to their governments, do not feel concerned with the « artificial » borders inherited from colonization. Since the same

ethnic groups may be found equally on both sides of a border, they pretend that relationships between the people have not been affected by the European border imposed on them. In short, African people would have lived for many decades as if the borders had not been in existence. These specialists use the expression « bottom-up integration » to designate this phenomenon. This "bottom-up integration" would, actually, contrast with the inability of African States to create conditions for Panafrican integration.

""*Nun nyep ben lanu* [litteraly we are forming one people], colonialists divided us" is the main chorus when Gambian and Senegalese people meet each other, according to sociologist Ebirma Sall[8]. This argument of similarity tends to disqualify the border inherited from the colonial period and revive the question of a pre-existing Senegambia. Following this logic identities would ignore the national reference and privilege ethnic ties articulated on the two territories. This argument of social and cultural continuum is frequently invested by analysts who denounced this border as a politico-administrative artifact[9]. Contrary to this thesis, I will demonstrate through an analysis of their space practices, that African people have not only integrated the usefulness of the border, but also that they have also taken part in its establishment.   This demonstration involves questionning the border from a micro-scale viewpoint. As Peter Sahlins maintains, in his book *Boundaries : The making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, published in 1991, I quote: « (…) the shape and significance of the boundary line was constructed out of local social relations in the borderland »[10]. From an epistemological point of view, this assertion is totally revolutionary. It means that borders are to be considered as local constructions. At this stage of my development I may point out: first, borders are both resulting from processes initiated from the bottom and from the top. But the rhythm and the logics of the two poles might be slightly different; secondly, an observation of the practices of the border by the people changes their perception. Presently, it may be both considered as a line and as transterritorial space, that is to say, as English conversely to French introduces the difference, both as a border and as a frontier. The two realities coexist. As Sahlins underlines, I quote: « The fact of this dualism has often mislead theorists into perceiving an evolutionary movement, necessary and irreversible, from a sparsely settled, ill-definied zone toward an uncontested, nonsubstantial, mathematically precise line of

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[8] SALL Ebrima, *Sénégambie : territoire, frontières, espaces et réseaux sociaux*, IEP, université Bordeaux I, 1992, p.2

[9] See for example BARRY Boubacar, *Sénégambie : plaidoyer pour une histoire régionale*, Rio de Janeiro, Sephis-Centro de Estudos afro-asiaticos, 2001.

[10] SAHLINS Peter, *Boundaries : The making of France and Spain in the Pyrenee*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p.8

demarcation ». But « The two polarities [zonal and linear] can be found at any given moment in the history of the boundary (…) »[11]. Hence, I will try to see if these understandings of the boundary contradict the projects pursued by Nation States and thus could be a prelude to the end of territories announced by Bertrand Badie (*La fin des territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et l'utilité sociale du respect*[12]). To answer these questions, I will present results gathered throughout a ground investigation.

Methodology: a history at the junction of different grounds

If it is quite of an evidence that I had to acquire a strong scientific background to understand the functioning of the boundary, I have to explain how I worked during my ground investigations. At the very beginning, I went on the border with a will to observe and know a little bit more about family strategies across the border. My hypothesis was that the border opportunity contributed to put people closer and reinforce the impression of a cultural and social continuum. If this hypothesis was not of an uninteresting one, I didn't know my purposes of investigations would change. When I arrived at Karang in June 2009, people told me that there had been, for many years, many confrontation in the area about the repartition of lands. So I decided to visit Djiddah[13], Keur Alassane Diallo[14], Keur Seyni Guèye[15] and Keur Ousseynou Dieng[16]. In between those border villages the infrastructure are almost inexistent. I had many difficulties to join the different points so unfortunately I couldn't go back and forth from one village to the other one. Moreover, I have to precise that I tried to make the same kind of investigation on the Gambian side but it was very much too difficult. Under Jammeh's regime, people are afraid of talking. Clearly identified as a stranger, I was also threatened by

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[11] SAHLINS (P.), op.cit, p.7
[12] BADIE Bertrand, *La fin des territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et l'utilité social du respect*, Fayard, Paris, 1995, 278 p.
[13] Interview du chef de village à Djiddah
[14] Interview du chef de village Abou Madiane Diallo à Keur Alassane Diallo, né en 1946 à Keur Bourama Bobo, en wolof. Traducteur : Assane Sokhna, le 10.07.2009.
[15] Interview du chef de village El Hadj Omar Guèye à Keur Seyni Guèye, né le le 10.07.2009
[16] Interview du chef de village

border people who learned that I had crossed the border without signaling, first, my presence at the check-point of Amdallaie[17]. So I didn't have other option but abandon.

Through my chronology 1970-1990 I want to emphasize that local rhythms and logics are slightly different from states ones. This period can be divided into three parts. From 1969 to 1975 prevailed a situation of nor war nor peace. The Senegalese financial Minister Jean Collin tried to impose a "no return policy" which aim was to put Gambia on her knees and make her adopt a common custom tariffs. This acrimonious climate had a direct impact on the boundary. Two incidents occurred in 1971 (in Bulock on the southern side of the border) and in 1974 (in Baria on the northern part). This period finishes in 1975. From that year to 1981, years were globally marked by a common will to cooperate. To give proofs of this cooperation, the two states sent, in 1975, a mixed commission of delimitation in the Kantora. This Eastern part of the boundary had not been delimitated during colonization or to be more accurate the delimitation had been suspended in the drawbacks of the 1904 agreement. To finish with the third period goes from 1981 to 1989 and corresponds to the Senegambian confederation. Despite this global context, I want to show that the bottom territorialization is neither totally independent nor totally depending on states' relationships. Logics and rhythm from the top and the bottom are not exactly the same.

The main goal of this presentation is to present the results of my ground investigation, to question the closure of land tenure on a border line and the emergence of national identities. By the way, I will show that those national identities are not exclusive from the remaining of transfontier ties and identities.

Penury of land and the renegotiation of spaces: the necessity of a linear boundary

how to understand the rarefaction of lands in the 1970s? Regarding landlords, access to ground used to be far others. Fields could be cultivated on two territories without problem. following the application of the 1889 convention whereas villages couldn't be divided by the border, fields could. Except the village of Gambissara situated in the Fuladu, villages were not divided by the French-English boundary. Or to be more accurate the inhabitants of the European border had to make a choice either to live in the French part or on the British one. If

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[17] This threat clearly taught me that border people embedded the boundary , in that I can join Donna Flynn analysis developed in her article ""We Are the Border": Identity, Exchange, and the State along the Bénin-Nigeria Border", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 24, No. 2.

the question of the entire coincidence between the delimitation of the fields and of the border was arisen in 1895, the French colonial administration made it clear that there could not be any enclave in the French territory. As a result of this decision, cultivated fields could be on one part and the village on the other part. For quite a long time this situation did not give rise to problems. Occupation of lands was tacitly negotiated by the people, regardless of boundary pillars. Fields could overflow the linear boundary. I do not mean that during colonization there were no problems regarding the management of landlords. This assertion would be false. But the problems were more or less controlled at a local level by populations themselves. Colonial administrations feared to face the issue and tried not to get involved in it so as to avoid migrations on the other side of the boundary. One should keep in mind here that one of the main goal of the colonialists was to retain and fix the populations. But in 1945, in the drawbacks of the Michel-Weir agreement (20 august 1945), colonial governments had no option but precise the boundary line between the Casamance and the Gambia. Here once again, I want to emphasize the fact that logic and rhythms of bottom territorialization were different from one sector to the other one of the boundary. From the seventies till the 1990s, the north segment had been concerned by the necessity to make coincidence between the international boundary and the limits of fields. Since the 1950s the area had been of an attractive one. People settled close to the border to benefit the border-effect. For example, it was easier to sell peanut productions to Senegal or to the Gambia depending on the price of purchase proposed by each state. But at the beginning of the 1970s the peanut basin space began to be saturated. The conjunction of this demographic pressure coupled with the severe drought totally changed the issue. The need for fields create a competition for the monopole of land. Tacit rules were no longer available.

Confronted with penury of lands, according to two convergent testimonies from Abou Madiane Diallo chief village of Keur Alassane Diallo[18] and El Hadj Omar Guèye chief village of Keur Seyni Guèye[19], the chief of Makabala Mané Gambian-sided withdrew, in 1973, the pillar boundaries and cultivated lands on the Senegalese side. In response, the inhabitants of Keur Alassane Diallo started to clear out fields on the Gambian side. The relationships between cultivators of the two sides worsened and people had no option but ask for a state arbitrage.

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[18] Interview du chef de village Abou Madiane Diallo à Keur Alassane Diallo, né en 1946 à Keur Bourama Bobo, en wolof. Traducteur : Assane Sokhna, le 10.07.2009.
[19] Interview du chef de village El Hadj Omar Guèye à Keur Seyni Guèye, né le le 10.07.2009.

The chief Aly Dieng from Keur Ousseynou Dieng confirmed this trend and told me that: " at the beginning there had not been lands delimitated. People were cultivating on both sides regardless of the border pillars. It was not a problem"[20]. But some twenty years ago (or at the end of the 1980s), things changed. Gambians asked for their lands cultivated by the Senegalese. Once again the climate was so tense that both administration had to intervene.

The very exception of Baria example.

As concerns the border incident of Baria which occurred in July 1974 there is abundant evidence of a link between the incident and the acrimonious relationships between Senegal and the Gambia. According to Kéloumang Sène (chief of Baria)[21], the inhabitants of Keur Amadou Fayal, Keur Omar Sène, Bantanding et Santia Assane Ba, withdrew the boundary pillar of Kissé Madiaw and started to clear out fields in the national forest of Baria. The alcalo of Baria was very upset because the forest had been classified and the inhabitants of his village had not the right to cut trees. He told me: "there is a classified forest of Baria. Unless the Gambians, nobody here dares to touch it.(...) if we clear out the forest one may be put to jail or pay fines". He added that some twenty years ago (but in fact it was in 1974), they went in Kaolack and ask to Malick Fall (directeur des Eaux et Forêts), why and if the Gambian had this right. In response a military operation was sent[22].

The Senegalese government sent a military operation in Baria in July 1974. Jawara compared this to "Banditry and brutality akin to the strong-arm tactics Hitler used against those who were less strong, or ancient marauding and slave taking regimes in Africa employed against their neighbours"[23]. The Senegalese government decided to put an end to this event and beg the Gambia for pardon[24].

Unless at Baria where government directly intervened, local problems were resolved at a local scale. On the Senegal side rural councilors (created in 1972) were entrusted with this mission.

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[20] « (…) il n'y avait pas de terres délimitées [par la frontière internationale]. On cultivait l'un chez l'autre. Chacun avançait, malgré les bornes. Ça ne posait pas de difficultés ».

[21] Interview de l'alcalo Kéloumang Sène né, à Baria, le 00/00/1914, le 3.07.2009, à Baria.

[22] « Il y a une forêt classée de Baria. Personne n'ose la toucher sauf les Gambiens. (…) il y a eu une dispute entre la Gambie et les Eaux et Forêts de l'Etat sénégalais. [Nous si on] touche à la forêt, l'Etat peut [nous] emprisonner ou [nous] faire payer de fortes amendes ». Il ajouta: « il y a environ 20 ans, [on est] allés poser la question à Kaolack parce qu'[on] n'avait pas ce droit. Malick Fall, directeur des Eaux et Forêts à Kaolack a envoyé des soldats et environ dix-huit voitures militaires. Ils ont renvoyé les Gambiens et personne n'a rien récolté ».

[23] "Border incidents", *West Africa* (19 August 1974), p.1032 in Colley Jeggan Senghor,op.cit., p.210.

[24] CADN Dakar Ambassade (559). Xavier Daufresnes de la Chevalerie, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire, Haut Représentant de la République française au Sénégal à Son Excellence Monsieur Jean Sauvagnargues, MAE, Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, 6.11.1974

Hence progressively, since the beginning of the 1970s, a slow but unavoidable process of bottom territorialization has been on its way. This process demanded a strict boundary line demarcated by boundary stones. Such situations which mainly emerged from the seventies, due to rarefaction of lands, the only one capable to arbitrate was state. The claim for state's interference shows that state function as an operative reference for border people**.** States were asked to arbitrate the distribution of lands and to clearly delimitate the two adjacent territories on the name of a national identity either Gambian or Senegalese. Hence, one may consider that nationhood can stem from the margins. The enclosure of landlords' horizon proves that the process from a zone to a line is on its way and may confirm the administrative and political role of the boundary. Regarding identities, the intermediation of the state is a sign of nationalism in the sense that people have integrated that states protect their interests. So I join Peter Sahlins who writes, I quote: *"(…) States did not simply impose their values and boundaries on local society. Rather, local society was a motive force in the formation and consolidation of nationhood and the territorial state"*[25]. As a consequence the building of territory, in which border people took part, shows that the process of national identities is on its way. This analysis contradict any end of territory.

Lands in between territory and territoriality: the dialectic allegiance both to national and local identity.

The integration of the border as a line (both mentally and physically) is not incompatible with transborder practices. For daily purchase, visiting family, or for contingent advantages identities may be renegotiated by the people. I qualified this type of negotiation as the necessity of elaborating a common transborder grammar. Most of the time boundary villages had/have no other option than deal with their immediate neighbor will it be on the other side of the boundary. For scholarship, care and so on people are sharing their very few resources regardless of the question of the boundary. Furthermore, one may keep in mind that the villages visited are partly cut from Senegal during the wet season and that the roads to main towns such as Karang or Kaolack remain difficult of access. So border people had/ have no option but cooperate. Despite an administrative intervention during which the limits of the boundary where shown to people or during which boundary pillars were re-erected (such as the Kissé Madiaw one) the penury of land was not resolved. Border people had to find and negotiate solution to palliate the absence of lands. The inhabitants of Keur Alassane Diallo and Makabala Mané put an end to disputes through a wedding alliance. The chief Abou

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[25] Sahlins (P.), op.cit., p.8

Madiane Diallo married one of Makabala Mané's daughter. El Hadj Omar Guèye from Keur Seyni Guèye also found a similar arrangement with Makabala Mané. Now fields of each village can overflow the boundary but everyone knows the value of the land exchanged. All villages could not negotiate pacifically this transition. Aly Dieng from Keur Ousseynou Dieng is still a little bitter about it: "Now my fields belong to the village of Keur Oumar Jawara. But before this land used to be mine. There had been many confrontations between me and the new owner Kébou Sakho (...). I think it's unfair. I cleared out the field. I feel theft. now I have no option but locate fields to Kébou for 15.000 to 20.000 francs CFA"[26].

These local arrangements have their own logics and are to be considered as "accommodation" measures. They largely depend on local relationships and negotiations of local identities. I define this game on identities as dialectical allegiance both to local and national identity. These permanent re negotiations of identities do not contradict the emergence of a national territory or a national identity although they tend to attenuate and weaken those two projects.

Although states are not totally regulating their territory (missing of infrastructure, scholarship or care capacities), they are neither totally absent from their margins/boundaries. The border line that introduced differences and which differences were reappropriated by people are to be considered by specialists in this ambiguity and through these types of paradoxes. To my opinion these ambiguities and paradoxes are not typical to the Senegalo-Gambian boundary but are consubstantial to every processes of boundary buildings. But the debate is open.

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[26] « Maintenant mon champ appartient au village de Keur Oumar Diawara. Mais à l'époque ce champ était à moi. Il y a eu plusieurs face à face entre moi et le nouveau propriétaire Kébou Sakho (…). Je trouve que c'est injuste. J'avais tout préparé. Je me sens volé. Du coup, je suis obligé de louer à Kébou un lopin de terre contre 15.000 à 20.000 francs CFA».

Vigilant Citizens on the Edge of a Paranoid State: Burundi, 1962–1968

Aidan Russell

Oxford University

aidanseanrussell@gmail.com

Draft paper - Please do not circulate or cite

Abstract

As they parted ways from their enforced colonial union, Rwanda and Burundi viewed each other with deep suspicion. Rwanda, emerging from a bloody revolution, feared that its new, ethnic Republic lay in mortal peril from the armed Tutsi exiles who found refuge just beyond its borders. Burundi, having lost its talismanic leader to assassination months before Independence, feared the shakily-maintained ethnic unity of its unstable monarchy was fated to be infected by Rwandan politics of division. As the two young states faced each other across the border that had stood between them for centuries, now suddenly rediscovered at Independence, the communities that peopled this perilous frontier were caught by doubt and deviance.

This paper explores Burundi's experience of this antagonistic border across its most traumatic decade. Within days of acceding to internal autonomy from Belgium, borderlanders found that their national and political belonging was under hostile question from a state that exhibited extreme paranoia regarding the presence of Rwandan refugees in the borderland, and the political infiltration of the local population. Their response was remarkable. Displaying themselves as 'more state than the state' (Feyissa, 2010), they took to filling the role of voluntary border guards, selectively. The state lacked the capacity to police its feared frontier, and reacted strongly to the patriotic and political claims of borderlanders who appeared to fulfil its desire for a rigid barrier on the border. Individuals approached the state to perform their loyalty through vigilance on the border, apprehending Rwandans or local Barundi who, they claimed, had exposed themselves as politically alien to the nation. The performance continued throughout the decade, and the paper explores two further exemplary incidents: first, a moment of local crisis as

rebels crossed from Rwanda and burnt hundreds of homes on the unprotected frontier, and then a peculiar incident during a time of international rapprochement, as Rwanda and Burundi sought to defuse their enmity, while the borderlanders continued to insist loudly on protection. As the state became dependent on the local community's vigilance to create the border, and the borderlanders repeatedly invoked the state's presence in their lives, each found an uncomfortably close relationship difficult to throw off when it became politically awkward.

The majority of the paper is based on an abridged and adapted chapter from my thesis. The preceding chapter considered a conflict on the borderland at the end of colonial rule, one that took on the characteristics of an anti-colonial revolt yet manifested in predominantly vigilante violence between adherents of rival political parties. Subsequent chapters explore how the terms of vigilance established in the border conflicts here explored were applied to bring the state into local political struggles. Finally, the thesis analyses how the terms of vigilance developed from the limits of the border context, and became expressive of political linkage across the nation, most terribly applied against society when the state demanded 'vigilance' of its supporters in pursuit of genocide in 1972.

1.1 Introduction

Traumatised and split by the assassination of its beloved Prime Minister, Prince Louis Rwagasore, Burundi achieved Indepedence from Belgium in 1962. In Rwagasore's absence his governing party, Uprona (*Unité et progrès nationale*), fractured, and leading politicians struggled for dominance within its structures. Popular discourse left little room for outright challenge to the Uproniste state itself. Successive governments drew deeply on the mythology of mass consensus to delegitimise those who attempted to disagree with those holding power in Uprona's name. The rhetoric of solidarity triumphed.

On the northern border with Rwanda, this imaginary of political cohesion between people and state was put to the test. During colonial rule Rwanda and Burundi had been notionally united in the single territory of Ruanda-Urundi, but strong national sentiment and divergent political development ensured that the two parted at Independence under emphatic mutual agreement. Rwanda emerged in 1962 from an ethnic civil war, having abolished its monarchy and reconstituted the nation as a Hutu Republic, spilling many militant Tutsi exiles among thousands of refugees into its neighbours' territory, while Burundi still clung to its self-conception as a united, non-ethnic monarchy. Juxtaposed to the Rwandan Republic that epitomised everything orthodox Burundi wished not to be, on a border once more imbued with political and legal reality as a division between separate nations, the northern borderland population had a choice of investment that might either undermine or substantiate the state claims of national identity.

In this space of political tension it was the choice of conformity that proved the most powerful course of action for the borderland population in the first years of Independence. Under pressures of border paranoia from the state, and repeated border incursions from the north, members of the local population developed a language of expression that suggested total submission to the state, yet made a claim on its duties of protection. In Doevenspeck's terms, developed in contemporary analysis elsewhere in the borders of the Great Lakes, borderlanders applied themselves to a 'story' of the frontier, one that permitted them engagement with the state.[1] By reiterating a narrative 'plot' based on the theme of vigilance, casting themselves as essential guards on the edge of the nation, borderlanders exploited the political resource of the border both to protect themselves against its inherent dangers, and to place themselves carefully within the protection of a sceptical state. In an atmosphere of conflict, to collaborate with the state in guarding the frontier emerged not as a matter of simple obedience, but as a vital, dangerous tool of power for those willing to perform this vigilance.

This paper examines this mode of addressing the state, a taut exchange of loyalty and

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[1] M. Doevenspeck, "Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolesewandan state boundary," *Political Geography* 30, no. 3 (2011): 129–142.

obligation that underpinned political relations along the frontier. The geographical focus is in the central stretch of the border alongside the main road from Bujumbura to Kigali, in the two communes of Ijene and Kabarore that rise steeply up to the heights of the Congo-Nile Ridge and the Kibira rainforest. Analysis begins with an exploration of the amplification of tensions along the frontier in the first years of the 1960s, leading to the eruption of violence in 1964. A brief moment of violent dissent, this new border uprising prompted the crystallisation of an alternative mode of interaction between society and state on the frontier. From this crisis, the paper proceeds to explore this collaborative relationship across the following years. Curious moments of lesser border tension in the early years following a military coup in 1966 show how border loyalty provided the opportunity for borderlanders to shape state reaction to their own interests. Retelling the story of the border even when state interests moved on, borderlanders exploited the particular expressiveness of vigilance in the context of the national frontier to force their recognition as essential citizens of the nation.

1.2   Burnings and Insurrection

The Border, 1962–1964: Incapacity, Fear, Incursion and Flight

At Independence, the border between Rwanda and Burundi was reborn in an atmosphere of opposition. As the belligerence of the Rwandan nation was apparently underscored in its civil war, and politicians in both countries strongly resisted the Belgian and UN pressure to federate, in the weeks before their separation even the Catholic newspaper *Ndongozi* cast the border as the marker of conflict. In times gone by, an editorial recalled, 'He who traversed the Kanyaru . . . sought only to provoke war, and the Barundi responded.'[2] An uncomfortable monetary union was maintained, but formally and politically the two countries parted in mutual distrust, watching the border with concern.

For a brief time, military posts protected the border and controlled passage, but total incapacity saw them disbanded only three months later.[3] In their short career on the border the nascent army nevertheless managed to instigate the first recorded instance in the long and considerable tradition of border corruption at Kanyaru-haut, the main crossing between Bujumbura and Kigali, only a few weeks after Independence, as a European businessman objecting to having to pay a 100 franc bribe.[4] The permanent posts were replaced by regular patrols, supplemented by military exercises, so that activities 'that

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[2] *Ndongozi y'Uburundi* (Gitega), "Uburundi n'Urwanda vyafatanijwe n'intwaro y'Abazungu," 1 March 1962, p. 1.

[3] *ANB*, B 7 (1), A. Verwayen, Letter to Commandants, 26 September 1962.

[4] *ANB*, BI 6 (75), Bizimana Septime, Letter to Captain of Ngozi, 1962; *ANB*, BI 6 (75), G. Van Dyk, Complaint of corruption at Kanyaru-haut, 29 August 1962.

will be planned outside of the garrison will permit the company to manifest its presence on the border'.[5] The patrols were augmented by a detachment of sixteen gendarmes stationed in Kayanza town. They were woefully undersupplied, all sixteen sleeping on the floor in the same one-room building, lacking equipment and provided with six firearms between the entire company.[6] Finally there were the officers of the Immigration authority, checking the documents of those crossing by the main roads; the relief must have been considerable in October 1963 when the Minister of Immigration sent a telegram to announce his decision, prompted by a complaint from the border officer himself,[7] that 'a single immigration officer cannot work day and night'.[8] The border would from then on be closed at nightfall.

A single border officer, and roving patrols of soldiers, were scarcely sufficient for the problem of the border as the state saw it. A few weeks after Independence a helicopter, flown by a Belgian pilot, reportedly landed near Kayanza to deposit a Rwandan man, who was swiftly apprehended by the local population as a spy.[9] Meanwhile, the great numbers of Rwandan refugees in the borderland inspired fears that they concealed a political infiltration of the Barundi population. Many took up residence immediately within the borderland, and under the influence of this refugee presence the communes of Ijene and Kabarore came to be considered the 'foyers de troubles' of Kayanza.[10]

In April 1962 three Rwandan exiles came to the Commissaire aux Réfugiés to reveal that the border communes were in the grip of a conspiratorial infection of Parmehutu[11] 'racism and violence'.[12] This spoke directly to the paranoia of the state. 'Must it not be feared that these fanatics are trying to export this poison into our peaceful Burundi?' questioned the Commissaire. The Governor of Ngozi Province was promptly commanded to 'take immediate action, without delay, to stop the chaos which may be in the process of creation in your Province.'[13] The informants named specific individuals in the borderland, including the local bourgmestres and the pastors at the protestant mission of Rubura, as hubs in a cross-border conspiracy. 'The tactics would be these: provoke battles between refugees, who would begin to burn both the houses of Unar[14] members and the houses of Upronistes, Parmehutu camouflaged in the ranks of refugees; thanks to these troubles, the paratroopers would enter into action, supposedly to restore calm, and the game would

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[5] *ANB*, B 7 (1), J. Ntungumburanye, Letter to Governors, 2 October 1962.

[6] *ANB*, BI 11 (3), Stanislas Sebasita, *Le détachement de Kayanza*, 22 January 1963.

[7] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Bizimana Septime, Telegram to Mininter, 15 October 1963.

[8] *ANB*, BI 6 (79), Immigration, Telegram to Progou Ngozi, 18 October 1963.

[9] *ANB*, BI 6 (75), Bizimana Septime, Letter to Minister of the Interior, 20 August 1962.

[10] *ANB*, BI 6 (73), Isidore Rwamavubi, letter to the Interior Ministry, 7 April 1962.

[11] Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation Hutu*, Rwandan governing party.

[12] ibid.

[13] *ANB*, BI 6 (72), Charles Kabunyoma, letter to Governor, 7 April 1962.

[14] Union nationale rwandais*, largely Tutsi party of Rwanda to which many refugees belonged.

be over.'[15]

Such were the anxieties and incapacities of the state on the border in its early months, but it was in 1964 that the fear of the frontier would be truly realised. As Rwandan exiles launched their first major invasion from eastern Burundi at the end of 1963, and internal reprisals against Rwandan Tutsi sent many more thousands in flight, the atmosphere of impending war enveloped the borderland. Rwanda unilaterally ended the monetary union, and the countries' separation was confirmed. But if it was the refugees that inspired initial suspicion and fear of the border in the state, it was Burundi's internal divisions that raised this concern to a level of urgency. Given its simultaneous centrality and remoteness, a mountainous region that nevertheless was not so far out of the way for those wishing to cross the border unnoticed, a short stretch marked only with young ficus trees, Kabarore became noted as the prime corridor of escape for prominent political exiles.[16] Opponents defeated by Uprona in the last years of Belgian rule, or high-profile dissidents from within the party engaged in personal feuds with other leaders, the most important of these exiles were Hutu, and were beginning to see their own persecution and personal troubles in ethnic terms.

In June 1964, reports came in that a foreign aeroplane, believed to be military in appearance, had been seen circling low near Ngozi.[17] Wanted political exiles were smuggled out of the country to the east in Gatsinda commune,[18] and the Prime Minister spoke at the second anniversary of Independence to denounce 'trouble-makers, thirsty for power, who want to destroy the heritage of our hero Prince Rwagasore ... [They] preach hatred, fire, blood and death.'[19] There was a sense that something was coming. 'Situation is alarming,' telegrammed the Governor of Ngozi in early August,[20] and on cue three soldiers, two of whom were said to be European, crossed from Rwanda at the Kanyaru-haut main customs post at one o'clock the next morning, the lone border guard left cowering in his office.[21] They were followed by two gendarmes skirting a hill a little further along the river in daylight a few hours later.[22] The world's attention was fixed on Congo, as Mulele's rebel *simbas* took Stanleyville, and the possibility that the war would overrun the borders of the region was dangerously apparent;[23] Burundi's government broadly

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[15] *ANB*, BI 6 (73), Isidore Rwamavubi, letter to the Interior Ministry, 7 April 1962.

[16] *ANB*, BI 6 (186), *RA Kayanza*, 1964.

[17] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Prime Minister, 12 June 1964.

[18] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Deputy Prime Minister, 26 June 1964; *ANB*, B 10 (1), Bizimana Septime, *Interrogations:* Rugata, Kobero, Ntabomenyereye, 26 June 1964.

[19] *ANB*, BI 6 (220), Albin Nyamoya, *Discours*, 1 July 1964

[20] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Minijustice, 11 August 1964.

[21] *ANB*, B 10 (1), Bizimana Septime, *Interrogation:* Misigaro, 12 August 1964.

[22] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Prime Minister, 12 August 1964.

[23] Clyde Sanger, "Threatened overspill of Congo fighting. Burundi, Rwanda and Tanganyika alarmed," *The Guardian* (London), 31 August 1964.

supported Mulele, while Rwanda was fully behind Tshombe as Prime Minister of Congo. '*Uburundi n'abarundi buri mu menyo y'ingwe*', read the headline of *Ndongozi* at the beginning of September: Burundi and the Barundi between the leopard's teeth.[24] The story dwelt on the political troubles of the government and the flood of white refugees, Belgians and Americans, that Burundi was now receiving out of Congo, but it was published on the same day that Kabarore and the other border communes went up in flames.

Invasion

On 1 September 1964, bands of men arose throughout the borderland, from Kabarore to Mparamirundi, and set to burning the huts of the local people. After several days of attacks and burnings, the state believed it had found the true the nature of the chaos: 'Invasion from Rwanda has burnt huts and pillaged the borderland region in Kabarore commune,' reported an urgent telegram.[25] 'The inhabitants of Ijene commune under threat, fled to the interior, gendarmes totally spent, grave matters.' A Rwandan gendarme was caught ferrying ammunition across the border.[26] The local population fled to the Kabarore commune offices, or even all the way to Kayanza.[27] It seemed as if the regional conflagration feared had finally come about. But only a brief, hazy report of violence along the border, spreading into the Ndora region of Cibitoke on the other side of the Kibira forest, reached the ears of an *Agence France Presse* stringer in Bujumbura. It was appended as a supplementary note of curiosity in the background of the gripping disasters in Congo, and forgotten.[28]

The initial bout of border violence lasted about a week, but repeated incursions and panics marked much of the following two months. Skirmishes between Barundi and Rwandans were reported in Gatsinda, to the east of Ijene, where it was alleged that the Rwandans were attempting to invade in pursuit of '*inyenzi*', 'cockroaches', the standard name for Tutsi exile militants.[29] The provincial Governor closed the border, only to be ordered by the Deputy Prime Minister to permit the movement of heavy goods into the country; security measures for the local population were crippling the nation's meagre economy.[30]

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[24] *Ndongozi y'Uburundi* (Gitega), "Uburundi n'abarundi mu menyo y'ingwe," 1 September 1964, p. 1.

[25] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Bizimana Septime, Telegram to Deputy Prime Minister, 7 September 1964.

[26] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Deputy Prime Minister, 11 September 1964.

[27] Munose Venant, interview in Ryamukona (Kabarore), 9 March 2011.

[28] *Le Soir* (Brussels), "Troubles graves au Burundi," 7 September 1964, p. 3.

[29] *ANB*, BI 5 (19), Cyprien Ntahomereye, *Interrogations:* Congera, Baritoya, Ndabirabe, Kabwa, Nankwa, 11 September 1964.

[30] *ANB*, BI 6 (79), Deputy Prime Minister, Telegram to Progou, 23 September 1964; *ANB*, BI 6 (79), Deputy Prime Minister, Telegram to Progou, 23 September 1964. The border with Congo had been closed the week before (*Le Soir* (Brussels), "Le Burundi ferme sa frontière avec le Congo," 13 September

/Users/aidanrussell/Documents/Oxford/DPhil/Chapter5/burnings.pdf

Figure 1.1: *Collines* in which claims for compensation were made for hut burnings between September and October 1964. Compiled from *ANB*, B 10 (1), Bizimana Septime, *Liste des victimes en communes Kabarore et Jene*, 8 October 1964, and *ANB*, BI 6 (34), *Recensement des sinistrés Ijene*, n.d. (1964).

The attacks continued, and in November it was reported that around 300 men attacked the border once again.[31] An itemised 427,347 francs of damage were claimed by those whose homes had been attacked, with many uncosted losses listed alongside (see Figure 1.1 for a map of the distribution of these claims).[32] Martial law was imposed across the borderland, civilian authority reduced to an advisory role and command taken by an official *Conseil de Guerre.*

Gendarmes swept through Kabarore and neighbouring regions, systematically arresting every individual found on the roads or in any public place.[33] Among the many arrested by the army were leading Upronistes, local heroes of Independence. The danger to Uprona of permitting the military complete control was amply demonstrated.

Yet the heavy-handed response of the army achieved some success. The burnings and raids tailed off, the arrested population surrendered claims of substantial intelligence about the identities and purposes of those they held responsible, and most of these witnesses were released back to their smouldering homes. By November some forty six individuals remained in custody, another 117 named as wanted fugitives.[34] Almost all, both those in custody and those tried in absence, were given between ten and twenty years for '*Atteinte sur la sûreté intérieur d'état*', assault on the internal security of the state.

The border crisis was over. In the shadow of national catastrophes across the following years the Kabarore burnings would be swiftly forgotten by the sparse histories of Burundi. But in their procedure, response and repression, vital themes of obsession surrounding the border, its inhabitants and the state that watched it fearfully would be realised, crystallised in the collaboration that surrendered evidence against the outcasts.

External Conspiracy and Internal Collusion

The first instinct had been to call the attacks an 'invasion', and the military commanders soon found grounds to justify this presumption. The Kabarore burnings were perceived as the final realisation of the perfidious plot the pro-Tutsi faction of Uprona that was now in power had long suspected: a grand Hutu alliance between the Rwandan Parmehutu government, the exiled Barundi opposition led by a man named Nigane Emmanuel, and Uprona's own dissidents, especially the eminent Paul Mirerekano. The most prolific

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1964, p. 3).

[31] *ANB*, BI 6 (94), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Deputy Prime Minister, 20 November 1964.

[32] *ANB*, B 10 (1), Bizimana Septime, *Liste des victimes en communes Kabarore et Jene*, 8 October 1964; *ANB*, BI 6 (34), *Recensement des sinistrés Ijene*, n.d. (1964).

[33] *ANB*, BI 5 (19), Cyprien Ntahomereye, *Interrogations:* Nsabuwanka, Ntirumveko, Sebiganiro, Sebihehero, Mbitse, Kavamahanga, 17 September 1964.

[34] *ANB*, BI 5 (22), Conseil de Guerre, *Audience publique*, 10 April 1965.

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informant on this 'conspiracy' was a man named Kabanda Samson from Buvumo *colline*, right on the border. He had seen his own house burn, but told the authorities that he had been involved in a series of meetings on Rwandan soil in which the full plot had been formed. 'The orders come from Kigali,' Kabanda explained, 'given by Mirerekano, and Nigane receives them as well.'[35] He described numerous assemblies in which specific targets were discussed. According to the *Conseil*'s prosecution, Mirerekano and Nigane were 'the inhuman masters of the insurgents', gathering a grand coalition of Barundi political exiles; in their conspiratorial assemblies, they 'preached a malicious doctrine, of which the design was as fatal as the product was destructive'.[36]

The imputation of Rwandan conspiracy entailed a presumption of ethnic politics. 'They openly said that every Tutsi, even though he may have done good things in Burundi, must be put to the fire with his wife and children,' Kabanda wrote in a rough, hand-scrawled note requesting permission to speak directly to the king.[37] 'This will be regarded as treasure to Parmehutu. On the other hand, a Hutu, even though he may have done extremely bad things, must not be killed, even when he is a member of the PDC.'[38] In the *Conseil*'s verdict, this was 'a war of extermination against the 'Tutsi' masses and their generation, the devastation and pillage of their goods, and the elimination of 'Hutu' leaders who remained loyal to the royalist institutions and to the Uprona party';[39] by such devastation, a Republic of Burundi would be founded, with Mirerekano as its President.[40] The *Conseil* considered that a snowballing revolution had been thwarted:

> '[The leaders of the plot] had promised highly important places in the heart of the government that would issue from the future victorious Republic, of which the Capital would be fixed at Kayanza, in order to conquer the extent of the Kingdom of Burundi ... The goal that drove the guilty was to 'provoke a civil war' ... they had thus excited certain Barundi citizens, a class of people in the communes of Kabarore and Ijene, to arm themselves against others, to settle their differences by force ... It was not necessary that the entire country should be desolated by civil war ... it sufficed that the war should exist, or that it should be incited in a part of the country, in a commune or even in a fraction of a commune, from which it could spread out across the rest of the country.'[41]

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[35] *ANB*, BI 6 (34), Bizimana Septime, *Interrogation:* Kabanda, 1 October 1964.

[36] *ANB*, BI 5 (22), Conseil de Guerre, *Audience publique*, 10 April 1965.

[37] *ANB* BI 6 (34), *Inama y'ukuri*, 29 October 1964.

[38] *Parti démocrate chrétien*, Uprona's main rival, defeated in the 1961 elections prior to Independence.

[39] *ANB*, BI 5 (22), Conseil de Guerre, *Audience publique*, 10 April 1965. 'Scare quotes' in original.

[40] *ANB*, BI 6 (34), Bizimana Septime, *Interrogation:* Kabanda, 1 October 1964.

[41] *ANB*, BI 5 (22), Conseil de Guerre, *Audience publique*, 10 April 1965.

The degree of internal collaboration in this plot most alarmed the authorities. Lieutenant Bernard Rubeya, an army officer stationed in Ngozi, scrawled some rapid notes on an unknown interrogation that reflected the fear of uprising, not invasion: 'Kabarore in general Parmehutu,' the notes begin; 'Extermination Tutsi.'[42] Rubeya summarised the information he received in a dark inversion of Voltaire, reporting an injunction to keep the death of any Hutu during the planned invasion quiet '*pour ne pas décourager les autres.*' The protestant mission at Rubura was the reputed heart of the insurgency, its cross-border links with daughter churches in Rwanda damning it in the eyes of the state. But most curiously Rubeya recorded the 'paths of infiltration, small children who circulate between Rwanda and Burundi to collect information to transmit it to Rwanda'. Using the market days, when traffic across the border was considerable, the children were said to cut through Kibira forest to cover their movements. It was the confirmation of the fears the state had long harboured of the Parmehutu 'poison' in the borderland, but it was said to come not simply through the machinations of politicians, bourgmestres and pastors, but through the unnoticed movement of children.

The degree of local involvement in the 'invasion' was apparent in the identities of those the military held personally responsible for the violence. Of the *Conseil*'s 163 accused, only two were Rwandans, one caught smuggling ammunition and the other simply accused of crossing the border; all the rest were Barundi, the vast majority from Kabarore. This local character of the raiders is supported by those in the region today. In Munege *colline*, stories are told of how they gathered in Rwanda, then infiltrated across the border wearing banana leaves over their heads, and talk of the violence of the 1960s leads unavoidably to the discussion of the wars of the 1990s; the raiders were like the rebel bands of the civil war, people say, the men who went to the wild to seek power.[43] In Karama, further to the east where they were spared the violence, people remember the light of the flames by night on high Ryamukona, specified as a key target of the raiders in Kabanda's testimony, and tell how the Barundi in Rwanda didn't even need to wade across Kanyaru to cause havoc; they would catch the rays of the sun in mirrors, and set light to thatched roofs from across the valley.[44] It was a border conflict, but it was an internal matter. The border was exploited as a resource to pursue violence both political and opportunistic.

If Kabarore was indeed 'in general Parmehutu', as was now claimed and as had been suspected by the state since before Independence, the borderland population must be either traitors or informants; those taken had a choice of roles to perform. Thus a group of men picked up outside a bar in Caguka *colline*, where no burnings had been reported, bought their freedom by describing the suspicious activities of their neighbours. They

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[42] *ANB*, BI 6 (34), Bernard Rubeya, Notes, 27 October 1964.

[43] Rwasa David (pseud.), interview in Munege (Kabarore), 14 March 2011.

[44] Niyongabo Côme (pseud.), interview in Karama (Kabarore), 8 March 2011.

fingered one man named Munuma, who, they said, 'was suspected of being a direct collaborator of Monsieur Mirerekano, and who deserted his home a year ago already; according to well-informed sources, Munuma has made a rather nice situation for himself in Rwanda, thanks to the support of Mirerekano.'[45] Munuma had already been arrested a week earlier, found hiding in a rocky crevasse;[46] the men were giving the soldiers what they wanted. Others reported that local youths had been known to pass through the commune before the burnings, distributing tracts 'emanating from Monsieur Mirerekano'.[47] None of the people to make this claim admitted to having seen the tracts themselves, but, 'According to what I've heard from my friends,' said one man in a characteristic statement, 'they said that the goal was to install Parmehutu.'[48] Rumours were circulating that every youth that burnt down a hut would receive a sum of 50 frs from Mirerekano and Nigane. Given the poverty of Kabarore, and the scale of the property stolen during the raids, either this payment or the opportunism of looting were likely powerful motivators for many of those taking part in the violence, regardless of its political character.

If the evidence supplied be these men was substantially defensive, informing on the subversive elements around them to achieve their own liberty, denunciation and collaboration with the state were adopted as a far more active tactic by others in the borderland. This was most sharply exemplified in the claims made against a man named Rukushi Isaac, a rare propagandist for the minor, defeated, pro-Hutu *Parti du Peuple*, PP. He was subjected to a citizen's arrest, apprehended by his neighbours who vacillated between vigilante justice and good citizenship, dragging him before the local *Officier de police judiciaire* to demand his punishment. Rukushi's neighbours gave evidence that he was harassing them by conducting door-to-door, personal propaganda, that denounced the legitimacy of the king and warned of a coming revolution.[49] Most venomously, according to one woman's testimony, he 'declared that if ever our children should attempt to flee to him, he will take a sickle and cut off their arms and legs. Some days afterwards we were in the valley, Rukushi was in the middle of work and when we passed by him he declared again that it would be better to cut off the right arm, the right leg and the right breast of each woman, and in that way the women would become wise. He said that because we were Uproniste women.' In a motif of violence that was becoming rapidly commonplace, his neighbours said that at the house of one of Rukushi's companions, 'There is a register

[45] *ANB*, BI 5 (19), Cyprien Ntahomereye, *Interrogations:* Nsabuwanka, Ntirumveko, Sebiganiro, Sebihehero, Mbitse, Kavamahanga, 17 September 1964.

[46] *ANB*, BI 5 (22), Conseil de Guerre, *Audience publique*, 10 April 1965.

[47] *ANB*, BI 5 (19), Cyprien Ntahomereye, *Interrogations:* Karega, Yumba, Mande, Baruwani, Ibrahim, Mwamba, Hamoudu, 10 October 1964.

[48] ibid.

[49] *ANB*, BI 5 (18), Misigaro Tharcisse, *Pro-Justitia*, Interrogation of Rukushi Isaac, Bucumi, Barekebivugire, Ncamugitsure, Rwanda, Ciza, Mvuyekure Barnabé, Bariyuntura, 29 September 1964.

in which is inscribed the names of the living and the dead ... people who will be killed and others who will be saved.'

Rukushi's neighbours emphasised not only his activities in their own community, but also alleged that he had been active in cross-border conspiracy. The man himself denied the accusations of hate speech and sedition against the king, likening himself to Christ in the process, but he readily confessed to crossing the border for political purposes, attempting to find his ideological leaders in exile.[50] But all he found were sympathetic ears and self-obsessed old men. Though unashamed of his political convictions, even proud of his crimes of collusion, the picture he painted of the 'conspirators' was of sad, conceited and atomised leaders incapable of, or uninterested in, pursuing a concerted attempt to regain power in Burundi.

There was, no doubt, a degree of truth in both perspectives. The attacks, over a prolonged period of time and concentrated in specific locations, appear to have had some direction, and by all accounts were launched from Rwandan soil. But the idea that the Kabarore burnings were attempts at genocide, or anything more than a destabilising foray, a test of resolution rather than a full-blown revolution, cannot be supported. The raids were characterised by arson, not massacre; the attackers spread fear, and took pillage, but left no signs of attempted extermination. However, in the swift shift to the extremities of accusation, and in the political cosmology constructed around the projection of foreign-sponsored conspiracy, the terms of interaction between borderlanders and state were established.

1.3   Frontier Politics

Despite its feeble presence on the frontier in the previous months and years of hostility from the north, when violence erupted within its bounds the state was swiftly capable of imposing itself with overwhelming force. Violent opposition may have been a limited choice for a small portion of the community, but for most, any form of outright dissent was possible neither politically nor practically. The reaction of the army and gendarmerie to the outbreak of conflict, arresting every individual they could find, had revealed the general suspicion much of the state had to the border community as a whole. While the rebels might have hoped this hostile stance against the people would have driven more into their arms, in the short term at least it simply confirmed for most of the *banyagihugu* ['common people'] of Kabarore the need to display their loyalty to the state. The denunciations made against those who had conducted propaganda for the government's opponents were swift and clear demonstrations of one's political position; the invoca-

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[50] *ANB*, BI 5 (18), Misigaro Tharcisse, *Pro-Justitia*, Interrogation of Rukushi Isaac, Bucumi, Barekebivugire, Ncamugitsure, Rwanda, Ciza, Mvuyekure Barnabé, Bariyuntura, 29 September 1964.

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tion of rumours was particularly effective in this regard. The men arrested at a bar in Caguka distanced themselves from personal exposure to political contagion by claiming knowledge only of the rumours of subversive political tracts, but proved their loyalty by confirming state suspicions. 'Every rumour has its public,' notes Kapferer, and these suited the state.[51]

In the context of a border incursion, firmly believed to be the result of a conspiracy between political opponents and a foreign government, political loyalty to Uprona was inevitably conflated with loyalty to the nation. One of his neighbours denounced the PP propagandist Rukushi through direct association as political opposition and national traitor: 'Rukushi is a man who, since the formation of the political parties, was in the party of Nigane, Baganzicaha and Cimpaye. Recently, Rukushi has received Rwandans who arrive at his house in the evening and almost never come out ... Due to these regular visits between Rukushi and these Rwandans, I believe that Rukushi conducts the propaganda of Parmehutu.'[52] While clearly connected to the border circumstances of the Kabarore burnings, this political cosmology was the product of several years of consistent development. During the political campaign at decolonisation it had been a central theme of Uproniste propaganda that its national rivals were affiliates of Rwandan Hutu-supremacist parties, explicitly labelling them 'Aprosoma' [*Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse*] before Parmehutu came out on top. The careful blurring of identification between Uprona, its leader Prince Rwagasore and Burundi itself was an eminently effective political strategy that was only enhanced with the Prince's death, as he became both party figurehead and '*héros national*'. As the opposition increasingly took refuge beyond Burundi's borders, the political duties of the loyal *munyagihugu* to nation, party and state became so intertwined as to be synonymous. The single order desired within the party was given form through external threat.

A national trend, nowhere would this integration of obligations be so clear and accessible as on the border. With internal opponents few and far between, yet with Rwanda as their rhetorical sponsor ever-present, the borderland community had the particular opportunity of volubly displaying their political orthodoxy and national loyalty in the overt rejection of the elements that caused state suspicion towards them; the border was their own political resource, inasmuch as it was the cause of state hostility.[53] In purposeful opposition to the raiders, whose exploitation of the border as a practical and political re-

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[51] Jean-Noël Kapferer, *Rumeurs: le plus vieux média du monde* (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1987), p. 107.

[52] *ANB*, BI 5 (18), Misigaro Tharcisse, *Pro-Justitia*, Interrogation of Rukushi Isaac, Bucumi, Barekebivugire, Ncamugitsure, Rwanda, Ciza, Mvuyekure Barnabé, Bariyuntura, 29 September 1964.

[53] cf. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, "State Borders and Borderlands as Resources: An Analytical Framework," in *Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 2010), 1–25, pp. 14–16.

source is echoed in many other circumstances,[54] performing loyalty meant overtly turning one's back on the presumptions of permeable frontiers and trans-border networks, even though, on an economic and social level, the border was as permeable as any other.[55] Denouncing or apprehending those who transgressed the border allowed the population to present themselves as the border guards the state lacked, making themselves essential to the state and not simply tolerated by it. The informant Kabanda, who supplied the bulk of the information on the preparatory meetings in Rwanda, was so valorised by the act of vigilance that he came into a position to request a face-to-face meeting with the king. He was only in possession of his information because he himself casually crossed the border and personally engaged with persons of dubious politics, but as an informant he positioned himself as a border agent, vital to the defence of the nation. It was frontier politics; with the dangerous other beyond, impinging on the national community within, there was great political capital to be made by portraying oneself as the vigilant defender on the fraught edge of the nation.

Of course, this stance as border guards was far from a simple pretence. With homes burning and, if the allegations were true, individuals threatening physical violence against loyal Upronistes, it could be a matter of genuine personal necessity to act as the first line of defence, an urgent issue of self-preservation not just from the suspicious state, but from immediate enemies. Nor was the state's attitude towards the border simple paranoia. If nothing else, the Kabarore burnings demonstrated that there were indeed those who were willing to use violence to destabilise the state further than it had already undermined itself. The regional context of brutally violent invasion and genocidal retaliation in Rwanda, alongside devastating war in Congo, ensured that the restricted violence of Kabarore would not be treated as proportional to its actual limits of destruction. The portrayal of a planned genocide and viral civil war lying behind the border raids may have been unrealistic, but with both these horrors on the verge of realisation in neighbouring territories, it was not beyond the realm of rationality to fear them in Burundi. Both people and state on the border had reason to invest in their performance and paranoia.

Thus self-conscious collaboration, encapsulated in the narrative of vigilance, emerged as the relationship of preference and necessity between the community and its government in the borderland. For the population, conforming to the role of voluntary border guards permitted positive relations with a hostile state, while pressing hard on its attention

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[54] e.g., Paul Richards, "The Sierra Leone–Liberia Boundary Wilderness: Rain Forests, Diamonds, and War," in *African Boundaries. Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, ed. Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 205–221; Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot, "Rebels without Borders in the Rwenzori Borderland? A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2012): 154–176.

[55] cf. Ieuan Griffiths, "Permeable Boundaries in Africa," in *African Boundaries. Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, ed. Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 68–84.

on matters of great local and personal significance. For the state, its political interests were served through the recognition of such popular endorsement of its presumptions and fears, while the politically-loyal border citizen was a valuable resource for the control or surveillance of the frontier. The scale of military investment in Kabarore could not be maintained, just as it had been almost entirely absent until the huts began burning. When the army inevitably withdrew to other areas of urgency, it needed a core of the community to pay lip service to the needs of border protection. Collaboration on the border was practically and politically convenient, providing far more potential for the service of both mutual and distinct interest than outright dissent could hope to provide.

1.4   Civil Defence and Moral Panic

To explore the nuances and reincarnation of this relationship away from the pervasive atmosphere of war, it is necessary to take a leap forward in time and consider the application of the terms of collaboration in the Republican world after 1966, when the new state sought *rapprochement* with Rwanda and border relations were meant to be easing.[56] Cautious diplomatic efforts between Parmehutu and the new Republican Uprona were slowly fruitful. Rwanda welcomed the end of the 'mwamist' regime in Burundi,[57] the two governments spoke words of friendship and fraternity, and tripartite talks chaired by Mobutu formed the first regional summits of cooperation over border issues, particularly the presence of each state's enemies exiled in their neighbours' territory.[58] Yet still, in the borderland itself, both people and state representatives continued to invest in the politics of the frontier, and meet each other on terms of collaboration against the stereotyped machinations of a Rwandan state that otherwise was gradually becoming a partner of convenience for the military government.

The Kidnap of Nkurunziza

Ryamukona, a *colline* that had been hit particularly hard in 1964, was once again the host of border conflict in 1967, and the contrast of contexts provides valuable insight into the nature of the performance of collaboration on the frontier. Rising steeply to tower above its neighbouring hills, it is frequently inaccessible after even the most moderate rainfall, and remains distinctly difficult to reach in any weather except across the border from

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[56] See Filip Reyntjens, "Rencontres burundaises: Inyenzi du Rwanda et rebelles du Kivu," *Cahiers du CEDAF* 7–8 (1986): 123–137, p. 134; the national events passed over here are explored in a previous overview chapter of my thesis.

[57] Thadée Bagaragaza, "En 1966: Multiples accords signés. En 1967: Coopération intensifiée au Rwanda," *Carrefour d'Afrique* (Kigali), February 1967, pp. 6–7.

[58] *Carrefour d'Afrique* (Kigali), "La rencontre au sommet de Goma règle les problèmes de sécurité," March 1967, p. 2.

Figure 1.2: Kibati, Ncili and Ryamukona

Rwanda. Situated at the crux of the Kanyaru, where the border river veers northwards, the boundary is marked here only by a small river, the Kumuremure. The *colline* is now noted in the region for its relative wealth, benefiting from constant interaction with Rwanda.[59] But in the 1960s it was plagued by ongoing feuds across the international line, and its community sought the terms of collaboration, the invocation of duty and reciprocal protection, to claim support from the state.

One Saturday afternoon in July of 1967, a man drove his cattle along the southern

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[59] Abbé Macaire, conversation in Jene (Kabarore), 7 March 2011.

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bank of the Kumuremure.[60] He had taken his cattle along this route many times, from his home on Ryamukona through the *colline* of Kivuvu and up towards the heights of the Congo-Nile ridge, where the grazing was better; he would prepare a temporary enclosure for his beasts near an abandoned camp of the Belgian mining company Minétain, so that they could graze without destroying his neighbours' crops. As he followed the line of the border this time, however, he was followed.

A group of Rwandan civilians had crossed the frontier and penetrated a kilometre into Burundi territory. They gave chase; he was caught, and forcibly taken across the Kumuremure, into Rwanda. There were Rwandan soldiers waiting on the far bank of the stream, and the man was stripped naked, dragged away to a hill at some distance from the frontier, and tied to a tree. At this point, the reports became confused. Initial government telegrams spoke of the man's 'murder',[61] but when the official reports were written a week later the Vice Governor of the Province would only claim that 'to this day, the fate of Monsieur Nkurunziza is unknown.'[62]

He shares a name with the current president of Burundi, but Nkurunziza was himself Rwandan. He had lived in the area for over fifteen years, first moving under Belgian rule when the border was officially just an internal administrative divide. Local authorities believed that Nkurunziza, along with members of the other six Rwandan families who lived in the same colline, had long been suspected by Rwandan authorities of being spies for Burundi. Rwandan soldiers had penetrated Burundi multiple times in the previous months, claiming to be searching for '*inyenzi*';[63] the abduction of Nkurunziza was believed to be a key part of this operation, aimed at eliminating a traitorous spy who was aiding the militant exiles, and attacks on the other six long-term residents were to follow. 'The Rwandan authorities,' reported the Vice Governor of Ngozi, 'have decided to liquidate systematically these seven persons.'[64]

This shock intruded into a complex of divergent perspectives on the border. The local provincial authorities had been extremely anxious about the threat from Rwanda, but in terms of political contagion rather than invasion. Since the first days of the Republic they had noted that the border *collines* engaged in continual conversation and exchange with Rwandans, discussing the political character of the two Republics in a derogatory fashion. The inhabitants of Ryamukona are indeed among the few to confess to political

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[60] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Paul Rusiga and Mathias Rwamo, *La situation frontalière*, 24 July 1967.

[61] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Commarro, Telegram to Mininter, Progou Ngozi, 21 July 1967.

[62] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Paul Rusiga and Mathias Rwamo, *La situation frontalière*, 24 July 1967; *ANB*, B 11 (2), *Affaire Nkurunziza*, 25 July 1967.

[63] *ANB*, B 11 (2), François-Xavier Muhamirizo, Letter to Minister of External Affairs, 17 July 1967; *ANB*, BI 6 (118), Commarro Kayanza, Telegram to Progou Ngozi, 8 May 1967; *ANB*, BI 6 (42), Zibakwiye Athanase, *Rapport mensuel Ijene*, 5 May 1967.

[64] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Paul Rusiga and Mathias Rwamo, *La situation frontalière*, 24 July 1967.

dialogue with their Rwandan counterparts across the decade.[65] The authorities feared that Rwandans were inciting the Barundi to subversion,[66] saying, 'always in secret, that the Republic of Burundi does not resemble their own ... that our Republic is only half a Republic,'[67] since 'blood has not been spilled as with them.'[68] In the eyes of the provincial officials, the border population were themselves a threat, going 'by day or BY NIGHT to Rwanda.'[69] Attempting to impose a system of *laisser-passer* permits,[70] Party officials in the borderland considered that the 'pretext' of buying goods in Rwandan markets was 'harmful to the morality of our population.'[71] Little concern was shown over the lost customs revenue except as it denoted a political conversation beyond state control.

The border population had their own concerns over the frontier, regularly complaining about the continued threat of cattle raids striking into their territories;[72] their own reciprocal raids were noted in turn. For different reasons, both the community and the provincial authorities viewed Rwanda as the enemy. But this stood against official policy. At the end of June, less than a month before the abduction of Nkurunziza, orders were given to 'maintain and improve our relations, whether diplomatic, economic or commercial, with our neighbouring countries.'[73] The situation was confused, and such instructions came alongside alarming warnings to 'redouble your vigilance on the frontier posts with Congo and Rwanda,' since 'we have information on a mercenary threat'.[74]

In these contested times, the kidnap of Nkurunziza was an opportunity for people and provincial authorities to collaborate. The local authorities' suspicion of the community was defused; in unanimous agreement over the Rwandan threat, people and administrators presented a forceful case for restructuring their government's attitude towards the frontier, back towards the antagonistic relationship they each felt in their daily border troubles. To do so, the old terms of universal danger were resurrected. During questioning over the affair, an unnamed resident claimed that the Rwandan incursion was a matter of old treachery, driven by the instigators of the 1964 burnings; now refugees in Rwanda, they were claimed to 'serve as intelligence agents for the Rwandans', all the

[65] Mbazumutima Thérèse (pseud.), interview in Ryamukona (Kabarore), 9 March 2011.

[66] *ANB*, BI 6 (120), Sakubu Lucien, Letter to Governor, 3 February 1967.

[67] *ANB*, B 9, Zibakwiye Athanase, *Rapport mensuel Ijene*, 1 March 1967.

[68] *ANB*, BI 6 (165), Budumo Onésime, *Rapport du Parti*, 1 April 1967.

[69] *ANB*, BI 6 (166), François-Xavier Muhamirizo, *Rapport politique*, Mois de mars-avril 1967, 15 April 1967; emphasis in original.

[70] *ANB*, BI 12 (4), Semahuna Charles, Letter to Immigration officers, 2 June 1967.

[71] *ANB*, BI 6 (165), Budumo Onésime, *Rapport du Parti*, 16 May 1967.

[72] *ANB*, BI 6 (118), Zibakwiye Athanase, Letter to Commarro, 14 April 1967; *ANB*, BI 6 (118), Zibakwiye Athanase, Letter to Governor, 8 May 1967; *ANB*, B 9, Sakubu Lucien, *Rapport mensuel Kayanza*, 4 April 1967.

[73] *ANB*, BI 6 (117), Jean Cicéron Masabo, *letter to Governors*, 19 June 1967.

[74] *ANB*, BI 6 (118), Dirgalinter, Telegram to Progous, 11 June 1967.

time 'motivated by a spirit of racism'.[75] The informant described the vigilance of the community against foreign threats of interest to the state; they had confronted their Rwandan neighbours on the border, and been met with ominous threats. 'It will not take more than nine days to achieve what we have planned to do,' the Rwandans reportedly claimed. 'Go and tell your leaders that we do not want *inyenzi* among the people, that Parmehutu will achieve its ends.'

The residents of Ryamukona proved their loyalty in the careful performance of guarding the frontier, even to the extent of enforcing the state's desire for a bureaucratic border regime. The inquiry noted that three days after the abduction, 'Thirty pigs, three goats and a bullock coming from Rwanda were seized by the people . . . The animals were sent to market by six Rwandans, without a *feuille de route* and without a customs visa.'[76] Their own regular transgression of customs regulation was kept judiciously quiet. But in a careful moderation of the popular stance as border protectors, great emphasis was placed on popular terror. The population was 'afraid, and believed that it was a great provocation'. Engaged in their own personal clashes with their Rwandan counterparts and former Barundi neighbours, the politically astute of Ryamukona performed the duty of vigilance, acting as loyal protectors, but exhibited their vulnerability and fear to elicit reinforcements from the state. They were thus sure to describe their border troubles in terms most threatening to national interest. 'Now the Rwandan population shout war cries, signs of great excitement,' the informant described, 'which makes the Barundi population of the border extremely anxious.'

The performance of vigilant loyalty was fully taken up by the provincial authorities, so that together they collaborated in the adjustment of national politics. In the formal report to the Ministry of the Interior, the Governor's office rendered the scribbled notes of the Ryamukona resident's evidence into the official position of the administration. The nights echoed with 'cries of alarm . . . intended to create a spirit of insecurity amongst the peaceful population of Burundi', since 'the Barundi refugees, former inhabitants of Ryamukona, are at the base of these ploys'.[77] Already on the eve of Nkurunziza's abduction an emphatic request had been submitted for a brigade of gendarmes to be permanently installed in Ijene, 'to ensure the surveillance of the frontier posts',[78] and the subsequent incursion served to underline this necessity. The officials of the *Arrondissement* were ordered to remain on Ryamukona indefinitely to report on the Rwandan 'provocations' and 'to reinforce the morale of the population'.[79] Where they had been deeply suspicious of this population's loyalty, the officials responded swiftly to the claims and performance

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[75] *ANB*, B 11 (2), *Affaire Nkurunziza*, 25 July 1967.

[76] ibid.

[77] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Paul Rusiga and Mathias Rwamo, *La situation frontalière*, 24 July 1967.

[78] *ANB*, B 11 (2), François-Xavier Muhamirizo, Letter to Minister of External Affairs, 17 July 1967.

[79] *ANB*, BI 6 (115), Progou Ngozi, Telegram to Commarro, 26 July 1967.

of the Ryamukona community as vigilant yet overwhelmed border guards, presenting a united face to the national government. The Governor's office urged the Ministry of the Interior that the state must 'protect these innocents of the borderland, who are condemned to the tyranny of a neighbouring country.'[80]

The response to the kidnap of Nkurunziza, himself a Rwandan by origin, thus demonstrated the utility of collaboration as a political tactic on the border. Even as the state's policy drifted away from hostility to Rwanda, local interests among population and administration united to maintain the warlike stance they felt necessary. In Feyissa's terms, they collaborated to show themselves together 'more state than the state'; they insisted on the 'rigidification' of the frontier against the particular interest of the government, 'mobilizing the state in a local struggle'.[81] It was a tense relationship. Soldiers occupying the border prevented more attacks, but they also curtailed all visits to market in Rwanda.[82] Yet while two-edged, it was a stance of power for all concerned. Acting the border guards, the population received support in their local cross-border feud, while acting the protectors, the provincial authorities convinced the national government that the border was still in danger and received greater resources. Even in a circumstance far distant from the national threat experienced in 1964, united opposition to Rwanda became the means by which state and society could see each other in concert on the frontier.

Vigilance: *Spies in the Congregation*

The performance of loyalty among the border population was an occasional choice, adopted in moments of necessity. These self-conscious moments of collaboration were applied tools, intended to elicit support in a specific circumstances. For the state, however, the loyalty of collaboration and constant, voluntary surveillance from the people was something it deeply desired, a potential source of stability in a decade defined by state uncertainty. Seeking to secure its tentative revolution, therefore, the Republican government formalised collaboration; instead of responding occasionally to invocations from the border population, it began to require the duty of guarding the border from the youth of the community.

'There are people,' wrote a pastor despairingly in 1967 at the protestant mission of Rubura, a constant subject of state hostility, 'who walk day and night, trying to find those

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[80] *ANB*, B 11 (2), Paul Rusiga and Mathias Rwamo, Letter to Dirgalinter, 24 July 1967.

[81] Dereje Feyissa, "More State than the State? The Anywaa's Call for the Rigidification of the Ethio-Sudanese Border," in *Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne (Oxford: James Currey, 2010), 27–43, p. 43.

[82] Mbazumutima Thérèse (pseud.), interview in Ryamukona (Kabarore), 9 March 2011.

who cross the frontier.'[83] His letter was addressed to a colleague in Rwanda, lamenting that a hoped-for marriage between their children was being prevented by the state's aggression on the border. Intercepted, the letter was considered to 'reveal clearly enough an assault on the security of the state'.[84] The pastor was right; the border was watched, and no longer simply by the *ad hoc* performance of private citizens. He referred to the new *Jeunesse révolutionnaire Rwagasore*, the JRR, Uprona's youth league. Their official slogan was 'Vigilance', a call to political orthodoxy and rigour, and on the border it took on a particular significance. They were the *de facto* formal border guards of the party and the nation, vigilant to incursions of the border in any form. Yet while carrying out this quasi-state duty, in the hills the JRR consisted of the eager youth of the community, providing genuine interest and opportunity for its members. 'They were like soldiers of the party,' explains a former member;

> 'if there was anything wrong in the community, they would call JRR members to try to put everything right. If there was someone who was making trouble they would go and take him and bring him to prison ... Every person would find his esteem to be a member of the JRR. Everything they would do they would be quick - helping people, doing jobs assigned to them, everyone found his pleasure to be a member of the JRR.'[85]

The *Jeunesse* was at a precarious edge between power and obedience, enthusiasm and control, responsibility and abuse, people and state. A report in *Le Soir* recounted how 'these young men, most often unarmed, block the roads and stop traffic, sometimes for several days; they molest, insult or kidnap their political opponents without hitherto provoking any real action from the government, which appears to fear them'.[86] The JRR was considered to be 'uncontrollable' by the Belgian newspaper, and Lemarchand emphasises this autonomy, describing the local cells of the JRR as 'an ultimate court of appeal in the provinces, with the local army men passively watching the proceedings'.[87]

The local leaders are more modest in their recollections, of course, proud of their role and prestige in the community but clearly denoting their subordination to the regular communal and party authorities. This may be an accurate representation of a less radical *Jeunesse* away from the political militants of Bujumbura described by *Le Soir*. In the hills of the border they assumed the duty of collaboration invoked as a point of connection between people and state. As the corporate realisation of this collaboration, they assumed

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[83] *ANB*, BI 6 (168), Nyakamwe Ezekiya, Letter to Pastor Gituro Eliyakimu, 12 August 1967.

[84] *ANB*, BI 6 (168), François-Xavier Muhamirizo, Letter to Governor, 23 August 1967.

[85] Ndikumana David (pseud.), interview in Mparamirundi (Busiga), 19 April 2011.

[86] Jacques Cordy, "Après un an de République," *Le Soir* (Brussels), 16 September 1967, pp. 1, 3.

[87] René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, Library of African Affairs (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970) p. 458.

the position of a new player in the political game, one that could take a remarkably ambiguous role in the negotiations of power and control at the edge of the nation.

To explore this complex and the role of the stance of collaboration within it, we may look to August 1968 and the far west of Kabarore. Four years after the frontier burnings things were remarkably calm, until one Sunday morning the JRR received a tipoff that in the small *colline* of Kibati (see Figure 1.2, p. 17), within sight of the Kibira rainforest, three Rwandan soldiers had appeared at a protestant church near the border. The youth league came quickly, managed to capture one of the men as the other two got away, and summoned the communal administrator immediately. But upon interrogation of the captured man the officials began to realise that this was far from the invasion they had feared. The Rwandans had come, the prisoner claimed, not even to hunt for '*inyenzi*', but simply to attend a service at the nearest protestant church to their camp.[88] Afterwards, he said, they chatted to the congregation. Conversation was genial, filled with casual inquiries of mutual curiosity; people asked them about their service in the Rwandan army and how it differed from that of Burundi, they discussed the relative size of communes in the two countries. The soldiers had apparently been in the region a few times before and seemed particularly at ease with their presence on enemy territory. There was some suspicion when it was noted that the soldier's identity card specified that he was Catholic, yet he claimed to be on a religious visit to the protestant church; when challenged on this inconsistency, in a fit of patriotic and political cheek the young man retorted, 'When one is Parmehutu, one is free to embrace the religion of one's choice.' Brimming with doubt, the *Administrateur de Commune* and soon the *Commissaire d'Arrondissement* considered his story, but it was eventually decided that he was merely 'an undisciplined soldier' and not part of any greater plot.

However, the most remarkable aspect of this peculiar event was the disjoint between the sequence of events and the colourful account given by the Barundi informers. One claimed that at the visit of the three Rwandan soldiers 'the population thought that it was war that was about to break out', but that 'since the arrest of these Rwandan soldiers, the population is calm. However, the people wish that Barundi soldiers would sometimes make patrols in our region so that the inhabitants of Rwanda can see that we have protectors.'[89] This was of course the correct official answer; to confess to knowledge of the unreported presence of Rwandan agents on Burundi soil, or to any reaction other than fear of the captured man, would immediately bring them under suspicion, and the wish for a greater military presence was a practical statement of the population's patriotism and political investment in the government. The informants described the

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[88] *ANB*, BI 6 (120), Mbanzamihigo Charles, *L'apparution de trois soldats rwandais sur le sol burundais*, 31 August 1968.

[89] ibid.

political reaction of the community as the grip of moral panic, righteously invoking the state to regulate the intrusion of political deviancy into their midst. They performed the loyal duty of trembling in fear and apprehending the invader, became the border guards the state wanted to see in this distant, uncontrolled corner of the frontier.

Far more clearly than in the 1964 burnings or the kidnap of Nkurunziza, this was a self-conscious performance; claims that the population were afraid 'war was about to break out' scarcely fit either with the reported neighbourly small talk held after the service, or indeed the fact that the soldiers had been able to sit through the service at all. The locals showed no sign of being genuinely under threat, yet the informants forcefully expressed terror to the government. The two who gave evidence were a communal councillor and a JRR member; it was the latter who had sat through the church service, witnessed the casual conversations afterwards, and then alerted his superiors it terms of panic. Making the claim of their orthodoxy with regards to the precepts of the community's duties on the border, the two performed their duty of vigilant loyalty.

Their curious evidence, on the other hand, suggested an awareness of the precariousness of the community that had so casually hosted enemy soldiers. Neither informant claimed personal responsibility for the alarm, a potentially powerful claim that might enhance their standing in contrast to the treacherous calm of their neighbours. Instead, the performance of loyalty and border protection was raised as a shield for the community as a whole, the congregation and Kibati population all said to be in fear at the soldiers' presence, and relief at the state's response. Indeed, the councillor emphatically rejected a clear opportunity to further his own individual status by denouncing one of his own. A member of the congregation who had been particularly friendly to the Rwandans was a former soldier in the army of Burundi, and his openness to foreign soldiers made the interrogating officials suspicious of his possible ethnic sympathies. When asked directly about the ex-soldier's political activities, the councillor revealed that the man had indeed been mixed up in ethnic ideas during the fractious elections in 1965. But the councillor went out of his way to minimise the heresy of the man he reported, assuring the authorities that he did not 'dabble in racial politics' any longer.[90] The informers at every turn sought to present the local Barundi community of Kibati as beyond reproach, uniformly loyal to the Burundi state and therefore fearful of Rwandan aliens, enthusiastic civilian agents of an ineffectual war footing. Yet their reports could not conceal that the behaviour of their neighbours indicated that it was the actions of the informers, the open call upon orthodox civic behaviour as collaboration with a protective, if insufficient state against an antipathetic other, that was in fact unusual in this area, at this time.

The Kibati story was a strange one. The JRR, tasked with the surveillance of the bor-

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[90] *ANB*, BI 6 (120), Mbanzamihigo Charles, *L'apparution de trois soldats rwandais sur le sol burundais*, 31 August 1968.

der and the population, seemed to stand as an intrusion of the state into society, 'soldiers of the party'[91] in places where real soldiers were lacking. 'It was a strong movement, it would help the administration, but the best of them,' describes one old associate, 'they were doing what the leaders were asking them to do, they would not improvise by thinking what to do, they were helping the leaders, they were like soldiers who were serving the community for the administration.'[92] Yet their ambiguous position between people and state permitted them, in the terms of loyal collaboration, to protect the former when they so wished. The community in Kibati was under no threat from Rwanda, but had exposed itself, and the approach of the JRR members to the state defused this threat as they embodied the assurance of political loyalty. While formalised by the government as an attempt to control the population and the frontier itself, collaboration remained a political identity, instrumentalised and adopted for the defence of the community.

1.5 Border Guards, Border Citizens

The collaboration of vigilance between state and society in the borderland sprang from the reformation of the border itself in the circumstances of Independence. In the troubled last years of colonial rule the state had discovered the borderland as a region of uncertainty and peril that extended well beyond the narrow boundary itself, and the combative confrontation with Rwanda in the first postcolonial years made this doubt a matter of urgency. It is to be expected that national borders should strengthen in political reality under the pressures of conflict, and this crisis atmosphere saw an attempt to push the border back, narrow its definition to the line on the map. This meant firmly determining the inclusion and loyalty of the borderland community within the political community of the nation. It was a collaborative process; the state approached the community intent on purging its undesirable elements, and members of the community responded by volunteering identification and evidence of these undesirables. As Rwanda embodied the tropes of Republicanism, ethnic politics and bloodshed against which the state in Burundi defined itself, the border community was required to prove itself as 'un-Rwandan' as possible. They had to prove their belonging to the nation; they had to prove their citizenship.

Throughout the situations described here, the overriding act of citizenship was that of vigilance. To be a good citizen was to be a vigilant citizen. Vigilance is 'a frontier phenomenon',[93] and on the literal frontier of the state it was a natural mode of engagement for the people. By reporting the incursion of individuals or ideas, one presented oneself to the state as belonging to the nation, and deserving of state endorsement. This was

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[91] Ndikumana David (pseud.), interview in Mparamirundi (Busiga), 19 April 2011.

[92] Ndayizeye Pascal (pseud.), interview in Cendajuru (Busiga), 26 April 2011.

[93] Ray Abrahams, *Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 24.

the sense of the collaboration performed in these relationships; citizen and state spoke to each other in shared terms of border vigilance, expressing political orthodoxy, and each provided a degree of protection to the other. It is only in the context of borderland performances of threatened national guards that the *Commissaire d'Arrondissement* in 1967, weeks before the kidnap of Nkurunziza, endorsed the concept of '*la population citoyenne*' as defined by loyalty on the frontier; he urged his superiors that it was essential to 'establish the measures to be taken to avoid in time any border tangles between the inhabitants of the Rwandan riverbank and the citizen population.'[94] There was reciprocity, mutual obligation, mutual protection in the collaboration of border vigilance.

Whether under the invocation of the community or the directive order of the state through the JRR, such civic vigilance entailed the definition and ordering of society.[95] For the borderlanders it was not an empty performance intended to deflect state hostility and then be set aside; by endorsing the state's consideration of political orthodoxy as the basis of belonging, the vigilant citizen gave it reality in his or her own community. When opposition or dissident propagandists were either apprehended or reported, the informant put into action the state attitude that these individuals had, by their political conviction, set themselves outside of society. Vigilance established criminality, and criminality defined community by the exception. As Roitman's informant in Cameroon argued, 'So that the system can continue to function properly, it's important that there are people in violation.'[96] Border vigilance recognised and confirmed these terms of violation.

It was, nevertheless, a state-centred act. The 'story' retold of vigilant defence was based on the original narrative of the state. Abrahams observes that vigilantism in its traditional sense 'presumes the existence of the state' by its attempt either to fill a gap left by state ineffectiveness or to express criticism of state failure to act, a fundamental question of self-help.[97] On the border in the 1960s, however, filling the gap left by the state was done at the state's own demand. It was collaboration on the state's terms. Only in the case of Nkurunziza's abduction could vigilance be construed as criticism, as both local people and local administration argued for greater state presence, the border a 'discursive resource' to demonstrate state deficiencies exposed by civic injury and vigilance.[98] Otherwise, vigilance appeared almost as an obligation, self-help required not in the later Zairean sense of *debrouillez-vous*, but as a duty owed to the state. Displaying

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[94] *ANB*, BI 6 (120), François-Xavier Muhamirizo, Letter to Governor, 5 May 1967.

[95] David Pratten, "The Politics of Vigilance in Southeastern Nigeria," *Development and Change* 37, no. 4 (2006): 707–734, p. 711; Lars Buur, "Reordering Society: Vigilantism and Expressions of Sovereignty in Port Elizabeth's Townships," *Development and Change* 37, no. 4 (2006): 735–757.

[96] Janet Roitman, "Productivity in the Margins: The Reconstitution of State Power in the Chad Basin," in *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 191–224, p. 210.

[97] Abrahams, *Vigilant Citizens*, p. 9.

[98] Feyissa, "More State than the State?" p. 27.

one's belonging within the nation, acting on behalf of the state, was to an extent subjection to the state's attitude of hostility towards the community, deflecting its wrath. 'Citizenship is Janus-faced',[99] and when the state considered any other path of action or expression to be treasonous, the duties of citizenship appeared synonymous with the obedience of the subject. Border vigilance was a 'ritual of citizenship' as described by Burgess, training a 'new kind of citizen' who embodied both the political ideals and needs of the aggressive state,[100] but it retained much of the expectations of submission from previous modes of power.

The JRR was only an avatar of this mode of cooperation with the state. Even outside of its ranks, by expressing themselves in the terms of the state's prejudice, vigilant citizens raised issues of obligation and mutual interest, purposefully placing themselves and, largely, their communities within the citizenship of belonging in order that they might benefit from the state's protection. It is notable that the denunciations of political deviancy or treachery frequently preceded the direct request for a greater investment of armed force in the borderland from the government, scarcely the desire of the oppressed subject. The language of state orthodoxy could be a tool of power, a means of access that permitted the elicitation of state power into a local contest by an involved local actor. It is impossible to judge the personal conviction of those who denounced ethnic politics, or collusion with Rwanda, or deviation from any of the norms of Uproniste dogma, but the careful invocation of these issues was a political act intended to shape and distort the local terms of contest to the interests of the informant. As Pratten observes in Nigeria, 'modes of vigilance . . . are configured by internal imperatives as much as they are by the national and transnational political economy.'[101] Yet the invocation of collaboration between vigilant citizen and state was not a limited act, within the control of the population, a tool to be used to solve a problem then be set aside. Once the state became invested in border surveillance it was difficult to dislodge. This would be distinctly uncomfortable for the population that lived and worked through daily cross-border exchanges, as the people of Ryamukona discovered in Nkurunziza's absence.[102] Performing the border guard once would require its repetition in the future, lest the claim of orthodoxy be followed by the condemnation of deviancy, and the dutiful expressions of the Kibati JRR informant exemplifies this need for persistence beyond vital necessity. The border was a continuously evolving political complex, and each attempt to enact the relationship of collaboration altered, but never concluded, the mutual tension between doubtful state and borderland

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[99] Steven Robins, Andrea Cornwall, and Bettina von Lieres, "Rethinking 'Citizenship' in the Post-colony," *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 6 (2008): 1069–1086, p. 1080.

[100] Thomas Burgess, "The Young Pioneers and the Rituals of Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar," *Africa Today* 51, no. 3 (2005): 3–29.

[101] Pratten, "The Politics of Vigilance," p. 710.

[102] See above, p. 21.

people. This manner of citizenship attempted no dissent, permitted no deviation from the language of the state, but nevertheless provided the opportunity to shape state actions and alter the political world of the border along lines the informer, the vigilant border guard, sought at the time. It was a gesture of power, but so thoroughly invested in the terms of the state that it was a tool over which the borderland population would struggle to maintain control.

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"TOKUNBO VEHICLES TRADE ACROSS THE NIGERIA'S NORTH-WEST INTERNATIONAL BORDER"[1]

BY

Abubakar Sama'ila
Department of History
Usmanu Danfodiyo University
P.M.B: 2346
Sokoto, Nigeria,
E-mail: abujabo28@yahoo.com
Phone: +234-8094629949, +234-8100590300.

Abstract

Cross-border trade has been one of the dominant themes in African border studies. The West African sub-region has been an important hub for cross-border trade. One dominant commodity in contemporary cross-border trade across Nigeria's north-west border is second-hand vehicles, popularly known as *tokunbo*. Cross-border trade in *tokunbo* is a thriving business in Nigeria and in spite of attempts by government to control it, it continues to expand. Second-hand vehicles from Cotonou and Lome mainly enter Nigeria through the extreme end of north-west border areas of the country. This border area is located within the Kamba-Gaya-Malanville region, between Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republics. As at the year 2000, *tokunbo* automobiles constitute about 90% of the imported automobiles in Nigeria and most of these imported automobiles come from Benin Republic as about 90% of second-hand vehicles imported into Benin from overseas end up in Nigeria. By the year 2010, 200,000 used vehicles were officially declared in Nigeria. The porous borders between Nigeria and its neighbours in the north-west facilitate the *tokunbo* trade. This aspect of cross-border trade has grown from an insignificant economic activity, particularly in the 1970s to a significant one in the 1980s and 1990s. Much as the trade has been expanding and creating opportunities to several individuals, scholars seem not to have given adequate attention to it. This paper therefore, is an attempt to fill this vacuum in the economic history of the area. The paper examines the nature, character, and trends that have accelerated cross-border trade in *tokunbo* vehicles across the Nigeria's North-West international border.

Key words: Cross-border trade, *Tokunbo,* Second-hand vehicles, Nigeria

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[1] . This paper is an extract from the draft of the three chapters of an ongoing PhD work entitle "Cross-border Automobile (*tokunbo)* Trade in Nigeria: A study of North-West International Border, 1982-2011". (See Appendix IV for the summary). The paper is prepared for the **2013 ABORNE PhD Winter school,** to be held in conjunction with Gaston Berger University in Saint Louis, Senegal, 9-12th January, 2013

Summary

➢ The Nigeria's North-West international border area is located within the Kamba-Gaya-Mallaville region, connecting Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republics. The former being the country with economic and demographic advantage in West African sub-region, served as major market for the re-export and transit goods coming from the latter two countries. While Niger republic is playing the role of transit state of second-hand vehicles to Nigeria, Benin on other hand served as re-export country.

➢ More than (80%) eighty per cent of second-hand vehicles *Tokunbo* landing in Cotonou port (Benin Republic) end up in Nigeria. As at the year 2000, *tokunbo* automobiles constitute about 90% of the imported automobiles in Nigeria. More than 300,000 *tokunbo* vehicles are estimated to have crossed the Nigeria's border in 2011 and more than half of these numbers come through the country's North-West border.

➢ The growth of cross-border *tokunbo* vehicles trade in the country is due to certain changes witnessed in the economic, political and social aspect of the country. These include the Oil boom and Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1970s and 1980s respectively.

➢ The increase in the figures of *tokunbo* vehicles traded across the Nigeria border has been determined by three major reasons viz; the demand for *tokunbo* vehicles informed by the reaction of the public against government policies; the Uncompetitive Nature of the Nigerian Ports and the role of Transit countries and the ease through which second-hand vehicles are supply from overseas countries.

➢ Cross-border tokunbo vehicles imports to Nigeria follow an elaborate and well-organized circuit and in most cases, through informal means. It is largely controlled by sophisticated and well-organized networks of big time business magnets in both Nigeria and Niger, with many small operators involved on the margins. The local methods used in the area are *Kaida and Tarkake* meaning arrangement and/or evasion of the security officers.

➢ The traders usually cross the border by land and use numerous and ever-changing tracks along the long border with Nigeria. Most of the *tokunbo* vehicle traders prefer to use illegal routes which mean evading the custom revenue or seizure. It is estimated that about 98% and 97% of all *tokunbo* vehicles re-exported from Togo and Benin respectively, use illegal routes to their destinations in Nigeria.

➢ *Tokunbo* vehicles trade across Nigeria's North-west international border will ever remain lucrative for those involve in it, given the level of technological and industrial development in these countries. But the extent through which this trade promotes economic interdependence

and development amongst the three countries defend more or less on the level of their commitment to harmonize and integrate their social and economic policies.

Introduction

The Nigeria's North-West international boundary is the classical example of a potential bridge for economic integration. That border carries a great volume of trade between Nigeria on the one hand and the Republics of Benin and Niger on the other. Nigeria shares international borders with Niger and Benin Republics totalling about 2370 sq. km. (Yoroms, 2007: 190). This border area connects the boundaries of Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republics in the North-Western, Southern, and North-Eastern parts of the countries respectively. The area had been an important hub for economic and social contact of people of the three countries. Vast array of goods involved in the conduct of the cross-border trade in the area include agricultural and manufactured goods mostly imported from overseas. Second-hand vehicles from Cotonou and Lome entered Nigeria mainly through the extreme end of north-west border area of the country. This border is located within the Kamba-Gaya-Mallaville region, between Nigeria, Niger and Benin Republics. While the countries of Benin and Togo serve the role of transit states of second-hand vehicles to other countries in the sub-region, Niger republic is playing the role of transit state of second-hand vehicles brought from Cotonou and Lome ports to Nigeria (Barkindo, 2007:258).

Initially, automobile is imported to Nigeria from Europe and the figures became significant especially after the Second World War and by 1950s its importation had become an important economic activity in the country. The number of vehicles imported in to the country grew from 1,878 in 1946 to 15,107 in 1956 and 20,967 in 1960 (Nigeria Trade Summary, 1958:24; Federal Ministry of Transport, 1973:18). This trend continued up to 1970s when the oil boom not only increased the importation of vehicles in to the country but encouraged the establishment of six automobile assembly plants (see Appendix 1). However, the collapse of the world oil market and resulting economic changes in the country in the 1980s made it impossible for an average Nigerian to purchase a new vehicle. Consequently the *tokunbo* vehicles became the alternative mode of automobile purchased by most Nigerians.

Research carried out indicated that, more than 80% of the *tokunbo[1]* vehicles landing in Cotonou from Europe are marked 'transit Niger' but most of the vehicles do not reach Niger before making a detour into Nigeria (Tassoua, 2005:2). Being the country with economic and demographic advantage in the sub-region, Nigeria is the engine of the economy for its four immediate land neighbours, namely; Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Asiwaju, 2003:239). The economic and demographic advantage of Nigeria made it a major market in the West African region. In fact, the country is the dominant economy in the region accounting for 62% per cent of the regional Growth Domestic Products in 2007 (ECOWAS Commission, 2009,a:24).

The growth of cross-border *tokunbo* vehicles trade in the country is due to certain changes witnessed in the economic, political and social aspect of the country. The developments in the 1970s and 1980s influenced the second hand *tokunbo* vehicles trade in the country. The oil boom period witnessed astronomical increase in the Nigeria export earnings. As the Nigerian revenue rose, expenditure also climbed, making it possible for the middle income elites to fulfil the dream of owning a car. However, the Structural Adjustment Program which followed in the 1980s turned the car dream in to an illusion forcing the vehicle traders to resort to the sale of second hand vehicles. In fact, most of the oil boom vehicle dealers, at least in the northern part of the country, turned to the *tokunbo* vehicles trade that eventually dominated the automotive sub-sector[2].

LARES studies estimated that in 2001, Nigeria had imported 220,000 *tokunbo* vehicles in contrast with Benin and Togo 250,000 and 55,000 respectively (LARES, 2002: NAC, 2001: Barkindo,2005). However, given the demand for *tokunbo* vehicles in Nigeria as well as its easy and flexible supply from overseas there had been constant increase in the figures that are traded across the borders of these countries (see Appendix 3). The bulk of second-hand cars traded in the Northern part of the country are imported through the Nigeria's North-west international border areas. The magnitude of this trade in the region over the past three decades, has called for the need to understand its origin and nature. This appears to be absent in the literature dealing with cross-border trade in the region. But first let us look at the concept of Cross-border trade.

Concept of Cross-Border Trade

Cross-border trade, which is also referred to as Trans-Frontier trade, is an act of acquiring commercial goods and services and taking them across the border of the country and selling them there. It involves the movement of goods and services across a common border of the two countries (Balami, 2003: 3). Cross-border trade had been categorized in the literature in to two types, namely the formal/official and Informal/unofficial (Ibid). The formal or official cross-border trade is documented in government records as regards its scope, route, volume and other important variables of the trade. It served as a source of revenue for the government of a particular country and there are national trade policies that provide the framework that regulate the trading activities or transactions.

The informal cross-border trade on the other hand, is that aspect of the trade in goods that were exchanged across the borders either by-passing the official customs checks and recording points or passing through these customs points while deliberately under–valued, mis-specified or unrecorded (Meagher, 2008: 2). The trade involves movement of imported finished goods which would ordinarily attract a considerable import duty across the border. It is also regarded as the movement of legal goods through unofficial channels (Usman, 2004:4). Scholars use descriptions like "clandestine", "smuggling", "underground", and "hidden" to refer to this type of trade. The convention in economic literature, however, use the term "parallel" "informal" to refer to the movement of legal goods through illegal or unofficial channels.

Smuggling on the other hand, is defined as the "crime of taking, sending or bringing goods secretly and illegally in to or out of a country" (Wehmeier, 2000: 1123). It is also defined as straight forward illicit carriage of goods across national borders through bush paths, or at vantage points along a country's coast, or through the appropriate borders with the connivance of the customs officials (Asiwaju, 2003: 235). It is an illegal activity undertaken by conveying goods and services clandestinely from one point to another without paying the required custom duties. Smuggling does take place in defiance and/or neglect of the law enforcement procedures. Scholars however, distinguished between Plain and Subtle smuggling. It is plain if it is a straightforward movement of goods across national borders, through bush paths, or at vantage points along country's coast or through appropriate borders with the connivance of the respective authorities. Subtle methods cover transactions where by goods pass through custom barriers just as in genuine trade but not all the facts of the goods involved are declared (Yoroms; 2007:186).

The literature that deals with cross-border trade in West Africa is generally divided into three parts each addressing the question of why this kind of trade persists especially amidst liberalization of the economies of the participating countries. The first saw cross-border trade as a tool for economic protest by the common citizens of the countries concerned (http://www.riai.uu.ss/forsk/previus/htlm,). These common citizens, it is argued, are those who are excluded by post-colonial elites in Africa from benefiting from their corrupt "politics of the belly", by passing the state and denying it an avenue for collecting transaction taxes (Oculi, 1996, Balami, 2003, Stephen, 2011). The second, views it as a tool of 'integration from below' by non state actors where political leaders have failed to achieve genuine economic and political integration in Africa despite the existence of formal regional associations from the top (Egg & Igue, 1993, Hashim & Meagher, 1999). The third point of view explains cross-border trade in the context of an expression of resilient pre-colonial African solidarity which had survived artificial and divisive colonial boundaries and political walls of balkanization (Asiwaju, 1989, Barkindo, 1989, Asiwaju, 2003). This view involves a shift of focus from the two above to a more empirical concern with the history, organization and commodity composition of cross-border trading activities (Igue, 1977 and 1985; Asiwaju, 1976; Egg and Igue, 1993). This perspective has highlighted the critical role of a number of structural features of cross-border trade which would not necessarily be eliminated by liberalization policies, whether regionally harmonized or not. It thus appears that, scholars generally seem to underscore the role of 'cross-border trade' in promoting economic development and regional integration in West African sub-region.

Nature of Cross-border Trade in Nigeria's North-West Border

The setting up of colonial frontiers and tariffs did not result in decline in the trade between the people of border areas of Nigeria, Niger and Benin (Thom, 1970; Collins,1974; Asiwaju, 1971; Miles,1994). Rather, the presence of national boundaries became a resource for traders to carry on their business. Consequently, there developed a complex and thriving pattern of cross-border trade operating in the borderland areas. Citizens of the areas join eagerly into the cross-border trade as an easy means of providing themselves with the necessities of life. They traded in a wide variety of goods which were in high demand and were easily transportable due to modern advances in transport technology. There developed large markets with goods traded upon and people who came daily from across the area to buy and sell.

Cross-border trade that started as a simple business of exchanging goods conveyed by different means of transport between various communities in West Africa become more widespread and complex in Post-colonial period (Walther, 2012: 2). The trade involved the exchange of variety of goods and services between the people of the border communities. Scholars have shown that as a result of colonialism which led to the integration of the economy of the border communities into the expanding cash-based economies of Europe, the border communities not only enjoy European imports but also buy them for re-export to other side of the border (Asiwaju,2003; Fadahunsi, 2002; Yoroms,2004; Meagher & Hashim 1999; Balami, 2006). Goods that are exchanged include agricultural produce, products of local industries and modern manufactured goods.

Cross-border trade in the area is organized with the participation of all forces representing the border communities: craftsmen, traditional institutions and state officials. The participants in the trade often organized themselves into occupational guilds, ring and sometimes pools (Golub, 2008:201). The operation of the trade is through a number of processes. The first process deals with the currency exchange between Nigeria on one hand and Benin and Niger on the other. One of the two ways of currency exchange is by employing the service of money changers ('*Yancanji* in Hausa). Who are of two categories: *Manyan 'Yancanji* (Major) and *Kananan 'Yancanji* these money changers organized themselves under an association which not only regulates their activities but also mediates with the authorities whenever the needs arise. (Meagher & Hashim, 1999:23). However, *Kananan Yankasuwa (*small traders) usually relied on exchange agents when transferring their money through bank transaction. This is by sending it through the agent's account and in return a certain percentage, insignificant however, goes to the agent. In the case of major *tokunbo* vehicles dealers they prefer the use of Bank services in transferring their money from Nigeria to Niger or Benin where they collect it in CFA notes.

The second process of cross-border trade is the purchase of trade goods. That is done in two major ways. The first is for trader or his aides to travel in person to obtain the trade goods. The second is to use the method known as booking through an agent who is given a specification of the trade goods and pay the amount of price the agent demands. The responsibility of purchasing the trade goods as well clearing and forwarding rests with the agent. Many *tokunbo* vehicles business persons from Nigeria buy their vehicles from Cotonou through their trusted agents especially with the current improvement in Banking

and GSM services. Even with one's presence in the market, these agents can act as mediating middlemen. They acted in a number of ways as market runners and the inexperienced buyers most of the time feel attracted to them because they put them in touch with the major dealers. In addition they apparently help them to acquire products and price information (Field Notes, July, 2012).

There are two main strategies used by cross-border traders in getting their goods across administrative boundaries cheaply. These are evasion and arrangement. Evasion which tends to be employed by economic operators, involve using indirect routes to transport banned products in to a given state. This is the most popular method used by the *tokunbo* vehicle traders across the border as shall be discussed in the subsequent sections. Arrangement relates to a negotiation between traders and the officials responsible for the surveillance of the national territory and is an essential requirement when sizeable flows are conveyed across borders on a regular basis. This is more so in the case of major *tokunbo* importers who make sure that consultations and arrangement have been made before the trip.

Traders used two methods (formal and informal) in conveying their goods across the Nigeria border in the north-west. The formal mode involves the use of services of forwarding and clearing agencies. This requires more funds, more elaborate organization and skilled personnel than the two informal modes known as *Ka'ida* and *Tarkake*:[3] The *Kaida* mode is based on informal agreement and mutual understanding between traders and state officials and there are two categories of it. The first category involves agreements between the senior officers who head organization as such as *Douannes*, *Gendarmeries*, and Police in Niger and Benin, Customs, Immigration, State Security and Police in Nigeria, on the one hand, and traders or intermediaries on the other hand. In this mode, an agreed upon amount of money would be given to each organization. On their part, officers not only cut a 'few corners' to get paperwork done with dispatch but also cooperate with the traders in different ways. For example, in Nigeria, whenever the Federal Patrol team is on duty, the traders would be alerted and advised on the next action to be taken. But once the team departs the road is "safe" for the traders to operate.

The second category of *Ka'ida* mode is based on agreement between traders and field officers who are of junior cadre. The major difference between the first and second categories is in terms of rank of officers, cost and risk involved. The first category is more expensive but less risky, while the second is relatively cheap but risky.[4] Moreover, the

second category entailed nocturnal journeys and avoiding major routes. To be sure, the junior officers demand less money than the senior officers but the danger is that when the senior officers discover the deal, it has to be re-negotiated all over. Whatever amount of money the junior officers received from the traders, it does not count and the agreement is invalid.

The second informal mode is *Tarkake* method, which requires no prior agreement with the security officers. In this mode rules and regulations governing cross-border trade are deliberately violated, evaded or ignored. What it requires include knowledge of trade routes, ability to evade security personnel or their informants, ability to conduct successful impromptu negotiation with them and money with which to strike a deal with them in the event of failure to evade them. This mode is the riskiest of all modes. This is partly because if negotiation with the custom officers, for example failed, the goods would be confiscated as contraband and the owner arrested. Under such a circumstance, the trader has few options. The first option is resigning himself to the prospect of being jailed which is not an option at all. The second is bribing the officers to "buy" his freedom. The third is to hire the services of people who acted as intermediaries between custom officers and traders which mean readiness to any astronomical sums to get his goods and freedom. And the fourth is to devise foolproof way of sneaking away without being seen. All these suggest that *Tarkake* is based on hole-and-corner method (group interview, Cotonou, July, 2012).

Development of Cross-border *Tokunbo* vehicles trade in Nigeria

The massive importation of second hand vehicles across the Nigeria's borders had been an important phenomenon in the lives of Nigerians not only because of its centrality to the aspirations of the middle-income elites but also because it underscores the limitations of enforcement as strategy for realising protectionist policies. Such measures of protection had been taken against the increasing level of *tokunbo* importation in to the country with little or no success.

In 1994, Nigeria banned imports of vehicles more than eight years old. In 2002 the law was further tightened to ban all vehicles more than five years old. In 2004 the ban was eased to apply again to vehicles more than eight years old. Moreover, any imports of vehicles by land routes, notably from Benin, are banned altogether. These bans have, until recently, proved impervious to the porous border between Nigeria and her neighbours and this is due to the strong demand for cheap vehicles and the ambiguous attitudes of the authorities in Nigeria.

Subsequent decisions have adjusted the five year ban to eight years in 2005 and 10 years in 2008 and 15 years in may 2012. Enforcement measures apart, trade statistics suggest that the import of used vehicles in to the country skyrocketed from few thousands per year in the 1980s to more than two hundred thousand by the year 2002 and this trend keeps on increasing (Golub, 2012:210). See also Appendix 3.

A cursory look at the available statistics shows that Nigeria has witnessed an upsurge of vehicle importation. For instance in 1988, no less than 600 to 800 fully Built up vehicles were imported monthly. In 1989, 18,000 vehicles came in through the Tin Can Island constituting about 80% of total vehicle supply in Nigeria. The trend continued in 1991 and 1992 when importation figure stood at 8,339 and 13,078 vehicles respectively (Bosa Iweka, 1993:7.) Between 1991 and 2002, about 288,000 used vehicles were imported in to the country, constituting (88%) of the 325,000 vehicles and only 37,000 (12%) were new vehicles. At the same time, internal automotive assembly which attained 90% capital utilization in 1981when it produces 88,823 vehicles has gone down to 10% producing paltry 23,000 vehicles (NAC,2004:1). Between 2004 and 2007, over 921 billion CFAF worth *tokunbo* vehicles were imported into Nigeria from Benin with an increase annually (Golub, 2012:210). What then constitute the determining factors responsible for this unprecedented flow of *tokunbo* or second hand vehicles in to the country?

i.   **The Demand for *tokunbo* vehicles in Nigeria**

The 'oil boom' although of a relatively very short duration, had a tremendous impact on the life of Nigerians in particular and the west African sub-region in general. One of such impacts was to make the dream of owning a car by the middle income elites realizable. This helped to change the position of car ownership as an attribute of a tiny top minority group to an affordable item for anybody with average means. The oil boom in the seventies offered opportunity for the middle class workers to earn more money due to increase in salary and wages. This increase emanated from the reports of the two commissions; the Adebo Commission and the Udoji Commission of 1971 and 1973 respectively (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1972: 74). With the implementation of these commissions' reports, the car ownership in Nigeria jumped to an unprecedented level because all the categories of workers found themselves with a much bigger percentage of disposable income. In the same period 1970-1981, the level of imports in to the country also rose steadily from N 1.2 billion to N8.2 billion in 1978 (Bangura, 1987:96). Imported manufactured goods increased by nearly 50% between 1976 and

1978 and nearly doubled again in 1981(Ibid.). Similarly imports of transport equipment increased by 121% between 1976 and 1981. However, the scenario created by oil boom was to turn upside down after the imposition of Structural Adjustment Program in the country. SAP reduces the real income of Nigerian wage earner four-fold (Olukoshi, 1991:93). This has made it impossible for the Nigerian middle class to ride or own new cars. This made them to almost wholesome resort to the imported second-hand car.

In the same manner, the massive importation of manufactured goods, due to Nigeria's oil wealth surpluses, has led to the increase in government expenditure which boosted from N3 billion in 1970-74 Second National Development plan to N53 billion under the Third National Development Plan of 1975-80. In addition, the so called subsidy on petroleum 'cheap' fuel and the ease with which the middle class obtained credit facilities from the state mostly to purchase personal vehicles had contributed to the impressive growth rate of owning a car.

The economic recession in the 1980s however, negatively affected the Nigerian economy. The dream of the Nigerian worker to own a car also became dashed. The automobile industry appears to be the one industry where the recession has been most dramatic and much more publicized. It has also been the one industry routinely accused and condemned among the largely import-dependent industrial and manufacturing structures, for constantly hiking prices (Iweka, 1993:7). The assembly plants therefore, must rank among the hardest hit of the industries in the recession. The life-wire of the industry, import licenses, was shortened with the collapsed of oil revenue. It is in this context of high inflation that the automobile plants have operated. In fact, towards the end of the 1980s, it became obvious that the ambitious public sector efforts in various industrial sectors were not making the desired development impact (http://www.google.com.ng/automobile%20).

The subsequent measures put in place to arrest the crisis in the economy have to some extent exacerbated the situation. With the adoption of Structural Adjustment Program and the various cost rationalization measures, including devaluation of Naira as well as the review of tariff structure under Babangida administration, the problem worsened. This became so because most of the manufacturing enterprises in the country were heavily dependent on imported inputs. In fact many of them had to come to terms with

producing in an economy that is in deep crisis (Bangura, 1991:137). Automobile assembly is one of those industries that was seriously hit by the crisis as will be shown below. The devaluation of the Naira seriously affected both the vehicle plants and the vehicle dealers. This was inevitable since vehicle in Nigeria, weather imported whole unit or assembled from imported CKDs, depend on foreign exchange. This meant that both the vehicle assembly plants and vehicle dealers found themselves out of the market. When the recession set in and the plants found it difficult to procure sufficient foreign exchange to maintain installed capacity, the mood of the public changed to reflect a changing reality of shortages, real escalating prices, e.t.c.

In spite of government effort to have functional automobile plants, production of the plants consistently failed to meet any of the annual targets. Between 1984 and 1985 production seriously dwindled.[5] The sale of heavy commercial vehicles also reduced from 7,089 in 1981 to 17,697 in 1985 (Federal Office of Statistics, 1985:4). Precisely by 1987, Volkswagen of Nigeria, (VWON) was complaining that its productivity level has gone down from 60 per cent capital utilization to less than 10 per cent (Barkindo, 2007:250), and by 1995, it had stopped production. Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN) also found it difficult to survive. With an install capacity to assemble 63, 000 vehicles per annum, it was only be able to produce 3,266 vehicle in 2003 (http://odili.net/news/source/2010/feb/25/punch/)

The changing pattern of price rising after SAP, as earlier said had been more dramatic in automobile industry than in any other given sector. The prices of car in particular witnessed volatile changes during the eighties. The VW Beetle was in1975 sold at N2,955 but has risen consistently to N6,662, in 1985, an increase of about 190 per cent (Barkindo,2007:252). The price variations within these periods become more dramatic after the introduction of SAP in 1986 when the price of VW beetle jumped to 9,000 in march 1986 to 19, 780 in October 1986, and 26,556 in 1987 to 31, 948 by December 1987 (Bangura, 1991: 134). This trend was the same in the prices of other brands of motor vehicles. The price of Peugeot cars for example rose between 200% and 194.11%, from the pre-SAP price of 10,000 to 17,000 to 30,000 to 50,000 in 1986 (Abdullahi &Suleman, 2002:193). The popular Peugeot 504 GR, which in 1981 was sold at N6, 691 was in 1987 sold at 33,432.(Ibid.). Consequently, there was a drop in

the number of both private and passenger vehicles due to sharp decline in the purchasing power of the public.

With the intensification of the recessionary phenomenon in the 1980s, real earning declined. The Nigerian public, particularly the middle income earners, who were seriously affected by the government austerity measures, were the ones that would have passed the threshold income levels to buy, own and maintain motor vehicles. Since then the Nigerian public, particularly this category, was thus unanimous in calling for the disbandment of the assembly plants because as far as it was concerned, they were unable to satisfy an objective for setting them up to produce and supply cheap and affordable motor vehicles. The Nigerian middle class therefore, realising that they cannot afford new cars, settled for the *tokunbo* vehicles.

ii.   **Uncompetitive Nature of the Nigerian Ports and the role of Transit countries**

The trade in *tokunbo* vehicles across the Nigeria's North-West border strive because the Nigerian ports were unable to satisfy the demand for the *tokunbo* vehicles in the country. Although Nigerian ports were very active as clearing ports for second hand vehicles in the 1990s, however, high port dues coupled with delays in clearance and a number of other problems made them unpopular. This negative aspect worked against the Nigerian ports (Pious, 1990:12; National Standard, 2008:16-18). Many vehicle importers, therefore opted for the for the ports in the neighbouring countries especially Cotonou in Benin.

From Cotonou, Nigeria has become the main destination for goods such as rice, wheat flour, textiles, second-hand clothing, second hand vehicles and tyres e.t.c .Even though Nigeria banned variety of these goods, the items are still imported and shipped to the country. For instance, Adesina, (2008), has shown that, Cotonou port is known to handle some 350,000 second hand vehicles imported from Europe in to Nigeria every year. But these figures appeared to have underestimated the volume of the inflow of the vehicles to Nigeria. This and other goods are smuggled in to Nigeria through every possible means and sold in Nigerian markets. As a result of this situation Benin has become a favourable destination of Nigerian businessmen. Nigerian Importers believe that it is better and cheaper to import through the ports of Benin Republic. The Beninoise on the other hand, offer rebate to the Nigerian importers. Apart from paying what is generally viewed as healthy tariff the Nigerian importer is further pampered

with about 15 percent tariff less than what is paid by his Beninois counterpart. However, to protect the Beninois market, the Nigerian importer must not sell his goods within the Benin territory. He has only three days to get his cargoes across (Saturday Sun, 2005:3). Study conducted by Perret (2002), indicates that, used vehicles constitute about half of the total unofficial re-exports in Benin republic and out of 50,000 people who are directly involved in the unofficial market in Cotonou, 15, 000, are in the used vehicle market (Perret, 2002:5). Thus the neighboring ports of Cotonou and Lome became the floodgates for import of goods into Nigeria. In fact from 1973, Benin and Togo adopted a re-export policy which led to the reduction in the tariff on their exported products to Nigeria. This made the goods from those countries cheaper than those imported through the Nigerian ports. In other words the state more or less built its economy on importing manufactured goods largely from Europe and re-exporting them to other countries in the region with Nigeria receiving the larger part. This situation forces Benin to always, more or less to adapt its policies to the economic situation in Nigeria (Egg & Igue, 1993; Balami, 2006).

The Republic of Togo has also of recent, developed a vibrant re-export *tokunbo* vehicle industry with greater number imported to Nigeria. From a modest importation of 28,804 *tokunbo* vehicles in 2001, the figure has gone up to 45,583or 58% increase in the following year Barkindo, 2007:264). This rise shows that Togo is determine not only to compete in the lucrative *tokunbo* vehicle trade, but also to challenge the primacy of Benin in the trade. In the case of Niger, it has been serving as a transit state for vehicles being brought from Cotonou, and possibly Lome, in to Nigeria. Officially, more than 80% of the *tokunbo* vehicles landing in Cotonou right from their embarking in Europe are stated "transit Niger". However, from the LARES reports one finds that most of these vehicles do not reach Niger before making a detour in to Nigeria (LARES, 2002). Interestingly too, even those passed through Niger, would finally ended up in Nigeria through the Sokoto and Katsina border outposts (Field Notes, 2012). According to LARES study out of 15,000 *tokunbo* vehicles that passed en route Niger, only 3000 must have actually being retained in the country (LARES, 2002:23), the rest found their way in to Nigeria. The discussion above shows that, while Niger plays a second transit role in *tokunbo* vehicles trade Nigeria, Togo is poised to not only compliment but also if possible supplement Benin in the trade.

iii. Easy and flexible supply of *tokunbo* from overseas

Tokunbo vehicles trade in West Africa and indeed Benin is the continuation of second hand vehicles trade from Europe to West Africa which developed in the late 1970's (Beuving, 2006:5). The *tokunbo* vehicles from where ever they were bought in Europe were mostly shipped from Antwerp Belgium, Hamburg Germany, La Havre France, Marseille France and others (Beuvin, 2006:55). The excellent shipping facilities in these ports account for their dominance in the shipping industry. Most of the leading *tokunbo* importers in Lome and Cotonou have their representatives based at those ports.

A strong West African presence in most of these European cities and the liberalisation of West African economies in the 1990's, together with the geographical location of some of these cities at the heart of Europe, boosted the overseas trade, which at the high-end is still dominated by the Lebanese. Beuvin (2006), have argued convincingly that, Lebanese main trading practices shows that they have developed an advanced form of vertical business integration that links European to West African vehicles markets and ties traders, shipping companies, cars and bureaucratic procedures into complex chains of relations.[6] Today, an estimated 800,000 vehicles per year are shipped from Europe to West Africa, the bulk of which pass through Kuregem and the port of Antwerp (Perret, 2002:11). Their primary destination is Cotonou, the port of Bénin, where second hand vehicles can be unloaded without customs clearing. From there, many of them continue their travel towards Nigeria, Ghana or further inland. The trade is known to be opaque and vehicles usually change hands at least four or five times before they reach their new owner, who often pays almost double the initial price. *Tokunbo* vehicle flooded on to the West African car market in the 1990s. The port town of Cotonou in Benin became an important operating base for this trade. Imports of vehicles to Cotonou have risen steeply from 50,000 in 1996 to 200,000 in 2000 and to 250,000 in 2002 and 2003; after a dip in 2004–05 to about 150,000, due to port related problems in Cotonou, they rose again to 200,000 in 2006, reaching an all-time high of 300,000 in 2007 (Perret,2002). About 90 percent of these cars imported into Benin are destined for Nigeria, with 5 percent for Niger and 5 percent for the domestic market (Ibid.).

Importers with connections in developed countries locate, purchase, and arrange for transportation of the vehicles. In 2001, 65 percent of the vehicle imported originated in Germany, with most of the rest coming from other European countries (Benjamin &

Mbaye, 2012:5). Perret, (2002), provides the statistics of the origin of second hand vehicles from different European countries.[7] However, since 2005 second hand vehicles from the United States starts dominating the Cotonou market.   Once a vehicle is unloaded from the carrying ship in Cotonou it now begun its second life in Africa. The vehicle traders then move the vehicles to their respective parks. In each of these parks there are several compartments ranging from 10 to 50 manned by individual dealers. These individual dealers deal directly with the importing companies who imports *tokunbo* vehicles from different parts of Europe, America and Asia. Eighty percent of these Parks in Cotonou are owned by Lebanese who deals directly with the shipping companies in overseas. Some of the major shipping companies include; RORO SHIPPING, GRIMALDI, HUAL, AQUA MARINE, AIR BENIN MARITIME, SOBEMAP BENIN, AIR SAGA, other important transporters of *tokunbo* vehicles in Benin include; ABU MEHRI (LEBANESE), LAUCOOL, (SWEDISH), HYUNDAI MERCHANT MERITIME, (SOUTH-KOREA), AND AFROBA TRANSPORTERS e.t.c. Customs clearance agents in the ports handle all of the paperwork and authorizations. However, there is close cooperation between formal and informal shippers and transporters in one hand and the customs clearance agents on the other.

The ample supply of aging vehicles in Europe and low incomes in West Africa provide a natural basis for trade in used vehicles. Imported vehicles averaged about 16 years of use upon arrival in Benin with 95 percent more than 10 years old. However, recent trends show that American vehicles are increasingly gaining popularity in Cotonou second hand car market with an average year of production between 10 and 5 years old. In fact new models brand (in form of used cars) not older than two years, mostly Toyota and Mercedes, can be found in Cotonou although rare (Field Notes, July, 2012). Toyota, Mercedes, and Peugeot cars have predominated, but the vehicles of other Japanese and European companies are increasingly prevalent (Beuving, 2006: 80).

Operators, Smuggling and Destinations

Used vehicle imports in to Nigeria, follow an elaborate and well-organized circuit and in most cases, through informal means. This involves movement of vehicles from Cotonou to Nigeria which is the continuation of clearing process from Benin to Nigeria. After the vehicles are cleared at the port, they are stored in car parks in Cotonou, before being driven to their destination by companies specializing in the delivery of the vehicles to the border, under escort from customs and with police permission. Thus the vehicles will be released through a

programmed escort to Nigeria frontier, even though this is just in theory, because in practical terms the traders are on their own once settled the Beninese authorities. There is no gainsaying that the Nigeria's north-west international border is the most porous of all the border areas Nigeria has. The bulk of *tokunbo* vehicles find their way easily across this border area towards Nigeria. Immediately after the processing of all the necessary papers in Cotonou, the Nigerian buyers hire drivers who take the vehicles to the border. The fees depend on the direction intended. For those going towards the northern parts, such as Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, they have to take the route to Malanville through Gaya. While those who prefer bush paths, which normally have no prior arrangement with the Nigerian security agents, take their ways through Indali-Segbona in Benin Republic crossing lengthy and dangerous paths to Tsamia or Maje border points in Nigeria. The driver's fees is 20,000-50,000 Naira. But this is only applicable where the trader prepared to follow the official routes if they have already arranged, or are prepared to bribe the security officials at the border.

Cross-border trade in *tokunbo* vehicles is largely controlled by sophisticated and well-organized networks of big time business magnets in both Nigeria and Niger, with many small operators involved on the margins (the structure of this has been shown in section B). The trust and connections provided by these networks, often ethnic or religious in nature, facilitate market transactions spanning the continents and enable the provision of credit and transfer of funds (Golub, 2008:201). However contrary to Beuving (2006:325), that variety of trading networks linked by cultural and ethnic ties controlled the trade, as far as the Nigeria's North-West border is concern, it is the commercial ties that is the most significant. This is due to the fact that, the composition of the traders is homogeneous in which various groups from Nigeria, Benin and Niger republics are represented (Walther,2009).

The traders usually cross the border by land and use numerous and ever-changing tracks along the long border with Nigeria. Most of the *tokunbo* vehicle traders prefer to use illegal routes which mean evading the custom revenue or seizure in the case of banned vehicles older than ten years from the date of manufacturing. There is a well-established set of procedures for obtaining documents from customs authorizing the diversion of vehicles to Nigeria. The fees and taxes for obtaining the authorizations amount to about CFAF 400,000 per vehicle (Field Notes, July, 2012). The taxes and fees for customs clearance alone amount to about 30 percent of the value of the vehicle. It has been estimated that 98% and 97% of all

tokunbo vehicles re-exported from Togo and Benin respectively, use illegal routes to their destinations (Barkindo,2004:275). In 2002 out of the 243,273 *tokunbo* vehicles that were officially declared to have been re-exported out of Cotonou, 229,081 were stated to have entered Niger while 14,192 went to Nigeria. In fact, only 15,000 and 396 of those vehicles were officially recorded to have entered Niger and Nigeria respectively (LARES, 2002:45).

Once a vehicle reaches Nigeria border point many devices are used to take it across. One of the simplest is the use of false plate numbers on the vehicles to show that they were returning from trips to Benin or elsewhere. A particular amount of money is fixed to be paid to each category of enforcement agents depending on the nature of their duty. Arrangement and consultations has to be made by the major importers before a trip. As for the small importers they have two options; either engaged with the major importer for protection through road pass *kaida* or risk himself through evading the enforcement agents *Tarkake*. These concepts had been defined in some details under the second section of this paper.

However, the main problems are with the Federal Operation Units or roving enforcement units, who may intercepts the vehicle even after they might have succeeded in smuggling it through the international borders. Middle range smugglers may employ some of the tactics of those bigger brethren, or chance the many illegal routes, trusting their knowledge of same, as well as movement of the security personnel. Once the vehicle arrived safely in any of the northern states of the country it thus became an object of real business involving many hands with expected profit ranging from N50,000 to N300,000 depending on the brand and model of the vehicle (Data based on Various Interviews conducted by the author).

Conclusion

The paper discussed   *tokunbo* vehicles trade across the Nigeria's North-West international border. The border area is an important corridor for the flow of large volume of second-hand vehicles from Cotonou and Lome ports, being the most significant ports in West Africa that receive the largest number of second hand vehicles from overseas. The trade developed in response to economic crisis in Nigeria since 1980s. The increasing demand for the *tokunbo* vehicles in Nigeria, accompanied by the uncompetitive nature of the country's Ports, coupled with the deliberate role played by the transit countries bordering Nigeria in the North-West, explains to a greater extent, why this kind of trade, which is largely conducted at informal level, continued to boom in spite of the efforts of the Nigerian government in controlling it.

Deferential trade and taxation policies and practices are other reasons for *tokunbo* re-export to

Nigeria. From what has been discussed in the paper, given the trend and structure of *tokunbo* vehicles trade in the area, it demonstrates how economic interdependence works across the borders. What is even more important is for the countries concerned to make this border area a potential bridge for economic Development through economic integration so as to maximise the benefits accruing through this form of trade.

NOTES

1.   '*Tokunbo*' is a yoruba term, which means 'the used goods coming from overseas'. In this work the word *Tokunbo* is used to refer to 'second hand Vehicles imported from abroad'.

2. Automobile here is referred to Motor-vehicles primarily passenger cars and commercial vehicles. This usage is meant to exclude all other related products such as motor cycles, tractors and other forms of motorized transport. These can only be mentioned in passing where necessary.

3. *Kaida* means arrangement in form of negotiation with border officials of a given state. While *Tarkake* on the other hand means evasion of regulations by using indirect routes to transport goods across the border of a given state or country.

4. It takes more than 600 kilometers in the bush for one to travel from Cotonou to the Nigeria's North-west border outposts located in different border areas of the two countries.

5. Out of the six assembly Plants that were established in the 1970s only two of them were able to reach the production target by the year 1984, VWON produced 35,000 in 1980, PAN 59,490 vehicles in 1981.See Appendix 1.

6. Lebanese traders integrate crucial nodes of the Euro-West African commodity chain for quite a long time. With regard to second hand vehicles trade itself, the Lebanese are particularly active in the fields of transport, handling and money transfer. Initially large European shipping companies owned most of the vessels that brought the second hand cars to their West African destinations in the 1990s. This changed when the Lebanese businessman Abou Mehri, started sailing Reefer ships from Antewerp to the West African Coast in 1997. See, (Beuving, 2009:104)

7. Germany 65%, Austria 5%, France 5%, Belgium 6%, Switzerland 19%.

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APPENDIX I

Nigeria's Vehicle Imports, 1946-1972 (Units)

Year	Private Cars, Taxis and Multi-Purpose	Commercial Vehicles
1946	674	1204
1947	1740	1684
1948	1726	2048
1949	2142	2867
1950	2154	2973
1951	3311	2757
1952	3457	5392
1953	3338	4460
1954	3868	3766
1955	6680	5578
1956	7025	8082
1957	7654	4884
1958	8228	6857
1959	9973	6194
1960	14573	6394
1961	14373	8050
1962	11799	2985
1963	11534	4450
1964	14752	7567
1965	17736	6512
1966	17092	5512
1967	13412	6257
1968	4368	8094
1969	3538	10808
1970	7488	18914
1971	18297	21203
1972	35717	19238
Total	**246649**	**184684**

Source: (Federal Ministry of Transport, 1973:18).

Appendix II

Yearly production of Automobile Firms in Nigeria (Units)

Year	ANAMMCO (Enugu)	Leyland Nigeria Ltd. (Ibadan)	NTM, National Truck Manufacturers (Kano)	PAN Peugeot Assembly Nigeria (Kaduna)	Steyr Nigeria Ltd. (Bauchi)	VWoN (Lagos)
1975	-	-	-	2 529	-	8750
1976	-	-	-	15 321	-	15 750
1977	-	-	-	23 550	-	23 250
1978	-	-	-	24 783	-	23 750
1979	-	-	-	35 992	334	19 750
1980	-	3 072	2530	48 325	774	35 000
1981	4 352	7 280	3406	59 490	1315	23 494
1982	3 920	3 946	2302	56 000	906	15 612
1983	2 551	3 075	2727	37 000	573	13 446
1984	1 958	1 909	1566	44 323	501	17 580
1985	2 000	2 639	1300	35 992	925	20 829

Source: (Federal office of statistics, January, 1985:4).

Appendix III

Tokunbo **Car imports to Nigeria 1993-2004**

Years	Federal office of statistics	LARES 2002	National Automotive Council
1993	144,613	229,439	143,641
1994	216,618	138,427	83,560
1995	85,338	87,000	43,181
1996	10,077	33,207	8,414
1997	N/A	28,605	7,835
1998	N/A	N/A	8,164
1999	N/A	N/A	30,599
2000	N/A	83,424	72,135
2001	N/A	223,337	131,794
2002	N/A	N/A	84,178
2003	N/A	N/A	41,309
2004	N/A	N/A	43,983

(Barkindo, 2007:237).

'CROSS-BORDER AUTOMOBILE (*TOKUNBO)* TRADE IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF NORTH-WEST INTERNATIONAL BORDER, 1982-2012'
(PhD History, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria.)

SUMMARY

The main aim of the work is to study cross-border trade in second-hand vehicles across the Nigeria's North-West international border. The study will examine how cross-border automobile trade in the area became transformed consequent upon economic and political changes between the period 1982 and 2012. The work is structured under eight chapters, each dealing with a particular aspect in the development of second hand vehicles trade in Nigeria;

➢ **Chapter One:** provides the general introduction for the study viz; Statement of the research problem, Aim and objectives, Methods and techniques of Data collection, and Review of related literature.

➢ **Chapter Two:** Overviews the physical geography as well as economic activities in the study area. It discusses the impact of geographical proximity of border areas of the three countries as well as the historical ties and the bond of ethnic relations on the growth of the contemporary cross-border trading activities.

➢ **Chapter Three:** Deals with the origin, growth and collapse of the automobile industry in Nigeria. The chapter intends to show that, the escalating prices in automobile due to the recession in the industry, as shown by the data used in the work, forced the Nigerian public to re-direct their attention towards second hand vehicles (*tokunbo*), especially since 1980s.

➢ **Chapter Four:** Concern with the growth of *tokunbo* vehicles cross-border trade in Nigeria since 1980s. It looks at the determining factors responsible for the growth of *tokunbo* or second hand vehicles in to the country.

➢ **Chapter Five:** Examines Nigeria's Government attempt at controlling the importation of *Tokunbo* Vehicles into the country and why such measures failed to prevent the massive importation of these vehicles in to the country.

➢ **Chapter Six:** Looks at the nature of *tokunbo* Vehicles and spare parts Markets in the changing economic trends in North-Western Nigeria since 1999.

➢ **Chapter Seven:** Examine the role of Custom services in Revenue generation and Corruption in relation to T*okunbo* vehicles trade across the Nigeria's North-west international Borders.

➢ **Chapter Eight** concludes the work

Global/Local; Security/Border: Drug Trafficking, Security and the (re)Constitution of

Borders in West Africa

Adam Sandor

PhD Candidate (ABD)

School of Political Studies

University of Ottawa

First Draft/Work in Progress- Please do not cite. Comments are welcome

Abstract: This paper asks two questions: What is the relationship between global security interventions and bordering processes in Africa? And how can we theorize the diffusion of security practices related to borders on the continent? Control over territorial borders is conventionally understood as a governance benchmark: those states that can provide security at the border are commonly viewed as 'strong' while those that cannot/ do not are understood as on the brink of 'failure' or 'collapse'. Western policy-circles increasingly operate under the consensus that such 'weak states' in the Global South incubate transnational security threats. International organizations have paid considerable attention to West and North Africa with regard to this security problematique. While the veracity of the claim is far from definitive (see Hehir 2007; Piazza 2008), this security discourse has had two demonstrable effects for security politics in Africa: First, a global extension of innocuous practices of intervention via capacity-building programmes proffering security-related technical expertise meant to shore up African borders; and second, a political reorientation of local African populations and governments towards global actors in pursuit of global security rents and prestige (Bayart 2000; Jourde 2007; Fisher 2012). If this is the case, I argue that the diffusion of security practices on the continent must be theorized in spatial terms which are not premised on territorialized or container-like states. Instead, these developments highlight how security governance on the continent is performed at multiple sites of application which stretch beyond state borders. To move in this direction, the paper proposes an understanding of the diffusion of border-related security practices through the lens of multi-sited performative security assemblages. The paper demonstrates this theoretical position empirically through an analysis of struggles over global programmes implemented by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and sponsored by the European Union at Senegal's airports, seaports and border regions aimed at interdicting illicit drug flows and trafficking networks. Specifically, local customs, police officers and gendarmeries simultaneously cooperate and compete with international capacity-builders and programme coordinators, and amongst themselves, over which group is most appropriate for accomplishing the tasks associated with curbing illicit smuggling. Through these competitive struggles over who should be a border's guardian and how it should be guarded, we see how new security practices and understandings are devised, as well as how borders become (re)constituted.

It is commonly argued that trafficking illicit goods (narcotics in particular) constitutes a

form of aberrant mobility that threatens international stability (Naim 2005; Mandel 2011;

Williams 2002). An emerging consensus has formed among international policy-making

circles such that transnational security threats incubate in 'ungoverned spaces' of the

Global South. North and West Africa have drawn significant attention with regard to this

general security problematique. Indeed, since 2004, West Africa has become an important

1

transit point in the global cocaine trade. It is understood that West African governments, particularly those states that have recently come out of periods of sustained armed conflict, are unable to provide adequate security governance capacity at the level of regional borders which would facilitate an increase in illicit trafficking activities. Moreover, it is argued that such an inability to secure borders from such threats is an indication of state weakness, failure, and can lead to state collapse (Collier 2000, 2007; Rotberg 2004; UNODC 2008, 2010; World Bank 2011). The discourse over the political importance of 'ungoverned spaces' in Africa (notably the Sahel) has thus been transformed from a global position of irrelevance, to a critical focal point in global security politics (US Congress 2005; EU Parliament 2011; Algerian Press Service 2011; UNODC 2011). These transnational concerns have been translated into a complex array of global partnerships and initiatives aimed at reestablishing order over this putatively 'ungoverned space.'

If this is the case, then this paper asks two questions: What is the relationship between global security interventions and bordering processes in West Africa? And how can we theorize the diffusion of security practices related to borders on the continent? Drawing from border theorists such as Agnew, Balibar, Newman and Rumford, I posit that global initiatives that aim to shore up West African borders involve complex social contests which rearticulate practices of sovereignty away from traditional centres of governance like state capitals and the outside of the territorial limits of the region's states towards multiple, non-contiguous sites. This does not imply that state-building programmes implemented by international actors do not target the capitals of most post-colonial states before moving towards a given state's hinterland (Boas 2010). They indeed do. What is argued here is that borders in the sub-region have taken on a set of diffuse patterns that are scattered to those sites understood as politically significant in terms of the types of mobility that predominate there, and which are amenable to global forms of management and control. Empirically, this means that particular governance sites, like airports, seaports, and those corridors which bridge West African states to centres of power in the Global North become sites of global security intervention.

We need conceptual tools that would allow for an understanding of security and bordering which better captures the contours of these new spatial imaginaries. To do this,

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I employ the concept of performative security assemblages. These assemblages represent a space of political manoeuvring where multiple security actors cooperate and compete, and whose practices link the global and the local. Performative security assemblages are multi-sited institutional orders which connect governance practices across disparate political jurisdictions. These assemblages do not conform to the neat delineations of international borders. Instead, they display dynamic properties which are deterritorialized and transnational, but which are evinced in multiple *local* political environments.

The paper begins by outlining the nature of drug trafficking flows and general patterns of behaviour of drug trafficking organizations that operate in the West African sub-region. The paper then demonstrates the nature of global responses to such trafficking flows and the types of effects that these global discourses, policies and programmes have on borders in the sub-region. I then outline my understanding of performative security assemblages, and explain how such a concept can serve to illuminate our understanding of the diffusion of security practices on the continent. The paper then analyses the implementation and management of the EU/Canada-funded UNODC narcotics interdiction project 'AIRCOP' operating at the Leopold Sédar Senghor Airport. The AIRCOP project demonstrates the contested terrain on which security practices are understood and put into use, as well as the sociality inherent to a governance site of security bordering. Evidence for this research was gathered in a three-month period in the summer of 2012, involving an interpretive ethnographic methodology which included participant observation and semi-formal interviews. Over 40 semi-formal interviews were conducted with customs, police and other security officials, as well as with several narcotics traffickers (former and current) in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Senegal.

Drug Trafficking Operations in West Africa

Any analysis of illicit economic activity and the social networks that participate therein inherently involves a theorization on borders. I take here a necessary analytical detour to examine flows of trafficking activities in order to become better acquainted with bordering processes. Trafficking activities involve contravening state structures, its claims over political authority, and its borders. For most West African traffickers, participation in illicit economic activities is not understood as resistance to state power or

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its form of political organization. Trafficking in goods (both licit and illicit) is an historical practice entrenched in the social systems of most populations attempting to circumvent what is seen as intrusive intervention by ruling classes and governments the world over (Scott 1998; 2009). It is also a mechanism through which power relations are inscribed on political subjects. Discourses over licit/illicit economic practices provide a degree of legibility and common understanding between state and non-state actors in a political context of economic austerity (Roitman 2005). By examining the interplay between traffickers and state agents, analysts can attain a more nuanced understanding of the sociality of borders and bordering in places like West Africa.

Coming to analyze and decipher patterns and trends of how drugs are trafficked in and through West Africa is in many ways a futile task for analysts and policymakers alike. Analysis of illicit economic activities relies heavily on data that is inherently partial, and which reflects the normative agendas of governments and the international community of states. Some regions draw significantly more attention and concern within the society of states with regard to illicit cross-border economic activities than others, which results in an increase in international cooperation, logistical support and training, as well as police intelligence-sharing provided to some governments over others. This has notably been the case in West Africa with regard to drug trafficking, where the police services of Ghana (the Narcotics Control Board- NACOB), Senegal (L'Office Centrale de Repression des Trafics Illicites des Stupéfiants- OCRTIS) and Nigeria (the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency- NDLEA) have received a lion's share of international resources aimed at facilitating narcotics interdiction. These states will have an advantage in pursuing investigations into narcotics trafficking over those states that have not been deemed to be 'as important' in drug trafficking.

Traffickers have fostered unique forms of local knowledge within their communities, and are practiced in sophisticated means of avoiding and or duping state controls in order to move goods across borders. When traffickers are caught by state security services they take note of the latter's security practices and controls, and modulate how smuggled goods are moved in subsequent trafficking runs. The practices of traffickers evolve, making an analysis of information given by official sources less than completely accurate. A senior Customs official from Burkina Faso likened this

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adaptability to state controls to attempts to chase and catch a flock of pigeons: once the flock is agitated, it becomes nearly impossible to chart the various itineraries of individual members taking flight (interview, Ouagadougou, July 10, 2012). This does not imply that trafficking operations are completely random, but that once interdiction efforts are employed traffickers will scatter and search for the next most convenient set of opportunities to complete their project. UNODC accurately reports that "professional drug traffickers avoid interception by continually shifting operations away from routes known to law enforcement" (UNODC 2007). Thus, seeking to interdict and minimize flows of trafficked goods requires a nuanced analysis of a complicated *pas de deux* between state and non-state actors, as well as a detailed knowledge of those structures of opportunity that either enable or constrain trafficking and interdiction.

Coming to an understanding of the social contours of drug trafficking in West Africa can be accomplished by examining broad structural changes in the global political economy. This would mean identifying emerging market opportunities, as well as market constraints. Since 2004, West Africa has become an alluring transit point for traffickers' efforts to introduce their product into lucrative west European markets. The US Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has assessed that approximately one-third of all cocaine destined for European markets transited through West Africa (US Department of State 2012). The UNODC reports that one possible reason for a shift in demand for cocaine from North America to Europe is a declining rate of cocaine usage among North American narcotics users (UNODC 2012). The decline of the American Dollar after 2003 compared to the high value of the Euro is commonly understood to have also influenced market preferences for cocaine traffickers to begin shifting operations towards Western Europe. It is also plausible to suggest that due to recent global financial crises that severely impacted economies in the United States and many Western European states (notably the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain- three countries with some of the highest cocaine prevalence rates in the European Union), that traffickers have targeted emerging markets in Eastern and Southeastern Europe where individuals may have relatively more disposable income than in previously-favoured markets. In recent years seizures in Eastern Europe have tripled

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(UNODC 2012). Such a market shift would alter trafficking itineraries, placing more importance towards some smuggling routes across West African territories over others.

Flows of narcotics through West Africa are also modulated by potential opportunities for profit in emerging economies in middle-income developing countries. China, South Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States present lucrative trafficking projects to West African traffickers, especially the well-entrenched Nigerian drug smuggling groups. Nigerian drug traffickers have extensive international networks and are known to have been integral in trafficking heroin, cocaine, and most recently methamphetamines in Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, the United States, South Africa, Korea and China (UNODC 2012; Ellis 2009). Nigerian law enforcement officers have recently become aware of recent shifts for Nigerian trafficking groups to modify their involvement in drug flows and utilize international networks in the production of narcotics, as opposed to simply trafficking. Since 2008, the NDLEA has have arrested several suspects and seized large quantities of methamphetamines (ATS) produced in rudimentary laboratories in southern Nigeria. Those arrested with Nigerian citizens include South American tourists- most often from Bolivia- who allegedly provide ATS production training in scattered sites across Lagos (Presentation by Senior NDLEA Official, 27 June 2012, Accra, Ghana). Recent arrests made in Nigerian airports for ATS traffickers demonstrate how emerging economies tend to be growing markets for the trafficking of such synthetics, while prevalence of ATS use in economically developed countries like the US and the UK is slowly declining (UNODC 2012; Jeune Afrique 2012; The Daily Trust 2012).

UNODC expert, Antonio Mazzitelli, has cogently explained some of the most important characteristics of groups engaged in transnational organized crime, which is of particular relevance when analyzing drug trafficking practices through West Africa: "Organized criminal groups operate according to strict rational principles aimed at minimizing risk and maximizing profit" (Mazzitelli 2007). For the purposes of this paper, that premise could be specified even further: transnational narcotics traffickers minimize the risk of the loss of their product. Minimizing the risk of loss of product entails developing logistical skills that involve knowing the appropriate level of avoidance/engagement of mobility constraints and potentialities. In particular, this would

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mean in practice avoiding forces (state or otherwise) that could threaten to interdict the movement of narcotics in their possession.

Minimizing risk in criminal endeavours involves several general practices. Traffickers tend to use routes that are well known locally, but not necessarily by customs agents, police and gendarmes who do generally not originate from those local communities. These routes involve the use of terrains that are easily exploitable and amenable to flight should traffickers come into contact with state officials (See Scott 2009). A Senior Police Officer from Sierra Leone informed this author that the majority of cannabis trafficking that occurs in his state was accomplished by Sierra Leonean locals bringing their product to markets in Guinea via mountainous and forested trails known to local communities- not along roads and highways that are patrolled by police officers (Discussion, Accra, June 27, 2012). The high sea and West Africa's many deltas and inlets are also terrains of choice for both licit and illicit trafficking. Local populations along the Sine Saloum Delta in Senegal make use of the Delta's mangroves to hide from Senegalese Customs patrols. Two traffickers explained how from a very young age, boys from local villages will accompany fishermen crews on local pirogues, and will be shown which recesses in the mangroves would allow for quick evasion of state officials on trafficking runs to Gambia (with a travel distance of one day at sea) to sell or exchange salt for sugar (making use of the Gambian state subsidy on sugar). Guinea-Bissau (where these traffickers would pick up cocaine) is only two-day sea voyage from the Delta, while the resort towns of Saly and Mbour (where they would drop off the product for local consumption and further transit towards the European market) only one and a half hours to the North (Interview, Ndangane, 8 September, 2012). Traffickers minimize operational risks by making effective use of local knowledge in environments that limit their contact with state officials.

Even the structure of drug trafficking networks are premised on logistical adaptabilities to state control and the operational requirement of minimizing risks of loss of product. These are not centralized organizations that endure over time, but small cells with members holding convergent interests that are adept at individually accomplishing small tasks that combine in the management of a larger trafficking project (Mazzitelli 2007; Ellis 2009; Ellis 2012). Networks are most often impromptu, are based on common

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town/ village/ neighbourhood origin, and on the ability to forge connections with individuals in markets providing both the supply and demand for narcotics. A former trafficker responsible for importing some of the first cocaine and heroin shipments into Accra from Nigeria explained the system of networks very casually: "We have Ghanaian cousins in Lagos. Nigerian traffickers have cousins in Accra. We talk together and make plans. We would then drive through Togo and Benin, pick up the drugs from our friends and drive back- often at night, get back to Accra and start selling the drugs here with whatever people we know are willing at that moment and that we trust" (Interview, Accra, 26 June, 2012).

The structure of African criminal networks involved in drug trafficking is small in scale, informal, adaptable and ad hoc. These characteristics are informed by historical patterns of informal trade and of general avoidance when possible of centres of state power typical of local responses to governance in the sub-region (Herbst 2000). However, traffickers realize that there is always a risk of encountering state security officials. Many narcotics traffickers require using areas where governmental authority is present, capable and provides the necessary stability and accessibility to move their product across territorial borders. As a result, most traffickers plan for this eventuality and actively assess how to adapt to state controls, and when possible to use law enforcement mechanisms to their advantage.

Responses to Drug Trafficking and Borders in West Africa

Responses to drug trafficking by both local security agents and global security experts from international institutions and states in the Global North demonstrate some key features about the contemporary nature of borders; namely how borders have proliferated, are polysemic in nature, and involve a sociality in terms of their (re)production. Following Balibar, we might argue that "borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled… the quantitative relation between 'border' and 'territory' is being inverted" (1998: 220; 2002). In less elegant terms: some borders matter; but some matter more. While political and economic borders between member-states of the European Union have diminished for citizens of these states, the difficulties that non-EU citizens encounter attempting to enter the Union have increased dramatically, as well as penalties associated with contravening

those borders (Bigo and Guild 2005). While the internal space of the EU, as well as its foreign policy influence in global affairs, has been associated with peace, human rights and the liberal political principle of freedom of movement, other regions outside of the Union have been ascribed identity markers associated with risk, insecurity and danger (EU Commission 2003). Dominant security understandings that are propagated by international institutions and Western states with regard to West Africa's 'weak' or 'failed' states is but one significant instance highlighting the polysemic nature of borders. International actors view the sub-region as a potential source of insecurity contagion. Border security, understood as a governance benchmark for effective sovereign states, is understood as all but non-existent in West Africa (Interview with Senior French Security Official, Ouagadougou, July 23, 2012). The inability of the sub-region's governments to control movement in and across its borders reinforces a view in Western policy-making circles of underdevelopment and poverty as a significant facilitating condition to the emergence of political instability, refugee flows, and humanitarian disaster, which subsequently become inscribed upon populations from the region (Abrahamsen 2005; Duffield 2001; Keen 2006).

One of the most influential treatments on the phenomenon of failed and failing states expresses how deficiencies in the performance of a state's ability to control its borders and its provision of security as a public good due to "high levels of internal violence are associated directly with failure and the propensity to fail" (Rotberg 2004). In such situations, the author continues, avarice propels antagonism, greed magnifies individual desires to loot resource wealth, criminal gangs take over the streets, trafficking in drugs and arms becomes common, and "smuggling soars" (ibid.). Similarly, Krasner and Pascual argue that "when chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish" (2005). US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates in 2010 perhaps most definitively shows the force of this security thinking when stating that the threat of failing states is the principal threat of our time (Gates 2010). Taken together, such closely related policy and research positions suggest that a lack of effective governance over a sovereign territory breeds criminal behaviour perpetrated by rebels, bandits and criminals seeking to enrich themselves through

fostering a political environment of instability, exacerbating violent conflict both regionally and transnationally.

Of course, more nuanced research on alternate forms of political organization in places where state governments have not consolidated territorial control recognizes that security policies inflected by research on the 'failed,' 'failing,' or 'fragile' states reveal a Western-centric bias rooted in modernization accounts of state development, Westphalian 'container-like' territorial borders, liberal democracy and market economies (Boas and Jennings 2007; Risse 2011). In reality, fleshing out the contours of bordering involves a host of both global and local forces that together come to delineate how borders function in any given political field. The case of the Malian borderland is instructive in this regard. Husken and Klute have aptly demonstrate how "para-state" forces in borderland regions have incorporated themselves in regimes of local governance, ruling if not on behalf of the state, but surely in tandem with it. In terms of state presence, until the recent retreat of the Malian military in April 2012 from the northern part of the country, it would make very little sense to argue that the Malian state, or its Algerian neighbour, were 'weak', 'absent' or 'failed'. Border security in these states was a principal objective of both the United States' Pan-Sahel, and Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (Lecocq and Schijver 2007; Bachmann 2010). Nevertheless, amidst state presence since the late 1960s, the types of illicit economic activities associated with such borderland regions, of which the Sahel holds a distinct notoriety, continue in earnest, and generally with full knowledge of central state and para-state officials alike (Husken and Klute 2010; Interview with Senior French Security Official, Ouagadougou, July 20, 2012). What the Malian case does demonstrate is that state officials and other non-state forces compete on a contested terrain of governance, where spoils of authority constitute its coveted prize. As is argued by Rumford, borders cannot be the sole preserve of the state, as societal actors engage in the redefinition of borders "or appropriate them for purposes other than those originally intended" (Rumford 2006: 159).

Nevertheless, this security problematique has demonstrable effects on international security policy with regard to West Africa. It serves as a presupposed set of assessments about spaces beyond the putative safety and stability of the Global North and a distancing function which relegates places like West Africa as a borderland in and of

itself, not simply a region with state borders. Populations from West Africa are viewed as 'on the cusp' of other territories of political stability- whether they arrive from Kidal or Bamako matters little to a French Customs official or Gendarme. As a result, global security initiatives aimed at limiting the mobilities associated with political instability become concentrated on those spaces viewed as functional mobility bottlenecks. Visa regimes, passenger-name registration, the introduction of biometric machinery at West African airports, and the development of transnational crime units stationed there and at the subregion's more popular seaports become those mechanisms employed to shore up the sub-region's borders and to curtail its illicit mobilities. While sealing off territorial jurisdictions is increasingly viewed as a practical impossibility, global security experts have tactically reinforced sites scattered across the sub-region which could be used as conduits to target markets in the Global North.

In order to better demonstrate how borders and the security practices and discourses which surround them become constituted, I next develop the concept of performative security assemblages.

Performative Security Assemblages

Since the 1970s, contemporary global security arrangements have taken on significant transformations which reflect an increased speed and reach (if not scale) of mobility. As critics of 'globalization' have correctly noted, not only have such types of mobility have always existed, but the non/reach of such flows and the historicity of their interconnections are rarely examined (Cooper 2001; Germain 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996). What is politically salient in regard to the intensification of capital, social, economic and political processes is the way in which the importance of certain state and non-state actors and objects are reconfigured and repositioned as a constitutive result of their relationships to various forms of global mobility. For example, Saskia Sassen effectively demonstrates how liberal democratic states are undergoing a partial disassembly of the state's public functions to private actors and forces, and subsequent reassembly of state structures in order to better facilitate entry into global economic systems (2006: 21-22). In lieu of these transformations, Central Banks, Departments of Finance and Trade, and state Executives have been repositioned as central arbiters in relation to capital flows both within and between states.

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Similar dynamics are increasingly evident with regard to the security concerns of national and international actors regarding potential threats to the functioning of international economic interactions. This is particularly the case with regards to distinctions made between external and internal security. Traditional security roles and concerns, the military and secret services with protecting the territorial integrity of the state from external threats while national police forces maintain public order and social civility within, while once differentiated at the border, have and continue to merge in reaction to the increased mobility of goods, individuals and their associated ideas and beliefs. In this context of transversality and the inability to bar foreign elements from the national space, security agents conduct their affairs on the assumption that security can only be achieved when acted upon at the level of the population. Stated otherwise, security is sought in connection to knowledge of population groups, their movement, their ideologies and their intentions in order to better induce mechanisms of social control. According to this logic, threatening individuals and groups can be located anywhere, thus requiring the targeted use of devices and means of surveillance, detection and information gathering. National police forces collaborate with multiple foreign partners, identifying geographical areas of concern (for example borderlands and areas of opacity) and groups and individuals 'of interest' (Bigo 2000; 2001; Lutterbeck 2006). The argument is made that threats no longer enter the national space via tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, but by trucks, barges, bellies and backpacks. Those agencies with methods and self-understandings which seem most appropriate in managing these non-traditional security threats acquire additional political clout and symbolic power in matters of security. This added clout becomes translated into material substance: increased budgets, operational equipment, and media attention. In West Africa, Customs agencies, National Gendarmeries and specialized police units (like national drug police) have come to occupy central positions of prestige and power, linked to global actors and interlocutors responsible for interdicting illicit forms of transnational mobility, especially customs training officials, and police liaisons (Lutterbeck 2004; Chalfin 2010a; 2010b).

As a response to transnational criminal activities, such international police cooperation occurs in multiple spaces, at times simultaneously, and involves the participation of several security agents representing perhaps the same general security

problematique, but which focus on particular roles, responsibilities and commitments depending on the locus and scope of their original base of operations. Increasingly, the activities of these agents cross through the international, national, and sub-national levels, an empirical reality which can tend to confound social science research. Also, the participation of these security agents are often impromptu, informal and based on the functional requirements of specific operations which would attempt to match the network-like, project-based activities of transnational criminal groups, by-passing state structures, rendering an analysis of such practices even more complex (Gerspacher and Dupont 2007: 357).

Such forms of cooperation involve more than the institutional development of international forums, organizations and tools which facilitate cooperative mechanisms and information-sharing between national states in such security efforts, or a set of functional responses to counter transnational criminal activities organized around networked forms of social organization. Attempts at controlling or managing forms of illicit mobility involve several temporal and spatial scales, and shifting scopes of activity across them, which together form the basis of understandings and practices of security and borders.[1] Thinking in terms of Assemblages, used here as a heuristic device, provides us with a novel conceptualization of the types of shifting geographies of power and agency involved in contemporary globalizing security transformations. In the same way that global economic forces are reorienting market actors and practices which enables certain sectors of national governments in terms of the exercise of power and policy manoeuvrability, security agents are also reoriented, and the exercise of power amongst those agents redistributed across national spaces, but also beyond at the global and local levels. Performative security assemblages are multi-sited institutional orders which link the governance spaces and practices of both governmental and non-governmental agents and agencies across disparate political jurisdictions. In their analysis of the rise of global security privatization, Abrahamsen and Williams explain how such security assemblages consist of "complex hybrid structures that inhabit national settings but are stretched

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1 For example, information-sharing for drug interdiction operations is often dependent on political realities, degrees of priority given to particular operations, and competing or divergent rhythms of responses. These rhythms are modulated by those professional and institutional networks that connect security agents across disparate spaces.

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across national boundaries in terms of actors, knowledges, technologies, norms and values" (2011: 95). In other words, such assemblages are constitutive of spaces which balk at neat sovereign delineations. As a conceptual apparatus, these assemblages account for how security discourses and practices play out in specific locales at both the global and local levels.

Analyzing the reconfiguration of relationships of power occurring at multiple scales which constitute global assemblages contributes to our understanding of the performativity and sociality of borders. Such security assemblages operate as fields of security where dominant understandings of the roles of security actors depend on the outcomes of struggles that they engage in by acquiring forms of symbolic capital and the legitimation of their authority in any given security domain (see Bourdieu 1977; 1991). While conceptions of security and the putative protection which ought to be derived from the inviolability of borders has historically been infused by discursive and symbolic practices at the national level and at the level of a system of states, how borders become protective in practice are the results of complex contests over how the border should operate. This often leads to novel practices which may alter any given border's security dynamic. At the local level, many security practices, for example with regard to interdiction efforts, may reflect the fluidities of local policies and security practices within the jurisdictional domains of national states while also encompassing security techniques developed in global centres of political and economic capital. Thus, performative security assemblages are generative: competition for authority often results in new hybrid practices, structures, and understandings of appropriate security governance. Moreover, these assemblages may crystallize around particular poles of security authority, privileging some understandings and practices of security over others. These security assemblages have demonstrable effects on the politics of border security and capture the new geographies of global security governance.

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ZAKI MOUSSA Halima,

zaki.halima@yahoo.fr

Université Le Havre (France) / Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar(Sénégal)

Citoyenneté et libre circulation des personnes : de quelques anachronismes du Protocole CEDEAO portant code de citoyenneté communautaire

Résumé :

« Dans un monde qui privilégie la globalisation, ceux qui sont confinés au local sont sanctionnés »[1].

L'intégration au sein d'organisations supranationales apparaît dès lors comme la seule voie de développement possible. Cette voie a été adoptée par la plupart des pays à travers le monde et particulièrement en Afrique avec, à côté d'une Organisation à vocation continentale (l'Union Africaine), des CER[2] à l'instar de la Communauté Economique des Etats De l'Afrique de l'Ouest[3].

Ces CER, et la CEDEAO en particulier, visent à terme le développement économique de leurs Etats membres ; afin de réaliser cet objectif, il a été notamment institué, à l'image de ce qui se fait en Europe, une citoyenneté communautaire. L'un des avantages de celle-ci est la liberté de circulation : cette liberté permet à son bénéficiaire de se déplacer librement à travers le territoire communautaire, de s'installer dans l'Etat membre de son choix afin d'y exercer ou non une activité professionnelle et de jouir de conditions de vie quasi similaires à celles des nationaux de cet Etat. C'est donc dire toute l'importance que revêt une telle liberté.

Citoyenneté et libre circulation des personnes ont de ce fait un lien étroit, l'une dépendant de l'autre.

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[1] Bauman Zygmunt, *Le coût humain de la mondialisation*, Hachette, 1999
[2] Communautés Economiques Régionales
[3] CEDEAO

Il faudrait néanmoins préciser que même si la citoyenneté communautaire est un concept partagé par de nombreuses Organisations d'intégration à travers le monde, il n'en demeure pas moins que cette notion renferme, en fonction des Organisations, différentes acceptions.

A ce titre, il ressort des dispositions du Protocole CEDEAO portant citoyenneté de la Communauté que le concept de citoyenneté CEDEAO est quelque peu inadapté au contexte mondial et communautaire marqués par une ouverture des espaces sous régionaux, régionaux et continentaux. Cette inadaptation est due au caractère exclusif dudit concept, qui n'est pas sans avoir de négatives répercussions sur le bénéfice de la libre circulation.

Le caractère exclusif de la citoyenneté CEDEAO se dépeint à travers les conditions d'acquisition et de perte de celle-ci. Quant à son impact sur la libre circulation, il est dû à la fragilité du lien entre le citoyen et la Communauté, ce qui favorise une remise en cause perpétuelle du bénéfice de la liberté de circulation dont le champ ratione personae est par ailleurs restreint.

« Le problème de la libre circulation des personnes […] constitue l'un des principaux défis auxquels l'Afrique est confrontée dans sa quête de l'intégration totale »[4].

Ce constat traduit, si besoin en est, l'importance que revêt la libre circulation des personnes dans la réussite de tout phénomène d'intégration. Cette importance a été prise en compte au sein des différents espaces d'intégration. Egalement qualifiée de « liberté d'aller et venir », la libre circulation des personnes est d'abord et avant tout une liberté consacrée, garantie et protégée par le droit international, notamment à travers la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme de 1948 et le Pacte des Nations Unies relatifs aux droits civils et politiques de 1966 qui énonce que «Quiconque se trouve légalement sur le territoire d'un Etat a le droit d'y circuler librement et d'y choisir librement sa résidence » et «Toute personne est libre de quitter n'importe quel pays, y compris le sien » (article 12).

Liberté fondamentale, la liberté « d'aller et de venir » s'est imposée progressivement au sein des Etats, des espaces sous régionaux et régionaux à travers le monde. Car intégration et libre circulation vont de paire : l'on ne saurait en effet promouvoir une intégration des différents Etats composant l'espace régional (ou sous régional) sans accorder aux ressortissants de ces Etats une liberté de circuler librement dans le territoire ''commun''.

Ramenée à ce contexte, la libre circulation des personnes acquiert une acception plus large et plus complète. Elle s'entend en effet, non seulement de la faculté de se déplacer librement d'un pays de l'espace d'intégration à l'autre, mais aussi du droit d'y résider et de jouir de conditions de vie et de travail (ou d'études) quasi[5] similaires à celles des nationaux.

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[4]Rapport du département des affaires économiques de la Commission de l'Union africaine, Libre circulation des personnes, des biens, des services et des capitaux, avril 2008, p. 2

[5] Il existe en effet des exceptions et limites à cette égalité de traitement avec le national

De fait, dans les différents espaces ayant pour but de créer et favoriser une intégration économique et/ou des peuples, la liberté d'aller et de venir demeure un principe sacrosaint.

L'implantation de cette liberté au sein des espaces d'intégration ne s'est cependant pas faite sans un certain aménagement en fonction de l'espace d'intégration concerné. Ces aménagements tiennent compte de deux impératifs majeurs : assurer une mobilité étendue aux bénéficiaires légitimes de cette liberté tout en limitant l'accès des tiers ou non bénéficiaires à l'espace intégré. Ce deuxième impératif traduit la velléité d'éviter que le territoire commun ne soit accessible à certaines catégories n'ayant a priori aucun lien avec l'espace commun et que l'on entend de ce fait soumettre à un contrôle, préalablement à leur entrée sur le territoire intégré. Ces aménagements sont de divers ordres en fonction de l'espace d'intégration concerné.

C'est ainsi qu'en droit CEDEAO, cette liberté n'est reconnue qu'aux seuls « citoyens de la Communauté ».

Le concept de citoyenneté peut être défini comme étant le lien juridique et politique, défini par la loi d'un Etat, et qui unit l'individu audit Etat[6]. Il traduit donc le rattachement de l'individu à un Etat déterminé. Ramenée au plan communautaire, la citoyenneté s'entend de ce même lien, mais défini par la législation communautaire et qui traduit le rattachement d'un individu à une Organisation communautaire donnée. A ce titre, la citoyenneté communautaire se superpose à celle nationale qu'elle n'a nullement pour objet de remplacer.

L'octroi de la libre circulation des personnes (à travers le territoire communautaire) aux seuls citoyens communautaires traduit le lien de connexité qui existe entre ces deux concepts, l'un étant tributaire de l'autre.

Une étude portant sur la citoyenneté communautaire CEDEAO et la libre circulation des personnes revêt un grand intérêt dans un contexte mondial marqué par la globalisation, mais aussi à l'heure où l'accent est mis par la CEDEAO sur la nécessité d'une intégration non plus des Etats, comme cela a toujours été le cas, mais des peuples (ce qui participe de la

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[6] Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique, PUF, avril 2007

« Vision 2020 » de la CEDEAO) afin de créer un lien plus étroit entre ceux-ci et la Communauté. Il apparaît donc primordial d'assurer la pérennisation de contacts entre populations des Etats membres, ce qui passe nécessairement par une large garantie de la liberté de circulation des personnes. Etant la condition sine qua non pour bénéficier de cette liberté, la citoyenneté communautaire doit donc, à travers son champ ratione personae, assurer une large prise en compte des individus.

La citoyenneté CEDEAO s'adapte-elle à ce contexte ? Rien n'est moins sûr au regard des dispositions du Protocole CEDEAO A/P3/5/82 portant Code de citoyenneté communautaire. L'étude de ce Protocole démontre en effet que la notion de citoyenneté communautaire, vue sous l'angle de la CEDEAO, est quelque peu inadaptée au contexte mondial caractérisé par des phénomènes de globalisation tant à l'échelle sous régionale et régionale, qu'à l'échelle continentale et mondiale. Cette notion apparaît également inadaptée à l'impératif d'une large garantie de la liberté de circulation aux personnes ayant un lien avec la Communauté.

Par ailleurs, le concept de citoyenneté CEDEAO implique un lien fragile avec l'espace d'intégration, ce lien pouvant être perpétuellement remis en cause à la suite d'évènements qui peuvent sembler anodins tel le fait de s'établir dans certains Etats non membres de la Communauté[7].

Cette inadaptation de la citoyenneté communautaire CEDEAO appelle fortement une évolution du concept.

De ce fait, nous nous attèlerons dans le cadre de cette étude à démontrer l'inadaptation du concept de citoyenneté communautaire CEDEAO, inadaptation due à son caractère exclusif (I) qui a de négatifs impacts sur la libre circulation des personnes (II).

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[7] Cet aspect sera étudié dans la partie consacrée aux cas de perte de la citoyenneté communautaire

La citoyenneté communautaire CEDEAO: une notion inadaptée

Le caractère exclusif de la notion de citoyenneté CEDEAO (I) ainsi que sa répercussion négative sur la libre circulation des personnes (II) font que ce concept est inadapté tant au contexte mondial qu'aux contextes communautaires caractérisés par l'ouverture des espaces d'intégration et une forte propension au rapprochement entre populations des territoires intégrés**,** offrant à celles-ci la garantie de droits effectifs et pérennes**,** ce qui sauvegarde des conditions de vie normales au citoyen de l'espace d'intégration.

I)   Le caractère exclusif de la notion de citoyenneté communautaire

Le législateur CEDEAO a opté pour une citoyenneté communautaire exclusive, en ce sens qu'il ne tolère pas l'adjonction de deux statuts. En faisant de la nationalité d'un Etat membre une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante à l'acquisition de la citoyenneté communautaire et en y adjoignant (notamment) la non jouissance de la nationalité d'un Etat non membre de la Communauté, le législateur exclut ainsi, non seulement les ressortissants d'Etats tiers ayant gardé une allégeance avec leur Etat d'origine, mais aussi les ressortissants d'Etats membres ayant un lien d'allégeance avec un Etat tiers à la Communauté ou ayant un lien avec le territoire de cet Etat, notamment en termes de résidence.

Cette exclusion se reflète aussi bien dans les conditions que le législateur pose quant à l'acquisition de la citoyenneté communautaire (A), que dans les cas de perte de cette citoyenneté (B).

A) Une exclusion à travers les conditions d'acquisition de la citoyenneté communautaire

Le Protocole CEDEAO portant Code de citoyenneté de la Communauté se distingue à travers la manière particulière dont il définit le citoyen communautaire. En effet, contrairement aux dispositions juridiques édictées par d'autres espaces d'intégration, notamment l'Union européenne, qui n'exigent comme condition de jouissance de cette

qualité que la possession de la nationalité d'un Etat membre, la CEDEAO y adjoint une condition cumulative qui est la non jouissance, concomitamment, de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers.

L'article 1er du Protocole A/P3/5/82 définit le citoyen communautaire comme « toute personne ayant la nationalité d'un Etat membre de la Communauté[8] », et ce quel qu'en soit le mode d'acquisition : par filiation (biologique et adoptive) ou par naturalisation.

Dans le cadre de la filiation biologique, le Protocole fait la distinction entre l'enfant dont les parents sont tous deux nationaux d'un Etat membre de la Communauté, et celui dont seul l'un des parents a cette qualité[9]. Un effet de droit y est rattaché: s'agissant du premier cas, la citoyenneté communautaire est acquise d'office tandis que dans le second, des conditions supplémentaires sont posées par le législateur préalablement à son acquisition définitive[10].

La filiation adoptive est également prise en compte par le législateur : pourra prétendre à la citoyenneté communautaire[11] tout enfant adopté par un citoyen de la Communauté. Toutefois, des conditions supplémentaires sont requises dans le cas d'adoption faite par un naturalisé.

Enfin, peut également prétendre à la citoyenneté communautaire tout individu naturalisé ayant la nationalité d'un Etat membre. Pour ce faire, celui-ci doit justifier d'une résidence permanente et effective pendant une période de 15 ans[12] sur le territoire d'un Etat membre et effectuer une demande formelle de citoyenneté communautaire, qui lui sera accordée à condition que cela ne porte pas atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux d'un ou de plusieurs Etats membres.

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[8] Sont membres de la CEDEAO : le Bénin, le Burkina Faso, le Cap-Vert, la Côte d'Ivoire, la Gambie, le Ghana, la Guinée, la Guinée-Bissau, le Libéria, le Mali, la Mauritanie, le Niger, le Nigéria, le Sénégal, la Sierra Leone et le Togo

[9] Concernant cette dernière catégorie, l'article 1-1 point b dispose qu' « [est citoyen de la Communauté] toute personne qui a la nationalité d'un Etat membre par le lieu de naissance et dont l'un ou l'autre des parents est citoyen de la Communauté […] »

[10] Ces conditions seront étudiées dans notre deuxième point

[11] Sous réserve des conditions qui seront étudiées dans notre deuxième point

[12] Pouvant être réduite dans certains cas

Le naturalisé pourra transmettre sa citoyenneté communautaire par filiation, sous réserve, en ce qui concerne la filiation adoptive, de la justification d'une résidence permanente et continue de 15 ans dans le même Etat membre.

La jouissance de la nationalité d'un Etat membre de la CEDEAO n'est cependant pas l'unique condition à l'octroi de la citoyenneté communautaire. En effet, et chose innovante par rapport au droit de l'Union européenne, le candidat à ladite citoyenneté ne doit pas jouir parallèlement de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers à la CEDEAO.

C'est ce qui ressort de l'article 1er du Protocole A/P3/5/82, fixant les conditions d'acquisition de la citoyenneté CEDEAO. Cet article énonce en effet, s'agissant notamment de la jouissance par filiation de la nationalité d'un Etat membre, qu'est citoyen de la Communauté « toute personne qui, par la descendance a la nationalité d'un Etat membre et qui ne jouit pas de la nationalité d'un Etat non membre de la Communauté »[13]. Quant aux autres catégories (celles ayant acquis la nationalité d'un Etat membre par adoption, par naturalisation ou par filiation et dont seul l'un des parents a la nationalité d'un Etat membre), il leur est imposé la renonciation à la nationalité de tout Etat tiers à la Communauté dont ils pourraient jouir. La renonciation doit être expresse : s'agissant du naturalisé, il lui est même exigé une renonciation par acte authentifié par l'autorité compétente de son ou ses Etats d'origine.

Le choix ne peut être opéré que par une personne majeure. Pour les mineurs nés d'un parent citoyen communautaire ou adoptés par un citoyen communautaire, la règle est qu'ils bénéficient de cette citoyenneté jusqu'à ce qu'ils soient, juridiquement, en mesure d'opérer un choix (conserver ou renoncer à la nationalité de l'Etat tiers à la Communauté).

Quant aux enfants adoptés par un ''naturalisé-citoyen communautaire'', l'obligation de résidence effective pendant 15 ans dans le même Etat membre laisse transparaître que la règle est l'absence de tout bénéfice de plein droit de la citoyenneté communautaire.

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[13] Ce cas s'entend donc en principe de celui de l'acquisition par filiation de la nationalité d'un Etat membre, étant entendu que les parents ont tous deux la nationalité d'un Etat de la CEDEAO

S'agissant des enfants nés d'un ''naturalisé-citoyen communautaire'', la règle paraît plus complexe : l'absence d'une exigence de résidence effective dans l'Etat membre laisse présumer que le principe est le bénéfice de la citoyenneté communautaire ; cependant, l'exigence d'une renonciation à la nationalité de tout Etat tiers que l'enfant pourrait posséder et ce, avant la majorité, fait craindre que la règle présumée ne soit plutôt une exception : le bénéfice de la citoyenneté communautaire serait de ce fait suspendue jusqu'à ladite renonciation avant la majorité du concerné[14]. Cet état des choses suscite une autre question : à considérer que la ''majorité communautaire'' soit fixée à 21 ans comme le laisse présumer l'article 1-c point ii (qui parle de « maturité »), on ne peut concevoir un choix valable de l'enfant concerné avant cette majorité comme l'exige l'alinéa 2 de l'article 1-f (« L'enfant doit avant d'atteindre l'âge de 21 ans renoncer expressément à la nationalité de tout Etat non membre de la Communauté qu'il pourrait posséder ») ; ce choix ne peut donc être opéré que par son représentant.

L'exclusion des ressortissants d'Etats tiers à la Communauté et des ressortissants d'Etats membres ayant notamment des liens d'allégeance avec un Etat non membre se manifeste également à travers les conditions de perte de la citoyenneté communautaire.

B) Une exclusion à travers les cas de retrait de la citoyenneté communautaire

L'exclusion des catégories citées ci-dessus se reflète à travers les cas de retrait de la citoyenneté communautaire, cas qui font l'objet d'une énumération par le législateur CEDEAO à travers les dispositions de l'article 2 du Protocole portant Code de citoyenneté communautaire. A ce titre, il convient de distinguer les cas communs de retrait de la citoyenneté, des cas spécifiques au ''naturalisé-citoyen communautaire''.

Ce dernier peut se voir déchu du bénéfice de ladite citoyenneté en cas d'implication dans des « activités incompatibles avec le statut de citoyen communautaire ou

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[14] Contrairement aux autres cas où la renonciation doit être faite après la majorité du concerné

préjudiciables aux intérêts fondamentaux d'un ou plusieurs Etats membres »[15]. Il encourt la même sanction en cas de condamnation pour crime dans un Etat membre.

Ces dispositions nous paraissent critiquables dans la mesure où elles instaurent une discrimination entre les individus ayant acquis la citoyenneté communautaire par filiation et ceux l'ayant acquise par naturalisation : les mêmes actes commis par des citoyens communautaires ''de souche'', car c'est le terme qu'inspire une telle discrimination, quand bien même ils seraient incompatibles avec le statut de citoyen communautaire et quand bien même ils seraient constitutifs de crime, ne sauraient pour autant exposer leur auteur à la sanction à laquelle s'expose le naturalisé. La discrimination persistera de ce fait indéfiniment et ferait planer une épée de Damoclès sur le chef du naturalisé, ce qui nous paraît fortement injustifié : soit l'on condamne la gravité de ces actes soit il est question de condamner plutôt une catégorie de citoyens communautaires, ce qui est inadmissible à notre avis. En outre, la notion *« d'intérêts fondamentaux d'un ou plusieurs Etats membres »* est sujette à caution.

S'agissant des cas communs de perte de la citoyenneté communautaire, ils peuvent être classifiés en deux sous catégories : ceux entraînant l'annulation de la citoyenneté communautaire et ceux entraînant son retrait. La différence se trouve au niveau des causes et des effets qui s'y attachent **:**

L'annulation, sanctionne l'absence de toute condition d'acquisition de la citoyenneté communautaire ou de toute qualité exigée à cet effet, et ce dès la date d'octroi de ce statut. De fait, entrent dans cette sous catégorie les cas où l'individu ne satisferait pas aux conditions d'acquisition de cette citoyenneté ou l'aurait acquise par mensonge ou fraude[16] . Cette sanction a un effet rétroactif.

Quant au retrait de la citoyenneté communautaire, il est engendré par des évènements survenant postérieurement à l'acquisition de la citoyenneté communautaire et est à ce titre relativement moins grave que l'annulation en ce sens qu'il est le fait d'évènements ne reflétant pas la mauvaise foi de son auteur et ayant une conséquence plus

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[15] Article 2-2, point a
[16] Article 2-3, points a et b

limitée dans le temps (non rétroactivité) même s'il est vrai que la sanction est quand même la perte de la citoyenneté communautaire.

Les cas entrant dans cette sous catégorie sont pour certains constitutifs, à notre sens, d'exclusion de personnes ayant un lien avec tout Etat tiers à la Communauté, que ce lien soit un lien avec le territoire dudit Etat ou un lien juridique, à travers la nationalité.

L'article 2, énonce en son premier alinéa les cas de perte de la citoyenneté communautaire. Celle-ci peut être retirée :

- Sur demande du concerné
- Suite à la perte de la nationalité d'origine
- Suite à l'acquisition « volontaire » ou « de facto » de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers à la Communauté
- Du fait de la résidence permanente dans un Etat tiers à la Communauté

Les deux derniers cas reflètent l'exclusion décrite dans notre premier point. De fait, l'acquisition de la nationalité d'un Etat non membre de la CEDEAO, par le biais d'une naturalisation (« acquisition volontaire ») ou par le biais de la filiation biologique ou adoptive (« acquisition de facto ») ou même par lien matrimonial (si le droit national permet une telle transmission de la nationalité), fait courir au concerné le risque de se voir retirer la citoyenneté CEDEAO et partant, les différents avantages procurés à savoir la liberté de circulation avec tous les droits qu'elle comporte[17].

Autre cas de perte de la citoyenneté, la résidence permanente dans un Etat tiers à la Communauté pourrait sembler anodine et de fait, elle est pratiquée par de nombreux individus et est encouragée par l'ouverture (bien que relative) des frontières, la mondialisation et le développement des moyens de transport : la mobilité caractérise le monde d'aujourd'hui et de ce fait, nombreux sont ceux qui décident de s'établir en dehors de leur pays, de leur sous région et de leur continent. Le législateur CEDEAO sanctionne cette attitude, ainsi qu'il ressort des dispositions de l'article 2-1 point a du Protocole visé. Le bénéfice des droits engendrés par la citoyenneté communautaire peut paraître inopportun en cas de résidence permanente du concerné à l'extérieur de la Communauté, ce qui ne lui donne pas l'occasion d'exercer ces droits(,) qui, il faut le dire, n'ont pleinement leur sens que dans le contexte communautaire, c'est-à-dire sur le territoire des Etats

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[17] Cette question sera étudiée dans le point suivant

formant la Communauté. Ce postulat doit être écarté dans la mesure où, bien que résidant à l'extérieur de la Communauté, l'individu peut se rendre occasionnellement sur le territoire communautaire afin d'y mener certaines activités. Il ne pourra donc prétendre au bénéfice de la citoyenneté communautaire et des droits y rattachés, quand bien même il serait ressortissant d'un Etat membre de la Communauté. Et, si d'aventure il rétablissait sa résidence permanente dans le territoire communautaire, une « réintégration » dans la citoyenneté s'impose à lui, avec tout ce que cela implique en termes de lourdeur procédurale[18] et de preuve de sa nouvelle situation.

Dans le cas de l'acquisition volontaire ou de facto de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers à la Communauté, une réintégration ne pourra être envisagée qu'une fois que l'individu concerné aura formellement renoncé à la nationalité de l'Etat tiers et opté en faveur de la nationalité de l'Etat membre. L'acte constatant cette renonciation servira de preuve lors de l'enquête.

Ce caractère exclusif de la citoyenneté CEDEAO qui ne tolère pas l'association de tout élément d'extranéité n'est pas sans avoir un impact négatif sur la libre circulation des personnes.

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[18] L'article 3 énonce que la réintégration dans la citoyenneté communautaire est faite après enquête

II) L'impact négatif de la notion de citoyenneté communautaire sur le bénéfice de la libre circulation des personnes

La liberté de circulation des personnes n'est, comme nous l'avons vu, accordée par le législateur CEDEAO qu'aux citoyens de la Communauté. Il en découle que la citoyenneté a un impact sur le bénéfice de cette liberté, car étant la condition même de son existence. Or, en ce qui concerne le droit CEDEAO, le caractère exclusif de ladite citoyenneté a un impact négatif sur cette liberté. Cet impact est perceptible à travers la fragilité du lien qui existe entre le citoyen et sa Communauté (A), mais aussi à travers le caractère restreint du champ personnel de la liberté de circulation (B).

A) La fragilité du lien avec la Communauté : la perpétuelle remise en cause du bénéfice de la libre circulation

Le lien créé entre l'individu et la Communauté, et qui est concrétisé par la citoyenneté communautaire est, il faut le regretter, un lien fragile. En effet, les conditions d'acquisition et de perte de la citoyenneté communautaire montrent, s'il en est, que le statut de citoyen communautaire peut à tout moment être dénié à l'individu, que ce soit du fait d'un évènement volontaire ou involontaire lui conférant la nationalité d'un Etat tiers à l'espace d'intégration. Ainsi, un citoyen qui, par des liens de mariage viendrait à jouir de la nationalité de son conjoint s'exposerait éventuellement à perdre le bénéfice de la citoyenneté communautaire et partant, des avantages qu'elle lui confère dont la liberté de circulation. Concrètement, l'individu ne jouirait plus de la liberté de déplacement lui permettant de sortir et d'entrer dans n'importe quel pays de l'espace communautaire sans être notamment astreint à une formalité de visa, non plus du droit de s'installer dans tout Etat membre et bénéficier d'une égalité de traitement par rapport aux nationaux, aussi bien dans le cadre d'une activité professionnelle que dans le cadre d'activités extra professionnelles.

Ce serait également le cas de l'individu qui viendrait à établir sa résidence permanente en dehors de la Communauté, que ce soit dans un autre Etat africain ou tout

autre Etat dans le monde. Ainsi, si dans le cadre d'une opportunité professionnelle par exemple, un enseignant citoyen de la CEDEAO décidait de s'établir dans un Etat tiers à la CEDEAO, il perdrait de plein droit les avantages conférés par la liberté de circulation, avantages qui sont tributaires de son statut de citoyen. De fait, même si dans un cadre professionnel ou personnel il décidait de revenir momentanément sur le sol communautaire (par exemple pour y effectuer quelques heures d'enseignements), il ne pourrait prétendre à ce que lui soient appliquées les dispositions relatives à la libre circulation, la résidence permanente dans un Etat tiers à la Communauté lui ayant fait perdre ce bénéfice en même temps que sa citoyenneté communautaire. Pour en bénéficier à nouveau, une réintégration doit être sollicitée, ce qui passe par une enquête préalable.

L'on est de ce fait en présence d'une relation fragile qui s'instaure entre le citoyen (qui a un statut en ''suspens'' en quelque sorte) et sa Communauté, le lien les unissant pouvant à tout moment être rompu ce qui place l'individu dans une situation de précarité quant au bénéfice de la libre circulation et des droits qu'elle engendre. Le citoyen CEDEAO est donc, au regard du protocole, celui-là qui se ''renferme'' dans sa Communauté et qui évite tout contact durable et permanent avec l'extérieur, à travers la résidence ou la nationalité. Cette exclusion de liens d'extranéité n'est pas sans impact négatif sur l'intégration voulue et défendue par l'Union Africaine dans un cadre plus global.

L'existence de telles dispositions dans le contexte ouest africain pourrait traduire une crainte du législateur de voir le territoire communautaire s'appauvrir davantage à cause d'une ''fuite des cerveaux''. Par ailleurs, certains auteurs ont relevé une suspicion à l'égard de la multi-allégeance, suspicion nourrie par la crainte que le citoyen communautaire ne défende plutôt les intérêts de l'Etat tiers plutôt que celui de la Communauté[19]. Néanmoins, cette crainte n'a pas lieu d'être au sein de la CEDEAO, les droits politiques n'y étant pas consacrés actuellement. De plus, la tendance actuelle est plutôt à l'ouverture des Etats et certains pays qui interdisaient jadis la double nationalité, la tolèrent[20].

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[19] Elvire Fabry, Qui a peur de la citoyenneté européenne ?, Paris : PUF, 2005, p.208-209, s'agissant de l'Allemagne. La Convention de La Haye de 1930 ainsi que la Convention du Conseil de l'Europe de 1963 traduisent cette suspicion.
[20] Elvire Fabry op.cit., p. 210

Autre effet induit, la restriction du champ personnel de la liberté de circulation traduit tout autant l'impact négatif de la notion de citoyenneté CEDEAO sur le bénéfice de la libre circulation.

B) La restriction du champ des bénéficiaires de la libre circulation

L'un des premiers effets du caractère exclusif de la citoyenneté CEDEAO est la restriction du champ des bénéficiaires de la libre circulation. En effet, en excluant les ressortissants d'Etats tiers, le législateur communautaire met à l'écart de la Communauté des individus ayant pourtant un lien avec celle-ci, soit à travers le sol communautaire, soit à travers le citoyen communautaire.

Les membres de la famille du citoyen communautaire sont écartés du bénéfice de la libre circulation dès lors qu'ils ont une nationalité tierce, et ce, même s'ils jouissent parallèlement de la nationalité d'un Etat membre de la CEDEAO à travers leur lien matrimonial et de filiation. De fait, ils ne pourraient prétendre à une égalité de traitement avec les nationaux dans le cadre des études[21], d'activités professionnelles et non professionnelles.

Ainsi, malgré la reconnaissance au citoyen communautaire des mêmes droits et libertés que les nationaux de l'Etat membre d'accueil[22] (à l'exception des droits politiques), le fait de ne pouvoir jouir de conditions de vie normales, faute d'une prise en compte de tous les membres d'une même famille par le droit communautaire, limite les effets recherchés. Pour prétendre au bénéfice des droits conférés par la liberté de circulation, ceux-ci devraient expressément renoncer à toute nationalité tierce à la Communauté.

Les membres de la famille du citoyen communautaire ne sont pas seuls à être mis à l'écart par les dispositions CEDEAO : les personnes ayant un lien avec le sol communautaire le sont tout autant. En effet, du fait qu'ils jouissent de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers, les

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[21] Même s'il est vrai que la législation communautaire dans ce domaine, et dans bien d'autres, laisse beaucoup à désirer

[22] Dans le cas où il serait installé dans un autre Etat que son Etat d'origine

personnes établies pendant une longue durée sur le territoire communautaire ne sont pas pour autant prises en compte par le législateur CEDEAO. De fait, un individu ayant résidé pendant 15 ans, par exemple, sur le territoire d'un Etat membre de la CEDEAO n'en bénéficierait pas pour autant des droits liés à la libre circulation des personnes, et ce même s'il y exerce une activité professionnelle.

Il conviendrait néanmoins de relativiser ces impacts négatifs de la notion de citoyenneté CEDEAO car en pratique, les dispositions en la matière sont difficilement applicables. Il n'est en effet pas aisé pour la Communauté de déterminer si un individu jouit d'une nationalité tierce du fait notamment d'un manque d'échange entre administrations nationales et entre elles et la Communauté ; en outre, le concerné ne se prévaut en pratique que de la nationalité d'un Etat membre lorsqu'il se trouve sur le territoire de la Communauté. Parallèlement, celle-ci ne peut en pratique être au fait d'une quelconque résidence permanente du concerné dans un Etat tiers.

Aussi, faudrait-il reconnaître que pour une fois l'absence de toute prise des textes sur la réalité est salutaire !

Cependant, il n'en demeure pas moins que du fait de leur simple présence, ces textes ''dérangent'', car comme le disait le Professeur Jean Carbonnier « la loi inappliquée n'en reste pas moins la loi »[23] ; c'est donc cette loi qu'il faudrait réformer.

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[23] Jean Carbonnier, Flexible droit : pour une sociologie du droit sans rigueur, Paris : LGDJ, 8e édition, 1995, p. 123

En définitive, la notion de citoyenneté communautaire CEDEAO de par son caractère exclusif a un impact négatif sur la libre circulation des personnes dont elle restreint les bénéficiaires, mais aussi à travers la possibilité de remise en cause perpétuelle des droits qu'elle garantit.

Cet état des choses appelle une évolution de la notion. En effet, si le contexte de l'époque permettait une telle suspicion à l'égard de la double nationalité, ce contexte n'est plus d'actualité dans un monde globalisé. En outre, l'Union Africaine vise une unification à terme, les Communautés Economiques Régionales étant appelées à disparaître au profit de la seule Union Africaine.

C'est ainsi qu'en droit de l'Union européenne par exemple, la citoyenneté communautaire est uniquement tributaire de la nationalité d'un Etat membre et ne comporte pas de limitation relative à la jouissance de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers ou la résidence habituelle dans cet Etat.

Il devient donc nécessaire d'instaurer une notion de citoyenneté CEDEAO qui inclut les catégories mises à l'écart par les textes communautaires. Cela passe dans un premier temps par l'institution de la nationalité d'un Etat membre comme condition nécessaire et suffisante à l'obtention de la citoyenneté communautaire. Cela aurait le mérite de mettre fin à la précarité du lien entre le citoyen et la Communauté tout en lui permettant de ''s'ouvrir au monde'' sans craindre d'être exclut du bénéfice des droits attachés à la citoyenneté (notamment la libre circulation des personnes) ; cela permettrait également d'intégrer dans certains cas les membres de la famille du citoyen communautaire non à titre principal il est vrai, mais du fait de la jouissance de la nationalité d'un Etat membre[24].

Cela encouragerait également les ressortissants d'Etats tiers installés de longue date sur le territoire communautaire à acquérir la citoyenneté de la Communauté sans craindre de perdre leur nationalité d'origine.

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[24] Nationalité qui pourrait être aisément transmise par le lien matrimonial ou la filiation

L'on pourrait même se demander s'il ne serait pas opportun de déconnecter à terme citoyenneté et libre circulation des personnes[25].

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[25] Sur les pistes quant à l'établissement d'un autre critère, voir la thèse de Myriam Benlolo Carabot, Les fondements juridiques de la citoyenneté européenne, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2006, p. 129 à 133, l'article de Dominique Nazet Allouche : « Quelle citoyenneté pour les ressortissants des pays tiers dans l'Union européenne ? », in Nationalité et citoyenneté : perspectives de droit comparé, droit européen et droit international, ss.dir. M-P. Lanfranchi, O. Lecucq, D. Nazet Allouche, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2012, pp. 196 à 201 et Marie José Garot, La citoyenneté de l'Union européenne, Paris : L'Harmattan, 1999, pp.267 à 340

THESIS TITLE: RELATIONS BETWEEN TANZANIA AND MALAWI: A STUDY OF BORDER DISPUTES

BY

James Zotto

University of Dar es Salaam

Zottojames@gmail.com

Abstract

Many contiguous African countries have experienced interstate conflicts over their shared international borders. Such conflicts suggest various historical processes which have shaped them over time. One example of the African countries which are still experiencing border disputes is Tanzania and Malawi. The two countries are at logger heads over the Lake Nyasa frontier. Basically, Tanzania-Malawi border dispute arises because of the conflicting interpretation of the Anglo-German (Heligoland) Treaty of 1890. This Treaty acts as a formal agreement between German and British colonial powers on the partition of the Lake Nyasa, which in legal terms can be viewed to exclude German East Africa (and today independent Tanzania) the rights of the Lake Nyasa waters. However, cartographic evidence leaves inaptness in terms of boundary delineation after the agreement was passed. Some maps indicate the shoreline boundary while others show the middle/water line boundary. The matter is heightened following German renunciation after WWI. After this event, former German East Africa (which later on was renamed Tanganyika by British administration) was placed under the Mandate of Great Britain from 1922 to 1961 when the former achieved her independence. During the period of Mandate, evidence of boundary delineation does not unequivocally point to one direction. Such inconsistencies laid the foundation of border claims after the countries attained their independence. Whereas Tanzania claims the boundary is on the middle of the Lake Nyasa, Malawi claims that the boundary is on the Eastern shores of the Lake Nyasa (Tanzania).The Tanzania-Malawi border dispute submits the dynamics of cross-border relations in terms of changes and continuities over time shaped by the various historical forces at work. However, there has been no permanent solution reached to resolve the Tanzania-Malawi border dispute, which is a puzzle that this study partly seeks to address. This paper is part of chapter I of my Ph.D. thesis, and it is therefore titled 'Chapter One'. It addresses issues such as problem statement, objectives, questions, significance, literature review, and methodology. Other chapters of my thesis include: Chapter Two: The Making of African Frontiers: A Reference to the Lake Nyasa Corridor; Chapter Three: States Administration on the Lake Nyasa Corridor; Chapter Four: Causes of Border Disputes between Tanzania and Malawi; Chapter Five: Border

Dispute Negotiations between Tanzania and Malawi; Chapter Six: The Dynamics of Relations between Tanzania and Malawi; and Chapter Seven: Conclusion.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Problem

Various studies indicate that many interstate dyads have occurred between contiguous states, and that these dyads are inextricably linked with international border disputes. The most critical shatterbelts of border disputes are Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia (O'Loughlin, 1986). In Africa, the colonial political geography, which has survived the transition from colonies to independent states, derives from the Berlin Conference of 15 November, 1884 to 26 February, 1885. The objectives of the conference were: to issue guidelines on procedural rules for colonial expansion and laying claim to new territory; to resolve any existing territorial disputes between European powers; and to advance the material and strategic interests of the European countries under any negotiated settlement (Leon, 1886; Griffiths, 1986). In principle, the objectives of the conference were intended for laying down the principles to guide European powers in the partition of the African continent. The boundaries were drawn to define the various European spheres of influence through treaties. And, by 1914, the partition had been completed and most of the African frontiers had been laid out to define various jurisdictions of what Robinson and Gallagher (1963) call Victorians of Africa.

The disintegration of colonialism in Africa, which began in the 1950s, did not affect the borders drawn by the colonialists. Most of these borders have caused a number of interstate disputes, which are viewed by scholars from two differing perspectives. Colonial scholars hold that African borders were legitimate, and that border disputes are caused by Africans themselves (Touval, 1966; 1969; Zartman, 1987). In contrast, nationalist scholars argue that the colonialists did not pay any regard to local circumstances while drawing these borders. Such disregard has led to border disputes (Ajala, 1983; Griffiths, 1986; Amadife and Warhola, 1993). Though these views are different, they both suggest that border disputes in Africa cannot be understood without recourse to the historical process of drawing colonial borders.

In Africa, early border disputes were manifested in movements such as Somali, Moroccan and Togolese irredentism, Biafran nationalism, Katangan separatism, and Eritrean secessionism. Some of the early interstate border disputes were between Tunisia and Algeria (1961), Morocco and Algeria (1963), Mali and Mauritania (1963), Dahomey and Niger (1963), Kenya and Ethiopia (1963), just to mention a few (Touval, 1966; Walters, 1969; Zartman 1987). During the 1960s, such tensions divided African heads of state into two camps. One camp advocated the revision of the boundaries while the other camp supported inheritance of the colonial boundaries. The debate was held under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU set up a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to mediate in disputes between its member states by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework (Wallerstein, 1967). Article III of the 1964 OAU Charter adopted the Westphalia principle of "the sovereign equality of all member states" and "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable rights to independent existence" (Touval, 1966; Ajala, 1983). This principle is called uti-possidetis, ita possideatis (Burghardt, 1973; Newman, 2005). However, the principle is claimed to have served to preserve the existing state of affairs, whether its origin was lawful or not (Allot, 1969). Consequently, it smothered, rather than settle disputes and, as a result, a

number of African countries have experienced interstate border disputes (Zartman, 1987; Newman, 2005). Among such countries are Tanzania and Malawi, which are in conflict over the Lake Nyasa frontier (Mandel, 1980; Mihanjo, 1999; Zotto, 2007; Mwinyi, 2011).

For decades, Tanzania and Malawi have experienced disputes over their shared international border. Among other things, such disputes have been characterised by a controversy involving the naming of the lake that serves as the border between Malawi and Tanzania. Whereas Tanzania has maintained the name Lake Nyasa, Malawi has renamed the lake as Lake Malawi. The dispute pertinent to the naming of the lake is historical and an understanding of its evolution is crucial. The Lake area was partitioned by tripartite colonial powers, notably Britain, Germany and Portugal. The partition of German East Africa (Tanganyika) and British Nyasaland (Malawi) was reached in the Agreement contained in Article I of 1st July, 1890 and confirmed on 23rd February, 1901. The Agreement indicates that the frontier between the two colonies passes along the shore of Lake Nyasa from the confluence of the Ruvuma River to the bank of the mouth of the Songwe River (Hertslet, 1896; Ian, 1979; Zotto, 2007).

The relations between Tanganyika and Nyasaland were disrupted by colonial policies, and were strained during the First World War. Such relations were manifested in a naval clash that occurred along the lake shore and the closure of missionary activities between 1914 and 1917 (Mihanjo, 1999). After the First World War ended, Germany lost its East African colonies, and Tanganyika became a mandated territory under the League of Nations in 1922. From this year to the time of independence of Tanganyika, both Tanganyika and Nyasaland were under the British administration. During this time, the two colonies were at loggerheads over boundary inconsistencies. One piece of evidence shows middle or waterline boundary; other evidence shows shoreline boundary; yet other evidence is hazy; and there is evidence showing no boundary description on either side of the Lake (Mayall, 1973; Ian, 1979). Despite these uncertainties, the period experienced stable cross-border relations between Nyasaland and Tanganyika (Mihanjo, 1999).

After Tanganyika got its independence from the British administration in 1961, she sought a review of the border in question through negotiations with the British colony of Nyasaland. However, the latter repudiated negotiations. Subsequently, Tanzania declared the median line boundary, and her official maps have indicated this boundary since 1965. In contrast, when Malawi became independent in 1964, she recognised the Eastern shoreline boundary, and in 1967 she passed a legislation renaming Lake Nyasa as Lake Malawi (Mayall, 1973). By this time, negotiations through parliaments and foreign ministries had in vain been attempted. As a consequence, a violent border discord occurred between May 1967 and September 1968 (Mayall, 1973; Ian, 1979; Zotto, 2007). Indeed, between the 1960s and 1975, cross-border conflicts were commonplace in the area (Mayall, 1973; Mihanjo, 1999). However, since 1975 relations between Malawi and Tanzania have been cordial, and the border row is dormant (Mihanjo, 1999). Despite this 'reign' of peace time, no permanent solution has been reached on the border dispute (Mwinyi, 2011). This shows that the conflict over the border is still a practical reality. Therefore, the proposed study sought to determine issues pertinent to border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi specifically causes of the disputes, the reasons why negotiations over the border have not been successful and the changing relations resulting from border creation and disputes.

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1.2   Statement of the Research Problem

It is an incontrovertible fact that some adjoining countries in Africa have experienced interstate border disputes, and that the case of Tanzania and Malawi is typical. However, previous researches on border disputes have not adequately addressed three critical issues. First, most of the studies have taken into little account the historical processes that have influenced interstate border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. Second, while scholars have indicated that interstate border dispute negotiations have not been successful in most African countries, they have not adequately explored the reasons as to why such negotiations have not been successful between Tanzania and Malawi. Third, whereas some of the extant literature has attempted historical analysis of border conflicts, little attention has been given to the analysis of such conflicts in relation to often changing cross-border relations. Therefore, this study sought to explore issues that are pertinent to border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi, specifically the causes of the disputes, the reasons as to why negotiations over the disputed border have not been successful, and the dynamics of cross-border relations.

1.3   Objectives of the Study
1.3.1   General Objective

This study sought a deeper understanding of the causes, negotiations and the dynamics of relations related to border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. It employed a historical perspective to study how these disputes and the changing relations have evolved over time and how they have shaped the history of conflicts, negotiations and relations between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1880s to 2000.

1.3.2   Specific Objectives

 The study specifically intended to:
1.   Find out the causes of border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1880s to 2000.
2.   Examine why negotiations to resolve border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1960s to 2000 have not been successful.
3.   Analyse the changing cross-border relations and how they have influenced disputes and negotiations between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1880s to 2000.

1.4 Research Questions

This study was guided by the following questions:
1. What are the causes of border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1800s to 2000?
2. Why negotiations to resolve border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1960s to 2000 have not been successful?
3. What have been the changing cross-border relations between Tanzania and Malawi and how have such relations influenced the disputes and negotiations between Tanzania and Malawi from the 1800s to 2000?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study contributes to the existing knowledge in the following ways. First, it will address the Tanzania-Malawi border dispute, thus supplementing existing studies by exploring local and global border disputes, hence bringing a comparative advantage for other studies. The study

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shows how historical processes at work have shaped the dynamics of border disputes, relations and negotiations over time. Moreover, the study sheds light on how regime change during the colonial period has complicated boundary matters. In addition, it addresses the downsides of border dispute negotiations and their implications in influencing disputes and cross-border relations. Apart from that, the study shows the role played by border creation and disputes in shaping the dynamics of cross-border relations and how these relations affect humanity across the border. By engaging into discussion the perceptions of state actors, elites and local people, the study opens up areas of new knowledge by extending current literature into new dialogue, conceptions, perspectives, theories and methods gearing towards a comprehensive understanding of border disputes.

1.6   Literature Review
1.6.1 Historiography of African Borders
Two schools of thought exist on the historiography of African borders. The nationalist position holds to irrationality, while the colonial position maintains the rationality of the borders. The former's position is based on the assertion that African leaders were either cajoled or forced to enter into what have been termed 'fictitious' imperial treaties. Therefore, the validity of resulting borders is questionable, as the borders are considered illogical, irrational and pseudo-borders (Ajala, 1983; Museveni, 2009; Soyinka, 2010). From this view, the nationalists argue that the pattern of partition considered European interests at the expense of local interests. There are two reasons why this happened the way it did. The first reason is to do with rivalries among European powers and the second one is to do with the limited information on ethnic affinity, linguistic facts or others which the powers had at the time of partitioning the continent. The result was arbitrary partition of the continent, which later on caused border disputes (Ajala, 1983; Amadife and Warhola, 1993). Colonial scholars dispute the artificiality notion of African borders and argue that all frontiers are artificial because they are humanly contrived divisions. As such, they see no reason why African borders such as the borders between Nigeria and Niger or Ghana and Ivory Coast should be regarded as more artificial than the borders between Hungary and Yugoslavia, Switzerland and France or the border between the United States and Canada (Touval, 1969; 1985). Also, they maintain that African borders were defined by colonial treaties with greater precision through involvement of local rulers. It is on this basis that colonial scholars hold that at independence, Africans accorded legitimacy to frontiers in an orderly and peaceful manner, each state succeeding to a distinct colonial entity. To them, border disputes in Africa are the result of pre-colonial history. For instance, Somali irredentism happened because movements of the Somalis westward in search of pasture brought them into conflict with their neighbours before the scramble for Africa among the European powers began (Touval, 1966; 1969). Therefore, Zartman (1987) concludes that border disputes have not been caused by the world super powers.

It is evident that after independence, African countries inherited colonial borders, and the majority of member states of the OAU supported the uti possidetis principle. Such countries based their support on the myth of "we-are-all-brothers". The countries aimed to avoid, among other things, what they perceived as chaos, balkanisation and recolonisation of the continent

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(Ajala, 1983). On the contrary, those who opposed the principle argued that inheritance of borders served only the interests of the new leaders who sought to maintain their power. As such, they proposed boundary re-adjustment hoping that this re-adjustment could end conflicts

and bring unity (Amadife and Warhola, 1993). Although the inheritance principle was successfully adopted in Asia, Latin America and Africa, and despite Davidson's (1993) credence to see it as a profound initiative in Africa, Sumner (2004) concludes that it merely delayed the surfacing of border disputes. In relation to Africa, Sumner's line of reasoning is water-tight, since the inheritance principle has led to more disputes than success in resolutions. In this, Touval (1966) identifies three categories of border disputes experienced in Africa, notably armed conflicts that are active such as the conflicts between Morocco and her neighbours, disputes which have been discontinued such as disputes between Tunisia and Algerian Sahara, Mali and Mauritania, Egypt and Sudan, Tanzania and Malawi, and Ghana and Togo, and territorial problems which did not develop into disputes like the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Border studies have established that international borders and disputes have resulted in the changing of cross-border relations. This is what Simmons (2005) has called "mixed-motive games", that is, elements of mutual dependence and conflict, and of partnership and competition. In my view, conflicts and competition have led to changes in relations, which some anthropologists have called 'discontinuities' (Ferrer-Gallardo,1999), while dependence and partnership have led to continuities of relations. Agnew (2008) has posited that borders have an equivocal character, which is an evolving construction that has practical merits and limitations. Ajala (1983) argues that changes have been brought about by 'a wall of separation', which limits freedom of movement and opportunities on either side of the frontier. Such changes have been a result of exclusionary border policies, which function to restrict cross-border relations. For example, Ackleson's (1999) study on the US-Mexican border reveals that the "Operation Hold the Line" policy established by America as a blockade, cut off the informal crossings of residents of Juarez who could not afford official papers to work or visit friends and families in El Paso. However, Simmons (2005) maintains that a well-accepted boundary arrangement provides mutual benefits that either state may not obtain through unilateral policies, leading to continuities of relations.

1.6.2 Border Studies on the Lake Nyasa Corridor

The Lake Nyasa corridor experienced the struggles of Germany, Britain and Portugal during the process of partitioning the African continent. Two bilateral treaties to resolve the controversy were signed. First, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 defined the sphere of influence in Lake Nyasa beginning from the Northern Limit of the Province of Mozambique, which is the source of the Ruvuma River, passing by the shores of the lake to the mouth of the Songwe River. Second, in the Germano-Portuguese Agreement which came into effect in 1894, the two powers agreed on the boundary extending from the confluence of the Ruvuma River with the Msinge River, westward to the bank of Lake Nyasa. Though the boundary between German East Africa and Portuguese East Africa was slightly adjusted by a joint Germano-Portuguese Boundary Commission in 1907, by shifting the border southward to Chiwindi, that is, 0.5 kilometres south of the initial point, the border between German East Africa and British Nyasaland remained intact (Mihanjo, 1999; Zotto, 2007). Two bases of border disputes between

Tanzania and Malawi have been identified. First, prior to the renunciation of German sovereignty and the establishment of the mandated territory of Tanganyika in 1922, German sovereignty had covered the median line of Lake Nyasa (Ian, 1979). However, it has not been

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established whether German authority existed in water bodies as one of the resolutions of the Berlin Conference or some agreements between German and British colonial officials which allowed free navigation of water bodies by the two powers. Second are frequent boundary changes during the British administration. Zotto (2007) shows that Article I of the British Mandate defined only the boundary between Tanganyika and Rwanda and Burundi. However, the boundary between Tanganyika and Nyasaland remained in accordance with the 1901 Anglo-German Treaty. Astonishingly, the same mandate clarified the boundary to the League of Nations in 1925, but did not redraw it. The clarification made indicates that the boundary runs along the central line of Lake Nyasa. This clarification was compounded by the contradictions contained in the maps and reports showing the shoreline boundary and the waterline boundary, some maps and reports obscured the lake boundary and others contained a vague description. Although Mayall (1973) and Ian (1979) regard the 1890 Agreement to have exhausted the matter of law and fact, and although Mayall regard Tanzania as the source of border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi, both have overlooked the same matter of law and fact. For instance, they have not pointed out why there was cartographic inaptness with respect to law and fact during the British mandate.

Tanzania and Malawi inherited an imprecise map of their shared border. Efforts of border revision negotiations were initiated by Tanzania to secure an equitable border with British Nyasaland state on the ground that: 600,000 people along the shore in Tanganyika depended on the lake for domestic purposes; the environmental and economic implications of the 1965 floods; and the dependence of permission from Nyasaland for any modernisation project along the lake. However, the British authority rejected this proposal. Malawi got independence in 1964, and in 1966 bilateral talks were held to resolve the misunderstandings. While negotiations were in progress, in 1967 the two countries revived their claims which ended in a border dispute (Mayall, 1973; Ian, 1979). Since then the dispute has not been formally resolved. This suggests that negotiations have not been successful. There exist, however, touchy propositions on this dispute. Mayall (1973) presents contrasting attitudes and policies towards the white minority regime in South Africa, President Banda's suspicion of subversion of his regime, delimitation of the boundary and President Banda's irredentism. Mihanjo (1999) presents a definition of the boundary which seems to exclude Tanzania from the control of the lake, and which shows the antagonism between Banda and Nyerere. Zotto (2007) presents the ambiguity in the definition of the lake, and the cultural inconsideration of the treaties along the tripartite division. However, much attention has been paid to strategic, political and economic aspects, and only exiguous attention has been given to historical, legal and other issues.

On the changing cross-border relations, Mayall (1973) and Mihanjo (1999) contend that during the First World War relations were bad and were characterised by naval actions and the closure of missionary activities since Lake Nyasa was a battlefield. But, from 1917 to independence, relations between the two colonies improved. It is said, however, that relations were again thorny between 1967 and 1975, as evidenced by military confrontations between Tanzania and Malawi, and the suspension of the steamer services which plied between Monkey Bay in

Malawi and ports in Tanzania. But since 1975 relations between the two countries with regard to the border dispute have improved. From the literature reviewed above, some issues have emerged. First, economic, political and strategic causes of the disputes have featured prominently in the border discourse. Second, the changing relations have been highlighted.

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Third, negotiations have been addressed. While I acknowledge that scholars have discussed these issues long-windedly in an effort to understand border disputes, I am of the view that they have looked historical processes which have influenced border disputes in a sweeping way. Second, the changing relations have been slackly illustrated. Third, border dispute negotiations have not been passably addressed to establish why they have not been successful. This study, thus, seeks to fill in these voids.

1.6.3 Theoretical Framework

This study is multifaceted and is built on the following theories: the political realist, the institutional statist and the normative. The political realist theory became dominant after the Second World War. Its main foundation is the principle of dominance. As such, it holds that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on national interests defined in terms of power. By power, it refers to the ability to get another actor to do what it would otherwise have done (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2009). Thus, the theory maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. Realists interpret international politics as a never-ending struggle for power and security among states, and regard border disputes as a constant, endemic and unavoidable facet of the struggle (Kocs, 1995; Simmons, 2005). So, borders must be defended and fought for because they are perceived as territorial divisions – the object of zero-sum state competition for power, prestige, lebensraum and security or an imagined historical identity. Therefore, borders and geographical expansion are reflections of and increase state power (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985). The theory is significant as it exposes the role of political, economic and strategic motives in bracing border disputes. However, the theory has downplayed forces which have reduced border disputes and other factors that have sparked border disputes, such as historical and legal claims. For example, the forces of modernisation have reduced border disputes in the Middle East, usually perceived as a hotbed of border disputes from 33% before the Second World War to 16% after the war. Yet, mutual treaties account for 80%. A similar case has been illustrated in Africa in which much of the economic interstate border contests have been successfully settled (Ajala, 1983; Simmons, 2005).

The institutional-statist theory is built on the proposition of what Blanchard (2005) calls a "volatile mix" between the functional values of the boundary being contested and the characteristics of the states involved in the dispute. This theory holds that the intrinsic salience of a given border depends *a priori* upon its seven functions: military-strategic, economic, constitutive, national identity, ethno-national unity, state building and preservation. Thus, the greater the number of functions a border performs, the greater the incentives it generates to policy makers to initiate border quarrels, to escalate existing controversies, or to reject boundary compromises. Also, he states that a country with low stateness can generate special needs which can make it highly desirable for policymakers to exploit the functions that boundaries can serve, since they have limited strategies that they can employ to achieve higher levels of stateness. As a result, domestic deficiencies, internal resource mobilisation obstacles and the inability to concentrate resources and attention on the resolution of specific problems mean that such countries must rely extensively on external assets to surmount their internal and external

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problems. One such important external asset is a border which helps to satiate a country's needs. Blanchard employed this theory to the analysis of the Indo-Pakistan border disputes between 1947/8 and 1965, and argues that border disputes are a result of a volatile mix characterized by rich functional value of the border, deficient disputant stateness and troubled borderlands. While

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we appreciate the sway of domestic tribulations and the salience of the border in igniting dissension, we are aware that other potent factors have been overlooked in the analysis, including historical and legal issues. For instance, the British Boundary Commission left without clearly resolving boundary issues, especially ethno-national and legal issues. This could have greater impact on upscaling border claims.

The normative theory is based on a view of history and international treaties. Its main exposition is that border disputes are motivated by the sense that a piece of territory was wrongfully seized rather than by strategic or economic values (Murphy, 1990). The theory views border disputes or accord as a function of the sturdiness of treaties. As such, international norms not only prevent disputes from arising, but also fuel them. Border claims can be reduced if norms are more precise, and provided that there is a wide consensus on following them and resolving or adjudicate claims. By contrast, the ambiguities contained in treaties are more likely to lead to border disputes, since parties may tend to have different conceptions of justice or because the meaning of the relevant norms may be differently understood in the disputed situation. Therefore, interstate border disputes have occurred in cases where international treaties seemed to have left room for such claims (Forsberg, 1996). This study makes use of the normative theory to explain border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. Some areas have illustrated its bearing. For instance, Japan pursued its claims to a few, small, sparsely inhabited islands in the northeast of Hokkaido (the northern territories) instead of the more economically and militarily valuable islands farther north; Venezuela persistently laid claims to agriculturally unproductive rain forest areas in Guyana instead of the oil-rich areas of northern Columbia. The same applies to the border disputes between India and Pakistan and China and Russia (Murphy, 1990; Forsberg, 1996). Compatibly, much evidence in the study area proposes the disputes are largely manifested in border treaties. I suggest that normative theory is focal in this study though a discussion on these treaties has been partial. However, since norms are also contested and negotiated terrains, the study will extend this theory to interrogate other factors for methodical understanding of border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi.

1.7 Research Methodology
1.7.1 Research Design
This is a qualitative study, which sought to examine the causes of border disputes, the reasons why border dispute negotiations have not been successful and the changing relations between Tanzania and Malawi. Data for this study were gathered from multiple sources, such as oral and written testimonies.

1.7.2 Area of the Study
The site of this study was on the Lake Nyasa corridor which serves as a border between Mainland Tanzania and Malawi. The border covers the area between the confluence of the Ruvuma River and the Songwe River. In other words, the border begins at the confluence of the Ruvuma River and ends at the bank of the mouth of the Songwe River. In Tanzania, the study was carried out in three districts, namely Mbinga, Ludewa and Kyela districts, while in Malawi

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it was carried out in Nkhata Bay, Rumphi and Kalonga districts. The area has been chosen because only scanty historical attention has been accorded to the border disputes that arise often in the area.

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1.7.3   Sources of Data
This study employed oral and written testimonies as both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary sources provide raw data for interpreting the events in the area, while secondary sources provide data for making generalizations and comparisons on the topic under study (Marwick, 1970). The following are the main sources of data for this study:

1.7.3.1 Written Records
These were sought from the Tanzania National Archives, Malawi National Archives, Public Records Office-London, the Parliaments of Tanzania and Malawi, and the collection of foreign correspondence in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Malawi and Tanzania. Also, dissertations/thesis, books, journals, periodicals and newspapers were accessed from the libraries of the University of Dar es Salaam, Chancellor College, and the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. Other data were accessed from the Internet. From such sources, the researcher obtained information about colonial treaties, causes of border disputes, debates, notions, negotiations, policies, relations and interactions which are important in understanding border disputes and relations. However, some of these records have been torn, scattered, misplaced and prejudicial. The researcher studied carefully the available records before drawing any conclusions related to the topic under study.

1.7.3.2 Cartographic Information
Maps from the Departments of Survey, Land and Mapping in Dar es Salaam and Lilongwe were gathered and interpreted. The interpretation of the maps ranged from the time the border was established, the period of the British regime to the post-independence period. The maps have been used to establish how changes in what Murphy (1990) calls "propaganda cartography" have led to border disputes between Tanzania and Malawi. The researcher asked the cartographers in the University of Dar es Salaam to help him with interpretation of the maps. However, cartographic interpretations have been carefully interceded to elicit evidence on multiple sources.

1.7.3.3 Unstructured Interviews
The researcher interviewed retired and active government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Land and Human Settlement Development, the Parliamentarians of the Constituencies located along the border and respondents from the study area. The information gathered includes; the causes of border disputes, negotiations, notions on the disputes and the changing relations between Tanzania and Malawi. It is expected that the researcher has through interviews explored issues of meaning with a great degree of methodological freedom of respondents' expressions, especially narratives (Shank, 2006; Berg, 2007). During the interviews, the testimonies were tape recorded and notes were taken. In all cases, the researcher sought to develop rapport with informants so as to encourage freedom and honesty in their submissions. The respondents were selected in order to obtain their views on border disputes, since they have been involved in such disputes or their life is partly shaped by the results and

experiences of the disputes. The end of interviews was determined by achievement of saturation of responses. Responses were considered to have reached this point when new and exciting information ceased to occur or became too rare to justify further interviews.

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1.7.4 Data Analysis

The data have been analysed by using the content analysis strategy. This kind of analysis involves a systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings (Berg, 2007). Therefore, the data and the literature reviewed have been sorted and categorised into various topical themes to establish an historical analysis of Tanzania-Malawi border disputes.

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